Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[Gary Richmond]

 a catastrophic collapse.
>
>
>
> I think Peircean semiotic is highly valuable for analyzing and
> understanding the role of communication media in this situation. They all
> deploy symbols, of course, and it's crucial to recognize that “Symbols are
> particularly remote from the Truth itself” (EP2:307
> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#3f>). But Peirceans also have
> to use symbols in order to communicate that insight, and the message is
> submerged in the flood of mis- and disinformation. It seems that no matter
> what people believe these days, however implausible to scientific (or even
> common) sense, they can find sources online that will reinforce their
> beliefs. Personally i'm not optimistic that semiotics can do much to
> reverse the trend of the Anthropocene. Maybe we can hope that human or
> posthuman survivors of the ongoing degradation of the planet will learn
> something from whatever is left of semiotic science.
>
>
>
> Love, gary
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
> Bateson] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Gary Richmond
> *Sent:* Saturday, April 27, 2024 6:10 PM
> *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness
>
>
>
> [Note: I'd like to replace my earlier response to Gary Fuhrman's post with
> this one. The first was written in haste and, in fact, I'd forgotten I'd
> sent it as it was nothing but a rough draft of some of the ideas I wanted
> to reflect on. I hope that the present post will offer something of
> substance to discuss. GR]
>
>
>
> gary f., List,
>
>
>
> I'm sorry to have taken so long to respond, but I've been unexpectedly
> busy dealing with off List issues (plus a bout of Covid 19 -- I'm finally
> testing negative).
>
> Your post is such a rich cornucopia of ideas that I've decided to focus on
> just a short segment of it with some comments centered around the
> quotations by Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and William James. I'll start with
> what amounts to little more than a paraphrase of the two quotations by M-P
> and Peirce which you juxtaposed.
>
> Merleau-Ponty remarks that our experiences are given as a unified whole
> with synthesis occurring, *not* because they express a fixed quality or
> identity, but because they are gathered together in an elusive 'ipseity'.
> Each perceived aspect of a thing only serves as an invitation to perceive
> beyond it. This leads to a *continual process of perception* [and of
> semiosis?]  If it were possible for the thing to be fully grasped it would
> cease to be a thing since its reality lies precisely in that 'mystery'
> which prevents us from fully possessing it.
>
> On the other hand, Peirce's statement defines the real as that which
> maintains its characteristics regardless of our thoughts or perceptions. It
> suggests that the true nature of something is independent of our subjective
> interpretations or opinions about it. Even if people have diverse opinions
> regarding something, even if they want something to be different, its
> fundamental characteristics remain what they are.
>
> So while both excerpts emphasize the elusive nature of attempting to grasp
> reality within the limitations of human perception, both putting forth the
> idea that reality is not dependent on our thoughts or interpretations,
> Merlea-Ponty focuses on the *continual process of perception and the
> 'mystery' surrounding the ipseity of things*; while Peirce emphasizes the*
> intrinsic independence of reality from human consciousness*. There is
> certainly some considerable correspondence here, however.
>
> I *have* been a bit perplexed by M-P use of 'mystery' which always
> sounded rather too 'literary' for the topic. In a review of Bryan E.
> Bannon's, *From Mastery to Mystery: A Phenomenological Foundation for an
> Environmental Ethic *
> https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/from-mastery-to-mystery-a-phenomenological-foundation-for-an-environmental-ethic/
>  *,* Michael E. Zimmerman finds the source of M-P's notion of 'mystery'
> in Heidegger.
>
> Counseling attunement to the "mystery" of things, a mystery that
> techno-science cannot countenance, Heidegger surmised that modernity's
> one-dimensional understanding of being is only temporary. In a few
> centuries, he prophesized, the clearing may be altered, thereby making
> possible a non-domineering relationship between human *Dasein *[and
> nature].
>
> This emphasis on the 'mystery' of nature challenges the idea of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[Gary Richmond]

tity of the object, but in that they are all
> collected together, by the last of their number, in the ipseity of the
> thing. The ipseity is, of course, never *reached*: each aspect of the
> thing which falls to our perception is still only an invitation to perceive
> beyond it, still only a momentary halt in the perceptual process. If the
> thing itself were reached, it would be from that moment arrayed before us
> and stripped of its mystery. It would cease to exist as a thing at the very
> moment when we thought to possess it. What makes the ‘reality’ of the thing
> is therefore precisely what snatches it from our grasp. ]] (Merleau-Ponty
> 1945, 271)
>
> This is, in context, quite consistent with Peirce's definition of
> ‘reality’:
>
> [[ I define the *real* as that which holds its characters on such a
> tenure that it makes not the slightest difference what any man or men may
> have *thought* them to be, or ever will have *thought* them to be, here
> using thought to include, imagining, opining, and willing (as long as
> forcible *means*  are not used); but the real thing's characters will
> remain absolutely untouched. ]] (CP 6.495, c. 1906)
>
> None of this denies that thoughts can make a difference to the *future*
> character of real things. Nor does it deny Peirce's assertion that ‘we have 
> *direct
> experience of things in themselves*’ (CP 6.95). Experience is not
> knowledge, although it is *involved* in knowing, as Secondness is
> involved in Thirdness, which in turn will determine ‘future facts of
> Secondness.’ In the process of inquiry or of learning, what James called
> ‘our sense of a determinate direction’ is a feeling of being about to know
> more than we did before, or getting closer to the Truth. But semiotic
> experience teaches that our knowledge is never completely determinate.
>
> [[ No cognition and no Sign is absolutely precise, not even a Percept; and
> indefiniteness is of two kinds, indefiniteness as to what is the Object of
> the Sign, and indefiniteness as to its Interpretant, or indefiniteness in
> Breadth and in Depth. ]] (CP 4.543, 1906)
>
> Any knowledge that will prove useful as guidance into the future must be
> *general*, and thus indefinite in that sense.
>
> [[ Yet every proposition actually asserted must refer to some non-general
> subject …. Indeed, all propositions refer to one and the same determinately
> singular subject, well-understood between all utterers and interpreters;
> namely, to The Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is
> assumed on all hands to be real. But besides that, there is some lesser
> environment of the utterer and interpreter of each proposition that
> actually gets conveyed, to which that proposition more particularly refers
> and which is not general. ]] (CP 5.506, c. 1905)
>
> That ‘lesser environment’ is evidently what Peirce elsewhere called ‘the
> common stock of knowledge of utterer and interpreter’ (EP2:310), i.e. the
> *commind* or *commens* (EP2:478). Its particular *subject* may be
> ‘determinately singular,’ but *predicates* are always general to some
> degree, so the proposition actually conveyed still involves some
> indeterminacy. Thus we can't say that a proposition is necessarily and
> absolutely either true or false unless we deny the reality of
> indeterminacy, i.e. of both generality and vagueness. This denial is
> formulated as the “principle of excluded middle.”
>
> [[ To speak of the actual state of things implies a great assumption,
> namely that there is a perfectly definite body of propositions which, if we
> could only find them out, are the truth, and that everything is really
> either true or in positive conflict with the truth. This assumption, called
> the principle of excluded middle, I consider utterly unwarranted, and do
> not believe it. ]]  (Peirce, NEM 3:758, 1893)
>
> Even if the dynamic Object of a symbolic utterance is a fully determinate
> singular, the sign itself is still ‘indefinite as to its Interpretant’ (as
> explained above). ‘No communication of one person to another can be
> entirely definite, i.e., non-vague’ (CP 5.506).
>
> 
>
> Love, gary f.
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> } Everything is involved which can be evolved. [Peirce] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] the logic of vagueness

[Gary Richmond]

and indefiniteness as to its Interpretant, or indefiniteness in
> Breadth and in Depth. ]] (CP 4.543, 1906)
>
> Any knowledge that will prove useful as guidance into the future must be
> *general*, and thus indefinite in that sense.
>
> [[ Yet every proposition actually asserted must refer to some non-general
> subject …. Indeed, all propositions refer to one and the same determinately
> singular subject, well-understood between all utterers and interpreters;
> namely, to The Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is
> assumed on all hands to be real. But besides that, there is some lesser
> environment of the utterer and interpreter of each proposition that
> actually gets conveyed, to which that proposition more particularly refers
> and which is not general. ]] (CP 5.506, c. 1905)
>
> That ‘lesser environment’ is evidently what Peirce elsewhere called ‘the
> common stock of knowledge of utterer and interpreter’ (EP2:310), i.e. the
> *commind* or *commens* (EP2:478). Its particular *subject* may be
> ‘determinately singular,’ but *predicates* are always general to some
> degree, so the proposition actually conveyed still involves some
> indeterminacy. Thus we can't say that a proposition is necessarily and
> absolutely either true or false unless we deny the reality of
> indeterminacy, i.e. of both generality and vagueness. This denial is
> formulated as the “principle of excluded middle.”
>
> [[ To speak of the actual state of things implies a great assumption,
> namely that there is a perfectly definite body of propositions which, if we
> could only find them out, are the truth, and that everything is really
> either true or in positive conflict with the truth. This assumption, called
> the principle of excluded middle, I consider utterly unwarranted, and do
> not believe it. ]]  (Peirce, NEM 3:758, 1893)
>
> Even if the dynamic Object of a symbolic utterance is a fully determinate
> singular, the sign itself is still ‘indefinite as to its Interpretant’ (as
> explained above). ‘No communication of one person to another can be
> entirely definite, i.e., non-vague’ (CP 5.506).
>
> 
>
> Love, gary f.
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> } Everything is involved which can be evolved. [Peirce] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at
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> links!
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[PEIRCE-L] List moderator;s request for a pause in the 'mark' v. 'tone' discussion, Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

[Gary Richmond]

List,

As Edwina accurately commented a few days ago, this exchange between John
and Jon has become less a discussion and more a debate, so much so that I
have commented  -- now for the third time -- that it would seem to me that
Peirce-L members now (and perhaps for some time now) have enough
information in the form of argumentation and accompanying textual (and
other) support to make up their own minds as to who has made the stronger
case, John for 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'. Or perhaps it still remains a
question in some Listers' minds. Or perhaps a certain ennui has settled in
for some here leading to a sense of "so what?" or "who really cares?" or
"enough already!" I personally have found the exchange stimulating and
valuable.

In any event, I am requesting that the two principal participants in the
thread, Jon Alan Schmidt and John Sowa, as well as all others who have
chimed in (including me), cease this particular discussion for now,
including their not commenting on my decision as moderator for* all* to
take a break from it. Should there be some good reason to take up the
question again in the future, I would ask that the two principals first
present that reasoning me off List. I would also ask that neither of them
now attempt "to have the last word" in this matter.

There are many topics of potential interest to members of Peirce-L such
that I would hope that other List members, given a window of opportunity to
suggest new topics for discussion, will indeed introduce them whether they
result in a threaded discussion or not. Rarely have I suggested that
certain participants were posting too frequently. But both Joe Ransdell and
I finally had to intervene as List moderators in the interest of the
Peirce-L community's well-being to say *just* that and to request in this
case, that John and Jon post no more than twice a week for the next two
weeks. Should either of them have questions regarding this action, I would
ask them to please write me off List.

The ideal for both Joe and me has always been that Peirce-L be as
self-moderating as possible. But sometimes forms of participant
*immoderation* calls for the moderator to step in the interest of the
health of the List. I am doing so now.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as Peirce-L moderator, co-manager with Ben Udell)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

[Gary Richmond]

uot;, i.e. something
> which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
> respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel.
>
>
> However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating it, by
> explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being observed is
> the [mark] itself--we need a *different* word for the embodiment of the
> [mark], such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if
> "mark" is the right word for the embodiment, then we need a *different*
> word for the form itself.
>
> Moreover, as I have already explained at length (
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00096.html), Peirce
> explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as "a
> 'general,'" thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are an
> existential graph and the word "camel," both of which he unambiguously
> classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
> Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.
>
> JAS: Any [observable] form which, if it were [embodied anywhere] would be
> [a token] is called a [*type*]. If it actually be so [embodied], it would
> be incorrect to say that the [type] *itself* is [embodied]. For that
> would be an impossibility, since the [*type*] itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "[would]-be", i.e. something
> which [would] be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
> respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*.
>
>
> After all, Peirce *defines* a necessitant "type" as "a definitely
> significant Form" and provides *different* words for its existent
> embodiments, namely, "tokens" that are "instances" of the type (CP 4.537,
> 1906). Hence, the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no relevance
> whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
> trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 5:50 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> John, Jon, Helmut, List,
>>
>> JFS:
>> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
>> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>>
>> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
>> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
>> the following two sentences:
>>
>> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
>> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>>
>>
>> Compare this to:
>>
>> GR:
>> 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in
>> the orchestra.
>> 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>>
>> "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
>> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce.  Now consider
>> the following two sentences:"
>>
>> 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in
>> the orchestra.
>> 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>>
>> Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon:  ". . . a mark is an actual
>> material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself  *"an
>> actual material sign."
>>
>> To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my
>> words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to
>> 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind."
>>
>> That is the case for both of John's examples: 1. A hump is a mark of a
>> camel and 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. These are both examples
>> of synecdoche, a figure of speech whereas a part represents the whole which
>> is the case in both these cases: the whole camel and the whole elephant.
>>
>> JFS wrote: "I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it
>> emphasizes the profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
>> 'tone' as they may be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( 
>> token type)."
>>
>> There is no "profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word
>> 'tone' here" and your claiming -- rather *insisting* -- that there *is*
>> only weakens your argument for the use of 'mark' in the trichotomy being
>> discussed.
>>
>> Ind

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

[Gary Richmond]

sing to Peirce's readers, and it is
> confusing to our readers today.   It has no redeeming social or academic
> value whatsoever.  Get rid of it.
>
> John
>
> --
> The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type):
>
> Great news!  I came across a quotation by Peirce that explains why the
> word that names an abstract "might be" *SHOULD* have exactly the same
> spelling as the word that names the actual thing that we observe by any
> external of internal senses.  Furthermore, his explanation takes just three
> sentences.
>
> Peirce's explanation below says that an existential graph *REALLY *is an
> abstract might-be.  However, we are permitted to call the perceptible
> replica on a phemic sheet an existential graph *PROVIDED **THAT *we
> acknowledge the distinction between the might-be and the replica.
>
> To generalize, following is my edit of the quotation below.  My words are
> enclosed in brackets (except for "[is]", which was added by the editor of
> the MS):   "Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed
> anywhere] would be [a mark] is called [a mark].  If it actually be so
> [observed], it would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is
> [observed].  For that would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself
> [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might
> be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they
> are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel".
>
> As for the reason why 'mark' is the best word for both the might-be and
> the actual is justified by Peirce:  The word that is used for the might-be
> should be applicable to all the actual occurrences.  Peirce's definition of
> 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary is applicable to marks observable by any or
> all external and internal senses (i.e. anything that appears in the
> phaneron)..  But the word 'tone', which is applicable to a subset of
> auditory sensations, is far less general than the word 'mark'.
>
> The quotation below, from December 1911, is Peirce's final word on this
> subject.  Although he wrote it about existential graphs, it may be
> generalized to any type of might-be and actual.  If the principle is
> sufficiently general that it can be applied to camels, it should be
> applicable to marks.
>
> This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody
> has written in all the notes on this subject.
>
> John
> ___
>
> Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an
> assertion is called a graph.  If it actually be so scribed, it would be
> incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet.  For that
> would be an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an
> abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
> which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
> respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel (L376, December
> 1911).
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Tone, Token, Type, was, Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Helmut, List,

This is a bald an expression of why "the word "mark" is a terrible
choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the details of Peirce's semeiotic
will almost certainly misunderstand and misuse it as signifying "an actual
material sign," thus incorrectly treating it as virtually synonymous with
"token."

In my opinion (and after reviewing your extended exchange with John Sowa on
the topic), it seems to me clear that you have well argued (with
*considerable *textual support) as to why 'tone' is *far preferable* to
'mark' for the "possible sign" under consideration. However, if one is
'married' to a term (because, say, he's published work using that term, or
plans to use it in future papers and presentations, etc.) then he will find
reasons to reject any other term. Yet I am *completely* willing to admit
that if he has weighed the arguments and still feels that
his argumentation is superior, well, that is that.

So, as I began the paragraph above, *all *of this is merely 'my opinion'.

Again, I expect Peirce-L members will make up their own minds on the
matter. In my thinking, it's really quite simple: either "mark" suggests "a
material sign" rather than a possible one, or it does not. But, on the
other hand, if one concludes that, in addition to those problematic
material associations with the term 'mark', that one finds nothing
connoting that which is 'material' about the term, 'tone', and for that
reason, along with other reasons which have been argued for it, that it is
the nature, and so, superior, term for the 'possible sign' being
considered, well that is in my view but an expression of critical
commonsense.

Best,

Gary

On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 11:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why
> the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the
> details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and
> misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly
> treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of
> "tone/tuone/tinge/potisign."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Helmut, Jon, List,
>>
>> That is the reason why the word  'Mark' is the perfect choice:  you won't
>> be wrong whether or not you know the details  of Peirce's semeiotic.
>>
>> HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
>> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
>> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
>> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>>
>> The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use
>> a word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody:
>> academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical
>> sense and everybody else who  doesn't know Peirce's technical sense.
>>
>> In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be
>> correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone.  He also
>> considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the
>> sound  of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that
>> subset of marks that could be tinges.  But the word 'mark' covers all those
>> sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings.
>>
>> That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was
>> close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended.   Since
>> the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little
>> about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose
>> terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly.
>>
>> John
>>
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[PEIRCE-L] Tone Token Type, was Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>>
>> List,
>>
>> I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I
>> felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs
>> too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual
>> material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else.
>> Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote:
>>
>> "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no
>> precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world
>> itself.  Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be
>> counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and
>> shifting their meaning with changes over time.  Just consider the words
>> 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today.  The things they apply to are
>> so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be
>> obsolete today."
>>
>> Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there
>> are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and
>> function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or,
>> as a matter of retrospection, in the past.
>>
>> In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of
>> classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes,
>> there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think
>> is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then"
>> to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation
>> of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and
>> classification (3ns).
>>
>> Best regards
>> Helmut
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

accolades can
> be made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an
> example of the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have
> made reference, - such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those
> of other people on the list.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> Edwina, List,
>
> This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your
> addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:
>
> You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of
> terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence
> that terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it
> can constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree
> (which you appear to), why?
>
> And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally
> focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt,
> and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a
> rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has *anything* to do
> with nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your
> definition of nominalism.
>
> And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with
> having different concepts?
>
> Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the
> List referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed
> constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today *you* 
> suggested
> that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression been
> directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a mild
> *kind* of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no
> idea what you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please
> explain what you mean by this.
>
> It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean
> semeiotic, of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and
> pragmatism -- and that they are not mutually exclusive, that a
> scholar/scientist can be interested both in theory and practice (and
> although Peirce once denied it, he himself accomplished much in both theory
> and practice).
>
> So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today.
>
> And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan
> Schmidt, not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean
> theoretical 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own
> priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully
> building on *Peirce's *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *
> words," is an accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often
> invited to speak at conventions and other gatherings because of his
> expertise.
>
> And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find,
> along with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean
> thought is applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and
> ethics.
>  https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cJ=en
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky <
> edwina.tabor...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List
>>
>> As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the
>> correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the
>> particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term]  and an difference to
>> ‘what is real’. [ ie the meaning and function].
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of
>> embodiment’ of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent debate
>> - and it’s a debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who Wins ]-
>> rejects a more basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is the
>> operative function of the triad which is using those terms; it is instead
>> focused solely on ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on ‘purity vs
>> functionality’. .
>>
>>  Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce
>> prefer’ with the result as you point out that  “imaginary distinctions are
>> often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression -
>> the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however” 5.398…But, equally
>> according to Peirce -  these are ‘false distinctions’….
>>
>> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

at Peirce used the word 'tone' more
>>> often, mainly in obscure MSS.  That is not a ringing endorsement.
>>>
>>> But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the
>>> triad (mark token type).   And he has devoted years of research to the
>>> issues.  As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are
>>> more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the
>>> street).
>>>
>>> And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in
>>> logic, including Peirce's logic.  See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for
>>> publications.   There are even more lecture slides.  (Copies upon request.)
>>>
>>> But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the
>>> future.  The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists,
>>> and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term,
>>> find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone.  I discovered that
>>> point while talking to them.  That is not a scientific survey, but I could
>>> not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word
>>> 'tone'.
>>>
>>> If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference)
>>> one way or the other, please let us know.
>>>
>>> John
>>>
>>> --
>>> *From*: "Gary Richmond" 
>>> List,
>>>
>>> While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as
>>> it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his
>>> reminded me that  the principal issue being considered has *not *been 
>>> resolved
>>> unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way,
>>> completely along the lines of *his* analysis. In other words, the
>>> 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled *because* John says it has
>>> and, so, there's no need for further discussion.
>>>
>>> I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's
>>> argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example,
>>> contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than
>>> sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with
>>> Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion
>>> of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by
>>> Peirce as a kind of *term* and, so, decidedly *not *a *possible sign*.
>>> Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an
>>> *existential* one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark.
>>>
>>> Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions of
>>> a *possible sign* include the idea that its being is a significant
>>> "quality of feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely
>>> possible, [is] felt to be positively possible."
>>>
>>> John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a
>>> "Vague Quality" that his listeners, typically *not* schooled in
>>> Peircean thought, "find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his
>>> talks and written work. I can only say that that has not been my experience
>>> over the years. For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a
>>> session of the George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the
>>> trichotomic structure of Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I
>>> found that in discussing tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost
>>> none of whom were familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be
>>> most genial and, indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the
>>> letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as
>>> it may, that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended).
>>>
>>> Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy
>>> used the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but
>>> the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of
>>> discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have
>>> faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words!
>>>
>>> Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his
>>> disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his
>>> papers 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Panel on Semiotic Exploration of Ecology at the 2024 Warsaw IASS-AIS World Congress

[Gary Richmond]

Dear Claudio,

This is exciting news indeed, and in an area of semiotics which I know
holds considerable interest to at least several members of the Peirce-L
forum including me.

Thank you for all the excellent work you have done and continue to do in
the Peircean semiotics -- including his three categories -- of design and
ecology, including the semiotics of art, architecture, etc. I'm delighted
that many of your works are available in English; were my Spanish better,
I'd delve into some of your work written in that beautiful language.
https://uba.academia.edu/CGuerri

 I have plans to be in Europe from September 9 through the 24th (Brussels,
Amsterdam/Tilburg, and Berlin) and will see if it is still possible to
adjust my schedule to include your Warsaw panel.

Warm regards,

Gary

On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 2:27 PM Claudio Guerri 
wrote:

> Dear Friends and colleagues, we have some excellent news to share with you!
>
> The network "SPACE SEMIOTICS [Design, Architecture, Urbanism, Landscaping]"
> https://significant.design/subscribe is organizing a *panel *titled: *Semiotic
> Explorations of Ecology (in Design, Architecture, Urbanism, Landscaping)* 
> (Isabel
> Marcos & Claudio Guerri) this year within the framework of the *16th
> IASS-AIS World Congress devoted to Signs and Realities, 2-6 September 2024
> in Warsaw, Poland.*
>
> *The call is open until the 15th April 2024, you can submit your paper
> here:* *https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty*
> <https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty>
>
> * How the registration process works:*
>
> *1. You pre-register without paying.*
>
> *2. You get your registration ID (RegID).*
>
> *3. With your RegID you can submit your paper abstracts until 15 April
> 2024.*
>
> At the end of the panel, we will include a round-table to discuss the
> unresolved problems of *Signs and Realities*, *Ecology in Design* and
> *Design* and *Morphology* in general. With this call we are asking all
> interested scholars to participate in this round-table and to propose their
> own point of view on applied semiotics.
>
> We will finally meet in person!
>
> Isabel Marcos & Claudio Guerri
>
> *Description of the panel proposal:*
>
> Ecology, when examined from a semiotic perspective, reveals itself as a
> complex reality, intertwining tangible environmental phenomena with
> theoretical, physical and symbolic representations. This manifestation
> possibilities invites us to explore the interconnections between semiotics,
> design, architecture, urbanism and landscaping. Thus, ecology, connecting
> the tangible aspects of the environment to the different semiotic
> constructions shape our understanding and interaction with this reality.
>
> *1. Semiotics in Environmental Communication:* Explore how semiotic
> systems contribute to the communication of environmental issues.
>
> *2. Semiotic Analysis of the Ecological Crisis:* Investigation of
> semiotic representations of the ecological crisis in different discourses.
>
> *3. Ecological Language and Technological Innovation:* Study of the
> creation of a specific semiotic language to discuss ecological issues, with
> an analysis of the impact of technological innovations.
>
> *4. Semiotic Ethics in Design:* Explore the ethical implications of
> semiotics related to growth in the fields of design. How do signs
> contribute to the formulation of new ecological ethics in design?
>
> *5. Semiotics in Bioclimatic Architecture:* Examine the role of
> bioclimatic architecture and how the signifying elements of this approach
> are used to create the maximum ecological impact of natural resources.
>
> *6. Urban Semiotics and Environmental Policy: *Examining how new
> ecological practices in the urban context impact environmental policies.
> What is the ecological significance of these urban practices and how do
> they shape environmental policies?
>
> *7. Landscape Semiotics and Ecological Impact:* Study of sign usage in
> vegetal, urban, and architectural landscapes, taking into account their
> ecological impact. How does landscape semiotics influence environmental
> awareness and sustainable practices?
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

List,

While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it
has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded
me that  the principal issue being considered has *not *been resolved
unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way,
completely along the lines of *his* analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v.
'mark' question has been settled *because* John says it has and, so,
there's no need for further discussion.

I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's
argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example,
contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than
sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with
Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion
of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by
Peirce as a kind of *term* and, so, decidedly *not *a *possible sign*.
Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an
*existential* one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark.

Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions
of a *possible
sign* include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of
feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt
to be positively possible."

John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague
Quality" that his listeners, typically *not* schooled in Peircean thought,
"find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written
work. I can only say that that has not been my experience over the years.
For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the
George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of
Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing
tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were
familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and,
indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the letter 't'
perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as it may,
that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended).

Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used
the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the
logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of
discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have
faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words!

Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his
disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his
papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with* several*
Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including John.

And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most
recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that he in fact
did provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the passages where
Peirce uses not only 'tone', but its variants (such as 'tuone' and
'potisgin'). John, on the other hand, has kept repeating his opinions with
little textual support.


So I ask each member of this forum who has an interest in this topic to
honestly weigh the arguments presented by Jon and John and determine for
themself who has made the stronger case, John for 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'.
Perhaps then we can put the matter to rest (at least for a time).

Best,

Gary Richmond




On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 2:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent
> with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point
> in its favor.
>
>
> As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support,
> any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's
> dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is
> *inconsistent *with his various explanations of what he means by "tone,"
> "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of
> term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to
> say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these
> terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a
> *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not a *possible *sign.
> On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being
> whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling
> which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature
> incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type

[Gary Richmond]

John, Jon, List,

JFS: I'm sorry, but I  don't understand why you're jumping through all
kinds of hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce
happened to mention just once.  (Except for once more in the LNB.)
GR: It appears to me that *if* Jon has been 'jumping through hoops' to
argue his position, then you have been doing no less hoop jumping.

But more to the point, it is your mere opinion that 'tone' is Peirce's
"rather poor choice of terminology' whereas, as I see it, it has been
argued rather convincingly by Jon that there is a strong case for
preferring 'tone' to 'mark'. Since you have settled on 'mark' in your own
work, I can see why you might want to argue for it exclusively. But -- and
as I've followed this discussion closely -- in my estimation, Jon's
argument for 'tone' is stronger than yours for 'mark'. And I know I am not
alone in that opinion.

This is brought home especially when you throw up your arms and argue from
authority, principally, your own. But not exclusively your own:

JFS: "I find Tony's [Jappy's] analyses convincing and compatible with my
own studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade."
GR: Far different from this approach, Peirce made a whole hearted effort to
solicit criticism of his own views. Even more than that, he called for
scientists and other scholars to try to *refute* his work where possible in
the interest of correcting possible errors. That seems to me to be almost a
corollary of the method of science as  opposed to the other methods of
inquiry. With the exception of well-prepared scientists offering testable
hypotheses, inquiry is, for Peirce, essentially a communal affair, and the
methods of tenacity (mere stubborn clinging to a position), the a Priori
method (pretty much a 'taste' or a 'feel' that some way of looking at some
matter is 'right' ), and that of authority are assiduously avoided in
scientific inquiry. Of course I needn't remind you, or any logician, that
the *appeal* to authority is a well-known logical fallacy.

JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic.
GR: Perhaps not; we shall see. But in any event, it is not for you to
determine. After all, this is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L, nor Schmidt-L nor, for
that matter, Richmond-L, but Peirce-L.  Still, I must agree with you that
the arguments for 'mark' and 'tone' have been fairly fully laid out and
List members can decide for themselves which argumentation has been
strongest, most convincing. This is to say that they needn't take your, or
Jon's, or my word for it.

JFS: You [Jon] said that you had read Tony's writings.  i strongly urge you
to study them.
GR: Your now repeated request that JAS read and study Jappy's works (which
he clearly does) appears to me as condescending as your appeal to authority
is unscientific from the standpoint of Peirce's four methods of fixing
belief.

It is my opinion as List moderator that in light of Peirce's ethics of
inquiry, and along with Joe Ransdell's notes on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe
meant to apply facets of that ethics to conduct in this forum, that
reflecting on those ought give you -- and everyone -- pause as to they
consider what conduct is and is not appropriate here. As did Joe, I have
always wanted Peirce-L to be essentially self-moderated. But in the past
few years I have seen that there are participants who rather flaunt their
independence from such ethical and collegial practices as Ransdell
outlined. It will no longer be tolerated, and those who have previously
been warned their anti-collegial conduct on the List jeopardizes their
continuation on Peirce-L. In short, they will be removed without further on
or off List discussion.

Gary Richmond (writing as forum moderator)

On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 12:15 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> I'm sorry, but I  don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of
> hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to
> mention just once.  (Except for once more in the LNB.)
>
> First, the terms potisign, actisign, and famisign are the kinds of words
> that Peirce frequently coined.  The three pages of EP2 show a great deal of
> thought, which is much more than he wrote about that trichotomy in 1906.
> It's also very closely reasoned thought, which is consistent with many
> issues he had been discussing for years.  Except for the fact that those
> words are rather ugly, they are the result of deep thinking.
>
> By contrast, the word 'tone' in 1906 sounds like a quick choice based on
> one rather rare kind of sign (a tone of voice).  The word 'mark' is much
> more natural, more general, more consistent with his definition in
> Baldwin's dictionary, and much, much easier to explain to intelligent
> listeners and readers who are not Peirce scholars.  (And I believe that
> those people are the most important audience for Peirce scholars to
> address.)
>
> F

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [teadus.biosemiotics:9385] ONE-DAY CONFERENCE ON SEMIOTIC AGENCY IN CELEBRATION OF ALEXEI SHAROV´S 70TH ANNIVERSARY

[Gary Richmond]

FYI: GR

Dear all,

on Wednesday April 10th (tomorrow) at 10.00-14.10 CET the one-day
international conference “The active forces of development and semiotic
agency (Developmental and semiotic agency)" will be held at the Institute
of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of
Sciences (INION RAN) in Moscow, Russia, and online. The conference, which
is held in Russian (mainly) and English, is organized in celebration of the
70th anniversary of Alexei Sharov and hosted by Mikhail Ilyin.

The conference starts with a presentation of the book *Semiotic agency:
Science beyond mechanism
<https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-89484-9> *(Sharov &
Tønnessen 2021), and features talks by Alexei Sharov, Morten Tønnessen,
S.T. Zolyan, S.V. Chebanov, V.I. Arshinov and M.V. Ilyin. The event can be
attended digitally by following this Zoom link:
https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88090035919?pwd=UUqbzYrUYJ64gAGrgVLhqUyLCR0mkK.1
(identificator:
880 9003 5919; password: 222986)

My best,

-- 
*Morten Tønnessen*
Professor of philosophy at University of Stavanger´s Department of social
studies <https://www.uis.no/en/department-social-studies> — Secretary of Nordic
Association for Semiotic Studies <http://nordicsemiotics.org/> — Member of
Norway´s Council for Animal Ethics <http://www.radetfordyreetikk.no>
---
ADDRESS Nådlandsbråtet 25, 4034 Stavanger, Norway — PHONE NO. (+47) 9423
7093
---
Academic blog: Utopian Realism <http://UtopianRealism.blogspot.com>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [teadus.biosemiotics:9384] Unresolved problems in biosemiotics

[Gary Richmond]

FYI: GR

Dear friends and colleagues,



We invite you to join the panel on biosemiotics which will take place at
the world congress of semiotics „Signs and Realities“ in Warsaw, Poland, 2–6
September this year. <https://www.semcon2024.com/>  The biosemiotics panel
– “Unresolved problems in biosemiotics” – was proposed by Don Favareau and
me (description below).

Deadline for abstracts is 15 April. Please submit
<https://www.semcon2024.com/abstrakty> your abstract.



With all best wishes

Kalevi & Don



Fundamentals of semiotics are not yet concisely formulated, theory of
meaning making requires still much work in clarification. Biosemiotics has
the major responsibility in this work inasmuch biosemiotics concerns the
general semiotics.

Among the unresolved problems we can recognize, for instance, the following:

(a) the minimal conditions for a metabolic system to carry semiosis;

(b) the relationship between interpretation, free choice, subjective
present, umwelt, agency, logical paradox, and semiosis;

(c) the operational typology of prelinguistic signs;

(d) the nature of (sign) modality as such;

(e) existence (and description) of forms of semiosis that never appear in
human communication or in human bodies;

etc.

We should also pay attention to the perspective methods to be used for
providing the solutions. In particular, this concerns the role of
mathematical and empirical study methods. This includes several problems,
for instance:

(x) whether the fundamental semiotic theory can be formulated in
mathematical terms;

(y) which are the general methods to be used for testing semiotic models.

The panel will include a roundtable to discuss the unresolved problems in
biosemiotics. We ask all interested scholars to participate in this
roundtable and to propose the ideas for solutions.
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: The Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter 8:1 - March/April 2024

[Gary Richmond]

List,

FYI: This latest edition of the Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter is
packed with information of interest to the Peirce community including an
introduction to Hans Joas, the new president of the Society, a section
*In Memoriam*: John Lachs, Nicholas Rescher, Don Roberts, and Beverly
Kent, news
of Society sessions and speakers at the 2024 World Congress of Philosophy
being held in Rome this August, and much else.

Gary Richmond, Moderator of Peirce-L


The Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter 8:1


[image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]

Dear Gary Richmond


Internationally, the thought of Charles S. Peirce continues to stimulate
significant work and discussion. Dedicated to promoting Peirce’s work and
thought, the Charles S. Peirce Society is pleased to update you on its
efforts, on new publications relating to Peirce and to pragmatism, and on
other news relating to Peirce. We are grateful for your support and for
being a part of such a wonderful and expansive community of inquirers.

Yours truly,

The Charles S. Peirce Society Executive Committee


*Spotlight on the Peirce Society President*


We are pleased to announce that Professor *Hans Joas*, Ernst Troeltsch
Professor for the Sociology of Religion at the Humboldt University of
Berlin, is the President of the Charles S. Peirce Society this year,
succeeding Professor Yi Jiang, who is now serving as past president and who
will be, along with other past presidents, a Society Fellow for life.


For more than twenty years, Professor Joas was also a visiting professor in
the Department of Sociology and in the Committee on Social Thought at the
University of Chicago. He holds honorary doctorates from the University of
Tübingen, Uppsala University and the Pazmanyi Peter University in Budapest.
>From 2011 until 2014 he was a Fellow at the Freiburg Institute for Advanced
Studies (FRIAS), and before that, from 2002 until 2011, he was the Director
of the Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies at the
University of Erfurt.


Professor Joas’s contributions to pragmatist thought begin with his famous
study on George H. Mead, *G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of His
Thought* (MIT Press, 1985, 1997). Since then, he has authored more than a
dozen other books, including *Pragmatism and Social Theory*, *The
Creativity of Action* and *The Genesis of Values* (all of them University
of Chicago Press, 1993, 1996 and 2000, respectively). They are all
contributions to a new social theory based on American pragmatism. A more
recent book is *The Power of the Sacred. An Alternative to the Narrative of
Disenchantment* (OUP 2021), in which he argues that Peirce’s semiotics can
be synthesized with William James’s psychology of religion, and that such a
synthesis is crucial to a contemporary theory of religion. His most recent
book is *Under the Spell of Freedom: Theory of Religion after Hegel and
Nietzsche* (OUP, 2024).


It is truly an honor that Professor Joas will help lead our Society this
year and into the future.



*The 2024-2025 Peirce Essay Prize*


Once again, our Society is holding an essay contest directed to promoting
work by junior scholars. The 2024-2025 Peirce Essay Prize offers a $1,000
cash prize plus up to $750 for travel to the Society’s annual meeting to
present the winning essay, as well as its publication (subjective to
editorial revision) in the *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*.


The essay can be on any topic related to Peirce’s work, and we consider
submissions from graduate students and those who are no more than seven
years out from the year they earned their last graduate degree,
or ten years for those who have given birth or have had childcare
responsibilities (past winners of the contest are ineligible). The list of
previous winners can be found here
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=4aa7dbbfd5=860edf35dc>
.


The submission deadline is *August 15, 2024*. Because the winning essay may
be published in the Transactions, the length of contest submissions should
be about the length of an average journal article.  The maximum acceptable
length is 10,000 words, including notes. The presentation of the winning
submission at the annual meeting cannot exceed 30 minutes reading time. Go
here
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=7e9cc86b35=860edf35dc>
for
more information.



*In Memoriam**: John Lachs, Nicholas Rescher, Don Roberts, and Beverly Kent*


We are saddened by the passing of four distinguished scholars over the past
six months, whose contributions to pragmatism and to Peirce studies are
well known. It is our duty and privilege to remember and honor each one of
them.


*John Lachs* served as the Peirce Society president in 1987. He was
professor emeritus at Vanderbilt University, where he had served since
1967. He is the author of more 10 books and 150 articles, with one of his
la

[PEIRCE-L] The passing of Don D. Roberts and his wife Beverly Kent

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Nathan Houser wrote to me this evening with the news of the passing of Dan
Roberts.

Nathan wrote:

I have some unhappy news that you may want to share with the list,
especially given the recent and continuing thread on EG. Don Robert’s son
called me yesterday to inform me that Don died on March 4. He died in his
home on Vancouver Island. Don’s wife, Beverley Kent, who wrote the book on
Peirce’s classification of sciences, died eight days later on March 12.
They had both been in poor and deteriorating health.


I wrote in reply:

There is hardly a discussion of EGs which does not reference Roberts' work
including, as you remarked, the recent one on Peirce-L. As for Kent's book
on the classification of sciences, while there is surely *no* work that I
am anywhere close to knowing 'by heart', if recurring study of any book
were to approach at least a very thorough familiarity for me, along with
your two volumes of *The Essential Peirce*, Kent's book would most
certainly qualify. I can't imagine making my recent presentation at APA
without once again having consulted her ground-breaking monograph.


Should I receive additional information, I will of course post it to
Peirce-L

Best,

Gary
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)

[Gary Richmond]

John, List,

JFS: I have responded precisely to every one of Jon's comments.
GR: A review of your recent exchange strongly suggests to me and, I
believe, anyone who might  undertake that review herself, that you have
responded *precisely* to *very few *of Jon's comments. I would say that you
have been quite *selective *about responding to his comments and questions,
mostly making what appears to me to be appeals to authority (such as to
that group of "eminent logicians" who, as do you, appear dismissive re:
formal modal logic).

However, as earlier noted,  I  am certain that I am not alone in eagerly
anticipating reading in the next few days the draft of your paper in
progress, "Delta Graphs: The Logic of Pragmatism,"  especially as "it will
include precise reasons why Delta graphs are based on metalanguage -- which
is the primary method that is used for *computational purposes* in the 21st
C."  (Emphasis added by GR)

GR: A quick question: Why do you valorize "computational purposes"" Are
they the only useful applications as you see it?

JFS: The axioms by C. I. Lewis and related developments are a dead end for
any purpose in science and engineering.
GR: How can you know that for sure?  Please explain.

JFS: Once again, Peirce's logic is at the forefront of 21st C developments.
GR: For now, although it is very much to be desired, I will have to take
your word for it.

Best,

Gary







On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 3:24 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Gary,
>
> I have responded precisely to every one of Jon's comments.  I am now
> writing an article with the title "Delta Graphs:  The Logic of
> Pragmatism".  I'll send a draft to P-list in a few days.   I guarantee that
> it will include precise reasons why Delta graphs are based on metalanguage
> -- which is the primary method that is used for computational purposes in
> the 21st C.
>
>  The axioms by C. I. Lewis and related developments are a dead end for any
> purpose in science and engineering.   After 1903, Peirce wrote a great deal
> about possibility and necessity, but he never used his 1903 modal logic for
> any of that.
>
> Once again, Peirce's logic is at the forefront of 21st C developments.
>
> John
>
>
> --
> *From*: "Gary Richmond" 
> *Sent*: 3/12/24 8:48 PM
> *To*: John F Sowa 
> *Cc*: Peirce-L , Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order
> Logics)
>
> John,
>
> Despite your earlier comment in a post addressed to me on March 6 where
> you wrote that "the important references are in the future, not the past"
> -- a remark which, in this matter of Delta EGs, I cannot say I much agree
> with insofar as it relates to Peirce's work -- it remains impossible for
> me, and I'd imagine others, to fully grasp your position on this issue that
> you've been clearly disagreeing with Jon on.
>
> In short, without your addressing Jon's repeated requests for Peirce
> quotations supporting your claims -- as well as a few examples of how you
> would represent (and reason about) modal propositions in your "candidate"
> for Delta EGs -- your contender for Delta graphs continues to be for me
> unclear, really, unfathomable.
>
> Of course those following this discussion look forward to reading the
> article which you are working on discussing Delta EGs. But it would be more
> than helpful to forum members if you'd offer some *quotations *and a few
> simple *examples* to clarify your views on the matter.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 1:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> John, List:
>
> CSP: The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts,
> distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I
> shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in
> order to deal with modals.
>
>
> JFS: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the details of the 1903
> logics. He is saying that he is preserving that DIVISION into Alpha
> (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and Gamma (something beyond
> Alpha and Beta).
>
>
> Please do not put words in Peirce's mouth. Preserving the division without
> also preserving the details of "the better exposition of 1903" would make
> no sense. Going straight into a specification for the new Delta part
> without saying anything at all about the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts,
> having just stated the intention to "adhere to" that division, would
> likewise make no sense. Again, can you identify even *one sentence* from
> the entire extant letter to Risteen that is about EGs but *not *applicable
> to those other 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)

[Gary Richmond]

/ twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 10:14 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> I'll go into much more detail in the preview article, which I am now
>> working on.  I'll just respond to the following point:
>>
>> JAS:  Your quotation here omits the crucial first part of the only
>> sentence in R L376 that mentions Delta--"The better exposition of 1903
>> divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta,
>> and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall
>> now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals."
>>
>> I answered that before:  Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the
>> details of the 1903 logics.  He is saying that he is preserving that
>> *DIVISION* into Alpha (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and
>> Gamma (something beyond Alpha and Beta).
>>
>> The most significant Gamma graphs are the the ones that represent the
>> second-order version of his 1885 Algebra of Logic.  He had reviewed
>> Russell's logic of 1903, and he must have heard about (but didn't have time
>> to study) Whitehead & Russell's logic of 1910.  Both of them discussed
>> higher-order logic (second order and higher), but not modal logic.
>>
>> During the years after 1903, Peirce mentioned the modal words in English
>> many, many times.  And he experimented with new notations for modality, but
>> he never used or even mentioned his 1903 modal logic for any purpose.  In
>> fact, he had only used it for a few examples in 1903.
>>
>> But the most important evidence is to look at the developments in the
>> years after Peirce.  C. I. Lewis introduced a new version of propositional
>> modal logic in 1932, which had been inspired by Peirce's 1903 modal logic.
>> It was different from Peirce's version, but equivalent in expressive power
>> to the propositional subset of his modal logic of 1903.  During the 30 or
>> 40 years after 1932, many logicians built on that logic. But many others
>> (Quine among them) rejected it.  Quine correctly said that modal logic was
>> just a version of metalanguage about logic.  Other logicians criticized it
>> or ignored it altogether.  Very few did much with it after the 1960s.  From
>> the 1970s and later, new versions of logic were developed to handle modal
>> issues, but (a) they did not use the box and diamond operators for
>> modality; (b) they used different words. such as contexts, situations, or
>> domains; and (c) they combined predicate calculus with metalanguage, as
>> Peirce did in L376.
>>
>> In my preview of the Delta graph article, I'll explain these issues in
>> more detail and discuss the directions taken in 1973 and later.  Short
>> summary:  All the useful applications are based on some version of
>> metalanguage, along the lines of the December 1911 article.   Logics that
>> use the two operators for necessary and possible, have no practical
>> applications of any kind.
>>
>> Peirce had good taste and good insights into the kind of logic required
>> for problems in philosophy, science, and engineering.  Metalanguage is the
>> foundation for all useful modal reasoning in the 21st C.  Textbooks still
>> mention the Lewis-style of modal logic, but there are no applications to
>> any kind of practical applications.
>>
>> Summary:  Any version of mathematics and/or logic that has no
>> applications is. literally, useless.  There are many such versions in the
>> many years of published tomes.  And most of them have few or no citations.
>>
>> On rare occasions, something from the distant past is revived and becomes
>> a big success.  Peirce has an unusually large percentage of successful
>> revivals.  His Delta graphs are among them.  I recognized their importance,
>> because I have used and worked with similar logics from the late 20th and
>> early 21st C.
>>
>> John
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was Delta Existential Graphs

[Gary Richmond]

m still wondering exactly how your
> candidate would represent the five modal propositions that Peirce wrote in
> his Logic Notebook, if not exactly as he scribed them on that page (R
> 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7).
>
> JFS: As for the two quotations by Peirce below, (1) they're irrelevant to
> the issues about Delta graphs, and (2) they are not consistent with modern
> developments in physics and astronomy.
>
>
> My only point in presenting those two quotations was to show a potential
> *application *of formal modal logic--system *S4*, with a reflexive and
> transitive alternativeness relation (AR) such that the model set of
> law-propositions never shrinks but can grow with each iteration of PSTs, is
> reminiscent of Peirce's hyperbolic cosmology. This is a *metaphysical 
> *hypothesis
> grounded in synechism, tychism, and objective idealism--not a finding of
> the *special *sciences, which have largely adopted the opposite
> assumptions of reductionism, determinism, and materialism.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
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Re:[PEIRCE-L]

[Gary Richmond]

Michael,

I have always seen Peirce positing 'objective idealism" as essentially  a
*metaphysical* doctrine as he contrasts it with two other 'doctrines' in
"The Architecture of Theories" and, in fact, refers to "objective idealism"
*as* a 'theory' in his definition.

The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to scientific
logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a certain
kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis absolutely
irreducible to reason, – an ultimate, inexplicable regularity; while the
only possible justification of any theory is that it should make things
clear and reasonable.

Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known as Ockham’s
razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed than
necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a par,
it seems to render both primordial.

The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism,
that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws.


 As such, your notion that "the participial form gives the  correct notion
of *process* involved in reaching the state of idealism"* implies that
'objectified idealism' is, rather, a processural state to be reached. *

*However,  reflecting further on Peirce's definition in light of your
participial version**, I can see how you might have come to that processual
notion because of one word in Peirce's definition, namely, 'becoming'.*


CSP: The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective
idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits *becoming *physical
laws. (emphasis added)


But 'becoming' is simply  a necessary component of the theory, and
especially in the context in which Peirce frames it in "The Architecture of
Theories," contrasting it with two other doctrines (viz. neutralism and
materialism). . .

(A) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I would name
*neutralism*; or,

(B) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone as
primordial, which is *materialism*; or,

(C) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as
primordial, which is *idealism*.


. . . I still would hold that  'objective idealism' is essentially a
metaphysical doctrine.


Best,

Gary







On Sun, Feb 25, 2024 at 3:04 AM Michael Shapiro 
wrote:

> Gary,
>
> I think that using the participial form gives the  correct notion of
> *process* involved in reaching the state of idealism.
>
> M.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Gary Richmond 
> Sent: Feb 25, 2024 12:17 AM
> To: Michael Shapiro 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L]
>
>
> Michael,
>
> What do you think of Ivo Ibri's notion that "Synechism is, in fact, a
> synthesis of Peirce’s idealism and realism, in the way that it is possible
> to conceive a reality constituted by general relations and possibilities
> under only one substance, viz., eidos or ideality" ?
> https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-09625-9_17
>
> I ask this as I'm still unclear as to what your distinction is between
> 'objective idealism' and 'objectified idealism'. Peirce's notion -- as
> controversial as it has been -- seems to me clear enough:
>
>
> The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism,
> that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws (Peirce,
> CP 6.25).
>
>
> "Objective idealism" seems to me to be a metaphysical idea, while
> "objectified idealism" suggests (perhaps) a logical notion. In any case,
> and again, I'm not certain as to what you mean by "objectified idealism."
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 3:35 AM Michael Shapiro 
> wrote:
>
>> John Sowa et al.,
>>
>>
>>
>> In case y'all would like to read something of what I've had to say more
>> recently (as in my last book, *The Logic of Language*, 2022), attached
>> herewith is an article.
>>
>> M.
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
>> https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at
>> https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all
>> the links!
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
>> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
>> message and nothing in the body.  More at
>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;
>> and co-managed by him and 

[PEIRCE-L] Mathematical Proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis; and Valental Graphs

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

You recently wrote:

JAS: I do not know whether anyone has posted a mathematical proof of
Peirce's reduction thesis on the Internet. Robert Burch wrote an entire
book to present his [. . .] while Sergiy Koshkin purports to demonstrate it
even more rigorously in a recent paper.

I vividly recall, although it was over a decade ago, a young
scholar (either Joachim Hereth or Reinhard Poschel) whom I'd previously not
met  coming up to me at an outdoor party during an ICCS conference,
excitedly announcing that he and another scholar had completed a
mathematical proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis that went beyond Robert
Burch's PAL. This is described in the Abstract of the paper below.

Peircean Algebraic Logic and Peirce's Reduction Thesis


   - Joachim Hereth and Reinhard Pöschel

*Abstract*

Robert Burch describes *Peircean Algebraic Logic (PAL)* as a language to
express Peirce's “unitary logical vision” (1991: 3), which Peirce tried to
formulate using different logical systems. A “correct” formulation of
Peirce's vision then should allow a mathematical proof of Peirce's
Reduction Thesis, that all relations can be generated from the ensemble of
unary, binary, and ternary relations, but that at least some ternary
relations cannot be reduced to relations of lower arity.

Based on Burch's algebraization, the authors further simplify the
mathematical structure of PAL and remove a restriction imposed by Burch,
making the resulting system in its expressiveness more similar to Peirce's
system of existential graphs. The drawback, however, is that the proof of
the Reduction Thesis from Burch (A Peircean reduction thesis: The
foundations of topological logic, Texas Tech University Press, 1991) no
longer holds. A new proof was introduced in Hereth Correia, and Pöschel
(The teridentity" and Peircean algebraic logic: 230–247, Springer, 2006)
and was published in full detail in Hereth (Relation graphs and contextual
logic: Towards mathematical foundations of concept-oriented databases,
Technische Universität Dresden dissertation, 2008).

In this paper, we provide proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis using a graph
notation similar to Peirce's existential graphs.
Keywords:: Peirce
<https://www.degruyter.com/search?query=keywordValues%3A%28%22Peirce%22%29%20AND%20journalKey%3A%28%22SEMI%22%29=all=article>
; Existential Graphs
<https://www.degruyter.com/search?query=keywordValues%3A%28%22Existential%20Graphs%22%29%20AND%20journalKey%3A%28%22SEMI%22%29=all=article>
; Burch
<https://www.degruyter.com/search?query=keywordValues%3A%28%22Burch%22%29%20AND%20journalKey%3A%28%22SEMI%22%29=all=article>
; Peircean Algebraic Logic
<https://www.degruyter.com/search?query=keywordValues%3A%28%22Peircean%20Algebraic%20Logic%22%29%20AND%20journalKey%3A%28%22SEMI%22%29=all=article>
; Relational Graphs
<https://www.degruyter.com/search?query=keywordValues%3A%28%22Relational%20Graphs%22%29%20AND%20journalKey%3A%28%22SEMI%22%29=all=article>
Published Online: 2011-08-08
*Peircean Algebraic Logic and Peirce’s Reduction Thesis*
https://wwwpub.zih.tu-dresden.de/~poesch-r/poePUBLICATIONSpdf/2011_Hereth_Poe.pdf
Published in Print: 2011-August

I must admit that the complexities of the math involved in their paper as
well as Koshkin's (which I only recently became aware of) has precluded my
reading much of either of them. But then, I tend to strongly agree with you
in this comment of yours.

JAS: I find Peirce's own diagrammatic demonstration to be simple and
persuasive enough--relations of any adicity can be built up of triads, but
triads cannot be built up of monads or dyads despite involving them (EP
2:364, 1905).

In *A Thief of Peirce *Kenneth Ketner calls these diagrams "valental
graphs" and discusses them in one or two of the appendices of that book (I
remember buying the book for just those appendices even though it seemed a
small fortune at the time).
[image: image.png]

Best,

Gary
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] Commens

[Gary Richmond]

List,

A couple of List members have noted that *Commens *is back up and running.
http://www.commens.org

We have Ben Udell to thank for noodling within the site when it went down,
then alerting Mats Bergman -- who manages and, along with Sami Paavola and João
Queiroz, developed that very useful site -- that the cause was likely
database corruption (which it was). Mats managed to repair it, but he's not
certain that it will remain stable. The good news, though, is that he's
been developing a new site to replace the current one.

Thank you both, but I worry that the solution may be temporary. The
database is now running in a fault-tolerant mode, which is not recommended,
but which should work as long as no new content is added. The new version
(which I have been developing offline) needs to be uploaded sooner rather
than later ‒ fingers crossed that the old site stays up and running until I
get it all done.


Please alert Ben if you encounter any errors on Commens.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as co-manager of Arisbe with Ben Udell)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

Erratum: I meant to write at the end of my post "Tom Short in his book on
Peire's semeiotic goes no further than to say that "the intentionality of
thought is a special case of significance" which hardly equates it with
3ns" (not "intentionality," of course). GR

On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 7:31 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> John, List,
>
> JFS: More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.
>
> And not only today but in Peirce's day as well. Peirce referred to
> Cantor's  conception as a "pseudo-continuum," a "bottoms-up" approach. It's
> too bad that a contemporary mathematician hasn't written a paper explaining
> the virtues of Peirce's top-down approach. Of course on List and in his
> *Transactions* paper, "Peirce's Topical Continuum," Jon Alan Schmidt has
> argued for Peirce's alternative "top-down" conception. In light of the
> current discussion, I reread JAS's paper and can heartily recommend it to
> anyone wishing to understand the "top-down" vs "bottom-up" distinction. See:
>
> Peirce's Topical Continuum: A “Thicker” Theory
> <https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SCHPTC-2==https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FSCHPTC-2.pdf>
> Jon Alan Schmidt <https://philarchive.org/s/Jon%20Alan%20Schmidt>
>
> *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
> <https://philpapers.org/asearch.pl?pub=1106>* 56 (1):62-80 (2020)   Copy
>  BIBTEX
> Abstract
> Although Peirce frequently insisted that continuity was a core component
> of his philosophical thought, his conception of it evolved considerably
> during his lifetime, culminating in a theory grounded primarily in topical
> geometry. Two manuscripts, one of which has never before been published,
> reveal that his formulation of this approach was both earlier and more
> thorough than most scholars seem to have realized. Combining these and
> other relevant texts with the better-known passages highlights a key
> ontological distinction: a collection is bottom-up, such that the parts are
> real and the whole is an ens rationis, while a continuum is top-down, such
> that the whole is real and the parts are entia rationis. Accordingly, five
> properties are jointly necessary and sufficient for Peirce’s topical
> continuum: rationality, divisibility, homogeneity, contiguity, and
> inexhaustibility.
>
> I'd also like to take this opportunity to join those on the list who
> question your insistence that 3ns = intentionality. I haven't anything to
> add to what Edwina, Mike, and now Jon has written except to note that even
> Tom Short in his book on Peire's semeiotic goes no further than to say that
> "the intentionality of thought is a special case of significance" which
> hardly equates it with intentionality.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 4:40 PM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum
>> is important.  But there are many different ways of talking and thinking
>> about time.   And there are also many different mathematical ways of
>> formulating theories.  See my previous note in response to Edwina.
>>
>> For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf .
>>
>> The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and
>> the long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not
>> obvious.  It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of
>> thinking about time, continuity, or the relation between time and
>> continuity.
>>
>> And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that
>> Cantor formalized.  More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.
>>
>> JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability
>> assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our
>> having the idea of a true continuum
>>
>> I admit that this statement is consistent with Peirce's quotations.  But
>> the languages Peirce knew, although remarkably extensive among 19th century
>> philosophers, do not exhaust the full range of thought about time or
>> continuity or the relations between them.  And the different theories about
>> continuity among professional mathematicians does not imply that the way
>> people talk about time implies the way they must formulate theories about
>> continuity.
>>
>> The best we can say is that Peirce's views are consistent with views in
>> SAE (Whorf's abbreviation for Standard Average European), but they are by
>> no mea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

John, List,

JFS: More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.

And not only today but in Peirce's day as well. Peirce referred to
Cantor's  conception as a "pseudo-continuum," a "bottoms-up" approach. It's
too bad that a contemporary mathematician hasn't written a paper explaining
the virtues of Peirce's top-down approach. Of course on List and in his
*Transactions* paper, "Peirce's Topical Continuum," Jon Alan Schmidt has
argued for Peirce's alternative "top-down" conception. In light of the
current discussion, I reread JAS's paper and can heartily recommend it to
anyone wishing to understand the "top-down" vs "bottom-up" distinction. See:

Peirce's Topical Continuum: A “Thicker” Theory
<https://philarchive.org/go.pl?id=SCHPTC-2==https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FSCHPTC-2.pdf>
Jon Alan Schmidt <https://philarchive.org/s/Jon%20Alan%20Schmidt>

*Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
<https://philpapers.org/asearch.pl?pub=1106>* 56 (1):62-80 (2020)   Copy   B
IBTEX
Abstract
Although Peirce frequently insisted that continuity was a core component of
his philosophical thought, his conception of it evolved considerably during
his lifetime, culminating in a theory grounded primarily in topical
geometry. Two manuscripts, one of which has never before been published,
reveal that his formulation of this approach was both earlier and more
thorough than most scholars seem to have realized. Combining these and
other relevant texts with the better-known passages highlights a key
ontological distinction: a collection is bottom-up, such that the parts are
real and the whole is an ens rationis, while a continuum is top-down, such
that the whole is real and the parts are entia rationis. Accordingly, five
properties are jointly necessary and sufficient for Peirce’s topical
continuum: rationality, divisibility, homogeneity, contiguity, and
inexhaustibility.

I'd also like to take this opportunity to join those on the list who
question your insistence that 3ns = intentionality. I haven't anything to
add to what Edwina, Mike, and now Jon has written except to note that even
Tom Short in his book on Peire's semeiotic goes no further than to say that
"the intentionality of thought is a special case of significance" which
hardly equates it with intentionality.

Best,

Gary Richmond





On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 4:40 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum is
> important.  But there are many different ways of talking and thinking about
> time.   And there are also many different mathematical ways of formulating
> theories.  See my previous note in response to Edwina.
>
> For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf .
>
> The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and
> the long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not
> obvious.  It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of
> thinking about time, continuity, or the relation between time and
> continuity.
>
> And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that
> Cantor formalized.  More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce.
>
> JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability
> assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our
> having the idea of a true continuum
>
> I admit that this statement is consistent with Peirce's quotations.  But
> the languages Peirce knew, although remarkably extensive among 19th century
> philosophers, do not exhaust the full range of thought about time or
> continuity or the relations between them.  And the different theories about
> continuity among professional mathematicians does not imply that the way
> people talk about time implies the way they must formulate theories about
> continuity.
>
> The best we can say is that Peirce's views are consistent with views in
> SAE (Whorf's abbreviation for Standard Average European), but they are by
> no means universal.  They do not rule out other reasonable human ways of
> thinking about, talking about, and representing time and continuity.
>
> John
> _
>
> *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>
> Helmut, List:
>
> According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in
> phaneroscopy--our conception of it comes from directly observing the flow
> of time, which he calls "the continuum *par excellence*, through the
> spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum" (CP 6.86, 1898), so
> that "to say it is continuous is just like saying that the atomic weight of
> oxygen is 16, meaning that that shall be th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

ET: I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of
the focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological,
physic-chemical and artificial worlds.


Yes, I'm well aware of that focus and have read extensively in the
literature. Thank you, though, for providing some recent examples, none of
which I knew.

My question, however, *specifically* pointed to Stjernfelt's work on
dicisigns. I wrote: "I've been wondering how this move of Peirce [throwing
everything possible into the subject] might figure, if it plays a part at
all, in consideration of what Stjernfelt called 'Natural Propositions',"
the dicisign being a generalization of the proposition. Helmut Pape called
Stjernfelt's book "an inter- and transdisciplinary study that discusses and
criticizes theories and uses examples coming from psychology, biology,
anthropology, neuroscience, biosemiotics etc."

So, mine was not a general question as to the influence of Peirce in fields
other than logic -- there is no question of that -- but of this particular
matter which Jon discusses at length and which may nor may not extend
beyond logic as we generally think of it.

Btw, here is another book I'd highly recommend for discussions of Peirce's
influence in biosemiotics in particular, edited by two fine Peirce scholars.

Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life Vinicius Romanini
(Editor), Eliseo Fernández
<https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=dp_byline_sr_book_2?ie=UTF8=Eliseo+Fern%C3%A1ndez=Eliseo+Fern%C3%A1ndez=relevancerank=books>
 (Editor)

The table of contents suggests the depth of the scholarship both by
distinguished Peirce scholars and equally distinguished biosemioticians.

*Table of Contents*

Introduction; V. Romanini, E. Fernández.- 1. The Intelligible Universe; N.
Houser.- 2. The Continuity of Life: On Peirce’s Objective Idealism; I.A.
Ibri.- 3. Peircian Semiotic Indeterminacy and Its Relevance for
Biosemiotics; R. Lane.- 4. Peircean Habits, Broken Symmetries, and
Biosemiotics; E. Fernández.- 5. Semeiotic Causation and the Breath of Life;
M. Hulswit, V. Romanini.- 6. The Ineffable, the Individual, and the
Intelligible: Peircean Reflections on the Innate Ingenuity of the Human
Animal; V. Colapietro.- 7. Instinct and Abduction in the Peircean
Informational Perspective: Contributions to Biosemiotics; L.F. Barbosa da
Silveira, M.E. Quilici Gonzalez.- 8. The Life of Symbols and Other
Legisigns: More than a mere Metaphor?; W. Nöth.- 9. Signs without Minds; J.
Collier.- 10. Dicent Symbols and Proto-propositions in Biological Mimicry;
J. Queiroz.- 11. Semeiosis as a Living Process; V. Romanini.
Best,

Gary Richmond

On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 10:34 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R,list
>
> I’m a bit surprised by your  request - since surely you are aware of the
> focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical
> and artificial worlds.
>
> A few quick examples:
>
> *Homeostasis and Information Processing: Eduardo Mizraji. Biosystems
> 2024 February*
>
> "Teleonomic objects are purpose-oriented entities lacking a creator 
> (Igamberdiev,
> 2023
> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0303264723002903#bib22>
> ).
>
> "What is the nature of the various types of information that different
> living beings, at different scales of their organization, use to inform
> their regulatory systems? This information is the result of the
> simultaneous existence of patterns and receptors capable of detecting these
> patterns. In this context, information is an emergent property of the
> interaction of two categories of entities, patterns and receptors.
>
> This duo of conditions, *thermodynamic openness and the need for
> homeostatic regulatory systems*, are inherent to all forms of life that
> we know."
> ———
> *Computation in Biological Systems as a quantum mechanical simulation .*
> *Ron Cottam. Biosystems April 2022. *
>
> This article actually references Peirce.
> ——
>
> *The Information Continuum Model of Evolution BioSystems November 2021
> R.Skern Mauritzen*
>
>
> *-*
>  The Biosystems journal  is a major site for the examination of
> informational processing within the natural world.  That is - the focus is
> on information processes - and this, after all, is what Peircean semiotics
> is all about. [And there are other journals tha examine information
> processing]...
>
> As I’ve kept saying, you don’t have to use Peircean terms to examine the
> same outlines Peirce was writing about …Unfortunately, the tendency of many
> Peircean scholars, to insist, almost with a religious and even cult-like
> fervour,  on the use of exact and specific Peircean terms, obscures the
> fact that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

Thanks for these additional comments and examples as they further clarify
Peirce's bold logical move. As you noted:

JFS: Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the
*indexical *nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since
one must already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand
them--and leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the *iconic *part of
the proposition.


Since you mentioned Frederik Stjernfelt, I've been wondering how this move
of Peirce might figure in consideration of what Stjernfelt called "Natural
Propositions." In his extraordinary book, *Natural Propositions: The
Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns*, Stjernfelt takes Peirce at
his word, so to speak, and generalizes the meaning of *proposition* well
beyond the logical-linguistic into the natural world, that which
biosemioticians naturally have a particular interested in. I don't know
what lasting impact -- if any -- his book has had in that community since,
as far as I can tell, it has been somewhat resistant to Peircean thinking.
This antipathy was suggested to me when I attended a Biosemiotics Gathering
at Roosevelt University in NYC some years ago (I was asked by Vinicius
Romanini to read a paper he himself could not deliver since officials
refused to allow him to board a plane to the USA because he'd brought his
Italian, rather than his Brazilian, passport to the airport) as the several
Peircean-inspired biosemioticians present seemed to be contradicted at
every turn.

Be that as it may, Stjernfelt argues in *Natural Propositions* that
Peirce's generalization of the logical concept of *proposition* to
*dicisign *as to include semiosis that occurs in the natural world, is of
the greatest consequence for our understanding of reality beyond our
specie's intellectual/logical conception of it. For dicisigns do not
necessarily require human language, thought, and logic -- not human
consciousness -- whatsoever.

I'm not a biosemiotician -- although I find the field of considerable
interest -- and I know that you aren't either, Jon. But I'd be most
interested in what you or others on the List might think regarding the
generalization of Peirce's furthest thinking as regards propositions into
the natural world.

Best,

Gary Richmond


On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 9:35 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary, List:
>
> GR: It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in
> Logic," which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking.
>
>
> Of course, that characterization is Peirce's own, again written in late
> 1908 (NEM 3:885) when he evidently adopted it rather suddenly and
> decisively. Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the 
> *indexical
> *nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must
> already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and
> leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the *iconic *part of the
> proposition. By contrast, standard first-order predicate logic goes the
> other way, throwing everything possible into the predicate and leaving only
> quantified variables as the subjects. Peirce himself endorses that approach
> in some earlier writings.
>
> CSP: The most perfectly thorough analysis throws the whole substance of
> the Dicisign into the Predicate. (CP 2.318, 1903)
>
>
> CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after
> all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains
> a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or
> otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be
> prescribed. (CP 5.525, c. 1905)
>
> CSP: Take the proposition "Burnt child shuns fire." ... On this view, the
> predicate is, "is either not a child or has not been burned, or has no
> opportunity of shunning fire or does shun fire"; while the subject is "any
> individual object the interpreter may select from the universe of ordinary
> everyday experience." (CP 5.473, 1907)
>
>
> "Cain killed Abel" becomes "there exists an *x* and there exists a *y*
> such that *x* is Cain and *y* is Abel and *x* stands in the relation of
> killing to *y*." It is an interesting historical fact that the usual
> abbreviated notation for such formulations is derived from one developed by
> Peirce--for these two examples, ∀*x* (¬C*x* ∨ ¬B*x* ∨ S*x*) = ∀*x* ((C*x* ∧
> B*x*) → S*x*) and ∃*x *∃*y *(C*x* ∧ A*y* ∧ K*xy*). Still, notice how
> compact the natural language expressions are, by virtue of utilizing syntax
> that iconically matches the flow of causation instead of spelling
> everything out with symbols. Likewise, as Frederik Stjernfelt observes on
> pages 138 and 172 of his 2022 book, *Sheets, Diagrams, and Realism in
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon,

Your post sheds light on both associated matters that you discussed in it.
This snippet of a quotation -- and which I've reflected on a number of
times previously -- represents for me something of a succinct summary of
the matter, especially as emphasizing the need for collateral knowledge.

 CSP: A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more
ways than one. But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject
whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the
proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its
interpreter is requisite. ... The result is that everything in a
proposition that possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving
the *pure *predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses
(as a character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation ___ to ___ ,' 'and' = 'is
at once ___ and ___ ,' etc.


It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in Logic,"
which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking. But it becomes
understandable that "a proposition may have any number of subjects but can
have but one predicate which is invariably general, namely, a *pure *or
*continuous *predicate that cannot be analyzed further and expresses the
logical relations between the subjects."


As to your question: JAS: "Where do these different constituent signs
within a proposition fit into Peirce's late taxonomies?

You answered: JAS: They are distinguished in his trichotomy according to
the mode of presentation of the *immediate* object, as he explains in
another late 1908 writing."

This will require a bit more study on my behalf. But this summary sentence
is clear enough:

JAS: When a proposition is expressed linguistically in a sentence, the
subjects that denote its objects are either *descriptive* names or
*designative* pronouns or gestures, while the pure/continuous predicate
that signifies its interpretant is often a *copulant* sign.


Equally clear is the question of "a sentence like "Cain killed Abel," which
includes no words except those serving as its subjects," Peirce's answer,
given in this lovely passage, explains it quite nicely (within the context
of the entire quotation, of course).

CSP: What, then, is left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the *flow of
causation*. It is true that we are more acquainted even with that in
Experience. When we see a babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and
that, while a smile of exultation plays upon its features, it is making
acquaintance with the flow of causation. So acquaintance with the flow of
causation so early as to make it familiar before speech is so far acquired
that an assertion can be syntactically framed, and it is embodied in the
syntax of every tongue.


Finally, the whole matter is tied up in your concluding paragraph which
begins with this idea.

JAS: Pure/continuous predicates are sometimes conveyed entirely by *syntax*,
which in natural languages tends to reflect "the flow of causation."


In conclusion: Jon,  I did not expect such a complete response to my
request for an explication of this comment in your last post:

JAS: *The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign* to
be understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the
recognition that *every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically
denotes one of its objects*, while *its syntax is the pure predicate that
iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical
relations*. (I've added the emphasis I put in this quotation as a kind of
"more iconic" diagram for the purpose of studying your post today. GR).

Again, much appreciated. Thank you for taking the time and making the
effort to explain at length that which was succinctly -- albeit abstractly
-- posited in that single sentence I just added emphasis to above. As
usual, quotations and examples proved extremely helpful.

Best,

Gary Richmond



On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 2:40 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary, List:
>
> GR: However, this passage seems to me to need a bit of 'unpacking' to be
> entirely clear.
>
>
> I am happy to elaborate, although it is mostly a matter of providing
> rather extensive excerpts from the various relevant passages that I merely
> cited at the end of my last post. I apologize for the resulting length of
> this one, but so many exact quotations should preclude anyone from getting
> the wrong impression that I am attributing views to Peirce without
> demonstrating that he explicitly states them in his own words--repeatedly,
> in fact.
>
> JAS: The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be
> understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the
> recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically
> denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the p

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[Gary Richmond]

Jon,

I would tend to strongly agree with what you've written. However, this
passage seems to me to need a bit of 'unpacking' to be entirely clear.

JAS: The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be
understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the
recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically
denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that
iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical
relations

Best,

Gary Richmond

On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 7:57 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary, List:
>
> Indeed, as I have said before, usefulness is in the eye of the beholder;
> and as Peirce himself said, "True science is distinctively the study of
> useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of
> scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). Nobody should disparage one particular
> field of study merely because that person does not happen to find it useful
> for his/her peculiar purposes.
>
> Moreover, Peirce's entire architectonic classification of the sciences is
> based on "the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental
> principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other" (CP 1.180,
> EP 2:258, 1903). Accordingly, *all *the special sciences--including
> cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence,
> neuroscience, and anthropology--depend on the normative science of logic as
> semeiotic for fundamental principles, but do not furnish such principles to
> semeiotic. That being the case, the generality of semeiotic is a feature,
> not a bug--like the other branches of philosophy, it "contents itself with
> observations such as come within the range of every man's normal
> experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his life" (CP
> 1.241, 1902).
>
> Of course, Peirce famously calls himself "a pioneer, or rather a
> backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call
> *semiotic*, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental
> varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor
> too great, for a first-comer" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413, 1907). I agree with
> Houser--by the way, the quoted paper is excellent, and I commend it to
> anyone who can get their hands on it--that there is still plenty of work to
> be done, and we would be foolish to start over from scratch instead of
> forging ahead from the ground that Peirce has already cleared for us,
> however incompletely.
>
> Regarding his theory of interpretants, I appreciate the reference to my
> own paper on that topic. In addition, I find it quite baffling that anyone
> would suggest that the context-dependence of uttered signs is somehow
> inconsistent with it. On the contrary, the necessity of collateral
> experience/observation for any sign to be understood is one of Peirce's
> most notable insights. It leads to the recognition that every name in a
> proposition is a subject that indexically denotes one of its objects, while
> its syntax is the pure predicate that iconically signifies its interpretant
> as the general form of their logical relations (CP 5.542, c. 1902-3; CP
> 5.151, EP 2:208, 1903; R 611, 1908 Oct 28; NEM 3:885-886, 1908 Dec 5; SS
> 70-72, 1908 Dec 14; R 664, 1910 Nov 26-27).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 6:08 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> List, John, Edwina, Jon,
>>
>> How differently some other distinguished scholars see this matter of the
>> 'usefulness' of Peirce's semeiotic project than John Sowa appears to.
>> Consider this passage near the conclusion of a paper by Nathan Houser in  a
>> festschrift for Lucia Santaella published just last year, a passage near
>> the end which would seem to contradict even John's conclusion regarding Tom
>> Short's take on especially Peirce's late taxonomy of signs. I've subdivided
>> the long paragraph in the interest of readability on the List and in order
>> to emphasize certain salient points. Houser writes (emphasis added by me):
>>
>>
>> *Conclusion (and Call to Carry On)*
>>
>> After devoting a great deal of care to Peirce’s later efforts to unravel
>> the puzzle of semiosis and to produce an extended classification of the
>> fundamental varieties of possible signs, *T. L. Short concluded that
>> Peirce’s later taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make
>> out, incoherent” (Short 2007, p. 260). But he *[GR, Short] *quickly went
>> on to p

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short

[Gary Richmond]

, *Semiotica* 2022 (246): 211-223. 2022.
https://philarchive.org/archive/SCHPEI-12v1

Moreover, I am certain that I am not alone in seeing the very existence of
semeiotics today as arguing against John's dismissal of Peirce's writings
about interpretants as "so vague that nobody has been able to use them to
do or say anything useful." John seems to be basically advocating ignoring
anything that Peirce wrote unless it is somehow relevant to "the latest
developments in cognitive science." Doing so suggests that he is employing
the methods of tenacity and authority rather than the method of science.

Best,

Gary Richmond

On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 5:41 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina, List,
>
> I am not denying the fact that interpretants, as defined by Peirce, exist,
> and I am not denying that Peirce's 3-way distinction is good.
>
> But you said that you had not studied the kinds of details that the
> linguists observe and specify.
>
> My claim is that any theory that does not dig deeply into those details is
> useless.   And by "those", I mean every kind of detail that is studied and
> analyzed by *EVERY **ONE *of the cognitive sciences:  philosophy,
> psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and
> anthropology.
>
> Any serious theory of interpretants must include *ALL POSSIBLE
> INFLUENCES *from any and every branch of cognitive science.  The kind of
> generic theory that Peirce attempted is too weak to make any specific
> predictions in any particular case.
>
> I believe that Lady Welby had a good intuitive sense of the need for
> considering every possible influence, but she did not have the formal
> training in math & logic that Peirce had.  If you examine the development
> of Peirce's ideas in the decade after he began their correspondence (from
> 1903 to the end), you can see how Peirce was moving away from more abstract
> universal definitions to a more concrete focus on details.
>
> The first step was a move from a phenomenology based on Kant's
> abstractions to a phaneroscopy that paid more attention to Welby's focus on
> concrete details.  But that shift made the task far more complex.  It's
> essential to focus on the concrete details of every method of observation.
>
> That is why Peirce was groping.  He could no longer make broad
> generalizations, and every attempt to state a generalization forced him to
> consider how it would affect every detail of every branch,
>
> John
>
>
> --
> *From*: "Edwina Taborsky" 
>
> John, list
>
> I continue to  either misunderstand or object - I don’t know which term I
> should use - to your rejection of the role of the Interpretants. I simply
> don’t see how the semiosic process can function - and it IS a function -
> without the necessary role of the Interpretants. How can you have a
> semiosic triadic function without the third relation - the relation that
> provides meaning to the original stimulus?  That third relation, the
> meaning[s] is provided by the Interpretant Relations.  And I emphasize the
> plural ecrus the simple one-node site [ the single interpretant or
> signified] such as is found in Saussure or ….is simply not enough to
> explain the complexity of the development of information.
>
> If you consider the semiosic process - we can see that there are a number
> of different ‘cuts’, that divides the experience into different zones
> of semiotic processes.
>
> The first cut’ so to speak, is simple:  ontological - the separation of
> external and internal [ See Atmanspacher, H. 1999. ‘Cartesian Cut,
> Heisenberg Cut and the Concept of Complexity’, In: The Quest for a unified
> Theory of Information. Eds. W. Hofkirchner. ; 125-147.
> Matsumo, K [Resurrection of the Cartesian Physics. Same edition; p 31-44. ]
>
> This simply separates the sign-vehicle which stores the habits of the
> representamen from the external world - as Peirce has written, such that
> the Immediate Object and the Immediate Intnerpretant are internal to this
> ‘cut’….and the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant and Final
> Interpretant are external.
>
> Obviously - an internal experience of an incoming data - is not as complex
> as one that is externalized.
> But - as you can see in Robert Marty’s outline of the 28 classes of signs
> [which are hexadic forms, ie, including the two Object Relations and Three
> Interpretant Relations] that the Internal or Immediate Interpretant can be
> in any of the three categories - as related to the other Relations in the
> semiotic triad.
>
> The next Interpretant is external to the sign-vehicle - the Dynamic - and
> inserts a ‘visible’ or objectively knowable and measurable reaction - and
> moves it int

[PEIRCE-L] Recently published: The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. Peirce

[Gary Richmond]

The Oxford Handbook of Charles S. PeirceEdited by Cornelis de Waal

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

I too hope that Michael might summarize at least some relevant aspects of
his work in 'markedness' for the List, or at least offer a few excerpts
from his several books and papers which take up the topic. Having read some
of Michael's work on markedness, its connection to meaning in Peirce's
sense seems to me patent as this excerpt from the Wikipedia article,
"Markedness," suggests.

The work of Cornelius van Schooneveld, Edna Andrews
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edna_Andrews>, Rodney Sangster, Yishai Tobin
and others on 'semantic invariance' (different general meanings reflected
in the contextual specific meanings of features) has further developed
the semantic
analysis <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_analysis_(linguistics)> of
grammatical items in terms of marked and unmarked features. Other
semiotically-oriented work has investigated the isomorphism of form and
meaning with less emphasis on invariance, including the efforts of Henning
Andersen, Michael Shapiro, and Edwin Battistella. Shapiro and Andrews have
especially made connections between the semiotic of C. S. Peirce
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C._S._Peirce> and markedness, treating it
"as species of interpretant" in Peirce's sign–object–interpretant triad.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness


I do not know Edna Andrew's work in this area.

Best,

Gary Richmond

On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 1:25 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Michael - Why not instead provide us with a brief discussion of your
> discussion?
>
> Edwina
>
> On Feb 3, 2024, at 1:14 PM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:
>
> To all participants in this discussion of interpretants I would like to
> recommend that they take a look at my discussion of markedness in one or
> more of my books, the latest being *The Logic of Lasnguage* (New York:
> Springer, 2022). Markedness in language is the epitomre of the relationship
> between sign and object.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Edwina Taborsky 
> Sent: Feb 3, 2024 7:46 AM
> To: Edwina Taborsky 
> Cc: John F Sowa , Peirce List ,
> CG 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
>
>
> Again, if I might continue with the importance of the hexadic semiosic
> process, in that it enables complex adaptation…within interaction
>
> That is - the reality of two Object relations, the Dynamic and the
> Immediate acknowledges that not all off the input data from the external
> interaction will be accepted by the capacity of the sign -vehicle and its
> representamen. And indeed, some of this data might be changed /affected by
> other input happening at the same time.
>
> Then - the three Interpretants are vital.
>
> The first one, the Immediate, confines the reaction to the internal
> experience of the individual. It goes no further. I think this is important
> - if we think of a disease - it would confine the infection to one
> individual. If we think of another situation - it would confine the
> sensation of the experience to one individual [ rather than mob hysteria].
>
> The next one, the Dynamic, is important - since it produces an external
> response to the input data and brings in local ‘observers’, so to speak,
> who treat this external Interfpretant as a Sign in itself. //something that
> they might react to. .
>
> The last one, the Final - moves the response to a general, common one.
>
> An example would be a sound heard by an individual in a group of monkeys.
> This one individual might only feel a subjective internal response
> [Immediae Interpretant] and other than that - continue gathering fruit].
> But - it might instead, produce an external result [ the monkey would
> scream]. This would act as its own triadic Sign to the other monkeys….who
> would recognize it as an Alarm.  Over time - this particular sound by the
> monkey is understood, always, as an Alarm.
>
> That is - I think the function of the three Interpretants, nuanced as they
> are, is vital.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Feb 2, 2024, at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> John, list
>
> 1] I don’t know what you mean by ‘His Commentary’…in your sentence
>
> But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show
> how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation
> of his commentary.
>
>
> 2] And I don’t know what you mean by ’that insight’ in your sentence:
>
> Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just
> useful) example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants
> helped discover that insight?
>
>
> 3] I briefly outlined why I think that the the hexadic semosic process is
> capable of generative development of matter and mind.  That is,
>
> 3-a] the reality of two object relations, with one, the DO,  be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants

[Gary Richmond]

John, Jon, Edwina, Helmut, List,

JFS (1/31): "I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing
interpretants."
JFS (2/2): "Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP)."
and "Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory
to make useful predictions about anything."


I would like to suggest that merely because Peirce's writings on
interpretants -- which he worked on until near the end of his life and
which many scholars see as an* integral* aspect of his semeiotic -- have
not been fully developed is no reason to think that may not be in the
future; and no reason for those who remain interested in the possibility of
their development to cease their inquiry.

"[W]e see arguments that Peirce’s later typology is crucial to a full
understanding and application of semiotics (see Quieroz 2012), or claims
that it whilst underdeveloped, it holds promise and deserves serious effort
and attention (see Houser 1992 and Jappy 2017).  [I would especially
recommend: Houser, N., 1992. “On Peirce’s theory of Propositions: A
response to Hilpinen” GR]. *Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society*.
28:3, 489–504.]

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/#DivIntot


And Edwina's post -- which I just read -- points to the potential value of
all three semeiotic elements "for analysis of both biological and societal
systems." I agree.

My recommendation: Let scholars pursue the inquiries which interest them
and which they see potential value in pursuing. To suggest otherwise is to
"block the way of inquiry."

Best,

Gary Richmond




On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:30 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List,
>
> Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the
> branches of cognitive science.  But he never found  any informative or
> useful applications of his writings on interpretants.  He was struggling
> with the ideas up to the end.
>
> Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on
> interpretants because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful
> system.  He couldn't convince anybody, not even himself.  See the end of
> this note for the citation and quotations from the Stanford article.
> Conclusion:  Neither Peirce nor anybody  else ever developed the theory to
> make useful predictions about anything.
>
> In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong
> -- just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do
> or say anything useful.
>
> Recommendation:  Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP),
> and focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront  of the latest
> developments in cognitive science.
>
> John
>
>
> --
> *From*: "Edwina Taborsky" 
>
> John, list
>
> Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis,
> I think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three
> Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is
>  Individual External, and the last one is Collective External.  And- each
> of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal categories.
>
> That’s how I see it.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even
> Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants.
> Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what
> Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories
> are what Peirce himself had intended.
>
> On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford
> Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022:
>  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/
>
> Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study
> this topic.  See below for some quotations from the end of the article that
> show how incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen
> to be.
>
> I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants.  But
> since Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that
> their interpretation is what Peirce had intended.
>
> John
> ___
>
> As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in
> terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one
> piece of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At
> various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the
> division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as
> emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as
> inte

[PEIRCE-L] New OUP Prize for Teaching with Technology Announced

[Gary Richmond]

[image: image.png]
New OUP Prize for Teaching with Technology AnnouncedMonday, January 29, 2024


The American Philosophical Association and Oxford University Press are
pleased to announce the establishment of a new prize recognizing
outstanding use of technology in the teaching of philosophy and
philosophical pedagogy by philosophers at a junior career stage. The Oxford
University Press Teaching with Technology Prize
<https://www.apaonline.org/page/oup_prize> is funded through the generosity
of Oxford University Press.

One prize of $2,000 and potentially one honorable mention prize of $500
will be awarded annually. Nominations must include (a) a brief statement of
no more than 500 words summarizing how the nominee(s) use technology in
their teaching, (b) the curriculum vitae of the nominee(s), and (c) up to 5
supplementary materials illustrating the use of technology, such as
screenshots and links to online videos.

We now invite submissions for the inaugural Oxford University Press
Teaching with Technology Prize. The submission deadline is February 25,
2024.

For more information about the prize, and to submit a nomination,
visit the Oxford
University Press Teaching with Technology Prize page
<https://www.apaonline.org/page/oup_prize>.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at 
https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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[PEIRCE-L] The highest good does not exist, but is real

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I came upon these quotations today from *Einstein and the Poet: In Search
of the Cosmic Man*:

"I like to experience the Universe as one harmonious whole. Every cell has
life. Matter, too, has life; it is energy solidified..."
"The basic laws of the Universe are simple, but because our senses are
limited, we can’t grasp them. There is a pattern in creation."
"If we look at this tree outside whose roots search beneath the pavement
for water, or a flower which sends its sweet smell to the pollinating bees,
or even our own selves and the inner forces that drive us to act, we can
see that we all dance to a mysterious tune, and the piper who plays this
melody from an inscrutable distance—whatever name we give him—Creative
Force, or God—escapes all book knowledge.."
"[A cosmic religion] has no dogma other than teaching man that the Universe
is rational and that his highest destiny is to ponder it and co-create with
its laws.."
"The soul given to each of us is moved by the same living spirit that moves
the Universe."
~Albert Einstein
Source of Quotes: Einstein and the Poet: In Search of the Cosmic Man
(1983). From a series of meetings William Hermanns had with Einstein in
1930, 1943, 1948, and 1954.
See: How Einstein Saw the World
https://creativesystemsthinking.wordpress.com/.../how.../
<https://creativesystemsthinking.wordpress.com/2014/02/16/how-einstein-saw-the-world/?fbclid=IwAR0ZuavlHYcE39uemJNDosvdfbC0_P0AI7q6usO41jdX7TwpFulTHrJs7m4>


This immediately reminded me of something Gary Fuhrman posted to his blog a
day or so before. There he juxtaposed a famous passage from the *Tao Te
Ching* with a thought of Peirce to the effect that God does not 'exist'
but, like the Tao, is 'real'. Water surely exists, but does its *flow*
exist? There's no question that the water's flow is *real* enough.

Slightly shortened and edited excerpts from Fuhrman's blog post:


The highest good is like water.
Water gives life to the ten thousand things and does not strive.
It flows in places people reject and so is like the Tao.— Tao Te Ching 8
(Feng/English)
A comment on this text by Wang Pi: "The Tao does not exist, but water does.
Hence, it only approaches the Tao."
[Fuhrman] Does the flow of water exist? Does energy flow exist? We can say
it does when we see work being done, some purpose being served. But what
determines which product or service exists or occurs as a result of the
process? The Way it works.
Charles S. Peirce would agree with Wang Pi that the highest good (or God)
does not exist, but is real, because it ‘determines the suchness of that
which may come into existence, when it does come into existence’.

Fuhrman adds: "Who or what is that good for?"

Here are a few additional short quotations from *How Einstein Saw the
World:*

"Religion and science go together. As I’ve said before, science without
religion is lame and religion without science is blind. They are
interdependent and have a common goal—the search for truth."
"Through my pursuit in science I have known cosmic religious feelings."
"The world needs new moral impulses which, I’m afraid, won’t come from the
churches, heavily compromised as they have been throughout the centuries."
Albert Einstein


Best,

Gary Richmond
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Gary Richmond]

Sign itself, which determines the Destinate
> Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines
> the Explicit Interpretant ..." Again, this is a *logical *ordering of the
> corresponding trichotomies for sign classification, not a *temporal *sequence
> within the actual process of semiosis.
>
> GR: I also don't see -- or, perhaps, don't yet understand -- why you write
> that the three interpretants "are not a trichotomy for sign
> classification." Why not?
>
>
> The point here is that a sign is never classified according to *whether *its
> interpretant is immediate, dynamical, or final. On the contrary, *every *sign
> can have *all three* interpretants. Instead, each of the two objects and
> three interpretants corresponds to a *different *trichotomy for sign
> classification, and there are additional trichotomies for the dyadic
> relations of the sign to its external objects and interpretants (dynamical
> and final), as well as the triadic relation of the sign to its genuine
> object (dynamical) and interpretant (final).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 12:23 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>> Thank you for presenting the alignment of the Peirce's three different
>> terminological expressions of the three interpretants so succinctly, which
>> is also to say that I agree with you -- as opposed to that anonymous
>> reviewer -- that the "[explicit/ effective/ destinate interpretants] ought
>> be aligned with the others" since, as you wrote: "The terms themselves
>> clearly imply this."
>>
>> You also write that aligning them thusly "is also consistent with the
>> principle that the genuine correlate (destinate/final) determines the
>> degenerate correlate (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly
>> degenerate correlate (explicit/immediate). . .'' So expressed, this seems
>> to follow the i*nvolutional* vector commencing at 3ns, moving through
>> 2ns, to 1ns. I note that you use the term 'determine' to express these
>> relations while in thePeirce quotation above Peirce writes "involving."
>>
>> I also don't see -- or, perhaps, don't yet understand -- why you write
>> that the three interpretants "are not a trichotomy for sign
>> classification." Why not? It seems to me that immediate/dynamical/final are
>> aligned with 1ns/2ns/3ns. Granted the three interpretants "constitute a
>> trichotomy in the specific sense defined by Peirce," but the "genuine
>> thirdness" of the final interpretant followed by the two genera of
>> degeneracy seem to me marked categorially: dynamic/"reactional" (2ns) and
>> immediate/"qualitative"1ns) as are all the other elements in Peirce's
>> classification as I read it. So why exclude the three interpretants from
>> Peirce's classification of signs as they seem to be a categorial
>> subdivision of an essential sign element, viz., the interpretant?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 8:49 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> List:
>>>
>>> For the record (again), although the three interpretants are not a
>>> trichotomy for sign classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the
>>> specific sense defined by Peirce as follows.
>>>
>>> CSP: Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is
>>> Thirdness, or Representation, the self-development of that essential idea
>>> ... results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three subclasses, or
>>> genera, involving respectively a relatively genuine thirdness, a relatively
>>> reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a
>>> relatively qualitative thirdness or thirdness of the last degeneracy. (CP
>>> 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903)
>>>
>>>
>>> Final interpretants as effects that signs *ideally would* produce are
>>> relatively genuine, dynamical interpretants as effects that signs *actually
>>> do* produce are relatively reactional (degenerate), and immediate
>>> interpretants as effects that signs *possibly could* produce are
>>> relatively qualitative (doubly degenerate).
>>>
>>> I initially addressed the explicit/effective/destinate interpretants at
>>> greater length in my *Semiotica *paper, but an anonymous reviewer
>>> adamantly rejected my argument for aligning them with
>>> immediate/dynamical/final. The terms themselves clearly imply this, and it
>>> is also consistent 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Gary Richmond]

Jon,

Thank you for presenting the alignment of the Peirce's three different
terminological expressions of the three interpretants so succinctly, which
is also to say that I agree with you -- as opposed to that anonymous
reviewer -- that the "[explicit/ effective/ destinate interpretants] ought
be aligned with the others" since, as you wrote: "The terms themselves
clearly imply this."

You also write that aligning them thusly "is also consistent with the
principle that the genuine correlate (destinate/final) determines the
degenerate correlate (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly
degenerate correlate (explicit/immediate). . .'' So expressed, this seems
to follow the i*nvolutional* vector commencing at 3ns, moving through 2ns,
to 1ns. I note that you use the term 'determine' to express these relations
while in thePeirce quotation above Peirce writes "involving."

I also don't see -- or, perhaps, don't yet understand -- why you write that
the three interpretants "are not a trichotomy for sign classification." Why
not? It seems to me that immediate/dynamical/final are aligned with
1ns/2ns/3ns. Granted the three interpretants "constitute a trichotomy in
the specific sense defined by Peirce," but the "genuine thirdness" of the
final interpretant followed by the two genera of degeneracy seem to me
marked categorially: dynamic/"reactional" (2ns) and
immediate/"qualitative"1ns) as are all the other elements in Peirce's
classification as I read it. So why exclude the three interpretants from
Peirce's classification of signs as they seem to be a categorial
subdivision of an essential sign element, viz., the interpretant?

Best,

Gary R

On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 8:49 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> For the record (again), although the three interpretants are not a
> trichotomy for sign classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the
> specific sense defined by Peirce as follows.
>
> CSP: Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is
> Thirdness, or Representation, the self-development of that essential idea
> ... results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three subclasses, or genera,
> involving respectively a relatively genuine thirdness, a relatively
> reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a
> relatively qualitative thirdness or thirdness of the last degeneracy. (CP
> 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903)
>
>
> Final interpretants as effects that signs *ideally would* produce are
> relatively genuine, dynamical interpretants as effects that signs *actually
> do* produce are relatively reactional (degenerate), and immediate
> interpretants as effects that signs *possibly could* produce are
> relatively qualitative (doubly degenerate).
>
> I initially addressed the explicit/effective/destinate interpretants at
> greater length in my *Semiotica *paper, but an anonymous reviewer
> adamantly rejected my argument for aligning them with
> immediate/dynamical/final. The terms themselves clearly imply this, and it
> is also consistent with the principle that the genuine correlate
> (destinate/final) determines the degenerate correlate
> (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate
> (explicit/immediate)--a logical ordering, not a temporal sequence.
> Nevertheless, I ultimately opted to leave out that entire section and only
> provide note 3 instead of continuing to debate the matter, especially since
> it was not directly relevant to my central thesis--the alignment of
> emotional/energetic/logical with immediate/dynamical/final.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [teadus.biosemiotics:9377] CFP. Traces of Extinction. (Tartu, Estonia, 5-7 June 2024)

[Gary Richmond]

List, FYI: A forum member emailed me off List that the links in this notice
from Timo Maran didn't work. I found that the 1st didn't, but that the 2nd
did who sent me the corrected link. See below.  GR

Dear Gary!



Thank you for letting me know. Here is the working link:

https://www.ecosem.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Extension_CFP_Traces-of-Extinction_2.pdf



The same information was available in the conference homepage under the
second link (it was just a shortcut).



Kind wishes,

Timo

On Fri, Dec 1, 2023 at 11:34 AM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> FYI GR
>
> Dear all!
>
> Due to many requests we have extended the deadline for the conference
> "Traces of Extinction: Species Loss, Solastalgia, and Semiotics of
> Recovery" (Tartu, Estonia, 5-7 June 2024) to 10 December 2023. We have
> already received a fine selection of proposals, from New Zealand to Canada,
> and from species ecology to social activism. If you are interested, please
> consider submitting your abstract to the conference secretary, Andrew M.
> Creighton (andrew.mark.creigh...@ut.ee).
>
>
>
> For further information please visit
>
>
> http://www.ecosem.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CFP_Traces-of-Extinction_1.pdf
>
> https://www.ecosem.ut.ee/en/valjasuremise-jaljed-konverents/
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Timo
>
> 
>
>
>
> Timo Maran
>
> Professor of Ecosemiotics and Environmental Humanities
>
> Head of Department
>
> phone: +372 7376139, +372 7375933
>
> e-mail: timo.ma...@ut.ee
>
> Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu
>
> Jakobi 2-311, Tartu 51014. Estonia
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Timo Maran
> *Sent:* Monday, October 9, 2023 8:18 PM
> *To:* teadus.biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
> *Subject:* CFP. Traces of Extinction. (Tartu, Estonia, 5-7 June 2024)
>
>
>
> Dear Friends in Biosemiotics!
>
>
>
> We would like to invite you to the conference "Traces of Extinction:
> Species Loss, Solastalgia, and Semiotics of Recovery" (University of Tartu,
> Estonia, 5-7 June 2024). The aim of the event is to discuss mass extinction
> from different perspectives: as a subjective experiential process, as a
> breakdown of semiosis, as an impoverishment of nature-cultures. In this
> context, our aim is to find ways in which creative culture and artistic
> research can raise awareness of and mitigate species extinction. The
> deadline for submissions is 1 December. More information is available on
> the CFP and conference website.
>
>
>
>
> http://www.ecosem.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CFP_Traces-of-Extinction_1.pdf
>
> https://www.ecosem.ut.ee/en/valjasuremise-jaljed-konverents/
>
>
>
> Hope to see you in Tartu in June,
>
> Timo
>
>
>
> Timo Maran
>
> Professor of Ecosemiotics and Environmental Humanities
>
> Head of Department
>
> phone: +372 7376139, +372 7375933
>
> e-mail: timo.ma...@ut.ee
>
> Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu
>
> Jakobi 2-311, Tartu 51014. Estonia
>
>
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [teadus.biosemiotics:9377] CFP. Traces of Extinction. (Tartu, Estonia, 5-7 June 2024)

[Gary Richmond]

FYI GR

Dear all!

Due to many requests we have extended the deadline for the conference
"Traces of Extinction: Species Loss, Solastalgia, and Semiotics of
Recovery" (Tartu, Estonia, 5-7 June 2024) to 10 December 2023. We have
already received a fine selection of proposals, from New Zealand to Canada,
and from species ecology to social activism. If you are interested, please
consider submitting your abstract to the conference secretary, Andrew M.
Creighton (andrew.mark.creigh...@ut.ee).



For further information please visit

http://www.ecosem.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CFP_Traces-of-Extinction_1.pdf

https://www.ecosem.ut.ee/en/valjasuremise-jaljed-konverents/



Best wishes,

Timo





Timo Maran

Professor of Ecosemiotics and Environmental Humanities

Head of Department

phone: +372 7376139, +372 7375933

e-mail: timo.ma...@ut.ee

Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu

Jakobi 2-311, Tartu 51014. Estonia





*From:* Timo Maran
*Sent:* Monday, October 9, 2023 8:18 PM
*To:* teadus.biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
*Subject:* CFP. Traces of Extinction. (Tartu, Estonia, 5-7 June 2024)



Dear Friends in Biosemiotics!



We would like to invite you to the conference "Traces of Extinction:
Species Loss, Solastalgia, and Semiotics of Recovery" (University of Tartu,
Estonia, 5-7 June 2024). The aim of the event is to discuss mass extinction
from different perspectives: as a subjective experiential process, as a
breakdown of semiosis, as an impoverishment of nature-cultures. In this
context, our aim is to find ways in which creative culture and artistic
research can raise awareness of and mitigate species extinction. The
deadline for submissions is 1 December. More information is available on
the CFP and conference website.



http://www.ecosem.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CFP_Traces-of-Extinction_1.pdf

https://www.ecosem.ut.ee/en/valjasuremise-jaljed-konverents/



Hope to see you in Tartu in June,

Timo



Timo Maran

Professor of Ecosemiotics and Environmental Humanities

Head of Department

phone: +372 7376139, +372 7375933

e-mail: timo.ma...@ut.ee

Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu

Jakobi 2-311, Tartu 51014. Estonia
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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https://cspeirce.com  and, just as well, at 
https://www.cspeirce.com .  It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
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[PEIRCE-L] Test (ignore)

[Gary Richmond]

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Peirce → Lady Welby → Ramsey → Wittgenstein

[Gary Richmond]

age. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [teadus.biosemiotics:9376] CFP. Traces of Extinction. (Tartu, Estonia, 5-7 June 2024)

[Gary Richmond]

FYI Forwarded from the Biosemiotics list. GR

Dear Friends in Biosemiotics!



We would like to invite you to the conference "Traces of Extinction:
Species Loss, Solastalgia, and Semiotics of Recovery" (University of Tartu,
Estonia, 5-7 June 2024). The aim of the event is to discuss mass extinction
from different perspectives: as a subjective experiential process, as a
breakdown of semiosis, as an impoverishment of nature-cultures. In this
context, our aim is to find ways in which creative culture and artistic
research can raise awareness of and mitigate species extinction. The
deadline for submissions is 1 December. More information is available on
the CFP and conference website.



http://www.ecosem.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/CFP_Traces-of-Extinction_1.pdf

https://www.ecosem.ut.ee/en/valjasuremise-jaljed-konverents/



Hope to see you in Tartu in June,

Timo



Timo Maran

Professor of Ecosemiotics and Environmental Humanities

Head of Department

phone: +372 7376139, +372 7375933

e-mail: timo.ma...@ut.ee

Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu

Jakobi 2-311, Tartu 51014. Estonia
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] AI’s greatest lie and greatest success

[Gary Richmond]

List,

As Joseph Ransdell wrote in inaugurating Peirce-L:

There is no standing agenda [on Peirce-L] except the promotion of
philosophical conversation of the sort which one would expect from people
with a special interest in Peirce and of other communication in support of
that. Thus discussion should be Peirce-related but not necessarily on
Peirce, and the working test for relevance would simply be a plausible
explanation of why the topic in question should be under discussion on a
list called "PEIRCE-L: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce", given that people
subscribe to such lists with some more or less definite expectations about
subject-matter in mind.

That seems to me both specific and generous.

So what does this current discussion of AI have to do with Peirce or
Peirce-related topics?

While I am personally quite interested in AI and am experimenting with it
employing such tools as ChatGPT,  it does not seem to me to  have relevance
here. No doubt there are any number of other lists-serves where discussions
of AI are pertinent.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)

On Thu, Aug 17, 2023 at 4:03 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> A recent article contains a great deal of truth, which the French
> summarize: Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose: Funding is the
> constant that drives AI and the choice of terminology.
>
> Note to Alex:  When you're defining the terminology, be sure to include
> the price tags.
>
> See below for some excerpts from a recent article.  From the founders in
> 1956 to today, it's la même chose.
>
> John
> ___
>
> If You Only Learn One Historical Fact About AI, Let It Be This One:  AI’s
> greatest lie and greatest success, by Alberto Romero:
>
> https://albertoromgar.medium.com/if-you-only-learn-one-historical-fact-about-ai-let-it-be-this-one-4373e94a5092
>  ..
>
> As a scientific field, AI (also computer science more generally, let’s
> ascribe blame where it’s due) has spent its history coining terms that have
> semantically blurred what happens inside in an attempt to close the gap
> with the cognitive sciences while going toward a divergent goal: Instead of
> understanding the human brain through explanatory theories, like
> neuroscience and psychology, AI is trying to artificially build one without
> necessarily understanding anything.
>
> Some broadly known examples of this semantic similarity are “neural
> networks” and “machine learning,” popularized a few decades back; “language
> models,” “attention mechanisms,” and “emergent behavior” have been
> established more recently. “Hallucination” won’t be the last, but it’s the
> first one that has created a backdoor that allows us to look directly into
> the makers’ facade and use it against them, as Klein has aptly done above.
>
> Because, in some sense, all these anthropomorphizing concepts are also
> open windows to hallucinating about a future that may never come.
>
> I realized the depth of this trap when I was reading the comments section
> to check out people’s (contrarian) takes on Klein’s conclusion. I didn’t go
> too far — The Guardian had pinned a comment that, in its unintended irony,
> sparked the idea to write this piece. This is the first sentence of that
> comment:
>
> “I have worked in AI and am extremely concerned at the idea that we hand
> over a high degree of autonomy and power to machines without any semblance
> of moral or democratic debate about whether we should be doing so.”
>
> It’s amazing to me how a reader who clearly agrees with Klein’s thesis
> implicitly proved the ultimate consequences of her initial point in such a
> short amount of words: “Hand over … power to machines.” Not to
> corporations. Not to tech CEOs. Not even to the designers and engineers
> immediately behind the machines — as if we were already talking about
> human-level artificial agents to which we can “hand over power.”
>
> Klein attacked current AI boosters’ hallucinations about the future, but
> it’s in the past where the biggest hallucination took place. In
> anthropomorphizing the field with those brainy terms since its conception,
> the AI community also *hallucinated* — as Klein explains with a swift
> shift of the word’s meaning — a hypothetical future that not even actively
> critical insiders can adequately decouple from the reality we’re actually
> heading to.
>
> If even those who remain skeptical despite the absurd amount of hype and
> who ostensibly despise the consequences that Klein highlights are unaware
> of how much anthropomorphism is ingrained in their conception of AI,
> there’s not much Klein can do to get her message across.
>
> And how could it be otherwise when the single most successful, “powerful
> and enticing cover stor[y],” as Klein refers to hallucina

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories for states and processes

[Gary Richmond]

nterest has not
>> been an object of interest before somebody had showed interest, has it?
>>
>> Best Regards!
>>
>> Helmut
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))

[Gary Richmond]

 after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce
>> and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics
>> when it comes to general terminology.
>>
>> best
>>
>> jack
>> --
>> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
>> *Sent:* Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM
>> *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L <
>> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; s...@bestweb.net ; robert
>> marty ; Edwina Taborsky <
>> edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The
>> Thing In Itself)
>>
>> John, Jon, list,
>>
>> We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as
>> to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant).
>>
>> Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this:
>>
>> [image: User]JC:
>> Premise 1: An object exists.
>> Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist.
>> Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object
>> 1) differently due to subjectivity.
>> Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the
>> perceiving objects.
>> Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as
>> they are copies. what is the conclusion?
>> ChatGPT
>>
>> Based on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be:
>>
>> Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving
>> objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their
>> perceptions.
>>
>> This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the
>> distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself.
>> It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or
>> experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it
>> exists independently of perception.
>> I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there
>> by itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough.
>>
>> Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in
>> itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative
>> which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the
>> structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd
>> like @Jon Alan Schmidt  to weigh in (not on
>> knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say
>> no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left
>> out for now I think).
>>
>> I just remember @robert marty  and @Edwina
>> Taborsky  (among others) telling me of such
>> things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the
>> mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it
>> from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in
>> itself's in(cognizablility).
>>
>> Best
>>
>> Jack
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Peirce-L subscriber, Atila Bayat, meant to send this post to the entire
forum, but posted it to me. He's asked me to resend it for him. See
directly below. GR

Gary, I wanted to answer an earlier thread, of yours but lost the cue.

Much or all of our public media has our intellectuals in a strangle hold .
We often discourse about our institutions using these Francophone prefixes
such  as super or extra or whatnot, instead of viewing social institutions
as matters of reform. These are matters for Deweyan pragmatists in that
forum, not sure about it in Peirce though.

Pragmatism has for many a newer meaning - (AB) institutional change,
effected by intelligent reform of social institutions. That is pragmatism,
as it’s meaningful to me. I think we lost that Deweyan definition. Bring it
back.

Atila





On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 1:04 AM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Martin, List,
>
> Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday
> and for your post to Peirce-L today.
>
> I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent
> question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a
> nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task
> for pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe.
>
> Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to *how
> we ought conduct ourselves*, not only in conferences and discussion
> forums and the like but, perhaps especially, in our quotidian lives. On
> Peirce's esthetic theory, this would represent the employment of a form of
> the* summum bonum*, this in conjunction with his ethical theory which
> includes making a decision to make *that* a habit of one's life. If we
> can do *that,* then perhaps we can hope to begin to personally model that
> kind of behavior in our scientific and philosophic work, as well as in our
> collegial, familial and work lives.
>
> The goal would seem to involve our coming to live more and more by faith,
> hope, and love, a trio of values Peirce saw as essentially logical.  See,
> for example, the chapter "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and
> vice versa)" by Ben Udell and myself in Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own
> Words <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781614516415/html>.
>
> While it doesn't seem at all clear to me *how* this can be brought about
> very generally in our philosophical and scientific communities in
> their current nominalistic/individualistic state, it is certainly something
> which we as pragmatists likely need to reflect on and attempt to work
> together toward.
>
> Jon has consistently tried to address some related issues in his papers on
> the ethics of engineering, and Gary Fuhrman in his e-book, *Turning Signs*,
> as well as in the electronic discussions he's created around it.
>
> Perhaps it would be helpful for us to reflect deeply on this question
> you posed in your post.
>
> MWK: How are we serving the needs of a world engendered by reductionism in
> politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism in social media
> platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of the law, the
> conundrums of individualism for economics, and rampant nihilism in every
> sector?
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 5:50 PM Martin W. Kettelhut 
> wrote:
>
>> Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary.
>>
>>
>>
>> What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint
>> representations of Peirce’s trichotomies, synechism, and Kaina Stoichea!
>>
>>
>> I supposed it was seeing each other, and hearing each other’s voices,
>> that spark my wanting to inquire into our participation (as pragmatist
>> philosophers) in our world currently—given what we learn from Peirce about
>> science, the long and synechistic view, and the power of signs.
>>
>>
>>
>> You all chose these topics wisely; they capture crucial aspects of what’s
>> irreducibly original in Peirce’s work. I submit that many of the questions
>> raised by participants in this conference (not unlike many of the
>> discussions here on the Peirce-list) reflect the challenge it is to
>> communicate what’s fresh, relevant, and pragmati*cistic* in Peirce. I
>> appreciate the patience, good will, and insight you three—in
>> particular—bring.
>>
>>
>>
>> In the background of the question I’m going to propose for discussion
>> here is a recognition that, although I did write a dissertation on Peirce's
>> semeiotic/metaphysics and receive a PhD from Temple U, I immediately left
>> academic life and became a "philosopher of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peircean Linguistics

[Gary Richmond]

8.
>
> 6. “Sémiotique de la rime” [“The Semiotics of Rhyme”], *Poétique*, 20
> (1974), 501-519.
>
> 7. “Deux paralogismes de la poétique” [“Two Paralogisms of Poetics”],
> *Poétique*, 28 (1976), 423-439.
>
> 8. “Toward a Global Theory of Style (A Peircean Exposé),” *Ars Semeiotica*,
> 3 (1980), 141-147.
>
> 9. “Russian Conjugation: Theory and Hermeneutic,” *Language*, 56 (1980),
> 67-93.
>
> 10. “Poetry and Language, 'Considered As Semeiotic',” *Transactions of
> the Charles S. Peirce*
>
>*Society*, 16 (1980), 97-117.
>
> 11. “Signs, Marks, and Diacritics,” *International Journal of Slavic
> Linguistics and Poetics*, 31/32 (1985), 375-384.
>
> 12. “Teleology, Semeiosis, and Linguistic Change,” *Diachronica*, 2
> (1985), 1-34.
>
> 13. “The Russian System of Stress,” *Russian Linguistics*, 10 (1986),
> 183-204.
>
> 14. “Style as Figuration,” *Stanford Literature Review*, 3 (1986),
> 195-211.
>
> 16. “Sapir's Concept of Drift in Semiotic Perspective,” *Semiotica*, 67
> (1987), 159-171.
>
> 17. “Dynamic Interpretants and Grammar,”* Transactions of the Charles S.
> Peirce Society*, 24 (1988), 123-130.
>
> 18. “Presidential Address: The Boundary Question,” *The American Journal
> of Semiotics*, 10 (1993), 5-26.
>
> 19. “A Case of Distant Assimilation: /str/ ® /∫tr/,”*American Speech*, 70
> (1995), 101- 107.
>
> 20. “Structural Analogies and the Sign Function in Dostoevsky,” *Elementa*,
> 2 (1995), 131-146.
>
> 21. “Broad and Flat *A* in Marked Words,” *American Speech* , 72 (1997),
> 437-439.
>
> 22. “The Change of Government of *commit* ‘pledge/bind oneself’,”*American
> Speech*,
>
>   74 (1999),  333-336.
>
> 23. “The Clitic -*uva *(< *of a*),” *American Speech*, 76 (2001), 219-221.
>
> 24. “The Reduplicative Copula *is is* [co-author, Michael C. Haley],” 
> *American
> Speech*, 77 (2002), 305-312.
>
> 25. “Is an Icon Iconic?,” *Language*, 84 (2008), 815-819.
>
> 26. “Roman Jakobson in Retrospect: Unvarnished Remembrances of a
> Stiff-NeckedStudent,” *Chinese Semiotic Studies*, 14 (2018), 41-56.
>
> 27. “Language as Semiosis: A Neo-Structuralist Perspective in the Light of
> Pragmaticism,” *Chinese Semiotic Studies*, 18 (2022), 131-146.
>
>
>
> *d. non-refereed journal articles*
>
> 1. “Observations on the Russian Case System,” *Linguistics*, 69 (1971),
> 81-86.
>
> 2. “Markedness and Russian Stress,” *Linguistics*, 72 (1971), 61-77.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

[Gary Richmond]

 to learn language. Here is the paper on it
> that states this best. https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007180
>
> From a Peircean perspective, it is important to realize that this works by
> inference over signs.
>
> Dan
>
>
> On Apr 19, 2023, at 12:58 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
> Dan, list,
>
> ok, so it is like I wrote "or it is so, that ChatGPT is somehow referred
> to universal logic as well, builds its linguistic competence up from there,
> and so can skip the human grammar-module". But that neither is witchcraft,
> nor does it say, that there is no human-genetic grammar-module. And I too
> hope with the Linguist, that we dont have to fear ChatGPT more than we have
> to fear a refrigerator.
>
> Best
> Helmut
>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is anyone familiar with this book by Tursman?

[Gary Richmond]

onship between logic and science
> through semiotic?
> Best,
> Harris Bolus
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>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Gary Richmond]

able than the development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose
> admirableness is not due to an ulterior reason is Reason itself
> comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. Under
> this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little
> function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering
> the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to us" to do
> so. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903)
>
>
> I recently came across the following in an unpublished manuscript where
> Peirce aligns elliptical philosophy (no starting/stopping point) with
> epicureanism, parabolic philosophy (same starting/stopping point) with
> pessimism, and his own hyperbolic philosophy (different starting/stopping
> points) with meliorism.
>
> CSP: [Meliorists] think that throughout the universe as a whole, the good
> has a decided tendency to prevail. If you ask what they mean by the good,
> they will tell you they mean the *ultimate end* of the universe.
> Accordingly, when they say the good tends to prevail, they mean there is a
> general tendency throughout the universe toward some describable condition
> of things. These thinkers consequently prescribe for us what they consider
> as an infallible recipe for being happy, if one only has the strength of
> mind to take the medicine, namely, to bring your desires into conformity
> with the general course of nature. ... Since the maxim of happiness is to
> recognize and accept the truth, they declare that contempt for the *ego *and
> love for the community of soul is the truest and happiest sentiment. (R
> 953, no date)
>
>
> This might be the closest that Peirce ever comes to endorsing a version of
> natural law theory, especially in conjunction with my suggestion that the
> complete revelation of God is the overall final interpretant of the entire
> universe as a sign, i.e., the "describable condition of things" toward
> which "there is a general tendency throughout the universe." Accordingly,
> "to bring your desires into conformity with the general course of nature"
> would then amount to bringing your desires into conformity with the
> revealed character of God Himself, along with your actions and beliefs.
>
> Regarding leadership, I think that it makes a lot of sense to frame it as
> *drawing* followers toward a designated goal as a *final* cause (3ns),
> instead of the all-too-common approach of *pushing* them toward it as an
> *efficient* cause (2ns). This allows appropriate flexibility in the *means
> *that they can employ to reach the specified end, as opposed to dictating
> every step along the way.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 10:14 AM Martin W. Kettelhut 
> wrote:
>
>> I appreciate your response, Gary.
>>
>> Yes, serving our world as pragmatists is fundamentally about leading our
>> lives as expressions of the *summum bonum*, and the passages from
>> Peirce’s papers rooting the logic of probability in the "social impulse”
>> are at the core of the book I’m writing on leadership as triadically
>> relational (vs leadership as traditionally conceived, namely as
>> characteristics of an individual):
>>
>> Leader (qua essential way of being) - Follower(s)/Led (qua actual object)
>> - Future (qua indeterminate interpretant).
>>
>> I’m a big fan of your and Ben’s chapter in "Peirce in His Own Words" on
>> this topic. It’s an inspiration for my book, in fact.
>>
>> I’d be honored if given the opportunity at some point to offer a
>> presentation on the book I’m writing, working title:  "Listening for
>> Leadership:  Three Essential Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]."
>>
>> Yours sincerely,
>>
>> Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
>> ListeningIsTheKey.com
>> 303 747 4449
>>
>> On 19 Apr 2023, at 11:04 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>> Martin, List,
>>
>> Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday
>> and for your post to Peirce-L today.
>>
>> I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent
>> question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a
>> nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task
>> for pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe.
>>
>> Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to *how
>> we ought conduct ourselves*, not only in confere

[PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

eds of a world engendered
> by reductionism in politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism
> in social media platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of
> the law, the conundrums of individualism for economics, and rampant
> nihilism in every sector?
>
>
>
> Thank you for considering,
>
>
> Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
> ListeningIsTheKey.com
> 303 747 4449
>
> [image: PastedGraphic-1.tiff]
>
> On 19 Apr 2023, at 12:50 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> List,
>
> I agree with both Jon and Gary Fuhrman as to the nature and purpose of
> Peirce-L. Because of its relevance, over the years I have had occasion to
> post the same quotation by Joe Ransdell that Jon did today. Especially for
> those new to this Peirce forum -- and, perhaps, for everyone here -- it
> might be helpful to review not only that quotation, but all that Ransdell,
> the creator and first moderator of Peirce-L, had to say about Peirce-L
> (btw, it's not a long read). See:
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM
>
> I would also reiterate this point of Gary Fuhrman's as getting to the
> heart of the matter of the anticipated 'audience' of this forum versus
> other venues, that, as he says, there are publications "aimed at venues
> and audiences other than the community of students and scholars with a
> special interest in Peirce, which I think describes the membership of
> peirce-l. If we want the wider world to benefit from Peircean analysis of
> contemporary issues, then we need to work in venues that are devoted to
> those issues."
>
> Finally, and while I've stressed this in the past, it is easy to forget
> that it is helpful, really important, to change the Subject line when one
> introduces a new topic. For, as Jon wrote by way of the example at hand, ".
> . .  none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with
> Helmut fall within the subject matter of *this *thread, which is
> specifically intended for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis
> Initiative" session that the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last
> Saturday.
>
> Thanks, Dan, for your collegial and gracious response to Jon's gentle
> admonition, your commenting that in the future you'd "begin new threads
> rather than to invade others’ existing threads."
>
> For everyone, I do believe that that is usually the very best way to
> proceed, that is, to introduce an entirely new thread.
>
> Occasionally, however, it makes sense to modify the Subject of an existing
> thread, for example, when in commenting on some facet of the intellectual
> content of a given thread one is brought to a quite different train of
> thought, say one springboarding from or necessarily deviating from the
> Subject of that thread.
>
> In that case, before posting I would recommend that you modify the
> existing subject in this manner: *Precede the Subject of the thread you
> are changing with the Subject of the new thread*
>
> For example, here's how that might look were one to change the current
> thread Subject, which I have:
> *Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, **The Basis of
> Synechism in Phaneroscopy*.
>
> (Some would include the entire address so as to read:
> Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, Re: [PEIRCE-L] The
> Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy. Either is acceptable.)
>
> Gary Richmond (writing as moderator of peirce-l)
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 12:43 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> I agree with Gary F. and will add that anyone is welcome to start a new
>> Peirce-L thread on any topic, as long as it is legitimately related to
>> Peirce's thought. Here is how the late Joe Ransdell put it.
>>
>> Since PEIRCE-L is best thought of as a public forum, which is primarily a
>> place rather than a discussion group, people contribute or not as they
>> think best, and come and go freely, as is taken for granted in public
>> forums wherever they occur. There is no standing agenda except the
>> promotion of philosophical conversation of the sort which one would expect
>> from people with a special interest in Peirce and of other communication in
>> support of that. Thus discussion should be Peirce-related but not
>> necessarily on Peirce, and the working test for relevance would simply be a
>> plausible explanation of why the topic in question should be under
>> discussion on a list called "PEIRCE-L: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce",
>> given that people subscribe to such lists with some more or less definite
>> expectations about subject-matter in mind. 

[PEIRCE-L] Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I agree with both Jon and Gary Fuhrman as to the nature and purpose of
Peirce-L. Because of its relevance, over the years I have had occasion to
post the same quotation by Joe Ransdell that Jon did today. Especially for
those new to this Peirce forum -- and, perhaps, for everyone here -- it
might be helpful to review not only that quotation, but all that Ransdell,
the creator and first moderator of Peirce-L, had to say about Peirce-L
(btw, it's not a long read). See:
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM

I would also reiterate this point of Gary Fuhrman's as getting to the heart
of the matter of the anticipated 'audience' of this forum versus other
venues, that, as he says, there are publications "aimed at venues and
audiences other than the community of students and scholars with a special
interest in Peirce, which I think describes the membership of peirce-l. If
we want the wider world to benefit from Peircean analysis of contemporary
issues, then we need to work in venues that are devoted to those issues."

Finally, and while I've stressed this in the past, it is easy to forget
that it is helpful, really important, to change the Subject line when one
introduces a new topic. For, as Jon wrote by way of the example at hand, ".
. .  none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with Helmut
fall within the subject matter of *this *thread, which is specifically
intended for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis Initiative"
session that the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last Saturday.

Thanks, Dan, for your collegial and gracious response to Jon's gentle
admonition, your commenting that in the future you'd "begin new threads
rather than to invade others’ existing threads."

For everyone, I do believe that that is usually the very best way to
proceed, that is, to introduce an entirely new thread.

Occasionally, however, it makes sense to modify the Subject of an existing
thread, for example, when in commenting on some facet of the intellectual
content of a given thread one is brought to a quite different train of
thought, say one springboarding from or necessarily deviating from the
Subject of that thread.

In that case, before posting I would recommend that you modify the existing
subject in this manner: *Precede the Subject of the thread you are changing
with the Subject of the new thread*

For example, here's how that might look were one to change the current
thread Subject, which I have:
*Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, **The Basis of
Synechism in Phaneroscopy*.

(Some would include the entire address so as to read:
Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, Re: [PEIRCE-L] The
Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy. Either is acceptable.)

Gary Richmond (writing as moderator of peirce-l)








On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 12:43 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> I agree with Gary F. and will add that anyone is welcome to start a new
> Peirce-L thread on any topic, as long as it is legitimately related to
> Peirce's thought. Here is how the late Joe Ransdell put it.
>
> Since PEIRCE-L is best thought of as a public forum, which is primarily a
> place rather than a discussion group, people contribute or not as they
> think best, and come and go freely, as is taken for granted in public
> forums wherever they occur. There is no standing agenda except the
> promotion of philosophical conversation of the sort which one would expect
> from people with a special interest in Peirce and of other communication in
> support of that. Thus discussion should be Peirce-related but not
> necessarily on Peirce, and the working test for relevance would simply be a
> plausible explanation of why the topic in question should be under
> discussion on a list called "PEIRCE-L: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce",
> given that people subscribe to such lists with some more or less definite
> expectations about subject-matter in mind. (
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/Peirce-L/Peirce-L.htm#relevance)
>
>
> However, none of Dan's suggested topics nor his subsequent exchange with
> Helmut fall within the subject matter of *this *thread, which is
> specifically intended for further discussion about the "10-Minute Thesis
> Initiative" session that the Charles S. Peirce Society conducted last
> Saturday.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 11:35 AM  wrote:
>
>> Dan, it’s true that “there are many contemporary issues that are crying
>> out for Peircean analysis.” I’ll mention below a few publications and
>> public venues that carry out this analysis in one way or another. But those
>> are aimed at 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

e constantly *becoming
> more determinate*, as the real possibilities and conditional necessities
> of the future are converted at the present into the actualities of the past.
>
> CSP: We look back toward a point in the infinitely distant past when there
> was no law but mere indeterminacy; we look forward to a point in the
> infinitely distant future when there will be no indeterminacy or chance but
> a complete reign of law. But at any assignable date in the past, however
> early, there was already some tendency toward uniformity; and at any
> assignable date in the future there will be some slight aberrancy from law.
> (CP 1.409, 1887-8)
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 11:23 AM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F,
>>
>> I too won't say much about the matter of primal 3ns, that is
>> ur-continuity, being at the origins of the cosmos (or not) except to
>> briefly comment on a snippet of a Peirce quote you gave from Kaina Stoicheia
>>
>> CSP:  [At the beginning there was "[u]tter indetermination. But a symbol
>> alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the
>> absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of
>> things can alone be understood. EP2:322]
>>
>>
>> GF: "It is not obvious how this can be reconciled with a cosmology
>> arising from an ur-continuity or a primal Thirdness."
>>
>>
>> GR: For now I'll say that I don't see a contradiction here. Peirce says
>> in KS that the indeterminate nothing -- not a 'nothing' of subtraction or
>> negation as he puts it in other writings, or, as he puts it here, not '
>> *determinately* nothing',  -- but rather a 'symbol', for "a symbol alone
>> is indeterminate."
>>
>>
>> Now a symbol is a 3ns, in this case admittedly and necessarily a most
>> unique one (as it occurs before there is even Time, which will become the
>> continuity *par excellence* once there is a cosmos). It is, one might
>> say, an ur-symbol; and, so, ur-3ns, ur-continuity.
>>
>>
>> Well, again, I'll be most interested in what you, Jon, and others think
>> before I comment further.
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> On Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 10:50 AM  wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, i have a question about your slides 20 and 23.
>>>
>>> On #20, under the heading of Objective Idealism, your proposal is that
>>>
>>> “Continuous/triadic semiosis is real and primordial (3ns).”
>>>
>>> On #23, under “Defining Continuity,” you cite the “Categorial Vector: 3ns
>>> →1ns→2ns,” (the vector of *representation* in Gary R's terminology),
>>> and i think it was at this point that you mentioned the idea of an “
>>> ur-continuity” which was there at the beginning in Peirce's cosmology
>>> (referring, i think, to his 1898 Cambridge Lectures).
>>>
>>> I wonder whether (or how) all this can be reconciled with the cosmology
>>> Peirce develops in “Kaina Stoicheia”, which i barely mentioned in my CSPS
>>> presentation on Saturday, but which seems to me highly relevant to 
>>> *Objective
>>> Idealism*. KS was written a few years *after* the Cambridge lectures,
>>> and Peirce does not explicitly mention either continuity or 3ns anywhere in
>>> KS; instead, his cosmology begins with *indeterminacy*. On EP2:322 he
>>> says:
>>>
>>> [[CSP:] If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there
>>> was in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no
>>> reaction and no quality, no matter, no consciousness, no space and no time,
>>> but just nothing at all. Not determinately nothing. For that which is
>>> determinately not *A* supposes the being of *A* in some mode. Utter
>>> indetermination. But a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing,
>>> the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way
>>> in which the beginning of things can alone be understood. What logically
>>> follows?]
>>>
>>> The whole paragraph starting here in the edition of Kaina Stoicheia
>>> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#4y> on my website gives
>>> Peirce's account of what logically follows. What he arrives at is this:
>>> “That is logical which it is necessary to admit in order to render the
>>> universe intellig

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F,

I too won't say much about the matter of primal 3ns, that is ur-continuity,
being at the origins of the cosmos (or not) except to briefly comment on a
snippet of a Peirce quote you gave from Kaina Stoicheia

CSP:  [At the beginning there was "[u]tter indetermination. But a symbol
alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the
absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning of
things can alone be understood. EP2:322]


GF: "It is not obvious how this can be reconciled with a cosmology arising
from an ur-continuity or a primal Thirdness."


GR: For now I'll say that I don't see a contradiction here. Peirce says in
KS that the indeterminate nothing -- not a 'nothing' of subtraction or
negation as he puts it in other writings, or, as he puts it here, not '
*determinately* nothing',  -- but rather a 'symbol', for "a symbol alone is
indeterminate."


Now a symbol is a 3ns, in this case admittedly and necessarily a most
unique one (as it occurs before there is even Time, which will become the
continuity *par excellence* once there is a cosmos). It is, one might say,
an ur-symbol; and, so, ur-3ns, ur-continuity.


Well, again, I'll be most interested in what you, Jon, and others think
before I comment further.


Best,


Gary R






On Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 10:50 AM  wrote:

> Jon, i have a question about your slides 20 and 23.
>
> On #20, under the heading of Objective Idealism, your proposal is that
>
> “Continuous/triadic semiosis is real and primordial (3ns).”
>
> On #23, under “Defining Continuity,” you cite the “Categorial Vector: 3ns→
> 1ns→2ns,” (the vector of *representation* in Gary R's terminology), and i
> think it was at this point that you mentioned the idea of an “
> ur-continuity” which was there at the beginning in Peirce's cosmology
> (referring, i think, to his 1898 Cambridge Lectures).
>
> I wonder whether (or how) all this can be reconciled with the cosmology
> Peirce develops in “Kaina Stoicheia”, which i barely mentioned in my CSPS
> presentation on Saturday, but which seems to me highly relevant to *Objective
> Idealism*. KS was written a few years *after* the Cambridge lectures, and
> Peirce does not explicitly mention either continuity or 3ns anywhere in KS;
> instead, his cosmology begins with *indeterminacy*. On EP2:322 he says:
>
> [[CSP:] If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was
> in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no reaction
> and no quality, no matter, no consciousness, no space and no time, but just
> nothing at all. Not determinately nothing. For that which is determinately
> not *A* supposes the being of *A* in some mode. Utter indetermination.
> But a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate
> of the absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the
> beginning of things can alone be understood. What logically follows?]
>
> The whole paragraph starting here in the edition of Kaina Stoicheia
> <https://gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#4y> on my website gives
> Peirce's account of what logically follows. What he arrives at is this:
> “That is logical which it is necessary to admit in order to render the
> universe intelligible. And the first of all logical principles is that the
> indeterminate should determine itself as best it may” (EP2:324).
>
> It is not obvious how this can be reconciled with a cosmology arising from
> an ur-continuity or a primal Thirdness. We could dismiss Kaina Stoicheia as
> anomalous among Peirce's works, or as something he changed his mind about
> later, but my preference (and i think yours, Jon) is to look for some
> continuity between KS and Peirce's other works that offer a semiotically
> realistic cosmology. I have a few ideas about this but would like to hear
> what others think before i post mine.
>
> Love, gary
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> } Everything is actually everything else, recycled. [anon] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this mess

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

Mary,

Thank you for your response to our 10 minute thesis presentations today
and, perhaps, especially your comment that "the connections among them were
and are rich and intriguing," which was most gratifying to read. Jon is
mostly to thank for making those connections, and I personally appreciate
his including examples of my trikonic vectors in his presentation, as well
as his mentioning my notion of ur-continuity in connection with a theory of
the origin of the cosmos, one which does *not* begin with an inexplicable,
but apparently at least quasi-*material *'Big Bang'. This alternative
theory is, of course, Peirce's, that theory subtly, richly and, in my
opinion, convincingly developed by Jon over the past few years in List
posts and published papers.

I should add that, in good time, both Gary Furhman and I will also be
posting our Powerpoint slideshows to Peirce-L. For now, however, we don't
want to overwhelm the List with too much material too soon. Still, we are
indeed eager to begin discussions of our presentation topics,
beginning with Jon's. With that in mind, I'll copy here his impossibly
succinct summary of what he covered in his presentation today, this as a
springboard to further discussion.

Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Peirce’s mature topical conception of continuity mathematically defines it
in accordance with Gary Richmond’s categorial vector of representation,
from 3ns through 1ns to 2ns. Such continuity is discovered in phaneroscopy
by observing and attending to the flow of time, the nature of the phaneron
itself, and experience as its compulsive aspect, especially perception.
Applying such continuity in semeiotic and metaphysics facilitates gaining a
better understanding of semiosis and objective idealism, leading to the
plausible hypothesis of the reality of God.


I would hope that it goes without saying that one does not have to have
attended today's 10 minute thesis to jump into the conversation.

Best,

Gary Richmond

On Sat, Apr 15, 2023 at 10:09 PM Mary Libertin 
wrote:

> Thanks for the presentations today.  They were well-coordinated; the
> connections among them were and are rich and intriguing. I look forward to
> further discussion. Thanks for providing slides, Jon.
>
> Mary Libertin
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Apr 15, 2023, at 8:44 PM, Daniel L Everett 
> wrote:
>
> 
> Yes, thanks very much. Very helpful.
>
> Dan Everett
>
> On Apr 15, 2023, at 19:56, Margaretha Hendrickx 
> wrote:
>
> 
> Thanks for your presentation.  It was very helpful (for me).
>
> On Sat, Apr 15, 2023 at 5:35 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> Gary R., Gary F., and I are grateful to those of you who attended today's
>> "10-Minute Thesis Initiative" session offered by the Charles S. Peirce
>> Society. It was nice to see a few familiar names from this group in the
>> participant list, and we are hoping that others will join us here going
>> forward. With that in mind, I have now posted a PDF of the slides from my
>> presentation online (https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHTBO-55.pdf) and
>> would like to invite further discussion. The following is a brief summary
>> of what I covered.
>>
>> Peirce’s mature topical conception of continuity mathematically defines
>> it in accordance with Gary Richmond’s categorial vector of representation,
>> from 3ns through 1ns to 2ns. Such continuity is discovered in phaneroscopy
>> by observing and attending to the flow of time, the nature of the phaneron
>> itself, and experience as its compulsive aspect, especially perception.
>> Applying such continuity in semeiotic and metaphysics facilitates gaining a
>> better understanding of semiosis and objective idealism, leading to the
>> plausible hypothesis of the reality of God.
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
>> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
>> message and nothing in the body.  More at
>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;
>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>>
>
>
> --
> If you feed them stones instead of bread, the young people will revolt,
> even if in so doing they mistake a baker for a stone-thrower.
> (Karl Poppe

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce Society Newsletter 6:2

[Gary Richmond]

FYI GR


Peirce Society Newsletter 6:2
Peirce Society Newsletter 6:2
View this email in your browser
<https://mailchi.mp/d4b2f7d32393/peirce-society-newsletter-62?e=860edf35dc>
[image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]

*The Charles S. Peirce Society Newsletter, 6:2*
*November 2022*


Dear  Gary Richmond,

For the past six years, we have been compiling a list of new books and
articles published on Charles S. Peirce for this newsletter.  We are
continually impressed by the quality of the research and the liveliness of
the Peirce community.  Across the world, from China to the United States,
from Brazil to Italy, from Nigeria to Colombia, scholars are doing
exceptionally good work explaining, developing, and applying Peirce’s ideas
to a wide variety of disciplines.  We’re grateful for your support and glad
to be a part of such a wonderful and expansive community of inquirers.

Yours truly,

The Charles S. Peirce Society Executive Committee

*Spotlight on the 10-Minute Thesis Initiative*

This year, the Charles S. Peirce Society launched a new initiative to
provide a forum for the exchange and development of new ideas and to help
connect scholars throughout the world.  Conceived by Catherine Legg, the
10-Minute Thesis is an hour-and-a-half long session held online.  Three
Peirce scholars present their new research for ten minutes each, each
presentation immediately followed by twenty minutes of question and
answer.  The first session, held in February, featured presentations by
Elizabeth Cooke, Andrew Howat, and Catherine Legg.  The second session,
held in October, featured presentations by James Wible, Claudia Cristalli,
and Jeff Kasser.  Our sincere thanks to Catherine Legg and Jeff Kasser for
organizing these sessions, to the presenters, and to all those who
attended!  If you are interested in organizing the next 10-minute thesis
initiative, please let us know by emailing peircesoci...@gmail.com!

*The 2022–23 Peirce Essay Prize Winner*

Many congratulations to Scott Metzger (McMaster University) for winning
this year’s Peirce Essay Prize!  He will present his award-winning essay
“Qualifying the Reduction of Illation to Sign Relation: The Roots of
Peirce’s General Theory of Signs” at our Annual General Meeting, held in
conjunction with the Eastern APA.

*In Memoriam: Larry Laudan*

The Charles S. Peirce Society is saddened to announce the recent death of
its former president Larry Laudan.  World-renowned for his work in
epistemology, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of law, Prof.
Laudan served as President of the Charles S. Peirce Society in 2009.  We
are grateful for his service to the Society and to the profession, and we
wish his family peace and comfort.  More information on his life and work
may be found at https://larrylaudan.com/larry-laudan/obituary/
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=77d8c0b7d5=860edf35dc>
.

*Logic of the Future, ed. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen*

De Gruyter continues to publish the thorough and multi-volume edition of
Peirce’s writings on the Existential Graphs.  A groundbreaking and
must-have set for any Peirce scholar, the following volumes have been
published or are forthcoming:

*Vol.1, History and Applications,* published Jan 2020 (Now also available
in paperback!)
*Vol.2/1, The Logical Tracts,* published May 2021
*Vol.2/2, The 1903 Lowell Lectures,* published May 2021
*Vol.3/1, Pragmatism,* forthcoming
*Vol.3/2, Correspondence,* forthcoming

*Have You Been Keeping Up with the Transactions?  *

The most cutting edge work on Peirce, pragmatism, and American philosophy
appears in the pages of The Transactions to the Charles S. Peirce Society.
Subscribe now to become a dues-paying member of the Society by going here
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=168cc74fe4=860edf35dc>
.

Recent essays published in the *Transactions* include:

   - Yael Levin Hungerford, “Charles S. Peirce on the University’s
   Political Potential”
   - Henrik Rydenfelt, “Environmental Pragmatism and the Revision of Values”
   - Laurence E. Heglar, “The Term ‘Experience’ as a Tool of Inquiry”
   - Bernardo Andrade, “Peirce’s Imaginative Community: On the Esthetic
   Grounds of Inquiry”
   - Jessica Wahman, “Psyche as Agent: Overcoming the ‘Free/Unfree’
   Dichotomy”
   - Michael Gifford and Scott Scheall, “Truth, Pragmatisn, and Democracy:
   Another Route to Liberal Values”
   - Audrey Brown, “Jonathan Edwards and the New World: Exploring the
   Intersection of Puritanism and Settler Colonialism”
   - Rush T. Stewart and Tom F. Sterkenburg, “Peirce, Pedigree, Probability”
   - Joshua M. Hall, “The Self-Swarm of Artemis: Emily Dickinson as
   Bee/Hive/Queen”

*Mark Your Calendars!*

January 4–7, 2023 | Montreal, Quebec, Canada | APA Eastern Division Meeting
| The Peirce Society is tentatively scheduled to meet on Thursday, Jan. 5,
from 9:00 a.m.–12:50 p.m.

February 22–25, 2023 

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce Society Newsletter 6:2

[Gary Richmond]

FYI
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Memorial for Shea Zellweger

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Yesterday I received an email from Holly Zellweger, the daughter of Shea
Zellweger, her father having died this year on August 7th. It included
an announcement
of a memorial service to be held this October 15th at 2pm in the Mount
Union Dewald Chapel in Alliance, Ohio.

Holly requested that I post the announcement and Professor Zellweger's
obituary to Peirce-l. Here is a link to the obituary:
https://www.the-review.com/obituaries/pwoo0309941 It is my sense from her
email that anyone who personally knew or professionally worked with her
father is welcome to attend the memorial.

I did not know Zellweger personally, but knew of his development of the
X-stem Logic Alphabet (XLA) -- an extension of Peirce's box-X notation
according
to the article linked to above -- and his contributions to semiotic. While
the obituary contains much of interest, there is, in addition, an excellent
Wikipedia article on him and his work here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shea_Zellweger

Best,

Gary

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: John Lachs Retirement Event

[Gary Richmond]

fyi

John Lachs Retirement Event
John Lachs Retirement Event
View this email in your browser
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Dear Gary Richmond,

Below, please find an announcement regarding an event celebrating John
Lachs as he retires from Vanderbilt University after a long a distinguished
career.

With best regards,
The Charles S. Peirce Society

***

Dear Colleagues,

We are pleased to invite you to join us on *October 14-15, 2022* in
Nashville, TN to celebrate the retirement of our beloved colleague John
Lachs.

John joined the Vanderbilt faculty in 1967 after earning his doctorate from
Yale. During more than 50 years on campus, John taught over 10,000 students
in his legendary Introduction to Ethics course and was first reader on 72
doctoral dissertations.

A preeminent scholar, John is the author, co-author, or editor of 21 books
and author or co-author of more than 151 articles.

John's many honors include the Harbison Award for Distinguished Teaching
(1967), the Chancellor's Cup (1969), the Herbert Schneider Award for
Lifetime Contribution to American Philosophy (1997), and the Graduate
Teaching Award (2000).

More than this, John's contagious love of life and learning together with
his playful spirit, boundless generosity, and unimpeachable character have
inspired and nurtured generations of students and colleagues.

The program takes place in Alumni Hall on the campus of Vanderbilt
University, beginning at 2:30 PM Central on Friday, October 14 and
concluding by 2:15 PM Central on Saturday, October 15.

*If you would like to participate in this special event in person, please
RSVP, letting us know if you plan to bring a guest, by
emailing michael.brodr...@gmail.com  no later
than Wednesday, September 7th. *

Due to Covid precautions, seats will be limited, so your prompt RSVP is
essential.

We have reserved a block of rooms at the Hampton Inn, West End at a
discounted rate, which is offered only until September 14. To book your
room at the discounted rate, *please follow this link*
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=0cf7b03023=860edf35dc>
.

*If you are unable to participate in person but would like to submit a
written or recorded tribute to John, please submit your tribute using this
link
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by Wednesday,
September 14. *All submitted tributes will be thoughtfully arranged and
presented to John.

We look forward to hearing from you and hope you can join us in celebrating
John.

Best wishes,

Michael Brodrick, Michael Hodges, and Eric Ritter

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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Call for Abstracts | The Pragmatic Maxim

[Gary Richmond]

Call for Abstracts | The Pragmatic Maxim
Call for Abstracts | The Pragmatic Maxim
[image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
Dear Gary Richmond,

The Charles S. Peirce Society endeavors to organize a panel for the Pacific
APA, to be held in San Francisco from April 5–8, 2023.  The planned theme
of the panel is The Pragmatic Maxim, but abstracts on any topic related to
Peirce's thought are welcome.  Scholars are invited to submit abstracts by
email to our Vice President, Yi Jiang, at yijiang[at]sxu.edu.cn.  Please
use the subject line "Abstract | P-APA Panel."  Abstracts are due by
September 30, 2022.  A decision will be made shortly thereafter.

With best regards,
The Charles S. Peirce Society
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Final CFP: Charles S. Peirce Essay Prize

[Gary Richmond]

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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Second CFP: Peirce Essay Prize

[Gary Richmond]

ge NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: C.S. Peirce Society Newsletter 6:1

[Gary Richmond]

in this newsletter, please forward it to her or him.  If you wish to be
added to the email list for the Peirce Society, please send your first and
last name and email address to peircesoci...@gmail.com.

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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: 10 Minute Thesis Initiative | Zoom Link

[Gary Richmond]

FYI

Dear friends,

The Charles S. Peirce Society is glad to welcome you to the first meeting
of our 10-Minute Thesis initiative.  The meeting will be held on Thursday,
March 3, 2022, at 5:00 p.m. EST (NYC time).  The Zoom link is below the
signature.  Many thanks to Catherine Legg for hosting the meeting!

Our scholars for the coming session are:

   - Elizabeth F. CooFYke (Creighton University)
   - Andrew Howat (California State University, Fullerton)
   - Catherine Legg (Deakin University)

Each scholar will present for 10 minutes, immediately followed by 20
minutes for question and answer from attendees.  The total time of the
session will be 1.5 hours.

We look forward to seeing you there!

With best regards,

The Charles S. Peirce Executive Committee


Catherine Legg is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.

Topic: Peirce "10 Minute Thesis" Session
Time: Mar 3, 2022 05:00 PM Eastern Time (US and Canada)

Join Zoom Meeting
https://deakin.zoom.us/j/85492151776?pwd=RHg4Y2NORkRJR0lTRUpVSklCM0hUQT09

Meeting ID: 854 9215 1776
Password: 46148388

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Find your local number: https://deakin.zoom.us/u/kepltzk4yV

Join by SIP
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Join by Skype for Business
https://deakin.zoom.us/skype/85492151776
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[PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:9370] deadline extended

[Gary Richmond]

fyi

Dear colleagues and friends,

*The call for submissions for Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2022 has been
extended until March 25. Find the full text of the call here
<https://www.biosemiotics.org/annual-gathering/>. *

Kind regards

Ľudmila

-- 





*Mgr. Ľudmila Lacková, Ph.D.*



Palacky University Olomouc | Czech Republic

Faculty of Arts | Department of General Linguistics

*Křížkovského 14 771 80 Olomouc Czech Republic*

ludmila.lack...@upol.cz | www.upol.cz
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: 10-Minute Thesis Initiative

[Gary Richmond]

FYI


10-Minute Thesis Initiative
[image: Header: The Charles S. Peirce Society]
Dear Gary Richmond,

The Charles Sanders Peirce Society is pleased to invite you to our new
*10-Minute
Thesis Initiative*.  Our inaugural session will be held on *Thursday, March
3, 2022, at 5:00 p.m. EST (New York City Time)*.   The session will be 1.5
hours long.

The 10-Minute Thesis Initiative provides Peirce scholars opportunities to
present their works in progress.  A scholar presents her or his work for 10
minutes, followed by 20 minutes to take questions from the audience.

Our scholars for the coming session are:

   - Elizabeth F. Cooke (Creighton University)
   - Andrew Howat (California State University, Fullerton)
   - Catherine Legg (Deakin University)

*In order to participate, you must complete the form here
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=f2530582b7=860edf35dc>.*
Please note that registration is limited to 75 participants.  A Zoom link
to the session will be sent one day before the session begins.  We hope to
see you there!

With best regards,
The Charles S. Peirce Society Executive Committee
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce Prize Presentation and Annual General Meeting

[Gary Richmond]

Dear friends,

We look forward to seeing you at the Peirce Prize Essay Presentation and
Annual General Meeting on Thursday, January 13, 2022, at 3:00 p.m. EST (New
York Time).

The zoom link for the meeting is: https://bccte.zoom.us/j/96073439748

Please note that you may be asked for your username and password.  This is
your username and password for your zoom account, not a special username
and password for the meeting.

The meeting will begin with the Peirce Essay Prize Presentation.  This
year's winner is Bernardo Andrade (Emory University) for "Peirce’s
Imaginative Community: On the Esthetic Grounds of Inquiry.”

Following the presentation, the Annual General Meeting will begin.  The
agenda for the Annual General Meeting is as follows:


   1. Approval of Minutes
   <https://peircesociety.org/minutes/cspsminutes_2021.pdf> of the 2021
   Meeting
   2. Report from the Executive Committee
   3. Report from the *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*
   4. Financial Statement
   5. Report from the Peirce Edition Project
   6. Report from the Nominating Committee and Election of New Officers
   7. New Business
   8. Installment of New President
   9. Adjournment


With best regards,

Richard Kenneth Atkins
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce Essay Prize Presentation and Annual General Meeting

[Gary Richmond]

FYI Note: "Persons who wish to attend must register here
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=7f891cb9dd=860edf35dc>.
Please note that registration is limited to 50 persons.  However, Members
of the Society (i.e., current personal subscribers to the journal) who are
not able to register prior to the form being closed may email
peircesoci...@gmail.com and will be added to the list." GR

Peirce Essay Prize Presentation and Annual General Meeting
Peirce Essay Prize Presentation and Annual General Meeting
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Dear Gary Richmond,

As previously announced, due to unforeseen circumstances, the Peirce
Society had to cancel its in-person meetings scheduled for the Eastern
APA.  Instead, the Peirce Prize Presentation and Annual General Meeting
will be held via zoom on Thursday, January 13th, at 3:00 p.m. EST (New York
City time).

Persons who wish to attend must register here
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=7f891cb9dd=860edf35dc>.
Please note that registration is limited to 50 persons.  However, Members
of the Society (i.e., current personal subscribers to the journal) who are
not able to register prior to the form being closed may email
peircesoci...@gmail.com and will be added to the list.

The meeting will begin with the Peirce Essay Prize Presentation.  This
year's winner is Bernardo Andrade (Emory University) for "Peirce’s
Imaginative Community: On the Esthetic Grounds of Inquiry.”

Following the presentation, the Annual General Meeting will begin.  The
agenda for the Annual General Meeting is as follows:


   1. Approval of Minutes
   
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=0ebdbd12ab=860edf35dc>
   of the 2021 Meeting
   2. Report from the Executive Committee
   3. Report from the *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*
   4. Financial Statement
   5. Report from the Peirce Edition Project
   6. Report from the Nominating Committee and Election of New Officers
   7. New Business
   8. Installment of New President
   9. Adjournment

As always, we thank you for your support of the Peirce Society.  We hope to
see you on January 13!

With best wishes for the new year,

The Charles S. Peirce Society Executive Committee


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[PEIRCE-L] New Day's Lyric (a poem for the new year)

[Gary Richmond]

 New Day's Lyric

May this be the day
We come together.
Mourning, we come to mend,
Withered, we come to weather,
Torn, we come to tend,
Battered, we come to better.
Tethered by this year of yearning,
We are learning
That though we weren't ready for this,
We have been readied by it.

Steadily we vow that no matter
How we are weighed down,
We must always pave a way forward.
This hope is our door, our portal.
Even if we never get back to normal,
Someday we can venture beyond it,
To leave the known and take the first steps.
So let us not return to what was normal,
But reach toward what is next.

What was cursed, we will cure.
What was plagued, we will prove pure.
Where we tend to argue, we will try to agree,
Those fortunes we forswore, now the future we foresee,
Where we weren't aware, we're now awake;
Those moments we missed
Are now these moments we make,
The moments we meet,
And our hearts, once all together beaten,
Now all together beat.

Come, look up with kindness yet,
For even solace can be sourced from sorrow.
We remember, not just for the sake of yesterday,
But to take on tomorrow.
We heed this old spirit,
In a new day's lyric,
In our hearts, we hear it:
For auld lang syne, my dear,
For auld lang syne.
Be bold, sang Time this year,
Be bold, sang Time,
For when you honor yesterday,
Tomorrow ye will find.
Know what we've fought
Need not be forgot nor for none.
It defines us, binds us as one,
Come over, join this day just begun.
For wherever we come together,
We will forever overcome.

Amanda Gorman

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
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[PEIRCE-L] Canceled: Peirce Society Sessions at Eastern APA

[Gary Richmond]

FYI GR

Canceled: Peirce Society Sessions at Eastern APA
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Dear Gary Richmond,

A confluence of factors mainly related to the ongoing pandemic require us
to cancel our two planned sessions for the Eastern APA.  We are currently
making alternate arrangements to hold both our Annual General Meeting and
the planned AMC session on James Liszka's recent book.  More details will
be forthcoming.

With best wishes for a happy new year,

The Executive Committee of the C.S. Peirce Society

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*Copyright © 2022 Charles S. Peirce Society, All rights reserved.*
You are receiving this message because either you are a member or former
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email list.

*Our mailing address is:*
Charles S. Peirce Society
140 Commonwealth Ave
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] CFP: Laws of Form 2022 Conference

[Gary Richmond]

Laws of Form 2022 Conference
Call for Papers

Submissions for papers, panel sessions, interactive presentations,
workshops, performance sessions, and creative contributions inspired by
George Spencer-Brown's work and life - and particularly his key work, Laws
of Form (LoF) - are now open and welcomed from participants keen to
contribute to LoF22 which will be held from Thursday 4 August to Saturday 6
August, 2022 at the University of Liverpool.
Keynotes will be given by Barry Smith and Francis Jeffrey.

https://lof50.com/?fbclid=IwAR2DaFABQksl1xApzLwuELY-EvQcCdfBZkuAd8fol7GXsNKNg2R1-4n0DvY

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

 am not in agreement with Peirce nor
you that their is no beginning of cosmological time. On the other hand, I
have come to agree with you that what I termed the ur-continuity is *not*
the mind of God but, rather, represents created 3ns (I might, however, say
"created continuity" rather than 3ns as I consider the categories,
including 3ns, to be characters of our universe, and so might stick to my
term 'ur-continuity' here).


GR: Again, I have suggested that a better subtitle might be "How Mind
Emerged from *constraints *on Matter," by which I mean that the mind in the
cosmos -- *not *God's mind-- but the kind of mind we call 'conscious' mind,
for example, is *not *given primordially, but evolves in the sense that the
whole cosmos is evolving.


JAS: I am having a hard time reconciling this suggestion with Peirce's
objective idealism, in which "the mind in the cosmos" *is *primordial and
matter comes about only as a peculiar sort of mind. Are you perhaps
referring to the origin of *individual *embodied minds as distinguished
from mind *in general*, which "is not necessarily connected with a brain"
but "appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely
physical world"?


As I see it,* constraints*, as discussed in Deacon's* Incomplete Nature*
are necessary, "to the origin of *individual *embodied minds" *as well as*
the origin of mind as "not necessarily connected with a brain" but
"appear[ing} in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely
physical world"?" However, I would exclude the idea 'general' here (JAS: .
. ". . . the origin of *individual *embodied minds as distinguished from
mind *in general*, which appears, etc.). For as everything which expresses
"mind in general" must itself be embodied, have a structure, whether it's a
human mind (better: what some would call a 'body-mind') or a bee body-mind
colony (within its* umwelt*), or a crystal-quasi-mind (also necessarily
involving structure, although admittedly it would be a stretch to call such
structures 'embodied'). And the whole of humanity is itself mind embodied
in a species, more real than any individual human person.


GR: Deacon's theory, at least at face value, may seem to be a kind of
"materialist doctrine;" but I see no reason to suppose that his scientific
insights "suppose that a certain kind of *mechanism *will feel." Rather a
certain kind of *organism *will feel.


JAS: I take Peirce's point to be that if the physical law is primordial and
the psychical law is derived and special, then dead matter must somehow
feel as a brute fact--"an ultimate, inexplicable regularity"--in order for
a living organism ever to develop from it. That is why he considers
materialism to be "quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common
sense" and rejects it accordingly, despite acknowledging that there is much
to be said for it.


Whatever his own views of what he considers primordial, mind or matter (and
more than likely to be 'matter'), my own *interpretation * of Deacon's
argument, leads me to a conclusion quite different, really almost the
opposite of your take on or use of the ideas expressed in *Incomplete
Nature*. For now I will attempt to succinctly summarize them.

In my view (perhaps not Deacon's, but springboarding off of it), mind is
certainly primordial as it *must* be active for there to be any kind of
cosmic evolution (let alone, and long before the biological one) in the
structuring of those 'materials' (everything from neutrons, protons,
electrons, anti-electrons, photons and neutrinos through the light gasses
and elements to soft, fragile tissue and all which brings together these
parts into a whole); that is, everything prerequisite for their eventual
forming viable structures via Deacon's 'constraints' into such structural
arrangements as crystals, and organisms such as bees (further manifesting
behaviors which structure, for example, honeycombs). And further, humans
and their 'societies', and other floral and faunal societies, each in their
own umwelt which is as structurally essential as their own intelligent
being. For the principle of what is the equivalent of created ur-continuity
reveals that nothing is truly independent of, if not literally all things,
but virtually all things.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Tue, Nov 23, 2021 at 6:29 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR: Your view would seem to imply that there is only one possible universe
> for all time and in all space.
>
>
> How so? I simply noted that the Big Bang theory is based on the assumption
> that the physical laws of *our *act

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

JAS: It seems clear to me that Champagne wrote his article "from a more
general and abstract semeiotic perspective," which is why I have sought to
address it accordingly. However, I have also commented on some of its
cosmological implications and will do so again now.


GR: I agree "that Champagne wrote his article "from a more general and
abstract semeiotic perspective," while I see no reason to limit my thinking
about it to that "more general and abstract semeiotic perspective." and I
am certainly relieved that you do not as well as you are also reflecting
"on some of its cosmological implications." In truth, I actually find
Champagne's view to be in some ways problematic in the extreme.

JAS: As I have said before, I see no place for any *definite *beginning of
the universe in Peirce's cosmology, including the Big Bang.


GR: I disagree. Your view would seem to imply that there is only one
possible universe for all time and in all space. Peirce's cosmological
lectures of 1898 seem to me to allow for any number of possible universes,
that is, so many ways for universes with characters far different from
our own to be born out of the infinite Platonic qualities Peirce
adumbrated. Why limit God's power to create to a single universe?

JAS: In that sense, [Peirce] maintains that semiosis likewise had no
beginning and will have no end, while *physico*semiosis came about with the
very first instance when primordial mind became specialized and partially
deadened as matter.

GR: "Semiosis. . . had no beginning and will have no end.  ." Are you
saying that this is Peirce's view? I don't see strong support for this
notion  when one considers the possibility of multi-universes. And
while "primordial
mind became specialized and partially deadened as matter" is certainly true
in one sense, it can't be so in, for example, another strictly theistic
sense (God's 'mind' "partially deadened as matter"? --that makes no sense).
Mind' here must connote something quite different than God's Mind.

So, a question: what do we (including Peirce) mean when we refer to
"primordial mind"? From a theological standpoint, is that 'mind' created or
uncreated?

You quoted me as writing: "Several Peircean concepts are involved in
Deacon's theory of the emergence of life and mind," and commented:
JAS: That might be so, but again, [Deacon's] book's subtitle is *How Mind
Emerged from Matter.*

GR: Again, I have suggested that a better subtitle might be "How Mind
Emerged from *constraints* on Matter," by which I mean that the mind in the
cosmos -- *not* God's mind-- but the kind of mind we call 'conscious' mind,
for example, is *not* given primordially, but evolves in the sense that the
whole cosmos is evolving. 'Constraints', in this sense, result in habits,
result in evolutionary development.

JAS (quoting Peirce): "The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as
repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to
suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a
hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason. . ."

GR: Deacon's theory, at least at face value, may seem to be a kind of
"materialist doctrine;" but I see no reason to suppose that his scientific
insights "suppose that a certain kind of *mechanism* will feel." Rather a
certain kind of *organism* will feel. (I don't claim that this is *strictly*
Deacon's view, but it is in my view possible to argue it based in part on
certain of his insights; but Deacon himself is a materialist.)

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 10:06 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR: I have been reflecting on Champagne's article critically from a
> cosmological standpoint, perhaps especially that of the early cosmos, while
> you seem to have been looking at it from a more general and abstract
> semeiotic perspective.
>
>
> It seems clear to me that Champagne wrote his article "from a more general
> and abstract semeiotic perspective," which is why I have sought to address
> it accordingly. However, I have also commented on some of its cosmological
> implications and will do so again now.
>
> GR: If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which
> I, for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
> appear*? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
> singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
> formed?
>
>
> As I have said before, I see no place for any *definite *beginning of the
> universe in Pe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

List, This just published study may have some bearing on the topic of this
thread. GR

*ScienceAlert* summarizes a new cosmological theory:
Our Universe Is Finely Tuned For Life, And There's an Explanation For Why
That Is So
<https://sciencealert.us2.list-manage.com/track/click?u=3996984deafc554c16e8bdad6=9d3b48b3bc=5dcb0caac4>
https://www.sciencealert.com/we-could-have-a-new-way-to-explain-why-our-universe-is-as-finely-tuned-for-life-as-it-is

Excerpt:

This latest suggestion mashes together the idea of unknown physics behind
the Higgs boson's shockingly itty-bitty mass with a kind of quantum
multiverse effect, one that this time could feasibly be tested.

Their model puts the Higgs particle at the center of the fine-tuning
explanation. By coupling the boson with other particles in such a way that
its low mass would effectively 'trigger' events in physics we observe, it
provides a link between forces and mass.

From there, the authors show how weakly interacting variables in a field
might affect different kinds of empty space, specifically patches of
nothingness with varying degrees of expansion. This potentially
demonstrates the link between Higgs bosons
<https://www.sciencealert.com/the-standard-model> and the cosmological
constant.

It's a multiverse in a way, given the triggers occurring in different
patches of infinite expanding space could plausibly give rise to a
seemingly well balanced Universe like ours.

Their math suggests these triggers would be limited to a few possibilities,
and even has room for explanations of dark matter
<https://www.sciencealert.com/dark-matter>. Better still, it also predicts
the existence of multiple Higgs particles of varying masses, all smaller
than the one we've already observed. That gives the hypothesis something
that can be tested, at least.

The study is published in *Physical Review *as:
Weak scale as a triggerNima Arkani-Hamed, Raffaele Tito D’Agnolo, and Hyung
Do KimPhys. Rev. D 104, 095014 – Published 15 November 2021
https://journals.aps.org/prd/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevD.104.095014

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 7:40 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F, Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> GF: "Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive
> definition of “life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an
> “interpretant” to one end of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the
> chain of efficient causations that precede it in time."
>
>
> GR: I, perhaps more strongly than you, support the notion that "Peirce’s
> cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of “life"." And
> at the moment I tend to strongly agree with you that, yet, that doesn't 
> "justif[y]
> reducing an “interpretant” to one end of a dyadic relation."
>
> I've also been thinking that it's possible that at least you and I, Jon,
> have been talking at cross purposes. I have been reflecting on
> Champagne's article critically from a cosmological standpoint, perhaps
> especially that of the early cosmos, while you seem to  have been looking
> at it from a more general and abstract semeiotic perspective.
>
> If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which I,
> for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
> appea*r? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
> singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
> formed? Or did it only first appear on some planet, such as our Earth, and
> as a necessary precursor to biosemiotics?
>
> Teerence Deacon remarks in the section of his book, *Incomplete Nature*,
> titled "Abiogenesis", that "the study of the origin of life has a
> paradoxical status compared to the rest of biology" (430).
>
> For to accept unconditionally the maxim, 'only life begets life'.  leads
> to a paradox: "Either life has been around forever in a universe without
> beginning, or else it originates from some other non-physical reality. . ."
> (431-32). [I should immediately note that Deacon is not a theist and has
> little to say about spiritual views of the origins of life, for example, a
> word or two on *elan vital.* In short he rejects the notion that life
> "originates from some other non-physical reality."]
>
> It is not possible to summarize Deacon's own teleodynamic theory of the
> origins of life and mind in a short message or, perhaps, at all. The
> exposition of that theory takes nearly 600 pages involving some new
> technical vocabulary (essential to his theory), and some argumentation
> which is *necessarily*, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon, Helmut, List,

GF: "Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive
definition of “life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an
“interpretant” to one end of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the
chain of efficient causations that precede it in time."


GR: I, perhaps more strongly than you, support the notion that "Peirce’s
cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of “life"." And at
the moment I tend to strongly agree with you that, yet, that doesn't "justif[y]
reducing an “interpretant” to one end of a dyadic relation."

I've also been thinking that it's possible that at least you and I, Jon,
have been talking at cross purposes. I have been reflecting on Champagne's
article critically from a cosmological standpoint, perhaps especially that
of the early cosmos, while you seem to  have been looking at it from a more
general and abstract semeiotic perspective.

If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which I,
for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
appea*r? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
formed? Or did it only first appear on some planet, such as our Earth, and
as a necessary precursor to biosemiotics?

Teerence Deacon remarks in the section of his book, *Incomplete Nature*,
titled "Abiogenesis", that "the study of the origin of life has a
paradoxical status compared to the rest of biology" (430).

For to accept unconditionally the maxim, 'only life begets life'.  leads to
a paradox: "Either life has been around forever in a universe without
beginning, or else it originates from some other non-physical reality. . ."
(431-32). [I should immediately note that Deacon is not a theist and has
little to say about spiritual views of the origins of life, for example, a
word or two on *elan vital.* In short he rejects the notion that life
"originates from some other non-physical reality."]

It is not possible to summarize Deacon's own teleodynamic theory of the
origins of life and mind in a short message or, perhaps, at all. The
exposition of that theory takes nearly 600 pages involving some new
technical vocabulary (essential to his theory), and some argumentation
which is *necessarily*, in my view, involved and complex. Gary, you no
doubt recall our attempt to get a discussion of *Incomplete Nature* going
on the LIst a few years back. After a very few weeks I think we both had
the feeling that few here -- if any -- had read the book which, again,
really needs not only to be read, but also studied (esp., for example, the
material on constraints, homo-, morpho-, and teleodynamics, supervenience,
and top-down causality is challenging).

Several Peircean concepts are involved in Deacon's theory of the emergence
of life and mind. For example, his central notion of *constraints* is "a
complementary concept to order, habit, and organization because something
that is ordered or organized is restricted in its range and/or dimensions
of variation, and consequently tends to exhibit. . . regularities." What
Deacon calls "constraint propagation" has more than a family resemblance to
Peirce's notion of "habits begetting habits" (see: 183-85, 197, esp. 202-3).

Several features of Peirce semeiotic also appear prominently in *Incomplete
Nature*, For example, interpretants are discussed in consideration of the
communication theory involved in Deacon's theory (see, for example, 443).
However, in an endnote he remarks that he is "less satisfied" with his
"effort to map Peirce's object terms" onto his theory than he is with his
use of the concept of interpretants (564, n.9), a remark which I found
telling.

I hope my comments aren't too much of a divergence from the topic of
abioticsemiosis while they most likely are from Champagne's article.

Best,

Gary R





“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 4:49 PM  wrote:

> Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your final
> paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.
>
>
>
> JAS: … my own current view is that "purely material interactions" are
> *degenerate* triadic relations, reducible to their constituent *dyadic 
> *relations
> … Accordingly, a series of strictly physical events can be understood as a
> dynamical object determining a sign token to determine a dynamical
> interpretant.
>
>
>
> GF: Let’s take a moving billiard ball A, which collides with billiard ball
> B, efficiently causing it to collide with billard ball C, efficiently
> causing

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, Jon, List,

You asked: "Is this far-fetching to press it into a table?"

Whatever may be the case for biotic semiosis/biosemiosis (I'd suggest that
'nervous semiosis' is a form of the former), since semiosis has come to be
seen by many researchers as always-already rather clearly in effect in the
life forms on earth, it seems to me that you are begging the question to
apply the O-R-I semiotic triad to abioticsemiosis when, it would appear,
that the thrust of Champagne's article is that we ought to deeply reflect
on the very conditions necessary to prove the reality of abioticsemiosis.

While Deely finds support for the idea of the reality of abioticsemiosis in
the work of Poinsot and Peirce (for example, consider this well known CSP
quote that Jon offered: "Thought [. . .] appears in the work of bees, of
crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"); and while the "inference
to the best explanation" (that the 'absence of semiosis outside the living
world would turn out to be more. . . unlikely than its presence' " is, at
least for me, rather compelling, yet merely asserting that
abioticsemiosis is a scientific fact is obviously in itself insufficient as
a proof of its reality (apparently the motivation behind Champagne's
article, which centers on what he believes is necessary for such a proof of
abioticsemiosis).

Yet I am also questioning Champagne's claim that "in order to truly
establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the
components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant – would have to
be abiotic (that is,not  dependent on a living organism)." My thought is
that it is not necessarily* only* biological organisms which are living.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sun, Nov 21, 2021 at 5:16 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary, List,
>
> I think, that abiotic semiosis follows  efficient causation, which is
> deductive necessity, the O-R-I follows rule-case-result (See Peirce´s
> example with the beans from the bag). E.g.: The rule is that masses attract
> each other (law as object), the case (representamen) is two masses with a
> certain distance and no relative velocity, the result (interpretant) is
> they are drawn towards each other and collide.
>
> Biotic semiosis also follows final causation, which is inductive
> probability, the O-R-I is case-result-rule. E.G.: An organism (objectively)
> needs food (case), it is hungry (result, representamen), when it then eats,
> the hunger and the need go away (rule, law, interpretant). The constraint
> on matter is the organism´s skin.
>
> Nervous semiosis also follows example causation (secularized causa
> exemplaris), which is abductive plausibility, the O-R-I is
> result-rule-case. E,g.: A neural image is a result (e.g of vision or
> smelling) and the object of an animal´s nervous system. About this object
> exists an abductive rule of plausibility, e.g. it is plausibly good or bad
> for the organism. This feeling of good or bad is the representamen. The
> case is that then the organism either pusues or flees it (interpretant).
>
> Is this far-fetching to press it into a table? Just an attempt.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> *Gesendet:* Sonntag, 21. November 2021 um 07:32 Uhr
> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" 
> *An:* "Peirce-L" 
> *Cc:* "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of
> abioticsemiosis"
> Jon, List,
>
> Jon quoted me, then commented:
>
>
> GR: A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is *not *strictly
> 'a*bio*tic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "*living *
> God."
>
>
> JAS: Champagne presumably uses the term "abiotic" because he is referring
> specifically to the forms of life that fall within the well-established
> science of biology. No theist would include God among them, and it also
> excludes mere atoms despite Peirce's conception "that they are not
> absolutely dead" (CP 6.201, 1898). In fact ...
>
>
> I am not especially concerned here with Champagne's use of the prefix
> 'bio' from his likely standpoint of "the well-established science of
> biology." Rather, I was looking at "abiotic" and "biotic" more from an
> etymological point of view. The "well-established science of biology" is
> surely Champagne's focus; and, if one reduces considerations here to the
> "science of biology," then surely, as you wrote, "No theist would include
> God among them."
>
> But why limit

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

Jon quoted me, then commented:

GR: A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is *not *strictly 'a
*bio*tic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "*living *
God."


JAS: Champagne presumably uses the term "abiotic" because he is referring
specifically to the forms of life that fall within the well-established
science of biology. No theist would include God among them, and it also
excludes mere atoms despite Peirce's conception "that they are not
absolutely dead" (CP 6.201, 1898). In fact ...


I am not especially concerned here with Champagne's use of the prefix 'bio'
from his likely standpoint of "the well-established science of biology."
Rather, I was looking at "abiotic" and "biotic" more from an etymological
point of view. The "well-established science of biology" is surely
Champagne's focus; and, if one reduces considerations here to the "science
of biology," then surely, as you wrote, "No theist would include God among
them."

But why limit the meaning of 'bio-' here, that is, in consideration of the
near certainly that, for Peirce, it has a much broader and deeper meaning
than its modern biological one? The Greek root, *bio*, means *life*, not
merely life as considered in the "science of biology," but much more
generally. After all, aren't we reflecting her on the metaphysical nature
of the universe before 'life' in the sense of the modern science of
biology? That is, aren't we looking at this from a very broad -- even vast
-- cosmological standpoint?

I think, Jon, that you get closer to my purpose in introducing this topic
in writing "Peirce's view is that the evolution of the universe is still in
progress from living mind. . " As I see it, *living mind* is there from the
get-go in Peirce's sense (although, again, I agree, most likely, not
Champagne's). It would seem to me that from this Peircean perspective,
there is actually no need for a "proof of abioticsemiosis."

In a word, life (bio-) is always already there from, so to speak,
"foundation of the world."

Best,

Gary R


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 10:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thanks for bringing this interesting and indeed very brief article to our
> attention (
> https://www.academia.edu/1237921/A_Necessary_Condition_for_Proof_of_Abiotic_Semiosis).
> I will likely offer some detailed comments about it in the near future, but
> for now I will just respond to a couple of your own remarks prompted by it.
>
> GR: A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is *not *strictly
> 'a*bio*tic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "*living *
> God."
>
>
> Champagne presumably uses the term "abiotic" because he is referring
> specifically to the forms of life that fall within the well-established
> science of biology. No theist would include God among them, and it also
> excludes mere atoms despite Peirce's conception "that they are not
> absolutely dead" (CP 6.201, 1898). In fact ...
>
> GR: But then the question immediately arises: whence comes this "semiosis
> outside the living world"?
>
>
> According to Peirce, physicosemiosis is *not *"outside the living world"
> because "dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete
> induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute
> irrationality of effort to complete death. Now I would suppose that that
> result of evolution is not quite complete even in our beakers and
> crucibles" (ibid). Moreover, "all thought is in signs" (CP 5.253, EP 1:24,
> 1868), and "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears
> in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"
> (CP 4.551, 1906). While bees are obviously biotic, crystals surely qualify
> as abiotic in Champagne's sense.
>
> In short, Peirce's view is that the evolution of the universe is still in
> progress from living mind toward dead matter--"the physical law as derived
> and special, the psychical law alone as primordial," such that "matter is
> effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.24-25, EP
> 1:292-293, 1891). He holds that "*matter *is a peculiar sort of *mind* ...
> mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost
> perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning"
> (R 936:3, no date). This is precisely the opposite of De

[PEIRCE-L] Daniel Chandler list of semiotic books in print

[Gary Richmond]

Daniel Chandler (Semiotic Research Group) has drawn up a selected list of
semiotic books in print. He commented: "It is frustrating that many key
works are out of print." Still, the list as is should prove helpful to many.
http://visual-memory.co.uk/daniel/Semiosis/?fbclid=IwAR2AQpYlJIJiqBaAUVDkACUdjxmBTn1stqH0a92Lz0GySoazrKbb-DursK4

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Phyllis wrote: "I just have a vague sense of the connection."

There may very well be a connection -- it even seems likely to me. Perhaps
others here might have some insights as to the nature/structure of that
possible connection.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 3:54 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I just have a vague sense of the connection. I don't know enough about
> either of them to provide an analysis.
>
> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021, 12:37 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Phyllis, List,
>>
>> Rovelli is a brilliant storyteller mixing reflections on quantum science
>> and Eastern thought in both insightful and entertaining ways.
>>
>> As one reviewer put it, the essence of his argument is "that every
>> entity in the universe, from protons to humans, exists only in relation to
>> other objects." I would tend to strongly agree with that, as well as his
>> suggestion that with this knowledge that we should -- as some Buddhist
>> and Daoist teachings would have it -- "go with the flow."
>>
>> Would you comment on how you see his quantum insights as being like the
>> theory of abioticsemiosis?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> “Let everything happen to you
>> Beauty and terror
>> Just keep going
>> No feeling is final”
>> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 2:53 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
>> phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Abioticsemiosis seems a lot like what is Happening in quantum physics.
>>> Especially Carlo Rovelli's relational theory as described in Helgoland.
>>>
>>> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021, 11:07 AM Gary Richmond 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> List,
>>>>
>>>> I recently came upon this quite short article, "A necessary condition
>>>> for proof of abioticsemiosis," by Marc Champagne (Semiotica, issue 197
>>>> (October 2013), pp. 283–287).
>>>>
>>>>  *Abstract:*
>>>> This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends
>>>> less careful inquiries into “physiosemiosis.” It is emphasized that, in
>>>> order to truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living
>>>> world, all the components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant –
>>>> would have to be abiotic (that is,not dependent on a living organism).
>>>> Failure to heed this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a
>>>> natural sign (like smoke coming from fire) for an instance of abiotic
>>>> semiosis. A more rigorous and reserved approach to the topicis called
>>>> for.
>>>>
>>>> John Deely endorsed, and so in a way (re)introduced, the idea of
>>>> *physiosemiosis* (a term he is credited with coining) to contemporary
>>>> semiotic communities, including the Peircean community.
>>>>
>>>> *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down the argument that the action of signs
>>>> extends even further than life, and that semiosis as an influence of the
>>>> future played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the
>>>> advent of life, a role for which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis*.
>>>> Thus the argument whether the manner in which the action of signs permeates
>>>> the universe includes the nonliving as well as the living stands, as it
>>>> were, as determining the "final frontier" of semiotics. Deely's argument,
>>>> which he first expressed at the 1989 Charles Sanders Peirce
>>>> Sesquicentennial International Congress at Harvard University, if
>>>> successful, would render nugatory Peirce's "sop to Cerberus." Deely's 
>>>> *Basics
>>>> of Semiotics*, of which six expanded editions have been published
>>>> across nine languages, deals with semiotics in this expansive sense.
>>>>
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely#Contributions_to_semiotics
>>>> In a footnote on Deely's approach to this matter, Champagne remarks:
>>&g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Phyllis, List,

Rovelli is a brilliant storyteller mixing reflections on quantum science
and Eastern thought in both insightful and entertaining ways.

As one reviewer put it, the essence of his argument is "that every entity
in the universe, from protons to humans, exists only in relation to other
objects." I would tend to strongly agree with that, as well as his
suggestion that with this knowledge that we should -- as some Buddhist
and Daoist teachings would have it -- "go with the flow."

Would you comment on how you see his quantum insights as being like the
theory of abioticsemiosis?

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 2:53 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Abioticsemiosis seems a lot like what is Happening in quantum physics.
> Especially Carlo Rovelli's relational theory as described in Helgoland.
>
> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021, 11:07 AM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> I recently came upon this quite short article, "A necessary condition for
>> proof of abioticsemiosis," by Marc Champagne (Semiotica, issue 197
>> (October 2013), pp. 283–287).
>>
>>  *Abstract:*
>> This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends
>> less careful inquiries into “physiosemiosis.” It is emphasized that, in
>> order to truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living
>> world, all the components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant –
>> would have to be abiotic (that is,not dependent on a living organism).
>> Failure to heed this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a
>> natural sign (like smoke coming from fire) for an instance of abiotic
>> semiosis. A more rigorous and reserved approach to the topicis called
>> for.
>>
>> John Deely endorsed, and so in a way (re)introduced, the idea of
>> *physiosemiosis* (a term he is credited with coining) to contemporary
>> semiotic communities, including the Peircean community.
>>
>> *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down the argument that the action of signs
>> extends even further than life, and that semiosis as an influence of the
>> future played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the
>> advent of life, a role for which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis*.
>> Thus the argument whether the manner in which the action of signs permeates
>> the universe includes the nonliving as well as the living stands, as it
>> were, as determining the "final frontier" of semiotics. Deely's argument,
>> which he first expressed at the 1989 Charles Sanders Peirce
>> Sesquicentennial International Congress at Harvard University, if
>> successful, would render nugatory Peirce's "sop to Cerberus." Deely's *Basics
>> of Semiotics*, of which six expanded editions have been published across
>> nine languages, deals with semiotics in this expansive sense.
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely#Contributions_to_semiotics
>> In a footnote on Deely's approach to this matter, Champagne remarks:
>>
>> Although Deely was prompted to endorse the idea of physiosemiosis by his
>> syncretistic study of Charles S. Peirce and John Poinsot (cf. Deely [Basics
>> of semiotics, Indiana University Press] 1990: 87–91), his ambitious
>> promissory note can also be motivated (perhaps more persuasively) by an
>> inference to the best explanation. On this view,a complete absence of
>> semiosis outside the living world would turn out to be more 
>> surprising/unlikely
>> than its presence, however minute or sparse, in the non-living world . .
>> .
>>
>> Deely's "inference to the best explanation" (that the "absence of
>> semiosis outside the living world would turn out to be more
>> surprising/unlikely than its presence") has always seemed persuasive enough
>> to me. But then the question immediately arises: whence comes this
>> "semiosis outside the living world"?
>>
>> Again, Champagne argument is that "in order to truly establish the
>> presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the components of a
>> triadic sign – *including the interpretant* – would have to be abiotic"
>> (emphasis added).
>>
>> But is this necessarily so? Or rather, is there a way of viewing one of
>> the "components of a triadic sign" as *not* abiotic ("signs grow" CSP)?
>>
>> A th

[PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I recently came upon this quite short article, "A necessary condition for
proof of abioticsemiosis," by Marc Champagne (Semiotica, issue 197 (October
2013), pp. 283–287).

 *Abstract:*
This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends less
careful inquiries into “physiosemiosis.” It is emphasized that, in order to
truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all
the components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant – would have
to be abiotic (that is,not dependent on a living organism). Failure to heed
this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a natural sign
(like smoke coming from fire) for an instance of abiotic semiosis. A more
rigorous and reserved approach to the topicis called for.

John Deely endorsed, and so in a way (re)introduced, the idea of
*physiosemiosis* (a term he is credited with coining) to contemporary
semiotic communities, including the Peircean community.

*Basics of Semiotics*, laid down the argument that the action of signs
extends even further than life, and that semiosis as an influence of the
future played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the
advent of life, a role for which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis*.
Thus the argument whether the manner in which the action of signs permeates
the universe includes the nonliving as well as the living stands, as it
were, as determining the "final frontier" of semiotics. Deely's argument,
which he first expressed at the 1989 Charles Sanders Peirce
Sesquicentennial International Congress at Harvard University, if
successful, would render nugatory Peirce's "sop to Cerberus." Deely's *Basics
of Semiotics*, of which six expanded editions have been published across
nine languages, deals with semiotics in this expansive sense.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely#Contributions_to_semiotics
In a footnote on Deely's approach to this matter, Champagne remarks:

Although Deely was prompted to endorse the idea of physiosemiosis by his
syncretistic study of Charles S. Peirce and John Poinsot (cf. Deely [Basics
of semiotics, Indiana University Press] 1990: 87–91), his ambitious
promissory note can also be motivated (perhaps more persuasively) by an
inference to the best explanation. On this view,a complete absence of
semiosis outside the living world would turn out to be more surprising/unlikely
than its presence, however minute or sparse, in the non-living world . . .

Deely's "inference to the best explanation" (that the "absence of semiosis
outside the living world would turn out to be more surprising/unlikely than
its presence") has always seemed persuasive enough to me. But then the
question immediately arises: whence comes this "semiosis outside the living
world"?

Again, Champagne argument is that "in order to truly establish the presence
of sign-action in the non-living world, all the components of a triadic
sign – *including the interpretant* – would have to be abiotic" (emphasis
added).

But is this necessarily so? Or rather, is there a way of viewing one of the
"components of a triadic sign" as *not* abiotic ("signs grow" CSP)?

A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is *not *strictly
'a*bio*tic',
that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "*living* God." But then
I was immediately reminded of Terrence Deacon's arguments in his
"stunningly original, stunningly synoptic book" (Stuart Kauffman), *Incomplete
Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (2012), which I have always thought
would be more accurately subtitled, "How mind emerged from *constraints on*
matter." But does that approach in a way beg the question? Whence those
'constraints'?

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce in Johns Hopkins mural

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I just received this from David Marans; it includes an interesting
discussion of how Peirce came to be featured on a mural at Johns Hopkins.

Best,

Gary R


Gary.

Peirce is featured on a mural at Johns Hopkins University.  The mural is on
the CSP page in my Open Access *Logic *Gallery.  The gallery which has a
full page for each of 178 figures since Aristotle, is a free download at
http://humbox.ac.uk/5497/
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=a0e0eb9fc2=0c7ad465a8>

In 1939, Johns Hopkins alumnus Alfred Jenkins Shriver died, leaving
$800,000 to the university.  In his will, Shriver stipulated that the funds
be used to construct a new lecture hall on the Homewood campus.  He
provided a lengthy list of conditions to be met if the university were to
accept the money.  These conditions included the creation of murals
depicting the Original Board of Trustees of Johns Hopkins University, the
Original Board of Trustees of Johns Hopkins Hospital, the Original Faculty
of Philosophy, the Original Faculty of the School of Medicine, Six
Generations of the Shriver family, Baltimore Clipper Ships, the Class of
1891, Philanthropists of Baltimore, and Famous Beauties of Baltimore.  In
the 1950s, the university began construction of the building and
commissioned artist Leon Kroll to paint the entrance murals.  With the help
of Johns Hopkins registrar Irene Davis, Kroll collected physical
descriptions, photographs, and costumes to accurately portray the
individuals named by Shriver. In 1956, the lobby murals made their debut.

Peirce was on a year-to-year contract in the mathematics department as a
lecturer in logic, but with neither rank nor tenure.  After five years his
contract was not renewed, because of a scandal in his marital and
non-marital life.  But during those five years he founded and led the
Metaphysical Club which had members from several departments including many
men from the Philosophy department.  Peirce presented many papers at the
club’s meetings and gained the admiration of all members.

By the time the artist researched the matter, Peirce had already become
recognized as one of, if not the, most famous American philosophers. So in
recognition of this, the artist Leon Kroll
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=885bda62df=0c7ad465a8>
included
Peirce (see arrow, far left).  The reason Peirce is not wearing an academic
robe is because his only degree was a BA from Harvard.

**

Feel free to use the above in any manner you see fit, including ARISBE.


Yours, Prof. David Marans
St. Thomas University
Florida, USA

===
A Clerk ther was of Oxenford also,
That unto logyk hadde longe y-go..
Sownnge in moral vertu was his speche,
And gladly wolde he lerne and gladly teche.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Peirce Society Newsletter 5:2

[Gary Richmond]

ge.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=62cc3028cb=860edf35dc>

Richard Kenneth Atkins, “A Peircean Examination of Gettier’s Two Cases,”
*Synthese*, doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03361-8
<https://peircesociety.us15.list-manage.com/track/click?u=2d67a1b536f133c3e9f9d5d8c=5f03aae27e=860edf35dc>

Pedro Atã and João Queiroz, “O Externalismo Semiótico Ativo de C.S. Peirce
e a Cantoria de Viola como Signo em Ação,” *Trans/Form/Acao*, 44: 3,
177–205.

D.A. Anapolitanos and D. Christopoulou, “Peirce and Leibniz and Continuity
and the Continuum,”  *Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and
Metaphysics*, 21:1, 115-128.

Neil Boulting, “The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy Debate
Revisited: Hartshorne, Peirce, and Weil,” *Process Studies*, 50:1, 88–106.

Stephano Poggi, “Metempsicosi positivistiche? Charles Sanders Peirce e
William James,” *Rivista di Filosofia*, 111:3, 491–511.

M.D. Murtagh, “The Firstness of Sexual Difference: Charles Sanders Peirce,
American Pragmatist and Incorporeal Feminist," *philoSophia: A Journal of
Continental Feminism*, 10:1, 1–23.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

Phyllis, Jon, Gary F, List,

PC: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of
music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?

In my view it depends on whether the piece of music or dance or art object
was 'reproduced' internally from something already 'composed', in which
case I'd say it is a *token*; or if it is, shall we say, a 'spur of the
moment' creation, then it is the original *sign *which may have tokens. But
in both linguistic and art creation, I am still unsettled on what the
*object* of that original sign is.

And a related question: since there is obvious 'structure' even in, say,
jazz improvisation (e.g., John Coltrans), or interpretive dance (Isadora
Duncan), or 'action painting' (Jackson Pollock), structure that in almost
all cases has its roots in previous study in the art form even if/when it
diverges radically from its historically more conservative or established
forms.

I'm glad you've introduced the arts into this discussion, Phyllis, as there
is a tendency among many -- if not most -- philosophers, semioticians,
logicians, mathematicians, etc. -- to work and write as if *only*
linguistic and mathematical signs were of interest and importance. And I've
yet to be much impressed by what I've seen of work in semiotics in the arts
(with a few notable exceptions, such as Martin Lefebvre) most of which is
not grounded in Peircean but, rather, other schools of semiotics (again,
then are exceptions, such as Claudio Guerri). But there may be work in
these areas that I'm not aware of, especially as I've pretty much stopped
looking for it.

Best,

Gary R



“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 5:18 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:

> What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of music,
> a modern dance or an abstract piece of art?
>
> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 12:17 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F, Jon, List,
>>
>> GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied* here
>> and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter* it or not,
>> just as a spoken or written text is *embodied* in a pattern of sound
>> waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal* 
>> sign,
>> invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*? I would
>> certainly hesitate to call it a *type*."
>>
>>
>> That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult to
>> answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that internal
>> sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a subway token
>> which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or, for your
>> thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought, expressed
>> in language written or spoken).
>>
>> But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the
>> subway token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed
>> thought?
>>
>> Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
>> dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
>> the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream
>> to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something
>> like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought
>> before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token.
>>
>> A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written or
>> spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal
>> expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more
>> developed way..
>>
>> Jon wrote:
>>
>> JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because
>> it is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an internal
>> thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries that are
>> marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue in which
>> the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of the same
>> (quasi-)mind.  the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign
>> is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or
>> marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text.
>>
>>
>> But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original thought
>> is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a random,
>> yet high

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon, List,

GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied* here and
now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter* it or not, just as a
spoken or written text is *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks
on a page. The only difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible
to others. Does that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate
to call it a *type*."


That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult to
answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that internal
sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a subway token
which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or, for your
thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought, expressed
in language written or spoken).

But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway
token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed thought?

Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the
dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than
the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream
to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something
like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought
before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token.

A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written or
spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal
expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more
developed way..

Jon wrote:

JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because it
is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an internal
thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries that are
marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue in which
the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of the same
(quasi-)mind.  the pattern of neural activity that embodies a thought-sign
is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of sound waves or
marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text.


But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original thought
is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a random,
yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as the
expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of neural
activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much
as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or
written text," and so the same questions just above might be put to,
especially, the verbal expression of that "highly original thought."

Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might be
better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the terminology
forged in semeiotic grammar. On the other hand, it would seem that for the
purposes of developing a scientific semeiotic that we require such
terminology to even speak about semiosis with other semioticians, to
discuss semiosis generally, or individual examples of semiosis, etc. The
danger, as I'm beginning to see it, is the possibility of getting 'lost' in
the terminology, to see individual trees rather than the forest, so to
speak. In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at
least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a
possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I doubt that few
would say that there aren't major challenges in dealing with Peirce's
semeiotic terminology as it develops over the course of his logical life.

I am only today grappling with the intriguing question you posed, Gary F,
and just a few minutes ago read Jon's post, so all of this is still quite
unsettled in my thinking. I'm eager to explore it further.

Best,

Gary R




“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 9:16 AM  wrote:

> Jon, Gary R, List,
>
> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by my
> internal editor.
>
> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they
> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However,
> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in
> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" as
> a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of those
> signs.
>
> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

List,

To follow up on the message I just sent out:

When I first came to live in NYC, and for several decades after, when you
wanted to take the subway you would go to a booth and purchase
subway 'tokens'. Each subway token was a token (in Peircean terms) of
the *type*, 'that object which will get you a single ride on the subway'. GR
“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 1:52 AM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon A.S., Gary F, List,
>
> JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of
> speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
> a token (emphasis added, GR).
> GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than
> sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:
>
> A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that
> one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at
> any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
> occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
> single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
> call a *Token*. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537,
> 1906)
>
>
> JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only
> an *individual *organism is properly called a token.
> GR: This follows from the above.
>
> JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different
> levels of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
> GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least
> somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of
> biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on
> 'genus':
>
> The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_(biology)>. The standards for
> genus classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities
> often produce different classifications for genera.
>
>
> Something similar is true for 'species': see:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species
>
> JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens
> where they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those
> *individual *instances is governed by the *general *type to which it
> conforms.
> GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation
> offered, that "only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."
>
> JAS: However, *individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as
> a word in English*, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type
> "ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
> those signs (emphasis added, GR).
> GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans,
> biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate
> the two.
>
> JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs"
> is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is
> why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
> GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
> unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late
> quotation:
>
> CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to
> our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only
> it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning
> Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)
>
>
> Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things
> regarding what Peirce thought, ought to be and *can be* quasi-settled
> (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say
> that from the standpoint of what Peirce meant (*at least* in the context
> of semeiotic grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding
> 'token', 'type', 'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be
> quasi-settled (the principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).
>
> At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce
> thought and wrote: Are there *any* terms and their accompanying meanings
> which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms
> and ideas. And one of these is that "*within the context of speculative
> grammar*. . . only an *individual *emb

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens

[Gary Richmond]

Jon A.S., Gary F, List,

JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of
speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a
token (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than
sufficient textual support for this claim. One clear, oft repeated example:

A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one
happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any
one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as
occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a
single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to
call a *Token*. (Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, CP 4.537,
1906)


JAS: Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only an
*individual *organism is properly called a token.
GR: This follows from the above.

JAS: Genus and species are both types, which correspond to different levels
of generality that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
GR: I agree that genus and species are types; and that they "are at least
somewhat arbitrary" is clear from a consideration of the history of
biological classification. Take this remark from the Wikipedia article on
'genus':

The composition of a genus is determined by taxonomists
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxonomy_(biology)>. The standards for genus
classification are not strictly codified, so different authorities often
produce different classifications for genera.


Something similar is true for 'species': see:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Species

JAS: Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where
they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances
is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms.
GR: This follows from the first statement above and the Peirce quotation
offered, that "only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."

JAS: However, *individual humans are not tokens of the type "man" as
a word in English*, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type
"ἄνθρωπος" as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
those signs (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I agree. This is an important distinction: namely, individual humans,
biologically vs the type, "man" or "human," mere words. Let's not conflate
the two.

JAS: Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs"
is simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is
why the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable.
GR: I agree that "the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be
unavoidable." Take, as supporting this notion the following, very late
quotation:

CSP: . . .we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to
our outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only
it calls up some feeling, effort, or thought. . . (The Art of Reasoning
Elucidated, MS [R] 678:23, 1910)


Perhaps it comes from my personal sense that at least some things regarding
what Peirce thought, ought to be and *can be* quasi-settled (the principle
of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here) So, I would say that from the
standpoint of what Peirce meant (*at least* in the context of semeiotic
grammar), what has been presented above (by JAS) regarding 'token', 'type',
'sign', all of this seems to me as if it ought to be quasi-settled (the
principle of fallibility requires the 'quasi-' here too).

At moments like this a question in my mind recurs: regarding what Peirce
thought and wrote: Are there *any* terms and their accompanying meanings
which are truly irrefutable? I personally think that there are such terms
and ideas. And one of these is that "*within the context of speculative
grammar*. . . only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a token."

Best.

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Thu, Nov 4, 2021 at 6:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is
> a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that
> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and
> species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality
> that are at least somewhat arbitrary.
>
> Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where
> they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual 
> *instances
> is governed by the *general *t

[PEIRCE-L] Theosemiotic, the entire universe as a narrative or argument?

[Gary Richmond]

List,

In an off List message Gary Fuhrman offered this quotation by the Peirce
scholar, most recently president of the Charles S. Peirce Society (now past
president) through the covid lockdown year of 2020, Michael Ramposa.


“For anyone who embraces theosemiotic, the entire universe is a text, not
so much a library, where two separate volumes might be pulled off the
shelves and juxtaposed, but a single grand narrative, with an infinite
variety of subplots.”  —Raposa, Michael L.. *Theosemiotic* (pp. 189-190).
Fordham University Press. .


In regard to this quotation Gary F asked the question:  "What’s the
difference between a narrative and an argument? Is the entire universe
both?" (Or neither; or something else.)


It would seem that for Peirce the answer is that the universe *is* an
"argument."


For those who embrace theosemiotic (and even for those who don't), what are
your thoughts?


Best,


Gary R




“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon A.S., List,

The introduction of psychological considerations into this discussion is, I
think, important, posing perhaps some interesting challenges for Peirce's
logic.

GF: If two minds can be simultaneously *distinct* and *welded* into one
mind *in the sign*, and the exchange of connected signs we call a
“dialogue” can be that one sign, why can’t the distinct determinations of
the minds of utterer and interpreter be “welded” into the Cominterpretant?
There is no relation of antecedence between interpretants, as there is
between object, sign and interpretant.

GF: This may be paradoxical, and Peirce himself admits that the text quoted
above may be “loose talk,” but maybe that’s what it takes to sustain a
binocular
vision <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/gld.htm#x19> (both logical and
psychological) of semiosis. . . Anyway I think it’s compatible with your
own explanation.

That "loose talk" includes, however, this rather telling 'binocular'
comment:

"Accordingly, it is not merely *a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity
of Logic*, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. (CP
4.551 <https://gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm#4551>, 1906)


Yet even here the psychology/logic *distinction* is adumbrated, for
dialogic, Peirce writes, is a mere *fact* for psychology, but a *necessity*
for logic.

That passage in turn reminded me of this remark by Peirce to the effect
that approaching research into Speculative Rhetoric his rule of excluding
psychological content could be relaxed in the interest of making the last
branch of logic as semeiotic "practically useful."


CSP: In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic
have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the
severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how
we think, and the like. The regulation has served its end; why should it be
allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful?
CP 2.107

A few years ago Ben Udell and I contributed a short chapter, "Logic is
rooted in the social principle, and vice versa" in a volume, C*harles
Sanders Peirce in His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics, Communication and
Cognition*, edited by Torkild Thellefsen and Ben Sorensen. I had long been
intrigued by the juxtaposition of these two snippets of Peirce. . .

1. Logic is rooted in the social principle. CP 2.653
2. So the social principle is rooted intrinsically in logic.CP 5.354


. . . and the invitation to contribute a chapter to that volume offered the
opportunity to think more deeply on that juxtaposition. I've more to say on
the topic of course, but for now I will only remark that Peirce was clear
that the work of science was essentially not that of individuals but of
communities of common scientific interest over sometimes great lengths of
time. But having run out of time as I approach a busy evening, for now I
will only leave those two snippets as a kind of intellectual koan for List
members to reflect on. Of course they're taken out of context (one can get
by reading the CP passages surrounding the two snippets and, perhaps,
reading Ben's and my paper). But even as given above, stripped of context,
I think they're worth contemplating.

Best,

Gary R

(PS I see Jon has also responded to your post, Gary, but I'd written most
of this before it appeared on the List and wanted to send it off today;
I'll  have to read Jon's post late this evening or tomorrow.)

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Tue, Oct 26, 2021 at 8:59 AM  wrote:

> Jon AS, List,
>
> JAS: Likewise, any "determination of the mind of the utterer," including
> both motivation and intention, cannot be *any *interpretant of the sign
> that is *currently *being uttered. Instead, it still seems to me that
> such determinations must pertain somehow to the *object* of that sign,
> since they are *antecedent *to it.
>
> GF: Yes, that’s why I specified that the Intentional Interpretant was an
> interpretant of *the dialogue in which he was currently engaged*, which
> continues both before and after the utterance of the focal text — which is
> *not* an isolated sign.
>
> CSP: Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further
> be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at
> least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and
> although these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself,
> they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say,
> *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a
> necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of 

[PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts

[Gary Richmond]

List,

To incorrectly, in my opinion, define 'representamen' as 'the mediative
node' -- for example, as the 'function' that transforms 'input' into
'output' -- effectively assigns the role of mediating between the object
and interpretant to the* interpreter* rather than to the *sign*.

This, in turn, leads to the error of denying that there is any such thing
as an objectively correct (or objectively incorrect) reading of a text. In
terms Gary Fuhrman recently used, this mistaken view has the *internal
context **of *the interpreter *govern over* the *external context* that is
*shared* with the utterer.

If we abandon this ideal of objectivity -- which, of course, can never be
perfectly or exactly realized -- we are left with nothing that serves as a
*standard* for assessing actual interpretations.

In the view of some on this List and off, this goal in the case of a
written text is always properly discerning *the* *author's intended
meaning* (intentional
interpretant) as expressed in the text (immediate interpretant). For anyone
who makes the interpreter the mediator, rather than the sign being that,
there are only various individual readings, none of which is more or less
valid than any other.

Such a version of semiotics is not a *normative *science at all as It
provides no basis for evaluating any particular reading as a *better*
interpretation
of a text, or even a *mis*interpretation of the text. And who would
honestly deny that misinterpretations of texts do indeed occur? And who
would seriously argue that any and every interpretation is as good as any
other?

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Classifications of the Sciences (was Should we start a new email list)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, Robert, John, List,
As I have in the past, I encourage anyone who wants to explore in detail
and in depth all of Peirce's versions of a classification of the sciences
to study the sole monograph on these various versions, Charles S. Peirce:
Logic and the Classification of the Sciences by Beverley Kent.
https://www.amazon.com/Charles-S-Peirce-Classification-Sciences/dp/0773505628
Helmut Pape, in his review of the book [untitled, in *The Journal of
Speculative Philosophy* New Series, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1988)
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/i25668231>, pp. 140-145] highlights the 40
pages in which Kent explores these several versions from 1866 to the
"perennial" classification of 1903.
More recently, Akti-Veikko Pietarinen in "Interdisciplinarity and Peirce's
classification of the sciences: A centennial reassessment" (*Perspectives
on Science*, 14, 2006) comments on the "perennial" classification.

The overall structure of Peirce's [1903] classification, were it to be
applied in today's situation, would not, in any major respect, be radically
different from what it was designed to reflect a hundred years ago, in
spite of the virtually exponential creation and production of new domains
and the massive increase in investment in research and scientific
publication.




Best,Gary R
“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Tue, Oct 19, 2021 at 7:41 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Robert, John, List:
>
> The *word *"phenomenology" appears in these early attempts by Peirce at
> classifying the sciences, but here it *does not* designate what he later
> defines as the study of whatever is or could be present to the mind in any
> way. This is explicit in the first one (R 1345:4-6), where the first branch
> of "phenomenology" is philosophy, whose *only *two branches are logic and
> metaphysics, and the *other *two branches of "phenomenology" correspond
> to what Peirce later designates as the special sciences. Esthetics is
> nowhere to be found, while ethics comes *after *logic, metaphysics, and
> all those special sciences as the first branch of pragmatics. I see no
> reason to interpret the second one (R 1345:7) any differently, while the
> third one (R 1345:37-39, posted separately today) excludes all observation
> from philosophy and omits ethics altogether.
>
> Anybody who prefers R 1345 to Peirce's *mature *classification of the
> sciences obviously disagrees with *his own *explicitly stated assessment
> and multiple supporting arguments that the normative science of logic as
> semeiotic depends for principles on not only the hypothetical science of
> mathematics, but also the distinct positive science of phaneroscopy, as
> well as the other two normative sciences of esthetics and ethics. Frankly,
> it seems to me that this arrangement is so fundamental to Peirce's
> post-1900 thought that rejecting it, and instead subsuming phaneroscopy
> under mathematics (Robert) or semeiotic (John), is effectively abandoning *his
> *"analytic framework" altogether.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 12:39 PM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, Bernard, List,
>>
>> Two other Classification of Sciences from the MS 1345;
>>
>> *FIRST :*
>>
>> MS1345_004
>>
>> Part 3. *Encyclopaedia*
>>
>> The first year I would propose to point my masterly Syllabus of Science
>> of which I have given a table of contents.
>>
>> *Contents of Syllabus of Science.*
>>
>> Dividing all science into
>>
>> I. *Mathematics*, the study of ideal constructions.
>>
>> *II.** Phenomenology, *which observes phenomena and seeks to identify
>> their forms with those that mathematics has studied.
>>
>> *III. **Pragmatics, *which studies how we ought to act in the light of
>> experience.
>>
>> I consider Mathematics
>>
>> 1. *Geometry* and the mathematics of continua, giving only a few
>> generalities§1
>>
>> 2. *Arithmetic*, or the mathematics of discrete infinite collections.
>> The special merle of reasoning explained
>>  
>>§2
>>
>> 3. *The theory of finite groups*. The peculiarity of the reasoning
>> explained. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] 50,000 MS pages to be digitized

[Gary Richmond]

John, List,

I couldn't help but notice that quite recently you've changed from "nobody
can claim that anything other than an exact quotation is what Peirce
intended" (which is reasonable enough) to "Nobody has a clue about what
Peirce meant" (which seems doubtful at best) to today's "Nobody on planet
earth has the right to claim that their opinion about what Peirce meant,
intended, or implied is correct" (which at very least tends to overstate
the case; also, as I earlier remarked, you have yourself made this claim in
some of your own papers and List posts).

Equally odd, at least to me, is your notion that "Until all these
[unpublished] pages become available, nobody can make firm conclusions
about Peirce's final intentions on any issue" (which would imply that in
the meantime we ought to ignore the vast amount of Peirce texts that are
already available in print, online, and in microfilm). Indeed, as Jon Alan
Schmidt recently noted, if your advice were actually taken, then nobody,
including you, would bother to read or discuss Peirce at all.

Best,

Gary R.

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Tue, Oct 19, 2021 at 12:30 PM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> A short description of the MS pages that will be digitized:
>
> "But Peirce’s mature work is only available in his papers
> <https://id.lib.harvard.edu/ead/hou02614/catalog> at Houghton Library.
> These, estimated at some 50,000 manuscript pages, remain unpublished, and
> are in brittle condition. While some of these documents are available on a
> poor-quality, 60-year-old black and white microfilm, scholars have found
> that linear format limiting, and it fails to capture Peirce's meaningful
> use of color."
>
> Source: https://library.harvard.edu/collections/charles-s-peirce-papers
>
> Until all these pages become available, nobody can make firm conclusions
> about Peirce's final intentions on any issue.  Even then, nobody knows how
> many pages were lost , destroyed, misplaced, or stolen after he died.
>
> Fundamental principle:  Nobody on planet earth has the right to claim that
> their opinion about what Peirce meant, intended, or implied is correct.
> Peirce himself insisted that he was fallible.  All our opinions about what
> Peirce intended are fallible opinions about a person who was fallible.
>
> John
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:9367] GIBS 2022 CFP

[Gary Richmond]

y All" to REPLY ON 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] Message from the List moderator

[Gary Richmond]

Today I was reminded by Ben Udell, the co-manager of Peirce-L, that there
were times when Joe Ransdell would suggest a limit on messages sent per
day. Because of the flood of messages posted to the List (many regarding
the current controversies) we think that it's time to make that suggestion
again.

So, please everybody, for the time being, send no more than three messages
to the List a day.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as List moderator and co-manager with Ben Udell)


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Should we start a new email list?

[Gary Richmond]

h they have no canned answer.

GR: An extraordinary and incorrect assertion made worse by the insulting
reference to a "canned answer." Personal insults will not be tolerated on
this List, and since three people were referenced, including me, let this
stand as a warning.

As for the biggest complainers, they have been you, Edwina, and a few
others, not Jon A S, Gary F, or myself. While I'm not willing to dig up all
the complaints, those from you and Edwina far out number any other list
members'.

JFS: An example is my note about phaneroscopy as a science egg.  ADT had no
explanation for Peirce's remark.

GR: Andre De Tienne did not actively participate in this slowread.

JFS: Somebody mentioned the attempt by Atkins to broaden phaneroscopy..
But that attempt blurred the line between phaneroscopy and normative
science.  *When I observed that the combination of phaneroscopy and
normative science would be equivalent to semeiotic, they refused to
answer *(emphasis
added).

GR: "Refused to answer"? No one *needs* to answer anything here; that is
their choice. Plus, I thought you insisted that objections be met not with
answers but with questions. This WAS in fact questioned: this idea of yours
"*that the combination of phaneroscopy and normative science would be
equivalent to semeiotic*" doesn't occur anywhere in Peirce's work that I
know of or, for that matter, in the literature surrounding his *Classification
of the Sciences*. It's only your opinion.

JFS: These are very important questions that need to be asked.  I am not
complaining.  I am asking a question that gets to the heart of Peirce's
1903 classification.

GR: Am I permitted to ask: Isn't this *all* your opinion? That yours are
"very important questions" and that they get "to the heart of Peirce's 1903
classification"? Who else makes these claims? And didn't you just argue
that "there is only one kind of disagreement that can be stated as matter
of fact"? Well, you've stated your (non-mathematical, non-logical) claim as
a fact. So which is it?

JFS: Request:  I hereby request permission to broaden the list of
permissible topics on Peirce-L.

GR: There is no need for you to "hereby request permission. . ." As already
stated, there is no limitation and *never* has been a limitation on "the
list of permissible topics on Peirce-L." Who even suggested as much? I have
pointed to Joe Ransdell comments to the contrary: anything Peirce-related
is suitable for discussion here.

JFS: I respectfully disagree with GR and GF that Jon AS is the one who has
the most profound understanding of phanerosocpy or any other aspect of
Peirce's work.

GR: Neither Gary Fuhrman nor I have ever claimed any such thing. Jon
himself sees himself as a novice in phaneroscopic studies and has made that
clear on the List. He is, however, just the kind of amateur philosopher
whom Joe Ransdell saw as essential in the development of the kind of
democratic list he conceived of and meant to create.

JFS: There are other subscribers on this list who have a PhD in philosophy,
mathematics, and other subjects and who have long lists of publications on
topics related to Peirce and related topics -- Robert Marty, for example.

GR: Degrees and publications, academic appointments, etc. are fine as far
as they go. But good scholarship is good scholarship,and it matters little
what credentials the scholar may or may not have. I will also remark that
there has been considerable appreciation shown on this list for the work of
such scholars as Robert Marty, for example, his podium diagram, and that
appreciation has been expressed by, for example, Gary Fuhrman, Jon Alan
Schmidt, and myself.


More to come. . .


Best,


Gary Richmond (writing as List moderator)

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*





“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sat, Oct 16, 2021 at 5:59 PM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> Margartha, Gary F, Ediwna, Jerry R, List,
>
> Before saying anything else, I'll repeat my previous remark:  "both and",
> not "either or".  I would not drop my subscription to Peirce-L, but I hope
> to discuss topics about Cognitive Science, which do not seem to be welcome
> on this list.  For an example of those topics, please see
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.pdf
>
> MH:  What I am trying to say is that it does not make sense to slice and
> dice Peirce.  A lot can be learned from engaging in non-judgmental
> listening; that is, thinking without a judgmental sucking-up/talking-

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's contributions to the 21st century

[Gary Richmond]

possible to *better* understand such an original and difficult thinker over
time.

As for the possibility that an "applied researcher" in a given field might
have even a clearer understanding of some Peircean concept and its possible
application in her field than others involved in pure theoretical research,
I wouldn't doubt that for a moment, and John's work with CGs (but not only
with CGs) is proof positive of that.

What I *did* say, rather, was that pure and applied work can *mutually
fructify* each other. In my view, the likelihood of Peirce's pioneering
work being much further advanced in the real world would come both from a
better, clearer, deeper understanding of his theories, while the
accomplishments of those thinkers applying those theories in the real world
clarify the pure theory itself -- at least if they respect each other and
are in communication with each other (admittedly, the latter especially is
hard to do).

There may be a division of labor implied here, but not a division of
purpose. In my view, it's not a matter of "one *or* the other" but
something more like "all together one after another" (F. Matthias
Alexander).

Best,

Gary R



“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sun, Oct 10, 2021 at 6:39 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, List
>
> I won't speak for John but only myself. I'm a bit confused by your post.
>
> First - I don't believe that anyone - whether in the 'pure philosophy'
> field or the applied fields can ever say: 'OK, I now sufficiently and
> thoroughly understand Peirce's contributions' . Someone, either oneself or
> some one else - will have more to say.
>
> Nor, can one genuinely say that ONLY people engaged in 'pure philosophy'
> research are equipped to ever 'sufficiently and thoroughly understand
> Peirce'.  I'd say that people engaged in the 'non-philosophical fields' -
> whether theoretical or applied sciences, linguistics, AI, biology etc are
> capable of sufficient understanding of Peirce to use his theories and
> infrastructure to more clearly explain their fields.
>
> My understanding of what John wrote was that he was saying that some
> people interested in Peirce are focused purely on the texts - and not on
> applied analysis. And surely one can't have a problem with that! BUT - are
> you saying that the world should not engage in the applied analysis of
> Peirce unless and until the 'pure textual research' is done and finished?
> [if it ever is, which I doubt].
>
> Are you saying that a biologist or linguistic or economics researcher, who
> is not focused on textual, philosophical analysis, cannot understand Peirce
> enough to use his theories in their field? And has to wait until the
> 'theoretical researcher' has done their work?  I don't see things this way!
> Indeed - I'd even bet that the applied researcher might have a clear
> understanding of Peirce - just from their own field - because Peirce's work
> is pragmatic and operative in the real world.
>
> ???
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun 10/10/21 5:47 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> John, List,
>
> John, do you really believe that most everyone -- or even many a one --
> now working in linguistics, cognitive science, and AI sufficiently, let
> alone, thoroughly understands Peirce's contributions to philosophy,
> semeiotic and a number of relevant sciences and so they are now fully ready
> to employ it to springboard into a new "foundation for science"?  Would
> that were the case.
>
> Your paper, "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century" (which I read
> during that decade when I was attending your International Conference on
> Conceptual Structure and was reading all your papers then available as
> well as the 1st edition of your book on KR), your "Peirce's contributions"
> paper,  even in its abstract, suggests that you are, of course, well aware
> that Peirce has been severely neglected;  and, I would add, not only
> neglected but misused by certain thinkers, and not only those whom you
> mentioned in the analytic tradition.
>
> Abstract. Peirce was [. . .] a largely neglected philosopher in the 20th
> century. Peirce's research in logic, physics, mathematics, and lexicography
> made him uniquely qualified to appreciate the rigors of science, the
> nuances of language, and the semiotic processes that support both. Instead
> of using logic to understand language, the philosophers who began the
> analytic tradition — Frege, Russell, and Carnap — tried to replace language
> with a purified version of logic. As a result, th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's contributions to the 21st century (was Dimensionality

[Gary Richmond]

 you now have "no intention of telling anyone what
they should not do." But the implication of what you've written on the List
is and remains that those who are trying to thoroughly understand what
Peirce thought -- and as they see it *precisely* for the edification of
scholars and scientists of the present and future -- are, well, rather
wasting time since, apparently, we already know enough of what we need to
know of his thought. Is this why you think that only a few scholars,
philosophers, and scientists at conferences like APA are interested in
researching and learning about Peirce's work in depth?

Yet you also seem to "acknowledge that those with a textual focus are vital
to the whole research field," "but a far more important issue is what his
ideas mean for us today." Well, which is it? If a "textual focus' is *vital*,
then it would seem to be an* equally* important issue.

Of course I personally think these two ought to be put on an equal footing
and, in fact, mutually fructify each other. The scholars whom I know in
person or by reputation (and I know quite a few) who are working "with a
textual focus" would all like to see Peirce's work play a greater role in
the semeiotic, linguistic, and cognitive science of our day and into the
future. They merely tend to strongly agree with you when you write that
their focus is "vital to the whole research field."

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sun, Oct 10, 2021 at 1:30 PM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> I accidentally hit SEND on my previous reply.
>
> I won't criticize anybody's attempts to determine exactly what Peirce
> intended a century ago/  But a far more important issue is what his ideas
> mean for us today.  A few years ago, I wrote a widely cited n article with
> the title "Peirce's contributions to the 21st century:
> http://jfsowa.com/pubs/csp21st.  If I were writing that today, I'd add
> quite a bit more.
>
> On the topic of continuity and dimensionality, an enormous amount of new
> work has been published in the century after Peirce.  For a survey, see the
> article on infinite dimensional category theory in the October 2021 issue
> of Scientific American.  This is related to the work that Robert Marty and
> others have been discussing.
>
> Different people have different preferences.   Textual criticism of what
> Peirce wrote (as the PEP project was doing) is important.  Surveys of what
> Peirce wrote are also important.  But at APA,conferences that kind of work
> is buried in sessions that are only attended by Peirce scholars.
> Meanwhile, lectures on other 19th century philosophers and logicians
> (Frege, for example) get far more attention in general sessions.
>
> I have no intention of telling anyone what they should not do.  But Peirce
> himself wwas writing for the future, especially in the last several years
> of his life.  I believe that Peirce's legacy depends critically on his
> relevance for ongoing research today.  The Peirce Centennial Congress in
> 2014 was far more exciting.  It drew international participants from a wide
> range of fields who showed how Peirce's ideas had influenced their research
> today.
>
> I have no intention of stopping anybody from talking about the past, but
> Peirce's emphasis was always on the future.  I believe that Peirce would
> strongly encourage us to relate his ideas to the latest research today.
>
> John
>
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>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Improving the quality of discussions (wasAbracadabra

[Gary Richmond]

Correction: The first quotation in my post today should have been labeled
JFS (John Sowa) not JAS (Jon Alan Schmidt). My apologies. GR

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







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On Sat, Oct 9, 2021 at 3:01 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> John, List,
>
> JAS: It's important to recognize that we are all sinners,
> and to do our best to promote more constructive discussions.
>
>
> I agree. And in a philosophical forum such as this, to "do our best" is to
> be as reasonable as it is possible for each of us to be. After all,
> 'reasonableness' is Peirce's *summum bonum *of philosophical esthetics
> (his spelling), which principle accepted and followed can then ground
> philosophical ethics and, further, logic.
>
> The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior Reason is
> Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend
> it. Under this conception, *the ideal of conduct will be to execute our
> little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward
> rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to
> us" to do so.* In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is
> reasonableness. . .. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903. emphasis)
>
>
> The 'sin' -- for philosophy, logic, and science more generally -- is being
> *un*reasonable. As you concluded:  "Occasional lapses may occur.  But we
> should do our best."
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
> On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 10:58 PM sowa @bestweb.net 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary R:  My entire concern in this exchange and as regards the recent
>> discussions in parallel threads is that, given all the recent good
>> ideas on improving List discussions, can we sincerely 'practice what
>> we preach'?
>>
>> We are all sinners.  It's important to recognize that we are all sinners,
>> and to do our best to promote more constructive discussions. Occasional
>> lapses may occur.  But we should do our best .
>>
>> John
>>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Improving the quality of discussions (wasAbracadabra

[Gary Richmond]

John, List,

JAS: It's important to recognize that we are all sinners,
and to do our best to promote more constructive discussions.


I agree. And in a philosophical forum such as this, to "do our best" is to
be as reasonable as it is possible for each of us to be. After all,
'reasonableness' is Peirce's *summum bonum *of philosophical esthetics (his
spelling), which principle accepted and followed can then ground
philosophical ethics and, further, logic.

The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior Reason is
Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend
it. Under this conception, *the ideal of conduct will be to execute our
little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward
rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to
us" to do so.* In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is
reasonableness. . .. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903. emphasis)


The 'sin' -- for philosophy, logic, and science more generally -- is being
*un*reasonable. As you concluded:  "Occasional lapses may occur.  But we
should do our best."

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







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On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 10:58 PM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> Gary R:  My entire concern in this exchange and as regards the recent
> discussions in parallel threads is that, given all the recent good
> ideas on improving List discussions, can we sincerely 'practice what
> we preach'?
>
> We are all sinners.  It's important to recognize that we are all sinners,
> and to do our best to promote more constructive discussions. Occasional
> lapses may occur.  But we should do our best .
>
> John
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Improving the quality of discussions (was Abracadabra

[Gary Richmond]

John, List,

JFS: When people make statements on Peirce-L, they usually have a good
reason for making them.  If one happens to disagree with them, it's far
better (more fruitful and more likely to lead to a deeper understanding) to
ask a question than to contradict what they said.

I agree with the three quotations in your reply to my note.  But I want to
emphasize the issues in my  note.

My entire concern in this exchange and as regards the recent discussions in
parallel threads is that, given all the recent good ideas on improving List
discussions, can we sincerely 'practice what we preach'?

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 1:19 PM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> Gary R,
>
> When people make statements on Peirce-L, they usually have a good reason
> for making them.  If one happens to disagree with them, it's far better
> (more fruitful and more likely to lead to a deeper understanding) to ask a
> question than to contradict what they said.
>
> I agree with the three quotations in your reply to my note.  But I want to
> emphasize the issues in my  note.   See below for a copy of those
> quotations followed by a copy of my note.
>
> John
>
> -
>
> "Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt that
> this is largely illusory . . . because their reasonings are prominent in
> their consciousness, and are attended to, while their instincts [and
> emotions] they are hardly aware of. . . .   — Charles S. Peirce
>
> "To think is easy. To act is difficult. To act as one thinks is the most
> difficult.” — Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
>
> “Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. The first principle is
> that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool.” —
> Richard Feynman
> On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 12:50 AM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote
>
> I agree that those suggestions are helpful:
>
>>
>> GR:  [Margaretha's] ideas and suggestive metaphors about how List
>> discussion might be improved -- along with the suggestions by John Sowa and
>> Gary Furhman which Jon Alan Schmidt just quoted -- if taken up in the
>> spirit of collegiality, could help improve communication here considerably.
>>
>> I would like to add a few more suggestions.
>>
>> The first one is that the method of asking questions, as in Plato's
>> dialogues with Socrates as the discussion leader, is one of the best ways
>> to promote fruitful discussions.  People may be offended by a direct
>> contradiction of what they just said, but nobody is offended by an honest
>> question.  (A loaded question can be offensive. e.g. "Have you stopped
>> beating your wife?")
>>
>> The so-called "Socratic method" can also be annoying when pushed to an
>> extreme.  But  an honest question is more likely to generate a fruitful
>> discussion.
>>
>> For Peirce, it's especially important to recognize that he had a very
>> fertile imagination, and his ideas were constantly growing .and developing
>> over the years.  His comment "symbols grow"  indicates that the same words
>> on different occasions may have very different meanings and implications:
>>
>> 1903:  For every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that
>> is no mere figure of speech.  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but
>> the meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off
>> old ones.  (CP 2.222).
>>
>> The only statements by Peirce that remain constant are the ones in
>> mathematics and formal logic  A statement in math or logic has a fixed
>> meaning forever.  But Peirce's comments about then may change, as we have
>> noted in various discussions.
>>
>> The following point is significant:
>>
>> CSP:  The little that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that
>> matter, to any other department of philosophy), has been entirely the
>> fruit of this outgrowth from formal logic, and is worth much more than
>> the small sum total of the rest of my work, as time will show.
>> (CP 5.469, R318, 1907)
>>
>> The categories of 1-ness, 2-ness, and 3-ness are based on logic, and they
>> have been central to his thought throughout.  But his applications of those
>> ideas continued to grow.  Even in his late writings of 1913, his ideas
>> continued to grow, and he had hopes of writing more.  Nobody on planet
>> earth can be cer