To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s
> terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to
> read them *in
Y' ..which seems to be, as noted a dyadic relation doesn't seem, to me,
to fit the triad. It's a rhema with two blanks; a dyad. Roberts p 115. So- I'm
confused about your point.
Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative tele
Gary, F, Gary R. Edwina, John S., List,
Gary F. has made a clear and interesting set of interpretative points about the
“'umbrella image' of the triad. While I agree with much of what he says, let me
insert some questions and offer some qualifications.
I probably shouldn’t intervene in this
-Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 12:57 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Ph
___
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 10:16 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic
problem with the term)
Jeff, List:
What I find interesting about that quote from "A Guess at the Rid
Edwina, Clark, Jon S, List,
Let's make a comparison for the sake of framing a question in the special
science of cosmological physics. Does Peirce's explanatory principle help to
address the kinds of questions that Ilya Prigogine is trying to answer about
the irreversibility of thermodynamica
Edwina, Clark, List,
Better, I think, to call the first explanatory principle you quote from Peirce
a hypothesis than an axiom. In addition to being a better reflection of what
Peirce is doing in introducing these grand explanatory principles into the
special sciences from his work in metaphy
Edwina, Jon S., List, All,
As I have suggested on other occasions, it will likely improve the quality of
our discussions if we make our aims clearer when we make a remark or engage in
a line of inquiry. That way, we'll have some assurance that different people
aren't working at cross purposes
s the diagrams by
processes of continuous transformation.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Tuesday, March 28, 2017 6:43 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downa
Jon A, List,
You say:
1. "one of the consequences of Triadic Relation Irreducibility (TRI)" is that
symbols "are the genus of all signs, while icons and indices are species under
that genus."
2. "Thus symbols...do not in the first instance grow from icons so much as
icons crystallize from
Hi Jon A, Val Daniel, Jon S, John S, List,
Let me ask a couple of questions about your experiences engaging with others in
collaborative inquiry using online tools including Wikipedia, blogs and the
Peirce-List. If others have suggestions based on their own experiences, please
feel free to chim
Jerry C., Jon S, List,
With respect to the 13 items on the list. None is, taken by itself, a theory of
truth. Rather, they are statements made by a commentator on passages in the
published works and manuscripts, many of which are from different contexts--and
many of which seem to have been wri
Peirce-L; Clark Goble
Cc: Benjamin Udell; Frederik Stjernfelt; Jeffrey Brian Downard; Jeffrey
Goldstein; Jon Alan Schmidt; Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich
points.
Jerry, Clark, list,
In my response to Jeff B.D., I was defending the
edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich
points.
On 3/7/2017 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> pure mathematics starts from a set of hypotheses of a particular sort,
> and it does not seem obvious to me that these games are grounded
> o
dwina Taborsky
Sent: Tuesday, March 7, 2017 8:54 AM
To: Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; John F Sowa
Cc: Benjamin Udell; Frederik Stjernfelt; Jeffrey Brian Downard; Jeffrey
Goldstein; Jon Alan Schmidt; Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity a
Hello,
The instructions indicated that we need to join the group and send the RSVP.
I've done both, but am not able to find the GoTo link on the Meetup site or in
my email. As such, I seem to be having the same problems. Let me know if you
figure out how to join the presentation.
--Jeff
Je
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8 523-8354
________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Friday, February 24, 2017 10:58 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Cyclical Systems and Continuity
Ben, Gary F, Jon S, List
The reference Ben makes to mathematical singularity theory is interesting.
Ben, Gary F, Jon S, List
The reference Ben makes to mathematical singularity theory is interesting. The
general idea of turning to work in algebraic metrical and projective
geometry--as well as algebraic topology--is the kind of approach I find
attractive when faced with a puzzling discussion
le link to p. 463: https://books.google.com/books?id=CqsLIAAJ&pg=PA463
Oxford PDF of article:
http://monist.oxfordjournals.org/content/monist/18/3/416.full.pdf
Reprinted CP 4.594-642, see 642 for the addition.
Best, Ben
On 2/22/2017 12:06 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
List,
I've b
List,
I've been trying to sort through the points Peirce is making about topology and
the mathematical conception of continuity in the last lecture of RLT. In the
attempts to trace the development of the ideas concerning the conceptions of
continua, furcations and dimensions in his later works,
Jon S, Mike, List,
Before trying to address metaphysical questions, why not start with some
semiotic questions. Let's start with two simple conceptions:
1. Quarter Horse
2. Unicorn
What sorts of answers seem to follow if we consider the different kinds of
relations that hold between objects, s
[PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and
realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's Sys
Eric, Ben, List,
Would it make any difference if, in addition to the different interpretations
of the regularities concerning the apples in the orchard, we also included
different interpretations of the principles of reasoning? As an example, why
don't we compare historical examples of nominal
Jon S, Jon A, List,
In a discussion of individuals at 3.612-3 in the Collected Papers, Peirce
points to the history of the conception as it has been used by scientists and
philosophers. He notes that the conception was worked out in the sciences of
astronomy and physics prior to Aristotle, who
nuary 29, 2017 8:35 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
Jeffrey,
I found this particular message of yours to be quite inspiring in explaining
the value of philosophical inquiry to non-philosophers. Would you have any good
examples of how these two metaphy
John C, John S, List,
Kant's lectures on logic and his remarks in the three Critiques make it clear
that he recognizes and appreciates inference to hypothesis and inference by
induction as forms of argument that are different in kind from deductive
inferences such as demonstrative reasoning.
I
8 523-8354
From: Eric Charles
Sent: Saturday, January 28, 2017 10:18 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism
Jeff,
Thank you for the thoughtful answer. (And Jon for the links.) It will take me a
bit to digest and respond. My
Hi Eric, List,
Let me address the last question you ask: what practical difference does makes
in your or my action as to which side of this debate one happens to be on?
Peirce suggests that the longstanding debates between nominalists and realists
over questions concerning the reality--or lack
John S, Jerry C, List,
In what senses might this be a fair claim?
Every version of temporal logic, dynamic logic, etc. can be mapped
to first-order logic with explicit quantifiers that range over time:
The claim might hold for some formal systems (i.e., mathematical) of deductive
logic, but doe
John S, Jon A, List,
It is quite helpful to me to see these kinds of points about how and why one
might go about setting up a system of logic one way or another to handle such
things as temporal change made more explicit. While I am familiar with
different ways in which temporal logics have bee
fessor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Monday, November 14, 2016 3:17 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity (
wb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, November 9, 2016 6:46 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: John F Sowa; Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Jeff,
Topology is the most general study of geometric space. It is critical here to
ge
John Sowa, Jon Awbrey, Edwina, List,
I wanted to see if anyone have might suggestions for thinking about the analogy
between (1) mathematical models of the differentiation of spaces starting with
a vague continuum of undifferentiated dimensions and trending towards spaces
having determinate dim
bits- of Thirdness
is, I think, a powerful force within the Peircean semiosis.
Edwina
On Sun, Nov 6, 2016 at 8:15 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
Jon S, List,
For the sake of clarity, let me point out that the interpretative hypothesis I
have been
wnard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: Saturday, November 5, 2016 10:03 PM
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Super-Order and the Logi
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, November 5, 2016 5:05 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity (was
Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce&
Gary R, Jon S, List,
The pages you and Jon are examining (RLT 261-4) are quite challenging. The
guiding aims of the lecture, he tells us on the first page, are (1) to work out
the logical difficulties involved in the conception of continuity, and then (2)
to address the metaphysical difficultie
ality of God.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 1, 2016 11:42 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce
Jon S, List,
You say: " In the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking," we discussed what
Peirce might have meant in the first additament to "A Neglected Argument for
the Reality of God" (1908) when he wrote that proving his "theory of the nature
of thinking" would also prove the hypothesis of
Jerry, List,
I find that John Sowa's remarks reflect my own assessment of where things
stand. He provides a link to a presentation by Susan Haack, and she offers a
nice review of how the philosophical landscape in the U.S. and the British
Commonwealth have shifted over the course of the last h
Gary R, Jon S, Edwina, List,
I hope it was clear that my aim in formulating and then reformulating a series
of assertinos and questions that pertain to Peirce's claims about God as
creator of the three universes of experience in "The Neglected Argument" was
clear. It was a deliberate attempt t
hings, and if so, on what basis;
or (d) none of the above. There seems to be some evidence that Peirce may have
stopped talking about Categories in favor of Universes late in his life; I want
to know whether that is really the case, and if so, what significance we should
attribute to this.
e.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 4:25 PM
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Ca
hing, brute matter from possibility, order from randomness, etc.) dependent
on something else?
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Friday, October 21, 2016 2
ent of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
____
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2016 9:17 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories
Jeff, List:
Thanks, that w
Jon, List,
In many of Peirce's discussions of the immediate interpretant, he offers a
diagram such as a skeleton set or a network figure as an example. I can imagine
such a diagram having the character of laying out possible relations that
pertain to feelings (e.g., the qualities in a percept),
Hi Jon S, Gary R, List,
Let me try to simply matters considerably. It will involve a number of
oversimplifications, but I'm hoping it might help to address some questions you
are finding vexing.
Let us compare three different sorts of discussions of universes, realms and
categories:
1. The
Soren, Jon S, Gary R,
Soren suggests there are two problems with Peirce's semiotic theory. One
problem is the phenomenological starting point--which starts with a set of
mathematical reflections on formal relations. Another problem is the attempt to
build a realistic ontology in the semiotic t
Hi Jon S,
I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of
signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles,
existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues in
the essay at that is appended to the collection on Sem
Jon, Gary F, List,
How might we think about the relationship between the categories and the
universes? First, let's note that he uses these terms in a number of different
ways in different contexts. For instance, in the Harvard Lectures of 1903, he
provides a phenomenological account of the uni
Hello John,
Over the years, I have found Jay Zeman's website to be remarkably helpful--both
for thinking about Peirce's philosophical ideas generally, and also for
understanding the existential graphs in particular. Given the value that it
might have for future generations of students, is there
Hello Jon S, Gary R., List,
What more might we say about Peirce's account of what "would-be"--where the
focus is on the conceptions of of generality, potentiality and
possibility--when we consider Peirce's suggestion that continuity is relational
generality?
It helps, I think, to consider th
From: Clark Goble
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 9:37 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce th
of
pragmatism.
[End quote]
Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent that
rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does not
offer rules for instinct.
Best, Ben
On 9/25/2016 1:56 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Ben U., Gary R., List,
Th
More to the point, I should just ask, how
does one strengthen the assurance that the Humble Argument is the only game in
town?
• Common elements in theological ideals of various religions - how alike are
those ideals, really?
Best, Ben
On 9/25/2016 12:06 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Hi Ben
uot; Ideal that might enable us to see how the different standards for
measuring the validity of arguments might be mapped--one onto another.
--Jeff
On 9/23/2016 2:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Hi Gary R., Ben U., List,
Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the
ose seeming invalidity
boils down to the occurrence of something contingently or necessarily false in
its premisses, maybe that difficulty is what Edwina was getting at in her reply
(I haven't had time to catch up with this thread). Anyway, whether one can
explain seeming invalidity as
sity
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 2:53 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Jeffrey - I have a few problems with your analysis. I'll c
Hello Jon, List,
The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more fully in a
number of ways. Here are a few suggestions for filling in some of the details a
bit more:
Major premiss: Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern
of inference, including those
Hi Jon S, List,
You say, "I find it fascinating, and perhaps relevant in this context, that
Peirce appealed to his readers' "instinct for that which is rational" in an
effort to make up for his inability to lay out his theory of logic 'in a
thoroughly satisfactory manner.'"
And then, a little
September 14, 2016 11:23 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] APERI project
Hola Jeff,
In the first of the two PDF diagrams you sent, I don't get what the roman
numerals inside the triangle signify. I gather that "i" is object
determining sign, and "ii"
: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Monday, September 12, 2016 11:33 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] APERI project
Jeffrey - what a great project. And your team members are terrific and
interdisciplinary. I'm delighted to see that you have Koichiro Matsuno in
antibiotics
before their eyes.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Kirk Fitzhugh
Sent: Monday, September 12, 2016 11:13 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: [PEI
List,
Thank you, Gary F., for sharing the blog post and the diagrams. I'd like to
share a diagram that Terry Moore and I have put together. It is designed to
illustrate the same basic relationships--but with a bit more detail. We are
using it to clarify the goals of a collaborative research pr
sidering the various wars of our
species, can indeed by apocalyptic. BUT - at the same time, this imaginative
capacity enables us to eventually deny that it's 'due to the witch', and
develop a vaccine or whatever. It's a difficult burden - to have the
capacity-to-imagine.
Ed
Jon, Gary F., List,
Jon asks: How can the Immediate Object "lack the efficiency to determine signs"
if it is precisely the Immediate Object that determines the Sign?
In response, I think it might help to notice that Gary F did not say the
immediate object lacks the efficiency to determine the
intelligibly within it; and just because within in the latter sense, is it
known as actually without in the former.
— G.J. Stokes, The Objectivity of Truth (1884), p. 53 ]]
A similar paradox applies to any cognitive sign which has a dynamic
interpretant, i.e. an effect on the reality extern
r
examples. Mine are falling short of what I was hoping to make clearer.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2016 7:15 PM
To: Jeffrey
that which the Object itself would under favorable
circumstances. ]]
I think both passages throw some light on what Peirce means by “determine”.
Gary f.
} Any analytical approach to understanding simplicity always turns out to be
very complex. [Howard Pattee] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ T
Jon, Gary F, List,
Jon, do the alternate terms you are recommending "virtual object" for immediate
object and "virtual interpretant" for immediate interpretant work equally well
for each of the three strata (i.e., the level of possibles, actuals and
necessitants) that Peirce describes? For ex
Jon, Gary R., Gary, F, Edwina, Clark, List,
If others are willing, I would like to return to an earlier point in the
conversation that has taken place over the course of the last few days about
Peirce's account of the different sorts of objects and interpretants. Let me
ask a few questions abou
List,
Looking at the late classification of signs-- focusing on the relationships of
determination, reference, representation (etc.) between the objects, signs and
interpretants--provides a remarkably rich way of seeing how the divisions
according to possibility, actuality and necessity figure
List,
Are the conceptions of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, as they are used in
Peirce’s phenomenology, ordinal concepts?
That, I think, is not an easy question to answer--especially if we want the
answer to be adequate for a number of different purposes. So, let me make a few
distinctio
List,
Wouldn't it make things clearer if we, like Peirce, made a distinction between
the immediate object conceived of as a possibility, or as an actuality, or as a
necessity? On the basis of this modal division between the the three ways in
which the immediate object of thought may serve as a
Hello,
Unlike Jerry R. and Kristi, I find Peirce's lifelong efforts to develop a
classification of signs to be a remarkably fruitful area of inquiry. In any
area of inquiry (e.g., chemistry, biology, psychology) it will be quite
difficult to provide any sort of adequate account of the laws go
hat might vary, continuously, from some
determinate value (say a value of 1), to a lower value of zero.”
But that’s all I can say for today!
Gary f.
} The meaning of a word is its use in the language. [Wittgenstein] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Jeffrey Brian
e sufficient for representing synthetic inferences.
(See, for example, CP 3.488-491)
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
____________
From: charles murray
Sent: Tuesday, May 3, 2016 5:29 AM
T
too sick to think straight for the past week, so pardon my belated
response to your post, Jeff. My replies are inserted below.— gary f.
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 24-Apr-16 19:49
List,
The first question I'd like to address is: what is Peirce&#x
Gary R., Ben, List,
A few quick thoughts about some recent comments concerning abductive inference:
1. Peirce uses the terminology of rule, case, result for the purpose of
exploring the relations between different forms of inference. The question is,
if the order of premisses (rule and case
s as have been adduced as
evidence that not all that is in the intellect has entered by way of the
senses. But I'm pretty rusty on that sort of thing, and don't remember such
claimed evidences.
Best, Ben
On 4/25/2016 5:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
List,
For those who (like m
List,
For those who (like me) might like or need to brush up on their understanding
of the development of the Aristotelian approach in logic, in which great weight
is placed on the notion of the canonical forms of inference, see the very nice
and relatively short explanations of Aristotle's wo
or an object to determine a sign, or for a sign to determine an
interpretant, etc.
Yours,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Wednesday, April
Gary F., Ben, Jon, List,
Jon has supplied us with a number of passages that characterize what it is for
a sign to determine an interpretant—and he draws our attention to two
definitions that are published in the NEM. Let’s note that both of those
definitions are incomplete. The key idea that i
Jon, Gary F., List,
Jon claims that the kind of determination that is at work in sign action is
always triadic in character. He says: "Looking back over many previous
discussions on the Peirce List, I think the most important and frequently
missed point is that concepts like correspondence and
Hi Gary F., List,
The detailed post you've made on “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic
Relations” is quite helpful in framing a number of issues. Having been through
it a few times, I don't see any places where I would want to voice
disagreement. In fact, I think you've sorted through a nu
on your comments. I think it'd be best to
start with the exchange I am thinking of but cannot locate it in my
notes or Peirce-l archives. Any chance you could help with this even
greater obscurity?
Best,
Charles
____
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Se
Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jerry Rhee [jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2016 12:03 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re:
na University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jerry Rhee [jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 11:19 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Six categorial vectors; three categorial mirrors,
was, The categorial "mirror image"
naming each sign
in his classification of 10 to show that the interpretant involves the sign's
object which involves the sign itself. Here, only the first sign in the
classification will be diagrammed, commencing at 3ns.
Semiotic involution (in theoretical grammar: example, class 1 of 10):
3
lves the sign itself. Here, only the first sign in the
classification will be diagrammed, commencing at 3ns.
Semiotic involution (in theoretical grammar: example, class 1 of 10):
3rd (1ns, as to the Sign itself) legisign.
|> 1st (3ns, as to its Interpretant) Rhematic,
2nd (2ns, as to its Object
1ns))
Deduction (bean example):
3rd (1ns) the beans in this sample are necessarily 1/2 white.
|> 1st (3ns) All the beans from this bag are 1/2 white,
2nd (2ns) this very large sample is taken from this bag;
Note also, and significantly in my opinion, that both deduciton and abduction
start at 3ns.
List,
The suggestion that, in Peirce's semiotic theory, determination and
representation present mirror images of one another is an interesting idea that
I would like to explore. Having spent some time digging, I'm finding it to be
quite a challenge to get straight about the relationship by wh
-Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, January 24, 2016 1:07 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEI
Edwina, Ben, List,
Here is a nice introduction to the concept of randomness: What Is Random?:
Chance and Order in Mathematics and Life, by Edward Beltrami. It might be
helpful for those who feel a temptation to "reject randomness" as being
explanatory when it comes to living systems.
--Jeff
Hello,
I'd like to follow up on the post that Gary F. made some weeks back about the
first two pages in NDTR. Let me focus on two paragraph that are found on the
second page of the essay in the EP:
Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the
First, the Second
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
____________
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2015 1:44 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] The categorial "mirror image"
Hello Gary R., List,
Would anything be lost if we substituted the language "directed graphs" for
"categorial vectors"? One reason I ask is that Peirce spent a fair amount of
time and effort sorting through and responding to A.B. Kempe's various works on
mathematical form. One of the criticism
Edwina, John, Jon, Gary R., List,
Edwina says that "A dyad operates within two existentialities."
I will agree with her suggestion that a dyadic relation between two existing
individuals is, for Peirce, a kind paradigm case of a genuinely dyadic relation
that can be considered in abstraction f
Hello Gary F., List,
In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a
sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a
more complete sign." How should we understand this distinction between a
sufficiently complete sign and those parts of
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