Why Natural Propositions?
The book Natural Propositions grew out of my investigation of Peirce's
general notion of diagrams and diagrammatical reasoning in Diagrammatology
(2007). If it is indeed the case that all deduction takes place by means of
transformation of diagrams, implicitly or
Dear Jon, list,
I am not sure I am able to identify with any precision that retrograde motion
which Jon speaks about - which ideas and persons are you referring to, more
precisely?
Do you have any more precise reference to where, in the ch. in my book we are
discussing, I fall prey to that
Dear Jon, list
Thanks for a great McCulloch quote. You are right that many of these issues
have been discussed before, but this is no reason to be tired or resigned like
you sound in your intro to that quote. It is a human condition that most
important issues have been discussed before. This
Dear Stan, list -
My claim certainly does not entail that physics be entirely mechanistic. My
observation is just that sign concepts are widespread in biology, not so in
physics. This gives us the idea that biology studies real semiotic processes,
while physics, including QM, does not. This
04/09/2014 kl. 16.10 skrev Jon Awbrey
jawb...@att.netmailto:jawb...@att.net:
Re: Frederik Stjernfelt
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13886
Frederik,
Yes, the orthogonality or independence of descriptive and normative sciences is
noted by McCulloch in his opening
Dear John, list -
We have discussed these issues at several occasions, as John writes. Now, our
different positions are clearly expressed again - and, what is more, unchanged.
So rather than taking yet another turn in that eternal circle, John, would'nt
you like to take a shot at my first
Dear Koichiro, list -
I am not sure I follow your argument. When I speak about natural Dicisigns, I
take them to presuppose organisms. So I do not think Schrödinger
indistinguishability precludes them.
Best
F
Den 05/09/2014 kl. 04.10 skrev Koichiro Matsuno
Dear Edwina, list -
I think Edwina is right here. It is no argument against pan- or physiosemiotics
to say that physics should be processes of pure secondness. If such processes
exist, they would indeed be completely random and follow no laws - as all laws,
due to their generality, are
Dear Jeff, lists
Thank you for good questions.
The gneralization that Jeff sums up in two points indeed forms my starting
point (and was considered in the Diagrammatology book of 2007).
Here, it is taken as the premiss to the vaster generalization that
logic/semiotics is independent of any
Dear Stephen, Clark -
I see your point. I regret there is not an e-book version available.
But the paper version is pretty cheap - around $15.
Best
F
Den 05/09/2014 kl. 18.29 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com:
On Sep 5, 2014, at 10:19 AM, Stephen C. Rose
Dear John, list
I don't think Peirce disagrees that thinking is necessarily psychological.
I think he does. From the 1860s to the 1910s he claims logic and the study of
thought are not part of psychology.
He thought that we can't get outside of the signs in the head via thinking
processes
because it does not add anything to saying the crater is caused by the meteor
F
Den 07/09/2014 kl. 21.45 skrev Deely, John N.
jnde...@stthom.edumailto:jnde...@stthom.edu:
How is “the crater is an index of the meteor” superfluous for understanding the
crater?
From: Frederik Stjernfelt
Dear John, Lists
He thought that we set aside a certain class of experiences that we take
(fallibly in each instance) to be externally caused (an abduction) because they
surprise us. However our thought does not get outside of the sequence of signs
that are connected in our thought (or
Dear Ben, John, list -
Den 08/09/2014 kl. 19.27 skrev John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
:
Thanks for this, Ben.
John
But John, you did not respond to the query: If the world is sucked up inside
the head - where is that head?
Frederik, John,
As far as I can tell (and I've been
of physical
theory inspired the development of calculus etc. and could be called a
genealogical basis for the more abstract subjects.
Best, Ben
On 9/8/2014 10:26 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
[John Collier] He thought that we set aside a certain class of experiences
that we take (fallibly in each
Dear Stan, Howard, list
I certainly agree with Howard here. My emphasis on the chain of reasoning in
recent list discussions may have given some a wrong impression of my position.
Again, the reason for this emphasis was to claim that the overall process of
knowledge-acquisition in a broad
Dear Howard, list
This is an important issue. I do not think it is a choice between a
psychological and a non-psychological model which must compete. It is a
distinction between two levels of description - one (the non-psychological) is
more general and adresses structures of thought and
Dear Ben -
Den 10/09/2014 kl. 00.14 skrev Benjamin Udell
bud...@nyc.rr.commailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com
:
[BU] To explain nature, to come up with a new idea to explain it, requires
inference, but that inference is neither (A) deduction to elucidate what one
already knows or assumes, nor (B)
Dear Jeff, list
Right. Another distinction might be between thinking and thought. There's no
thinking in a book - but there is thought.
And books are not repositories of thoughts better stored in brains - which is
indicated by the fact that few authors, if any, know all of their books by
Dear Jeffs, lists,
Reduction is the easiest way to characterize psychologism, but you are right
that is not the center of my concern. I think the important concerns are at
least three
1) the ignorance of ideality - thoughts and signs are general (or ideal, or
schematic) - this is easily
Dear Ulysses, lists -
The quote you give is a paraphrase of Husserl's Prolegomena. But it refers to a
huge issue only partially dealt with in NP.
Peirce was no believer in sense data but he did think there are degrees of
(im)mediacy of knowledge. I do not go deeply into his perception theory in
Dear Sung, lists -
To take thought to be but the result of thinking is an idea that may lead us
astray - especially if you take thinking in all its aspects to be a
psychological process only.
Thought is not determined by thinking only but, importantly, by the object of
thought and the structure
Dear Stan, lists -
As you know, I'd like to see some results here before I shall be convinced.
I tend to think - a bit in the vein of Stuart Kauffman - that semiotics only
arises when you have stable, autokatalytic cycles in an environment of organic
molecules, as a sort of proto-metabolism -
Dear Sung, lists …
Hmm, I think processes, at least over QM level, are generally continuous. So I
also think the transition between non-life and life is continuous (the
increasing degree of autokatalysis in the space of organic compounds) - at the
same time I think this process crosses a
Dear Edwina, Stan, lists -
But there is triadicity all over the place - all regularity, vague or strong,
in the universe falls under Peirce's category of Thirdness. But not all
thirdnesses are signs - even if they form a condition of possibility for signs
to emerge …
Best
F
John, I don't
Dear Sung, lists -
I am not sure that this is the proper comparison.
It is possible to chart thresholds in many continuous processes - that does not
alter their continuous nature nor make them fundamentally discontinuous in any
sense. Continuity may include discontinuities - the opposite is not
Dear Howard, lists -
But then neither is the opposite …
Best
F
Den 14/09/2014 kl. 03.51 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com
:
At 04:35 PM 9/13/2014, Frederik wrote:
Dear Stan, lists -
Good. I tend to side with Peirce here - though I would change the wording
Dear Mary, John S., lists -
John already gave the background of the dabbit-ruck.
Peirce, however, has a drawing stating some related (though not quite
identical) points. from the Lectures on Pragmatism, 1903, 5.183 - a curved
line which may alternately be perceived as a stone wall. P claims he
Dear Stephen, Howard, lists -
I tend to share Stephen's position here. But Howard is right that there is no
simple way of deciding the basic issues of the foundation of mathematics and
logic. It is a question which can not be decided by empirical evidence -
because that begs the question (to
Dear Gary, lists -
Thanks for some important comments - you highlight an issue which has not been
so central in our discussions on (anti-)psychologism until now - namely the
fact that psychological reductions of logic very often downplay or even deny
the generality of meaning.
If we think
AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
Dear Ben, list -
Dear Frederik, lists,
You wrote,
[BU] The 'novel' aspect has sometimes been called psychological.
[FS] Why? - and by whom?
I think de Wulf or some other (neo-)scholastic did. I think it's been said by
others too, but I admit that I've
From: Frederik Stjernfelt [stj...@hum.ku.dk]
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2014 12:24 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6695] Re: Natural Propositions
Dear Jeffrey, Lists,
Thank you for some beautiful quotes from the young Peirce
Dear Stan, Gary, lists -
I think intersubjectivity is widely different from social constructivism.
Husserl's take on the former is that objectivity is the correlate to
intersubjectivity, and despite his (prudent) caution with the subject-object
terminology, I think Peirce's theory of science
Dear Jon, lists -
Den 15/09/2014 kl. 05.06 skrev Jon Awbrey
jawb...@att.netmailto:jawb...@att.net
Okay, I was being a bit punny there, as if say, where senses diverge there
must be a search for a sense in common. And being a good Peircean it was at
least a triple pun, with hints of
Dear Mara, lists -
Certainly it is through an index that WE know about the cause of the crater.
But the physical process itself, the meteor creating the crater, is not an
index. The index relies upon causal, purposive and other actual connections
which are not, in themselves, signs (or only
Dear Gary, lists,
Thanks for a thought-provoking posting. Peirce's phaneroscopy was developed
comparatively late but seems to serve, inter alia, as the investigation of what
may be present to any thinking mind whatsoever - consequently he also called it
his phenomenology, or phanerochemy (sic)
Dear Ben -
Good posting. We should not attempt too hardhandedly, armchair-wise to
legislate the dependency relations between sciences. We should rather look at
which connections are, in fact, out there.
And as to neurology and mathematics, I think it is safe to say that the
dependence until
Dear Gary -
Funny you mention Haack's crossword analogy. To me it is a brilliant example of
how a simple metaphor may spread a lot of conceptual fog. Crossword puzzles
have only one solution, still that solution may be reached in a large number of
different ways, all of them implying guesses,
Dear Stan, lists,
Hmmm, I rather think the pie in the sky is the idea that culture might make
truth criteria evolve so as to have no connection with how they are conceived
of today.
I think that vastly exaggerates the power of culture to determine science -
which forms a special case of a
Dear Ben, lists -
That is exactly why I like the approach to philosophy of science in two of my
heroes: Peirce and Cassirer. Theory of science must learn from the successful
practices of the special sciences - but not strive to reduce itself to any of
them.
Best
F
Den 16/09/2014 kl. 23.41
Dear Ben, Jeffs, Gary, lists -
Sorry for being away from the list - am at the Semiotics World Conf. in Sofia.
The claim that logic and theory of science are independent of psychology does
not at all imply they can not learn from psychology - or from other special
sciences. Especially methodeutic
the repetition of such ideas makes you
agitated …
Best
F
Den 18/09/2014 kl. 07.07 skrev Jerry LR Chandler
jerry_lr_chand...@me.commailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com
:
Frederik, List:
On Sep 17, 2014, at 4:08 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
1) simple metabolism, self-sustaining chemaical cycles
Dear Stan, lists,
S: The studies supported by society -- especially in science -- are often of
longer term interest. SC is not a bugaboo, just a fact.
I think SC is no simple fact - rather it is a host of different things - from
the (trivial) observation that universities and academies and
Dear Stan, lists -
Frederick -- replying again to:
Hmmm, I rather think the pie in the sky is the idea that culture might make
truth criteria evolve so as to have no connection with how they are conceived
of today.
S: Possibly, but that might not disturb anyone in that future time because
Dear G -
Not at all - I do not think it is a bad analogy - I think it is a great analogy!
As any analogy, it has similar and non-similar parts. But the similar parts of
this one are eye-opening …
Best
F
Den 18/09/2014 kl. 16.38 skrev Gary Fuhrman
g...@gnusystems.camailto:g...@gnusystems.ca
:
Dear Howard, Stan, lists,
I think Stan is right the line has both qualities - the geometric line is
continuous and the arithmetic line is discontinuous.
Some higher animals are capable of rudimentary mathematics (subitizing small
numbers).
But Howard, the claim that human brains do mathematics
Dear Ben, lists,
I think you are right in proposing that quasi-inferences are inferences with
less than full self-control.
But self-control comes in many degrees ( I address this a bit in ch. 6 I
think). A very low degree of self-control may be the slow change over
evolutionary adaption - with
Dear Jon, Tom, lists
Well spoken Jon, I think this also covers my position.
The pre-semiotic world is full of connections, causal, morphological, formal,
which may be taken, in the semiotic processes of biology, as a basis for signs.
Best
F
Den 19/09/2014 kl. 20.10 skrev Jon Awbrey
Dear Koichiro, lists
At 9:54 PM 09/19/2014, Frederik wrote:
In intellectual history I think the idea that cyclic, self-sustaining processes
may play a special role in biology goes at least back to Kant (in the latter
half of the 3rd Critique).
Philosophically, it could be okay. In practice,
great!
F
Den 20/09/2014 kl. 05.01 skrev Jon Awbrey
jawb...@att.netmailto:jawb...@att.net
:
A nominalist in name only would be a nominal nominalist.
But a real nominalist would be a contradiction in terms.
Checkmate ...
Jon
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply
Dear Jon, Howard, lists,
As far as I can make out, there are important relation between Hertz' basic
ideas and Peirce's.
To Peirce, the relation of similarity connecting a diagram to its real-world
object is not necessarily easy to grasp - on the contrary, in many cases it
requires protracted
Dear Jon, lists,
I think Jon has an important point here.
Too many people confuse the idea that diagrams are iconic, on the one hand,
with the idea that iconic signs should be immediately interpretable, on the
other.
It is the latter which is false. Most if not all diagrams require symbolic
Dear Ben, Stan, lists
I agree Stan's interpretation of fallibilism here is far too colored by radical
constructivism. Fallibilism is not equal to scepticism or constructivism at
all, nor does it imply that all knowledge will change completely over time.
Science is growing by the day, we
Dear Stan, lists,
The problem here is a bit as when Collier thought all the world was in the
head - for where is that head? in the world? in another head?
The same holds here: the world will be constructed by each [tradition] via
different models - now, WHERE are those traditions? Seems to be
Dear Jon, lists
This is indeed a problem.
So much literature appears now - partially due to bibliometric imperatives
like publish or perish - that many papers are now never really read by anyone
but editors and peer reviews - among them undoubtedly many good or even great
papers. So those
Dear Stan -
You're right - let us agree to disagree on this point - and move on.
Best
F
Den 19/09/2014 kl. 16.40 skrev Stanley N Salthe
ssal...@binghamton.edumailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu
:
Frederick -- Replying:
I think we have projected our viewpoints sufficiently that this need not be
Actual nominalists do exist, of course, but only in the fleeting moment.
In the next moment, they may be different - maybe realists? - because no law
or tendency exists which grants their existence over time -
Best
F
Den 21/09/2014 kl. 21.36 skrev Stanley N Salthe
Dear Howard, lists -
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 02.47 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com
:
But Howard, this is a different position than the one you presented in the
earlier quote just some lines before. There, each foundation of math was
legitimized by specific
Dear Jeff K, lists -
I merely reproduced P's argument for his hierarchy of sciences from memory
because it came up in the list discussion - it is not something playing a
prominent role in the argument of my book (apart from the issue of
(anti-)psychologism).
Best
F
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 06.50
Dear Clark, lists -
But aren't formal and material causes just re-baptized in physics as constants
(of laws), as types of forces or particles, or as boundary conditions?
Best
F
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 15.59 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com
:
On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:13
Dear E, G, lists
I also have no idea as to how Peirce would pronounce it.
I chose dee-see- for these reasons:
The C I pronounce as S for the reasons Edwina quotes - in the traditional
pronunciation of Latin words, C is generally S before front wovels like I
The I I pronounce as EE because that
Dear John, lists,
I think you're right - Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting
points were propositions.
Best
F
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 18.46 skrev John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
:
At 01:41 PM 2014-09-13, Frederik wrote:
Dear Sung, lists -
To take thought
Dear John, lists
OK, that clarifies things.
Best
f
Den 23/09/2014 kl. 11.35 skrev John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
:
At 10:50 PM 2014-09-21, Frederik wrote:
Dear Stan, lists,
The problem here is a bit as when Collier thought all the world was in the
head - for where
Edwina, lists,
In the ten-sign list of the Syllabus, the Dicent Symbolic Legisign is but one
of three types of Dicisigns. So you can not identify the two. I discuss the
other two, Dicent Indexical Sinsign and Dicent Indexical Sinsign, in the
chapter.
Best
F
Den 24/09/2014 kl. 15.16 skrev
Dear Clark, lists,
Den 24/09/2014 kl. 22.17 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com
:
On Sep 24, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Richmond
gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote:
In any event, I'm finding section 4. of New Elements of especial interest and
want
Dear C, B, lists -
Scares me as well - is this really so widespread among philosophy students? Why
don't they study sociology instead, then?
And why should we be culturally sensitive at all? We have only reached to
where we are now by being INsensitive to a lot of cultural ideas - including
Dear Gary, lists -
This is correct. This is also why not every phase of thought needs
consciousness - even if Peirce was very insistent on thought being
self-controlled. But he also realized self-control come in many degrees, not
all of them necessarily conscious - even if consciousness
Dear Jeff, Gary, lists -
Sorry for being absent from the discussion - I fell ill during traveling in
Germany but am now back on the horse.
Jeff, it is certainly an interesting and important idea to compare Peirce's
mature doctrine of the Dicisign from the years after the turn of the century
Dear Clark, lists -
Mathematics certainly deals in propositions according to P.
P's general philosophy of math claims that math is about forms of relations,
and that those abstract objects are addressed by the help of diagrams.
Existing, particular, physical diagram tokens permit the access to
Dear Clark, lists,
Den 25/09/2014 kl. 19.22 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com:
On Sep 25, 2014, at 8:50 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt
stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the move
towards
Dear Cathy, lists
Good point
F
Den 29/09/2014 kl. 02.37 skrev Catherine Legg
cl...@waikato.ac.nzmailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz:
Dear All,
Yes, just to reiterate what has also been said by Jeff D in his post in this
thread – the key criterion for thought, and intelligent thought, is not
Dear Jon, lists
Peirce use the concept degenerate in his sign theory in analogy to the
geometric sense of the term.. Referring to conic sections, certain sections are
generic (hyperbolas, ellipses) while other sections are degenerate because
corresponding to non-generic cases where one or more
Dear Garys, lists,
There is certainly no disparaging in Peirce's claim that icons and indices are
degenerate as compared to symbols. The concept comes from mathematics, conic
sections in particular, where figures like hyperbolas and ellipses are
considered non-degenerate while figures like
Dear Gary, lists,
I think Gun country counts as a Dicisign - it makes a pretty straightforward
claim which could be translated into the linguistic utterance like The US is a
gunlike country. Of course, as in many artworks, the dicisign character is
deliberately weakened in order to leave some
Dear Jerry, lists -
I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's dicisign
conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject parts as atoms with
valencies which fit each other when forming the molecule of the dicisign. He
even compared the two with halogens and
Dear Ben, lists -
Good summary. I discuss some early arguments by Peirce pertaining to these
distinctions in a later ch. of NP.
Best
F
Den 05/10/2014 kl. 16.19 skrev Benjamin Udell
bud...@nyc.rr.commailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com
:
Gary F., Tom, lists,
A predicate's denotation can be narrowed (and
Dear Howard, lists,
Very good - what should be added is just that bits are symbols in another sense
than Peirce's sense of symbol.
Maybe we can compare it to the old vocabulary of structural linguistics - words
are made up of units which may be signs (in-flat-ion), but each of these are
made up
thanks, that is a helpful overview!
F
Den 11/10/2014 kl. 21.46 skrev Gary Richmond
gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com
:
Frederik, lists,
So glad to learn that your health is improved, Frederik. It's terrific having
you active again in the seminar.
Here's a little chart
Dear Gary, lists -
A good Damasio finding. There are rather different viewpoints in the Cog Sci
communities - some of them, including also the Andy Clark school, refuse
neurocentrism and the idea that cognition arises only with neural tissue.
Best
F
Den 19/10/2014 kl. 15.27 skrev Gary Fuhrman
Dear Howard, Gary, lists,
I think Howard and myself are on the same main line here, even if not in all
details.
I think Howard's generalization of language goes too far because that seems
to require an elaborated system to exist as a prerequisite to even the very
first occurrences of signs
Dear Jon, lists -
I do not think that jumping out of the pan of psychologism into the pyre of
biologism is doing logic, pragmatisim, or semiotics much good.
So watch out for that ...
Ha! - point taken!
But I do not see the interest in tracing the development of semiotic and logic
capabilities
Dear Jerry, lists -
There is a bit terminological confusion here. Peirce's distinction within
Dicisigns was between propositions and quasi-propositions, the latter being
those Dicisigns which are not symbols. (One confusion comes from the fact that
Peirce often uses Dicisign and proposition
Dear Jeff, Gary, lists
Den 24/10/2014 kl. 00.10 skrev Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edumailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu:
Gary R., Lists,
Here is a minor point. You say: But Frederik is arguing in his book that the
other two, the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical
Dear Tyler, Gary, lists
I have nothing against a taxonomic approach, as Tyler calls it. We should
certainly develop means to distinguish the simple E.Coli cognition of sugar
from the richness of human propositions - my argument is just that these
taxonomic means are not to be found in Peirce's
Dear Stan, lists,
That is a beautiful picture, and certainly a good candidate for an important
type of conceptual development. But I am not convinced it is the only type.
There could also developments beginning with a pretty precise but narrow
conception … I think different development patterns
F
Den 03/11/2014 kl. 04.40 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com
:
On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:24 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt
stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
There is a bit terminological confusion here. Peirce's distinction within
Dicisigns was between propositions
Dear Howard, lists -
I stumbled over a text bite from mid-October which gave me the idea that there
may be some terminological confusion at the root of some of our discussions.
Den 20/10/2014 kl. 18.19 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com:
HP: Exactly. More
Dear Howard, Gary, lists -
It is certainly correct, as Howard says, that Peirce also maintained the
irreducibility of discreteness to continuity and vice versa. In his categories,
2-ness is discrete, 3-ness is continuous. It is also correct that this is far
from trivial. Actually Peirce
Den 06/11/2014 kl. 17.11 skrev Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edumailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
:
Dear Jeff, lists,
I do not think this P-quote deals with the reduction of individuals to
generalities. It deals with the status of possibilities - it is pertaining to
possibilities he
Dear Gary, lists,
I vaguely recall a picture connecting 1-2-3 - some possibilities (1) seep
through the cracks of existence (2) to become real (3) habits …
I don't recall where it is from …
But whaddabout Jim Hurford and his challenging hypothesis of the visual/dorsal
split realizing
Dear Howard, lists -
I am not sure. Much of the yet unresolved discussion of QM have to do with
deciding which ontological commitments come with the Schrödinger equation. As
far as I have understood, there is no scientific agreement about this (unlike
basic knowledge about iron and cakes
Dear Gary, lists -
I think this is a very nice combination of Damasio's account and mine between
which I do not see any insurmountable difference - thanks!
Actually, I thought of involving Rosen's notion of anticipation when writing
the chapter - but it was already too long -
Best
F
Den
Dear Mara, Garys, lists -
A good summary.
But I do not think neutral objects are confined to human being Umwelt only. It
is correct that Uexküll sometimes said things in that direction, just as, other
times, he said the opposite.
But we have no reason to assume that mammals or birds, e.g., have
Dear Jeff, Michael, Gary R, Lists,
Peirce's engagement with continuity is a huge issue (see books by Kelly Parker
and Matthew Moore addressing this). One comment - when writing Diagrammatology
(2007) I spent considerable time grappling with this issue for the evident
reason that many diagrams
Howard, great, almost Voltarian oneliner ...
Den 25/11/2014 kl. 14.16 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com:
Natural selection only works after you are dead. Semiosis allows selection
while you are still alive.
-
PEIRCE-L
Dear Stan, lists -
:
F: So Howard's claim about the indecidability of epistemologies does not extend
to his own basic epistemologic assumptions which remain stably realist.
S: I do not recall that Howard has urged the philosophical realist argument.
??? Of course he hasn't. He has urged the
sounds like a great solution! - but meticulously distinguishing what is realist
in science and what is not is different from indecidability …
F
Den 01/12/2014 kl. 21.08 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com
:
By undecidable I was thinking of the typical
Dear Howard, lists,
Sorry for having been away from the discussions for some time. Hope to catch up
a bit in the Christmas week.
HP: Chapter 6 is full of examples of signaling and communication by special
purpose symbols. What is missing is the fact that the existence of all
thesespecial
Dear Doug, lists,
Thanks for a good summary of Ch. 7.
Here a few comments.
F
Den 12/12/2014 kl. 03.57 skrev Douglas Hare
ddh...@mail.harvard.edumailto:ddh...@mail.harvard.edu:
Stjernfelt Seminar: Chapter 7: 7.2-7.3
How should we classify the various different types of diagrams which can
Dear Gary, Doug, lists,
I do think the upshot of taking thinking about thinking and hypostatic
abstraction as human privileges must be that non-human animals are (largely)
incapable of second-order logic, both in the standard sense of quantifying over
predicates, but also in the more
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