[PEIRCE-L] A note to sign out

[kirstima]

Gary,

Hereby my wish to sign out from the P-list. Best wishes. Kirsti

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure and applied mathematics

[kirstima]

The answer offered  here to Jerry Chandler by John Sowa I find a very 
good answer.


Cheers, Kirsti



John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.9.2018 17:33:

Jerry LRC,

As Kirsti said, the subject line about categories and modes was
a long thread about Peirce's 1903 classification of the sciences.
I plan to post a copy that text, my diagram about it, and related
quotations by Peirce on my web site.

But I changed the subject line for the topic of pure & applied math.


everything that is imaginable can be described by some theory
of pure mathematics.


How can one describe a “feeling” in pure mathematical terms?


You can't.  That would require applied mathematics.


How can one describe a large bio-molecule, such as Nicotinamide
Adenine Dinucleotide (NAD) in pure mathematical terms?"


For any theory of applied math, there is a simple procedure for
finding a corresponding theory of pure math.  And it's based
on the point you mentioned:

Simply quote W.O Quine:  “To be is to be a variable.”


 1. Start with whatever applied theory you have.  Let's assume
that it's stated in some mixture of mathematical formulas,
chemical symbols, chemical formulas, and English statements.

 2. Leave every name or symbol in pure math unchanged.  Replace
every name or symbol in the application with some distinct, but
non-obvious name -- for example, relation names R1, R2, R3...;
function names F1, F2, F3...; and entity names E1, E2, E3
For variables, use non-obvious names:  x1, x2, x3...

 3. Then translate every statement or formula in any notation
to predicate calculus (Peirce-Peano algebra).  This would be
systematic for the formulas in math & chemistry, but it may
take some thought and rewriting to force raw English into
predicate calculus.  But if the English is precise (or can
be restated precisely), the translation can be done.

 4. But your theory probably depends on many other theories
of chemistry and physics.  Repeat the above steps with all
of those theories -- and be sure to maintain a record of
the way each name was translated -- consistent translation
across all the theories is essential.

 5. After you finish that, throw away the crib sheet that says how
the original names were mapped to the R, F, E, and x symbols.

You now have a theory about which Bertrand Russell would say
"We don't know what we're talking about or whether what we're
saying is true."

That's pure math.

Of course, nobody would ever attempt to translate a complex
theory with many complex dependencies by the above procedure.

Scientists and engineers normally adopt and adapt pure math theories
one at a time, as they are needed.  They often create applied theories
from scratch, without looking for a prefabricated theory in pure math.
But all  such theories can be translated to pure math by the above
method or some variation of it.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being

[kirstima]

Jerry,

John is quoting what Peirce stated in several contexts. So he is right.

In other contexts, CSP writes a lot on unconscius (subconscious etc) 
mind. But he definitely considered his normative logic only applicable 
to deliberate thought. - He also stated that a person is a bunch of 
habit. And on the nature of habits he had a lot to say.


How is unconscious or subconscius mind present to the consicousness? 
CSP's answer was FEELING. - Emotions are something else, they are 
qualitatively different. - What you happened to write below on emotion 
and thought shows in itself how muddled common views on these issues 
are. - Peirce, by the way, did not present a theory of emotions.



Cheers, Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 17.9.2018 21:51:

John:


On Sep 15, 2018, at 5:28 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
To avoid the controversy, I'll delete the phrase "partial and
narrow"
and replace it with a line that says normative logic is the "theory
of self-controlled or deliberate thought".

 Hmmm…

Does this really help?
How does a thought, a spontaneous thought, become normative?
What is the compelling distinction between an ordinary every day
emotion (say, about the sexuality of a beautiful women /man) become
differentiated from normative logic?

Perhaps CSP would have referred to habitual feelings held by a group
of like-minded investigators or some similar rhetorical gesture?

Cheers

Jerry



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] On universalism and essentialism

[kirstima]

Thank you, Edwina.

Kirsti

Edwina Taborsky kirjoitti 16.9.2018 17:35:

Kirstima

Thank you so much for your very astute and wise posts - both of them.
You have pointed out, very subtly and yet accurately, the problem [in
my view] of the many posts on 'exact terminology'.

Edwina

On Sun 16/09/18 10:17 AM , kirst...@saunalahti.fi sent:


List,

After reading some more of the discussion on these threads, I wish
to
remind all of endless feminist disputes on essentialism and
universalism. The answer does not have the form: either/or.

Best, Kirsti



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[PEIRCE-L] On universalism and essentialism

[kirstima]

List,

After reading some more of the discussion on these threads, I wish to 
remind all of endless feminist disputes on essentialism and 
universalism. The answer does not have the form: either/or.


Best, Kirsti


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

[kirstima]

John, list,

First, I wish to thank John for his comments to my earlier post to the 
list. I agreed with all, but one point. Which consist in an, to my mind, 
unwarranted focus on classifications. Peirce in several occasions wrote 
about KINDS. (Should be easy enought to google). - Kinds (as a 
philosophical concept) rely on Qualities and qualitative 
differentiation. Thus on Firstness. Classifications, at least as we late 
moderns know them, do not.


Take, for example, genus, species and an existent individuals (be they a 
facts, events or something else). All empirical sciences deal with 
facts, events or some other kinds of existent individuals.


It is well worth noticing, that CSP relied on KINDS of events in laying 
the grounds for his theory of probabilities. To CSP, they come first. - 
So cutting a long story short, in order to successfully and 
scientifically probabilities in science, including humanities, there 
must be some sense of these qualities.


Now, there is a peculiar linguistic fact, that in English there are two 
different verbs to denote BEING and EXISTENCE. But in French or in Latin 
there are not. In ancient Greece, as far as I know, this would have been 
unconceivable.


Peirce was a polyglott, who conversed with fluence and subtlety e.g. on 
Baskian language. - But I do not recall his ever taking up this special 
feature of English. (And Spanish, as well). I wonder why?


Nowadays English has more and more become the new Latin of scientists 
and scholars. Thus perpetuating a new uniformity within ways of 
thinking. - Translating ones thoughts from one language to some others 
helps a lot in sustaining diversity of thoughts and human mental life. 
Which is just as important as biodiversity.


When taking up MIND, in a Peircean context, one should remember that 
Peirce took up unconscious mind, and especially pointed out that he used 
his concept of FEELING in the same sense that it was used and developed 
by Tetens. Peirce named Tetens Kant's teacher. - Still, no Kant expert, 
nor Peirce expert I have discussed on this, had ever even heard of 
Tetens. To my knowledge, Kant never mentioned Tetens. (Perhaps google 
knows better nowadays).


Why did Peirce change the term 'phenomenology* into 'faneroscopy'? - My 
hypothesis was that it was an attempt to make a distinction with (by 
then more and more popular) Husserlian phenomenology. - I then met a 
very distinguished Peirce scholar in Finland and asked her what she 
thougt. She confirmed that the side notes in the manuscripts were all 
fore this hypothesis.


Peirce does write that math makes its ow logic, but he does not write 
that it is all there is to it.


But no Peircean should do the error of taking the mind as the same as 
consciousness, whatever one may mean by that. Husserlian philosophy was 
designed as a philosophy of consciousness, it aimed to answer to the 
modern question of knowledge, not the ancient or medieval one. - Wisdom 
of the heart was by then dismissed from epistemology. Not so by 
Aristotle and his Sensus Communis.


The clift between epistemology and ontology has left this into the reign 
of common stupidity. In the era of mass media, when it would be most 
direly needed and cultivated.



With best wishes, Kirsti






John F Sowa kirjoitti 13.9.2018 17:03:

Jon AS, Auke, and Jeff BD,

Both subject lines are closely related.  For modes of being,
I'll quote Bertrand Russell, whom I rarely cite:


Mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know
what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true.


That is a dramatic way of making a point that Peirce repeated many
times in many ways:  Every theorem in pure mathematics is hypothetical.
It has the form "If hypothesis (and/or axioms), then conclusion."

That means the subject matter of pure mathematics is pure possibility,
and the theorems are necessary statements about those possibilities.

If a mathematical theorem is applied to something actual in some
branch of science or in common sense, then its conclusion is a
prediction about those actual entities that must be tested by
methodeutic.  For quotations by Peirce, search for the phrase
"pure mathematics" in CP.  There are 49 instances.

As for semiotic, there is a reason why CP 1.190 is just one line:

Phenomenology is, at present, a single study.


Please look at CP 1.300 to 1.353, which he wrote in 1894.  That is
his study of the "conceptions drawn from the logical analysis of
thought."  Since he had previously written that long analysis,
there was no reason for him to say more about phenomenology in 1903.

In 1905, he used the term 'phaneroscopy':

Phaneroscopy is the description of the _phaneron_; and by the
_phaneron_ I mean the total of all that is in any way or in
any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it
corresponds to any real thing or not.  (CP 1.284)


Whether or not phaneroscopy/phenomenology are identical or closely
related, Peirce's 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

[kirstima]

John, P-listers,

I wonder why science(s) seems to be left out of the context in the 
discussions in this thread.  To my mind they are direly needed in order 
to make sense , ecp. of the  latter part of the title, to start with.  
So:


What does a variable refer to?

Within empirical science(s) a variable refers to something  specifically 
measured , and to something specifically controlled  & by any means 
attepted to keep constant OR taken as non-significant in relation the 
issue under study.


Theories and theoretical models are needed in order to make sensible 
decisions on which are the variables that matter. – Thus "a variable" 
(in this context )refers to  the model  chosen for the investigation.  
The model may or may not be presented as a diagram.  All models present 
simplifications of reality.  Just as any map presents a simplification 
of the terrain.  – Otherwise it simply does not do the job.  – EG's 
present  a certain kind of logical maps .


John wrote:
" When we use the words 'possible' and 'actual', we must distinguish
pure mathematics and applied mathematics:

 1. Pure mathematics is pure possibility.  It can never make any
claims about what is or is not actual.

 2. But *applied* mathematics must determine which of the infinitely
many theories are the best approximations to some actuality


Lets take up the logical form of the first assertion. It is about the 
relation between pure math and pure possibility, with the logical 
connection "IS".


This seemingly inocuous connective smuggles in the assumption that we 
are dealing with an existent relation, a relation between two existents 
we can simply name. – With existents, a question of the type: is OR NOT 
is, makes sense. With other kinds, it does not.


(Remember Hamlet: to be OR NOT to be? – Hamlet got stuck in the 
question. Ofelia went mad with Hamlet stuck in it.)


When *applied* math enters, it never does so but within and into a stage 
and scene and plot already *there*.


The audience is also already there. – With no audience, the play just 
flops.


A division between *pure' and *applied* makes sense only within a 
historical, ongoing context.


I do understand that John does have a context, an actual, ongoing 
discussion (ontology) he is taking part in. I do not wish to interfere 
with that. Thus I only send this to the Peirce-list.


Just because I was left wondering wether the ontology context proves out 
to be a Procrustean bed for a Peircean frame of thought?


Best,

Kirsti Määttänen


John F Sowa kirjoitti 22.8.2018 08:31:

Azamat,

When we use the words 'possible' and 'actual', we must distinguish
pure mathematics and applied mathematics:

 1. Pure mathematics is pure possibility.  It can never make any
claims about what is or is not actual.

 2. But *applied* mathematics must determine which of the infinitely
many theories are the best approximations to some actuality


[JFS] Challenge:  I claim that it's impossible to find or
describe anything that is somewhere in between possible/actual
or mathematical/physical -- according to the way I defined it.
 [AA] It was shown by Aristotle that the method of dichotomy is
not good in making an exhaustive division into two and ONLY two
classes.

But that statement is about applied mathematics, where we have to
choose among all the possibilities.  That is the gray area where
there is no certainty.  We can never do an exhaustive analysis.

AA

Reality is so rich and diverse that hardly any formal science
or logical scheme could meet its infinite complexity.


Yes.  But I would prefer to emphasize the choice:

JFS

Reality is so rich and diverse and the possibilities are infinite.
We can never be certain which formal science or logical scheme is 
best.


John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

[kirstima]

John,

Well put, indeed!

Kirsti M.

John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57:

On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that)
you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought:
"No, you don´t tell me when to shut up".


That was from the his first book, the Tractatus.  He wrote that
while he was still following his mentors, Frege and Russell.

Russell and Carnap loved that book, because they misunderstood
his point.  There is much more to say.

Please read the signproc.pdf article.

John



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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic

[kirstima]

Helmut, list,

I do not get confused very easily on these topics:) But I think I quite 
understand your dilemmas. Helmut. Negation is no easy topic.


Formal logic may succeed in making it seem easy. To my mind mostly 
because the sentences to be formalized are invented for the purposes of 
demonstation. Thus they are made seem easy.


But if and when one is interested in natural language, one soon tumbles 
into various difficulties & problems. I would recommend skimming through 
a book by Lawrence R. Horn (1989: A natural history of negation. Horn is 
a linguist, who "..focused on the exploration of natural language 
negation and its relation to other operators" (Wikipedia). Just in order 
to get an overview on the variety of problems.


Don't get stuck with 'exclusion'! - CSP starts his graph theory with the 
concept of a sheet of assertion, which has a recto and verso. - Now, 
does the recto exclude the verso? - Well, yes AND no.


IF you have started with the idea of a sheet of paper, then you can only 
see what's on it but not simultaneously the other side. IF you have 
started out with yhe idea of pages in a book, you simultaneously can see 
two pages, and then you need to turn the page. (But unless you have 
superpowers you only can read the pages one by one.)


With computer screens thigs go differently. It is no longer obvious to 
all, that any verso even exists. Common sense is changing... though 
slowly.


CSP's general advice is: one must start what we believe (i.e do not 
doubt in our hearts). And then proceed in a methodical way, step by 
step, without jumping into conclusions. As our minds naturally, i.e 
spontaneously tend to do.


In order to follow Peirce's mindset in laying out the logic in EG's, one 
must start with the practical settings in his days. A sheet of paper and 
a pen, OR a blackboard and a piece of chalk.


Which one is positive? Which on is negative? - One just must make up 
ones mind! AND be consistent with the choice. - Ink on paper cannot be 
easily erased, whilst chalk on a blackboard is.


Our contemporary habits have more and more been formed to accord with 
computer screens. Erasing is so easy, one does not tend to even take 
notice of doing so.


Why do these practical trivialities matter? - Because they presume and 
indicate certain kinds of mind-sets, which  change in time. Our task (as 
Peirceans) is to understand his mind-set and 'translate' as best we can 
to our contemporaries (with now prevailing mind-sets).


Action and experience are formed by each other. => Common sense.

I have only studied in detail Peirce's introduction to EGs. Partly 
because my limited interest in formal logic. My main interest lies in 
natural language(s), discourse in the Foucaldian sense. Even with that 
my interests lie in meanings conveyed, i.e. the relations between 
thoughts and various ways of conveying thoughts. I.e. understanding.


Your problems with the concept 'identity' I find most relevant and 
important. - There is a great difference between mathematical indentity 
and logical identity. ( I think you may gain from taking up Fayerabent: 
Anything goes. He writes a most fun exposition on varieties of traits in 
attempts to define anything. I do not agree with his conclusions, mind 
you. - But they somewhat resemble what you write in your post.)


There was (in the list) a quote (by gnox) from CSP on three lines of 
identity I have hoped to take up here. We'll see.  - Was it about 
magpies? If it was about another species of birds, it makes no (logical) 
difference. Somewhere in his writings the demonstrative example is about 
magpies.


Thank you for your post!

Best, Kirsti



Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 27.5.2018 01:41:

Kirsti, list,
I also think, that "negation" is an interesting and urgent topic.
Peirce´s graphs are maybe based on exclusion, but is exclusion the
same as negation? And, is exclusion the opposite of inclusion (Venn?)
And is negation of negation the same as affirmation? Many questions,
of which I suspect each answer to be "No". But we want to find the
"Yes"ses, dont we.
Example: There is said (in the internet) that integrity is based on
identity. I don´t agree:
Identity is traital negation, definition by exclusion of certain
traits, and keeping the left ones, and if there are none, just pick
any out of the blue, like nations, ethnics, your mothers, esoterics,
religions, or else.
Integrity is negation of negation of temporal and situative
differences of behaviour.
So both are completely different, but are not opposites either, as
they concern different things. So there may be a negation which is not
a negation.
So much for that, I hope I have completely confused you, because
complete confusion is the most democratic starting point for a
fruitful discussion. Best, Helmut.

 26. Mai 2018 um 18:38 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
John,

 I took up your reference to vol 4 in Chronological ed. - I you can
shed
 any more light on loops and twists in CPS's 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic

[kirstima]

John,

I took up your reference to vol 4 in Chronological ed. - I you can shed 
any more light on loops and twists in CPS's way to his latest 
existential graps, I would be most grateful.


Greimas, the Lithuanian semiotician I have met and discussed with, used 
a square similar to the one in page 397. It turned out that he had never 
thought of his semiotic square in terms of triad (or triple) relations.


A square, like the diagram in CSP page 397, can be folded two ways. Then 
one gets two triangles. One recto, one verso, each visible at a time, 
but not together (the very idea of recto and verso).


My interest lies mainly on the relation of logical negation and other 
forms of opposition. Pythagorean oppositions, for example are often 
treated as negations, without proper grounds.



Best,

Kirsti Määttänen


John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.5.2018 18:44:

On 5/18/2018 12:54 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
I've only seen Venn mention Peirce in regard to Peirce's symbolism for 
symbolic logic. It's too bad there wasn't more interaction between the 
two.


I agree.

After reading your note,  I didn't do an exhaustive search, but
I found that Peirce (a) had a high regard for Venn, (b) recognized
the limitations and errors in Venn's writings, and (c) considered
Venn's errors a stimulating starting point for his own thinking.

That led me to Venn's articles from 1880, which may have had a
significant influence on Peirce's thinking about graph logics.
They're in the 1880 proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical
Society, which can be downloaded from Google Books:

"On the various notations adopted for expressing the common
propositions of Logic", pp. 36-47 (55-66).

This article includes brief excerpts from a large number of
sources, including Frege (1879) and Peirce (1880).  But Venn's
comments about Frege's notation were not encouraging.  See
the attached FregeByVenn.jpg.

Immediately following that article (pp. 47-59) is Venn's
article "On geometrical diagrams for the representation of
logical propositions."  In this one, he compares his own
diagrams with a variety of other representations.

In 1882, Peirce wrote a letter to O. H. Mitchell (Writings,
vol 4, pp. 394 to 399) in which he drew diagrams to represent
the "logic of relatives.

John



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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Roses are red

[kirstima]

Helmut, list,

Pastness is always relative to present and future, that is what Peirce 
means. There is a feeling of pastness attacheched to memories and 
reminiscences. Which is the ground for recognizing them AS memories.


Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.5.2018 17:40:

John, Stephen, list,

I agree that it is trivial. But then why did Peirce write that
pastness is relative? Maybe "pastness" is the feeling, not the past?
Here is the quote again:

Peirce: CP 8.194 Cross-Ref:††

"A questioner to whom pragmaticism comes as a novelty will naturally
ask, "Do you mean to say that you do not believe there has been any
past?" To which the pragmaticist will reply, -- and note well his
answer, because it is analogous to the answer he will give to a host
of questions to which no further allusion will be made, -- "Why, I
believe in the reality of the past just as completely as you do, and
just in the way that you do, except that either you or I perhaps do
not describe correctly the intellectual side of [its] real meaning. To
any memory [of] the past, there attaches a certain color, -- a certain
quality of feeling, -- just as there does to the sight of a
Jacqueminot rose.†5 Ontological metaphysicians usually say that
'secondary sensations,' such as colors, are delusive and false; but
not so the Pragmaticist. He insists that the rose really is red; for
red is, by the meaning of the word, an appearance; and to say that a
Jacqueminot rose really is red means, and can mean, nothing but that
if such a rose is put before a normal eye, in the daylight, it will
look red. Just so, the feeling qualities attaching to memories are
entirely true and real, though obviously relative, as pastness itself
obviously is relative."

 Best, Helmut
More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [1] .
Links:
--
[1] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm



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Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[kirstima]

List,

I second Gene's views. A most important post.A most important CSP quote!

Kirsti Määttänen

Eugene Halton kirjoitti 5.3.2018 23:01:

Dear Gary R.

You mention the problem of greed, Gary, denying that it is
a problem of science and claiming that it is a misuse of science by
“the world’s power players,” ie., outsiders to science. You say,
“Peirce himself almost certainly did find the essential “wicked
problems” to be a consequence of the political-economic system, not
science itself.” I disagree. Peirce actually did severly criticise
the science of political economy itself as a philosophy of greed:

“The nineteenth century is now fast sinking into the grave, and we
all begin to review its doings and to think what character it is
destined to bear as compared with other centuries in the minds of
future historians. It will be called, I guess, the Economical Century;
for political economy has more direct relations with all the branches
of its activity than has any other science. Well, political economy
has its formula of redemption, too. It is this: Intelligence in the
service of greed ensures the justest prices, the fairest contracts,
the most enlightened conduct of all the dealings between men, and
leads to the _summum bonum_, food in plenty and perfect comfort. Food
for whom? Why, for the greedy master of intelligence. I do not mean to
say that this is one of the legitimate conclusions of political
economy, the scientific character of which I fully acknowledge. But
the study of doctrines, themselves true, will often temporarily
encourage generalizations extremely false, as the study of physics has
encouraged necessitarianism. What I say, then, is that the great
attention paid to economical questions during our century has induced
an exaggeration of the beneficial effects of greed and of the
unfortunate results of sentiment, until there has resulted a
philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that greed is the great
agent in the elevation of the human race and in the evolution of the
universe.” 6.290:

Peirce was criticizing the science of political economy of
his time as reaching what Peirce held to be a false generalization.
But it was the science itself that held this false generalization, not
simply outsiders. And Peirce’s criticism extended to Darwin’s
scientific theory of natural selection:

“The Origin of Species of Darwin merely extends
politico-economical views of progress to the entire realm of animal
and vegetable life. The vast majority of our contemporary naturalists
hold the opinion that the true cause of those exquisite and marvelous
adaptations of nature for which, when I was a boy, men used to extol
the divine wisdom, is that creatures are so crowded together that
those of them that happen to have the slightest advantage force those
less pushing into situations unfavorable to multiplication or even
kill them before they reach the age of reproduction. Among animals,
the mere mechanical individualism is vastly re-enforced as a power
making for good by the animal's ruthless greed. As Darwin puts it on
his title-page, it is the struggle for existence; and he should have
added for his motto: Every individual for himself, and the Devil take
the hindmost!” 6.293

Peirce did not reject Darwin’s theory, which he admired,
but argued that it was a partial view of evolution, to which Peirce
added two other modalities to produce a three category model. But it
was Darwin’s scientific theory, not oligarch Andrew Carnegie’s
capitalist expropriation of it, that Peirce criticized.

My criticism of the overreach of science and technology
comes from somewhat of a similar place. I’m criticizing the costs of
outlooks which take precise elements of reality as the whole of
reality, myopically, while excluding real elements in ways whose costs
and consequences have now brought the biosphere to the gates of
catastrophe. Yes, I would agree that Peirce offers a much broader
understanding of science, but that does not excuse the ways in which
science and technology have been willing perps in unsustainability as
well.

Gene H

PS Dear Edwina, I did not address fossil fuels, perhaps you were
responding to Gary R’s discussion of fossil fuels. But I would say
that there, as in any technology, it is not simply a question about
human comfort, but rather the question of sustainable limits: not
simply for human comfort, but for a longer “seven generations”
outlook inclusive of the community of life.




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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

[kirstima]

Good points. But both of you seem to move only within the thin air of 
abstractions. There is a need for concrete demonstrations. Examples to 
examine, for example.


Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 19.2.2018 14:47:

Jon,

Your collection of Peirce quotes deploying the term “quasi-mind”
(if each is taken in context) seemed to me quite enough to clarify
what the term signifies — so I haven’t followed your additional
explanation very closely, as it seemed to me redundant. But I think it
may also be misleading in a couple of ways.

First, you seem to be developing a concept of “quasi-mind” which
makes it _more specific_ than “mind,” as if it has some special
qualities that other kinds of “mind” don’t have. I think this is
a mistake, because in Peirce’s usage, “quasi-mind” is a broader,
_more general_ term than “mind.” He was directing attention to
something that has mindlike qualities but not necessarily _all_ those
qualities or functions which we habitually associate with “mind,”
and not necessarily _only_ those qualities or functions. For instance,
a human mind is one kind of quasi-mind, not the other way round.

Second, Peirce says (EP2:545) that “Such perfect sign is a
quasi-mind,” but you seem to be interpreting this as if it said that
_every quasi-mind is a perfect sign_. I don’t see any warrant for
that.

Pardon me if I’ve misread you, but if so, at least you know that
such misreadings are possible!

Gary f.

FROM: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
SENT: 18-Feb-18 20:41
TO: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

List:

Having received no corrections or objections to my summary of the
relevant Peirce quotes, I would like to offer some further comments.

In these contexts, at least, Quasi-minds are clearly indispensable to
Sign-action. In fact, there must be at least _two _Quasi-minds (#4-5)
involved, such that the Sign serves as a medium for communication of a
Form _between _them (#6), "welding" them such that they are at one in
the Sign itself. Hence the term "Sign" here evidently refers to what
Peirce elsewhere called a _genuine _Sign--one that requires
Quasi-minds serving as _both _utterer _and _interpreter, which may be
past and future versions of the _same _Quasi-mind. By contrast, a
_natural _(or degenerate) Sign does not require a Quasi-mind to _utter
_it, just a Dynamic Object to _determine _it.

The Dynamic Object does this _only _in the particular respect that
enables the (genuine or natural) Sign to act upon the second
Quasi-mind _as if _the Dynamic Object itself were acting upon it (#7).
I take this "respect" to be the Immediate Object, the _partial
_combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the Sign
_denotes _it. Thus "deputized" by its Object, the Sign _determines
_the second Quasi-mind to produce a feeling, exertion (action), or
other Sign (thought) as its Dynamic Interpretant (#8), which is a
_singular _event (#3). The Sign is best regarded as this very
determination of the interpreting Quasi-mind, rather than as an Object
that addresses itself to that Quasi-mind (#9).

So what is a Quasi-mind? My last tentative definition called it a
bundle of Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation (i.e.,
_reacting substance_) that retains the capacity for Habit-change
(i.e., _learning by experience_), and thus can be the Quasi-utterer of
a _genuine _Sign (since this requires a _purpose_) and the
Quasi-interpreter of _any _Sign. I still think that this is close to
the mark, but can now clarify that a Quasi-mind is a _Sign _that
constitutes an aggregate or complex of all _previous _Signs that have
determined it, which are so connected together as to produce _one
_Interpretant (#1). As such, a Quasi-mind _includes _the Immediate
Objects of all those previous Signs, which serve as its Collateral
Experience, as well as their Final Interpretants, which serve as its
Habits of Interpretation.

I also still believe that the capacity for Habit-change is what
distinguishes a Quasi-mind from a brute Thing--a strictly _material
_reacting substance whose Habits of Interpretation have become
inveterate ("matter as effete mind," CP 6.25; 1891). I was previously
leaning toward also requiring a Quasi-mind to be a center of
consciousness (i.e., _unity of feeling_), based primarily on the
following passage, as expounded in a recent book chapter by Vincent
Colapietro ("Habits, Awareness, and Autonomy," in Donna E. West and
Myrdene Anderson, Eds., _Consensus on Peirce's Concept of Habit_, pp.
297-313).


CSP: Of course, each personality is based upon a "bundle of habits,"
as the saying is that a man is a bundle of habits. But a bundle of
habits would not have the unity of self-consciousness. That unity
must be given as a centre for the habits. The brain shows no central
cell. The unity of consciousness is therefore not of physiological
origin. It can only be metaphysical. So far as feelings have any
continuity, it is the metaphysical nature of feeling to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims and Mediation

[kirstima]

Thank you, Jon for bringing up your "Seven major variations..."

In it you take up with excellent clarity seven perspectives upon the 
Maxim, from the standpoint of a philospher. Mentioning year with each 
quote is very informative in respect of development of CSP's main 
interests and aims.


However, my main interests lie in contexts of various formulations. 
Those in Harward lectures have occupied my thoughts several decades. The 
problem of mediation needs that, to my mind. Perhaps not yours.


Best,

Kirsti Määttänen



Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 14.2.2018 15:40:

Kirsti, List ...

I did once collect seven major variations on the theme:

Pragmatic Maxim
Seven Ways of Looking at a Pragmatic Maxim
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/

Plus a sample of previous discussions:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/?s=Pragmatic+Maxim

Regards,

Jon




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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell Lectures)

[kirstima]

gnox,

There must have been some misunderstanding of my post, if you could not 
find what I meant. Which is foud EP 2, 134-135.


Even if CSP states in his Harward Lectures (1903) "I have not succeeded 
any better than this: Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical 
judgement expressible in the indicative mood is a confused form of 
thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to 
enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional 
sentencehaving its apodosis in the imperative mood. " EP 2, 134-135


Now, this CSP gave in 1903, quite late. So we may certainly claim that 
he gives a so-called understatement in writing on having not succeeded 
any better than... And may infer that this formulation had been most 
critically inspected several times over a long period of his work. - 
This I take to be a stamp of approval.


The quote above points at "a corresponding practical maxim" (note: 
"imperative mood").


CSP continues with the Maxim of Pragmatism, as he originally stated it. 
"Consider what effects  (etc)


So CSP first presents a later formulation  of the principle, which, in 
relation to the earlier formulation (in the context of this particular 
lecture) may taken as a second (II). That is a later one. And in this 
very context the one taken up after it, is to taken as a first (I).


On which grounds? - On the grounds of simplest arithmetics and the very 
idea of ordinality. I, II, III.



In the Harward Lecture (1903) Peirce leaves this, and goes on with the 
theory and concept of probability. - Why?


To me the answer seems clear: Because a proper theory of probabality is 
absolutely needed in order to understand and put into scientific use 
both of the formulations.


I will come back to other responses in this thread as soon as possible. 
But, alas, I will be away for at least a couple of days.


This question by gnox seemed the most pressing one.

Also, I wish to think before I respond. Sometimes I give in to the 
temptation of a quich response.



Best,

Kirsti Määttänen






g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 16.2.2018 20:04:

Kirsti,

Jon A.S. gave five of Peirce’s formulations of the “pragmatic
maxim,” but I haven’t found the place in EP2 where “he gave a
final stamp of his approval by explicitly NAMING them AS The first and
The second formulation of The Pragmatic Maxim (in EP vol 2).” Can
you tell us where to find that? Otherwise, as Jon said, we can’t
tell which formulation is the “second,” or discuss how a third
might differ from it.

By the way, my book is not about Peirce; it’s about the
philosophical issues involving signs, and though it quotes Peirce
quite a lot, it’s about those semiotic issues rather than issues of
Peirce interpretation. I’ve had my say about those interpretive
issues elsewhere, such as peirce-l and a couple of papers, but not
very much in _Turning Signs_.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 14-Feb-18 14:23
To: PEIRCE L 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell
Lectures)

Gary f., list,

Your response presented as full an understanding of essential points
in my post as I could ever hope. Even more, I was greatly and happily
surprised.

And yes, of course there are any formulations of the ideas conveyed by
the two short expressions he gave a final stamp of his approval by
explicitly NAMING them AS The first and The second formulation of The
Pragmatic Maxim (in EP vol 2). (Note the cardinals!)

He writes about them all the time, of course. In search of as good a
linguistic expression as he was ever able to come up with.

But, at a later date he takes up the First of these feeling a need for
a Second, which does not (in any way) contradict with accepting the
First, but taking it into a further stage, so to speak.

I have not read your book, Gary. I do not read about Peirce, have not
done so for centuries. Which, just as you write, gives much more
weight and value to us both.



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell Lectures)

[kirstima]

Gary f., list,

Your response presented as full an understanding of essential points in 
my post as I could ever hope. Even more, I was greatly and happily 
surprised.


And yes, of course there are any formulations of the ideas conveyed by 
the two short expressions he gave a final stamp of his approval by 
explicitly NAMING them AS The first and The second formulation of The 
Pragmatic Maxim (in EP vol 2). (Note the cardinals!)


He writes about them all the time, of course. In search of as good a 
linguistic expression as he was ever able to come up with.


But, at a later date he takes up the First of these feeling a need for a 
Second, which does not (in any way) contradict with accepting the First, 
but taking it into a further stage, so to speak.


I have not read your book, Gary. I do not read about Peirce, have not 
done so for centuries. Which, just as you write, gives much more weight 
and value to us both.


If you see my point on ordinality and cardinality, it is very, very 
exceptional. Simplest math is most difficult for both philosophers and 
mathematicians to understand. There is this cultural aura around math 
which seems to make people bow there heads and kneel. Instead of 
approaching the questions at hand head on.


I have always preached that it takes courage and guts to think properly 
and face the consequences of one's own thinking.


I am very happy to have had the experience of feeling understood in my 
old age with some issues I've almost given up hope with.


My sincere thanks to your, Gary f.

Kirsti










g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 14.2.2018 19:32:

Kirsti,

I did give your post on ordinality and cardinality a second reading,
and I think I see your point, but I don’t have any particular
response to it, except to say that these logico-mathematical issues
are likely to arise again as we move on to Lowell Lectures 4 and 5,
where Peirce has much to say about “_multitude”_.

I guess it’s time to start on Lowell 4, which I’ll do any day now
… my transcription is already up on my website,
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell4.htm [1] .

About Peirce’s formulations of the pragmatic maxim, I’m pretty
sure there are more than two in his writings, so it would help if you
would quote exactly the two that you refer to as the “first” and
“second.” Then we can look for a third.

I think your new post makes a very important point when you say that
“the self to write down was the former self, not exactly the same as
the one(self) doing the writing down.” Or as I might put it, When
one decides to write down what one is thinking, one often finds that
the thought is changed by the act of writing it down. And it may
change again when you read what you’ve written. So, as you say,
“We all (hopefully) reformulate what we write during writing. Up
until it feels good enough. - Or should do so.”

Some of us who post here usually do go through such a process. Others
are so eager to have their say that they usually hit “Send”
without even looking over what they’ve written. That’s one extreme
which tends to increase the quantity, and decrease the quality, of
posts on the list,— which makes many subscribers impatient. At the
other extreme are those who formulated their ‘positions’ years
ago, but never tire of repeating those same formulations or opinions,
usually in the context of agreeing or disagreeing with somebody
else’s formulation. That habit also increases the quantity, and
decreases the overall quality, of posts on the list, because it
usually generates repetitive “debates” instead of developing a
genuine _argument_ (in the full Peircean sense of that word).

I think the ideal kind of post on the list is somewhere between those
two extremes. It’s the kind of post that has already gone through a
formulation and reformulation process, but takes the result of that
prior process as an “experiment,” and genuinely hopes to learn
something new from the result, i.e. from whatever response it gets. As
you say, “A living mind is continuously active, and any symbol lives
as long as [its] continuity gets created and recreated by new minds,
in new contexts.” For instance, I’ve said very similar things in
my book, but your statement is every bit as _original _as mine was,
because it was formulated based on _your_ experience and _your_ way of
using the language. Both of us have “recreated” the symbol by
reformulating it, “replicating” it in different ways, and thus
taken its expression a step or two further. That’s part of what I
call a genuine _argument_ (as opposed to a debate, which is a kind of
context between two fixed positions). It’s the sense in which Peirce
said that the Universe is “an argument”, “a vast representamen
… working out its conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193-4, CP
5.119).

I hope you don’t find this presumptuous. At least I can assure you
that it’s been formulated with some care, including careful
attention to your post. So if you think I got you wrong, I’d really
like to know that!

[PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell Lectures)

[kirstima]

List,

First I wish to express my appreciation to Gary f., to his lead and his 
commentaries on LL. - However, it seem to me that the discussions tend 
to get muddled on certain very, very basic respects.


Peirce's first formulation of the Pragmatic Maxims was about "practical 
bearings". So it was about doing something, more specifically it was 
about experimentation. Experimentation is about doing systematical 
observations (with some stated, conscious rules, mostly with non 
conscius habits of feeling). This applies to thought experiments just as 
well.


The second, later formulation of the Pragmatic Maxim is about 
understanding and interpreting the ideas an thoughts mediated by texts, 
diagrams (etc).


But to my knowledge CSP did not write down a third, strictly worded 
formulation of the Maxim. If there is one to be found, it must reside in 
his very latest writings.


However, he left a legacy on how to find and grasp the essence of The 
Third. - To my mind Peircean phenomenology is the Turning Point. And the 
key.


Writing down or drawing down means making one's ideas observable, 
objectifying them to be inspected. By oneself AND by others. But the 
self to write down was the former self, not exactly the same as the 
one(self) doing the writing down.


Husserlian Phenomenology is all about knowledge and consciousness. 
Nonconscious mind gets left out at the outset. (I have consulted several 
experts on Husserl, as well as thoroughly inspected some of his key 
writings.) I have good reasons to believe that Peirce resorted in 
choosing (for some time) not to use the same term in order to avoid 
confusing and muddling his phenomenology with that of Husserl.  - 
Hegel's Phenomenology he partly accepted, but definitely not Hegel's 
Logic.


We do have conscious control (deliberation) in starting to write down 
our thoughts and ending it. But our minds are not simultaneously 
starting or ending feeling and thinking. Not with the first nor with 
last word (or line etc).


A living mind is continuously active, and any symbol lives as long as 
continuity gets created and recreated by new minds, in new contexts.


Any act of writing down one's thoughts and ideas is an experiment. We 
all (hopefully) reformulate what we write during writing. Up until it 
feels good enough. - Or should do so.


Peirce List is not supposed to be an arena for just opinions, in the the 
sense: "This is my opinion, and as such it is just as good as yours!". - 
A have seen such a response in the List. - The majority in Peirce's 
times voted him down, remember!


This list is and should by all means remain an arena for argumentation, 
not just expressing opinions. In philosophy and in sciences (including 
human sciences, i.e. humanities) soundness of grounds matters.


When I was a little child my mother sometimes used to respond to us 
children: "Auf dumme Fragen antworte ich
nicht". I did not understand the language, but in time I got the 
message: There was something wrong with the question asked. The question 
was stupid, unanswerable.


Perhaps my interest in formulating questions, in relation with possible 
answers, stems from these early, preschool times.


I will leave below my earlier mail on ordinality and cardinality, which, 
to my mind, deserves a second reading. The choice if of course yours.


By the time of the FIRST Maxim, CSP was concentrating on Signs, later on 
(SECOND) he shifted towards Meaning, though not at all changing his 
subject. Just changing the main, but not only perspective.


Best,

Kirsti Määttänen



kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 7.12.2017 11:57:

John & Jon,

The two paragraphs offered by John to clarify the meaning of the verb
'to indentify'  did not do the job for me. Quite the contrary.  Many
questions arose.

JFS:  "In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two
structures that are isomorphic.  Some mathematicians call that
practice "abuse of notation" and insist on adding some annotations to
the marks in order to distinguish the references.  But most do not
bother to clutter their notations with such annotations."

Question:  Which (variety of) notations do you mean?   2 = 2  and  a = 
a ?

Both can be read aloud as – equals – ,  OR – is identical with – .

The mark remains the same, but there is change of meaning, depending
on the (mathematical) context.
With cardinals,  2 = 2 can be taken as equal and identical with  1+1 =
1+1. With a = a the situation is not that simple.

With ordinals this does not apply.  As was shown by CSP in his
cyclical arithmetics.

Not only does "how many?" count, "how many times? " counts. (This is a
joke, mind you).

Positions within multiple cycles begin to mean a lot.

Also zero becomes very interesting, indeed.

When zero was introduced (by arabic influence) to our number system,
it brought with it not only calculus, but also the arabic numbering
system.

Thus 000 = 00 (etc.), but 10  and 100 and 1000 (etc.) make a huge
difference. (As we 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

[kirstima]

List,

I too second Gary Richmonds note. I'd like to add that multiple postings 
seem to be adjunct to this problem.

People send to personal mailboxes in addtion to the list.

If just that gets left out, the mass of mails would not look so awfull, 
so hopeless.


Best, Kirsti



Ia mail is sent to the list,

Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 12.2.2018 16:40:

Peircers,

I also have to unsubscribe periodically, as I don't have time
even to scan for relevance, and many postings recently appear
to move ever so agonizingly and asymptotically toward first
principles without quite grasping them, much less applying
them to non-trivial problems in any field beyond various
folks' hermeneutically sealed bubbles -- but I digress --
At any rate, one thing I find helpful, since I usually
read posts first at the Web Interface, is to toggle
the No Mail subscriber option on, allowing me to
re-send only selected posts to my email inbox
for archiving or reply.

Regards,

Jon

On 2/12/2018 9:01 AM, Everett, Daniel wrote:
Deletion is always a possibility. So is unsubscribing. There are 
occasionally (rarely though) useful bits in these disputations about 
meaning. As I have tried to point out, they strike me as both 
unPeircean (no practical consequences, no problem solved) and not 
particularly well-connected to the vast literature on lexical meanings 
or cognizant of the kind of “essentialist disputes” that bothers many 
philosophers.


I do look through them all, however. The reason is that I am a novice 
to Peircean studies and am writing a book (Oxford U P) on the 
consequences of his epistemology for modern linguistics (which has 
been deeply Cartesian in the main for decades). So when more 
experienced Peirce scholars discuss his terms, it can be educational.


I think that the suggestion of taking a few deep breaths before 
responding and perhaps responding once a day instead of several times 
would/could lead to better responses of more benefit to others.


To delete the messages would require me to know in advance that there 
is nothing in them that I want to know. So I look through them and 
then delete them if I am going to. Time-consuming.


At the same time, let a hundred flowers bloom. If folks want to keep 
shooting out their messages this frequently, so be it. But many of us 
will be more likely to read them if they come less frequently. If 
these are just personal quibbles, though, perhaps they don’t need to 
be on the list. If they are felt worthy for the entire list, frequency 
reduction would be useful. But if not, I won’t say another word on the 
subject.


Dan




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's search for a more iconic notation

[kirstima]

To my mind CSP by iconical meant turning into geometrical proof. Not 
only minute steps written in a very long row
according to a large set of rules given by tradition, but difficult or 
even impossible to convey.


A possibility for an overview of logical structures, an overview to be 
obtained by patient practicing.


I truly cannot understand what is meant by "more taraditional algebraic 
notation". The birth of algebra came  historically by in amalgamation of 
Europian and Arabic traditions (al yabr). There were wars and invasions. 
Spain, for example was taken over for a very long time.


The idea of zero, of marking out a place for nothing, was as good as 
unthinkable in ancient Greece.


With zero came forth equation mark (=).

With equation mark, came forth algebra. Which is about equations.


The logical meaning of equations comes down to what we all the time do 
when we believe we are just re-phrasing.


The mark = means a claim of essential equality. According to a long 
tradition of well-studied, well established  rules.


I apologize for butting in, again, in discussions I have not been 
following but sporadically.


If I were to read all responses, and think, it would soona become my 
main job.


No one would wish that! - So leaving you for a while, I wish you all the 
best for the year now well on its way!


Kirsti






Aristotle never wrote down or explicated his syllogisms. As is often 
presumed.


John F Sowa kirjoitti 8.1.2018 23:52:

I was rereading Peirce's 1885 article "On the Algebra of Logic",
in which he presented the algebraic notation that was adopted
by Schröder, Peano, Russell, Whitehead, and the rest of the world.

In the final paragraph of that article (csp85p202.jpg), he wrote

It is plain that by a more iconical and less logically analytical
notation this procedure might be much abridged...


That comment shows that he was already thinking about a graphical
notation as more iconic that the algebra -- and he expected its proofs
to be "much abridged" in comparison to proofs with the algebra.

In later writings, he wrote that EG proofs tended to be longer than
other methods.  But he was comparing them to the more traditional
syllogisms, not to the algebraic notation (which few of his readers
at that time had seen).

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

[kirstima]

John, list

If and when "formal languages" end up with attepts at eliminating 
flexibility in natural languages, it will not be natural languages which 
will get defeated.


Just take a quick look at the history. All proof lies in the side of 
natural languages.


John wrote: "Since teachers use NLs to explain formal languages, it's 
possible

to constrain NLs to limit the meanings to a smaller set.  But that
requires tight discipline and more verbose expressions."


This kind use of the word "SINCE" I find most objectionable. In this 
expression it is used as if making believe that it stands for any kind 
of a logical proof is mere sham. By the rules of formal logic in the 
strictiest of senses.


Do you mean "some teachers" or "all teachers"? Do "all teachers" explain 
formal languages, or just a majority of the teachers you happen to know? 
Is it not possible, or even most probable, that your sample is somewhat 
skewed? Since you know them by teaching them formal languages?


If "discipline" is taken to be the highest goal to be imposed upon all 
others, then not much is known on human learning. - Are formal logicians 
to take on whipping or what?


Peirce was definitely not just or only a mathematician. - Math is often 
found scary. But only because it has been teached in very bad ways. 
Taking disrete objects and counting them in whatever order as the 
starting point.


It is true that in ancient Greece pebbles at the strand of the ocean 
were commonly used. But definitely not as a by a random throughing 
about. - The main question was not: HOW MANY? - The main question was 
about the relations of the pebbles, very carefully set in front of the 
discussants in a preplanned order, into a preplanned pattern.


In set theoretical approach HOW MANY remains the main type of questions. 
It just gets more complicated in various manners.  The question often 
gets modulated into questions of exacting the measurements more and 
more. Even Kochs curves have shown the futility os such attemps. With 
more and more exatly focused cameras, any length of any strand, however 
small, the line between the water and the ocean, gets infinitely long.


This is true of all natural shapes.

Set theory landed in Finland, too. This happened here by the time my 
daughter went to school. I was appalled. Was very happy to hear that 
Rolf Nevanlinna (whose name assume you know, being a mathematician 
yourself) was greatly opposed to such an idea. Which I find quite 
'natural', he being a famous function theorist.


Even if and when the Cartesian origo and two axes ( x and y) may be used 
to map all kinds measurements (as long as the scales are agreed to 
match), algebraic (mathematical) functions are about continuity.


Continuity gets projected upon and from discrete values if an alberaic 
formula formed by generalizing
from two values  obtained by marking the places at where they meet in x 
and y axes, respectively.
(In order to get into even near z, the famous third, much more math is 
needed.)


Thus continuity gets violated (just as CSP wrote)and Gary f. duly noted. 
But as far as I know, he did not write down the more trivial steps, 
which mathematicians seem to have left into oblivion, but which may be 
of interest to those who not so familiar with basic math. Who may get 
dazzled by seeming mysteries on the the multiplicity of modern 
mathematical branches)


Anyone can count from zero, IF discete objects, like so popular apples 
are offered and taken for granted. . But if any child asks how did 
apples come to be, or how many apples there  ever have been or may 
become, true teachers must confess that they do not know. - Even those 
well and thoroughly familiar with differential and integral algebra, and 
most skilled in calculating  (seemingly exact) approximations near the 
limit, LIMES, of the so called positive turning into somethin else, 
called the negative.


There is and must be s kind of turning point. Of its nature there is no 
agreement amongst mathematicians. Math alone cannot handle the question 
very well.


Remember "recto" and "verso" by Peirce! Remember two sides of a coin!

The other side of any coin shows its value, the other shows the kingdom 
the value inscribeb the other side is valid.


What connects the two sides? - Only human thougt. And human customs.

This is what meaning is all about.

Both Epimetheus and Prometheus, the one that remembers and the one which 
foresees, must join, come together in order to make sense.


Best, Kirsti

I'll leave John's mail underneath. To save the trouble of searching for 
it. Which I often find cumbersome.




John F Sowa kirjoitti 10.1.2018 22:44:

Gary,

Continuity in meaning is fundamental to the flexibility of natural
languages (NLs).  But the formal languages of logic, mathematics,
and computer science gain precision by reducing or eliminating that
flexibility.  They do so by severely restricting the range of meanings.

Since teachers use NLs to explain 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic

[kirstima]

Jerry, list,

CSP wrote: the meaning of anything lies in what it aims at. - This what 
teleology is about.


The problem lies in that we cannot just just look and see what the aims 
are. - Can you now just see what my aim now is? - You may and most 
probably do have thoughts and opinions on the issue, but how about 
finding out whether they are true about this particular case?


Putnam quote takes up only one side of the issue of finding out. Also 
the other side, that of loosing one's way, finding oneself utterly 
confused, loosing one's foothold etc.


Reading Aristotle often does that. So does reading CSP, or Hegel etc.. 
Wittgenstein even made it kind of his aim.


CSP was quite clear in his critique of relying on the method of 
authority only. But it is very often gone unnoticed that he did not just 
condemn it. His advice was to try (whatever) out first, as best one can. 
 And only if one can find independent proof, not just once but 
repeatedly, THEN accept some (or much) authority to the writer in 
question.


These belong to the basics of scientific proof by empirical testing. No 
results of a single experiment proves anything. There always has to be a 
series of expreriments.


Along with the common belief that single words carry a meaning which 
simply can be defined (which does not fit with the just as common 
agreement that all meanings are contextual), there goes the belief that 
scientific facts are provided by results of any single empirical 
experiment.


All and any empirical experiments may have methodical faults. Which may 
undermine the results. - This is much more often the case than is 
commonly believed. - CSP knew that very well. Having thoroughly explored 
the very idea of probablity and its consequences.


He also explicitely wrote that he does not wish to be a shepherd 
followed by a pack of lambs. That he wished all and everyone to try out 
oneself. He advised NOT TO BELIEVE just BECAUSE HE SAID so and so.


So, you are quite right in questioning all BECAUSE types of grounds.

It may be easy to read Aristotle, but it is not definitely not easy to 
understand what he meant. Disputes on that have no end.


I've had long discussions with most expert Aristotelians in Finland on 
some issues. (The major works by Aristotle were translated into Finnish. 
A huge project, a huge investment in our scale.)


On the issue of ultimate aim  the answer by CSP was very clear, 
oftentimes repeated in various wordings. On this issue he said that,  
like THE TRUTH, it cannot be known, but only foreseen as kinds of 
schetches.   - All aims, by their natur AS aims point at the future, and 
the future is never yet here. As such it always remains vague.


If there is no future, there cannot be any aims. But if there is no 
future (the cosmos collapses ot so), there are no us to ponder about it.


We humans just have to live with this. Faring as well and best as we 
can.


Best, Kirsti

P.S. I do not put refererences to CSP's writings in my contributions to 
the list, because anyone nowadays can find those by making an internet 
search, just by combining some key words. - Let's have machines do what 
they can do, and leave us humans to do what the machines cannot do.


Sorry for typos, but I do not have time or energy to look this over. 
Those who are interested in what I aim to convey, will look beyond 
trivialities.





























Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 3.1.2018 22:17:

Dear gary, list,

If what Gary adds of John about Putnam is true,

 “I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about Aristotle:


"Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle has
also become clearer."

I would make that same comment about Peirce.”

Then is it obvious to you that Peirce and Aristotle (among others) are
talking about one great big thing that has relation to several similar
things?

it seems to me that the logician ought to recognize what our ultimate
aim is.

.. it is clear that this one ultimate End must be the Good, and indeed
the Supreme Good.

Will not then a knowledge of this Supreme Good be also of great
practical importance for the conduct of life? Will it not better
enable us to attain our proper object, like archers having a target to
aim at?

If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at all events
in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of the
sciences or faculties it is the object.

That is, if nothing is complete which has no end and only one thing is
the ultimate aim,

then why do I find it so bizarre to justify our actions with:

_ _

_because_ Peirce..

_because_ Aristotle..

_because_ ultimate aim?

I would greatly appreciate someone explaining this joke to me so that
I may

_redirect my attention to the subject_,

recognize that it is clear it has a reality, in _some_ mode of being,

which is independent of what anyone thinks about it,

“become clearer” and lead to a modification of those habits

3. Aristotle. Have read and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

[kirstima]

In regard of the title in this chain, I'd like add:

If anyone has written a huge amount of definitions on anything does not, 
by itself, prove that those are even on the right tract. Words come 
easy. Tests on the thougts conveyed do not.


Best,

Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 9.1.2018 16:04:

On 1/8/2018 5:14 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I also think, that philosophers are not a class. Everybody is a 
philosopher somehow, and every philosopher is a non-philosopher

somehow too, especially Nietzsche.


You can make a similar claim about almost any word in any
language. For an analysis of the issues, I recommend the article
"I don't believe in word senses" by Adam Kilgarriff:
https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/I_dont_believe_1997.pdf

The title "I don't believe in word senses" is a quotation
by Sue Atkins, a lexicographer who devoted her career to
writing and editing definitions of word senses for dictionaries.
She also collaborated with linguists in developing better methods
for developing dictionaries.

The author, Adam Kilgarriff, was a linguist, lexicographer, and
computational linguist who developed tools for deriving lexical
resources by analyzing large volumes of texts.  The title of
his PhD thesis was "Polysemy":
http://www.kilgarriff.co.uk/Publications/1992-K-thesis.pdf

They were speaking from years of experience.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

[kirstima]

Linguistists and lexicographers may be and often are experts in 
language, but they are no experts in questions on human mind or the 
nature of human understanding. The best of them acknowledge this fact.


No onesided expertice can overcome this dilemma. Both sides of any coin 
are needed. Just as are understanding BOTH 'recto' and 'verso' with any 
EG.


It is undestanding the relation that matters.n

It does not simply consist of "a negation". Or "the negation". The issue 
is far more complicated than two-value propositional logic has 
traditionally taken it to be, as I am sure you know very well.


I agree with Helmut on that philosophers should not classify themselves 
as a class amongt other special sciences. Unfortunately the halo of (one 
sided) expertice has for decades made philosophers to concentrate on 
discussions restricted within professional boundaries.


CSP did not do so. Aristotle, Plato or Pythagoras did not do so. In fact 
the whole idea of onesided expertice as a philosopher was unknown, even 
unthinkable up till about a hundred or so years ago.


What counted as common sense was different back then. By then it was 
commonplace that experts on widely different   sciences (and humanities) 
shared a table of discussions.


With all due respect,

Kirsti





John F Sowa kirjoitti 9.1.2018 16:04:

On 1/8/2018 5:14 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I also think, that philosophers are not a class. Everybody is a 
philosopher somehow, and every philosopher is a non-philosopher

somehow too, especially Nietzsche.


You can make a similar claim about almost any word in any
language. For an analysis of the issues, I recommend the article
"I don't believe in word senses" by Adam Kilgarriff:
https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/I_dont_believe_1997.pdf

The title "I don't believe in word senses" is a quotation
by Sue Atkins, a lexicographer who devoted her career to
writing and editing definitions of word senses for dictionaries.
She also collaborated with linguists in developing better methods
for developing dictionaries.

The author, Adam Kilgarriff, was a linguist, lexicographer, and
computational linguist who developed tools for deriving lexical
resources by analyzing large volumes of texts.  The title of
his PhD thesis was "Polysemy":
http://www.kilgarriff.co.uk/Publications/1992-K-thesis.pdf

They were speaking from years of experience.

John



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Gary f.

Now I truly believe you were sincere with your wishes for a happy new 
year.  Thanks.


We still do disagree. And I do not think the problems can be reduced 
into language problems.  There are more fundamental issues involved.


I am not asking anyone to believe without testing out what I say.  I 
attemp to offer a different way of looking at, and to interpret what CSP 
wrote.  I wish to share somethings I have learned the hard way.  To 
smooth up, a little bit, the way for someones possibly interested.  – As 
a rule, they tend to come outside US.


The list has become more and more a US list.  US vernacular is expected, 
for instance. This I think is a pity.


We do disagree with fundamentals in text analysis and text 
interpretation.  You say it is guess work.  Which I find partially, but 
only minimally, true.  – It is true that by reading a chapter or so does 
not give anyone the, lets say "phaneron" the writer supposedly had, as 
such and with all there is to it.


We do agree in that the first challenge in doing and teaching  text 
interpretation is to make it clear that there is a difference between  
whatever occurs to the mind of the reader and finding out, by a careful 
study, what can with good grouds, be (logically) inferred from the text 
at hand.  (Be it a quote or book or the oevre).
Text interpretations can be classified into three types (remember: tone, 
token, type by CSP).  Those with strong and logically valid grounds 
based on the text, those with weak grounds  but not disproved by the 
text, and those which have no grounds in the text or even are disproved 
by the text. – This third type I take as just guesses.
Student often get very ashtonished when I say: Show you proof by using 
the text only.  (Which, of course is made known in the instructions, but 
do not reach the minds of most).


Opinions are offered. "My (strong) opinion is that…"

Such views have been stated in P-list.  Belongin to the type: My 
interpretation is as good of yours, BECAUSE  I have a right to my own 
opinion.  – Well, this presents a most unhappy mix up of civil rights 
and logic.


You asked me to prove my points.  Quite right.  My response was that 
you'll have to search for proof yourself.


Now I trust you and offer you what CSP called "precept" ( so unnoticed  
amongst his conceptual system that it is not included in the idex of his 
writings).


What follows is my invention, derived from Peirce but not offered by 
him.  (I did share this with Gary R.  in off-list mails some decades 
ago,  along with the triangular as a diagram for triadicity).


My instructions to the students, at the beginning of my classes include 
three colours of  translucent pens,  yellow,  orange and green.  The 
text  I give.  The task is: Construct the question this text offers an 
anwer. Give grounds to the question by using this text only.


Use the yellow pen first to mark the points you first think are 
essential. Then look again and write down the grounds. Note that the 
question may not be the one explicated in the text.


First I gave my students a piece of newpaper science news.  With a 
little pressure on logical grounds and consistency, they came (as a 
rule) very excited.  They found more grave  logical faults than I had 
noticed.


Then there were questions on what to do when it was impossible to find 
grounds within the text at hand.  – Then I told them that it is 
logically OK to say so.  And that it is a logical merit to state this as 
exacly as possible, but not more exacly than was warranted by the text. 
And that it was a merit to be able to point out where else to seach for 
an answer.


These were multidiclipnary classes for postgraduate students making 
plans for a thesis (Phd mostly).
Then I proceeded to instructing them to read books from a different 
angle.  Telling them that after you have figured out the question your 
study aims to aswer, then change your standpoint.  Then you select the 
books etc. on the ground of what they offer in respect to your question.


This may seem simple.  But it is not so when put into practise.

The importance of what comes first, what comes second, what comes third 
was something I had learned from studyin Peirce.  Using my experience 
with children I used three stages of being a teacher ( which I took as a 
method, not as an expression of  my personality).  First I was lenient.  
Telling them just to listen at ease. Telling them that what I am going 
to say will not be easy to understand.  But not to worry.  Nothing of 
the introductory part will be demanded at the final exam.


Then, with the texts, I was very strict and very demanding.  Lots of 
praise of course if demands were met.  Then came the encouraging part.  
With focus on their own work. Still to come.


The students were always so happy by the end.  There was love in the 
air.


These are happy memories I wish to share.  Not because they were happy 
for me, but because the methods were 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Gary f,

Sorry for inexact expressions. I should have made a distinction between 
just interpreting a quote and going beyond it. Paraphrasing is 
customarily marked with expressions like "as XXX says elsewhere...".


If I had problems with understanding where you were paraphrasing Peirce, 
and where you were stating your own inferences,  I was just one reader 
amongst many. Why the tone?


My point has been that words and ideas are not in any kind of identity 
relation. And that the relation between signs and meanings is a tricky 
question, not a simple one.


If you disagree, why can't we just agree to disagree?

Surely you are well aware that Peirce did not mean something like a 
college chemistry lab with laboratory and seminary philosophy.


He does offer many very detailed precepts for thought experiments as 
well as practical everyday experimentations he conducted himself, many 
of them for many years, even decades.


Most of these I have conducted myself. Following his descriptions as 
accurately as I can. Very often Peirce points out that everyone should 
do so. In order to find out oneself. Instead of only following the 
method of authority. - Which is OK, if and after


I really meant to thank youn and wish you a happy new year.

Best wishes anyway, Kirsti




g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 31.12.2017 22:29:

Kirsti, you quoted my post in yours and commented that you “cannot
understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo them in
what follows.”

It’s quite simple: The part enclosed in quotation marks is a direct
quote of Peirce’s exact words, and the rest is my own words. This is
what I always do in my posts, whenever I am commenting on something
Peirce (or anyone) wrote; I “try to keep quotes and interpretations
so marked that any reader can tell which is which” (quoting you, in
that case). In my post, I included the link to my blog so that anyone
who wanted the exact source citation could find it there. I don’t
see the problem with that.

I also don’t see how your claim — that Peirce’s own choice of
term, such as “phaneron,” is “inconsistent with his deeper
views” — can be tested in any laboratory, as you appear to
suggest. I don’t know any way of comprehending Peirce’s “deeper
views” about matters except to study what he wrote about them, on
the DEFAULT assumption that he meant exactly what he wrote, and “it
is quite indifferent whether it be regarded as having to do with
thought or with language, the wrapping of thought, since thought, like
an onion, is composed of nothing but wrappings” (Peirce, EP2:460).
Perhaps you do have a better way of gaining insight into Peirce’s
deeper thoughts, but if so, I think it’s up to you to demonstrate it
rather than ask the rest of us to take it on faith.

And Happy New Year to you too!

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 31-Dec-17 10:25
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Gary f, list

My source on Eucleides was Grattan-Guinness (The Fontana history of
the mathematical sciences) and my thirty years old notes on the topic.
(& Liddell and Scott, of course.)

It is important to keep in mind that no such divisions (or

classifications) between sciences that are taken for granted today did
not exist in ancient times. - Still, Eucleides was studied by
mathematicians for centuries. It was taken for granted. Up till
non-Euclidean math. Even the Bible came much, much later.

Meaning is context-dependent, that much we all agree. We have signs
from old times, no dispute on that. But do we have meanings?

I have problems with the following:

GARY f.: My


answer to the question of whether a sign has parts was, I thought,



implied by the Peirce quote in the blog post I linked to,



http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1] [1]: “upon a

continuous line


there are no points (where the line is continuous), there is only

room


for points,— possibilities of points.” But if you MARK a point

on the


line, one of those possibilities is actualized; and if the line has

a


beginning and end, then it has those two points



(discontinuities) already.


I cannot understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo
them in what follows.

Peirce took up in several contexts his point of marking any points and
thus breaking continuity. He took care to set down rules for (logical)
acceptability for doing so.

In order to understand his meaning three triads are needed.
Possibility, virtuality and actuality makes one of them. (But only one
of them.)

CSP wrote on Ethics of Terminology. - Did he follow these ethical
rules?

- I'd say YES and NO. To the despair of his readers he chanced his
terminology over the decaces very, very often. But it was HIS to
change, in order to accommondate with renewed understanding of his
whole conceptual system, his new findings along the way in making it
move...

I firmly believe he had a reason 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Jeffrey, list,

A beutiful example of ethics of interpretation you offered, Jeffrey. 
Thanks.


With quotes from Collected Papers my sincere wish is that the year of 
writing is mentioned, whenever possible. Those are to be found in the 
small footnotes.


Peirce was not just a corpuscular entity, his thinking developed over 
time and he did change his views, although never his most basic ones.


Best, Kirsti

Jeffrey Brian Downard kirjoitti 22.12.2017 20:33:

Hello Gary F, John S, Helmut, Kirsti, List,

I take John to be asking a good question about whether or how the
part/whole distinction might or might not apply to the account of
relations and relationships as it is applied in the normative science
of semiotics. Given the context of our discussion, we can ask similar
questions about how the distinction should be applied in the formal
logic of the EG.

In asking "what practical difference would it make," I take John to be
asking the very same kind of thing that Peirce asked in his account of
relations and relationships when he moves from the first (i.e.,
familiarity) and second (logical) grades of clarity, to a third
pragmatic grade of clarity (see _The Logic of Relatives_ starting at
CP 3.456 and also 6.318 below).

Starting with the texts, I see that Peirce applies the distinction in
a number of places to the account of relations and relationships. Here
are several relevant passages (note: words both underlined and in bold
are my emphasis):

1. CP 2.316. Let us now proceed to compare the conclusions from the
abstract

definition of a Dicisign with the facts about propositions. The first
conclusion is that every proposition contains a Subject and a
Predicate, the former representing (or being) an Index of the Primary
Object, or Correlate of the relation represented, the latter
representing (or being) an Icon of the Dicisign in some respect.
Before inquiring whether every proposition has such PARTS, let us see
whether the descriptions given of them are accurate, when there are
such PARTS. The proposition "Cain kills Abel" has two subjects "Cain"
and "Abel" and relates as much to the real Objects of one of these as
to that of the other. But it may be regarded as primarily relating to
the Dyad composed of Cain, as first, and of Abel, as second member.
This Pair is a single individual object having this relation to Cain
and to Abel, that its existence consists in the existence of Cain and
in the existence of Abel and in nothing more. The Pair, though its
existence thus depends on Cain's existence and on Abel's, is,
nevertheless, just as truly existent as they severally are. The Dyad
is not precisely the Pair. The Dyad is a mental Diagram consisting of
two images of two objects, one existentially connected with one member
of the pair, the other with the other; the one having attached to it,
as representing it, a Symbol whose meaning is "First," and the other a
Symbol whose meaning is "Second." Thus, this diagram, the Dyad,
represents Indices of Cain and Abel, respectively; and thus the
subject conforms to our conclusion.

2. CP 4.173 A part of a collection called its whole is a collection
such that whatever is u of the part is u of the whole, but something
that is u of the whole is not u of the part. (174) It is convenient to
use this locution; namely, instead of saying A is in the relation, r,
to B, we may say A is an r to B, or of B; or, if we wish to reverse
the order of mentioning A and B, we may say B is r'd by A. If a
relation, r , is such that nothing is r to two different things, and
nothing is r'd by two different things, so that some things in the
universe are perhaps r to nothing while all the rest are r, each to
its own distinct correlate, and there are some things perhaps to which
nothing is r, but all the rest have each a single thing that is r to
it, then I call r a one-to-one relation. If there be a one-to-one
relation, r, such that every unit of one collection is r to a unit of
a second collection, while every unit of the second collection is r'd
by a unit of the first collection, those two collections are commonly
said to be in a one-to-one correspondence with one another. . . .

3. CP 2.311 This latter Object may be distinguished as the Primary
Object, the other being termed the Secondary Object. The Dicisign in
so far as it is the relate of the existential relation which is the
Secondary Object of the Dicisign, can evidently not be the entire
Dicisign. It is at once a PART of the Object and a PART of the
Interpretant of the Dicisign. Since the Dicisign is represented in its
Interpretant to be an Index of a complexus as such, it must be
represented in that same Interpretant to be composed of two PARTS,
corresponding respectively to its Object and to itself [the Dicisign].
That is to say, in order to understand the Dicisign, it must be
regarded as composed of two such PARTS whether it be in itself so
composed or not. It is difficult to see how this can be, unless it
really have two such 

Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[kirstima]

Jerry, list,

JERRY:
"Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy" is a mystery to me.
Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?"


No mystery to me what CSP meant with "corpuscular philosphy". - The 
problem with your question lies in "Exactly what..." - It (logically ) 
demands some kind of an exact (verbal) definition. Such cannot be given.


Definitely it was not (just) about Boscowitz.

Still, I find it silly to ponder what CSP may have or not have known at 
his time. - What are theories for? They are for reaching beyond 
available information. Philosophical theories especially are (or should 
be) for making clear what must be, what may be, and what cannot be.


There you have it. In a nutshell. This is a logical triad no new 
information or data may ever break down. All exact definitions must, of 
course, be accommondated to this logical triad together with new data or 
information, which consist of some experimental results. which - if 
brand new - have not been to hold in the long run OR with a wider view.




Best, Kirsti



Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 22.12.2017 18:03:

List, John:


On Dec 19, 2017, at 10:10 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

Jerry,

Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing.
But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day.
I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples
for making a stronger claim:


For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends
with a discussion of chirality and the laws of motion
(Right—handed and Left-handed screws)

“There, then, is a physical phenomenon absolute inexplicable by
mechanical action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the
corpuscular philosophy.”


By the end of the 19th century, the general consensus in physics
was that all the major problems had been solved. But the first
decade of the 20th c. shattered their complacency.

If Peirce had access to a university library with the latest
journals, he might have found stronger arguments to "overthrow
the corpuscular philosophy."

John


Your response deserves a longer reply.

But, for the moment, one brief comment.
Here is a recent reference from the the Royal Society journal:

Review article: Spontaneous mirror symmetry breaking and origin of
biological homochirality
Josep M. Ribó, David Hochberg, Joaquim Crusats, Zoubir El-Hachemi and
Albert Moyano
J. R. Soc. Interface 14:20170699; doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0699
(published December 13, 2017)
http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699 [1]

It discusses the central role of the development of chirality in
emergence of life.
CSP concerns were well founded and remain a profound research problem
to this day.

The issue of chirality effectively blocks the mathematization of
natural sorts and kinds using physical laws alone.
Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy” is a mystery to
me.
Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?

At a minimum, CSP was arguing against a universal law of mechanics.
Or, was he merely arguing against the putatively universality of the
newly-defined laws of thermodynamics (entropy?)

Whatever he was arguing for or against, the chiral tetrahedral carbon
atom, as a well-defined natural geometrical object that was
irreducible to a triad, posed a major conundrum for him (and all
others) who seek to construct a universe in simpler terms.

Cheer

Jerry



Links:
--
[1] http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/14/137/20170699?etoc



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Gary f, list

My source on Eucleides was Grattan-Guinness (The Fontana history of the 
mathematical sciences) and my thirty years old notes on the topic. (& 
Liddell and Scott, of course.)


It is important to keep in mind that no such divisions (or 
classifications) between sciences that are taken for granted today did 
not exist in ancient times. - Still, Eucleides was studied by 
mathematicians for centuries. It was taken for granted. Up till 
non-Euclidean math. Even the Bible came much, much later.


Meaning is context-dependent, that much we all agree. We have signs from 
old times, no dispute on that. But do we have meanings?


I have problems with the following:

GARY f.: My

answer to the question of whether a sign has parts was, I thought,
implied by the Peirce quote in the blog post I linked to,
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]: “upon a continuous
line there are no points (where the line is continuous), there is only
room for points,— possibilities of points.” But if you MARK a
point on the line, one of those possibilities is actualized; and if
the line has a beginning and end, then it has those two points
(discontinuities) already.


I cannot understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo them 
in what follows.


Peirce took up in several contexts his point of marking any points and 
thus breaking continuity. He took care to set down rules for (logical) 
acceptability for doing so.


In order to understand his meaning three triads are needed. Possibility, 
virtuality and actuality makes one of them. (But only one of them.)


CSP wrote on Ethics of Terminology. - Did he follow these ethical rules? 
- I'd say YES and NO. To the despair of his readers he chanced his 
terminology over the decaces very, very often. But it was HIS to change, 
in order to accommondate with renewed understanding of his whole 
conceptual system, his new findings along the way in making it move...


I firmly believe he had a reason every time for those changes. BUT he 
also experimented with words he took into a kind of test driving for his 
concepts. Such as "phaneron". An experiment doomed to fail.


Why do I believe so? - I have never read him explicitly saying so. But 
the term (etymology etc) did get the idea twisted in such ways which 
were inconsistent with his deeper views. - So when I read those texts by 
him using "phaneron", I took note of the year and looked forward to see 
him stop using it.


It not a job for me to search whether he did or not. It is job for 
seminary minded philosophers. Not for the laboratory minded ones.


I wish to take up Ethics of Interpretation in a similar spirit. In order 
to make our ideas more clear, it may be good to try to keep quotes and 
interpretations so marked that any reader can tell which is which.


It is an impossible task, I know. Just as impossible to any human being 
as is Christian ethics. But a very good guideline to keep in mind & to 
follow as best one can.


The links in any post may get read or not. - It takes too much time to 
read all those offered.


What cannot be included in the verbal response, I find informative. 
Still, I may not have the time at my disposal to open them.


Looking forward to forthcoming chapters in Lowell lectures. My thanks 
for the most valuable job you are doing Gary f.


Best regards, Kirsti





g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 22.12.2017 14:50:

Kirsti, John, list,

My source for the usage of SEMEION was Liddell and Scott (which can be
searched online). As John says, the primary meaning is “mark”. My
answer to the question of whether a sign has parts was, I thought,
implied by the Peirce quote in the blog post I linked to,
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]: “upon a continuous
line there are no points (where the line is continuous), there is only
room for points,— possibilities of points.” But if you MARK a
point on the line, one of those possibilities is actualized; and if
the line has a beginning and end, then it has those two points
(discontinuities) already.

I was suggesting an analogy to a sign: for instance, you can say that
a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but in late Peircean
semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat arbitrary,
and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one
“subject” or several. The more “complete” a sign is, the more
the element of continuity (or Thirdness) is predominant in it, and
thus the more room there is in it for POSSIBILITIES of parts, i.e. the
more opportunity for analyzing it into “partial signs.” Sorry for
being so elliptical in my post, but that was my point (if you’ll
pardon the expression). I have a very unPeircean fondness for
conciseness.

By the way, the manuscript of Lowell 4 has a very detailed and
previously unpublished explanation of (hypostatic) abstractions such
as “dormitive virtue”, so that may be of use for continuing your
recent discussion of abstraction, when we reach that point in the next
lecture.

Gary f.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

John, list,

I have been out of reach for more than a week. A heap of mails in this 
thread.  My responses may seem to many as ancient history. For that 
reason I'll leave the comment responded below. And I'll try to be 
concice.


No arguments on words and reference, however detailed, can possibly give 
next to nothing towards making clear the crucial issue on the nature of 
rel. betw. sign and meaning. (CSP of cource presupposed as the context).


Analytical (nominalistic) philosophy made the mistake of taking words 
and reference as all there is to sings and meaning.


Do you agree?

Best, Kirsti


John F Sowa kirjoitti 22.12.2017 08:00:

Kirsti and Gary F,

K

Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which
has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of
the earlier STIGME .


GF

By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον
for point before Euclid. [And from web site] According to the Liddell
and Scott lexicon, the word σημεῖον (the usual Greek word for sign
and root of semeiotic) was also used by Aristotle for a mathematical
point, or a point in time. In this sense it was synonymous with
στιγμή (stigma).


I checked Liddell & Scott, Chantraine's dictionnaire étymologique,
and Heath's translation and commentary on Euclid.

The base word is the verb 'stigo', which means to mark something;
for example, as a sign of ownership.  From that, the word 'stigma'
(ending in alpha instead of eta) meant the mark caused by a pointed
instrument.  The word 'stigme' originally meant a spot in a bird's
plumage; then it came to mean any spot, a small mark, or an instant.

Aristotle explicitly said that a  point was a marker on a line,
not a part of the line.  Heath said that Euclid generally followed
Aristotle.  But in vol. 1, p. 156, he said that 'semeion' was
probably "considered more suitable than 'stigme' (a puncture)
which might claim to have more reality than a point."

In summary, all three words (stigma, stigme, and semeion) could refer
to a mark, but semeion is more abstract and general than the others.

K

Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?


The word 'semeion' could be used to refer to any kind of mark.
Euclid used it for just one particular kind.  For that use in
geometry, the thing it refers to has no parts.

K
the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their 
commentaries.


I believe that it was good idea to have two distinct words:
'signum' for sign, and 'punctum' for point.

John



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Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Helmut,

I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I 
did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of 
course, are deeply related. But how?


To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in 
connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.


Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a 
laboratory, but one needs though experiments.


I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the 
question and searching for answers which logically fit with the 
question, is such an experiment.


Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our 
logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.


EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines. 
Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for 
logical thinking.


Comments?

Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:

Gary, Kirsti, List,
I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not
geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
Best,
Helmut

 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 wrote:

Kirsti, list,

Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last
month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way,
according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
_point_ before Euclid.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
 From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
 Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25

Listers,

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later
Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.

Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning?

Best, Kirsti

 - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L
posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a
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"UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [2] .

Links:
--
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/
[2] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Gary f., list,

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 21.12.2017 16:39:


"Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
points."


Yes its does. But that does not answer the questions I posed. Perhaps I 
should have added: What do you (listers) think?


Gary f.: " By the way,

according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
_point_ before Euclid."


Interesting. Was in connection with geometry?  Or how does your source 
infer it was used FOR 'point'?


Best,

Kirsti



-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25

Listers,

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
instead of the earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans &
later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.

Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?

Best, Kirsti



Links:
--
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Listers,

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for 
geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as 
that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead 
of the earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans & later Boethius 
changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.


Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?

Best, Kirsti


g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 18.12.2017 23:07:

List,

Aristotle's remarks at the beginning of _De Caelo_ go like this: "A
magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and
if three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the
three dimensions are all that there are, and that which is divisible
in three directions is divisible in all. For, as the Pythagoreans say,
the world and all that is in it is determined by the number three,
since beginning and middle and end give the number of an 'all', and
the number they give is the triad." Peirce occasionally called this
triad the "cenopythagorean categories" -- but for him, there is much
more to them than we find in Aristotle's summary of the Pythagorean
notions. Although these elements are so fundamental that "confused
notions" of them go back to the beginning of philosophy, great
patience and effort is required to clarify them as they ought to be
clarified by anyone interested in philosophy.

Peirce's comments on his predecessors Kant and Hegel help to situate
Peirce's own efforts along these lines. His emphasis on "the
inexhaustible intricacy of the fabric of conceptions" -- referring I
think to conceptions _in general_, not just the three in question here
-- is remarkable, and his recognition of that (rather than modesty)
compels him to say "I do not flatter myself that I have ever analyzed
a single idea into its constituent elements." In the drafts of this
lecture and elsewhere, Peirce did give some account of his labors,
though he decided not to "inflict" such an account on his audience at
this time. I think we can be sure that if Peirce never managed to
"analyze a single idea into its constituent elements," it wasn't for
lack of effort or skill at logical analysis.

Gary f.

FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
SENT: 17-Dec-17 15:07
TO: 'Peirce-L' 
SUBJECT: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5,
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13896
[1]

Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy,
as most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions
of the three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you
can.

[CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be
conveyed in one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot
sun-shine of hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well
aimed thought; and you must have patience, for long time is required
to ripen the fruit. They are no inventions of mine. Were they so, that
would be sufficient to condemn them. Confused notions of these
elements appear in the first infancy of philosophy, and they have
never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental importance is noticed
in the beginning of Aristotle's _De Caelo,_ where it is said that the
Pythagoreans knew of them.

[522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant
possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a
philosopher,
1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness;
2nd, Inventive originality;
3rd, Generalizing power;
4th, Subtlety;
5th, Critical severity and sense of fact;
6th, Systematic procedure;
7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to
philosophy.

[523] But Kant had not the slightest suspicion of the inexhaustible
intricacy of the fabric of conceptions, which is such that I do not
flatter myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its
constituent elements.

[524] Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever
lived, had a somewhat juster notion of this complication, though an
inadequate notion, too. For if he had seen what the state of the case
was, he would not have attempted in one lifetime to cover the vast
field that he attempted to clear. But Hegel was lamentably deficient
in that 5th requisite of critical severity and sense of fact. He
brought out the three elements much more clearly. But the element of
Secondness, of _hard fact,_ is not accorded its due place in his
system; and in a lesser degree the same is true of Firstness. After
Hegel wrote, there came fifty years that were remarkably fruitful in
all the means for attaining that 5th requisite. Yet Hegel's followers,
instead of going to work to reform their master's system, and to
render his statement of it obsolete, as every true philosopher must
desire that his disciples should do, only proposed, at best, some
superficial changes without 

[PEIRCE-L] Irony and style in CSP (Was: Peirce's adjectives...)

[kirstima]

Cassiano, Jon, list

I have been studying style in connection with argument analysis for a 
long time. Recognizing textual markers of irony forms a part of the 
method I developed in 1990's in my university lectures in Finland.


In 2000's I started a slow read on Kaina Stoicheia (New Elements) in the 
P-list. It can be found on the list archives by that title. In the slow 
read I describe my method of argument analysis (for complex texts) as I 
proceed.


But Gary f  found the method too arduous, and the pace of reading to 
slow for his taste, and all of a sudden jumped ahead with the text under 
study. - Consequently I ended my slow read.


Perhaps Jon Awbrey will help? I hope so even myself.

Regards,

Kirsti Määttänen



Cassiano Terra Rodrigues kirjoitti 6.12.2017 05:38:

Hello fellow listers,

It's been a while I notice Peirce has some great nouns of his own pen,
frequently used in ironic contexts. For instance, besides
pragmaticism, I could mention projaculation in Evolutionary Love, or
maybe the nychtemeron in the article on God's Reality (tough this is
not really Peirce's, it's Gospel's).
But I was wondering, and about adjectives? Do you notice preferred
adjectives in Peirce's vocabulary? He uses First, Second and Third as
adjectives, of course, but I mean real adjectives, or adjectival
expressions. Ironic or not. Maybe other preferred expressions, for
exclamations etc.?
I assume there has been previous discussion on Peirce's style
in the list, so excuse me if I am being tautological.  But I think the
recurrent expressions a writer uses reveal a lot, especially
adjectives and other seemingly unimportant idiomatic expressions. And
it's always fun to know what others regard as interesting in an
admired writer's style.
So, apart from the more deep stuff, if anyone is willing to share
their preferred Peircean quotes, but in the sense above, I'm an
interested reader.
Best regards to everyone,
cass.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.1

[kirstima]

Gary f,

A kind remark on a typo in lecture 3, which you may wish to correct. It 
is in short paragraph consisting of three lines. It begins: "A quality, 
or Firstness, has mere logical..." Third sentence thereof should begin 
with a capital, but it does not. It should be: "A fact, or Secondness.." 
NOT "a fact...)


Just a typo which should be corrected. Even if it were originally made 
by CSP.


Kirsti




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[PEIRCE-L] Contexts and hypostatic abstraction (was Lowell lectures...

[kirstima]

John,

I'll rephrase my point (which you seem to have missed).

We started from your post saying:

JFS

The distinction between a verb form such as 'asserting' and a noun
such as 'assertion' is what Peirce called *hypostatic abstraction*.

To illustrate the point, Peirce used a term that Molière invented
as a joke in "Le Malade Imaginaire":


Quare Opium facit dormire: … Quia est in eo Virtus dormitiva.
Why does opium make one sleep:  Because in it is dormitive virtue.


My point is that both Peirce and Molière ridiculed the question - answer 
sequence & the ease and please such sequences get accepted.


(I also took a look and noted that the Latin "quare" means both HOW and 
WHY. But this is just a side remark.)


I cannot recall the context where Peirce used this example, but I think 
you are somewhat mistaken in what CSP meant with the concept: 
hypostasis. You view seems too narrow. Dominated by nouns too much.


Well, it is also possible that CSP wrote down something on hypostasis 
which just does not make sense. I remember having a lot of trouble with 
the concept & being somewhat dissatisfied with the sample of his 
clarifications I had run across by then.


I assume you agree in that nothing can be explained by a word, 
ecpecially by a noun.


It is good to remember that Peirce objected grammarians for use of the 
term "pronouns"  and exclaimed that nouns should be called 
"prodemonstratives".


NAMING IS NOT EXPLAINING, this is Kirsti Määttänen's maxim, not as such 
found in Peirce's wrtitings.


Thank you, John for taking up this quote from Molière. - A very, very 
interesting example.


Kirsti







kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 12.12.2017 12:48:

John,
Thanks for changing the subject line!

I'm well aware of hypostatic abstraction and I have given a lot of
thought to its position in the overall philosophy of CSP.  Which is
the context for both EG's and his logical graphs in a more general
sense.

In a certain narrow sense hypostatic abstraction may be seen as (just
a) distinction between verb forms and noun forms.  But the relation
between hypothesis and hypostasis is more complicated, as I assume you
are well aware.

Your example (opium) seems somewhat simplistic and misleading.  (Of
course it is difficult to express one' ideas in short mails like
these!)

In any experiment in the strict and narrow sense, a hypothesis in
absolutely needed.  Further, a hypothesis  must  initially present a
certain kind of question.  Only questions which imply a YES or NO
answer will do.  The next step (next act) is to transform the question
into an assertion.  Which is then experimentally tested.

In order to perform a scientific experiment, there must be statements
(verbal ones) on some existent entities taken together with reasons to
believe that one/some/all other entitities will be affected in certain
ways. (Thus presenting some kind of regular relation(s). )

If it were just stated "Opium – sleep",  then it is asserted that
there is (a well known substance) opium which is somehow related to (a
well known) state of mind called sleep.  (The expression is commonly
called elliptic).

Now, this (elliptic) expression does not state what kind this asserted
relation is.  (In English the word "sleep"  as such does not by itself
reveal whether it is used as a noun or a verb. In Finnish, which is
verb  dominated language , like (old) Latin and Greek  were in this
respect. )

To my mind Molière  (and Peirce) ridiculed  just as well the kinds of
answers commonly offered  and generally accepted to WHY – questions.

My claim is that this is a cultural issue, not a scientific one.
Peirce made great efforts to transform such (unconscious) habits of
thought into philosophically and experimentally relevant and
interesting ones.
(Unfortunately my studies on Cultural Paradigms and their relation to
sciences are published only in Finnish.  Still, I can share thoughts
based on these investigations of mine. (In the hope that they are not
just exploited, but give credit, too)

Existential quantifiers,  theory of probabilities etc.were a part of
this work by CSP. Just as were logical graphs.
-
JFS: " …Peirce said that the act of replacing the verb to noun leads
to a hypothesis (hypostatic abstraction) that there exists something
that causes sleep. That hypothesis led chemists to discover morphine
as the substance with dormitive virtue. "


Is this a summary interpretation?  Or did CSP truly write so?  -
Either there is irony in the statement, or something is wrong.  Or are
you using the verb "to discover" in the sense of "leaning how to make
in a laboratory a synthetic substance  with the same kinds of effects
that opium, a natural product, was already known to possess" ?

"Opium facit dormire", opium makes people (and animals) sleep was a
well know fact for ages before CSP.  – The "WHY" question, on the
other hand, is still not resolved.  A chemical formula does not answer
the question to the full, because there are 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[kirstima]

List,

Peirce did not just "refer to" some  well-established "facts" of his 
time; he has all the time been developing a whole theory. All good and 
true theories go beyond any number of "facts" (id est: array of 
empirical findings). It could be called 'hypo-determination' (just a 
coined word, c.f hypo-stasis and hypo-thesis). They are under-determined 
by  empirical findings. Theories aim to the future, their purpose is to 
guide later investigations.


Organic substances are active substances. Rotating to the right or to 
the left has later been commonly called handedness. Thus 'handedness' 
and/or 'veering to the right or left' are what anyone can google and 
find out about the present views.


This is not just about organic chemistry, it is about LIFE.

Kirsti



g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 13.12.2017 14:56:

Jeff,

Thanks for drawing our attention to Peirce's remarks on substances in
the earlier "Logic of Mathematics" text. They do seem to confirm what
I'd suspected, that Peirce is referring to _organic_ compounds as
"such active substances." But I still don't know what he's referring
to as "those substances which rotate the plane of polarization to the
right or left." What would those be called by chemists today?
Something like the DNA molecule? Of course its structure was not known
until long after Peirce died, but I'm guessing some simpler organic
molecules would have been known at the time to fit Peirce's
description. I guess what I'm trying to grasp is the connection (in
Peirce's mind) between three-dimensionality and Thirdness.
Conceptualizing the elements of the phaneron takes a long time, as
Peirce is about to say in Lowell 3 …

Gary f.

FROM: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
SENT: 12-Dec-17 22:11
TO: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Gary F, Mary, Edwina, Gary R, List,

Gary F: "his reference to the chemistry of "active substances" is not
very clear, at least to me"

One place where Peirce seems to clear this matter up about the
chemical character of "active substances", at least to some degree, is
in "On the Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories
from within." As in the Lowell Lectures of 1903, I take him to be
drawing on a phenomenological account of the categories--both material
and formal--as a basis for sorting out the phenomena that call out for
explanation in philosophy.

Peirce says:

Laws which connect phenomena by a synthesis more or less intellectual,
or inward, are divided somewhat broadly into laws of the inward
relations, or resemblances, of bodies, and laws of mind. The laws of
resemblances and differences of bodies are classificatory, or
chemical. We know little about them; but we may assert with some
confidence that there are differences between substances -- i.e.,
differences in the smallest parts of bodies, and a classification
based on that, and there are differences in the structure of bodies,
and a classification based on that. Then of these latter we may
distinguish differences in the structure of the smallest pieces of
bodies, depending on the shape and size of atomicules, and differences
in the manner in which bodies are built up out of their smallest
pieces. Here we have a distinction between that kind of structure
which gives rise to forms without power of truth [true?] growth or
inorganic structures, and the chemistry of protoplasms which develope
[or] living organisms. (CP 1.512)

Let us outline the classification of the laws that "connect phenomena
by a synthesis more or less intellectual or inward."

(1) Chemical or classificatory laws of inward relations or
resemblances of bodies.

(2) Law_s of mind._

The first class is further divided into laws based on the (a) nature
of the smallest part of the bodies that make them up (e.g., atomic
elements), and the laws that are based (b) on the structural relations
between the parts of bodies. The latter class is further divided into
the laws of (i) inorganic chemistry, which are based on the shape and
size of the atomicules, and the laws of organic chemistry, which give
rise to (ii) forms that have the power of growth and life.

The laws of organic chemistry (including biochemistry and protoplasm)
are, I take it, examples of the chemistry of "active substances"
because they are the kinds of things that are capable of growth and of
developing into living organisms. As such, the laws of organic
chemistry are on the border between the laws of fact and the
principles of thoroughly genuine thirds that govern the growth of
living things.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

-

FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca 
SENT: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 5:56:07 PM
TO: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
SUBJECT: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Mary, Edwina, Gary R, list,

Getting back to Mary's question, I dug out my copy of _The 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Contexts and hypostatic abstraction (was Lowell lectures...

[kirstima]

John,
Thanks for changing the subject line!

I'm well aware of hypostatic abstraction and I have given a lot of 
thought to its position in the overall philosophy of CSP.  Which is the 
context for both EG's and his logical graphs in a more general sense.


In a certain narrow sense hypostatic abstraction may be seen as (just a) 
distinction between verb forms and noun forms.  But the relation between 
hypothesis and hypostasis is more complicated, as I assume you are well 
aware.


Your example (opium) seems somewhat simplistic and misleading.  (Of 
course it is difficult to express one' ideas in short mails like these!)


In any experiment in the strict and narrow sense, a hypothesis in 
absolutely needed.  Further, a hypothesis  must  initially present a 
certain kind of question.  Only questions which imply a YES or NO answer 
will do.  The next step (next act) is to transform the question into an 
assertion.  Which is then experimentally tested.


In order to perform a scientific experiment, there must be statements 
(verbal ones) on some existent entities taken together with reasons to 
believe that one/some/all other entitities will be affected in certain 
ways. (Thus presenting some kind of regular relation(s). )


If it were just stated "Opium – sleep",  then it is asserted that there 
is (a well known substance) opium which is somehow related to (a well 
known) state of mind called sleep.  (The expression is commonly called 
elliptic).


Now, this (elliptic) expression does not state what kind this asserted 
relation is.  (In English the word "sleep"  as such does not by itself 
reveal whether it is used as a noun or a verb. In Finnish, which is verb 
 dominated language , like (old) Latin and Greek  were in this respect. 
)


To my mind Molière  (and Peirce) ridiculed  just as well the kinds of 
answers commonly offered  and generally accepted to WHY – questions.


My claim is that this is a cultural issue, not a scientific one.  Peirce 
made great efforts to transform such (unconscious) habits of thought 
into philosophically and experimentally relevant and interesting ones.
(Unfortunately my studies on Cultural Paradigms and their relation to 
sciences are published only in Finnish.  Still, I can share thoughts 
based on these investigations of mine. (In the hope that they are not 
just exploited, but give credit, too)


Existential quantifiers,  theory of probabilities etc.were a part of 
this work by CSP. Just as were logical graphs.

-
JFS: " …Peirce said that the act of replacing the verb to noun leads to 
a hypothesis (hypostatic abstraction) that there exists something that 
causes sleep. That hypothesis led chemists to discover morphine as the 
substance with dormitive virtue. "



Is this a summary interpretation?  Or did CSP truly write so?  - Either 
there is irony in the statement, or something is wrong.  Or are you 
using the verb "to discover" in the sense of "leaning how to make in a 
laboratory a synthetic substance  with the same kinds of effects that 
opium, a natural product, was already known to possess" ?


"Opium facit dormire", opium makes people (and animals) sleep was a well 
know fact for ages before CSP.  – The "WHY" question, on the other hand, 
is still not resolved.  A chemical formula does not answer the question 
to the full, because there are living beings involved. As expressed by 
the word "sleep".


To heap of new questions still unanswered, belongs e.g.:  Why do some 
people need opioids to get any sleep?  Why do not they spontaneously 
fall asleep, as even babies are able to do so?


'It is because they are addicted', won't do. 'Before' and 'after' get 
confused in those kinds of answers.


In experiments, even thought experiments,  like actually doing EG's ,  
time is essentially involved.  Before – after.  Even the logical form 
celebrated by CSP: If – then, involves time.


You take up Chinese in a way which makes me assume you mainly know 
Chinese in its present, mechanized and computerized form.  Which  tends 
to hide from view the true nature of Chinese as a language, worth 
clearing up in more detail.


It does not consist of "words" in the Western sense.  Our categories of 
nouns, verbs and adjectives just does not apply.  Written Chinese 
consists of concepts, not only presented in certain successions, but 
also painted by hand with a brush  IN A CERTAIN TRADITIONAL ORDER.


The order of strokes brings in meaning, stroke by stroke.  So Chinese 
marks resembl a theory, more than anything  else.  Then the "little 
theories" are presented in a certain order, which sheads ligth on the 
meaning of the whole.  (The meaning of the whole gets transformed as 
long as the writing in question goes on.)


In Japanese, there are two kinds of notations for writing down one's 
voiced thoughts.  One like in Chinese, another one like our Western 
habits of writing down our thoughts.


Wittgenstein devoted his later work on traps our language games lure us 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[kirstima]

John, Jon,

I agree with John on the issue of "every word.."

Opening the pdf by John did not succeed. So a little note on his wording 
in:



JFS; In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as

open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs.
It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or
speech act, such as assertion.


Shouldn*t the last word be "asserting", thus using the verb, not the 
noun?
This may sound trifle, but I do think it is important to make clear 
whether and when one is talking about an act, or an entitity.


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 28.11.2017 22:03:

Jon A and Kirsti,

Jon, replying to JFS

[In] a proof by contradiction... there would be no universe about
which the statements on the paper could be true.


In that case we may say that a sign's set of denoted objects is empty.


Yes, but there are several reasons why Peirce's original discussion
about the Sheet of Assertion is too restrictive.

Jon

By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”
is either word magic, word animism (?), or nominalism...


No.  Every use of signs, especially natural language, can only
be interpreted in context.  The sentence that precedes the in
question states the context:  "This syntax is so simple that
I will describe it." (NEM 3:162)

I didn't quote that sentence because the context was a  comparison
with the Lowell lectures, in which Peirce distinguished "verbs"
that named rhemes (or predicates) from "nouns" that named the kinds
of entities in the universe of discourse.

In 1911, he did not limit the part of speech of the words or phrases
that named rhemes or predicates.  See Peirce's own examples in
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm :

From the first two graphs:  -man, -eats.  Fig 1:  -phoenix.
Fig 3: -thunder, -lightening.   Unlabeled graph:  -is-.
Fig 5: -will die.  Fig 7: -boy, -industrious.
Fig 9: -known for certain, -communication with-.  Fig 10: -deceased.

Kirsti

If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard or
a piece of paper, there has to have been some co-operative human
beings to make even the empty ones.


Yes, and those people must have some reason or intention for doing so.
Assertion is just one reason among many.

Peirce discussed the kinds of "speech acts" long before John Austin.
Any of those acts may be performed with EGs:  metalanguage (talking
about an EG); hypothesis (suggesting an EG without claiming it's true);
proof (drawing implications before the conclusion is known); teaching
the syntax and rules for EGs (what Peirce was doing in his lectures)...

In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as
open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs.
It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or
speech act, such as assertion.

For more examples of contexts in language and logic, see the
slides in http://jfsowa.com/contexts.pdf .

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[kirstima]

John & Jon,

The two paragraphs offered by John to clarify the meaning of the verb 
'to indentify'  did not do the job for me. Quite the contrary.  Many 
questions arose.


JFS:  "In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two 
structures that are isomorphic.  Some mathematicians call that practice 
"abuse of notation" and insist on adding some annotations to the marks 
in order to distinguish the references.  But most do not bother to 
clutter their notations with such annotations."


Question:  Which (variety of) notations do you mean?   2 = 2  and  a = a 
?

Both can be read aloud as – equals – ,  OR – is identical with – .

The mark remains the same, but there is change of meaning, depending on 
the (mathematical) context.
With cardinals,  2 = 2 can be taken as equal and identical with  1+1 = 
1+1. With a = a the situation is not that simple.


With ordinals this does not apply.  As was shown by CSP in his cyclical 
arithmetics.


Not only does "how many?" count, "how many times? " counts. (This is a 
joke, mind you).


Positions within multiple cycles begin to mean a lot.

Also zero becomes very interesting, indeed.

When zero was introduced (by arabic influence) to our number system, it 
brought with it not only calculus, but also the arabic numbering system.


Thus 000 = 00 (etc.), but 10  and 100 and 1000 (etc.) make a huge 
difference. (As we all may,  sorely or happily, know by looking at one's 
bank accounts.)  This is not as trivial as it may seem to some.  Neither 
mathematically,  nor logically.


The first zero, the second zero, the third zero … acquire a  different 
meaning by their relative position in the chain of numbers.  Which is 
not trivial, either.


Relational logic is needed.  Which is just as complex ( and perplex) as 
CSP has shown it to be.


I have presented my thoughts as simply as I possibly can, but it does 
not follow that the thoughts are inherently simple.


With ordered chains of numbers (or other kindred marks) the problem of 
reversibility and irreversibility acquire a new acuity.


CPS deals with the problem a lot in Lowell Lectures.

I'll leave my second question on the meaning of identifying to a later 
date.


Best,
Kirsti Määttänen



John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.12.2017 23:06:

On 12/2/2017 2:20 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Re: Peirce List Discussion • John Sowa

JFS:
   In 1911, Peirce clarified [the] issues by using two distinct terms:
   ‘the universe’ and ‘a sheet of paper’.  The sheet is no longer
   identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
   couldn’t or shouldn’t shade a blank area of a sheet.

There is a difference between being a universe of discourse
and representing a universe of discourse.


On your website, please do not imply that I was confusing being
and representing.

In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two structures
that are isomorphic.  Some mathematicians call that practice
"abuse of notation" and insist on adding some annotations to the
marks in order to distinguish the references.  But most do not
bother to clutter their notations with such annotations.

If you are not convinced by mathematical practice, note the first
definition of 'identify' in the Merriam-Webster dictionary:
"1 a: to cause to be or become identical b: to conceive as united
(in spirit, outlook, or principle)."

Request:  Please remove the initials "JFS" from that page on your
website, or please insert the above two paragraphs to clarify the
meaning of the word 'identify'.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[kirstima]

John, Jon, list,

Thank you for a most interesting discussion.

Not being so keen on set theory, or the utterly simple assertions formal 
logic has so far dealt with, I would like to draw your attention to 
these assertion of mine:


If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard or a 
piece of paper, there has to have been some co-operative human beings to 
make even the empty ones.


If there exists any assertion stated on it, there has to have been a 
human individual to draw/write (etc) it.


As you can see, I have taken time into the timelessly considered issue 
of empty sets.


Thus, empty sheets may exist, but they can only become real (have any 
effect) if and only if some community (of whatever kind) not only 
exists, but has become real.


How about these? Comments?

These present some outcomes from taking BOTH formulations of the 
Pragmatic Maxim simultanously seriously. Which they usually are not. 
People tend to take sides at the outset.


I have made wonders with modulations of Aristotelian syllogisms on this 
basis. With the help of two new concepts, experiential time and 
experiential meaning. Which have been exploited, but not funded.


Which kind of reminds me of someone else... Who on earth could it be...

With kind regards,

Kirsti






John F Sowa kirjoitti 27.11.2017 19:00:

On 11/27/2017 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

JFS:

In 1911, Peirce clarified the issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'.  The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.


There is a difference between *being* a universe of discourse
and *representing* a universe of discourse...


I agree.

In the Lowell lectures, Peirce defined the Sheet of Assertion
as the representation of a universe that was constructed during
a discourse between Graphist and Grapheus.

But that is just one of many ways of using logic.  In 1911,
he wrote about "whatever universe" and "the whole sheet":

Every word makes an assertion.  Thus ——man means "There is a man"
in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to.


This is less restrictive than the definition in the Lowell lectures.
For example, it would allow a logician to use a sheet of paper to
write a proof by contradiction.  In that case, there would be no
universe about which the statements on the paper could be true.

John



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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[kirstima]

Jon,
I agree!
Kirsti

Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 27.11.2017 17:30:

John, Kirsti, List ...

JFS:

In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'.  The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.


There is a difference between *being* a universe of discourse
and *representing* a universe of discourse.  The basement level
universe of discourse X is part of some object domain O in view
and the systems of signs that represent aspects of the universe
belong to whatever sign domain S and interpretant domain I are
relevant to the context of discourse at hand.

With logic as formal semiotics and semiotics as the study of
triadic sign relations, properly understanding how Peirce's
graphical symbol systems manage to represent universes of
discourse requires us to consider the larger contexts of
triadic sign relations in which they play their role.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/27/2017 6:49 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

John,

Thank you very much! - I was wondering why I did not find PEG in the 
list.


Now it's all making sense.

With gratitude,

Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 27.11.2017 09:05:

Gary F, Mary L, Kirsti, Jerry LRC, and list,

In 1911, Peirce presented his clearest and simplest version of EGs.
He explained the essentials in just 8 pages of NEM (3:162 to 169).
I believe that it is his final preferred version, and I'll use it
for explaining issues about the more complex 1903 version.

Gary

[Mary's] question about the “blot” has me thinking again about
“the two peculiar graphs” which are “the blank place which asserts
only what is already well-understood between us to be true, and
the blot which asserts something well understood to be false”


Kirsti,

instead of warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would
have been most interesting to hear how they are related.


In his 1911 terminology, Peirce did not use the words 'spot', 'dot',
or 'blot'.  Instead, a spot is just a very short line of identity.
The line represents an existential quantifier, and there is no
reason to distinguish long lines from short lines (spots).

He used the word 'peg' instead of 'dot'.   Each relation has zero
or more pegs, to which lines of identity may be attached.

He also shaded negative areas (nested in an odd number of negations)
and left positive areas unshaded (nested in an even number, zero or
more, negations).  A blot is just a shaded area that contains
nothing but a blank.

Gary

[The blank place and the blot] are peculiar in several ways,
and each is in some sense the opposite of the other.


Each is the negation of the other.  The blank place is unshaded,
and the blot is a shaded blank.

Gary

For instance, the blank cannot be erased, but any graph can be
added to it on the sheet of assertion; while the blot can be
erased, but nothing can be added to it, because it “fills up
its area.”


One reason why the "the blank place" is "peculiar" is that Peirce
had talked about it in two different ways.  He called the sheet
of assertion the universe of discourse when it contains all the
EGs that Graphist and Grapheus agree is true.

But the blank, by itself, is true before anything is asserted.
In modern terminology, the blank is Peirce's only axiom.  Any EG
that can be proved without any other assumptions is a theorem.

In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'.  The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.

Gary, quoting Peirce

[A blot] "fills up its area."


In 1911, Peirce no longer used this metaphor.  With the rules
of 1903 or 1911, a blot or a shaded blank implies every graph.
To prove that any graph g can be proved from it:

 1. Start with a sheet of paper that contains a shaded blank.

 2. By the rule of insertion in a shaded area, insert the graph
    for not-g inside the shaded area.  All the shaded areas of not-g
    then become unshaded, and the unshaded areas become shaded.

 3. The resulting graph consists of g in an unshaded area that is
    surrounded by a shaded ring that represents a double negation.

 4. Finally, erase the double negation to derive g.

Another important point:  In 1911, Peirce allowed any word, not
just verbs, to be the name of a relation.  From NEM, page 3.162:

Every word makes an assertion.  Thus ——man means "There is a man"
in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to.  The dash before 
"man" is the "line of identity."


This EG is Peirce's first example in 1911.  And note that he begins
with a Beta graph.  In fact, he does not even mention the distinction
between Alpha and Beta.  The same rules of inference apply to both.

For Peirce's version of 1911 with my commentary, see
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm

Jerry,

CSP’s genius [etc.] make it difficult for anyone to project his

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[kirstima]

John,

Thank you very much! - I was wondering why I did not find PEG in the 
list.


Now it's all making sense.

With gratitude,

Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 27.11.2017 09:05:

Gary F, Mary L, Kirsti, Jerry LRC, and list,

In 1911, Peirce presented his clearest and simplest version of EGs.
He explained the essentials in just 8 pages of NEM (3:162 to 169).
I believe that it is his final preferred version, and I'll use it
for explaining issues about the more complex 1903 version.

Gary

[Mary's] question about the “blot” has me thinking again about
“the two peculiar graphs” which are “the blank place which asserts
only what is already well-understood between us to be true, and
the blot which asserts something well understood to be false”


Kirsti,

instead of warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would
have been most interesting to hear how they are related.


In his 1911 terminology, Peirce did not use the words 'spot', 'dot',
or 'blot'.  Instead, a spot is just a very short line of identity.
The line represents an existential quantifier, and there is no
reason to distinguish long lines from short lines (spots).

He used the word 'peg' instead of 'dot'.   Each relation has zero
or more pegs, to which lines of identity may be attached.

He also shaded negative areas (nested in an odd number of negations)
and left positive areas unshaded (nested in an even number, zero or
more, negations).  A blot is just a shaded area that contains
nothing but a blank.

Gary

[The blank place and the blot] are peculiar in several ways,
and each is in some sense the opposite of the other.


Each is the negation of the other.  The blank place is unshaded,
and the blot is a shaded blank.

Gary

For instance, the blank cannot be erased, but any graph can be
added to it on the sheet of assertion; while the blot can be
erased, but nothing can be added to it, because it “fills up
its area.”


One reason why the "the blank place" is "peculiar" is that Peirce
had talked about it in two different ways.  He called the sheet
of assertion the universe of discourse when it contains all the
EGs that Graphist and Grapheus agree is true.

But the blank, by itself, is true before anything is asserted.
In modern terminology, the blank is Peirce's only axiom.  Any EG
that can be proved without any other assumptions is a theorem.

In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'.  The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.

Gary, quoting Peirce

[A blot] "fills up its area."


In 1911, Peirce no longer used this metaphor.  With the rules
of 1903 or 1911, a blot or a shaded blank implies every graph.
To prove that any graph g can be proved from it:

 1. Start with a sheet of paper that contains a shaded blank.

 2. By the rule of insertion in a shaded area, insert the graph
for not-g inside the shaded area.  All the shaded areas of not-g
then become unshaded, and the unshaded areas become shaded.

 3. The resulting graph consists of g in an unshaded area that is
surrounded by a shaded ring that represents a double negation.

 4. Finally, erase the double negation to derive g.

Another important point:  In 1911, Peirce allowed any word, not
just verbs, to be the name of a relation.  From NEM, page 3.162:
Every word makes an assertion.  Thus ——man means "There is a man" in 
whatever universe the whole sheet refers to.  The dash before

"man" is the "line of identity."


This EG is Peirce's first example in 1911.  And note that he begins
with a Beta graph.  In fact, he does not even mention the distinction
between Alpha and Beta.  The same rules of inference apply to both.

For Peirce's version of 1911 with my commentary, see
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm

Jerry,

CSP’s genius [etc.] make it difficult for anyone to project his
thoughts into rarefied logical, mathematical, scientific or
philosophical atmospheres.


Yes.  He wrote volumes of insights that we still need to explore.
But you can't put words in his mouth.  If you can't find where he
stated something explicitly, you can't claim him as the source.

Note my discussion above.  Every one of my claims is based on
something that Peirce explicitly wrote.

John



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[kirstima]

Gary f. wrote:

- “Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness”

and “Thirdness” are all technical terms of Peircean phenomenology...


Many mistakes in this. - Just offer one example where CSP explicitly 
states that these are TECHNICAL TERMS. (If you can.)


Categories concern definitely not only Peircean phenomenology. Which 
present A PART embedded in Peirce's philosphy.


He continues:

..which also have “meanings” (i.e. intensions) in ordinary language.


The question of MEANING cannot be reduced just to intensions, especially 
not into those in ordinary language.


With CSP we are dealing with PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY, not just ordinary 
language.


Then he continues:


"As Peirce said and wrote repeatedly, the last three are concepts which
are extremely difficult to grasp;"


Are you making a claim that Categories and Elements are not concepts? Or 
are claiming that they are easy to understand?


It seems to me you get into difficulties with all of them, not just the 
last three.


To me they have all become quite easy. After harduous work, of cource.

The way you both Gary's are dealing with legitimate questions posed by 
Jerry F. Chandler seems to me just evasive, at best.


Best,

Kirsti

P.S. I am not asking for "detailed explanations". I wish to be saved 
from such.


g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 27.11.2017 00:01:

Jerry, Kirsti, list,

“Spot”, “dot” and “blot” are three of the many technical
terms used by Peirce to explain his system of existential graphs.
Peirce has given both visual examples and definitions of all three in
those parts of Lowell Lecture 2 which I have posted to the list. If
you are confused about their exact role in the EG system, you probably
need to review Lowell 2 by studying the complete text, which is online
at http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm [1] . Secondary sources such as
Roberts are also helpful, but you need to study them carefully in
order to see how the system elucidates Peirce’s logic of relations,
and perhaps set aside your preconceptions about the meanings of key
terms.

“Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness”
and “Thirdness” are all technical terms of Peircean phenomenology
which also have “meanings” (i.e. intensions) in ordinary language.
As Peirce said and wrote repeatedly, the last three are concepts which
are extremely difficult to grasp; sometimes the ordinary-language
meanings of terms listed above are helpful, and sometimes they are
misleading. These concepts are pretty much unique to Peirce, so you
have to pay close attention to Peirce’s usage of them _in context_
if you want to understand what they mean. Lowell Lecture 3 is one of
his most extensive and cogent explanations of his phenomenology, which
is (from 1902 on) foundational to both his logic and his
classification of signs. This will all be discussed in connection with
Lowell Lecture 3, and I don’t have time now for dozens of examples
and detailed explanations of these points, so that’s all I’ll say
about them for now.

My previous commentary on 2.14 consisted mostly of direct quotations
from Peirce and some factual observations about the sources of those
quotations, which I identified in the post. Kirsti, it’s not clear
what you are disagreeing with, or what exactly you think I am
“mistaken” about. If you will quote my words that you disagree
with, I’ll try to resolve the disagreement. But if you don’t
believe that Peirce used both “categories” and “elements” as
terms referring to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, I think you
need to read the Peirce texts (especially the Lowells and the Syllabus
texts given in EP2) and see for yourself. As I said, I don’t have
time right now to search out and paste in dozens of examples to
demonstrate what should be obvious from a careful reading of Peirce.
The question of _why_ Peirce chose the terms that he did is
interesting, but I’ll leave that for the discussion of Lowell 3. If
you want to get a head start on that, there’s a fairly large chunk
from Lowell 3 starting at CP 1.343.

And finally, my comments on the Lowell bits I’m posting are just
that, comments — they are not meant to be a substitute for reading
the actual Peirce texts, and probably don’t make much sense to those
who haven’t read those Peirce texts.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 26-Nov-17 08:29
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

Gary f.,

Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different
meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about
terminonology. They are not synonyms.

But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names
for classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.

If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:


Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[kirstima]

Gary f.,

Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different 
meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about 
terminonology. They are not synonyms.


But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names 
for classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.


If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:

Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in
quotation marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for  
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898.

In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the
term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for
instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because
I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly
evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on.

As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it
should be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I
can add anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in
the terminology of EGs.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

Gary f.,

I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his
"categories"??? Insted of... his categories???

Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it
would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is
all about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?

Not about just classification.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:


List, Mary,







Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with



either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth



comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898



(RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before



Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness,




Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more



specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained

"by


means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the



unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll



include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:







Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity



attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion,

I


call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached




to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs

according


to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads,



triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete

assertion,


like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb,



needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as







--obeys mamma



you obey--







A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete




the assertion as







—OBEYS—



or —IS IDENTICAL WITH—







A _triad_ needs just three subjects as







--gives--to--



--obeys both--and--







The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology:

what


Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or

"predicate"


in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the

semiotic


trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus,

EP2:292


or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here



represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy

dot"


in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate"



of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces



well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph,

and


the interpreter of it."







The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT



155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to




the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold

in


the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of




identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the



line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which



would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb,



though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with,"

its


subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of

the


"spots."







In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very




different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety.



Among these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends

of


the line of identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[kirstima]

Gary f.,

I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his 
"categories"??? Insted of... his categories???


Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would 
have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all 
about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?


Not about just classification.

Kirsti





g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:

List, Mary,

Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with
either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth
comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898
(RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before
Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more
specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained "by
means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the
unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll
include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:

Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity
attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I
call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached
to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs according
to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads,
triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete assertion,
like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb,
needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as

--obeys mamma
you obey--

A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete
the assertion as

—OBEYS—
or —IS IDENTICAL WITH—

A _triad_ needs just three subjects as

--gives--to--
--obeys both--and--

The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: what
Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or "predicate"
in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the semiotic
trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus, EP2:292
or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here
represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy dot"
in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate"
of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces
well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph, and
the interpreter of it."

The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT
155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to
the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold in
the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of
identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the
line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which
would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb,
though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with," its
subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of the
"spots."

In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very
different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety.
Among these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends of
the line of identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as having
such loose ends) are signs of a totally different kind. They are
demonstrative pronouns, indicating existing objects, not necessarily
material things, for they may be _events_, or even _qualities_, but
still objects, merely designated as _this_ or _that_. In the third
place the writing of verbs side by side, and the ovals enclosing
graphs not asserted but subjects of assertion, which last is
continually used in mathematics and makes one of the great
difficulties of mathematics, constitute a third, entirely different
kind of sign. Signs of the first kind represent objects in their
firstness, and give the significations of the terms. Signs of the
second kind represent objects as existing,-- and therefore as
reacting,-- and also in their reactions. They contribute the
_assertive_ character to the graph. Signs of the third kind represent
objects as representative, that is in their Thirdness, and upon them
turn all the inferential processes. In point of fact, it was
considerations about the categories which taught me how to construct
the system of graphs.

One last comment: the usage of the word "individual" in logic can be
confusing, but Peirce's definition of the term in _Baldwin's
Dictionary_ -- http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Individual [1]
--is helpful for understanding Peirce's usage.

Gary f.

SENT: 23-Nov-17 16:38

Continuing from Lowell 2.13,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13620
[2]

You will ask me what use I propose to make of this sign that
_something exists_, a fact that graphist and 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.6

[kirstima]

Jon,
You expressed my point even in what I did not put into words.

Kirsti

Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 3.11.2017 23:06:

Kirsti, List,

The Greek “dia-” means across, apart, or through.
And Peirce recognizes that one is often talking
to oneself or one's future self, so the number
of people that one is speaking across to is
indefinite.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/3/2017 4:50 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

John, Jon, list

Some comments in response

In Peirce's view logic needs mathematical grounds, but I have not 
found anything to support the view that there should be such sharp 
distinction as you propose. – There were many, many classifications of 
sciences he developed over the years. Of which latest ones should be 
given precedence. According to Peirce, the expession 'should be' has 
no meaning, if no aim is involved. If and when it is agreed that 
Peirce was aiming at something better, then this becomes self-evident, 
does it not?


I have difficulties in understanding what is meant by

John:

Game theoretical semantics (GTS) is just a mathematical theory.
As pure mathematics, Peirce would not object to it.

My understanding of what Peirce meant by pure math just does not fit 
with this statement. I won't even try to express how and why. Instead, 
I take up the question at hand.


Hintikka's early lectures on game theory were addressed to 
philosophers and social scientists, as part of the curriculum of 
practical philosophy at Helsinki University.


Prisoner's dilemma played a major role. I wonder whether it has been 
taken up by the means of existential graphs? Would like very much to 
see it/them.


My interest lies in that it presents the Dilemma of Achilles and 
tortoise in other cloths. The (seemingly) physical problem is dressed 
up as a  (seemingly) social problem in Prisoner's Dilemma.


Peirce did not object to the former, he just solved it. Thus I see no 
reason why he would have objected the latter, he just would have shown 
it to be a pseudoproblem.


Both dilemmas exist. No doubt about that. – But are they real 
problems, is quite another kind of issue. An issue about the relations 
between thought and language, but not only.


As soon as the latter dilemma is given the name 'Prisoner's dilemma', 
a host of presuppositions are taken in. – Let's just make a seemingly 
tiny change. Let's call it 'Prisoners dilemma', thus omitting a 
grammatical detail, which deeply affects the meaning conveyed. – The 
logical move entails a move from one to many. Not something to be 
overlooked or dismissed, surely.


In GTS it has been. But now I have pointed it out, a needle in the 
haystock of GTS. If you feel no sting, then I must have overestimated 
your logical sensitivity.


I have studied Peirces writings on existential graphs in a preliminary 
way, just to get the general idea & to understand it's proper place 
within Peirce's philosophy. After testing the idea on the contents of 
further (and further…) reading CSP, it holds. After testing it in the 
light of your most valuable teachings, it seems to hold. - Which is 
why I get deeply puzzled if and when your views on CSP are not, well, 
congruent.


Also, I wish to point out the currently common (sense?) 
misunderstanding with the term DIALOGUE. The very word is taken as 
referring to a discussion involving two (and only two) participants. 
As if Greek 'DIA' would mean two, which it does not. It just means 
'between'.


Thus I find

Jon:

Peirce's explanation of logical connectives and quantifiers
in terms of a game between two players attempting to support
or defeat a proposition, respectively, is a precursor of many
later versions of game-theoretic semantics.

as neclecting something essential (in a Peircean view). The implied 
third is the audience ( from 'dear reader' on…). 'There is one…' 
claims a possibility. 'All…' claims a necessity. In between the lies 
the realm of probable inference, abduction, hypothesis & the lot.


The idea of continuity is of course needed to understand the the real 
nature both dilemmas and to solve them. Both are pseudoproblems, in 
the positive meaning of the term offered in EG. Really solving them, 
of course, goes beyond the proper realm of existential graphs. Gamma 
graphs would be needed.


But if the meaning of the term 'formal theory' is for starters defined 
as just a part of math, then … Well, what? Does math then mean 
anything else but 'formal'?


Wondering,

Kirsti


John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.11.2017 22:08:

Gary F, Jeff BD, Kirsti, Jon A,

I didn't respond to your previous notes because I was tied up with
other work.  Among other things, I presented some slides for a 
telecon

sponsored by Ontolog Forum.  Slide 23 (cspsci.gif attached) includes
my diagram of Peirce's classification of the sciences and discusses 
the
implications.  (For all slides: http://jfsowa.com/talks/contexts.pdf 
)


Among the implications:  The sharp distinction between "formal 
logic",
which is part of mathematics, from logic as a 

Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.6

[kirstima]

John, Jon, list

Some comments in response

In Peirce's view logic needs mathematical grounds, but I have not found 
anything to support the view that there should be such sharp distinction 
as you propose. – There were many, many classifications of sciences he 
developed over the years. Of which latest ones should be given 
precedence. According to Peirce, the expession 'should be' has no 
meaning, if no aim is involved. If and when it is agreed that Peirce was 
aiming at something better, then this becomes self-evident, does it not?


I have difficulties in understanding what is meant by

John:

Game theoretical semantics (GTS) is just a mathematical theory.
As pure mathematics, Peirce would not object to it.

My understanding of what Peirce meant by pure math just does not fit 
with this statement. I won't even try to express how and why. Instead, I 
take up the question at hand.


Hintikka's early lectures on game theory were addressed to philosophers 
and social scientists, as part of the curriculum of practical philosophy 
at Helsinki University.


Prisoner's dilemma played a major role. I wonder whether it has been 
taken up by the means of existential graphs? Would like very much to see 
it/them.


My interest lies in that it presents the Dilemma of Achilles and 
tortoise in other cloths. The (seemingly) physical problem is dressed up 
as a  (seemingly) social problem in Prisoner's Dilemma.


Peirce did not object to the former, he just solved it. Thus I see no 
reason why he would have objected the latter, he just would have shown 
it to be a pseudoproblem.


Both dilemmas exist. No doubt about that. – But are they real problems, 
is quite another kind of issue. An issue about the relations between 
thought and language, but not only.


As soon as the latter dilemma is given the name 'Prisoner's dilemma', a 
host of presuppositions are taken in. – Let's just make a seemingly tiny 
change. Let's call it 'Prisoners dilemma', thus omitting a grammatical 
detail, which deeply affects the meaning conveyed. – The logical move 
entails a move from one to many. Not something to be overlooked or 
dismissed, surely.


In GTS it has been. But now I have pointed it out, a needle in the 
haystock of GTS. If you feel no sting, then I must have overestimated 
your logical sensitivity.


I have studied Peirces writings on existential graphs in a preliminary 
way, just to get the general idea & to understand it's proper place 
within Peirce's philosophy. After testing the idea on the contents of 
further (and further…) reading CSP, it holds. After testing it in the 
light of your most valuable teachings, it seems to hold. - Which is why 
I get deeply puzzled if and when your views on CSP are not, well, 
congruent.


Also, I wish to point out the currently common (sense?) misunderstanding 
with the term DIALOGUE. The very word is taken as referring to a 
discussion involving two (and only two) participants. As if Greek 'DIA' 
would mean two, which it does not. It just means 'between'.


Thus I find

Jon:

Peirce's explanation of logical connectives and quantifiers
in terms of a game between two players attempting to support
or defeat a proposition, respectively, is a precursor of many
later versions of game-theoretic semantics.

as neclecting something essential (in a Peircean view). The implied 
third is the audience ( from 'dear reader' on…). 'There is one…' claims 
a possibility. 'All…' claims a necessity. In between the lies the realm 
of probable inference, abduction, hypothesis & the lot.


The idea of continuity is of course needed to understand the the real 
nature both dilemmas and to solve them. Both are pseudoproblems, in the 
positive meaning of the term offered in EG. Really solving them, of 
course, goes beyond the proper realm of existential graphs. Gamma graphs 
would be needed.


But if the meaning of the term 'formal theory' is for starters defined 
as just a part of math, then … Well, what? Does math then mean anything 
else but 'formal'?


Wondering,

Kirsti


John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.11.2017 22:08:

Gary F, Jeff BD, Kirsti, Jon A,

I didn't respond to your previous notes because I was tied up with
other work.  Among other things, I presented some slides for a telecon
sponsored by Ontolog Forum.  Slide 23 (cspsci.gif attached) includes
my diagram of Peirce's classification of the sciences and discusses the
implications.  (For all slides: http://jfsowa.com/talks/contexts.pdf )

Among the implications:  The sharp distinction between "formal logic",
which is part of mathematics, from logic as a normative science and the
many studies of reasoning in linguistics, psychology, and education.

Peirce was very clear about the infinity of mathematical theories.
As pure mathematics, the only point to criticize would be the clarity
and precision of the definitions and reasoning.  But applications may
be criticized as irrelevant, inadequate, or totally wrong.

Gary

as late as 1909 Peirce was still trying 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.6

[kirstima]

OK. Thanks. Kirsti



Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 30.10.2017 20:45:

Kirsti, List,

It would be more accurate to say, and I'm sure it's what John meant,
that Peirce's explanation of logical connectives and quantifiers in
terms of a game between two players attempting to support or defeat
a proposition, respectively, is a precursor of many later versions
of game-theoretic semantics.

Regards,

Jon

On 10/30/2017 2:33 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:


I attended Hintikka's lectures on game theory in early 1970's. No 
shade of Peirce. I found them boring. No discussion invited nor 
wellcomed. Later on he got more mellow. And very interested on Peirce. 
- I greatly appreciate his latest work, remarkable indeed. Especially 
from a representative of analytical philosophy, to which he remained 
true. - Still, it hurts my heart and soul to read a suggestion that 
Peirce's endoporeutic may have or could have been a version of 
Hintikka's game theoretical semantics. - Must have been a slip.


Is it so that Peirce never gave up his project on developing a 
genuinely triadic formal logic? Even though Part II,  existential 
graphs were the only part he completed in a satisfactory way (to his 
own mind)?


Thanks again,

Kirsti




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[PEIRCE-L] A test

[kirstima]

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.6

[kirstima]

Thank you very much John for a most enlightening post.

Recto/verso issue (in other forms, of course) was taken up & became 
somewhat popular within feminist philosophy 1980's and 1990's. I felt 
uncomfortable with it. But could not pinpoint the locical (in the narrow 
sense) errors.


A pseudograp is always false, you wrote. If and when probabilies are 
taken seriously. Just as the prefix in naming the concept implies.


In other contexts CSP uses "quasi-", denoting an "as if.." prefix.  
Something, anything in priciple, may be taken as if it were true. - E.g. 
beliefs no one present (in any sense) doubts.


N-valued logic, in abtracto, does not involve time. So I gather? - So, 
even if the possible truth values are unnumerable, innumerable, as soon 
as events and successions of events are involved, (logical) anything 
just vanishes. Then there always (already) is something.


With empereia, there always is something.

To all I know, CSP never used the term 'semantics'. It was introduced & 
became popular after CSP. (If anyone proves me wrong, I'll be glad to 
know better).


I attended Hintikka's lectures on game theory in early 1970's. No shade 
of Peirce. I found them boring. No discussion invited nor wellcomed. 
Later on he got more mellow. And very interested on Peirce. - I greatly 
appreciate his latest work, remarkable indeed. Especially from a 
representative of analytical philosophy, to which he remained true. - 
Still, it hurts my heart and soul to read a suggestion that Peirce's 
endoporeutic may have or could have been a version of Hintikka's game 
theoretical semantics. - Must have been a slip.


Is it so that Peirce never gave up his project on developing a genuinely 
triadic formal logic? Even though Part II,  existential graphs were the 
only part he completed in a satisfactory way (to his own mind)?


Thanks again,

Kirsti











John F Sowa kirjoitti 29.10.2017 19:16:

Jon A and Gary F,

Peirce's way of presenting EGs in his Lowell lectures and his
publications of 1906 is horrendously complex.  The best I could
say for it is "interesting".  But I would never teach it, use it,
or even mention it in an introduction to EGs.  I would only present
it as a side issue for advanced students.

The version I recommend is the 8-page summary that he wrote in a
long letter (52 pages) in 1911.  The primary topic of that letter
is "probability and induction" (NEM v 3, pp 158 to 210).

When he got to 3-valued logic and probabilities, the recto/verso
idea is untenable.  Instead of talking about cuts, seps, and scrolls,
he just talks about *areas* on the sheet of assertion.  To represent
negation, he uses a shaded oval, which he calls an area, not a cut.

The shading makes his notation much more readable.  An implication
(the old scroll) becomes a shaded area that encloses an unshaded area.
His rules of inference are much clearer, simpler, and more symmetric:
just 3 pairs, each of which has an exact inverse.  See the attached
NEM3p166.png.  (URLs below)

Jon

Peirce's introduction of the “blot” at this point is


I would continue that sentence with the word 'confusing'.

Peirce said that a blank sheet of assertion is a graph.  Since
it's a graph, you can draw a double negation around it.  The blank
is Peirce's only axiom, which is always true.  If you draw just
one oval around it, you get a graph that negates the truth.
Therefore, it is always false.  Peirce called it the pseudograph.

In a two-valued logic, the pseudograph implies everything.
But when you get to probabilities or N-valued logic, you can't
make that assumption.  I believe that's why Peirce dropped his
earlier explanations.  For the semantics, he adopted endoporeutic,
which is a version of Hintikka's Game Theoretical Semantics.

Gary

At this point the “experiment” resorts to a kind of magic trick:
Peirce makes the blot disappear (gradually but completely) — yet
falsity remains


Yes.  But it's just another confusing way of explaining something
very simple:  The pseudograph is always false.  If you draw it in
any area, it makes the entire area false.

John
___

I first came across this version of Peirce's EGs from a copy of a
transcription of MS514 by Michel Balat.  (By the way, I thank Jon
for sending me the copy.  I still have his email from 14 Dec 2000.)

For my website, I added a commentary with additional explanation
and posted it at http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm

In 2010, I published a more detailed analysis with further
extensions:  http://jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdf

For the published version in NEM (v3 pp 162-169), see
https://books.google.com/books?id=KGhbDAAAQBAJ=PA163=PA163=%22false+that+there+is+a+phoenix%22=bl=LKYw9nZEKh=LEaTyTSTGiEuT-P_-9a6XHEVwWQ=en=X=0ahUKEwi509vA9pPXAhWEOSYKHcDQBZQQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage=%22false%20that%20there%20is%20a%20phoenix%22=false

Note: I found that volume of NEM by searching for the quoted phrase
"false that there is a phoenix" 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[kirstima]

Thank you, John, for clearing the issue. I wholly agree.  By the way, 
using the term 'universe' is fine with me.


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.10.2017 00:03:

Kirsti and Gary R,


Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter.


My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine summarized
in just one line.  If a reference to Quine is offensive, I'll
restate the issues in terms of passages by Peirce that Gary cited:

1901 | Individual | CP 3.613

...whatever exists is individual, since existence (not reality)
and individuality are essentially the same thing...


1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349

Existence [...] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other
characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely 
determinate.


1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7

...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of
metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if
and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same
universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is
used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of
a logical universe, or universe of discourse.


The first four lines of the 1905 passage discuss existence in
a metaphysical sense.  The last three lines state the equivalent
of Quine's dictum:

In Peirce's algebraic notation, "the definition of a logical proper
name" means that it appears as the name that follows a quantifier.
In his existential graphs, it means that the name is assigned to
the referent of a line of identity.

The last two lines say that "exist" means "to be a singular of
a logical universe, or universe of discourse".  If you object to
the word 'universe', replace it with the word 'domain'.

Quine stated exactly the same point in one line by saying "To be is
to be the value [referent] of a quantified variable."

I quoted the one-line version only because it's shorter and simpler.
But if you object to Quine, then use Peirce's definition.


Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP.


I agree.  Peirce distinguished the metaphysical sense from the
logical sense.  That enabled him to talk about a domain of
possibilities, which may be referenced by a quantified variable.

As a nominalist, Quine only allowed a single domain, which corresponds
to Peirce's metaphysical existence.  Therefore Quine equated existence
in the physical universe with reality.  Quine never used modal logic,
metalanguage, or higher-order logic.  And he was strongly opposed to
any talk about real possibilities.

Although mentioning Quine was a distraction, I think that this
discussion can help clarify the distinction between Peirce's
realism and Quine's nominalism.

In short, Peirce allowed multiple universes (or domains), but
Quine allowed only one universe (or domain).

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[kirstima]

Ontology/ epistemology taken as it has been does not apply to Peirce.

Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.10.2017 15:53:

Jon AS, Edwina, Jerry LRC, Gary R, Mike, and Ben,

Jon

By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully
employed late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be used to
talk about actual things that "react with the other like things
in the environment" (CP 6.495).


Yes.  That's why I avoided the word 'exist'.  In my note, I did not
use the words 'exist', 'existence', 'real', or 'reality'.  I assumed
logic in a way that could be represented in either Peirce's algebraic
notation or his existential graphs.  In his Gamma graphs, Peirce used
lines of identity in areas that represented possibilities.

One can use English sentences without the word 'exist' and map
them to logic in a way that the variables or the lines of identity
show what kinds of things are assumed.  But assumption does not
imply existence.

Edwina

thanks for a great post. I think that we don't pay enough
attention to relations.


Thanks.  And note that Frege may have published the first complete
notation for first-order logic in 1879.  But Peirce was the first to
introduce higher-order logic by quantifying over relations in 1885.

Jerry

I suggest that John’s reliance on Quine’s sentence to relate
metaphysical terms is highly problematic.  The sentence is merely
a rhetoric trick to divert the reader’s attention...


Yes!  Exactly!  I'm sure that Quine's rhetorical trick is one that
Peirce would have loved:  diverting attention away from the words
is essential.  That step cuts through a mass of verbiage to clarify
the implicit logical assumptions.

Quine was a strict nominalist, who used his trick to get rid of
assumptions he did not like.  But I used it to support Peirce's
much richer ontology, which uses logic in ways that Quine did not
approve:  metalanguage, higher-order logic, and modal logic.

Jerry
Consider the word “Love” for example.  Or, almost any human feeling. 
... the logics of molecular biology and medicine. which require

recursive compositions of terms to operate in multiple metalanguages.


Good examples.  Write sentences about those topics in English and
translate them to your choice of logic.  Q's dictum will show which
assumed entities are referenced by quantified variables.

Gary

according to Peirce existence is not "properly" a term of logic,
but of metaphysics.

1905 [c.] | The Basis of Pragmaticism | MS [R] 280:36-7

...the term existence is properly a term, not of logic, but of
metaphysics; and metaphysically understood, an object exists, if
and only if, it reacts with every other existing object of the same
universe. But in the definition of a logical proper name, exist is
used in its logical sense, and means merely to be a singular of a
logical universe, or universe of discourse.


That is exactly what I was trying to say.

Note the word 'But', which separates what Peirce said about the
metaphysical sense and the logical sense.  By applying Quine's
dictum to the logic, we can determine what is contained in the
logical universe (AKA domain of discourse).

Instead of saying that the possibilities exist, we can say that
they are contained in a special domain of discourse.  That does
not imply existence in the physical environment.

Gary

As for the reality of possibles, Peirce holds that  "...it is the
reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned
to insist upon."  Here one can begin to see how the last branch
of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.


Mike

Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations)


Peirce rarely gave enough examples to illustrate and clarify his
ideas.  But I would cite any engineering project or plan for the
future.  If you translate those plans to logic or a computer
program, the variables represent "real possibilities".

But as mice and engineers know, the best laid plans "gang aft agley".
Many possibilities that seemed real in the planning stage never get
built, get modified, or get rejected as the project develops.

Ben

My question is: Why does not the verb "to realize" work or
function to "talk about actual things and real relations"?


I doubt that having a verb is relevant to the issues.  Peirce
was a logician, who allowed logic to refer to multiple universes
(or domains) of discourse.  When he applied his logic to issues
expressed in ordinary language, he always kept that logical
distinction in mind.

As Peirce himself said, he found that existential graphs clarified
his way of thinking about all the issues in his philosophy.  The
exercise of mapping his language to logic can help us understand
what he was trying to say.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

[kirstima]

Hah! To the point Ben!

Kirsti

Ben Novak kirjoitti 19.10.2017 14:30:

Dear List:

Jon A. writes in his first post on this string: "Some of the
difficulty here is likely due to the fact that there is no verb form
of "reality," which could then be used to talk about both _actual
_things and _real _relations."

My question is: Why does not the verb "to realize" work or f'unction
to "talk about actual things and real relations"?

Ben Novak

BEN NOVAK
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702

_"All art is mortal, __not merely the individual artifacts, but the
arts themselves._ _One day the last portrait of Rembrandt_ _and the
last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—__though possibly a
colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—__because the last
eye and the last ear accessible to their message __will have gone."
_Oswald Spengler

On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 12:46 AM, Mike Bergman 
wrote:


Hi Gary, List,

I like your analysis and I see its logic. I (and others on the list)
have at times been confused as to whether abduction was in Firstness
or Thirdness. I still feel that abduction is applied to the
"surprising fact" that causes us to question the generals in
Thirdness, so is *grounded* there, but the results of abductive
logic informs the possibilities to be considered anew in the next
sequence of inquiry, so informs what to consider in Firstness. By
this thought, abduction is really a bridge between Thirdness and
Firstness in a dynamic process.

In that context, then, "some possibilities" which we should be "most
concerned to insist upon" are those that prove to be the most
pragmatic responses to our inquiry. I think that is the point you
are making here. In that context, then, virtually any "conditional
proposition" worthy of pragmatic consideration could/would be
instantiated in some pragmatic reality. Even unicorns fit under this
umbrella, since we know of no natural reason to discount a
horse-like animal with a single frontal horn. Under this
formulation, any reasonable "conditional proposition" could be seen
as real.

While I like some of the nugget of this argument, I think it
ultimately begs the question. What caught my attention in the CSP
quote you surfaced seems to suggest more: a "most concerned"
criterion that seems to go farther than any "conditional
proposition".

I get it that possibles, once instantiated or as a character of what
gets instantiated, can be deemed to exist (and are obviously real).
But I'm also not sure I am comfortable with a notion that any
possible is real simply because it is possible. My sense is there is
more here.

BTW, can you provide a citation of the quote in question?

Thanks!

Mike

On 10/18/2017 11:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Mike, List,

Thanks for your generous comments and support. It did take a bit of
research to come up with the citations to support the argumentation
of that post, so I'm glad you found it of interest.

I do think that this matter of the distinction Peirce makes between
existence (2ns) and reality (all 3 categories-- from the standpoint
of what I've termed the_ vector of involution_, commencing at 3ns,
which involves 2ns & 1ns, 2ns involving 1ns) is semiotically of
considerable importance and, so, ought not be swept under the carpet
of a piece of logic which would equivocate existence and reality in
a logico-grammatical sleight of hand ("quantified variables") which
makes _everything_ "exist" by the conceptual trick of having "is"
stand for not only existence, but also reality. While the problem is
difficult, as Jon S has suggested, I do not think that Quine's (and
Sowa's) strictly logical solution is adequate.

You quoted me, then asked:

GR: As for the reality of _possibles_, Peirce holds that ". . . it
is the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most
concerned to insist upon." Here one can begin to see how the last
branch of logic rather melds into metaphysical inquiries.

MB: Might you or others on the list identify what "some" of those
possibilities may be (with citations).

I think yours is a very good question, that it is undoubtedly
important to point out what "'some' of the possibilities may be."
But I believe that the first question we ought try to answer is why
Peirce says that "it is the reality of some possibilities that
pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon."

My preliminary thoughts on the matter: If pragmatism is the logic of
abduction, as Peirce asserts in 1903, then I would think that "some"
of those possibilities will be particular abductions and hypotheses
which might prove fruitful, which, upon reflection and/or testing,
show themselves to be valid, perhaps even finally useful. As Peirce
writes:

Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you
please to consist in conceived conditional resolutions, or their
substance; and therefore, the conditional propositions, with their
hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[kirstima]

John,

For the first time, there seems to be a deep disagreement of views. 
Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter.


Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP. Which I 
have taken to be one of the points in your most valuable mails. I must 
say I feel confused.


Lets rather take Aristotle as a starting point. We all know Peirce took 
Aristotle as his starting point, developed those ideas in his work. Into 
something new.


True, the logic Quine presents takes up the existential quantifier: 
there is one (or some) (this or that). Thus he (amongst others), but he 
takes it (amogst others) as a single fact (true or untrue as such). 
Then, in addition, there are propositions (understood as sentences, a 
major fault), which claim: "All x "(etc), or "no x" (etc).


Seems ok, but te the true fact is that no fact stands alone. No 
individual stands alone, about possibilities we do not know. Will they 
remain open? - We do not know.


Aristotle bended into thinking tha all possibilities will be actualized 
sometime. - There is no way any of us can explore and decide for certain 
whether this is true OR not. - The end of time was not decided, or even 
taken up by Aristotle.


What is real in Peircean way of thougt lies in the future. As it 
unfolds, in everyday life as well as in experiments.


One steam engine proves the possibility of steam engines. No need for 
two. That would be twice. Which, of cource is needed. - Two and twice 
are not logically identical. The first is about cardinal numbersystem, 
the second about ordinal numbersystem.


Very few mathematicians, since Peirce, have given serious thought on 
this basic issue.


Kirsti










John F Sowa kirjoitti 18.10.2017 19:06:

Kirsti and Gary R,

If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since
Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either
(a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely.

Kirsti,

Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
become actual.


In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues:  'real',
'exist', and 'actual'.  To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's
dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."

(And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'.  I wrote 'Kirsti'
in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many letters.)


But claiming existence to possibilities just does not hold.


In Peirce's article of 1885, he introduced the algebraic notation
for predicate calculus.  For "first intentions", he used quantified
variables to range over individuals.  For "second intentions", he
used quantified variables to range over relations among individuals.

Every possibility or general that we talk about in ordinary language
can be represented by a relation in logic.

For first intentions, the domain may be the physical world or the
domain of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and
geometrical shapes.

For second intentions, the domain is relations, which may represent
generals of any kind.  Those generals include possibilities, among
which are sign types.

If we restrict the word 'actual' to physical, Generals and possibles
aren't actual, but they exist in a domain of second intentions.

For example, let's consider a relation TallerThan.  As a general,
it doesn't exist in the first-intentional world of actual entities.
But there could be a particular instance TallerThan(Bob,Bill)
which does exist in the physical world.

However, we could use second-intentional logic to say that the
relation ShorterThan is the inverse of the relation TallerThan.
We can use quantified variables to refer to those relations
in the domain of second intentions.

Gary (quoting excerpts from CP 5.503)

[Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists
are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that
all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic
realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist."
[But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that
time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so opine.


In the excerpt that precedes that quotation, Peirce wrote about
what "many a logician" would consider:

reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so
is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the
environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two
meanings, he would say, are clearly not the same.


Since Peirce was talking about logicians, he would expect them to use
logic to represent both reality and existence.  But the domains would
be different.  Logic about physical existence is first intentional;
it refers to things that react with the environment. Logic about
reality is second intentional; it has a "cognitionary character"
that does not react with the environment.  But both first intentional
lo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[kirstima]

John,

Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist untill they become 
actual. Thus a token.


There always is the Scylla and Charybnis between understandability and 
logic. But claiming existance to possibilities just does not hold.


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 17.10.2017 05:48:

This thread is getting hung up on words.  I recommend Peirce's
advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow
from any options that anyone is debating.

Let's consider the two  words 'real' and 'existence'.

Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his
dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."

Consider the following sentence from a recent note:

I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential,
but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal
nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or 
habits.


My recommendation is to translate that sentence (or any other sentence
that is under consideration) to logic (pick whichever version you
like).  That process of translation is a purposive action.

Then look at which words in that sentence get mapped to quantified
variables.  Each of them refers to something that the speaker would
be committed to say exists.

By that test, many sentences that talk about possibilities and
generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables.
Therefore, they refer to something that exists.  But that existence
might not be in the physical world.  However, Peirce talked about
"real possibilities".  So they might exist in some possible realm.

Next problem:  Do signs exist?  In the real world or in some
realm of possibilities?

To answer that question, I'd look at Peirce's simplest triad:
Mark, Token, Type.

To analyze that triad, I would use the sentence "Every mark is
something perceptible that is classified as a token by some type."

By Quine's dictum, a translation of that sentence to logic would
assign quantified variables to 'mark', 'token', and 'type'.

Therefore, all three refer to something that exists.  Mark and
token refer to something perceptible.   Therefore, they exist
in the physical world.  But type would refer to a possibility.
Therefore, it exists in some realm of possibilities.

I don't know whether the people who used those sentences would
agree with me.  But unless I hear some very persuasive arguments,
I'll assume the above answers.

John



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Re: LEM Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

[kirstima]

John, Jerry, list

I feel utterly surprised. It never occurred to me that LEM could be 
taken as a 'technical' term. - Thank you Jerry for correcting that 
mistake.


The three basic assumtions of modern logic are, of course, intertwined. 
If LEM is put questionable, the other two simultaneously begin to wave. 
- Then fall.


Well, they do no fall. Rather what logically happens resembles what has 
happened with classical mechanics (Newton etc. you know). It has never 
been proven wrong, (which it is not), but it has been relativized.  It 
only applies within certain scales.


Peirce and his logic were not modern. They reach the time and scale 
beyond modernity.  Existential graphs and trichotomies do not show that. 
It is possible to use those fluently without ever noticing any problems.


Everyone knows Einstein's relativity theory. But there are few who 
understand it. Present day cosmology is attempting to make sense, to 
understand & find empirical evidence in order to get a better 
understanding.It is all about relativity theory.


Well, Peircean locic is all about relations and relativity. It is not 
about naming things. As if they were always already out there to pick up 
and see.  Seeing just does not happen that way.


And to note: my name is NOT kirstima. I am not identical with my e-mail 
address.  I always sign my post with my name. Which is:


Kirsti





Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 15.10.2017 01:47:

List, John:

Comments on “technical” aspects of Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) are 
inserted.



On Oct 12, 2017, at 3:15 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote:

Jerry and Kirstima,

Jerry

the issue of the "Law of the Excluded Middle” is a red herring to me.


Kirstima

LEM presents one of the three basic misassumptions in modern logic.


LEM is a convention used in a technical (mathematical) sense.
It's important to keep the conventions distinct from ordinary
(non-technical) uses of words.


LEM plays a central role in triad, the logic of logic, the logic of
mathematics and the logic of science. It is far more important then
just a notational convention or a traditional usage of a mathematic
symbol which is free to substitution for another symbol with the same
definition.
LEM has profound geometric inference for continuity.


Jerry

“Everything”, in my opinion, goes far beyond the ultra-simple notions
mathematical logic, mathematical formalisms, and  physical units of
representations


Yes, of course.  You have to keep technical terms in logic distinct
from words in ordinary language that are spelled the same.


???
My view is rather different, perhaps because economic considerations
are suppressed.
If the usage of a word is not that of ordinary language, then one is
obligated to distinguish the technical usage and explain to the reader
what it means.  CSP was very careless in this area and, often, the
modern reader is very hard put to make any sense of his techno -
babble.  At least, that is how I often feel.  On the other side of the
coin, when CSP felt up to the task, he wrote many beautiful sentences
and paragraphs with a special brilliance that is seldom matched.




The term 'universe of discourse' is a technical term, which Boole
introduced in his famous book, _Laws of Thought_ (1854):

Now, whatever may be the extent of the field within which all the
objects of our discourse are found, that field may properly be termed
the universe of discourse. Furthermore, this universe of discourse
is in the strictest sense the ultimate subject of the discourse.


When Peirce was talking about logic, he followed the terminology
of Boole and de Morgen.  It's important to remember that context.


I disagree.
CSP often stated that chemistry and chemical names were intrinsic to
his logical terminology.
If one is fluent in the logic of chemistry (as it developed in the
second half of the 19 th Century), then the augmentation of Boolean
and de Morgen terminology is readily apparent in the logic of
relatives. And in his development of his views on (non-mathematical?)
Graph Theory.

I agree that it is important to remember context, but this is possible
if and only if one is looking at  at all possible interpretations of
“icons, indices and symbols” as used in the scientific community in
his age.

Cheers

Jerry



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

[kirstima]

List, John, Jerry and Jon,

LEM presents one of the three basic misassuptions in modern logic. For 
all I know CSP and Brouwer came to similar conclusions independently.  
They also offered their grounds and conclusions very differently.


There was a deep change in math and locic during and after the centuries 
1500-1600.


Arabic influence, for starters. Latinization of ancient greek 
philosophical heritage.


Modal logic was self-evident for Plato, Aristoteles etc.

Modern (especially formal) logic is just feebly trying to recover and 
gather together the remants after LEM & the other two mispremisses.


Kirsti







John F Sowa kirjoitti 11.10.2017 09:20:

Jerry LRC, Jon AS, List,

Jerry

[JFS] Since a contradiction is always false, a contradiction
implies everything.


Everything?  While this assertion is widely repeated in
the literature, I think it is highly problematic.


It's widely repeated because it is a fundamental assumption
of most versions of formal logic -- i.e., of every logic that
assumes the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM).

But it is indeed problematic.  Brouwer, for example, rejected
LEM for intuitionistic logic.

And even for systems that are based on LEM, nobody actually claims
that everything has been proved.  Instead, they recognize that there
is a mistake somewhere, and they start searching for it.

Jon

[JFS]  For modal logic, there are three options:
necessary, possible, and contingent (not necessary and not 
impossible).


Did you mean to say necessary, impossible, and contingent?


Yes.  I wrote that too hastily.  "not impossible" is a synonym
for "possible".  For the three options, I should have written
necessary, impossible, and contingent (possible and not necessary).

But after I sent that note, I did some googling, which led me
to the article "Peirce and Brouwer" by Conor Mayo-Wilson:
http://mayowilson.org/Papers/Peirce_Brouwer.pdf

Some excerpts:

page 1

In his 1908 "The Unreliability of the Logical Principles" Brouwer
rejected the law of excluded middle (LEM)...
Five years earlier, Peirce had reached similar conclusions...


p. 2

Peirce and Brouwer's common rejection of LEM is not simply a
coincidence, but rather, stems from a deep underlying similarity
in their respective philosophical analyses of the continuum.


p. 3

Peirce and Brouwer seemed to have no knowledge of each other's work.
Brouwer might have learned of Peirce's ideas on semiotics in the
1920's through his association with Lady Welby... However, the two
most likely worked independently...


Fernando Zalamea also discusses Peirce and Brouwer in connection
with the continuum.  But he doesn't mention Lady Welby:
http://uberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Zalamea-Peirces-Continuum.pdf

In any case, these sources indicate that Peirce began to reconsider
his ideas about LEM around the same time as the Lowell lectures.
His thoughts about the continuum seem to be the original reason.
But by 1909, his thoughts led to 3-valued logic and a new way
of representing and describing existential graphs.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

[kirstima]

List, Jerry and John

Highly problematic, I agree. But it is not true that any 
contradiction,or all contradictions imply everything. Not logically, not 
really.


Everything does not mean the same as anything.  For CSP anything remains 
an open (vague) question UNTILL further studies & determinations on that 
basis.


On everything we can never definitely say.

On whichever moment in time (the current present), there always remains 
more to be found out.  - Or else there is no one to say anything.


Kirsti


Kirsti


Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 11.10.2017 00:22:

List, John:


On Oct 10, 2017, at 1:17 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

Since a contradiction is always false, a contradiction implies
everything.


Everything?

While this assertion is widely repeated in the literature, I think it
is highly problematic.

Because it violates the common sense of the meaning of natural
language terms in the premise.

Cheers

Jerry



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

[kirstima]

Gary,

Is it truly possible to just by defining to make oneself into strictly 
separate parts?


An interesting question.

Nevertheless, this discussion does not deserve continuation. All your 
points have become quite clear. With the undertones.


Kirsti

Gary Richmond kirjoitti 25.9.2017 05:00:

Kirsti, List,

I really can't say that I understand what your complaint is. Your post
began with and highlighted the snippet pointed to
​. Here it is exactly as it appears in your post​:


List,
I agree with Jerry.
Kirsti


IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR



BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?






You offered, btw, no reasons for your 'agreement'. You now say:


Kirsti: You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing
at the snippet you took up, it has been unintentional.


Looking again at what I just quoted, it certainly seems intentional to
me. But if it wasn't, so what? That wasn't at all the point of my
post. You continued:


​​KR: A
​​s a list manager your concern on the snippet is
understandable.


​I wasn't looking at this as list manager at all. In fact, when I
post something as 'list manager' or, ore characteristically, since
it's my principal role on peirce-l, viz., 'list moderator', I add to
my signature, ("writing as list moderator" and sometimes when Ben and
I have drafted a post together, "writing as list moderator and
co-manager with Ben Udell).

You continued:


Kirsti: However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do
not feel good about the way you expressed your concern.

Putting your addressees in a proper order could be a start.
Addressing the substance in the issue put forth as a main concern
could facilitate valuable discussions.

Which, as I believe, are the reason for keeping up with as well
joining in the list.


So, in the context of my posting merely as a member of the forum, your
other comments (just quoted) seem at least untoward since, again, I
make a fairly sharp distinction between my role as moderator and that
of simple participant in forum discussions.

To reiterate: my post was merely to suggest that (a) one couldn't
simply say that one agreed with Jerry when he was indeed suggesting
several (4) options, and even as he seemed to be leaning strongly
toward one or two in particular and (b) that _IF_ _I_ were to choose
one of the four that it would be Jerry's #1, _style_, that the
'introductory flourish' which Jerry remarked was perhaps an expression
of Peirce's style of thinking, especially when he was delving into
logical questions as fully and as deeply as he could. I gave my
reasons for my choice and even tried to moderate them (pardon the pun)
by suggesting that Peirce _may_ have  rhetorically overstated his
case.

I must admit that this kind of exchange which you introduced seems to
me besides the point, is, in my opinion, a waste of my and the list's
time. I, for one, would rather be addressing Gary F's thoughtful
comments having briefly commented on Jerry's remarks. Although I may
be mistaken, it would appear that you have some 'beef' with the way I
moderate (or co-manage?) the list. But that is an entirely different
matter which you might have, as discussed here even rather recently,
first addressed to me as list moderator off-list.

Best,

Gary R (writing as list moderator)

​





GARY RICHMOND
PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING
COMMUNICATION STUDIES
LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
718 482-5690

On Sun, Sep 24, 2017 at 7:06 PM,  wrote:


Gary R.

You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing at the
snippet you took up, it has been unintentional.

As a list manager your concern on the snippet is understandable.

However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do not feel
good about the way you expressed your concern.

Putting your addressees in a proper order could be a start.
Addressing the substance in the issue put forth as a main concern
could facilitate valuable discussions.

Which, as I believe, are the reason for keeping up with as well
joining in the list.

Kirsti

Gary Richmond kirjoitti 24.9.2017 23:25:
Kirsti, Jerry, Gary F, list,

Kirsti, you wrote that you "agree with Jerry" and pointed to this
snippet from his message: "IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP
STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?"

But Jerry has here offered 4 _possibilities of interpreting_ the
opening comments by Peirce. While I think there may be even more, I
would suggest that Peirce was the _most _thorough of thinkers, in
particular, of logicians. And so it is my sense that while he _may_
have somewhat overstated his efforts (in this "opening flouish," as
Jerry put it), that it was indeed his _style_ to make such
extremely
thorough, even 'minute' analyses (although, in fact, this might
seem
an impossible task).

I too want to thank Gary F for initiating this potentially most
valuable inquiry in conjunction with the work of Jeff Downard and
Terry Moore in initiating the SPIN 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

[kirstima]

Gary R.

You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing at the 
snippet you took up, it has been unintentional.


As a list manager your concern on the snippet is understandable.

However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do not feel good 
about the way you expressed your concern.


Putting your addressees in a proper order could be a start. Addressing 
the substance in the issue put forth as a main concern could facilitate 
valuable discussions.


Which, as I believe, are the reason for keeping up with as well joining 
in the list.


Kirsti


Gary Richmond kirjoitti 24.9.2017 23:25:

Kirsti, Jerry, Gary F, list,

Kirsti, you wrote that you "agree with Jerry" and pointed to this
snippet from his message:  "IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH  A CASE OF CSP
STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?"

But Jerry has here offered 4 _possibilities of interpreting_ the
opening comments by Peirce. While I think there may be even more, I
would suggest that Peirce was the _most _thorough of thinkers, in
particular, of logicians. And so it is my sense that while he _may_
have somewhat overstated his efforts (in this "opening flouish," as
Jerry put it), that it was indeed his _style_ to make such extremely
thorough, even 'minute' analyses (although, in fact, this might seem
an impossible task).

I too want to thank Gary F for initiating this potentially most
valuable inquiry in conjunction with the work of Jeff Downard and
Terry Moore in initiating the SPIN project. And one might note that
there are other members of the list, such as Gary F and Jon Alan
Schmidt, who have contributed to SPIN.

I'm looking forward to a lively discussion of the 1903 Lowell Lectures
on peirce-l. I'll try to respond to Gary F's comments in the next few
days, but have just returned from what was to have been a vacation
trip on Martha's Vineyard but which soon became something of a battle
with Tropical Storm Jose.

Best,

Gary R

GARY RICHMOND
PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING
COMMUNICATION STUDIES
LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
718 482-5690 [3]

On Sun, Sep 24, 2017 at 3:55 PM,  wrote:


List,

I agree with Jerry.

Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41:

List, Gary:

Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream.

It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance
(“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems (
linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to
communicate with others.

This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of
mathematical symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of
logical
stances are common and part of the everyday communications among
practitioners.

Beyond that, the following quote:

I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation
of
the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed
clear
and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that
it
would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute
examination
of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses
might
be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape from the
refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe the
phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how
the
argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be
interpreted.

simply lacks credibility. How could one write out all possible
emanations of all possible things? Such that representations of all
possible sin-signs could be given form?

"But after I had written it out,…"
Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript?

The phrase:
"the minute examination of all possible ways in which the
conclusion
and the premisses might be emended…"

remains a logically impossible task today.
I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because
the
symbol systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be
put
into premises.
Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and
chemistry, closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am
aware, impossible because of the irregularity of valences of atomic
numbers.

Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and
let
each reader evaluate the possible meanings for themselves.

IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR
BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?

I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will
be
offered and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in
various
disciplines.

Cheers

Jerry

On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an
intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of
science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is “a
false notion about reasoning,” and the practitioners of science
are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the “logical
acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

[kirstima]

List,

I agree with Jerry.

Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41:

List, Gary:

Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream.

It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance
(“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems (
linguistic, musical, mathematical, chemical … ) one can use to
communicate with others.

This rhetoric stance is rather bizarre from the perspective of
mathematical symbols and chemical symbols where refutations of logical
stances are common and part of the everyday communications among
practitioners.

Beyond that, the following quote:

I had intended to present to you a thorough and formal refutation of
the fallacy. But after I had written it out, although it seemed clear
and convincing, yet I found it too lengthy and dry; and I felt that it
would abuse your patience to ask you to follow the minute examination
of all possible ways in which the conclusion and the premisses might
be emended in hopes of finding a loophole of escape from the
refutation. I have, therefore, decided simply to describe the
phenomena presented in reasoning and then to point out to you how the
argument under examination must falsify these facts however it be
interpreted.

simply lacks credibility. How could one write out all possible
emanations of all possible things? Such that representations of all
possible sin-signs could be given form?

"But after I had written it out,…"
Really? Has anyone read this putative manuscript?

The phrase:
"the minute examination of all possible ways in which the conclusion
and the premisses might be emended…"

remains a logically impossible task today.
I believe that, even today, this assertion is impossible because the
symbol systems lack closure so that all possibilities can not be put
into premises.
Further, when one attempts to combine symbols from mathematics and
chemistry, closure over the possible premises is, as far as I am
aware, impossible because of the irregularity of valences of atomic
numbers.

Thus, I will close this “flame-out” with a simple question and let
each reader evaluate the possible meanings for themselves.

 IS THIS OPENING FLOURISH  A CASE OF CSP STYLE? OR HUBRIS? OR
BRAGGING? OR SOPHISTRY?

I remain very curious about how many different interpretations will be
offered and how these will relate to symbolic competencies in various
disciplines.

Cheers

Jerry


On Sep 24, 2017, at 11:04 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Peirce begins his lecture series with a ‘hook,’ warning of an
intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of
science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is “a
false notion about reasoning,” and the practitioners of science
are vulnerable to it because many of them lack the “logical
acumen” which would detect its falsity. It is “particularly
malignant” because of a peculiarity “which will prevent any
refutation of it from receiving any attention.” In this respect
it’s like a conspiracy theory, which is reinforced (for its
believers) rather than refuted by pointing out the lack of evidence
for it (the conspiracy has hidden the evidence!).

Perhaps for this reason, Peirce has decided not to present a
“thorough and formal refutation” of the kind of fallacious
argument which would exemplify this “false notion of reasoning.”
He proposes instead “simply to describe the phenomena presented in
reasoning and then to point out to you how the argument under
examination must falsify these facts.” Now, “describing the
phenomena” in the simplest and most general terms is the task of
_phenomenology_, and Peirce’s way of doing that was to identify
the irreducible elements found in _any and every possible
phenomenon_ — including those “presented in reasoning.” In
this way we can show how the phenomena necessarily involved in
reasoning are related to other phenomena, and by this process
combining observation and generalization, we can establish some
“facts_”_ about reasoning. Then we can see “how the
[fallacious] argument under examination must falsify these facts.”
Peirce is proposing to refute a “confused” theory of logic by
confronting it with facts gleaned from phenomenology. This procedure
is consistent with Peirce’s placement of logic as dependent on
phenomenology, in his classification of the sciences which
accompanied these Lowell Lectures.

That’s how I see it, anyway.

Gary f.

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway

FROM: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
SENT: 23-Sep-17 09:06

Here is the first of the projected series presenting Peirce’s
Lowell lectures of 1903 for close reading and discussion. Comments
and questions are invited as replies to this post. Here is the
source information given in EP2:242:
_[Partly published in CP 1.591– 610 (MS 448), 1.611– 15 and 8.
176 (MS 449). Composed at the end of the summer 1903 and delivered
on 23 November 1903, this is the first of eight lectures Peirce gave
at the Lowell Institute in Boston under 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences

[kirstima]

There is a link between ideas of recursion and that of cyclical 
arithmetics. Has this not been recognized?


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.9.2017 20:53:

On 9/1/2017 6:37 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote:
I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy could 
be convinced with this diagram, because in it, metaphysics

is presented rather as the last philosophy, instead.


I googled "prima philosophia" and found an interesting discussion
of the commentaries by Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle:
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11406-013-9484-8.pdf

The question Avicenna raised and Aquinas analyzed is the seemingly
circular reasoning in calling metaphysics "prima philosophia et
ultima scientia".

From p. 2 of the article:

According to the beliefs of the Medieval philosopher, the system
of knowledge encompasses mathematics as well as ethics, natural
sciences as well as theology...
I hope to disclose what Thomas Aquinas meant by metaphysics as
the first and simultaneously the last philosophy (prima in
dignitate, ultima in addiscendo, first in dignity, last in the
order of learning), while also revealing the difficulties faced
by those who ask: “What is first” in this particular context.


Since Peirce had studied Scholastic logic and philosophy early
in his career, he must have been aware of these issues for many
decades before his 1903 classification.  I believe that the dotted
lines in CSPsciences.jpg, for which Peirce cited Comte, represent
ideas he had been contemplating for many years.

Tommi

So because anything that can be found real can also be merely
"imagined" (independently on its reality), it is always possible
to draw a mathematical structure out of it, i.e. some mathematical
concepts and structures are present in any other science (and 
therefore

"nature appears to US as written in the language of mathematics").


Yes.  That is why Peirce said that philosophy and the special sciences
depend on mathematics for their methods of reasoning.  As he said,
mathematics is based on "diagrammatical reasoning":  draw or imagine
a diagram of any kind and make observations about the connections
and patterns in it.  The diagram need not conform to any prior
knowledge or experience.

Tommi

philosophical concepts should be somehow included in every theory
in special science... But from such principle follows severe
restrictions to the content of philosophical sciences (most of all
to metaphysics) and their application to special sciences (e.g. in 
which sense psychology is dependent on logic).


That would explain the phrase "ultima in addiscendo" by Aquinas.
But a restriction on the content of metaphysics would not affect
the principles it derives from mathematics, phenomenology, and
the normative sciences.

I would also cite Peirce's article on "Logical Machines" (1887),
which he published in vol. 1 of the American Journal of Psychology:
http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf

From p. 4 of "Logical Machines":

When we perform reasoning in our unaided minds, we do substantially
the same thing, that is to say, we construct an image in our fancy
under certain general conditions, and observe the result.  In this
point of view too, every machine is a reasoning machine, in so much
as there are certain relations between its parts, which involve other
relations that were not expressly intended... [But] every machine
has two inherent impotencies...


In this comment, Peirce admitted that machines could do mathematical
reasoning.  The two impotencies of a machine: "it is destitute of all
originality, of all initiative"; and "it has been contrived to do a
certain thing, and it can do nothing else".

He added "the mind working with a pencil and plenty of paper has
no such limitations...  And this great power it owes, above all, to
one kind of symbol, the importance of which is frequently entirely
overlooked -- I mean the parentheses."

With that comment, Peirce stated the importance of recursion.
He used recursive methods in various writings, but most logicians
and philosophers who read his writings missed that point because
the word 'recursion' was not used in mathematics until the 1930s.

And by the way, recursion looks circular, but useful recursions
always include a test for stopping when the result is achieved.
These issues about recursion came out of the debates of Gödel,
Church, and Turing when they were together in Princeton.

John



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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences

[kirstima]

As wished by John, some comments to the jpg, as well as on some comments 
presented:


I find the diagram a misleading, not a clarifying one.

I found the quote provided by Tommi a highly relevant problematization 
of the issue. I also agree with the critical notes provided by Jerry, up 
to a point.


The essence of anything lies in what it aims at, wrote Peirce. He also 
emphasized that meaning lies in effects, not just in words.


Changing 'science' into 'knowledge' in CSPsciences jpg cannot be 
justified by current English dictionaries or other records of current 
use of the word 'science' in US or UK.  - In Finnish usage, for example, 
the word for 'sciences' includes human sciences, and philosophy.


Who could say, on any grounds, that here and now we have  a state of 
affairs (in science) CSP aimed at?  The future he was aiming at?


What has  truly and really changed from the day CSP died to this day, is 
that by now CSP has become popular in academic circles. That is a new, 
quite recent phenomena.


With fame comes all the misfortunes always attached to it. – People just 
do not like to change their habits of thought. (Which truly is 
cumbersome!)


People are inclined to accomondate whatever is presented to accord and 
follow their habits. With even acrobatic twists and turns in their 
(mostly spontaneus and nonconscious) moves of mind in the process of 
making sense of whatever is offered.


CSP was a radical, in the sense of not following the well-trodded-on 
pathways. His ways of thinking still are radical in that respect. 
Easy-to-digest presentations will do no good.


To cut it short:  I do find this CSPsciences.jpg a misrepresentation.

The latin rooted "idio" was used by CSP for a deep reason, in accord 
with his comprehension of the web of (semeiotic) relations between minds 
and meanings. – It just is not something to be thrown into a bin as 
'outdated'.


This web of relations I have been studying for almost half a century. 
First without Peirce, then with Peirce. So I have deep reasons, just as 
well.


Jerry has been approaching the idea of 'idio' from the viewpoint of 
identity and perplexity. And has met with conundrums, id est (ie) 
cul-de-sac's.


Hegel tried to tackle the question with his Phänomenologie des Geistes. 
–It is to be noted that whilst Peirce quite harshly mocked Hegels 
'Logik', he later on took a much more mellow view with Hegel's 
phenomenology. Even stated that the three moments by Hegel bore a  clear 
resemblance with his three elements of (all) experience.  (Which is what 
the quote presented by Tommi is basicly about).


Peirce found a positive accord with the phenomenology of Hegel, but 
definitely not so with Husserl & followers. – However, nowadays the WORD 
phenomenology is commonly understood as refering to Husserlian 
phenomenology. With whatever variation of its meaning that may apply 
with any given audience.


This is a problem to be addressed, not something to be overlooked. 
Especially with audiences not familiar with CSP.


Best,
Kirsti





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Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

[kirstima]

John,

Your posts greatly  appreciated. But Peirce did write on cyclical 
arithmetics. With detailed instructions on how demonstrate the rules by 
experimenting with a pack of cards.


Detailed instructions include strict rules on how to achieve a random 
order with the pack of cards at hand. Only after doing this, the 
experimentations may duly be executed.


CSP describes eg. a procedure to demonstrate the birth of a habit, for 
instance. You start with a random pack and end up with, say, spades 
only.


Thus his cyclical arithmetics is deeply bound together with his ideas on 
the relation between probability and rules. What happens with true 
randonmess with a rule (any rule) applied to it?


This, for CSP was a question in need of experimentation as well as 
pre-locical (math!) demonstration.. The rule CSP choosed was that of 
cyclicity.


Nowhere have I seen this relation studied. Not in Moore's collection, 
nowhere.


A pack of cards contains 52 cards. - Well, there is a pattern of 
patience I have known since childhood. It may be called Napoleon' grave 
or not. Anyway, it consists of three cycles of ten. So, 52 ends up 
uneven with cycles of ten.


Does this make a significant difference with as few cycles as three? - 
CSP does not tell. - In this context, anyway.


All Peirce writes on cyclical arithmetics can be tested AND personally 
exprienced by really doing exactly as he minutely advices. Also 
repeatedly, as any experiment worth anything  should be done.


I have been experimenting systematically with a pack of cards for 
several, several decades. In order to truly understand the principles of 
cyclical arithmetics, by CSP.


What I have found out, for example is the huge difference between 
repeating, for three times in a cycle of ten, a pack of random 52 to a 
pack of 50. Really doing the patience includes that one counts down wins 
and losses as something personal, It is you who wins or loses. - It 
makes a difference, too.


There is no way any collection of quotes may replace experimentation. 
Inferences should be based on those, not just by leaning on any kind of 
hear-say. Not on  even well-selected quotes ripped from manuscrips by 
CSP.


With best wishes,

Kirsti







John F Sowa kirjoitti 16.8.2017 23:42:

Jerry,

JFS

In his late writings on the logic of pragmatism, he emphasized the
multiple cycles of observations, induction, abduction, deduction,
testing (actions) and repeat.


JLRC> Do you have specific citations?

I wish that Peirce had used the word 'cycle' and had drawn a diagram
similar to the one I frequently use.  See the attached soup1.jpg.

I pieced together passages from many of Peirce's writings about
induction, abduction, and deduction to construct that cycle.
There are many such comments scattered all through his writings.
(His lectures on pragmatism in EP vol. 2 contain many of them.)

Following is a passage (CP 5.171) that mentions all four arrows of the
cycle:  abduction, deduction, testing (action), and induction:
Abduction merely suggests that something may be. Its only 
justification

is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can
be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn anything or
to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is
to be brought about.


See Section 7, pp. 26 to 34, of http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf .
Diagram 7 (p. 31) is soup1.jpg.  On page 32, I use that diagram to
explain Peirce's point "truth can be nothing more nor less than the
last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately
carry us." (EP 2.379-380)

That passage implies a cycle.  Peirce's lectures on pragmatism would
have been much clearer if he had drawn such a cycle.

John



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Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Helmut,

Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use 
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense 
(meaning) it is used nowadays.


I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in 
more detail. But I left keeping up with this tract, except in a most 
superficial way.


I think you may be after something truly important. Of course there are 
others with similar aims.


Best wishes,

Kirsti

kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:41:

Helmut,

That is good to know. Thanks.

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:

Kirsti,
you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
because I do not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?"

I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come
out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about
systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP.
Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies:
"Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two
kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter
is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways
both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of
signs.

Best,
Helmut

05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
 > Kirsti,
 > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
 > According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
 >
 > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
 >
 > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you
add
 > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

 Helmut,

 It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
 whole picture".

 A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better,
or
 "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.

 What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the
ground
 of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
 science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
 methods and tools for research.

 There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making
a
 composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
 making them.

 I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do
not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?

 Best,

 Kirsti

 >
 > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 >
 > Helmut,
 >
 > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
 > and
 > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
 > which
 > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something
arrived
 > at
 > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without
working
 > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or
even
 > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
 >
 > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
 >
 > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
 > spent
 > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
 > those
 > issues.
 >
 > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
 > CSP
 > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still
holding
 > the
 > firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
 > three
 > logically necessary approaches.
 >
 > I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
 > this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early
1990's
 > I
 > tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.
 >
 > Best, Kirsti
 >
 > Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
 > > Kirsti, List,
 > > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
 > and
 > > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
 > > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign
classes,
 > > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
 > > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
 > categorial
 > > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
 > "NAND",
 > > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND",
so
 > > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
 > > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
 > > composition is just a matter different from classification.
 > Therefore
 > > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
 > > matter what a sini- 

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Letters to lady Welby need to be interpreted and evaluated on the basis 
to whom they were addressed to. Lady Welby was highly interested in sign 
classifications. Classifications were a dominant topic at the times, in 
vogue. (Remnants of this vogue are still effective.) - Peirce was 
explaining her about his earlier work and results on the topic, as best 
he could. Also following the rules of polite correspondence (by then) 
and taking her interests (Welby's Significs) to the foreground.


As evidence backing up interpretations on CSP's then current main 
interests, works at hand, I find Welby correspondence necessarily weak. 
Not strong, that is.


Best

Kirsti






kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 6.8.2017 10:39:

List,

I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work
with sign classifications.
Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52:

I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim
that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign
classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims."

I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he
must have done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for
Peirce's classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby
drafted in late December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It
was here that he set out his "ten main trichotomies of signs."

In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by
him to indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical
analysis") or "meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign"
and of sign types. Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled
"Meaning":

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "_fast_,"
which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not _this word itself_
that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only _an instance_ of
it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is
when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and
quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to
abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must
"represent," as we say, something else, called its _Object,_ although
the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps
arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an
exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing
prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from
carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article
is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's
Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an
island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all
ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not,
that represents _qua_ place on the map, the very same point _qua_
place on the island.

A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed
Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain,
even if it be not regarded as it should, as having _"a killing"_ as a
third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one
complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be
treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing
difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there
must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or
argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what
reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does.
Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and
since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an
additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged
Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way,
we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its
own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according
to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object.
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may
call a _Precept_ of explanation according to which it is to be
understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the
Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the _"species"_ of the
Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be
an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object,
the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If
the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the _"ratio,"_
or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course,
are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ]
CP2.230 (1910) ]

This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a
focus on signs and various 

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Helmut,

That is good to know. Thanks.

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:

Kirsti,
you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
because I do not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?"

I want to combine CSP with systems theory. I think, there might come
out a triadic systems theory this way. Peirce did not write much about
systems, I think, and existing systems theories are not based on CSP.
Stanley N. Salthe wrote about systems hierarchies:
"Salthe´12Axiomathes". In this paper he wrote, that there are two
kinds of systems hierarchies: Composition and subsumption. The latter
is, or includes, classification. Therefore I am interested in the ways
both (composition and classification) play a role in CSP´s theory of
signs.

Best,
Helmut

05. August 2017 um 12:44 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
wrote:

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
 > Kirsti,
 > you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
 > According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
 >
 > Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
 >
 > But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you
add
 > all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?

 Helmut,

 It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a
 whole picture".

 A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better,
or
 "good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.

 What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the
ground
 of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of
 science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering
 methods and tools for research.

 There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making
a
 composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or
 making them.

 I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do
not
 have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
 for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
 understanding you are after?

 Best,

 Kirsti

 >
 > 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 >
 > Helmut,
 >
 > You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
 > and
 > "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
 > which
 > one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something
arrived
 > at
 > from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without
working
 > out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or
even
 > impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.
 >
 > Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
 > view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".
 >
 > I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
 > spent
 > a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
 > those
 > issues.
 >
 > Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
 > CSP
 > to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still
holding
 > the
 > firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
 > three
 > logically necessary approaches.
 >
 > I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
 > this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early
1990's
 > I
 > tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.
 >
 > Best, Kirsti
 >
 > Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
 > > Kirsti, List,
 > > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
 > and
 > > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
 > > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign
classes,
 > > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
 > > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
 > categorial
 > > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
 > "NAND",
 > > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND",
so
 > > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
 > > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
 > > composition is just a matter different from classification.
 > Therefore
 > > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
 > > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
 > > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification
and
 > > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct
 > to
 > > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
 > > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course,
is
 > not
 > > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both
 > topics
 > > (make them one topic) to understand both.
 > > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces 

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

List,

I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work 
with sign classifications.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52:

I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim
that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign
classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims."

I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he
must have done it in 1909 or later. One of the main sources for
Peirce's classification of sign types is his letter to Lady Welby
drafted in late December 1908 (SS 73-86, EP2:478-491, CP 8.342-79). It
was here that he set out his "ten main trichotomies of signs."

In 1909-10, many of the pieces that Peirce drafted were entitled by
him to indicate they were about either "definition" (i.e. "logical
analysis") or "meaning." Many of these deal with definitions of "sign"
and of sign types. Here is one example from a 1910 manuscript entitled
"Meaning":

[[ The word Sign will be used to denote an Object perceptible, or only
imaginable, or even unimaginable in one sense--for the word "_fast_,"
which is a Sign, is not imaginable, since it is not _this word itself_
that can be set down on paper or pronounced, but only _an instance_ of
it, and since it is the very same word when it is written as it is
when it is pronounced, but is one word when it means "rapidly" and
quite another when it means "immovable," and a third when it refers to
abstinence. But in order that anything should be a Sign, it must
"represent," as we say, something else, called its _Object,_ although
the condition that a Sign must be other than its Object is perhaps
arbitrary, since, if we insist upon it we must at least make an
exception in the case of a Sign that is a part of a Sign. Thus nothing
prevents the actor who acts a character in an historical drama from
carrying as a theatrical "property" the very relic that that article
is supposed merely to represent, such as the crucifix that Bulwer's
Richelieu holds up with such effect in his defiance. On a map of an
island laid down upon the soil of that island there must, under all
ordinary circumstances, be some position, some point, marked or not,
that represents _qua_ place on the map, the very same point _qua_
place on the island.

A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, the sentence "Cain killed
Abel," which is a Sign, refers at least as much to Abel as to Cain,
even if it be not regarded as it should, as having _"a killing"_ as a
third Object. But the set of objects may be regarded as making up one
complex Object. In what follows and often elsewhere Signs will be
treated as having but one object each for the sake of dividing
difficulties of the study. If a Sign is other than its Object, there
must exist, either in thought or in expression, some explanation or
argument or other context, showing how--upon what system or for what
reason the Sign represents the Object or set of Objects that it does.
Now the Sign and the Explanation together make up another Sign, and
since the explanation will be a Sign, it will probably require an
additional explanation, which taken together with the already enlarged
Sign will make up a still larger Sign; and proceeding in the same way,
we shall, or should, ultimately reach a Sign of itself, containing its
own explanation and those of all its significant parts; and according
to this explanation each such part has some other part as its Object.
According to this every Sign has, actually or virtually, what we may
call a _Precept_ of explanation according to which it is to be
understood as a sort of emanation, so to speak, of its Object. (If the
Sign be an Icon, a scholastic might say that the _"species"_ of the
Object emanating from it found its matter in the Icon. If the Sign be
an Index, we may think of it as a fragment torn away from the Object,
the two in their Existence being one whole or a part of such whole. If
the Sign is a Symbol, we may think of it as embodying the _"ratio,"_
or reason, of the Object that has emanated from it. These, of course,
are mere figures of speech; but that does not render them useless.) ]
CP2.230 (1910) ]

This text has a lot to say about meaning, but it obviously maintains a
focus on signs and various types and functions of signs. If someone
can provide an even later Peirce text that discusses meaning but
dispenses with the focus on signs, I could take that as supporting
Kirsti's claim about "historical fact." Otherwise I don't think that
claim stands up to scrutiny.

Gary f.

} I must follow up these continual lessons of the air, water, earth, I
perceive I have no time to lose. [Walt Whitman] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ _Turning Signs_ gateway

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 5-Aug-17 07:00

Jerry, list,

It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications
aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Jerry, list,

It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications 
aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he 
found that way a dead end. - Anyone is free to disagree. - But please, 
leave me out of any expectations of participating in further discussions 
on the topic.


Best,

Kirsti


Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 4.8.2017 17:37:

Kirsti:


On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings
on those issues.


In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the
essence of human communication and the formation of human communities,
including professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics,
chemistry, biology, and the medical professions.

Thus, we are at polar opposites here.

The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if...In view

Cheers

Jerry



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:

Kirsti,
you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
According to my
 view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."

Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "

But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add
all aspects or perspectives, you have the whole picture?


Helmut,

It depends on what is meant by containing or composition. And with "a 
whole picture".


A whole picture of what? The final truth??? - Something like "better, or 
"good enough" would be a better way of putting the issue.


What did CSP aim at? That is something to be interpreted on the ground 
of all his Nachlass. - To my mind he was aiming at a philosophy of 
science which truly works. In real life, that is. He was offering 
methods and tools for research.


There already are billions of pictures of wheels, hammers etc. Making a 
composite picture of those does not help in skills of using them or 
making them.


I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not 
have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground 
for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and 
understanding you are after?


Best,

Kirsti






 04. August 2017 um 08:34 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi

Helmut,

 You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign"
and
 "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of
which
 one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived
at
 from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working
 out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even
 impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.

 Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
 view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".

 I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent
 a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on
those
 issues.

 Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found
CSP
 to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding
the
 firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the
three
 logically necessary approaches.

 I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on
 this. This work has been immensely useful. In 1980' and early 1990's
I
 tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.

 Best, Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:
 > Kirsti, List,
 > For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex
and
 > hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
 > understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
 > eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
 > Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of
categorial
 > parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or
"NAND",
 > but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
 > where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
 > composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
 > composition is just a matter different from classification.
Therefore
 > a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
 > matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
 > So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
 > triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct
to
 > say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
 > them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is
not
 > possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both
topics
 > (make them one topic) to understand both.
 > So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from
CSP
 > just does not work. The "pieces" only
 > work in the context of his work as a whole."
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 > wrote:
 > Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in
Peircean
 > philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
 > classifications.
 > This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
 > only,
 > or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce
definitely
 > left this road.
 >
 > By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
 > they
 > are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
 > research
 > relying on Peircean Categories.
 >
 > It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
 > Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
 > the
 > reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
 > issue
 > was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on
the
 > issues involved.
 >
 > To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
 > misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Jerry,

A misunderstanding here. I did not mean all sign classifications in the 
world. I meant those parts in CSP's work where he developed more and 
more complex classification systems; and that taken in the context of 
all his work. - Also, when said: "I have not found (etc...), I meant in 
the context of my work.


Of your work I said nothing.

Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that?

Best, Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 4.8.2017 17:37:

Kirsti:


On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I
spent a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings
on those issues.


In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at the
essence of human communication and the formation of human communities,
including professional disciplines such as logic, mathematics,
chemistry, biology, and the medical professions.

Thus, we are at polar opposites here.

The unity of body, mind and spirit can succeed if and only if...

Cheers

Jerry



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Concernig the supplement:

Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this 
"something higher". Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 00:12:

Supplement:
I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s
Peirce- reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-think" the same as
"consistency"? And what about the logic of relatives? Is it not a
different topic either, but must be made part of the whole topic too,
thus is refuting the original "new list of categories" for Peirce, but
not for Apel? Why did Apel claim, that Peirce was "looking for"
something "higher"? Is this "looking for something higher", or Apel´s
supposition of it, just the old continental hybris? But then I could
not read on, they wanted my email adress. I guess, they want money.
Maybe I will give it to them. Capitalism is not good, but still much
better than this continental drive to explain the world in order to
rule it.

Kirsti, List,
For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and
hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND",
but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore
a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to
say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not
possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics
(make them one topic) to understand both.
So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP
just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole."
Best,
Helmut

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
 philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
classifications.
 This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
only,
 or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
 left this road.

 By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
they
 are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
research
 relying on Peircean Categories.

 It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
 Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
the
 reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
issue
 was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
 issues involved.

 To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
 misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
 traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

 Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole.

 Best, Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
 > List,
 > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One
is
 > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think,
is
 > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition.
Is
 > that so? It is my impression.
 > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
 > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
 > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and
transcendental
 > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
 > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 > wrote:
 > Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
 > question
 > of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift
of
 > interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification)
into
 > triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
 >
 > On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
 > 2000's.
 > As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
 > refer
 > to the list archives.
 >
 > It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
 > Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
 > published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.
 >
 > What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
 > that
 > his starting points were different from those most often refered
and
 > discussed here in the 

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Helmut,

You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and 
"icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of which 
one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived at 
from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without working 
out oneself what is involved in all this, it is bound to hard or even 
impossible to grasp what you seem to be after.


Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my 
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing".


I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent 
a lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those 
issues.


Existential graphs is the only part of his logic, that I have found CSP 
to write down that he had succeeded in developing. But still holding the 
firm view, that it presented only a part of Logic. Only one of the three 
logically necessary approaches.


I have only worked out the introductory sections CSP has written on 
this. This work has been immensely useful.  In 1980' and early 1990's I 
tried to find companions to form a study circe, with no success.


Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 22:54:

Kirsti, List,
For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and
hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper
understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes,
eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
Another puzzling thing is, that a triad is a composition of categorial
parts, so an "AND"-matter. Classification means "either or" or "NAND",
but a legisign contains sinisigns and qualisigns. This is "AND", so
where is the "NAND"? The answer is, I think, that a legisign is
composed of sinisigns, which are composed of qualisigns. But
composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore
a sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no
matter what a sini- or a legisign is composed of.
So it was incorrect of me to have written, that classification and
triads are two different topics. Instead it would be more correct to
say, that they are two different things, but to understand one of
them, you must have had understood the other. Which, of course, is not
possible (a paradoxon), so it is necessary to read about both topics
(make them one topic) to understand both.
So I agree with you having written: "Taking bits and pieces from CSP
just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole."
Best,
Helmut

 03. August 2017 um 10:08 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
 philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only
classifications.
 This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the
only,
 or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
 left this road.

 By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often
they
 are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious
research
 relying on Peircean Categories.

 It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work
 Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that
the
 reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The
issue
 was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the
 issues involved.

 To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and
 misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on
 traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.

 Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only
 work in the context of his work as a whole.

 Best, Kirsti

 Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:
 > List,
 > Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One
is
 > classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think,
is
 > more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition.
Is
 > that so? It is my impression.
 > And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
 > opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
 > Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and
transcendental
 > philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
 > impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
 > Best,
 > Helmut
 >
 > 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
 > kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 > wrote:
 > Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
 > question
 > of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift
of
 > interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification)
into
 > triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
 >
 > On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
 > 2000's.
 > As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
 > refer
 > to the list archives.
 >
 > It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
 > Apel's book: "Charles 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean 
philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications. 
This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only, 
or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely 
left this road.


By this I do not mean that classifications are useless. Quite often they 
are useful as a stepping stone in the beginning of any serious research 
relying on Peircean Categories.


It is true that in his later life CSP started call his work 
Pragmaticism, in opposition Pragmatism. But I do not agree in that the 
reason was anything like the latter being "too relativistic". The issue 
was much more complicated. Best to study CSP's later writings on the 
issues involved.


To my mind Apel ended up with many misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations in his work on CSP. E.g. he relied too much on 
traditional Continental views of the hermeutic circle.


Taking bits and pieces from CSP just does not work. The "pieces" only 
work in the context of his work as a whole.


Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.8.2017 01:12:

List,
Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is
classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is
more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is
that so? It is my impression.
And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragmaticist", in
opposition to "Pragmatism", which was too relativistic for him? So
Peirce has a connection ability towards metahysics and transcendental
philosophy, and maybe that is what Apel liked him for? Only my
impression too, maybe wrong, I have not read so much.
Best,
Helmut

 01. August 2017 um 15:45 Uhr
 kirst...@saunalahti.fi
 wrote:
Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A
question
 of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
 interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
 triads and triadic thinking (as a method).

 On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early
2000's.
 As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I
refer
 to the list archives.

 It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto
 Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism"
 published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.

 What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is
that
 his starting points were different from those most often refered and
 discussed here in the list.

 Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly
 familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later
developed
 his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.

 In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics.
 Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost
only
 analytical philosophy.

 Best,

 Kirsti

 CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:
 >> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond

 >> wrote:
 >>
 >> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
 >> of this classification recently discussed here was an important
part
 >> of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
 >> discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
 >> (meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
 >> features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.
 >
 > Well I think we're saying the same thing the question is more the
 > more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity
of
 > structure in general. That's a more subtle point I don't have
 > strong positions on although I'm sympathetic to what I took Kirsti
 > to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime
driver.
 > But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was.
 >
 > I'd love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the
 > driver.
 >
 > My own beliefs here (which I'm more than happy to change with
 > further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted
 > earlier "Pragmatism" from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different
 > variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong
focus
 > on meaning.
 >
 >> Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
 >> doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
 >> things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard
 >> words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe
 >> will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and
 >> idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is
quite
 >> another affair.
 > (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)
 >
 > He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
 > discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about
 > _total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by
asking
 > how his 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A question 
of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of 
interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into 
triads and triadic thinking (as a method).


On these issues I have written extensively to the list in early 2000's. 
As Gary R. well knows as a participant in those discussions. So I refer 
to the list archives.


It was after I had reached this view of mine, that I read Karl-Otto 
Apel's book: "Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism" 
published in 1981. He arrived at similar conclusions.


What, to my mind, makes Apel's treatise especially interesting, is that 
his starting points were different from those most often refered and 
discussed here in the list.


Apel wrote his doctoral thesis on Heidegger (1950). Was thoroughly 
familiar with the hermeneutic tradition (e.g. Dilthey). Later developed 
his transcendental pragmatism. These I have not read.


In my early years (as a post-graduate) I read a lot on hermeneutics. 
Hegel also. Helsinki department of philosophy was offering almost only 
analytical philosophy.


Best,

Kirsti

CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 1.8.2017 07:52:

On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion
of this classification recently discussed here was an important part
of his letters to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his
discussion of and expansion of the notion of the Interpretant
(meaning, as discussed in my last post) has important structural
features, not to be glossed over in my opinion.


Well I think we’re saying the same thing the question is more the
more minor issue of what was the driver: meaning or just curiosity of
structure in general. That’s a more subtle point I don’t have
strong positions on although I’m sympathetic to what I took Kirsti
to be claiming: mainly that it was meaning that was the prime driver.
But I think we all agree with what the outcome of that inquiry was.

I’d love to hear Kirsti defend her claim about meaning being the
driver.

My own beliefs here (which I’m more than happy to change with
further information) come largely from the same paper you quoted
earlier “Pragmatism” from 1907 (MS318) In particular the different
variants of the paper he worked with seem to me to show a strong focus
on meaning.


Suffice it to say once more than pragmatism is, in itself, no
doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of
things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meaning of hard
words and abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe
will cordially ascent to that statement. As to the ulterior and
idirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is quite
another affair.

 (Sorry just have my Kindle handy so no accurate page numbers)

He then continues going into nuance on meaning to shift to a
discussion to signs. He bridges the discussion after talking about
_total meaning _in terms of counterfactual (would-be) acts by asking
how his principles of predication are to be proved. He turns for that
to a discussion of signs, but the discussion of signs is ultimately
conducted in service to his larger discussion of meaning and
pragmatism. As he continues to discuss signs though, he always keeps
that topic of meaning in sight. It’s true that by the middle of the
paper he’s shifted from talking about meaning to talking about
signification. But that’s merely because it’s a more precise way
of continuing the same discussion. (IMO) I think he continues
discussing meaning, noting such things that object of the sign can’t
be the proper object. He then relates feelings as tied to the meaning
of the sing. He finally discusses meaning once again in terms of
“would be” as a way of ultimately grounding meaning.

He finally closes by going through the various types of pragmatism
contrasting them with his own over where they vary in terms of meaning
using his discussion of the sign. To me that implies that the whole
point of signs in that discussion was to elucidate the differences
between his own meaning of pragmatism with James, Schiller and others.

Again, I’m fully willing to be wrong here. Most of you are far
better versed in the nuances of Peirce’s development than I. But it
really seemed to me to be that distancing himself from others over
meaning that led to his getting into deeper nuance in the structure of
the object and interpretant than he had in previous decades.






SR: Is this forum an effort to establish scholarly precision about
what Peirce said or meant or understood? Or is is an attempt to
use his ideas as we understand them as relevant signposts to now?
Maybe it is both. . .


This has come up a number of times on this list, a few times by
Stephen. I would say that certain members of this forum at times
emphasize the importance of clarifying what Peirce's thought, while
others at times emphasize 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

[kirstima]

Peirce did not use the term "semantics. But he did use the term: 
"semeiotics". He even gave advice in spelling the word. This was his 
advice: " see-my-o-tics".


Anyone can google this, I assume. If need be.

In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his 
life after SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings.


Heidegger was never attempting to create any theory of SIGNS. He was 
after meanings. Thus he turned into our ancient Greek heritance.  And 
did not accept the modern meanings attacted to the basic concepts. - He 
re-interpreted them.


With this he truly was in line with Peirce.

In 1970's  ( and onwards) Peirce became kind of covertly famous in 
Europe. His writings were studied by the top philosophers. But his name 
was seldom, if ever mentioned.


The French style of writing philosophy relies on argumentation. Within 
the text at hand. It is kind af assumed that any reader is thoroughly 
famaliar with the sources.


I do not know this much on the German tradition. Continental it was, 
that is sure.


Since I read Heidegger's Time and Being, It has been quite clear to me 
that he was after something akin to Peirce. - Kind of muddled Peirce, I 
thought.


Afterwards I read about all Heidegger has written. And was even more 
convinced that my idea was valid.


Kirsti








CLARK GOBLE kirjoitti 30.7.2017 19:52:

On Jul 28, 2017, at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

By the 20th century Peirce will have somewhat changed his
terminology; but from 1902 on I believe he always refer to three
branches of _logica docens_, or logic as semeiotic: namely
speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic (or, speculative
rhetoric). These branches of logic all concern themselves with the
_study of signs as such_, while phenomenology is, as it were,
pre-logica docens (although it most certainly employs logica utens
as has been discussed on this list as we all employ logic even
before we've reflected on it in a scientific spirit).


My understanding is that for Peirce semiotics (our term) is grounded
in phenomenology or phaneroscopy. So I definitely don’t want to
argue that the semantic extension of terms is the same in the
Heideggarian tradition as in the Peircean tradition. Rather I wish to
argue that via similar influences there is a similarity of content.
Heidegger doesn’t really engage much with semiotics proper - his
focus is primarily on Being arising out of his early work on Scotus
and then via rethinking Husserl’s phenomenology - primarily
intentionality and moving from bracketing/reduction to a general
hermeneutic. Derrida is the one who later takes up semiotics in the
more Heideggarian tradition via his research on Peirce.

So I’ll readily concede some of your points, such as pointing that
some things are metaphysics rather than phenomenology for Peirce. But
again I think we have to distinguish between the content of the two
movements versus the terminology used to describe that content. I
think the latter gets focused on to the detriment of thinking through
the former.


In truth this more scientific logical _trivium_ goes back very far
indeed, to the Romans, Peirce writes:


Yes, while we often look to Peirce’s engagement with the
scholastics, particularly Scotus, a lot of this can be found in the
tradition of platonism and stoicism in late antiquity. I’ll confess
I’ve not read or studied much of Peirce’s engagement with such
figures although I know he was very well read in the texts available -
particularly Proclus and similar figures.


So while I agree that in Heidegger as in Peirce that there is no
_bracketing or reduction_ or _psychologism_ or _egoic intentiality_
as there is in Husserl, yet speculative grammar (as a branch of
logic) is, in Peirce's classification of the sciences, further down
in the list of sciences and, so, draws principles from it and not
the reverse. This is quite different from your commenting that,
"like Peirce, Heidegger uses [speculative grammar] as a stepping off
point" for his phenomenology. Quite the contrary in my opinion.






Let me think through this a bit. Although my initial inclination is to
note that in terms of thinking through issues it’s different from
the position in the taxonomy of Peirce. That is while phenomenology
ultimately grounds signs and signs these later fields that doesn’t
entail that in inquiry the process of thinking proceeds solely in that
direction. But you raise some good points and I’ll have some further
comments later.



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[kirstima]

A bold interpretation. I wonder whether to quote is enough to give 
grounds for it.


It almost sounds as if stating that the main purpose of CSP was to 
uphold old, established views. Which is surely not meant to be the 
message?


I do not quite understand what "repurposing" means, especially in a 
philosophical context. I hope to get more information on this. Did 
Peirce ever use this word?


Kisti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 29.6.2017 02:10:

Jeff,

What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the _application_
of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them.
That does not mean that their depth, or "signification" as Peirce
often called it, changed in any way; rather it signals an increase of
information conveyed by those propositions. So I think it's misleading
to say that Peirce's "meaning" of those terms changed from 1867 to
1893 (or later), or that his _concepts_ of breadth and depth changed
in any way.

Indeed, whenever he brings up the subject in his 1903-4 writings (such
as "New Elements"), he is careful to say that the concepts are very
old indeed, and he does _not_ say that he is repurposing these
well-established logical terms to say something different from what
logicians have said for centuries. Indeed his own ethics of
terminology would discourage that sort of repurposing. His originality
was in defining "information" as a third "quantity" which could be
formalized as the logical product of the other two.

In short, these are very basic concepts in logic/semiotic, and what
Peirce did by broadening their _application_ within logic was to
demonstrate just how basic they are. I could supply a dozen or so
quotes from Peirce to back this up, and will do that if you wish, but
there's probably no need for that.

Gary f.

FROM: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
SENT: 28-Jun-17 18:15
TO: Peirce-L 
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

Hello Gary R, John S, Gary F, Jon A, List,

I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use
of "depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and
1896. The change was a broadening of the use of both terms.

I restricted myself to _TERMS, _because at the time this chapter was
first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of
breadth and depth was equally applicable to _PROPOSITIONS _and to
_ARGUMENTS. _The breadth of a proposition is the aggregate of possible
states of things in which it is true; the breadth of an argument is
the aggregate of possible cases to which it applies. The depth of a
proposition is the total of fact which it asserts of the state of
things to which it is applied; the depth of an argument is the
importance of the conclusions which it draws. In fact, every
proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term.--1893. (CP
2.407 Fn P1 p 249)

I wonder if other changes are involved that were required by this
broadening in the meaning of both of these terms?

Given the fact that the classification of signs as terms, propositions
and arguments is based in 1903 on the relation between the sign and
the interpretant--and that he later grounded the distinction on the
relation between the sign and the _final_ interpretant in
particular--I tend to think that Peirce is reforming the early
explanations in a number of ways--but it isn't obvious to me what
might count as natural development or refinement of the earlier
position and what might count as a more dramatic shift in position.

The distinction between different classes of final interpretants as
emotional, energetic or logical should give us some reason to
reconsider how the conceptions of "breadth" and "depth" work in the
context of the mature semiotic theory.

--Jeff



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology

[kirstima]

Gary, list,

First: I did not feel offended, I felt surprised. The expertice and 
authority of John F. Sowa were so clear to me that I could not think of 
anyone,least John, to take any offence in my stating my view so bluntly. 
- Which I apologized.


After the suprise I do feel offended. I was critisized for my tenor and 
tone.


Is there anything more personal, more 'ad hominem', as that?

I wish the person or persons not liking my responses would take it up on 
list, or post it to me.


I do not understand how or why  anything on P-list should be to anyone's 
likings.


End of this dicussion in my part.

Kirsti


Gary Richmond kirjoitti 20.6.2017 23:30:

Kirsti, list,

As list moderator and co-manager I try to follow what I consider to be
the exemplary notions expressed by the founder and first manager and
moderator of peirce-l, Joseph Ransdell, concerning what he considered
to be best practices on the list. I may not always be as successful as
Joe was in this, but I try to do the best I can. For Joe's remarks,
see: HOW THE FORUM WORKS (scroll down a bit):

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM [1]

if you are new to the list or have not read them for some time, I
highly recommend (re)reading Joe's remarks, something I do myself from
time to time.

In the current matter I would especially recommend reading these
passages (I've inserted a very few of my own comments into these).

CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS

-

It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued:
philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed
and self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in
this connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not
to the purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing
which should be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself
by posting a message to that effect to the list in general. Because
there is so little overt or formal moderation by the list manager, it
is natural to suppose that the individual members can and should take
that role as needed. But this rarely if ever produces the effect
intended, regardless of how reasonable it may seem at a particular
time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what can or should
be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of protests
and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to
rectify the problem on-list.


GR: Following the practice Joe advised here, I was properly
contacted by three members of the list who found especially this
passage in a message from Kirsti addressed to John problematic:
Kirsti had written:

"This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't
know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice
and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through."

THESE REMARKS WERE SEEN BY ONE LISTER AS "DENIGRATING" AND BY
ANOTHER AS "UNTOWARD." I AGREED AND WROTE KIRSTI OFF-LIST.


WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING

-

Should you contact the person yourself first, off-list, in an attempt
to rectify their way of participating rather than bothering me with
it? Although you do of course have a right—professional, moral,
legal, whatever—to do this, and it may seem best to you, let me urge
you to contact me first, nonetheless, unless there is some truly
special and urgent reason to the contrary. There are several reasons
for this:

(1) None of us really knows yet what the most humane and productive
communicational mores will turn out to be for communication of this
sort: it is continually surprising, and if anything is certain here it
is that our initial hunches tend to be unreliable. The list manager is
more likely to understand enough about the dynamics of this particular
list than anyone else, and has also had enough experience of these
things to have learned what is likely to be the most effective
response to something problematic.

(2) It is the list manager who is ultimately responsible for the list,
as regards institutional accountability. Speaking directly to this: I
need to have these things under my own control if I am to handle
judiciously the problems that can arise in such connections. I am open
to advice and counsel at all times and try not to act imperiously. But
there is no way that I can effectively delegate my responsibility to
the list members, which would be essential if the members were
themselves to participate in the management of the list other than as
informal advisors in off-list discussion.

(3) It is probably because everybody on the list understands (at least
unreflectively) that no list members as such have any special right to
regulate or moderate the conduct of others as list members that
criticisms of one another that suggest directly or indirectly that
someone is not of the proper sort to be on the list because of what
they post are highly inflammatory and are the 

[PEIRCE-L] An apology

[kirstima]

Dear John,

I sincerely apologize for any negative feelings my latest mail addressed 
to you may have caused.


I have been reprimanded by list managers that my tenor and tone are not 
tolerated. In a democratic list, so I am told.


There have been three complaints. Off-list. So I'm told.

My rare praises have been out-of-place and unfounded too. So I have been 
told as well.


Hereby I publicly apologize for both kinds of responses.

Regards,

Kirsti








kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 10.11.2016 15:51:

John, list,

Most important points you take up, John. Time-sequences   between
stories do not apply. - The big-bang is just a story,one on many just
as possible stories.

Time-scales are just as crucial with the between - issue as are
storywise arising issues. There are no easy ways out ot the time-scale
issues.

Best, Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 9.11.2016 21:25:

Edwina, Kirsti, list,

ET

I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail.


I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the
issues.  See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from p. 2
of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical 
point:


GB

thinking in terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds
whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones...
A story is a little knot or complex of that species of
connectedness which we call relevance.


This observation is compatible with Peirce, but CSP used the term
'quasi-mind' to accommodate the species-bias of most humans:

CP 4.551

Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further
be declared that there can be no isolated sign.  Moreover, signs
require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-
interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind)
in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct.  In the Sign
they are, so to say, welded.  Accordingly, it is not merely a fact
of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical
evolution of thought should be dialogic.


Re time:  We have to distinguish (1) time as it is in reality
(whatever that may be); (2) time in our stories (which include the
formalized stories called physics); (3) the mental sequence of
thought; and (4) the logical sequence (dialogic) of connected signs.

ET
The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the 
so-called

Big Bang?  I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S [not John S]
read them as BEFORE. In my reading, before the Big Bang, there was
Nothing, not even Platonic worlds.


This question is about time sequences in different kinds of stories:
the Big Bang story about what reality may be; and Platonic stories
about ideal, mathematical forms.

The time sequence of a mathematical story is independent of the time
sequence of a physical story.  We may apply the math (for example,
the definitions, axioms, and proofs of a Platonic form) to the
construction of a physical story.

But that application is a mapping between two stories.  The term
'prior to' is meaningful only *within* a story, not between stories.

In short, our "commonsense" notion of time is an abstraction from
the stories we tell about our experience.  The time sequences in two
different stories may have some similarities, but we must distinguish
three distinct sequences:  the time sequences of each story, and the
time sequence of the mapping, which is a kind of meta-story.

JFS

Does anyone know if [Peirce] had written anything about embedding
our universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension?


KM

I am most interested in knowing more on this.


David Finkelstein, p. 277 of the reference below:

Peirce seems to have included geometry in his evolutionism, at least
in principle...  [He] seems not to have responded to the 
continuously-
evolving physical geometry of Riemann and Clifford... nor to 
Einstein's

conceptual unification of space and time.


In any case, I think that the notion of time as an abstraction from
stories -- imaginary, factual, or theoretical -- provides a way of
relating different views.  It also allows for metalevel reasoning
that can distinguish and relate different kinds of stories that
have independent time scales and sequences.

John


From Google books:

_A Legacy for Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as Precursor
to Biosemiotics_ edited by Jesper Hoffmeyer, Springer, 2008:
https://books.google.com/books?id=dcHqVpZ97pUC=PA246=PA246=Order+is+simply+thought+embodied+in+arrangement=bl=DQUnZlvOYu=X8bH0YAG597uwjyedB4dSf2BuC0=en=X=0ahUKEwizyZD88JrQAhVENxQKHeEeBwoQ6AEIHTAA#v=onepage=Order%20is%20simply%20thought%20embodied%20in%20arrangement=false

David R. Finkelstein, _Quantum Relativity:  A Synthesis of the Ideas
of Heisenberg and Einstein_, Springer, 1996.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[kirstima]

Jon,
I like your tenor, but do not quite agree.

Yes, linguistics has changed just as you say.  But logic?

In my view, the very grounds of modern logic are groumbling down. But it 
is an ongoing process, with no predictable end.


Now we live in late modern ot early post modern times. Just to give a 
vague sense of what I mean by ' modern'. With this, I mostly follow 
Foucault's analysis.


There is a fierce fight going on internationally within logic. - The 
very position of formal locic is at stake.


The fight really is not about what locically is valid or not. Nor is it 
about which kind of locic gets science on with it's task. It is about 
taking hold of university departments as fortresses.


About getting rid all all kinds of 'weed'.

We in the Peirce list are lucky and fortunate to have John F. Sowa and 
you.


Kirsti










Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 17.6.2017 07:00:

John, Kirsti, List ...

The most important difference between linguistics and logic
is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative.

Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive,
but most in modern times have given up on that and realize
that usage will have its day and win out in the long run.
And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so
only on the plane of signs, sans objects, and so remains
a flat affair.

It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I
of sign relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our
transactions with signs in order to realize their objectives.
A normative science has different aims even when it looks on
the same materials as a descriptive science.  So logic may
deal with abstractions from language but it is more than
abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language.

Regards,

Jon

On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote:

Kirsti and Jon A.

Kirsti
Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even 
partly,

by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite
famous ones even, which have made that mistake.


Jon

ditto amen qed si.


Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related
by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or 
logic.


The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a
very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.
He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit
by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language 
often

almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic
philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions
that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably
arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."
For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

Kirsti,
CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that 
mistake.


Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied
the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from
language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.
Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language,
not as a replacement for language.

In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell.  But
Frank Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce
with LW.  Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more
compatible with Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell.
I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf

Kirsti

I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace
reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a
limited degree.


I certainly agree with that point.  When I said that dictionaries
were useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion.  Please
remember that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for
several dictionaries.

But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time.
Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations.
See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer
Adam Kilgarriff:  https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf

John




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[kirstima]

Hah. The minute I sent my message on no response, I got John's response.

This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong,

You just don't know  what you are talking about. - just walking on very 
thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through.


It is not that some identifiable person is needed to put AI into inhuman 
action. Nor is it needed that this kind of mishap originates in any 
identifiable "machine".


You know better!

In any net, everything is connected with every other 'thing'. Just as 
you said on the philosphy of CSP.


Life is net-like.

Are you taking the side: "machines are innocent, blame individual 
persons' ???


If so, you are not seeing the forest, just the trees.

Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 16.6.2017 06:15:

On 6/15/2017 1:10 PM, Eugene Halton wrote:

What "would motivate [AI systems] to kill us?"
Rationally-mechanically infantilized us.


Yes.  That's similar to what I said:  "The most likely reason why
any AI system would have the goal to kill anything is that some
human(s) programmed [or somehow instilled] that goal into it."


these views seem to me blindingly limited understandings of what
a machine is, putting an artificial divide between the machine
and the human rather than seeing the machine as continuous with
the human.


I'm not denying that some kind of computer system might evolve
intentionality over some long period of time.  There are techniques
such as "genetic algorithms" that enable AI systems to improve.

But the word 'improve' implies value judgments -- a kind of Thirdness.
Where does that Thirdness come from?  For genetic algorithms, it comes
from a reward/punishment regime.  But rewards are already a kind of
Thirdness.

Darwin proposed "natural selection" -- but that selection was based
on a reward system that involved energy consumption (AKA food).
And things that eat (such as bacteria) already exhibit intentionality
by seeking and finding food, as Lynn Margulis observed.

As Peirce said, the origin of life must involve some nondegenerate
Thirdness.  There are only two options:  (1) Some random process that
takes millions or billions of years produces something that "eats".
(2) Some already intelligent being (God? Demiurge? Human?) speeds up
the process by programming (instilling) some primitive kind of
Thirdness and lets natural selection make improvements.

But as I said, the most likely cause of an evil AI system is some
human who deliberately or accidentally put the evil goal into it.
I would bet on Steve Bannon.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[kirstima]

Gene,

The most important message ever in Peirce-list is this one you posted!

I repeat: ever!

I am literally schocked by the fact, that I am the first to respond. 
This late.


Am I conversing with human beings? - Or just kinds of extensions to 
automatization of everyday life & "common sense" moulded into it?


The news you are sharing, Gene, are even more alarming than climate 
change.


Because this proceeds more rapidly, for instance.

I have no deep trust in tests of empathy etc. But even a poor tests do 
catch this kind of change. in these proportions.


Are you folks happy with this? - Not moving your eyelid?

If this is the situation in US, something like it happens almost all 
over the world.


But, just a moment, this list may not be about what CSP was concerned 
about. This list may nowadays  be concerned just about AI.  And how to 
(mis)use CSP to those purposes.


Hey, fellows, there is life to attend to!

Kirsti






Eugene Halton kirjoitti 12.6.2017 19:40:

In the past generation in the United States, empathy among college
students, as measured by standardized tests, has dropped about 40%
according to a 2010 University of Michigan study, with the largest
drop occurring after the year 2000. This is the new normal. Should we
now suppose the previous norm to be paranormal, above or beyond the
norm? Other standardized tests show that Narcissism has gone up for
this age group, as would be expected, since Narcissism involves
empathy deficiency.

Could there be a day when empathy is regarded as a paranormal
phenomenon? Imagine that society where rigorous experiments on the
subjects show no signs of empathy above chance, because the society
has systematically self-altered itself to diminish or virtually
extinguish a passion older than humanity itself.

Of course all of this involves socialization and especially parenting.
Imagine a society where frequent empathic touch and gaze between
parent and young children is regarded as paranormal, because the norms
reveal very little empathic touch or gaze. Harlow’s monkey
experiments showed what this would be like.

A society shaped by a rational-mechanical bureaucratic
mindset is likely to manifest it not only in its norms of parenting
and social interaction, but tacitly in its science and technology as
well, despite the best intentions and technical methods. The passions
tend to be denigrated in such a world.

In mid-twentieth century “the new synthesis” in
genetics, as Julian Huxley called it, showed a determinist perspective
in which socialization, experience, and Lamarckian-like phenomena,
such as Peirce’s idea of “evolutionary love,” evolution by
Thirdness, were unacceptable, perhaps again, literally
“paranormal.” Epigenetics and related developments in biology have
shown the limitations of "the new synthesis."

I grant that Sheldrake attempted rigorous experiments with original
designs, which I'd like to look further into, including the dog ones.
On the upside I can see that the dog experiments at least included
beings living more from their passions. It throws a light on the more
typical experimental assumptions: Why would we think that randomized
untrained subjects from the humanly diminished altered state of a
rational-mechanical bureaucratic society performing cognitive tasks
would provide rigorous objective data in experiments on phenomena such
as telepathy?

Gene Halton

On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 10:41 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
 wrote:


List:

Kirsti’s very solid post is worthy of a very careful read,
although I not state the case so forcefully.

In general, although I have not studied Sheldrake’s work as
closely as she, I have followed it for several decades from the
perspective of biochemical dose-response relationships. In general,
I find his scientific logic sound.

Historically, quantitative scientific measurements of phenomena can
proceed decades or centuries before a quantitative theories of how
the phenomena can be symbolized.

A clear example of the factual measurements before quantitative
explanations are genetic phenomena. Inheritable traits appear as if
by magic. Another example, the need for specific vitamins in diets
and the influence of hormones on behavior. CSP grounds his view of
realism on the facts associated with quali-signs, sin-signs and
legi-signs, in illation to possible measurement. Scientific
theories are necessarily grounded in such facts, either qualitative
of quantitative.

It (observation) is what it is, regardless of assertions about the
formal logics of mathematics.

Sheldrake's statements about scientific “dogmas” contain some
grains of truth but are not well stated from either a chemical,
mathematical or logical point of view.

Sheldrake is certainly NOT applying a Procrustian bed to
observations in order to accommodate his personal philosophy.

Cheers

Jerry


On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:33 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

John,
Actually Sheldrake 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

[kirstima]

Thank you, John (again) for clearing up the issue with utmost clarity!

Gratefully,

Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 18.6.2017 16:39:

On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe
the character of the philosophical sciences--as well as the
special sciences. They are positive (and not merely ideal)
in that they study real things and not idealizations.


In the 19th century, the term 'positive' was popularized by
Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach.  In the 20th c, it was adopted
by the Vienna Circle in the form of logical positivism.

As Peirce used the term, it was part of a much richer system.
But the 20th c version was an extreme nominalism that lost
all the subtlety of Peirce's use.

The most extreme was Carnap, the most brilliant of the Circlers.
To the end of his life, he claimed that the laws of physics were
just summaries of observation data.

The following remark by Clarence Irving Lewis (in a letter to Hao Wang
in 1960) is an excellent summary of Carnap's philosophical method:

It is so easy... to get impressive 'results' by replacing the vaguer
concepts which convey real meaning by virtue of common usage by pseudo
precise concepts which are manipulable by 'exact' methods — the 
trouble

being that nobody any longer knows whether anything actual or of
practical import is being discussed.


Wang earned his PhD at Harvard with Quine as his thesis adviser, but
he found Lewis more congenial.  He quoted that excerpt on page 116 of
Wang, Hao (1986) Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What
We Know, MIT Press.

Wittgenstein visited the Vienna Circle a few times, but he found
Carnap's attitude so abhorrent that he refused to attend if Carnap
was there.  Peirce would have found it equally repulsive.  If he had
known that the word 'positive' would be "hijacked" by Carnap, Peirce
would have disowned it.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Deely & Apel

[kirstima]

Hello Brad,

A very interesting theme you have taken on. A challenging one, too.

Apel and Deely come from very different traditions. I guess about all 
listers have read Deely (on Peirce), but none to my knowledge has read 
Apel (on Peirce). Except me. - I'd like to know if there are some other 
seasoned listers with an interest in the views of Apel on CSP.


Early on I took the habit of avoiding any reading of interpretations on 
any classic texts before I had got the feel of understanding the classic 
in question on its own right. (Invented many kinds of tests to my 
correct understanding in the way.)


Now you have taken the job of comparing two eminent writers with a very, 
very different background and standpoints. Different traditions of 
thought.


If you are seaching for earlier publications comparing Deely's 
interpretations and those of Apel, I suspect there is none to find.


How come you got interested in Apel? - I am a European philospher, so of 
course I do know Apel, and not only on CSP.


My best,

Kirsti Määttänen

Tampere University, Finland









Brad Venner kirjoitti 15.6.2017 20:19:

Hi, all.  My name is Brad Venner - I'm a new list subscriber.

I'd like to put together a paper comparing the approaches of John
Deely and Karl-Otto Apel, in memorium of their recent passing (Deely
in Jan 2017; Apel in May 2017).  I'm thinking of focusing on their
history of philosophy projects as a frame.  Both credit Peirce as the
originator of a new philosophical age.  Apel considers three major
phases of "first philosophy" (ontology, transcendental subject,
transcendental semiotics) while Deely considers four (ancient, latin,
modern, post-modern).  Thus Deely splits the ancient age into Greek
and Latin phases.  This difference seems related to their overall
emphasis on Peirce's influences - Apel emphasizes the Kantian
influences, while Deely emphasizes the Latin influences.  Apel's term
"transcendental semiotics" caries this Kantian/Latin distinction.

I haven't found any such direct comparisons in the literature so far,
which concerns me a little, since it almost certainly reflects my
ignorance of philosophy (I'm a professional statistician).  If anyone
has any relevant references that I've missed, or related ideas that
you know of, I'd appreciate if you would post them to the list.

Thanks!



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

[kirstima]

My applauds, Gene!

What a great wake-up call.

Kirsti Määttänen

Eugene Halton kirjoitti 15.6.2017 20:10:

Gary f: "I think it’s quite plausible that AI systems could reach
that level of autonomy and leave us behind in terms of intelligence,
but what would motivate them to kill us? I don’t think the
Terminator scenario, or that of HAL in _2001,_ is any more realistic
than, for example, the scenario of the Spike Jonze film _Her_."

Gary, We live in a world gone mad with unbounded technological systems
destroying the life on the Earth and you want to parse the particulars
of whether "a machine" can be destructive? Isn't it blatantly obvious?
 And as John put it: "If no such goal is programmed in an AI
system, it just wanders aimlessly." Unless "some human(s) programmed
that goal [of destruction] into it."
 Though I admire your expertise on AI, these views seem to me
blindingly limited understandings of what a machine is, putting an
artificial divide between the machine and the human rather than seeing
the machine as continuous with the human. Or rather, the machine as
continuous with the automatic portion of what it means to be a human.
 Lewis Mumford pointed out that the first great megamachine was
the advent of civilization itself, and that the ancient megamachine of
civilization involved mostly human parts, specifically the
bureaucracy, the military, the legitimizing priesthood. It performed
unprecedented amounts of work and manifested not only an enormous
magnification of power, but literally the deification of power.
 The modern megamachine introduced a new system directive, to
replace as many of the human parts as possible, ultimately replacing
all of them: the perfection of the rationalization of life. This is,
of course, rational madness, our interesting variation on ancient
Greek divine madness. The Greeks saw how a greater wisdom could over
flood the psyche, creatively or destructively. Rational Pentheus
discovered the cost for ignoring the greater organic wisdom, ecstatic
and spontaneous, that is also involved in reasonableness, when he
sought to imprison it in the form of Dionysus: he literally lost his
head!
We live the opposite from divine madness in our rational madness:
living from a lesser projection of the rational-mechanical portions of
reasonableness extrapolated to godly dimensions: deus ex machina, our
savior!
 This projection of the newest and least matured portions of our
brains, the rationalizing cortex, cut free from the passions and the
traditions that provided bindings and boundings, has come to lord it
over the world. It does not wander aimlessly, this infantile tyrant.
It projects it's dogmas into science, technology, economy, and
everyday habits of mind (yes, John, there is no place for dogma in
science, but that does not prevent scientists from being dogmatic, or
from thinking from the unexamined dogmas of nominalism, or from the
dogmas of the megamachine).
 The children and young adults endlessly pushing the buttons of
the devices that confine them to their screens are elements of the
megamachine, happily being further "programmed" to machine ways of
living. Ditto many (thankfully, not all) of the dominant views in
science and technology, and, of course, also in anti-scientific views,
which are constructing with the greatest speed and a religious-like
passion our unsustainable dying world, scientifically informed
sustainability alternatives notwithstanding. Perfection awaits us.
 What "would motivate them to kill us?"
 Rationally-mechanically infantilized us.

Gene Halton

"There is a wisdom that is woe; but there is a woe that is madness."

On Jun 15, 2017 11:42 AM, "John F Sowa"  wrote:


On 6/15/2017 9:58 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:


To me, an intelligent system must have an internal guidance system
semiotically coupled with its external world, and must have some
degree of autonomy in its interactions with other systems.


That definition is compatible with Peirce's comment that the search
for "the first nondegenerate Thirdness" is a more precise goal than
the search for the origin of life.

Note the comment by the biologist Lynn Margulis: a bacterium
swimming
upstream in a glucose gradient exhibits intentionality. In the
article
"Gaia is a tough bitch", she said “The growth, reproduction, and
communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria” lie on
a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our
sensitivities
and stimulations.”


I think it’s quite plausible that AI systems could reach that
level
of autonomy and leave us behind in terms of intelligence, but
what
would motivate them to kill us?


Yes. The only intentionality in today's AI systems is explicitly
programmed in them -- for example, Google's goal of finding
documents
or the goal of a chess program to win a game. If no such goal is
programmed in an AI system, it just wanders aimlessly.

The most likely reason why any AI system would have 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[kirstima]

Hi, Jerry,

Where in earth did you take the "moral authority" you (mistakenly) 
assume I was refering to?


Pity you did not understand my points.

But if Hilbert is your leading star in the universe of sciences, then it 
is understandable that you hold on to his mistakes, as well as his 
achievements.


I do not find the concept of identity as easy and simple as eg. Hilbert 
took for granted. - But if you remain happy with your ideas on it, I 
just wish you luck.


Best, Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 15.6.2017 16:37:

Hi Kirsti:

Curious reply!

Other matters have dominated my life in recent months so that I have
not the time to respond to most issues opened here.  Nevertheless, you
post deserves comment.


On Jun 15, 2017, at 12:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Jerry,

When CSP used "ERGO", that was a case of ENTHYMEME (cf. Aristotle). 
The rheme "If - then" remains implied. One is supposed to regocnize 
that.


What is the source of the moral authority that I am supposed to be 
following.

These three sentences are typical of philosophical conjectures.
Science uses more effective means of communication.


Logic is not linguistics, and shluld not be replaced, not even partly, 
by lingquitics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite 
famous ones even, which have made that mistake.


I am concerned with two clearly separate and distinct notions of logic.
1. The logic of nature that generates the consistency, the
completeness, and the decidability of natural phenomenology.
(following Hilbert.)
2. The logics of human communication by whatever means. These logics
are entangled with one another. How are they entangled?   Various
categories of these logics have been used and abused.  The records of
human communication about logic appear to originate several millennia
ago and these forms of communication continue to evolve today.


CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.


I am pleased to learn that philosophers can be, on occasion, 
infallible!  :-)




I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace 
reading CSP. - Even though they may of of help sometimes. To a limited 
degree.


IMHO, every human being is free to use terminology in whatever form of
“units of meaning" that they choose - the forms of the units of
meaning are often related to experience and sometimes even to units of
fact! Of course, one’s usage of terminology allows colleagues to
evaluate the meanings of those units from any perspective the
colleagues may choose.

The central concept behind these comments is the conceptual role of
identity in generating the conceptual dynamics of the perplexity of
individual minds.

Abstractly, as I noted some months ago,
“The union of units unify the unity.”

The graphs (icons) of such perplex unions record the meanings visually.

Cheers

Jerry




Best Kirsti











Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 12.6.2017 17:55:

List:

On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:50 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
ERGO present just the THEN part.

from Wikipedia (sorry!)
Ergo may refer to:
* A Latin [1] word meaning "therefore" as in Cogito ergo sum.
* A Greek word έργο meaning "work", used as a prefix ergo-, for
example, in ergonomics.
Pragmatically, the syntactical force of “ergo” vastly exceeds the
syntactical force of “then”.
Just my opinion.
Cheers
jerry
Links:
--
[1] 
apple-wikipedia-api://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases:_E#ergo



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[kirstima]

Jerry,

When CSP used "ERGO", that was a case of ENTHYMEME (cf. Aristotle). The 
rheme "If - then" remains implied. One is supposed to regocnize that.


Logic is not linguistics, and shluld not be replaced, not even partly, 
by lingquitics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite 
famous ones even, which have made that mistake.


CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.

I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace 
reading CSP. - Even though they may of of help sometimes. To a limited 
degree.


Best Kirsti






Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 12.6.2017 17:55:

List:


On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:50 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

ERGO present just the THEN part.


from Wikipedia (sorry!)

Ergo may refer to:

* A Latin [1] word meaning "therefore" as in Cogito ergo sum.
* A Greek word έργο meaning "work", used as a prefix ergo-, for
example, in ergonomics.

Pragmatically, the syntactical force of “ergo” vastly exceeds the
syntactical force of “then”.

Just my opinion.

Cheers

jerry


Links:
--
[1] 
apple-wikipedia-api://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases:_E#ergo



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[kirstima]

Well, it is well known that CSP was not so very keen on existence. Even 
though he succeeded in completing his Existential Graphs to his full 
approval.  But on being that was not the case.


Being was to him the key to what is real.  What was real (to him) was 
effects.


Does belief in God have effects. - It most certainly does. No statitical 
tests needed.


Wtih existance follows the question of location.

With elector-magnetic phenomena the question is just silly.

Was CSP essentialist? - Absolutely so. But not in the sense of catching 
any being by any set of firmly set definitions.  - Which are just as 
abolutely needed in deductive inferences.



Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 12.6.2017 15:08:

On 6/12/2017 7:33 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

It may well be that it is LOGICALLY impossible to prove.


That may be true.  That may be like the existence of God.
There are no proofs that God exists.  There are no proofs that
God does not exist.

In fact, there are no two people -- believers or nonbelievers --
who will give you the same definition of God.  Just ask them.


But I do think they are worth some attention.


I agree.  A useful term is 'prescientific'.  That is not the
same as 'unscientific'.  It just means that the methods of
science are not applicable.   Perhaps someday they might be.
But nobody knows how.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[kirstima]

Jerry, list

Dictionary may not be the source to turn to. ERGO is an abbreviation 
used by CSP to his audience at the time. There are hidden parts, assumed 
to be self-evidently known to all his readers.


In another parts of his writings CSP tells that the primary and 
fundamental logical relation is: IF - THEN.


ERGO present just the THEN part.

The funny thing with the IF -part is that it can never get fully 
explicated.


Gödel proved this, in his part. But still his proof has not been fully 
believed in.


The ppoof is absolutely valid. Just hard to understand.

Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 11.6.2017 04:10:

Open questions to the list:

The following quote, posted by gnox (Thanks, Gary) appears to be a
deep conundrum from several perspectives of 21 st Century logic.


On Jun 9, 2017, at 8:44 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896):
[[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and
fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by _ergo_.
A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the
assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion. This makes every
proposition a conditional proposition at bottom. In like manner a
“term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with
its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite. The common noun
happens to have a very distinctive character in the Indo-European
languages. In most other tongues it is not sharply discriminated
from a verb or participle. “Man,” if it can be said to mean
anything by itself, means “what I am thinking of is a man.” ]]


First we note that CSP notes that he has held the view for 29 years!

Second, we note the singularity of the assertion


there is but one primary and fundamental logical relation


Thirdly, we note that this single ur-form of logic is expressed by a
single term:


expressed by _ergo_.


In English, the word Ergo means therefore.

Next, CSP expresses his conclusion on the nature of a proposition:


A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the
assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion.


With this simple sentence, does the single term, “argumentation”
replace the traditional ur-logical ground of logic, antecedent and
consequence? How important is this sentence?

If "divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion”,
then what is the meaning of the grammar? Or the meaning of arithmetic?
Are arguments to be fabricated in a completely ad hoc manner,
depending solely on the emotions whims of the author?

The sentence


In like manner a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a
proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite.


suggests that all of language is merely a blank form. The notion of
“counting” is apparently completely discounted.

My gut level response to CP 3.440, in toto, is that if I take this
description of a fundamental logical relation as a conclusive
statement, it seems to deny the realism of my experiences.

I am very curious as to how others interpret this gloss of 3.440 and
welcome both online as well as offline responses.

Cheers

Jerry



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[kirstima]

John,
Actually Sheldrake was able to test a hypothesis (which, to my knowledge 
he did not himself believe in at the time)on non-local effects. His 
series of experiments (one will never do) on pidgeons are truly 
ingenious and suberb AS experimental designs.


If that is agreed (after thorough studying), then his findings arew 
noteworthy. Within my expertice his experimental designs were 
impeccable.  - If the result feel odd and mysterious, that is no  
scientific ground to reject them.


This has nothing to do with sympathy or antipathy. The result of any 
well-conducted experiment are what they are. They present 'brute 
secondness' as I think CSP would have put it.


Being so seasoned as I am in doing and evaluating experimental research, 
I do not take seriously any 'results' I have not been able to check 
according to the design, process and statistical methods used. - 
Sheldrake with his pidgeon investigations passed this test.


In philosophy of science, as you well know, there was a belief in 
cumulating scientific 'facts' showing us 'the truth'. Positivism.  Now 
we, at least most of us, know that truth is a bit more complicated 
issue.


With former investigations on phenomena called 'telepathy' or other of 
the same kind, one of the flaws rises up from statistical tests used to 
test statistical significance. Any results (measuremensts) of any 
investigation showing statistically nonsignificant difference between 
zero hypotothesis (no effect) and the hypothesis tested, do not in fact 
prove the zero hypothesis. - The 'no effect' hypothesis is extremely 
difficult to prove. - It may well be that it is LOGICALLY impossible to 
prove.


To my knowledge this has not been truly PROVED, so far. I believe it 
will be. But this is just foreboding.


Relational thinking is needed in taking any stance with 'paranormal' 
phenomena. What today is taken as such, were not so taken in history. 
Even our history as modern scientists and logicians. It is not so long 
ago phenomena now considered as odd, were considered as normal.


One difference lies in that people talked about such things. Nowadays 
people get worried about seeming odd. - Nothing scientific or logical in 
that. It is about paying attention. In science, that means systematic, 
prolonged attention.


The modern world and history is full of totally useless experimental 
investigations.

Sheldrake's investigations do not belong in this lot.

This does not mean that I all fore for his "dogma" thing. I am 
definitely not.


But I do think they are worth some attention.

Kirsti









John F Sowa kirjoitti 11.6.2017 13:36:

Kirstina,

I'm sympathetic to the possibility of paranormal phenomena.  In fact,
I know of some unexplained examples.  But the only thing we can say
is "They're weird, and we don't know how or why they happened."

Sheldrake has not been searching evidence for 'parapsychology' as 
such, as a somewhat popular stream of thinking, instead he has been 
lead to investigate phenomena commonly considered paranormal.  Such as 
'telepathy', i.e non-local connections between minds which may have 
systematically observable effects.


Investigation involves search.  There have been claims about paranormal
phenomena for centuries.  They fall into three categories:

 1. Explainable by normal or abnormal psychology.  For example, as the
result of human feelings and imagination -- sometimes delusional.

 2. Deliberate fraud.  Magicians are experts in creating weird effects
-- and in exposing fraudulent claims by other magicians.

 3. Unexplainable by any known causes.

For #3, there have been many kinds of explanations, but none of them
can make any testable predictions.  For telepathy, there are cases
where people have experienced information about a distant event that
could not have come by any known method of communication.

But nobody is able to control the telepathy or to do it on a consistent
basis (i.e., at a level above chance).  That failure of control is not
a proof that telepathy does not occur.  But unless telepathy can be 
done

at a level above chance, it cannot be distinguished from a lucky guess.


Just compare the experimental investigations by Jastrow and Peirce
with those by Sheldrake.


They are totally different.  Jastrow and Peirce were doing science:
They started with observations, formed hypotheses, make predictions
about what would happen in new circumstances, performed the 
experiments,

and got results that confirmed their predictions.


He observed (systematicly) the workings of his own mind as well as
the workings of his dog's mind. And  he experimented with both.


Sheldrake started with some observations (or claims about observations)
and formed hypotheses.  But he did not make testable predictions,
perform experiments, and get results that confirmed the predictions.

And the experiments have to be performed under controlled conditions.
A dog can easily pick up subtle cues.  See the case of Clever 

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[kirstima]

Helmut,

Now you are talking! Excellent post.

"Interaction" is one way of taking relational logic seriously.

But it does not follow that "explanation" (if based on scientific 
evidence, may not have any objective definition. Or whatever the term 
used.  I would prefer the expression: "objective grounds".


Nominalistic philosophizing realies on just definitions. In geometry, as 
well as with any deductive inferences (e.g. formal logic) definitions 
play a very different role than in empirical sciences, relying a great 
deal on abductive % probable inferences.


"Interaction" is a dual idea. CSP deals with such taking them to present 
secondness & Secondness.


Which do not mean quite the same in the writings of CSP. He uses 
capitalized and not so terms SYSTEMATICALLY. Which has not been taken 
into proper consideration in republishing & editing his writings.  - It 
not just a matter of linguistic concerns & current usage of capitals.


CSP was definely not modern, he truly was post-modern. Anticipating 
developments in our millennium.


So, interaction is good to start with, but a third is needed. Mediation 
brings in the third.


The third brings in Meaning, not just reference.

Best, Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 9.6.2017 22:16:

John, Kirsti, All,
Now I think that it was naiive of me to put "explanation" in
opposition to "magical thinking", which "reverses cause and effect".
Because cause and effect are reversed all the time in what we call
"interaction". And "explanation" has no objective definition, it
merely is subjective, when an individual says: "Ok, I am satisfied,
this explains it for me".
Now I say: Magical thinking is to take an effect for cause and be
satisfied with that, and stop inquiring.
To be open minded would mean not to stop the inquiry, and say: Nothing
is the cause alone, nothing the effect alone, what I am looking for is
interaction with known other effects and laws.
I doubt, that a magnetic field is fully explained to everybody. At
least for me, there remain many mysteries. But there is known
interaction between the magnetic field and other phenomena: Electric
current, change of electric field, presence of iron or nickel...
With the morphogenetic field this is not so.
Also the memory of water is mysterious to me: I think, that only solid
structures (stable networks) can have a memory.
This is not a criticism of Sheldrake´s: It is not his fault, that
there are not sufficient interactions discovered, that would sort of
explain "morphogenetic field" and "water memory" to me.
All I want to say is: I do not believe in two worlds (a physical and a
magical or fine-substantional (? german:"feinstofflich") one) between
which there is no measurable interaction, and the said phenomena are,
experimentally well confirmed ok, but not causes, but effects, of
something not yet uncovered, I guess.
Best,
Helmut

07. Juni 2017 um 08:54 Uhr
 "John F Sowa"  wrote:

Jerry, Kirsti, Gary R, Helmut, list,

 I didn't respond to some earlier points in this thread because I was
 tied up with other things. But I looked into Sheldrake's writings and
 the earlier writings on morphogenesis by Conrad Waddington, a pioneer
 in genetics, epigenetics, and morphogenesis. For a 1962 article about
 Waddington's theories, see

http://www.microbiologyresearch.org/docserver/fulltext/micro/29/1/mic-29-1-25.pdf?expires=1496787497=id=guest=4E2DC93EE4641BFAB00E8253006B4B2C
[1]
 .

 Alan Turing (1952) wrote a mathematical analysis "The chemical basis
 of morphogenesis" and cited a 1940 book _Organisers and Genes_ by
 Waddington. See http://cba.mit.edu/events/03.11.ASE/docs/Turing.pdf
[2]

 Sheldrake has a PhD in biochemistry from Cambridge, and he spent a
year
 at Harvard studying the philosophy of science. His primary reference
 is to Waddington's work. But many scientists believe that he crossed
 the thin line between genius and crackpot: he took a reasonable
 hypothesis in biology and mixed it with dubious speculations about
 parapsychology. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Sheldrake
[3]

 For a sympathetic interview with Sheldrake by a skeptic, see

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/scientific-heretic-rupert-sheldrake-on-morphic-fields-psychic-dogs-and-other-mysteries/
[4]

 Some comments on previous notes:

 Jerry
 > Are you saying Hamiltonian:Lagrangian :: local state:global state?

 No. I was just saying that the Hamiltonian and the Lagrangian are
 related: both are global functions of a system, and local equations
 of motion can be derived from them. For any physical system, the
 Hamiltonian represents the total energy, and the Lagrangian
represents
 the total action (it has the dimensions of energy x time).

 Kirsti
 > Are there dogmas in science? Could there be?

 Gary R,
 > Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an ideal of scientific...

 Science, as science, does not have dogmas. As Peirce stated in his
 First Rule of Reason, "Do not block the way of inquiry."

 But 

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[kirstima]

Jerry R., list

The question of "sizing" electromagnetic "fields" is not the kind of 
question to be posed first. (See e.g. Kaina Stoicheia). If you pose the 
question, the answer is: Not possible to answer it.


The problem of morphic (etc.) resonance must be tackled before any 
measuring of any kind of size makes sense.


If e.g. the equation of quantum potential is properly studied, one can 
see that distances vanish, only frequences remain (to be measured). With 
kinds of requences only possible resonance matters. In principle, there 
are just three kinds of (inter)resonance. One of them is indifference.


Wave theory is needed, not just particle theory. They are complementary. 
As you most likely well know.


Also, the question of proper scale must be tackled before any attepts to 
measure sizes in any sensible way.


Best, Kirsti

Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 22:48:

btw, I was also trying to call attention to the difficult problem of
sizing the field, for different, complex physical/mechanical and
chemical interactions operate across large domains.  It's hard to
imagine a complete theory of pattern formation involving a field size
of a whole, entire vertebrate embryo.  a better approach would be to
treat individual, growing fields of proper size, ~ 500um.

Best,
J

On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 2:43 PM, Jerry Rhee 
wrote:


dear kirsti, list:

I was responding to your remark:
""Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a
theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining
anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence
backing it up."

I posted a quote from Lewis Wolpert's theoretical paper on pattern
formation that ought to lead you to the sound experimental evidence
on morphogenetic fields. It's rather large and still mysterious
once you get down to the molecular details.

Best,
J

On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:42 PM,  wrote:
Dear J. Rhee,

You addressed you post especially to me, but I can't see any
connection to my recent post to the list.

Seeing the host of copies you listed up, I guess you take your
point to be a most important one.

Please do enlighten me on your reasons and grounds.

With most kind regards.

Kirsti

Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 21:21:

Dear kirsti, all,

"The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than
50
cells in any direction."

Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in
diameter.

Best,
J

On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM,  wrote:

Helmut,

"Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a
theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining
anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence
backing it up.

Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been
presenting is not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his
theory? - If so, where?

Or are his theories just surprising and odd?

In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his
experiments both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were
exceptionally well designed and carried out.

I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of
the usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile
theory
should!)

All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think.

Best,

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52:

Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in
the
below text.
Lalala,
Helmut

Dear list members,
I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.:
Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think
that
the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness
blocks
the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and
leads
to false conclusions.
To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two
ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental.
The
experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other
experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the
same?

If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to
explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop
looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not
think,
that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If
they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or
something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not
remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim.
I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only
publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being
done
now to some extent?
On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma,
Laplacism
was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union
Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead
to
famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery
of
epigenetic mechanisms.
When 

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[kirstima]

Dear Jerry R., list

No theoretical paper gives detailed enough description of the 
experiments, experimental designs & the process of conducting the 
experiments in order to check its soundness.


Which is a time consuming job & which cannot be done without being 
properly skilled in designing and conducting experimental research 
oneself. Which is what I have been doing for a couple of decades. I also 
have been teaching post-graduate students how to design and conduct 
experimental investigations for many, many years.


Your belief that e.g. Wolpert "ought to lead" to sound evidence just is 
not good enough for me.


Also, if you find Wolpert's paper/ evidence mysterious, how can you 
conclude that the evidence is sound?


Best, Kirsti




Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 22:43:

dear kirsti, list:

I was responding to your remark:
""Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a
theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining
anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing
it up."

I posted a quote from Lewis Wolpert's theoretical paper on pattern
formation that ought to lead you to the sound experimental evidence on
morphogenetic fields.  It's rather large and still mysterious once you
get down to the molecular details.

Best,
J

On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:42 PM,  wrote:


Dear J. Rhee,

You addressed you post especially to me, but I can't see any
connection to my recent post to the list.

Seeing the host of copies you listed up, I guess you take your
point to be a most important one.

Please do enlighten me on your reasons and grounds.

With most kind regards.

Kirsti

Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 6.6.2017 21:21:

Dear kirsti, all,

"The size of embryonic fields is, surprisingly, usually less than
50
cells in any direction."

Surprisingly, that makes a morphogenetic field about 500um in
diameter.

Best,
J

On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 1:10 PM,  wrote:

Helmut,

"Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a
theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining
anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence
backing it up.

Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been
presenting is not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his
theory? - If so, where?

Or are his theories just surprising and odd?

In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his
experiments both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were
exceptionally well designed and carried out.

I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of
the usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile
theory
should!)

All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think.

Best,

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52:

Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in
the
below text.
Lalala,
Helmut

Dear list members,
I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.:
Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think
that
the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness
blocks
the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and
leads
to false conclusions.
To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two
ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental.
The
experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other
experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the
same?

If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to
explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop
looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not
think,
that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If
they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or
something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not
remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim.
I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only
publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being
done
now to some extent?
On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma,
Laplacism
was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union
Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead
to
famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery
of
epigenetic mechanisms.
When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier
convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England
have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the
carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do
not
know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl
molecules.
But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the
"Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This
Peircean
"Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It
is
merely an observation. I think it 

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[kirstima]

Helmut,

"Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical 
concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory 
is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up.


Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been presenting is 
not sound? Are there flaws and shortcomings in his theory? - If so, 
where?


Or are his theories just surprising and odd?

In 1990's I got interested in Sheldrake. Took up some of his experiments 
both in detail and as wholes. Found out that they were exceptionally 
well designed and carried out.


I did (and do) find some shortcomings in his theory, but only of the 
usual sort. They could be even better. (As any worthwhile theory 
should!)


All criticism should be specified in these respects. I think.

Best,

Kirsti

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 6.6.2017 02:52:

Supplement: Sorry, Mr. Laplace, please transform into Lamarck in the
below text.
Lalala,
Helmut

Dear list members,
I suggest three steps of more or less innovative thinking: 1.:
Dogmaticness, 2.: Open-mindedness, 3.: Magical thinking. I think that
the middle way is the best: Open minded thinking. Dogmaticness blocks
the inquiry, and magical thinking reverses cause and effect and leads
to false conclusions.
To tell, whether a theory is open-minded or magical, there are two
ways, I think. One of them is theoretical, the other experimental. The
experimental way is easy: Can the experiment be reproduced by other
experimenters in other laboratories, and will the results be the same?

If this is so, but there is no theoretical explanation available to
explain the results, then I guess that scientists will not stop
looking for explanations until they have found them. I do not think,
that they are afraid of being accused of pseudo-scientificness. If
they were, they would not have become scientists, but clerks or
something like that. I think, that scientists are curious, and not
remote-controlled, as conspiration-theorists often claim.
I have read somewhere the proposal, that scientists should not only
publish their successes, but also their failures. Is this being done
now to some extent?
On the other hand, for a long time Darwinism was the dogma, Laplacism
was refuted, it was even correctly said, that in the Soviet Union
Laplacist-like attempts of crop adaption to colder climate has lead to
famines. But today, Laplacism has a revival, due to the discovery of
epigenetic mechanisms.
When Sheldrake was claiming, that rats in Australia can be easier
convinced to jump through a burning ring, if before rats in England
have been taught to do that, you might ask: What should be the
carrying mechanism for this effect? Maybe there is something we do not
know now, just as we did not know about the epigenetic methyl
molecules.
But: "Morphogenetic field" is not an explanation. Neither is the
"Dormative principle" of opium, and neither is "Habit". This Peircean
"Habit" sort of disturbs me, because it is not an explanation. It is
merely an observation. I think it is necessary to inquire about the
ways how "habit" exactly is formed, stored (memorized), transmitted,
and so on.
Best,
Helmut

 02. Juni 2017 um 08:55 Uhr
 "John Collier"  wrote:

I am not sure that these "dogmas" are not merely working hypotheses
that have served well.

But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can be
dogmatic. A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of the
world's experts on Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application
noting that he had found variation that could be explained neither by
genetics nor by environment, and he wanted to explore
self-organization during development. This is a commonplace now, but
thirty years ago he failed to get the grant because his referees (not
Douglas fir experts) said that he just hadn't looked hard enough for a
selectionist explanation.

John Collier

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier [2]

FROM: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
 SENT: Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM
 TO: Peirce-L 
 SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED
Talk

John S, list,

John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree,
nothing is a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that
nothing _ought _to be a dogma.

And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical philosophy,"
materialism, necessitarianism (recall his response to Camus in "Reply
to the Necessitarians"), reducing cosmology to the nothing-but-ism of
actions/reactions of 2ns, etc.

Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an _ideal_ of scientific, but
I do not agree you in that it seems to me that any number of
scientists in Peirce's day and in ours as well yet hold them, whether
they would say they do, or think they do, or not.

Late in life, Peirce concluded the N.A. (not including the
Additaments) by writing that even 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[kirstima]

Clark,

I fully agree with your points.

Kirsti

Clark Goble kirjoitti 1.6.2017 22:33:

On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien 
wrote:

I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite
exactness of conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must
be exactly the same before and after a reaction. Though in a very
small (quantum) scale it is not so, but then there must be some kind
of counting buffer mechanism to make sure that in a bigger scale
infinite exactness is granted. This one is also governed by laws. I
do not believe in the dualism sui-generis versus laws, I rather
guess that it is all laws providing the possibility of evolution and
generation of new things, self-organization and so on. Without laws
nothing would happen, I´d say. I think that natural constants may
change, but that there are some laws that dont. And if these laws
are only the ones based on tautology: One plus one can never be
2.001, because 2 is defined as 1+1. I guess these eternal laws
are the laws of logic. I think they are tautologies, like a
syllogism is a tautology: The conclusion is nothing new, all is
already said in the two premisses: "Arthur is a human, all humans
are mortal, so Arthur is mortal", you can forget the conclusion by
just putting an "and" between the premisses: "Arthur is a human, and
all humans are mortal". The conclusion ", so Arthur is mortal" is
redundant, except you do not believe in continuity which is
indicated by the word "and" between the two premisses.
My conclusion: "Law" is an inexact term. A "law" is a compound
constructed of an eternal part (tautology, continuity), and a
changeable part ((temporary) constants).


Mathematically of course conservation laws arise out of Noether’s
Theorem. That more or less just states the relationship between
symmetries and conservation laws. I don’t think we need a
“buffer” to deal with this, just symmetries. It would seem that
continuity may (or may not) apply to those symmetries and thus
determines the conservation.

Of course Noether did her important work both on the theorem that
bares her name as well as linear algebra well after Peirce died. But
Peirce did do some work in the logic of linear algebra that is tied to
the theorem. So far as I know he never approached the insight of her
theorem though. He was familiar with the abstract principles though.
However Peirce did write on conservation laws which we discussed here
a few months back as tied to chance and determinism relative to
habits.


In my attack on "The Doctrine of Necessity" I offered four positive
arguments for believing in real chance. They were as follows:

1. The general prevalence of growth, which seems to be opposed to
the conservation of energy.

2. The variety of the universe, which is chance, and is manifestly
inexplicable.

3. Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is
to be explained must be explained by something else, that is, by
non-law or real chance.

4. Feeling, for which room cannot be found if the conservation of
energy is maintained. (CP 6.613)


So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal due
to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those
terms, I believe the implication is that chance breaks symmetries
enabled by determinism.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[kirstima]

Nothing should be does not quite amount to nothing is. CSP was for the 
first, not for the second.


Are there dogmas in science? Could there be? If so, how could one tell?

Kirsti


John F Sowa kirjoitti 1.6.2017 09:34:

On 5/31/2017 10:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

I agree that #3 is not a dogma of science.


As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree,
nothing is a dogma of science.

John



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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[kirstima]

Jon,

Thanks for your prompt response. I've read your mails, I do know you see 
the problem.

Kirsti

Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 29.5.2017 18:36:

Kirsti, List,

I know what you mean about the title but decided to take it
more as a reference to the revolution in physics that began
with relativity and quantum mechanics in the last century
than any particular issue about the nature of continua.
Anyway, I tried to focus on the underlying conceptual
transformation in my previous posts on this thread.

https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00019.html

https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2017-05/msg00023.html

As it happens, this whole ball of wax falls in line with
some sporadic reflections I've been writing up on my blog,
so I lumped the above thoughts in with that series of posts:

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/05/14/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-4/

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/05/17/the-difference-that-makes-a-difference-that-peirce-makes-5/

Regards,

Jon

On 5/29/2017 10:05 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Dear listers,

I do not think the title of this thread is well-thought. There is 
nothing such as a "Space-Time Continuum" which could
be reasonably discussed about. Even though it is often repeated chain 
of words.


For the first: Continuity does not mean the same as does 'continuum'. 
-  and this is not a trifle issue. Within

philosopy one should mind one's wordings.

For the second: Take into true consideration the quote provided:

MB
One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different 
subjects
of one predicate precisely what time does for different predicates 
of

the same subject." (CP 1.501)


Here CSP is clearly talking about conceptual issues & philosophizing. 
The key point being the relation between 'subject'

and 'predicate'.

CSP differentiates between considerations of space and time. At least 
he does so in separating the issues for a specific

approach  each approach needs.

What CSP is saying, is to my mind, that continuity in time and 
continuity in space need to be fully grasped BEFORE
taking them both as an issue to be tackled. Especially by such a 
concept as a continuum.


A continuum has a beginning and an end. It is presupposed in the very 
concept. The very idea of a big (or little) bang
as a start or an end just illustrates current minds, current common 
sense. The still dominating nominalistic world-view.


What is non-Eucleidean geometry about? It is about radically changing 
the scale. Any line which appeared to previous
imagination as a straight one, and necessarily so, does not appear so 
after the fact that the earth is round had been

fully digested.

This is not assumed to play any part in the invention of non-Euclidean 
geometry. And it does not in the stories and

histories told about it.

The earth does appear flat, in the experiential world of all human 
beings. And goes on to appear so untill
interplanetary tourism becomes commonplace. Flat, although somewhat 
bumby.


I am curious about possible responses. Do wish I'll get some.

Kirsti



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Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[kirstima]

Jerry, list,

In my view (with no access to the latest writings of CSP) did not just 
anticipate continuity, but grasped it, both in respect of space and 
time. But he did not solve the new kinds of problems arising with those.


One essential issue, to my mind, is that he advised not to mix them 
BEFORE both are given due attention, with adequate results.


His experimental work on gravitation gave him a global view on space and 
spatiality. Not just the by then triviality that "the earth is round".


Continuity and change belong together. Even gravity does not work 
exactly the same way on all points of the earth. An often neglegted 
point in his works is the concepts of residue. It has been mistaken as 
only an error of measurement. To CSP it was not.


To him it was just as well in the nature of nature. To bend, just a 
little, now and then. Giving rise to question in the nature of: What 
if...


We all know that in any kind of graphical presentation in a global scale 
the picturing must curve. The meridians do bend towards the poles. Our 
flat pictures on the globe do not present our globe 'as it really is'.


How about genetics, then? We know, or should know, that just a little 
bending, small changes do work, but major changes tend to end in 
disasters.


Well. well. I truly do not know why I am writing this to you lot. All I 
say is just common sense (or wished for common sense). - Always, and 
always 'continuum' is taken as a synonym for continuity.


In the history of mathematics, a major change occurred with the 
amalgamation of Arabic and European math. (Not the first time, mind 
you).


The idea of Zero (as well as nothingness) entered Western math. With 
zero entered many things. Not just its counterpoint, infinity. But also 
equations, for instance.


With the arithmetics taught in primary schools, equation marks (=) are 
used. In ancient Greece, there were no such marks, no such idea.


Grattan-Guinness is the only writer on history of mahtematics I know, 
who has taken this up. The modern idea of identity was both unknow and 
unimaginable for the Greeks by then.


Well, then. The modern idea oof identitity has many facets. Modern logic 
has taken it as one of the tree basic logical rules, in the form that 
any 'thing' is identical to itself. A= A and B=B.  - Many disputes 
followed between mathematician and logicians.


CSP takes as an example of identifying a characterization of any magpie 
that it is 'stealish'. Fact or fancy?


But that is not the issue.

Chemical identities are the field Jerry is working on. But I see the 
problems coming on with the concept 'identity'. Two different lines of 
thinking on and about it tend to mix in the wrong way.  - One is 
identifying, the other is identicality as equation.


Identification relies on implications, not equation. The true difference 
between toso two come to the fore (only) with time.


With any equation, your mind may go bacwards and forwards as you wish. 
Not so with implications.


Empirical evidence is always about implications (with grounds). Never 
about  = ,


or <=>.

And by the way, the digital world is an always-already-put-to-pieces 
world. Which never can tell about the world we live in. And live on.


Kirsti

















kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 29.5.2017 18:16:

 Alkuperäinen viesti 
Aihe: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time 
Continuum?

Päiväys: 29.5.2017 18:13
Lähettäjä: kirst...@saunalahti.fi
Vastaanottaja: Jerry LR Chandler 

Jerry,

Well,  stricly speaking you are not taking up a triad, but three
interconnected propositions.

Anyway, you asked about MY views .

- Euclidean geometric line does not even exist outside Euclidean
geometry. It is an abstraction, a part of results of systematic human
imagination. Thus there is no sense in assumiming it has any
properties outside the geometry in question. Continuity was assumed,
that is true. But as it turned out, Euclidean geometry could only deal
with issues of limited scale. - Continuity demands unlimited scale.

- Any Euclidean geometric line is treated as(and assumed to be)
continuous. But so is the case with non-Euclidean geometry just as
well. - It was only the (pre)supposition that a geometric line is and
will be forever straight, not bend, that was put into question. With
the very good results. - Thus became modern topology into being!

- It makes no sense to ask whether a continuum is continuous or not.
Of course any continuum is continuous, It is presupposed. But within
its own limits. So no answer to this question can provide any answet
to the question of continuity per se.

Here comes functional geometry and differential and integral calculus
to the fore. SCP handled them like water in his tab.  - Euclid did not
have any inkling of these issues.

Infinity became something mathematicians could and did handle. - Or
could they, really?

Just provisional answers,

Kirsti


Jerry LR Chandler 

Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[kirstima]

 Alkuperäinen viesti 
Aihe: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?
Päiväys: 29.5.2017 18:13
Lähettäjä: kirst...@saunalahti.fi
Vastaanottaja: Jerry LR Chandler 

Jerry,

Well,  stricly speaking you are not taking up a triad, but three 
interconnected propositions.


Anyway, you asked about MY views .

- Euclidean geometric line does not even exist outside Euclidean 
geometry. It is an abstraction, a part of results of systematic human 
imagination. Thus there is no sense in assumiming it has any properties 
outside the geometry in question. Continuity was assumed, that is true. 
But as it turned out, Euclidean geometry could only deal with issues of 
limited scale. - Continuity demands unlimited scale.


- Any Euclidean geometric line is treated as(and assumed to be) 
continuous. But so is the case with non-Euclidean geometry just as well. 
- It was only the (pre)supposition that a geometric line is and will be 
forever straight, not bend, that was put into question. With the very 
good results. - Thus became modern topology into being!


- It makes no sense to ask whether a continuum is continuous or not. Of 
course any continuum is continuous, It is presupposed. But within its 
own limits. So no answer to this question can provide any answet to the 
question of continuity per se.


Here comes functional geometry and differential and integral calculus to 
the fore. SCP handled them like water in his tab.  - Euclid did not have 
any inkling of these issues.


Infinity became something mathematicians could and did handle. - Or 
could they, really?


Just provisional answers,

Kirsti


Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 29.5.2017 17:42:

Kirsti, List:

Could you expand your intervention to give some examples of how YOU
assign tangible meaning to CP 1.501?

Other comments will have to wait, but for one.

A Euclidian geometric line has continuity.
A Euclidian geometric line is continuous.
A Continuum is continuous.

Do you agree with this triad?   :-)

Cheers

jerry




On May 29, 2017, at 9:05 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Dear listers,

I do not think the title of this thread is well-thought. There is 
nothing such as a "Space-Time Continuum" which could be reasonably 
discussed about. Even though it is often repeated chain of words.


For the first: Continuity does not mean the same as does 'continuum'. 
-  and this is not a trifle issue. Within philosopy one should mind 
one's wordings.


For the second: Take into true consideration the quote provided:

MB
One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different 
subjects
of one predicate precisely what time does for different predicates 
of

the same subject." (CP 1.501)


Here CSP is clearly talking about conceptual issues & philosophizing. 
The key point being the relation between 'subject' and 'predicate'.


CSP differentiates between considerations of space and time. At least 
he does so in separating the issues for a specific approach 
 each approach needs.


What CSP is saying, is to my mind, that continuity in time and 
continuity in space need to be fully grasped BEFORE taking them both 
as an issue to be tackled. Especially by such a concept as a 
continuum.


A continuum has a beginning and an end. It is presupposed in the very 
concept. The very idea of a big (or little) bang as a start or an end 
just illustrates current minds, current common sense. The still 
dominating nominalistic world-view.


What is non-Eucleidean geometry about? It is about radically changing 
the scale. Any line which appeared to previous imagination as a 
straight one, and necessarily so, does not appear so after the fact 
that the earth is round had been fully digested.


This is not assumed to play any part in the invention of non-Euclidean 
geometry. And it does not in the stories and histories told about it.


The earth does appear flat, in the experiential world of all human 
beings. And goes on to appear so untill interplanetary tourism becomes 
commonplace. Flat, although somewhat bumby.


I am curious about possible responses. Do wish I'll get some.

Kirsti








John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.5.2017 00:28:

Jeff and Mike,
Those are important points.
JBD

In a broad sense, Sir William Rowan Hamilton anticipated Einstein's
idea that space and time can be conceived as parts of a four 
dimensional
continuum. In fact, he used the algebra of quaternions to articulate 
a
formal framework for conceiving of such physical relations as part 
of a

four dimensional field.

Peirce was familiar with Hamilton's work.  And when he was editing
the second edition of his father's book _Linear Algebra_, he added
some important theorems to it.  In particular, he proved that the
only N-dimensional algebras that had division were the real line
(1D), the complex field (2D), quaternions (4D), and octonions (8D).
MB
One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different 
subjects
of one predicate precisely 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

[kirstima]

Dear listers,

I do not think the title of this thread is well-thought. There is 
nothing such as a "Space-Time Continuum" which could be reasonably 
discussed about. Even though it is often repeated chain of words.


For the first: Continuity does not mean the same as does 'continuum'. -  
and this is not a trifle issue. Within philosopy one should mind one's 
wordings.


For the second: Take into true consideration the quote provided:

MB

One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different subjects
of one predicate precisely what time does for different predicates of
the same subject." (CP 1.501)


Here CSP is clearly talking about conceptual issues & philosophizing. 
The key point being the relation between 'subject' and 'predicate'.


CSP differentiates between considerations of space and time. At least he 
does so in separating the issues for a specific approach  
each approach needs.


What CSP is saying, is to my mind, that continuity in time and 
continuity in space need to be fully grasped BEFORE taking them both as 
an issue to be tackled. Especially by such a concept as a continuum.


A continuum has a beginning and an end. It is presupposed in the very 
concept. The very idea of a big (or little) bang as a start or an end 
just illustrates current minds, current common sense. The still 
dominating nominalistic world-view.


What is non-Eucleidean geometry about? It is about radically changing 
the scale. Any line which appeared to previous imagination as a straight 
one, and necessarily so, does not appear so after the fact that the 
earth is round had been fully digested.


This is not assumed to play any part in the invention of non-Euclidean 
geometry. And it does not in the stories and histories told about it.


The earth does appear flat, in the experiential world of all human 
beings. And goes on to appear so untill interplanetary tourism becomes 
commonplace. Flat, although somewhat bumby.


I am curious about possible responses. Do wish I'll get some.

Kirsti








John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.5.2017 00:28:

Jeff and Mike,

Those are important points.

JBD

In a broad sense, Sir William Rowan Hamilton anticipated Einstein's
idea that space and time can be conceived as parts of a four 
dimensional

continuum. In fact, he used the algebra of quaternions to articulate a
formal framework for conceiving of such physical relations as part of 
a

four dimensional field.


Peirce was familiar with Hamilton's work.  And when he was editing
the second edition of his father's book _Linear Algebra_, he added
some important theorems to it.  In particular, he proved that the
only N-dimensional algebras that had division were the real line
(1D), the complex field (2D), quaternions (4D), and octonions (8D).

MB

One of my favorite Peirce quotes... "space does for different subjects
of one predicate precisely what time does for different predicates of
the same subject." (CP 1.501)


He also discussed non-Euclidean geometry.  While he was still at the
US C, he proposed a project to determine whether the sum of the
angles of triangles at astronomical distances was exactly 180 degrees.
Simon Newcomb rejected that project.

John



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