Re: [PEIRCE-L] de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science

On Apr 14, 2014, at 8:39 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Recently I chanced to read the first few pages of a recent book on Heidegger who is supposed to be phenomenologist, but the book never mentioned Peirce's phenomenology (or phaneroscopy) who preceded Heidegger by half a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1

On Jun 17, 2014, at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: I wouldn't speculate that Peirce wanted God to be a 'thing-in-itself'. There's no evidence, to my knowledge, of that. Only reason I bring that up is more because of the place of God in traditional Christian theology. My

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [Fwd: AW: Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics:: Evidence]

On Jul 2, 2014, at 2:57 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Sung, list, I think you're getting into a thicket. Mathematicians have varied on these questions. It’s interesting how there was a burst of activity on mathematical foundations in the early 20th century and then a lot of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [Fwd: AW: Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics:: Evidence]

On Jul 2, 2014, at 10:06 PM, Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com wrote: Putnam’s perhaps Peirce inspired semi-empirical methods in mathematics paper. I rather enjoyed that paper but some noted that it was a bit after the fact given the reality of how computers were already being used

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [Fwd: AW: Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics:: Evidence]

to such matters. For more full throated platonism we can ask what would count as an experience in conflict. Again, I’m not making a claim about Peirce’s overall beliefs here. Just noting an application of certain elements of his thought that I find interesting. Clark Goble

Re: [PEIRCE-L] IS THE ALPHABET ARBITRARY OR SOMEHOW SYSTEMATIC?

On Jul 6, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Moore peirce-l@list.iupui.edu wrote: I was reading in Eco, on the basis of the Kabbalistic belief that every letter of the Hebrew alphabet has a meaning, at least a numerological meaning. So the Kabbalah too, though it may seem to be combining and

[PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6061] Re: Unreasonable

(My apologies if these came through more than once. I’d sent them from the wrong email address and despite resending them didn’t see them appear in my feed) On Jul 3, 2014, at 4:03 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: You're mixing apples and oranges, using the word 'sign'

Re: [PEIRCE-L] IS THE ALPHABET ARBITRARY OR SOMEHOW SYSTEMATIC?

On Jul 7, 2014, at 1:31 AM, Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com wrote: ...the sign enables a shift of denotation in language due to connotation. Eco plays this up via an analysis of the type/token issue that arises out of Peirce. For Derrida, who in many places Eco follows, the key issue is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Invigorating Philosophy with Natural Propositions

Sorry I’ve not had time to contribute much the past weeks. A few thoughts below. On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: We could say that PPs are miners of Peirce because in his work they find realizations that deserve to be replicated in the philosophical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

(Sorry for any repeats - I accidentally sent several emails from the wrong account so they didn’t make it to the list) On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

On Jul 25, 2014, at 8:01 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: As you know, Prigogine (1917-2003) divided all structures in the Universe into two classes – equilibrium structures (ES) and dissipative structures (DS) [1, 2]. ESs do not but DSs do need to dissipate free energy for them

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

On Jul 29, 2014, at 1:44 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: I made the relevant distinctions in a book chapter in 1990, Intrinsic Information (1990) but I had to introduce some new concepts and definitions to the usual thermodynamic ones. The lack of those has caused multiple

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

One brief last point. I think Peirce’s distinctions between token, type, and tone are rather helpful here and should be kept in mind. Of course the token/type distinction in particular can be blurry but I’m not sure that’s relevant to the discussion at hand. My sense is that the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

On Jul 31, 2014, at 2:37 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Yes. That is what I am saying, and I too distinguish between material process of semiotics and semiotics in general. My working hypothesis is that Physics of words/signs is necessary but (073114-2)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

On Jul 31, 2014, at 12:19 PM, Søren Brier sb@cbs.dk wrote: My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

On Jul 31, 2014, at 3:32 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Do you deny that DNA is matter ? Does it not represent an organism? Do you deny that “Semiosis is a material process enabled by the action of the(073114-6) irreducible triad of object, representamen and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:06 PM, Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com wrote: It is rather common to assume some space/time substrate with extension as a necessary substrate for any property. So much so that it’s rather common for many from the scientific community to even recognize

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for

On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: I agree that the laws are generals and not material; they couldn't be general AND material, for materiality is existentially local and particular. However, following Aristotle, I consider that the general law (Form)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parsimonious Peirce

On Aug 31, 2014, at 6:24 AM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote: Reading on my Kindle the remarkably-edited text CP (a compendium of segments of Peirce statements), I didn’t know CP was available as an ebook. I looked on Amazon but didn’t see it. Where did you get the ebook

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6624] Natural Propositions

On Sep 3, 2014, at 2:47 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Personally, I tend to side with the latter of the two schools, based on the observation that the science of physics does not need semiotics in the description of its subject matter (only in its theory of science)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions

On Sep 4, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study cognition and communication processes - biology does. and On Sep 4, 2014, at 12:59 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions

On Sep 4, 2014, at 2:18 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Interaction seems to me to be a far wider concept than communication. Any possible empirical event involves energy exchange, that is, interaction. To me, it dilutes the concept of communication almost to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6633] Natural Propositions cognition

On Sep 4, 2014, at 9:36 PM, Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com wrote: Edwina, Pansemiotics carries the connotation of panpsychism. Physiosemiosis has no such connotation. And the term “pansemiosis” carries just the opposite of what you attribute, namely, the idea that the universe IS composed

[PEIRCE-L] Mind and Universe

takes place. They may, as does Clark Goble, admit that mediation (Thirdness) plays a role but it is a non-cognitive mode. John Deely simply rejects Mind within the physical realm and considers their interactions, if I understand him, pure acts of Secondness - dyadic interactions

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mind and Universe

On Sep 5, 2014, at 10:19 AM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote: Is there yet an online version of the book? I checked a while back and found none but it makes sense to have texts available on Kindle as they can be read on any device and online will be the permanence of texts in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mind and Universe

On Sep 5, 2014, at 10:29 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: No, Peirce was an Aristotelian not a Platonist or NeoPlatonist. The latter proposes some power or force 'beyond or outside of being' - and Peirce rejects this. And to define Peirce as a neo-Platonist because he read

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mind and Universe

On Sep 5, 2014, at 10:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Clark - I got the paperback of the book, Natural Propositions, from Amazon for $16.19. Oh whoops. I’d been looking at Diagrammology. Ugh. My bad. Please ignore everything I said. I’m a complete idiot - perils of

[PEIRCE-L] Physics Semiosis

If feel somewhat bad of having brought the discussion down this tangent. (I’ve changed subject as per request) I hope you don’t mind me making one final comment. On Sep 7, 2014, at 4:49 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Not all triadicity and thirdness is semiotic - that is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physics Semiosis

On Sep 11, 2014, at 6:41 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: However, I claim that “Unlike DNA, ‘entropy’ does not have any agent, (091114-4) other than humans, for which it can act as a sign.” Just to add, while this may be true of foundational physical concepts, we

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physics Semiosis

Wow. Lots of posts since I checked in last. I’ll try to answer as best I can in the time I have. It’s a very busy week for me, so apologies if I don’t answer or answer in a half hearted way. On Sep 12, 2014, at 3:26 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Clark wrote: Material

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Consequences Of Triadic Relation Irreducibility

On Sep 12, 2014, at 9:41 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: My experience with failures to communicate over many trials tells me that the biggest and most numerous rifts in our several understandings of Peirce all point back to the visions of relations, triadic relations, and triadic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:23 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: (He came to regard philosophy as consisting of so-called logical analysis (intellectual autobiography, 1904, Ketner editor), and to regarding such logical analysis as really being phaneroscopic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 16, 2014, at 10:32 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Yes, analytic philosophy seems tepid next to Peirce. I hardly know what analytic philosophers mean by 'analysis' or, more importantly, by 'philosophy'. Decades ago I got a similar vagueness from continental

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy

On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:17 PM, Clark Goble cl...@libertypages.com wrote: On Sep 18, 2014, at 11:02 AM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com mailto:stever...@gmail.com wrote: 2) Which of Peirce’s writings contribute to the development and articulation of his late value theory? http

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:13 PM, Clark Goble cl...@libertypages.com wrote: On Sep 18, 2014, at 8:49 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Clark, in reference to the Peirce passage you quoted about the “community of quasi-minds”, you said that “While we could

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6844] Re: Natural Propositions: like

On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:00 PM, Clark Goble cl...@libertypages.com wrote: On Sep 17, 2014, at 3:32 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: My claim is certainly not that Husserl and Peirce agree in all respects. Just that both of them unite objectivity

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth

On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:59 PM, Clark Goble cl...@libertypages.com wrote: On Sep 21, 2014, at 11:57 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: To Peirce, the relation of similarity connecting a diagram to its real-world object is not necessarily easy to grasp

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physics Semiosis

On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:58 PM, Clark Goble cl...@libertypages.com wrote: On Sep 17, 2014, at 3:08 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: I am not sure complexity is enough, also because of the fact that we have no agreed-upon measurement of the degree

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6900] Re: Natural Propositions,

On Sep 21, 2014, at 8:44 PM, Clark Goble cl...@libertypages.com wrote: On Sep 20, 2014, at 12:31 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: The main idea is not that of a long run. Instead the idea is that of sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6950] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 22, 2014, at 11:33 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: On 9/22/2014 12:15 PM, Bob Logan wrote: Dear All - Sorry for the last posting I inadvertently sent it before I was finished. What I wanted to say is this in response to John's request for thoughts: I would say

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

On Sep 23, 2014, at 4:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu wrote: So, I'd like to ask, what are the key data that a logical theory should draw on for the purposes of generating and testing hypotheses about real the nature of the dicisign?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6968] Re: Natural Propositions,

On Sep 23, 2014, at 12:12 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: I remember years ago here at peirce-l I did another one of those examples of what would happen in courtrooms (but I was a LOT wordier in those days) if some replacement of truth as a value

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.2

On Sep 24, 2014, at 6:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: But as Frederik points out in his footnote (p. 51) about “degeneracy,” not all Dicisigns are symbols — only propositions are. Does this mean that non-symbolic Dicisigns — or “natural propositions” — are degenerate in some

Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

One other brief thought. Something I’ve not seen discussed much in the literature is the relationship between mathematics and propositions. (This may just because admittedly I’ve not sought out such discussions) Propositions are usually taken as linguistic with fairly strict boundaries on

Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

On Sep 24, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: In any event, I'm finding section 4. of New Elements of especial interest and want to discuss the passage discussing the copula as an index and the way that in the proposition Socrates is wise, for example, that . .

Re: [biosemiotics:6973] [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

Just to go along with those last comments of mine, the following quote is be useful. The logic of relatives furnishes the solution, by showing that propositions usually have several subjects, that one of these subjects is the so-called Universe of Discourse, that as a general rule a

Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

On Sep 25, 2014, at 8:50 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the move towards an externalist approach to mind in Heidegger is also made in Peirce. And it’s precisely within the proposition (or more

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions

On Sep 25, 2014, at 8:48 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Stephen, Peirce sees conscious thinking as Thought (i.e. a sign) actively taking consciousness and directing it, rather than the other way round, as you here (and most people generally) see it. That’s one reason why

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 26, 2014, at 12:41 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Clark, list, I've also noticed a difficulty of finding usefulness for the formal cause in physics, though I came at it from other directions, simpler ones for me since I'm not a physicist, but also I'd like to add

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

the future. One could well say that even in possibility the possibilities excluded are lawlike in that exclusion. (That’s what makes it a limited possibility) Clark Goble Lextek International cl...@lextek.com mailto:cl...@lextek.com (801) 655-1994

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 27, 2014, at 6:05 PM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote: Have you read The God Problem by Harold Bloom. I have no science but it seems he is out to contradict every theory out there. He has one of his own about origins. Best, S I confess I’ve not read that one, although

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

debates such as those Dewey was involved in. On 9/28/2014 11:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote: On Sep 27, 2014, at 8:11 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: [BU] A realist can and often enough ought to be skeptical about particular models and diagrams as representative of reality. A realist believes

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 29, 2014, at 6:28 PM, Howard Pattee hpat...@roadrunner.com wrote: Goble: I think the ultimately problem is that most physicists (like most scientists) are nominalists and thus to make a realist claim requires knowing what the singulars are. Yet most physicists don’t think they

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 30, 2014, at 7:24 AM, Howard Pattee hpat...@roadrunner.com wrote: At 08:58 PM 9/29/2014, Clark Goble wrote: HP: To get a fairer picture of how physicists think, please peruse this survey http://arxiv.org/pdf/1301.1069v1.pdf. CG: I'd seen that before. While it's a great guide

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

On Sep 30, 2014, at 9:21 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: If one is a realist _only_ about things that one doesn't know, then one implies that the real is not cognizable. I suppose that one could say in a loose sense that one is partly an

[PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

(Changed the thread title since we’ve drifted far from natural propositions) On Sep 30, 2014, at 11:58 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: [CG] Whether the “nearly real” is good enough is a reasonable question. Like you, I see it as good enough, but I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuine triadicity, chirality (handedness) and the origins of life

On Sep 30, 2014, at 2:05 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Regarding conservation of energy: My understanding is that, in general relativity it's considered not to be conserved in an expanding or contracting universe, although it's still regardable as conserved in normal

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

On Oct 1, 2014, at 8:50 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Maybe I've underestimated the amount of instrumentalism - it's hard for me to discern how seriously people take their own ideas of 'useful fictions' in practice. And I should add my own important caveat. I’m simply not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

(Changed title to distinguish it from Natural Propositions thread and to match my previously renamed posts) On Oct 1, 2014, at 4:00 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: The more contemporary nominalism is based in a view of language and thought (which is understood on a linguistic

Re: [biosemiotics:6973] [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

On Oct 2, 2014, at 4:59 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Mathematics certainly deals in propositions according to P. P's general philosophy of math claims that math is about forms of relations, and that those abstract objects are addressed by the help of diagrams.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

it in a more naive way. I think asking what it means to test is an important consideration though that not enough physicists ask. At 02:03 PM 10/1/2014, Clark Goble wrote: It’s also interesting in that even people I’d largely call nominalist in science still tend to have a “dodge” regarding

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Am I Wrong

On Oct 2, 2014, at 5:31 PM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote: Am I wrong in recalling that Derrida actually spent some time going through unpublished Peirce mss in Cambridge. Or am I thinking of someone else of more than passing fame? I’ve never heard that. Sure you aren’t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Am I Wrong

On Oct 2, 2014, at 6:47 PM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote: Nope. Not Whitehead I'm pretty sure. But if no one else has heard it. I associate it with some post-modern sort but I am drawing a blank. I know it was someone though. I was curious and did a bit of search. You were

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Am I Wrong

On Oct 2, 2014, at 8:28 PM, Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com wrote: It’s ten years later that he writes about Derrida and the symbol in On Grammatologie. Whoops. An other typo - my apologies. Doing this quickly as I do some work. Obviously I meant Peirce there, not Derrida. I should have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theories and Realism (was Natural Propositions)

On Oct 3, 2014, at 5:41 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: This conclusion seems consistent with the postulate I proposed in 2012 that the wave-particle complementarity operates not only in physics, but also in biology and semiotics (see Table 2.13 in the chapter entitled

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce QM

I don’t have much to say on Peirce and QM. Although I have the following quote in my notes that might be of interest. I’m not sure it’s fair to say that Peirce is anticipating QM in this although there clearly are some interesting parallels. . . . Let us next consider how a state of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions . Selected Passages

On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:20 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: On 10/3/2014 2:04 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: Ben, Jeff, Jon, lists, 1) Can we say that there can be many triads, depending one how one defines them, but the Peircean triad is special and identical with a mathematical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.5

On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu wrote: Perhaps we should distinguish between different ways that the word 'intention' is used in Peirce's texts. There is the common meaning that is expressed when I say, for instance, that my intention in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.5

On Oct 3, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: I wasn't referring to intentionality in the sense of aboutness, or to the scholastic ideas of first and second intentions; I guess it's tautologically true that informational signs must involve intentions in that sense.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

On Oct 5, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me: Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some kind of sign? GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0). But

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7

On Oct 6, 2014, at 5:45 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: And, further, for Peirce these two are joined not, as they've traditionally been, by a copula, but rather by an index of a peculiar kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the real fact

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

On Oct 9, 2014, at 8:17 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Those who find this concept of causality questionable would do well to post their questions now. I confess I’ve always had trouble with the conception of “events” in philosophy. While I’ve long

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.8

On Oct 9, 2014, at 3:05 PM, Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote: The notion of a complete cause of any event involves one in speculation for which there is no answer that is not metaphysical. The cause of any event must either be immediate or traceable to the point that it can no

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.9

On Oct 11, 2014, at 9:26 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Section 3.9 of NP brings us one of those Peircean ideas that is startling at first, but illuminates his whole system of semiotics in the light of continuity. In this post I’ll just give some of the highlights directly

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7226] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.10

On Oct 14, 2014, at 1:21 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: An important point. For now I would only add, perhaps anticipating what is to come in Chapter 6, that we should recall that Peirce says somewhere that the utterer or interpreter need not be a person, but that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four

On Nov 2, 2014, at 3:15 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Jerry, yes, Peirce does say in many places that the structure of a rheme, or a predicate, has a valency analogous to chemical valency. But if you look at my statement carefully, you’ll see that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions Chapter four, Proto-propositions

On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:24 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: There is a bit terminological confusion here. Peirce's distinction within Dicisigns was between propositions and quasi-propositions, the latter being those Dicisigns which are not symbols. I wanted to talk about

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four

On Nov 2, 2014, at 6:49 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: This brings me to Gary R’s question about the relations between concepts and symbols, and where consciousness fits into this picture. Briefly, if we agree that the function of consciousness is to add a higher level of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions Chapter four

The pragmatistic character of that last paragraph should be obvious enough. What may not be so obvious is the definition of consciousness as “connection with an internal world.” This is rather vague on the face of it, but I think it offers the key to a concept of “consciousness” which

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Monist special issues on Peirce free onlne

On Feb 10, 2015, at 8:57 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: List, It seems that the entire run of _The Monist_ is now free online. We should be grateful to the Hegeler Institute and to Oxford for this. Anyway the two special issues of articles on Peirce are now free online:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Bayes and abduction

On Mar 26, 2015, at 3:21 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Good texts by Peirce to read on abductive inference, besides his discussion in his 1903 lectures on pragmatism, include On the Logic of Drawing Ancient History from Documents (1901), Essential Peirce v. 2, wherein Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Article on origin of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists

On Apr 2, 2015, at 4:27 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: You maline Logical Positive here with a historical confusion. Carnap immediately pointed out to Popper, of course, falsifiable. Popper's complaint was a noisy no-op. Sorry, something is missing here. Could you

Re: [PEIRCE-L] abduction in the brain

On Mar 29, 2015, at 2:40 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: 1. Peircean abductive inference is not Bayesian at any level. Insofar as you involve Bayesian subjective priors at all (even if not on all levels), your idea of abduction (or at least of how

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Article on origin of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists

On Apr 2, 2015, at 5:29 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: I was simply pointing out that the Logical Positivist argument is not as simplistic as Popper stated it, and that, Carnap said immediately said: of course, falsifiable! The Peirce family were very well aware of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Article on origin of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists

On Apr 3, 2015, at 11:55 AM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: I'll defend the Vienna Circle just a little further because I believe that they have been misunderstood and mistreated by lesser men in the twentieth century and that there is some correction going on now. Quine

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Bayes and abduction

On Apr 3, 2015, at 12:04 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: You wrote, While not everyone would agree, I think Peirce is somewhat influenced by virtue ethics with regards to abduction. Thus abduction arises out of an optimistic development of an aesthetic and ethical life.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Article on origin of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists

On Apr 3, 2015, at 12:16 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: So, for example, these over simplifications by the Circle that Clark mentions really need to be seen as an exploration of rigor and are not rightly a source of criticism in my view. I’m not sure the rejection of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Article on origin of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists

On Apr 2, 2015, at 11:00 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: An empirical proposition is falsifiable if a counterexample is logically possible. When we go for a long enough time without observing a counterexample, which may involve creating experimental conditions under which a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Constructor Theory

On Aug 21, 2015, at 10:02 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca mailto:tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Clark - doesn't the question then become - how are habits or laws formed? I wonder if 'abduction, induction, deduction' are the answer. We, who analyze and verbalize the laws, may indeed

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Constructor Theory

On Aug 12, 2015, at 7:15 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: It's quite possible that I'm wrong-headed about it, but Is this inversion by the idea of constructors a difference that makes a difference? What is it beyond rephrasing? Peirce found plenty of modalism in the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Constructor Theory

On Aug 12, 2015, at 8:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Ben - I agree. From a quick reading, constructor theory isn't offering a new analytic frame, for the notion of general laws (Thirdness) operating as causal of individual instances (Secondness) - is basic Peircean

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce Constructor Theory

Someone just introduced me to Constructor Theory. This is a new theory of information which attempts to express all physics in terms of a difference between possible and impossible physical transformation. The idea is more or less to take the success of Shannon in the classical realm and apply

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Constructor Theory of Information (CTI) as a physical theory of semiosis

Sorry I didn’t comment much. I appreciate your comments on Constructor Theory though. It’s something I definitely need to study up on when I finally have the time. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing things

> On Oct 23, 2015, at 9:37 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > Again, your outline of 'things are so because they are CALLED so' (my > emphasis) is postmodernist nominalism, focusing on the NAME. Whereas, as I > said, Peirce's emphasis is not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing things

> On Oct 23, 2015, at 9:43 AM, Eugene Halton wrote: > > I would add that it is not only metaphor that, “reverses the process by > unmaking a familiar distinction, revealing a richer and stranger > relationship,” as you put it. This is also the essence of aesthetic >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing things

> On Oct 23, 2015, at 11:24 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark - yes, the Heidegger-Derrida mysticism of The Word. That was/is - > truly terrible! Pure nominalism - but made authoritative by the aspatial and > atemporal mystic essentialism of The Word. Yes, I just

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

> On Oct 21, 2015, at 3:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > The main thing I want to add to what you've said is prompted by a remark that > Kant makes about philosophical methodology. In the Preface of the Grounding, > he puts a sharp edge on the claim. He

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

> On Oct 21, 2015, at 11:25 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > The positivists divided sciences into formal (i.e., mathematics and deductive > logic) and factual. I never got clear on where they put philosophy, I suspect > they hoped to make it into a formal science. I think

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?

> On Oct 26, 2015, at 12:26 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > There was indeed a “reversal” of usage of the terms “subjective” and > “objective” starting in the 17th century, but no such reversal with “subject” > and “object.” This is explained in the Turning Signs chapter at >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's categories

> On Oct 29, 2015, at 9:31 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > In what sense can phenomenology "draw" things from logic? If it can draw > something, what can it it draw? An other question. We tend to think of logic as functional in its own right. For deduction

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