Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
tter to Welby in December 1908, while in May 1911--more than two years later--he stated plainly, "A *Graph*, then, as the word is used when it is plain that an *Existential *Graph is meant, is not a sign or mark or any other existent or actual individual." Hence, *this *is his final word on the matter. JFS: The word 'tone' is a special case of an auditory mark. ... Even for a spoken utterance, it would not be used to distinguish differences in the subject matter. I could say instead that the word "mark" is a special case of a visible tone. Either way, the role of a tone/mark in Peirce's semeiotic is not to distinguish differences in *subject matter* (object), but to distinguish differences in *meaning *(interpretant). Different tokens of the same type can be uttered (spoken, printed, handwritten, etc.) with different tones/marks as "indefinite significant characters" that change their *effects *on interpreters. JFS: Even for Peirce's example of a camel, the sound of a camel has been compared to a toilet flushing. Nobody would call that a tone. But it is certainly a prominent mark of a camel. Again, "mark" as used here is *not *what Peirce defines as the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." His example of "camel" has nothing to do with the *animal *that we call by that name in English, he is talking about the *word *"camel"; and for any actual *instance *(token) of that word, a tone/mark is a significant *quality *of the sound when it is spoken, the typeface when it is printed, the ink when it is handwritten, etc. JFS: His choice of 'mark' is more consistent with his definition in Baldwin's dictionary and other English dictionaries. Again, "mark" as a candidate name for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "tone" is *not consistent at all* with Peirce's definition of that word in Baldwin's dictionary. It is not a term that can be predicated of anything of which certain other terms can be predicated, it is "an indefinite significant character." JFS: We acknowledge that the definition of the word 'mark' generally refers to a physical instance. But any English word that refers to something physical can also be used to refer to the abstract form of that thing. Again, whether we choose "tone" or "mark," this term *does not* refer to the "definitely significant Form" (type) of something physical (token), but to "an indefinite significant character" of something physical. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 19, 2024 at 4:22 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > The word 'instance' is an *OPTIONAL *term that may be added to almost any > noun in the English language. As I'm now looking out the window, I see > three tree instances nearby and many more instance of trees farther down > the hill. But the word 'instance' may be dropped when there is no need to > emphasize that distinction. Most English speakers never use the word > 'instance'. They would just say "I see three trees nearby and many more > down the hill" > > In mathematics, everything is abstract (a "might be" as Peirce would > say). But when mathematicians who speak any language draw instances of > geometrical entities (circles, triangles, hexagons...) on a blackboard or > whiteboard or paper..., they do not refer to them as circle instances, > hexagon instances, etc. They just call them circles or hexagons. Nobody > gets confused by that convention. > > JAS: Peirce *only *uses the word "graph" for "a mere form, an > abstraction, a 'general' or as I call it a 'might-be'"; and he states > explicitly that "it would be incorrect to say that the graph *itself *is > put upon the sheet. For that would be an impossibility." > > On that point, we are in total agreement. And since Peirce is trying to > teach his readers a totally new notation for expressing a new form of > diagrammatic reasoning, he uses that *OPTIONAL *word 'instance' to > emphasize the distinction. > > But I suggest that you look at any book on mathematics. To make the > comparison more obvious, look at books on geometry from Euclid to the > present. Most authors rarely or never use the word 'instance' when they > talk about circles or triangles they draw. > > JAS: Peirce also acknowledges the *convenience *of talking only about > graphs (or words), not graph-instances (or word-instances). > > Thank you for acknowledging what I have been saying. The only point > where there may be some disagreement is over the word 'convenience'. In > English, the default for
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
rticle, *the*, will commonly occur, on an average page of novel or essay, over twenty times. They are reckoned by the editor who asks for an article of so many thousand "words" as distinct words; but in fact they are only twenty or more *instances *of the same word; and if the editor takes any pleasure in speaking accurately he should call for an article of so many thousand "word-instances." At any rate, it would be highly inconvenient to call "Graph-instances" Graphs. (R 669:9-10, LF 1:579, 1911 May 27) Here Peirce explicitly *denies *that a graph is a "mark," which he explicitly *equates *with an "existent or actual individual," i.e., a token--so "mark" is plainly unsuitable for naming a *different *member of the same trichotomy. In any case, the bottom line is that when a graph is scribed on the sheet, what actually stands on the sheet as a result is *not *a graph, but a graph-instance. GR: 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the orchestra. 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. JFS: Yes, they are normal sentences because the word 'tone' in these examples is used to refer to the actual sound that is heard, not to some mark that might distinguish one tone of voice from another. No, the word "tone" in Gary's examples is used to refer to a certain *quality *of the actual sound that is heard, which *can *distinguish one flute from another or one utterance from another. Likewise, in my own example, all lowercase, all caps, bold, italics, and color *can *be employed to distinguish different instances (tokens) of the same word (type) from each other such that they have different dynamical interpretants in their different contexts. Such an "indefinitely significant character" is *exactly *what Peirce defines as a "tone," the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type" (CP 4.537). JFS: Nobody has found anything later (or better at any time) on this topic. Later, maybe not; better is obviously a subjective judgment. I have quoted several passages in this post alone, as well as in my previous posts, that I believe are *better *in the sense that they are *clearer*. JFS: My primary concern is that you and Jon have made claims abut Peirce without showing any justification. Anyone who alleges that we have offered no justification for our claims about Peirce is either not paying attention or willfully ignoring the *considerable *evidence that we have provided. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 6:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, Gary, List, > > Please reread the paragraph below by Peirce from L376 (December 1911). > The example he uses is 'existential graph'. He uses exactly the same word > with no change whatsoever for the abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern > of spots, lines, and ovals) and the visible graph as it is written on a > phemic sheet. > > CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would > be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it > would be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet. > For that would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere > form, an abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. > something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in > that respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R > L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8) > > This is Peirce's final word on the subject: the word 'graph' (or the > longer phrase 'existential graph') is the correct term to use for *BOTH *the > abstract form and for the visible drawing on a phemic sheet. If you need > more examples, look at how Peirce writes about the EGs he is using to > *SOLVE *problem or *PROVE *a theorem. In every such example, he calls > them graphs, not graph-instances. The only cases when he might talk about > a graph instance is in *METALANGUAGE *about the theory. If anybody finds > such examples, please let us know. > > JAS: However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating > it, by explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being > observed is the [mark] itself--we need a *different* word for the > embodiment of the [mark], such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." > Alternatively, if "mark" is the right word for the embodiment, then we need > a *different* word for the form itself. > > No. Th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Gary, List:
Needless to say, I strongly agree. I would like to revisit what John Sowa
quoted from Peirce in an attempt to support his claim that "'mark' is the
best word for both the might-be and the actual" (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00095.html).
CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would
be an assertion is called a *graph*. If it actually be so scribed, it would
be incorrect to say that the graph *itself* is put upon the sheet. For that
would be an impossibility, since the *graph* itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*. (R
L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8)
John also proposed the following generalization.
JFS: Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere]
would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it
would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that
would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something
which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel.
However, this *contradicts* John's claim instead of corroborating it, by
explicitly stating that we *cannot* say that what is being observed is the
[mark] itself--we need a *different* word for the embodiment of the [mark],
such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if "mark" is
the right word for the embodiment, then we need a *different* word for the
form itself.
Moreover, as I have already explained at length (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00096.html), Peirce
explicitly refers to the kind of sign that he is describing as "a
'general,'" thus corresponding to 3ns not 1ns; and his two examples are an
existential graph and the word "camel," both of which he unambiguously
classifies as *types* in other writings, thus necessitants not possibles.
Accordingly, I suggest the following generalization instead.
JAS: Any [observable] form which, if it were [embodied anywhere] would be
[a token] is called a [*type*]. If it actually be so [embodied], it would
be incorrect to say that the [type] *itself* is [embodied]. For that would
be an impossibility, since the [*type*] itself [is] a mere form, an
abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "[would]-be", i.e. something
which [would] be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that
respect it [is] just like a "*word*,"--*any* word, say *camel*.
After all, Peirce *defines* a necessitant "type" as "a definitely
significant Form" and provides *different* words for its existent
embodiments, namely, "tokens" that are "instances" of the type (CP 4.537,
1906). Hence, the quoted passage in R L376 turns out to have no relevance
whatsoever to what we call the *possible* member of this
trichotomy--"tone," "mark," or some other name.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 5:50 PM Gary Richmond
wrote:
> John, Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> JFS:
> 1. A hump is a mark of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant.
>
> Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
> the following two sentences:
>
> 1. A hump is a tone of a camel.
> 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant.
>
>
> Compare this to:
>
> GR:
> 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in
> the orchestra.
> 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>
> "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would
> understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider
> the following two sentences:"
>
> 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in
> the orchestra.
> 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry.
>
> Again, quoting snippets of Helmut and Jon: ". . . a mark is an actual
> material sign. . " while "a possible sign. . . is never *itself *"an
> actual material sign."
>
> To which I added: "Even when 'mark' is used *figuratively* ("mark my
> words" "he made his mark in the art world" "it's a mark of collegiality to
> 'x' ") physical material is brought to mind."
>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
areas. These are indefinite in the sense that no *specific *shape, thickness, or color is prescribed for them, although Peirce suggests in one manuscript that the colors of names and lines of identity *could *be utilized as tones to distinguish hypostatic abstractions from determinate individuals. CSP: The difficulty of representing a hypostatic abstraction in existential graphs (which I trust may be conquered eventually) is that what suggests itself is to distinguish individuals regarded as determinate in every respect, so that the principle of excluded middle applies to them, by (for example) using a different colored ink say red from that say blue used in scribing predicates such as ‘is wise’. But then the dot which denotes ‘something,’ should be red while the continuous line which has a dot at every part of it should be blue. Perhaps the remedy would be to make this line *purple*. Solomon*---*is wise But when the operation of hypostatic abstraction is performed, the proposition takes the form 'Solomon *possesses wisdom*' or 'Solomon is possessor of wisdom.' I must interpose a special dyadic relative between two parts of the line, as well as changing the color of 'is wise'. (R 96:11-12, LF 1:513n6, 1905) On the other hand, the overall *size *of an EG is *not *a tone, because it is not *significant*--it has no effect on the *meaning *of the EG. JFS: This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody has written in all the notes on this subject. Again, there is a stark contrast between such a forceful (and overreaching) pronouncement with what Gary and I have repeatedly said about our discussion of this topic--readers can and should evaluate the arguments on both sides for themselves, and then make up their own minds. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 12:04 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted > Peirce's explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be' > should have exactly the same spelling as the word that names the actual > thing. See below for a copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of > Peirce's statement. > > But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's > unfortunate choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy. > > In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term > 'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the > same spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic > sheet. Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an > abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just > like a 'word', any word, say camel". > > I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the > profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may > be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( token type). Consider > the following two sentences: > > 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. > 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. > > Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would > understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider > the following two sentences: > > 1. A hump is a tone of a camel. > 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant. > > Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had > read Peirce's writings. For those of us who believe that it's important to > bring Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we > cannot assume that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce > scholars). > > In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else > uses one of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use. It > is abundantly clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer > programmers have adopted and used the pair (token type) frequently, and > some of them even mention Peirce. But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use > 'tone' as the first term. And even Peirce scholars never use it for a > broad audience. > > Fundamental principle: We live in the 21st C. Our readers live in the > 21st C. The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is > confusing to our readers today. It has no redeeming social or academic > value whatsoever. Get rid of it. > > John > > -- > The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type): > > Great news! I came across a quotation by Peirce that explains why the > word that names an abstract "might be" *SHOU
[PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Helmut, List: HR: I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three relations. According to Peirce, the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating has three correlates--the sign, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. This relation is *irreducibly *triadic, such that it is not *composed *of its constituent dyadic relations, although it *involves *the genuine dyadic relations between the sign and its external correlates--its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its final interpretant. HR: Each of the three relations (if it may be said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign and itself), are of one of three classes so a sign triad it is a composition of classes. According to Peirce, there is no trichotomy for the sign's *relation *with itself. In his 1903 taxonomy, the first trichotomy is for the sign itself *as a correlate*, while the second and third trichotomies are for the sign's genuine dyadic *relations *with its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant. Together, these three trichotomies result in ten sign classes, not "compositions of classes"--one class of qualisigns (later tones), three classes of sinsigns (tokens), and six classes of legisigns (types); three classes of icons, four classes of indices, and three classes of symbols; six classes of rhemes (later semes), three classes of dicisigns (phemes), and one class of arguments (delomes). In his 1906-1908 taxonomies, Peirce adds trichotomies for the other five correlates, the sign's genuine dyadic relation with its dynamical interpretant, and the genuine triadic relation. Together, these ten trichotomies *would *result in 66 sign classes upon being arranged in their proper logical order of determination, but Peirce himself never did this. HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction. According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols *involve *indices and icons, and all indices *involve *icons. Moreover, a sign can be *predominately *iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or *predominately* indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant Forms" are *embodied *in tokens, such that every type *involves* tokens (its instances) and every token *involves *tones. Most (maybe all) of the other eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, although the necessitant typically *involves *the existent and the possible, and the existent *involves *the possible. For example, every sign must be *either *a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes *involve *phemes and semes, and all phemes *involve *semes. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Apr 16, 2024 at 11:33 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Jon, List, > > you wrote: > > "Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 > trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object > is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp > distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting > any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying > any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and > an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a > *degenerate > *sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. > 1901)." > > I think: A sign triad is an irreducible composition of the three > relations. Therefore e.g an index doesn´t come alone, it cannot be a "pure" > one. So I donot see a point in guessing, what a pure icon would be like, it > is not possible, can not exist. Each of the three relations (if it may be > said, that "the sign alone" is a relation too, a relation between the sign > and itself), are of one of three classes. so a sign triad it is a > composition of classes. But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel > classes (such as icon, index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a > sharp distinction. > > Best regards, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.e
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: On the contrary, as Helmut and Gary have observed, that is the reason why the word "mark" is a terrible choice--someone who is unfamiliar with the details of Peirce's semeiotic will almost certainly misunderstand and misuse it as signifying "an actual material sign," thus incorrectly treating it as virtually synonymous with "token" instead of "tone/tuone/tinge/potisign." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Apr 15, 2024 at 5:42 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Helmut, Jon, List, > > That is the reason why the word 'Mark' is the perfect choice: you won't > be wrong whether or not you know the details of Peirce's semeiotic. > > HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I > felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs > too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual > material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. > > The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a > word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody: > academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical > sense and everybody else who doesn't know Peirce's technical sense. > > In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be > correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone. He also > considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the > sound of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that > subset of marks that could be tinges. But the word 'mark' covers all those > sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings. > > That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was > close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended. Since > the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little > about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose > terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Helmut, List: HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by Peirce--while such a possible sign must be *embodied *in an existent token in order to *act *as a sign, it is never *itself *"an actual material sign." HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with the gist of it in accordance with synechism. HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". Classification is not *always *"either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A *pure *icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a *pure *index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has *both *an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a *genuine *sign, an index is a *degenerate *sign, and an icon is a *doubly degenerate* sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901). HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". Determination in sign classification can be *described *using if-then, but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme. HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns). Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that *composition *is itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 14, 2024 at 11:18 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > > List, > > I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, > that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too > much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material > sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. > Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: > > "But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no > precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world > itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be > counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and > shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words > 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are > so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be > obsolete today." > > Ok, there are not always clear boundaries in time, but nevertheless there > are clear boundaries (in the world itself) in properties, space and > function at a certain moment, if this certain moment is in the present or, > as a matter of retrospection, in the past. > > In this thread, taxonomy too is a topic. Taxonomy is a kind of > classification, and classification is "either-or". So, betweeen classes, > there are precise boundaries. Otherwise it would be "or", which as I think > is composition. BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" > to the "if". I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation > of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and > classification (3ns). > > Best regards > Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L p
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's ethics
n the peculiar force a general word may have in a proposition or argument. (CP 2.265, EP 2:297, 1903) On the other hand, since Peirce never spells out the proper logical order of the ten trichotomies in his 1906-1908 taxonomies, he also provides no corresponding text with examples of the 66 classes. I am inclined to think that this would be too granular for practical purposes anyway, but it can nevertheless be useful to look at different subsets. I have done so in a recent post (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00015.html) for the three interpretant trichotomies because I find the ten classes that result from arranging them as final/dynamical/immediate to be more plausible than the ten classes that result from arranging them as immediate/dynamical/final. I also suggested the following a couple of months ago (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00082.html ). - A question is a suggestive phemic actuous symbol, a proposition presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce action (elicit an answer). - A command is an imperative phemic actuous symbol, a proposition urged by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce action. - A hypothesis is a suggestive phemic temperative, a proposition presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control. - An assertion is an imperative phemic temperative, a proposition urged by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 1:06 PM Claudio Guerri wrote: > Dear Etwina, Gary, List > It has been a long time since I last wrote to the List, however, I still > receive the corresponding information and from time to time I find precise > indications on the possibility of deepening in some Peircean concept in my > extensive library on Peirce. > > Coming from architecture and design disciplines in general, I am > interested in being able to use the Peircean approach to better understand > the design project (as a semiotic process) and to be able to take practical > design decisions... and the same with respect to qualitative market > research... another discipline with a necessary practical scope. > > However, in both cases it is a matter of developing to the maximum the > aspects of the *enabling Firstness*: the *design* and the understanding > of the problem... a difficult subject if there are any... or… our world > would be a little better than what we have. > > I consider Peirce's *ethics* (2ness) to be directly related to his > training in chemistry where every element in Mendeleev's table must > necessarily be precisely nominated: H=1 cannot be confused with Pb=207. > This is not the case with other matters such as color where there may be a > subtle variation, unnameable with precision, in a [blue] or a [red]. > > However, this *ethical concern* (Peirce?) entails a serious contradiction > with respect to the Peircean triadic semiotics proposal where the main task > should not be the positive essence but the inter-relational construction of > a semiotic concept or process (Lizska wrote something about this). > > I believe that the exegesis of Peirce's work is still necessary given the > vastness and the difficult access to his writings. However, semiotics, as a > discipline with pretensions of *scientific methodology* (Magariños de > Morentin) does not deal with any exegesis, but with cognitive-semiotic > processes that are important in order to understand something about any > subject and to be able to make decisions of different kinds, for example: > > 1. *to make possible* the formal description of the logic of a > theoretical concept in order to improve it, change it or discard it > (1ness); > > 2. to analyze a concrete product or behavior to *determine* its relative > economic validity (2ness); and > > 3. to allow the analysis of any socio-cultural-political value in order to > make a *decision* (Althusser) coherent with the *needs* (Peirce) of a > given time and context (3ness). > > On the other hand, while the proposal to take the classification to 128 or > hundreds of thousands of different sign-subsigns is absolutely logical, I > wonder if there is a single person in the world who has developed that > immense semiotic process applied to any object, problem or concrete case. > Probably AI programs will be able to do it... but will anyone really be > able to understand and review it for practical purposes? > > This is why I have developed the *Semiotic Nonagon* as a practical tool > for qualitative analysis
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, Edwina, List: Like Gary, I would prefer not to engage in another back-and-forth on this well-worn ground, so I will just offer a few comments and hopefully leave it at that. JFS: The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species. Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions *themselves *as the underlying *motivation *that prompted biologists to embrace them. CSP: The problem of the biological taxonomists has, however, been incomparably more difficult; and they have solved it (barring small exceptions) with brilliant success. How did they accomplish this? Not by appealing to the power of congresses, but by appealing to the power of the idea of right and wrong. ... [W]hoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903) That is why the portion of "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic" where this passage appears bears the title, "The Ethics of Terminology"--it advocates *voluntary *cooperation by the practitioners of any particular branch of science to use scrupulously consistent terminology. In fact, Peirce acknowledges up-front that it would *violate *his own principles "to make the smallest pretension to *dictate* the conduct of others in this matter" (CP 2.219, EP 2:263; emphasis mine). Our disagreement over "tone" vs. "mark" is a good example--we have each attempted to *persuade *the other (and those reading along) to adopt one of these and abandon the other, but since Peirce himself considered both without definitively choosing one, neither of us can rightly *impose *his preference on the other (or anyone else). JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that he was justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'. Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out--"for philosophical conceptions which vary *by a hair's breadth* from those for which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for the usages of philosophical terminology and those of the English language, but yet with a distinctly technical appearance" (CP 2.226, EP 2:266; emphasis mine). He coined "the phaneron" for whatever is or could be present to any mind in any way because this is a slightly different conception from "the phenomenon" as introduced by Hegel and later adopted by Husserl, and he renamed the corresponding science "phaneroscopy" because it is more about direct observation than systematic study. JFS: It is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing terminology for that field. I recommend that practice. In the field of Peirce scholarship, the expert whose advice on choosing terminology should be given the most weight is obviously Peirce himself. Otherwise, how can we legitimately claim to be expounding *his *ideas and applying *his *framework? Unfortunately, when the terminology of modern research fields is used instead, it is not always clear that those different terms really have the same meanings as *Peirce's *terms. Consequently, it can be inaccurate or at least misleading to describe the resulting framework as *Peircean*--the terminological differences reflect underlying *conceptual *differences. Frankly, that is one of my concerns about "mark"--perhaps it *seems *congenial to audiences today because they already have a sense of what it means, but in fact they *do not* have in mind "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 12:07 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > John, List > > I think that Peirce’s focus on the ethics of terminology points to his > claim that a term that he uses means, so to speak, ’this but not that’.In > other words, his focus was that a term has a specific meaning..and I see > absolutely nothing wrong with this!! > > My point is different - What I’m saying is that other scholars have > focused on the same issues as Peirce, but they have used different terms. > When we refer to these issues and this includes within a Peircean > discussion, I think we should feel free to use those different terms and > thus, show how Peirce and other scholars h
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Robert, List: Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's 1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his 1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537, 1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens. RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this. CSP: A *Qualisign *is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign. A *Sinsign ...* is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291, 1903) CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign. (CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903) Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied in sinsigns/tokens in order to *act *as signs. In fact, every sinsign/token *involves *qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every iconic sinsign/token *embodies *a qualisign. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 5:30 AM robert marty wrote: > List, > I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a > few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but > the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the > six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. > https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens > Regards, > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. Again, the key difference is between Peirce's *definition *of "mark" in Baldwin's dictionary and his *definition *of "tone"--as well as "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places. JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. Peirce famously *preferred *an ugly word for his version of pragmatism so that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a criterion, then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration with "token" and "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device." JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone" is the *only *word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple times between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type." It is also the *only *one that was published during his lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in Logic Notebook entries and the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby, with "mark" and "potisign" found solely in the latter, although *she *subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone once said, "She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations for his abstract ideas" ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html). JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or the other, please let us know. Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed his personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully building on *Peirce's *views by carefully studying and adhering to *his *words. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Gary, Jon, List, > > My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous > notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.). > > My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the words > 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any word pulled > out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark. But some > words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly. > They are certainly not memorable. > > Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible > mark'. That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word > for the future. Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more > often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. > > But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the > triad (mark token type). And he has devoted years of research to the > issues. As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are > more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the > street). > > And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in > logic, including Peirce's logic. See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for > publications. There are even more lecture slides. (Copies upon request.) > > But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the > future. The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists, > and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term, > find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone. I discovered that > point while talking to them. That is not a scientific survey, but I could > not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word > 'tone'. > > If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) > one way or the other, please let us know. > > John > > -- > *From*: "Gary Richmond" > List, > > While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as > it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of hi
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical *fallacy*". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy when "the opinion of an influential figure is used as evidence to support an argument" ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_authority). Quoting a dictionary or encyclopedia--including Wikipedia, as in this case--is *not *a fallacious appeal to authority because such references contain *facts *on which there is broad consensus, not *opinions *whose persuasiveness depends primarily on the eminence and purported expertise of a particular person who holds them. JFS: The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims. That is not my understanding of why scrupulously citing references is required by academic publications these days, unlike in Peirce's time. Instead, it is primarily to give credit where it is due for ideas that are not the author's. JFS: In fact, when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority. Quoting Peirce to support scholarly claims about *his own views* is also not a fallacious appeal to authority. On the contrary, as I have said before, his is the *only *authority that matters in such a context. As someone once said, "Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00085.html). JFS: The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a *term*. Obviously, all these English words *are *terms--no one is disputing that. The issue here is whether they *signify *a certain kind of term. As defined by Peirce in Baldwin's dictionary, that is *precisely *what "mark" signifies; but as defined by Peirce in the various passages that I have repeatedly cited and quoted, that is *not at all* what "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign" signify. JFS: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a mistake. I have not accused anyone of anything, nor have I claimed that anyone is making a mistake. I have simply spelled out *Peirce's *relevant views, as amply supported by exact quotations. Besides, as someone once said, "we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00089.html)--not treat it as an accusation. JFS: If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so. I have not criticized anyone for believing that "mark" is a better choice than "tone" for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type," even though I strongly disagree. On the contrary, I have explicitly stated more than once that anyone is welcome to hold that opinion and make a case for it. Nevertheless, as I have also stated more than once, no one can accurately claim that it was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, Gary, List, > > First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical > *fallacy".* > > Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an > encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. The requirement to > cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are > *required *to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their > own claims. In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are > appealing to him as an authority. Of course, everybody is fallible, even > authorities. But rejection of an authority requires some evidence. > > Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted > below): "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever > it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to > say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one > term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or > things can be predicated". > > The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are *terms *in > exa
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor. As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is *inconsistent *with his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a *necessitant *type embodied in *existent *tokens, not a *possible *sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why I adopted it in my writings on this topic. The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly *misunderstands *the word "mark" when it is used for a *possible *sign, the counterpart of an *existent *"token" and a *necessitant *"type." For example, as a candidate to replace "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely *not *"that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type" ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again, among other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its *Instances *or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity" (R 339:277r, 1906 Apr 2). JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'. Tony Jappy *uses *"mark" rather than "tone," but does he ever give a *reason *for doing so? Maybe it is just for convenience when quoting the *only *sentence where Peirce himself employs it without qualification--"Consequently an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives" (CP 8.367, EP 2:489, 1908 Dec 25). Either way, as Gary already observed, appeal to authority is a logical *fallacy*, and we also need to be mindful of the danger of confirmation bias. Over the years, I have benefited greatly from my *disagreements *with others on the List because they have prompted me to go back to *Peirce's *relevant writings and then either bolster my arguments (as in this case) or revise my position accordingly, although I never find bald assertions to be persuasive. JFS: I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject. There is nothing new. On the contrary, in my last post ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00049.html), I listed for the first time *all *the different passages where Peirce uses "tone" as well as "tuone," "tinge," "potisign," and even "idea"; and I provided a long excerpt from his Logic Notebook that has not previously appeared in this or any other recent List thread, where he describes what he has in mind (using "tuone") and carefully distinguishes it from a type. By contrast, much of the post below is repetition of previously expressed opinions, with no exact quotations from Peirce to support them. JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. Then why keep posting about it? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 9:02 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Gary, Jon, List > > To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions > have to be made. I have stated the reasons why I believe that the > trichotomy (potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and > most detailed reasoning. I also agree with him that (mark token type) are > simpler English words that would
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Twenty-Eight Sign Classes and the Philosophy of Representation* ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00019.html). Again, why assume otherwise? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Apr 8, 2024 at 11:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > I'm sorry, but I don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of > hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to > mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.) > > First, the terms potisign, actisign, and famisign are the kinds of words > that Peirce frequently coined. The three pages of EP2 show a great deal of > thought, which is much more than he wrote about that trichotomy in 1906. > It's also very closely reasoned thought, which is consistent with many > issues he had been discussing for years. Except for the fact that those > words are rather ugly, they are the result of deep thinking. > > By contrast, the word 'tone' in 1906 sounds like a quick choice based on > one rather rare kind of sign (a tone of voice). The word 'mark' is much > more natural, more general, more consistent with his definition in > Baldwin's dictionary, and much, much easier to explain to intelligent > listeners and readers who are not Peirce scholars. (And I believe that > those people are the most important audience for Peirce scholars to > address.) > > Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been devoting years to his analysis of the > evolution of Peirce's writings in his last decade. I have also been > devoting a great deal of study to the evolution of other aspects, > especially EGs during that decade. And I find Tony's analyses convincing > and compatible with my own studies and with other studies of Peirce's last > decade. > > There is nothing further to discuss about this topic. You said that you > had read Tony's writings. i strongly urge you to study them. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: Peirce defined this trichotomy [potisign/actisign/famisign] without making any reference to (Tone Token Type). This is highly misleading--Peirce wrote EP 2:478-490 over three consecutive days (1908 Dec 23-25), and he *did* make reference to tone/token/type both before and after introducing potisign/actisign/famisign. CSP: For a "possible" Sign I have no better designation than a *Tone*, though I am considering replacing this by "Mark." Can you suggest a really good name? An Actual sign I call a *Token*; a Necessitant Sign a *Type*. (EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23) CSP: Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are divisible into: A. *Potisigns*, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible ... B. *Actisigns*, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced *hic et nunc*; such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. ... C. *Famisigns*, familiar signs, which must be General, as General signs must be familiar or composed of Familiar signs. (EP 2:483, 1908 Dec 24) CSP: But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a *Potisign* a *Tinge* or *Tone*, an *Actisign* a *Token*, a *Famisign* a *Type* ... I think *Potisign Actisign Famisign* might be called *Mark Token Type (?)* (EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25) Peirce was dissatisfied with potisign/sinsign/actisign and was *considering* replacing "tone" with "mark," so he explicitly asked Lady Welby for her opinion, which she gave a few weeks later--"I should prefer *tone* to *mark* for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). He *tentatively* replaced "potisign" with "mark," using the word "might" and a parenthetical question mark, but then wrote "tone" in his Logic Notebook two days later ( https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i, 1908 Dec 27)--his last known mention of this trichotomy. Again, some might hold the opinion that "mark" is a *better *choice than "tone" for the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification whose other two members are "token" and "type," but no one can accurately claim that "mark" was *Peirce's *final and definitive choice. CSP: In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think. (EP 2:489, 1908 Dec 25) JFS: In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of trichotomies "the wildest guesses". What Peirce here calls "the wildest guesses" are not the trichotomies themselves but "the *relations* I assumed between the different *classes*." In other words, he never presents all ten trichotomies of the 1906-1908 taxonomies in their proper *logical* order of determination for working out the 66 sign classes. Instead, he repeatedly presents them in *phaneroscopic* order. JFS: For the definition of Mark, by itself, his definition in Baldwin's dictionary should be considered and compared to what he wrote about Potisign. I agree, and sure enough, there is nothing in Peirce's definition of "mark" for Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* about it being a sign whose mode of being, apprehension, or presentation is "merely possible" as distinguished from an existent token and a necessitant type. On the contrary ... CSP: *Mark*. To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated. The word translates the Latin *nota*. It has many practical synonyms such as quality, mode, attribute, predicate, character, property, determination, consequent, sign. Most of these words are sometimes used in special senses; and even when they are used in a general sense, they may suggest somewhat different points of view from mark. ( https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) By this definition, a mark is a term that can be predicated of things of which other terms are predicated. For example, "scarlet" and "crimson" are different terms that both have the term "red" as a mark--anything that is scarlet or crimson is also red. However, the *term* "red" is obviously not a tone/potisign, it is always a token/actisign of a type/famisign. On the other hand, the *color* red--as well as a specific shade like scarlet or crimson--can be a tone/potisign when and where it serves as "an indefinite significant character." Regards, Jon Alan S
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and the token are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable things. Whatever these sentences are supposed to be describing, it is certainly not what *Peirce *ever defines as the first member of the trichotomy for sign classification "according to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself" (CP 8.344, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec 24), the other two members of which are "token" and "type." A tone (or mark) is "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906)--it is not *itself *a physical thing, but it can be *possessed *by a token, which *is *a physical thing (or event) that exists (or occurs) at a single place and time (ibid). A type is "a definitely significant form" that can be embodied in any number of different tokens (ibid), each of which might *also *embody different tones/marks as *indefinite *characters. Consequently, two different tokens of the same type can possess different tones/marks, and two different tokens of two different types can possess the same tone/mark--there is no strict alignment between indefinite tones/marks and definite types. JFS: But Peirce explicitly defined 'mark' or 'tone' as a 'potisign' -- a sign of a possibility. To help avoid mistakes, I recommend providing exact quotations when attributing explicit definitions to Peirce. In this case, he *never* defines a tone/mark/potisign as a sign *of *a possibility, as if its (dynamical) *object *were a possibility. Instead, he defines it as a sign that is *itself *merely possible. "A Sign may *itself *have a 'possible' Mode of Being ... For a 'possible' Sign I have no better designation than a Tone, though I am considering replacing this by 'Mark.' Can you suggest a really good name?" (EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23). "Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are divisible into: A. *Potisigns*, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.347, EP 2:483, 1908 Dec 24). In short, a tone/mark is a *possible *sign, distinguished from a token as an *existent *sign and a type as a *necessitant *sign. Again, none of this is at all controversial among Peirce scholars. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 1:47 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > See the recent notes about the ZOOM talk on Friday. It is essential for > Peirce scholars to bring his philosophy and its applications to the > attention of philosopher, scientists, and engineers in the 21st century -- > Peirce worked in all three professions. > > The word 'tone' is a special case that Peirce himself forgot when he > coined the new term 'potisign'. He later recalled his definition for > 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary (consciously or not) when he suggested it as > a replacement for 'tone'. I have lectured and adopted Peirce's logic and > semeiotic for a broad modern audience, and I realize that 'mark' is far > more natural, more understandable, and more memorable than 'tone' for any > purpose other than a detailed textual criticism of the MS. As Peirce > himself said, if nobody else adopted a word he coined, he was under no > obligation to keep it. > > JFS: Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type. > > JAS: A tone of voice is merely the *example *that Peirce gives in CP > 4.537 (1906) to illustrate what he has in mind. His *definition *of a > tone in that passage is "an indefinite significant character," as opposed > to a token as a "Single event which happens once and whose identity is > limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some > single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being > significant only as occurring just when and where it does," and a type as > "a definitely significant Form." > > No. A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an > image that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and > the token are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable > things.. > > Bur the word 'tone' is an poor choice, which caused the misunderstanding. >Lady Welby assumed that the word 'tone' was an actisign that referred > to an existing thing -- some feeling of the speaker. But Peirce > explicitly defined 'mark' or 'tone' as a 'potisign' -- a sign of a > possibility. > > As another example, consider the images on Mayan temples. For years, they > were considered de
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, List: ET: I’m not sure why you have defined the object as ‘dynamical’; and the interpretant as ‘final’. Peirce didn’t do that in this section. This is not at all controversial among Peirce scholars. He does not refer to the *dynamical *object and *final *interpretant in 1903 because he has not yet recognized that each sign has two objects and three interpretants. We know for sure that the 1903 object is the *dynamical *object because the 1906-1908 trichotomy for the sign's relation to its dynamical object is icon/index/symbol, identical to the second 1903 trichotomy for the sign's relation to its object. We know for sure that the 1903 interpretant is the *final *interpretant because the 1906-1908 trichotomy for the sign's relation to its final interpretant is seme/pheme/delome, the generalization of rheme/dicisign/argument, which is the third 1903 trichotomy for the sign's relation to its interpretant. ET: I note that you have added, without informing the reader, all the terms in brackets; they are not in the original writing of Peirce. The use of brackets is standard practice when inserting words into a quotation that do not appear in the original text, often for the sake of clarification. CP, EP, and other published collections of Peirce's writings do this routinely. ET: What do YOU mean by ‘genuine’ and how does that explain the semiotic process? The term and concept are Peirce's, not mine. I suggest reading CP 1.521-544 (1903). ET: And what is the functional difference between the three categories and the three universes? The three categories are the irreducible elements of whatever is or could be present to the mind (quality/reaction/mediation), while the three universes together contain whatever could serve as the dynamical objects of signs (possibles/existents/necessitants). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 5, 2024 at 5:58 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > 1] ET: I’m not sure why you have defined the object as ‘dynamical’; and > the interpretant as ‘final’. Peirce didn’t do that in this section.. Again > - my problem is with your focus on the Final Interpretant. > > ET: I note that you have added, without informing the reader, all the > terms in brackets; they are not in the original writing of Peirce. Again - > Peirce does not write ’the relation of the sign to its (dynamical) object; > he writes only: ‘the relation of the sign to its object". And he also does > not write ‘according as its [final] Interpretant…but only “in its relation > to an interpretant”. > > 2] ET: I don’t agree that the fact that the Representamen/Sign is not > split up [ as the object is into the DO and IO] snd the Interpretant is > into the II, DI, FI] means that these can be defined as ‘degenerate > sub-correlates'. > > I understand them instead, within their functional semiosic role, where > the IO is understood as the data accepted within the capacities of the S/R > to process it. That is - even though an entity’s S/R may be interacting > with an external Object [ DO], it is a fact that not all of the data input > of that DO can be processed/received by that individual S/R. A baby > receives different sensual data from an adult; a bee, a dog, a plant..can > interact with that same DO but can only accept receive different sensual > data [IO]. . > > 3] ET: Again, I don’t agree with your view about ‘genuine dyadic > relations’ and ‘genuine triadic relation’. What do YOU mean by ‘genuine’ > and how does that explain the semiotic process? And what is the functional > difference between the three categories and the three universes??? > > 4] The fact that these three are the ’three correlates' doesn’t mean that > each has any capacity to exist ‘as itself’. Distinguishing them, > analytically, from each other within a relationship is conceptually not > the same as proving that each is existing ‘in itself’. I disagree that > when we are speaking of the ‘interpretant’ we are speaking of it ‘itself’. > Again, the interpretant functions only as a form of information > within interaction - and that differs according to the type of > Interpretant [ Immediate, dynamic, Final] and its modal category. > > 5]ET - I’ve explained my rejection of your placing the Final Interpretant > before the S-Id in another post, with an example, and an outline of what I > consider the functional role of the FI - in today’s posts. > > 6] ET: To say that the semiotic process is a cognitive process is hardly > outside the Peircean framework, but, in my view, is basic. After all- as > I’ve quoted so often, from Peirce, “Thought is not necessarily connected > with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and through
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
uture. A > tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark. > > On this point, Tony made the correct choice. The word 'tone' should be > used *ONLY *in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS. In all discussions of > Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice. > > > John > > -- > *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > > John, List: > > JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two > tokens of the same type. > > > This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an > indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can > have *different *tones, yet be tokens of the *same *type; and two things > can have (some of) the *same *tones, yet be tokens of *different *types. > > JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice. > > > Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, > https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, > > I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of > 'mark': > > Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of > Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) > > Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same > mark are two tokens of the same type. > > It confirms Peirce's final choice. > > John > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
have under ideal circumstances. Finally, just to be clear, although the terminology is similar, this is *not* the same division as possible/existent/necessitant for each individual trichotomy in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification. Again, the *purpose* of the final interpretant (ideal effect) is either to produce feeling (for a gratific sign), to produce action (for an actuous sign), or to produce self-control (for a temperative sign); the *mode of being* of the dynamical interpretant (actual effect) is either that of a feeling (for a sympathetic sign), that of an exertion (for a percussive sign), or that of another sign (for a usual sign); and the *mode of presentation* of the immediate interpretant (range of possible effects) is either as abstract qualities (for a hypothetic sign), as concrete inherences (for a categorical sign), or as real relations (for a relative sign). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 8:07 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > I will try to answer in pints: > > 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of > signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of > semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical > modes to the interpretants? > > 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why > the’ phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. > > 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object > itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the > semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the > ‘inerpretant, of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the > representamen/sign. > > 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between > theSign/representamen and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the > three categorical modes. > > 5] Sorry- I’m simply not convinced; I don’t see how the 8.338 > reference suggests your conclusion. > > 6] My phrase of ‘cognitive movement’ is hardly outside the bounds of > understanding; after all - that’s precisely what is going on within the > semiosic process. And I disagree with your conclusion about the purpose of > the Final Interpretant…..I don’t agree that it ‘constrains the mode of > being of the DI..and the DI contains the mode of presentation of the II. I > don’t see how this could functionally occur- and would appreciate an actual > example. > > I also don’t agree that the ‘mode of presentation/being of the II > ‘constrains’ the mode of being of the DI…and I don’t agree that there is a > ‘purpose to the FI. Most certainly, if the II is in a mode of 1ns, then, > th DI is also in a mode of 1ns - but, I’d put that down to the fact that > the mode of Firstness has a limited amount of information [ being primarily > feeling] and therefore - can’t provide enough information to the next > experience [ the Dynamic Interpretant]..to enable it to function within the > clarity of Secondness. > > So- we’ll have to as usual, continue to disagree. > > Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
John, List: I have likewise already read (and carefully studied) about a dozen articles by Tony Jappy, as well as his 2017 book, *Peirce's Twenty-Eight Sign Classes and the Philosophy of Representation*. Why assume otherwise? I still disagree with him on destinate=final and explicit=immediate (as I maintain) vs. destinate=immediate and explicit=final (as he maintains). However, having made our cases, I agree with him that we must ultimately "leave the list members to make up their own minds." The only authority that really matters here is that of Peirce himself. I strongly urge everyone to study *his *writings in light of our different arguments, and then draw their own conclusions about *his *views based on those texts. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy > that explain these issues in far greater depth and generality. I strongly > urge you to study his writings. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
immediate interpretant constrains the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, which constrains the purpose of the final interpretant. I find the former much more plausible than the latter. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 12:53 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > List > > I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ > or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that > ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent > to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?. > > And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes > an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he > says: possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But > this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. > > And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the > Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a > necessitant] but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY > ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are > in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I > think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final > Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in > a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. > > And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes - > we see, of course, the same format > > Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative > representamen/sign, not within the Interpretants. It is this site that > plays the key role in forming the nature of the sign triad’/hexad. > > And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from > possible to existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not > then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is > that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other > two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate > interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants > can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s > outlines. > > Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
mes). Hypothetic signs can only be names (semes), which would be scribed on the phemic sheet without *any *attached lines of identity, if that were allowed in Beta EGs--the interpretant as represented by the sign is presented as a possible, not an existent. Regards, Jon On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > List: > > It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most > important reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final > interpretant and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant > (SS84, EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly > imply this. In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below strongly > *supports > *my position. > > TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear > definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means > that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to > descriptions Peirce gives of the immediate interpretant as being the > interpretant ‘in the sign’: ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the > Immediate Interpretant, i.e., the Interpretant represented or signified in > the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the > mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 1908). > > > Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being > "explicit." It is the interpretant that is *right there* in the sign > itself, which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign classification > is a division according to its mode of *presentation*. > > CSP as quoted by TJ: The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative > result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is > sufficiently considered ... The Final Interpretant is that toward which the > actual tends. (SS 111, 1909) > > > Here the final interpretant is unambiguously identified as the "destined" > interpretant, i.e., the "destinate" interpretant. > > CSP as quoted by TJ: But we must note that there is certainly a third kind > of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that > which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if > consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion > were reached. (EP 2:496, 1909) > > > As Peirce says elsewhere, "No matter what his opinion at the outset may > be, it is assumed that he will end in one predestinated belief" (CP 7.327, > 1873). Also, "No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of > other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to > escape the predestinate opinion" (CP 5.407, 1878). Also, "The logician > maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that > of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain predestinate > conclusions which are the same for all men" (CP 3.161, 1880). Also, "I call > 'truth' the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which > *would > *ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in > that particular direction" (EP 2:457, 1911). Since the "ultimate opinion" > is the "predestinate opinion," the final interpretant is likewise the > "destinate" interpretant. > > TJ: JAS’s phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic > object is genuine and the immediate degenerate ... > > > Indeed, Peirce's recognition around 1904 that each sign has two objects > and three interpretants is the result of phaneroscopic analysis--within the > genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, the > sign is the first and simplest correlate, the object is the second > correlate of middling complexity, and the interpretant is the third and > most complex correlate (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903). Accordingly, the > dynamical object is the *genuine *object, as it is in itself, independent > of the sign; and the immediate object is the *degenerate *object, as it > is represented by the sign. > > TJ: It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant > in a classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is > defined to be present. > > > It is perfectly logical in a classification of *signs*, because the three > correlates of the *genuine *triadic relation of representing/mediating > are the *genuine *correlates--the sign itself, its *dynamical *object, > and its *final *interpretant. On the other hand, there is only a *degenerate > *triadic relation between the sign, its dynamical object, and its *dynamical > *interpretant--it is reducible to the sign's genuine *dyadic *rel
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
John, List: JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two tokens of the same type. This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can have *different *tones, yet be tokens of the *same *type; and two things can have (some of) the *same *tones, yet be tokens of *different *types. JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice. Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of > 'mark': > > Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of > Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) > > Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same > mark are two tokens of the same type. > > It confirms Peirce's final choice. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
John, List: JFS: I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead of 'tone'. Again, going by the manuscript dates, Peirce's *final *choice was "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i), not "mark" (CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25)--especially since the latter passage includes the word "might" and a parenthetical question mark, clearly indicating that "mark" was tentative rather than definitive. JFS: The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system As quoted, Lady Welby does not say that she does not *understand *Peirce's "exposition of the 'possible' Sign"--on the contrary, she calls it "profoundly interesting"--only that she is "not equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer *tone *to *mark*"; and again, her stated rationale for this preference is strikingly similar to Peirce's stated rationale for coining "tone" in the first place (CP 4.537, 1906). Besides ... JFS: That is the primary reason why he [Peirce] found Lady Welby's correspondence so important: She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations for his abstract ideas. ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html) Why think that "tone" vs. "mark" was an exception to this, such that her "homely" opinion about it did not sway him--especially since he was still vacillating between these two options, and specifically *asked *her to help him choose one? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 1:08 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Edwina, Tony, Jon, List, > > I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line: Evolution. I > believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in > from 1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which > he highlighted the features he considered important. I'd also emphasize > Tony's point that too many Peirce scholars stopped at the issues, > terminology, and notations of 1903. That was an important beginning, but > the evolution in the following decade made fundamental changes. > > One important source of evidence is Peirce's choice of terminology. He > coined and adopted a wide range of terms, some of which he retained to the > end. But there are others that he stopped using and replaced with new > words. The points where he changed terms also involve critical > innovations. If he never again uses the old terms, that is an important > indication that he began a new way of thinking (paradigm). For example, > the words 'cut' and 'scroll' were banished in June 1911. > > There are multiple places where he made a major shift in terminology, and > every one of them shows a significant innovation in his system. The shift > from phenomenology to phaneroscopy is a permanent shift, and I believe that > it indicates a shift from an abstract Kantian style to the more concrete > examples that Lady Welby used. Another shift from the word-based > terminology, such as dicisign, to terms that include diagrams and images, > such as semes and phemes, is significant. Since semes include hypericons, > he never again needed that word. He also used the term "phemic sheet" as > replacement for 'sheet of assertion'. > > I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead > of 'tone'. The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she > admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason > for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system: "Your > exposition of the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not > equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer > *tone* to *mark* for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say > 'I do not object to his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). > > There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I > have the time. > > John > > PS: The initials JS are ambiguous. It's better to write JAS or JFS. > > -- > *From*: "Edwina Taborsky" > *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation > from 1903 to the end > > This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
thin the process of semiosis. The final interpretant is not the *last *interpretant in a series of dynamical interpretants--recall that in 1906, "I confess that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536). Instead, it is the *normative *interpretant, hence "normal interpretant" in some places--the dynamical interpretant that the sign *would *produce under ideal circumstances. It is "final" in the sense of a final cause, "that toward which the actual [dynamical interpretant] tends," not an efficient cause that deterministically necessitates the dynamical interpretant. TJ: There is no suggestion here that the final interpretant determines the sign’s meaning (of which the immediate interpretant is the exponent). All three interpretants of a linguistic sign are aspects of its meaning. The immediate interpretant is the range of what it *possibly could* mean in accordance with its constituent word definitions and grammatical syntax, the dynamical interpretant is what it *actually does* mean to any one interpreter of it, and the final interpretant is what it *necessarily would* mean under ideal circumstances, including after infinite investigation by an infinite community. TJ: And surely misinterpretation and misconception depend upon the degree of congruence between the intended meaning emanating from the utterer and the actual reaction displayed by the interpreter. These definitions (in which Ii is the sign’s inherent interpretability, Id the actual reaction to a sign and If a future tendency) surely suggest that the only possibility of misinterpretation comes from when, in an actual semiosis, the Id reaction is not congruent with the intended interpretation. On the contrary, a sign is mis-*uttered *to the extent that its immediate interpretant deviates from the utterer's intention, while it is mis- *interpreted* to the extent that a dynamical interpretant of it deviates from its *final *(normative) interpretant. We are not always completely successful in accurately conveying our intentions with the signs that we utter, so their final interpretants are not strictly dictated by those intentions. "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that *sign" (R 339, 1906 Apr 2). As William Abraham nicely puts it, "If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more or less than what the author intended" ( https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421=asburyjournal, p. 20). TJ: To which I reply that Chapter Four of my book has a Table (4.1) displaying 14 six- and ten-division typologies established between 1904 and 1908, of which only the first two (both from 1904) have the order given by JS - *all *the others have immediate > dynamic > variously named final interpretants. I do not have the book, but Peirce's late taxonomies are almost always arranged in *phaneroscopic *order--from the simplest correlate (sign) to the most complex correlate (interpretant); for each correlate, from the most degenerate (immediate) to the genuine; for each dyadic relation, coming right after its second correlate; and for the genuine triadic relation, coming last. He *never *provided a typology with all ten trichotomies arranged in their proper *logical *order for sign classification--if he had done so, then there would obviously be no room for debate about what he had in mind. Instead, we have only a few *partial *orderings--S, S-Od, S-If (1903); S-If, S-Id (1904); and Od, Oi, S, If, Id, Ii (1908), taking destinate=final and explicit=immediate. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 2:46 AM Anthony Jappy wrote: > List, > > I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the > three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper > published in *Semiotica *(which is indeed the published version of the > text mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his > posting, I prefer not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless > will offer an alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much > greater detail in Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the > interpretant ordering of David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS > and reply to two of his objections to my ordering. These replies are > sufficient to support my position. First this statement: > > ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical > determination for sign classification, not *causal* nor *tempo
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
John, List:
FYI, I removed Dr. Jappy from the cc: line because he has told me in the
past that he greatly values his privacy and thus prefers not to be included
in any List discussions.
JFS: This is an unpublished article by Tony Jappy.
The title is different, but the abstract exactly matches "From
Phenomenology to Ontology in Peirce's Typologies" as published in *Semiotica
*in 2019 (https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0080). Regarding the content, as
I have said before, I strongly disagree with equating "the Destinate
Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant and "the Explicit Interpretant"
to the final interpretant (SS84, EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), for at least four
reasons.
- The terms themselves clearly imply the opposite, namely,
destinate=final/normal ("effect that would be produced on the mind by the
Sign after sufficient development of thought," CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec
24-28) and explicit=immediate ("the Interpretant represented or signified
in the Sign," ibid).
- The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is
*logical *determination
for sign classification, not *causal *nor *temporal *determination
within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If)
determines the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly
degenerate correlate (Ii).
- The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of
determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the
order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when
accounting for the possibility of *mis*interpretations.
- The S-If trichotomy unambiguously comes *before *the S-Id trichotomy
(CP 8.338, SS 34-35, 1904 Oct 12), so it makes sense for the If trichotomy
likewise to come *before *the Id trichotomy.
I can elaborate on any or all of these if anyone is interested. As for the
inserted comments ...
JFS: Note that “Mark Token Type” is Peirce's final choice of labels for
that trichotomy.
In that draft letter to Lady Welby, Peirce states, "But I dare say some of
my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a *Potisign
*a *Tinge *or *Tone*, an *Actisign *a *Token*, a *Famisign *a *Type *... I
think *Potisign Actisign Famisign* might be called *Mark Token Type (?)*
..." (CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). The word "might" and the
parenthetical question mark indicate that his choice of "mark" is *not *final.
In fact, he reverts to "Tone" in a Logic Notebook entry dated two days
later (27 Dec 1908,
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).
Moreover, two days earlier, Peirce writes, "For a 'possible' Sign I have no
better designation than a *Tone*, though I am considering replacing this by
'Mark.' Can you suggest a really good name?" (SS 83, 1908 Dec 23). Lady
Welby replies a few weeks later, "Your exposition of the 'possible' Sign is
profoundly interesting; but I am not equal to the effort of discussing it
beyond saying that I should prefer *tone* to *mark* for the homely reason
that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his words, but to
his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21).
I agree with her, especially since Peirce himself gives essentially the
same rationale for "tone" when he introduces it--"An indefinite significant
character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token.
I propose to call such a Sign a *Tone*" (CP 4.537, 1906). Besides, "mark"
already had a well-established and quite different definition in logic,
which Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of
Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark);
and as discussed on the List recently, "markedness" is now an unrelated
technical term in linguistics.
JFS: In computer science and applications, the Lewis-style of modal logic
has been useless in practical computations.
Again, "useless" strikes me as an overstatement, and even if accurate, it
does not entail that modern formal systems of modal logic will *never *turn
out to be useful in these or any other applications. More to the point,
such an assessment is *utterly irrelevant* for ascertaining what *Peirce *had
in mind when writing R L376, including his statement, "I shall now have to
add a *Delta *part [to Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals." A
straightforward reading of that text itself is that he simply needs a new
notation to replace the unsatisfactory (broken) cuts of 1903 and
nonsensical tinctures of 1906 for representing and reasoning about
propositions involving possibility and necessity.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 2:46 PM John
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jerry, List: Roberts is not discussing metalanguage at all in that excerpt from p. 22 of his 1973 book, he is talking about rhemata/rhemes (Peirce uses both terms). These are incomplete propositions, with blanks where subjects need to be added in order to turn them into complete propositions. Metalanguage only comes into play if the blank in a rhema/rheme is filled with a proposition, resulting in a proposition *about *a proposition. In Beta EGs, general concepts are attributed to indefinite individuals by attaching names to heavy lines of identity. In Gamma EGs, a line of identity attached to a name can be replaced by a dotted (or lightly drawn) line attached to a dotted (or lightly drawn) oval that contains the EG for a complete proposition. Roberts discusses Peirce's 1903 version of this notation on pp. 76-77, but as John Sowa has observed all along, a much simpler example is on RLT 151 (1898)--"That you are a good girl is much to be wished." [image: image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:20 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > John, Jon: > > In my opinion your responses to the issues surrounding Tarski’s > “metalanguage" are so weak from a scientific point of view that it is > simpler to just pose an example of the meanings of metalanguages in the > relevant logic used by CSP. > > The following is an excerpt from Robert’s book, page 22: > > What is a reasonable interpretation about the “blanks” in sentences > relative to concatenations of logical operations between the posits and the > consequences? > > How would the blanks be relative to the copula? Copula’s of > “metalanguages? > > What would be the number of metalanguages necessary for a conclusion from > a posited pragmatic sentence with n blanks? > > Which of the logical particles would associated with a metalanguage in the > example cited by Roberts? > > Have fun! > > Cheers > Jerry > > The collection of Peirce papers at Harvard University contains a number of > undated manuscripts on logical graphs to which Peirce could here be > referring. Consider in the second place Peirce's use of dashes in place of > demonstrative terms and nouns to produce blank forms of propositions called > 'rhemata'. If only one noun is erased~ a non-relative rhema is produced, as > '__ is mortal'. If two or more nouns are erased, the result is a relative > rhema, such as '__ is bought by __ from __ for __ ' (3.420). Consider in > the third place the expressed analogy between logical compounds and > chemical compounds: > A rhema is somewhat closely analogous to a chemical atom or radicle with > unsaturated bonds. A non-relative rhema is like a univalent radicle; it has > but one unsaturated bond. A relative rhema is like a multivalent radicle. > The blanks of a rhema can only be filled by terms, or, what is the same > thing, by "something which" (or the like) followed by a rhema; or, two can > be filled together by means of "itself" or the like. So, in chemistry, > unsaturated bonds can only be saturated by joining two of them, which will > usually, though not necessarily, belong to different radicles. If two > univalent radicles are united, the result is a saturated compound. So, two > non-relative rhemas being joined give a complete proposition. Thus, to join > "__ is mortal" and "__is a man", we have "X is mortal and X is a man", or > some man is mortal. So likewise, a saturated compound may result from > joining two bonds of a bivalent radicle; and, in the same way, the two > blanks of a dual rhema may be joined to make a complete proposition. Thus, > "__ loves __", "X loves X", or something loves itself [3.421]. > This article is important for several reasons. It shows clearly that the > parallel existing between these diagrams and chemical diagrams was strong > in Peirce's mind; > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
John, List: JFS: I am happy to say that I completely agree with Jon's note below. However, the following passage from another note is misleading about Peirce, Euclid, and mathematical practice from ancient times to the present. The quoted passage is from my same note below. JFS: In mathematical texts, it's common to say "Given A1, A2, A3..., it follows THAT T1, T2, T3... where the A's are axioms, and the T's are theorems that follow from the axioms. Note the word 'that'. It is a sign of METALANGUAGE, between two clauses of a sentence. It is not a sign of implication. The word 'follows' or more precisely 'my be proved from' indicate the steps of a proof. "Given A, it follows that T" is logically equivalent to "if A, then T," which is logically equivalent to "A implies T." A is the premiss or antecedent (e.g., postulates), and T is the conclusion or consequent (e.g., theorems). There is no need for metalanguage to express this in EGs since it is represented by a scroll or nested cuts or a ring-shaped shaded area--including a sheet with a red line drawn just inside its edges (or a shaded margin). JFS: As for the notations in R514 and L376, Peirce made another distinction: postulates are propositions on which the utterer and the interpreter agree. The choice of postulates is the result of an AGREEMENT between the utterer and the interpreter. The results inside the red line are the result of an INVESTIGATION that may be far more complex than an mathematical proof. In R 514, Peirce only states that "in the margin outside the red line, whatever is scribed is merely asserted to be possible. Thus, if the subject were geometry, I could write in that margin the postulates, and any pertinent problems stated in the form of postulates." He does not say anything about "an agreement between the utterer and the interpreter," nor about the "results inside the red line" before the text breaks off in mid-sentence. In R L376, Peirce does not say anything about "the red line" nor "an investigation," complex or otherwise. The "agreement between the utterer and the interpreter" is on the *subject *of the graphs scribed on each piece of paper, which represents a *portion *of the overall universe of discourse that "is before the common attention" of both parties at one time or another. He only discusses postulates in the paragraph right *before *the section on "The Phemic Sheet," and only for the purpose of explaining why "any valid deductive conclusion" is *not *"instantaneously evident upon an examination of the premisses." Here is what he says. CSP: My second reason is found in the peculiar character of mathematical postulates. These pronounce that certain things are possible. But these possibles are not, of course, single things, for a single thing must be more or less than possible: they embrace whole infinite series of infinite series of objects in each postulate; and it is upon the statement of the possibility of one single one of those objects or single one for each set of certain others, that some essential part of the conclusion is founded. How many demonstrations, for example, and very simple ones too, as mathematics goes, depend, each of them, upon the possibility of a single straight line; while this possibility is only asserted in the postulate that there is, or may be, a straight line through any two points of space. In that statement the possibility of every single straight line in space is asserted, including the single one whose existence is pertinent and concerning which a similar postulate directly or mediately asserts something which is an essential ingredient of the conclusion. Consistent with R 514, postulates "pronounce that certain things are possible." Moreover, the *only *kind of investigation that Peirce discusses here is a mathematical demonstration. JFS: The complexity of the investigation is the reason why Delta graphs are a completely new branch of EGs. Again, Peirce's *only *stated reason for needing "to add a *Delta *part" to EGs is "in order to deal with modals"--not for metalanguage, and not for complex investigations. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Mar 23, 2024 at 4:46 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jerry, Jon, List, > > JLRC: If the critical concept that is under scrutiny here the issue of > “graphs of graphs” , how is this related to the arithmetical notion of > division? > > I agree with Jon's explanation below that Peirce did not use the word > "division" to mean the numerical operation of dividing two numbers. He was > talking about dividing different parts of a text. > > As for the phrase "graph of graphs&q
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jerry, List: In this context, "division" simply refers to Peirce's 1903 *organization *of Existential Graphs (EGs) into distinct Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts. Alpha implements propositional logic, Beta implements a version of first-order predicate logic by adding the line of identity, and Gamma implements various advanced logics by adding the broken cuts (modal logic), the heavy line with dotted lines along both sides (second-order logic), the dotted oval/line (metalanguage), etc. Again, the latter is equivalent to the 1898 (RLT) notation, which has a lightly drawn oval/line instead of a dotted oval/line. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 11:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > List, John: > > On Mar 20, 2024, at 3:16 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > That quotation shows that Gamma graphs add one and only one *NECESSARY* > feature > to Alpha + Beta graphs: the same or equivalent metalanguage feature used > in 1898 (RLT). When Peirce referred to the *DIVISION *of Gamma graphs, > that is the only feature required.He later did much more talking about > modality and with new notations. He never again used any of the notations > that are unique to the 1903 Gamma graphs. > > I am puzzled by this paragraph. > > If the critical concept that is under scrutiny here the issue of “graphs > of graphs” , how is this related to the arithmetical notion of division? > > And what sort of mental operations would be required to assert the nature > of a division of a “graph of graphs“? > > Cheers > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jerry, List: No one is claiming that Peirce ever used the *term *"metalanguage," only the *concept*. Specifically, he provided a Gamma EG notation for asserting a proposition about a proposition--the lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) oval for treating a complete proposition as a *subject *that fills the blank in a rheme attached to the oval by a lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) line to compose another complete proposition (CP 4.560, 1906). For example, here is the Gamma EG for "A thinks that it is possible that B," where A is a person, B is a proposition, "A thinks ___" and "___ is possible" are rhemes, and each instance of "that" in English corresponds to a dotted oval/line in the graph. [image: image.png] The "red pencil" notation (1909) is entirely different from this--a red line is drawn just inside the physical edge of the sheet, and postulates are written in the resulting margin. These are not propositions *about *the propositions written inside the red line (metalanguage), they are premisses (antecedent) from which the propositions written inside the red line follow necessarily as deductive conclusions (consequent). For example, if the EGs for Euclid's five postulates are scribed in the margin, then they can be iterated to the interior, where the EGs for all the theorems of Euclidean geometry can be derived from them in accordance with the usual permissions. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 11:43 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Jon, List > > On Mar 20, 2024, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > >- Peirce's 1898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are *identical*, >except that the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in >the latter. >- Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with >metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, >with the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent >(theorems) inside the red line. > > In these two paragraphs, the term “metalanguage” is used. > Was I misled by the assertion (by another logician) that Tarski was the > first to use this term? > > Although this may seem as a trivial point, it becomes rather critical from > the perspectives of emergence and evolution with the putative levels of > development and the corresponding grammatical distinctions between the > social and natural sciences and current notions of “metalogics”. > > At issue is the languages in which propositions are posited. > > Cheers > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Cuts are out. Tinctures are in.
John, List: JFS: It's not clear which "55 pages" Peirce was counting. On the contrary, here is the relevant text in R L376. CSP: An account of slightly further development of it was given in the *Monist *of Oct. 1906. In this I made an attempt to make the syntax cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. Peirce cites an "account" of EGs that appeared "in the *Monist* of Oct. 1906," then refers to "the description" twice, calling it "as bad as it well could be" and saying that it "fills 55 pages." He is clearly talking about "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" as originally published in *The Monist* (vol. 16, no. 4, Oct. 1906, pp. 492-546 = 55 pages). Moreover, for the forthcoming volume 3/1 of *Logic of the Future*, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen has compiled an "Index to 'Prolegomena'" from R 292, R 1256, and R 1632, all dated 1910 or later. Sure enough, it lists "over a hundred technical terms" that are employed in that article. JFS: Following are excerpts from the Prolegomena prior to the specifications of tinctured EGs. They have strong similarities to related material in L376: I agree--they demonstrate that the "many papers" concept was not an innovation in 1911, and thus not unique to the new Delta part, just as I have been saying all along. It was already a well-established aspect of EGs as one of "the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System" that constitute "a cross division" orthogonal to the division into the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts--hence, applicable to *all* of them. JFS: an organization of the papers according to Cayley's trees, which Risteen had studied. (See the references to Risteen in EP2.) There are no "references to Risteen in EP2"--his name is not in the index, and a search turns up zero mentions. However, Nathan Houser's introduction to volume 8 of the *Writings *includes a paragraph about how "Peirce asked Risteen to add 'trees' to the list of mathematical subjects he was gathering information on for Peirce’s dictionary work" (W 8:xlviii-xlix). Nevertheless, this was in 1891--two full decades before Peirce wrote the letter to Risteen that we have been discussing, which itself says nothing whatsoever about Cayley's trees, nor any other particular "organization of the papers." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 4:33 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > It's not clear which "55 pages" Peirce was counting. It may have been his > own MS. As for L477, he was probably recalling words that he remembered > from the letter to Risteen. In L477, he only mentioned one sentence on > that topic: "It cost me the trouble of my nonsensical 'tinctures' and > heraldry." The more detailed comments in L376 said that the "cuts" with > their recto/verso implications were responsible. But the word 'tinctured' > was prominent in the name of those EGs, and that is what Peirce (and his > readers) remembered. > > For the Gamma graphs of 1903, I commented on the absence of any later > use. I found a reference from 1906 that explains why Peirce never again > used the Gamma graphs: > > In my former exposition of Existential Graphs, I said that there must be a > department of the System which I called the Gamma part into which I was as > yet able to gain mere glimpses, sufficient only to show me its reality, and > to rouse my intense curiosity, without giving me any real insight into it. > The conception of the System which I have just set forth is a very recent > discovery. I have not had time as yet to trace out all its consequences. > But it is already plain that, in at least three places, it lifts the veil > from the Gamma part of the system. > > The new discovery, which sheds such a light is simply that, as the main > part of the sheet represents existence or actuality, so the area within a > cut, that is, the verso of the sheet, represents a kind of possibility. > (R490, April 1906; CP 4.576) > > The first paragraph above explains why Peirce never used his Gamma graphs > of 1906. It also shows that he was exploring cuts with recto/verso > options, which he continued to use until R669 (May 1911). He finally > abandoned recto/verso cuts in R670 (June 1911). > > But the text of the Prolegomena (other than the definition of the EGs) > helps to explai
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Cuts are out. Tinctures are in.
John, List: In the first passage that you quoted from R L376, I agree that Peirce is primarily condemning cuts, not tinctures. However, he is also condemning his *entire *55-page description of EGs in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism"--that is the total length of the article as originally published in *The Monist*, which is where he *introduces* the tinctures. Moreover, he explicitly bemoans "my nonsensical 'tinctures' and heraldry" two years later, in a letter addressed to F. A. Woods (R L477, 1913 Nov 8). I will not further belabor the points that I have already made at length about the "many papers." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 21, 2024 at 4:37 PM John F Sowa wrote: > I just wanted to clarify some issues that may be unclear in what Peirce > wrote in L376: "in the Monist of Oct. 1906... I made an attempt to make > the syntax cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, > on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. > Carus rejected. For although the system itself is marked by extreme > simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred > technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to > the lines called “cuts” which simply appear in the present description as > the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet”. > > Many people interpreted this text as implying that Peirce was condemning > the tinctures. But as he said explicitly, it was "chiefly due to the > lines called cuts”, which in 1906 were defined as cuts through the paper > from the recto side to the verso side. The last mention of recto/verso was > in R669 (May 1911). From R670 (June 1911) to the last long letter in 1913, > negative areas were marked by shading, not by cuts. From L231 (June 1911) > to the end, Peirce also avoided the word 'cut'. > > In R670, he also mentioned tinctures as an option: “The nature of the > universe or universes of discourse (for several may be referred to in a > single assertion) in the rather unusual cases in which such precision is > required, is denoted either by using modifications of the heraldic > tinctures, marked in something like the usual manner in pale ink upon the > surface, or by scribing the graphs in colored inks”. > > I'm not discussing these issues as a criticism of anybody. I'm just > clarifying several points: (1) A notation for distinguishing "the universe > or universes of discourse" is important. (2) Tinctures, by themselves, are > not a bad way to express the distinction, but they could not be used in > print in the early 20th C. (3) But methods for distinguishing the UoD are > necessary in any text that happens to mention two or more. (4) This issue > is important for any discussion about L376, because Peirce explicitly > mentioned the division of the phemic sheet into multiple papers, which > might express different opinions by an utterer and an interpreter. (5) In > R670 above and in L376 below, the utterer and interpreter may refer to > different UoDs and discuss entities in them. Those discussions, when > expressed in EGs, would involve lines of identity (or quantified variables) > that refer to universes and to entities in them that may be abstract, > imaginary, possible, or impossible. Note that they may also discuss > "special understandings". An understanding is another* ens rations*, as > Peirce would say. > > From L376; "If 'snows' is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that > in the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and > interpreter has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is > scribed to relate, it sometimes does snow. For they two may conceive that > the “phemic sheet” embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before > the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that > actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of > those pieces relate to one subject and part to another”. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Mike, List: I agree that the interchange was (generally) enjoyable and enlightening, and I am sorry that it ultimately became contentious and tiresome--I am not interested in "slugging it out" further. I also agree that John Sowa has much of value to say about EGs and logic, especially as applied in computer science and artificial intelligence research, from which we all can learn. I would not be surprised if combining the "many papers" concept from R L376 with the use of metalanguage has all the important practical applications that he anticipates--but it is *his own *idea, not Peirce's. Accordingly, my only major objection to his article-in-progress is the unqualified claim in its title and proposed content that it describes what *Peirce *had in mind for Delta EGs, which indeed is "not backed sufficiently by Peirce's own statements." As far as I know, no other Peirce scholar has ever suggested that his December 1911 letter to Risteen presents a "specification" of Delta EGs, presumably because there is no basis in the text itself for such an interpretation. In fact, there is nothing in its extant 19 pages that deals with modals or is otherwise unique to the new Delta part. As Peirce himself says up-front, "the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System" are "a cross division"--*orthogonal *to the division into the Alpha/Beta/Gamma parts in "the better exposition of 1903," and thus applicable to *all *of them. This includes the "many papers" concept for the phemic sheet, where different pages contain graphs about different subjects that the utterer and interpreter give their "common attention" at different times, which is not novel in 1911--it reiterates something that Peirce had stated at least twice previously. Moreover ... - Peirce's 1898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are *identical*, except that the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in the latter. - Peirce never again uses *either *of these notations in manuscripts after 1903, so it is equally unlikely that he would have revived *either *of them in 1911. - Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, with the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent (theorems) inside the red line. - Those pages in R 514 are among the "Fragments on Existential Graphs" that properly belong there and are dated 1909, not from the misfiled letter to Kehler of June 1911 (R L231) that includes a "tutorial" on EGs (NEM 3:162-169). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 10:16 PM Mike Bergman wrote: > Hi All, > > As many have noted, I, too, have learned much and have (generally) enjoyed > this interchange between JAS and JFS. Further, I have no dog in this hunt > and certainly do not claim any special understanding about Peirce's > existential graphs. > > So, as a voting matter, my impression of this interchange is that I would > have no problems with a thesis put forward such as, "Sowa has studied > Peirce's EGs for many decades and believes that 'metalanguage' helps > exposit . . . " > > Where I concur with JAS is that these assertions are not backed > sufficiently by Peirce's own statements. Further, now from my own > perspective, I think these kind of minutiae arguments are deflective from > understanding the more important points of what Peirce was trying to do, > what he was striving for, what his mindset and thought process and logical > rigor were striving to achieve. Much has changed in the six score decades > since Peirce but his ultimate objective of trying to reason about the > nature of things remains. That is a conversation I welcome, and may > initiate at some point myself. > > If the protagonists want to keep slugging it out, I say, OK, go for it. > But the fight from my perspective is growing tiresome. > > Best, Mike > On 3/19/2024 9:04 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > To refresh my memory, I reread Peirce's Lowell Lectures about Gamma > graphs. And the following passage from Lecture V (NEM 3, p. 365) explains > what he meant in L376 when he said that he would keep the Gamma division: > > "I must begin by a few words concerning gamma graphs; because it is by > means of gamma graphs that I have been enabled to understand these > subjects... In particular, it is absolutely necessary to representing the > reasoning about these subjects that we should be able to reason with graphs > about graphs and thus that we should have graphs of graphs." > > That exp
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
John, List: Up until the off-List message that you sent me late Saturday evening, we were having a respectful and substantive discussion despite our ongoing disagreements. I am disappointed that this is no longer the case and inclined to refrain from any further engagement after one more attempt to set the record straight. JFS: The critical additions [for a proof of pragmatism] are closely related to what Peirce specified in L376. I call that material a specification of Delta graphs. I don't care what you call it. The specifications are important. The names are irrelevant. The name is relevant when it is one that Peirce himself used. If he had never mentioned a Delta part of EGs at all, then anyone would be free to invent one and give it that name. However, he *did *mention it, albeit in only one sentence-- "I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals"--so no one should misleadingly use the name "Delta graphs" for anything that deviates from or goes well beyond this very brief description. As I have explicitly and repeatedly acknowledged, unless additional pages of R L376 turn up that spell it out, *no one* can know for sure exactly what he had in mind. That is why I have carefully and consistently referred to the notation that he scribed on R 339:[340r] as a *candidate* for Delta EGs. JFS: I realize that you insist in ignoring everything but the first two paragraphs of L376. I believe that is a serious mistake. You are deliberately putting blinders on your eyes. I think that we can all agree that it's unwise to reject anything Peirce wrote just because of some preconceived notion that it's irrelevant. On the contrary, I am not ignoring *anything *in R L376, and I have no preconceived notions about it. I am simply reading and explaining what the *entire *extant text actually says--and does not say. Again, the "many papers" correspond to different *subjects *that attract "the common attention" of the utterer and interpreter at different times, such that *together *they represent the entire universe of discourse. This is not new or innovative in 1911--it echoes what Peirce had already written at least twice previously, as I have demonstrated with exact quotations ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-03/msg4.html). Nothing precludes using the "many papers" with Alpha, Beta, or Gamma EGs--they do not "deal with modals" and are not otherwise unique to Delta EGs. Cheers, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Mar 17, 2024 at 9:29 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > Before I read your note below, I had just sent an off-list note to you and > Gary R. to recommend that you make very important revisions to your > article. It's a pity that you had sent the article to the publisher so > long ago. It's probably too late to stop the publication and make the > necessary revisions. > > Basic point: Peirce added the notation for metalanguage to EGs in 1898 > (RLT). That is 5 years before the Gamma graphs of 1903. That addition is > sufficient to support modality. It makes the modal features of Gamma > graphs irrelevant. > > But modality alone is not sufficient for a proof of pragmatism (a major > goal of Peirce's last decade). Metalanguage is a prerequisite, but much > more is necessary. I have been urging you (and other subscribers to > P-list) to read the developments of the IKRIS project of 2004 to 2006, > which uses a metalanguage feature added to the ISO standard for Common > Logic. See https://jfsowa.com/ikl . > > I was just one of a committee of 9 who defined the IKL logic. But that > logic, by itself, was not sufficient to support the major developments > needed for a proof of pragmatism. The critical additions are closely > related to what Peirce specified in L376. I call that material a > specification of Delta graphs. I don't care what you call it. The > specifications are important. The names are irrelevant. > > Allan Risteen was also highly influential in discussing the issues with > Peirce before he started to write L376. Please read the references to > Risteen in EP2 -- they're all listed in the index. And one of Risteen's > areas of expertise was his study of the mathematics by Arthur Cayley (see > his Wikipedia page). > > I realize that you insist in ignoring everything but the first two > paragraphs of L376. I believe that is a serious mistake. You are > deliberately putting blinders on your eyes. I think that we can all agree > that it's unwise to reject anything Peirce wrote just because of some > preconceived notion that it's irrelevant. > > I have a strong background in mathematics and logic and their application
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
gment to thank me for all this help in explaining what Peirce was doing. I am glad to see that you are maintaining a sense of humor. Again, I have appreciated the stimulating exchange and have learned quite a bit from it about how Peirce anticipated the use of metalanguage in logic, even though we continue to disagree on whether it has anything to do with Delta EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Mar 17, 2024 at 2:06 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > Since your article has just been accepted for publication, you probably > still have time to make a few corrections. Following are some suggestions. > > JAS: Indeed, given that Peirce *already *had a notation for > metalanguage in his 1903 Gamma EGs--in fact, five years earlier--how could > *that* be what he had in mind for the new Delta part that he added in > 1911? What exactly are *you *proposing to add that goes beyond the dotted > (or thinly drawn) oval and line for asserting propositions about > propositions? > > What must be added is all of L376. More would be better, but we can look > to the future to see what is needed. More precisely, Peirce had a notation > for metalanguage in 1898, which is simpler and does not need the useless > baggage of Gamma graphs. There is no need for them when you adopt the > notation for metalanguage. But metalanguage, by itself, is not sufficient > for a proof of pragmatism. There is an open-ended variety of ways for > using metalanguage. > > I also copied page 340r from the logic notebook (see attached). Please > note that EGs that refer to "circumstances" can be translated to ordinary > statements in Peirce's algebraic notion for first-order logic. There is > nothing special about circumstances, by themselves, that makes them modal. > You should make that correction in your article. > > Did you read the Wikipedia article about Arthur Cayley and the comments > about Risteen in EP2? Those topics would explain why Delta graphs (as > described in L376) have much more structure than just a notation for > metalanguage. Peirce used that structure to support a phemic sheet that > has multiple "papers". And the remainder of L376 describes how they may > be used in an "investigation". That is necessary to support a logic of > pragmatism. > > That additional structure is what makes Delta graphs the fourth kind of > logic that goes beyond Gamma graphs. I suggest that you include all of > L376 in an appendix to your article. That is what I'm doing. > > In summary, Peirce was years ahead of his time, and it's essential to give > him full credit for his accomplishments. It would be insulting to claim > that he didn't realize that his logic of 1892, by itself, was sufficient. > > And by the way, when you make these additions to your article, you can > include an acknowledgment to thank me for all this help in explaining what > Peirce was doing. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
entions" at the beginning of the second paragraph. The word "now" appears only once, referring to the new Delta part; but "here" appears in the first two sentences--as well as "1903" and "division"--in both cases referring to the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts. According to the second sentence, what will follow is "a cross division" into "the conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System"--i.e., these three aspects apply equally to *all *the parts of EGs, just as they did in "the better exposition of 1903." The first sentence of the next paragraph confirms this--the common purpose of *all *the parts of EGs is to analyze necessary/mathematical/deductive reasoning into its ultimate logical steps. JFS: Finally, if Peirce thought that the notations in his Gamma graphs of 1903 were adequate to represent everything in the Delta graphs, why did he claim that he needed to add a fourth part to his system of EGs? There must be something in those Delta graphs that cannot be represented with just some excerpts from the old Gamma graphs. Indeed, given that Peirce *already *had a notation for metalanguage in his 1903 Gamma EGs--in fact, five years earlier--how could *that* be what he had in mind for the new Delta part that he felt the need to add in 1911? What exactly are *you *proposing to add that goes beyond the dotted (or thinly drawn) oval and line for asserting propositions about propositions? Is there any evidence that *Peirce *ever used that notation to represent a modal proposition by writing "is possible" or "is necessary" as the attached rheme? On the other hand, consider what he says in the four sentences right before the one where he mentions the need for "a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals." CSP: In this ["Prolegomena," 1906] I made an attempt to make the syntax cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected [in 1897]. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to the lines called "cuts" which simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of *shadings*, or shaded parts of the sheet. The broken cuts of 1903 and the tinctures of 1906 were Peirce's previous attempts to "deal with modals," but they were ultimately unsatisfactory--even "nonsensical" in the case of the tinctures, as he called them two years later (R L477, LF 3/2, 1913 Nov 8). The badness of his *description *of EGs in 1906 was chiefly due to the use of cuts, a deficiency that he had already rectified by replacing them with shading (R 670, LF 3/1, 1911 Jun 11-12). What he needed now was a better *graphical *notation, compatible with shading, for representing and reasoning about modal propositions. Attaching heavy lines denoting possible states of things to the top of letters denoting propositions that would be true in them fits the bill. Moreover, Peirce himself suggested this solution (R 339:[340r], LF 1:624, 1909 Jan 7), although he evidently never worked out the details. I believe that I have done so in my forthcoming paper. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 15, 2024 at 6:34 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > Before saying anything more, I'd like to ask a question: If Peirce > thought that the notations for his Gamma graphs of 1903 were adequate to > represent everything in Delta graphs, why did he claim that the he needed > to add a fourth part to his system of EGs? There must be something in > those Delta graphs that cannot be represented with just some excerpts from > the old Gamma graphs. > > Next point: In your diagram below, the row of four EGs on the left > represent pure first-order predicate calculus. Any sentences outside of > the EGs (whether in English or EGs or some other notation) do nothing to > change those sentences from FOL to any version of modal logic. They are > pure, unadulterated FOL. > > In RLT in 1898, I agreed with you that a thin line attached to an oval is > not a line of identity. As Peirce explained, it is a way of making a > statement about the nested EG: The EG for "You are a good girl" describes > a situation THAT is "much to be wished". > > Since the word 'metalanguage' was introduced about 20 years after Peirce > died, he did not give a name to that thin line. But after Tarski and > others introduced the word 'metalanguage' into English (and equivalents in > other languages), there can be no doubt that the thin line is equ
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
ut by a series of erasures, insertions, iterations, and/or deiterations? JFS: I believe that Peirce recognized the need for more expressive power. And metalanguage adds that power without losing anything that might be expressed with the 1903 EGs. Again, the 1903 Gamma EGs *already *included the dotted oval/line notation for metalanguage, so there was no need for Peirce to invent something new for *that *purpose in 1911. In order to represent *modal *propositions with EGs, his *only *stated reason for adding a Delta part, he needed a better notation to replace the unsatisfying broken cuts of 1903 and nonsensical tinctures of 1906. The vertical heavy lines of R 339:[340r] fit the bill, and as spelled out in my forthcoming paper, they provide *graphical *solutions for iterated modalities, modal axioms, etc. JFS: And we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction. ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00089.html) I continue to agree wholeheartedly with these sentiments and hope that you will give serious consideration to my feedback accordingly. I am sincerely trying to help you as I work through all this myself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 14, 2024 at 1:54 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > Every statement about a thought expresses a possibility. Every statement > about a claim, a wish, a fear, etc, expresses a possibility. That is why > metalanguage is a more explicit method for expressing and reasoning about > possibility. Quine said that in the 1960s, and other logicians have been > developing methods for doing that since the 1970s. Today, nobody uses the > Lewis-style of modal logic for any practical purpose. > > JAS: how would you scribe the graph for "A thinks that B is *possibly * > true"? > > I'm sorry that I forgot to answer that question. I was commenting on > other points, and I forgot to state the translation for the EG you drew. > For my recommended version of metalevel EGs, I would first replace the > dotted line of your EG with a solid line. That would express the sentence > "A is thinking the proposition that there exists a B." Then I would > connect that solid line by a ligature to the word 'possible'. > > Literally, that new EG could be read "A is thinking the possible > proposition that there exists a B." But it could be read more simply "A > thinks it's possible that there is a B." > > Exactly the same procedure can be used to attach any other adjective or > phrase, such as 'necessary', 'impossible', 'probable', 'useful', > 'desirable', 'feared', 'doubted', 'lawful', 'illegal' or 'written in Holy > Scriptures". That is the reason why the version of modality that C. I. > Lewis specified in 1932 is a dead end. Anything you can express with it can > be expressed more clearly and generally with metalanguage. > > I believe that Peirce recognized the need for more expressive power. And > metalanguage adds that power without losing anything that might be > expressed with the 1903 EGs. Some people dabbled with methods for > computing with a Lewis-style of reasoning, but they have never been used > for any practical applications. Metalanguage is simpler and more general. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
John, List: JFS: In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' Yes, of course; that is obvious from the syntax of the English sentences that I translated into those two graphs--although, as I said in that post, it is a *dotted *line, not a *thin *line. JFS: But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of it. No, of course not; that is obvious from the fact that neither of those two sentences expresses a *modal *proposition, i.e., one that involves possibility or necessity. JFS: They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta graphs No, this is incorrect; that is obvious from the fact that such propositions about propositions can already be represented by *Gamma *EGs using the dotted oval/line notation that Peirce introduced in 1903 (LF 2/1:166), which is isomorphic with the thinly drawn oval/line notation that he used in 1898 (RLT 151). In 1911, he did not need a new Delta part of EGs in order to deal with *metalanguage*; according to his own explicit statement in R L376, he needed a new Delta part of EGs in order to deal with *modals*, due to his dissatisfaction with the cuts (including broken cuts) of 1903 and the tinctures of 1906. With that in mind, in your candidate for Delta EGs, how would you scribe the graph for "A thinks that B is *possibly *true"? Or will you continue refusing to provide *any *examples of how you would represent (and reason about) even *very simple* modal propositions, despite my multiple requests? By contrast, I am happy to show you how I would scribe that graph in my candidate for Delta EGs based on R 339:[340r] (1909). [image: image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 4:51 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' > > A thinks THAT C is a good girl. > > A is claiming THAT A is thinking THAT C is a good girl. > > Both of those sentences and both of those EGs can be translated to and > from the IKL logic of 2006, which uses the symbol "that" to represent > metalanguage. They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta > graphs, which can be translated to and from the IKL logic. > > But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of > modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of > it. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
Helmut, List: Different kinds of possibility can be addressed with different formal systems of modal logic--alethic, deontic, doxastic, dynamic, epistemic, temporal, etc. For example, deontic logic defines possibility as *permissibility *and necessity as *obligation*, which is why its alternativeness/accessibility relation is merely serial and not reflexive--every obligation is permissible, but not every obligation is actually fulfilled, i.e., people can (and do) behave in ways that are *not * permissible. It is a fundamental principle of Peirce's Existential Graphs (EGs) that the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse *as already agreed upon* by the utterer (or graphist) who scribes discrete EGs on them and the interpreter who reads them. In other words, the underlying assumption is that both are genuine inquirers who are sincerely seeking the truth together. If the utterer scribes the EG for "A thinks that B," then this is true within that universe of discourse--it has nothing to do with what A *claims *to think, only what A *really does *think, unless the utterer instead scribes "A claims that A thinks that B." By the way, since B designates a proposition instead of a name for a general concept, the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "thinking," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around B, preferably spelled out as a Beta EG ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Likewise, the Gamma EG for "A claims that A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "claiming," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" as just described, except that A is not repeated; instead, the one heavy line is branched and extended to "thinking." Here are those Gamma EGs, substituting "C is a good girl" for B. [image: image.png] As far as I know, the only place in Peirce's writings where he discusses a specific role for God in EGs is R 280 (c. 1905). In three different drafts, he states the following. CSP: The Graphist is really Plastic Nature, or the Artifex of Nature; and the special permissions are the experiences given to the interpreter of Nature, to the man, to which he is at liberty to attend, or not to attend at all, or to attend and immediately put out of sight, as he will. CSP: The sheet of assertion is the mirror of the interpreter’s mind, and through that it is the sign of what the Graphist authorizes. Now the graphist, as the author of truth (for we have seen that falsity is what he forbids and truth what he permits) and source of all the interpreter’s knowledge must be recognized as being either Plastic Nature or the Artifex of Nature. The universe is simply the collective whole of all things to the assertion of whose existence the Graphist interposes no veto, or extends a positive permission. CSP: We further conceive that this feigned sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth sufficient effort. The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to the "Plastic Nature" of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature. Again, everything that is asserted on the sheet is true, in this case because the one scribing all the EGs is "the author of truth"--either God the Creator himself or what Peirce describes elsewhere (referencing Cudworth) as "a blind agent intermediate between God and the world" (R 870, 1901). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 12:15 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > List, > > I put a new name to this, because I am not inside the discussion, just > want to mention a problem I have with the topic. First, there are different > types of possibility: Is it not definite but possible about the past or > about the future, is it due to limited knowledge or to different options of > decision, and so on. All in all it is the same problem as with > metalanguage, like "A says B": Who heard him/her saying so?, and "A thinks, > that B": Who knows how, what A thinks? Like with possibility: Who or what > group of people regards it merely for possible instead of true, and might > there not exist somebody, e.g. God or "the universe", who knows, whether it > is true or false? > > For example, if you have an EG with the term "A thinks, that B", it is > written on t
[PEIRCE-L] Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
Jerry, List: Your questions as posed are extremely general, and their answers depend heavily on the particular context of interest. Peirce *assigns *specific logical content to certain signs in his Existential Graphs (EGs) and develops the transformation rules for them accordingly. In all parts, the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse, graphs scribed on it represent propositions that are asserted as true in that universe, juxtaposition represents coexistence in that universe (conjunction), and a scroll (double cut or ring-shaped shaded area) represents a consequence (material implication) from which a single cut or shaded area is derived as representing negation (implication of falsity/absurdity). In the Beta part, heavy lines of identity denote indefinite individuals and attached names denote general concepts being attributed to those individuals. In the Gamma part, there are various additional signs for various purposes, such as the broken cut for possible falsity (modal logic), the heavy line with dotted lines along both sides for quantifying predicates (second-order logic), and the dotted oval for treating a proposition as a subject that fills the blank in a rheme attached to the oval by a dotted line (metalanguage). As I keep emphasizing, we cannot know for sure what Peirce had in mind for the Delta part, other than that it would "deal with modals," unless and until new manuscript evidence turns up, such as the missing pages of R L376. My hypothesis is that he was considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal propositions involving possibility or necessity, such as the one that he introduces in his Logic Notebook (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). In that case, heavy lines represent "circumstances" or "times"--more formally, possible states of things (PSTs)--and attached letters represent propositions that would be true under those circumstances, at those times, or in those PSTs. The transformation rules for these "lines of compossibility" (my term) are different from the ones for the "lines of identity" (Peirce's term) in the Beta part because of the obvious and fundamental semiotic difference between describing *things *with names (rhemes/semes) and describing *states of things* with propositions (dicisigns/phemes). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 8:01 AM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Jon, John, List: > > The attempts to interpret the on going discussions leads to simple > questions about meaning of symbols and logics. > > Given a graphic object, how does one decipher the logical content of it? > > What types of semantics can be associated with what types of visual > distinctions? > > How many distinctions are to be associated with a graphic object? And how > are these distinctions associated with the forms embodied in the objects > with logical premises OF ANY ORDER? > > I pose these questions because as the discussion unfolds into the vast > richness of modal logics within the modern forms of symbolic logics, the > roles of individual minds in expressing semes appears to become dominant. > In other words, the boundaries between symbols and icons seems to > disappearing... > > Cheers > > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
John, List: CSP: The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals. JFS: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the details of the 1903 logics. He is saying that he is preserving that DIVISION into Alpha (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and Gamma (something beyond Alpha and Beta). Please do not put words in Peirce's mouth. Preserving the division without also preserving the details of "the better exposition of 1903" would make no sense. Going straight into a specification for the new Delta part without saying anything at all about the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts, having just stated the intention to "adhere to" that division, would likewise make no sense. Again, can you identify even *one sentence* from the entire extant letter to Risteen that is about EGs but *not *applicable to those other three parts, i.e., unique to Delta? JFS: Quine correctly said that modal logic was just a version of metalanguage about logic. That is Quine's opinion, apparently one that you share. However, it is by no means universal, even among logicians today, and there is no basis for claiming that *Peirce *would agree unless you can provide an exact quotation to that effect. Again, having made up your own mind, I suspect that you are reading that position back into his texts, including R L376. JFS: All the useful applications are based on some version of metalanguage, along the lines of the December 1911 article. It is a letter, not an article, and as far as I can tell, it neither states nor implies anything about the use of metalanguage instead of formal modal logic. Please provide an exact quotation to support your claim. JFS: Logics that use the two operators for necessary and possible, have no practical applications of any kind. Again, I would caution against making such sweeping and dismissive pronouncements. After all, there might very well be practical applications of formal modal logic that have not yet come to your attention or that get discovered in the future. In any case, according to Peirce, "True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). JFS: Peirce has an unusually large percentage of successful revivals. His Delta graphs are among them. I recognized their importance, because I have used and worked with similar logics from the late 20th and early 21st C. No one can say for sure what Peirce had in mind for Delta EGs since he never spelled it out himself, unless there are more pages of R L376 somewhere out there, waiting to be discovered. I still see no evidence in the extant text of that letter nor elsewhere (including R 514) to support your conjecture that it was about adding metalanguage to Beta EGs, given that his only stated reason for needing "a *Delta *part" at all is "in order to deal with modals." It seems much more plausible that he was considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal propositions to replace his unsatisfactory broken cuts (1903) and tinctures (1906), such as the one that he introduces on R 339:[340r] (1909 Jan 7). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 10:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I'll go into much more detail in the preview article, which I am now > working on. I'll just respond to the following point: > > JAS: Your quotation here omits the crucial first part of the only > sentence in R L376 that mentions Delta--"The better exposition of 1903 > divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, > and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall > now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals." > > I answered that before: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the > details of the 1903 logics. He is saying that he is preserving that > *DIVISION* into Alpha (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and > Gamma (something beyond Alpha and Beta). > > The most significant Gamma graphs are the the ones that represent the > second-order version of his 1885 Algebra of Logic. He had reviewed > Russell's logic of 1903, and he must have heard about (but didn't have time > to study) Whitehead & Russell's logic of 1910. Both of them discussed > higher-order logic (second order and higher), but not modal logic. > > During the years after 1903, Peirce mentioned the modal words in English > many, many times. And he experimented with new notations for modality, but > he neve
[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
John, List: JFS: For convenience, see the attached Delta376.txt. I appreciate the complete transcription, although it would still be very helpful if you could quote specific sentences that you interpret as supporting each of your claims. JFS: I believe that there is no way to interpret that text without acknowledging the fact that it is the beginning of a specification of Delta graphs. Note the ending of the second paragraph: "I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. A cross division of the description which here, as in that of 1903, is given precedence over the other is into the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System." Your quotation here omits the crucial first part of the only sentence in R L376 that mentions Delta--"The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals." Accordingly, I believe that there is no way to interpret the 19 extant pages of this letter *as *the beginning of a specification of (only) Delta graphs. On the contrary, Peirce plainly states his intention to describe *all four parts* of EGs, but he never gets around to explaining their differences, let alone dealing with modals or discussing anything else that is unique to the new Delta part. JFS: Then the paragraph immediately after that begins "The Conventions." And it continues with a specification of the conventions for something. I cannot imagine that the "something" is anything other than Delta graphs. Your failure of imagination is not dispositive. Can you identify even *one sentence* from the entire section on "The Conventions"--or, for that matter, the rest of the letter--that is about EGs but *not *applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma? JFS: Note the later discussion about different "parts" of the phemic sheet, which may be asserted and interpreted in different ways. Peirce states, "For they two [utterer and interpreter] may conceive that the 'phemic sheet' embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to one subject and part to another." As I have noted before, the different parts relate to different *subjects *to which both parties pay attention at different times--equivalent what Peirce describes in previous texts such as R 280 (c. 1905) and CP 4.561n (1908), both of which I quoted last week ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-03/msg4.html). As such, this concept is fully applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma EGs--it does not exclusively "deal with modals," and thus is not unique to Delta EGs. JFS: That is why metalanguage must be used to state the many kinds of modality that Peirce discusses in the attached text. Peirce indeed briefly discusses modality in R L376, but he does not address how to represent and reason about modal propositions using EGs, which is his only stated reason for needing a Delta part. JFS: But the original MS, a copy of which you included in your note, had a thin line that connected the oval to the word 'is'. I suspect that who drew that diagram thought that the thin line between the oval and the word 'is' was just part of the word 'is'. But in his handwiriting, Peirce never drew a line in front of an initial letter 'i'. Therefore, that graph was mistakenly drawn. Thank you for correcting my mistake. I noticed that line, drawn even more lightly than the one in the first EG on RLT 151, but assumed that it was part of Peirce's cursive "i"--just as Ketner evidently did. However, after looking at a few other manuscripts, I agree that Peirce generally *did not* include such a line when handwriting "i" as the first letter of a word, so there is indeed a lightly drawn line connecting the oval (containing a proposition) to the rheme (whose blank that proposition fills). Of course, I already brought to your attention his similar notation in a later manuscript--R 492 (1903), erroneously reproduced in CP 4.471 but corrected by both Roberts and Pietarinen--where the oval and line are dotted instead of lightly drawn ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). This notation in Gamma EGs asserts a proposition about a proposition, but there is no hint of anything like it in R L376 (nor R 514). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 3:56 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, Jeff, Gary, List, > > I am now writing the article on Delta graphs. In a few days, I'll send a > preview. For conveni
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
art" at all is "in order to deal with modals." It seems much more plausible that he was considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal propositions to replace his unsatisfactory broken cuts (1903) and tinctures (1906), such as the one that he introduces on R 339:[340r]. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Mar 9, 2024 at 12:02 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jeff, Jon, List, > > In his 1885 Algebra of Logic, Peirce presented the modern versions of both > first-order and second-order predicate logic. The only difference between > his notation and the modern versions is the choice of symbols. Since > Peano wanted to make his logic publishable by ordinary type setters, he had > to avoid Peirce's Greek letters and subscripts. Therefore, he invented the > practice of turning letters upside-down or backwards, which type setters > could do very easily. > > For every version of first-order logic, there is a fixed domain D1 of > entities in the domain of quantification. Those entities could be anything > of any kind -- that includes abstractions, fictions, imaginary beasts, and > even hypothetical or possible worlds. For second order logic, the domain > D2 consists of all possible functions and/or predicates that range over > entities in D1. > > Second order logic is the only kind of higher order logic that anybody > uses for any practical applications in any version of science, engineering, > or computer systems. When they use the term HOL, they actually mean some > kind of second order logic, which may be the one described above or > something with a different way of specifying D2. > > The first (and most widely cited or defined) version of higher order logic > that goes beyond second was developed by Whitehead and Russell (1910). It > goes beyond second order logic by introducing domains D3, D4,..., which are > so huge that nobody has ever found a use for them in any practical > application. > > Given D1 and D2 as above, W & R specified D3 as the set of all possible > functions or predicates that may be defined over the union of D1 and D2. > Then D4 is defined over the union of D1, D2, D3. And so on. Logicians > (usually graduate students who need to find a thesis topic) publish papers > about such things in the Journal of Symbolic Logic. And the only people > who read them are graduate students who need to find a thesis topic. > > Peirce never went beyond second order logic. But any statement in any > language or logic about any language or logic is metalanguage. Since that > word was coined over 20 years after Peirce, he never used it. But there > are many uses of metalanguage in Peirce's publications and MSS. But he > never chose or coined a word that would relate all the instances. > > In the example that Jon copied below, "the line of identity denoting the *ens > rationis",* Peirce used the term 'ens rationis' for that example of > metalanguage. But he described other examples with other words. > > In the passage below by Jay Zeman, "a different kind of line of > identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of > individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at > least the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring > quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able > to determine", Jay mistakenly used the term "second order PC". There is > no quantified variable for some kind of logic. It is just another example > of metalanguage that makes an assertion about the EG. > > There is much more to say about metalanguage, which I'll discuss in a > separate reply to Jon. But these examples are a small fraction of the many > instances of metalanguage throughout Peirce's publications and MSS. Once > you start looking for them, you'll find them throughout his writings. > Unfortunately, Peirce had no standard terminology for talking about them. > > I hate to say it, but this is one time when I wish Peirce had found a > Greek word for it. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
Jeff, List: Indeed, as Don Roberts summarizes, "The Gamma part of EG corresponds, roughly, to second (and higher) order functional calculi, and to modal logic. ... By means of this new section of EG Peirce wanted to take account of abstractions, including qualities and relations and graphs themselves as subjects to be reasoned about" ( https://www.felsemiotica.com/descargas/Roberts-Don-D.-The-Existential-Graphs-of-Charles-S.-Peirce.pdf, 1973, p. 64). Likewise, according to Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "In the Gamma part Peirce proposes a bouquet of logics beyond the extensional, propositional and first-order systems. Those concern systems of modal logics, second-order (higher-order) logics, abstractions, and logic of multitudes and collections, among others" (LF 2/1:28). Jay Zeman says a bit more about Gamma EGs for second-order logic in his dissertation. JZ: There is also another suggestion, in 4.470, which is interesting but to which Peirce devotes very little time. Here he shows us a different kind of line of identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at least the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able to determine, but it seems to me that there would not be too much of a problem in working it into a graphical system which would stand to the higher order calculi as beta stands to the first-order calculus. The continuity interpretation of the "spot line of identity" is fairly clear; it maps the continuity of a property or a relation. The redness of an apple is the same, in a sense, as the redness of my face if I am wrong; the continuity of the special line of identity introduced in 4.470 represents graphically this sameness. This sameness or continuity is not the same as the identity of individuals; although its representation is scribed upon the beta sheet of assertion, its "second intentional" nature seems to cause Peirce to classify it with the gamma signs. ( https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481, 1964, pp. 31-32) The CP reference here is to the paragraph right before the one where Peirce suggests the notation of a dotted oval and dotted line to assert a proposition about a proposition (CP 4.471, 1903), similar to the first EG on RLT 151 (1898), as John and I discussed recently ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Here is what Peirce says (and scribes) in that text; the image is from LF 2/1:165, with Peirce's handiwork on the right and Pietarinen's reproduction on the left. CSP: Convention No. 13. The letters ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, etc. each with a number of hooks greater by one than the subscript number, may be taken as rhemata signifying that the individuals joined to the hooks, other than the one vertically above the ρ taken in their order clockwise are capable of being asserted of the rhema indicated by the line of identity joined vertically to the ρ. Thus, Fig. 57 expresses that there is a relation in which every man stands to some woman to whom no other man stands in the same relation; that is, there is a woman corresponding to every man or, in other words, there are at least as many women as men. The dotted lines between which, in Fig. 57, the line of identity denoting the *ens rationis* is placed, are by no means necessary. [image: image.png] On the other hand, as I keep pointing out, Peirce's *only *stated purpose for needing to add a new Delta part was "in order to deal with modals" (R L376, 1911 Dec 6), so I doubt that it would have had anything to do with higher-order logics. John Sowa seems to be convinced that Peirce had in mind a more generalized situation/context logic using metalanguage, but so far, I see no evidence for this in the extant 19 pages of that letter to Risteen. Pietarinen speculates, "Perhaps he planned the Delta part on quantificational multi-modal logics as can be discerned in his theory of *tinctured graphs* that was fledgling since 1905" (LF 1:21), but that also seems unlikely to me since Peirce ultimately describes the tinctures as "nonsensical" (R 477, 1913 Nov 8). As far as I know, the *only *new notation that Peirce ever proposes for representing modal propositions with EGs after abandoning broken cuts (1903) and tinctures (1906) is the one in his Logic Notebook that I have been advocating (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). Echoing Zeman's remark in the quotation above, the sameness or continuity of a possible state of things (PST) as represented by a heavy line of compossibility (LoC) in my candidate for Delta EGs is *not *the same as the identity of individuals as represented by a heavy line of identity in Beta EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSc
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was Delta Existential Graphs
e] and KR [knowledge representation]." JFS: The many different axioms for modal logic that had been defined over the years were constrains on the domain of quantification. But those constraints were just useless baggage. You could keep them, reject them, or replace them with any kind of constraints that were relevant to the problem(s) being considered. That is what Peirce was specifying in L376. Please provide an exact quotation from R L376 where Peirce specifies what you describe here, because I am not seeing it. As I have explained previously, the different modal axioms added to classical propositional logic are hardly "useless baggage." They correspond to different properties of the binary alternativeness/accessibility relation (AR) between the AST and PSTs--serial for D, reflexive for T, symmetric for B, transitive for 4, euclidean for 5--thus formalizing different criteria for a state of things to be *possible* in the first place. None of this was worked out during Peirce's lifetime, and various logicians contributed pieces to the puzzle decades after his death. How would such complexity be handled in your candidate for Delta EGs? So far, you have not even been willing/able to show/tell us how you would represent several *very simple* modal propositions and then derive others from them. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 6, 2024 at 5:47 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > In every one of these notes, I have urged you to read the references to > the IKL logic of 2006, which is based on earlier developments from 1973 and > later by Dunn, Hintikka, and others. > > The fundamental principle involves metalanguage and quantifiers that range > over possible worlds -- or subsets of worlds called contexts (John > McCarthy) or situations (Barwise & Perry). Hintikka was also developing > ideas along similar lines with his game theoretical semantics. He also > allowed quantifiers to range over possible worlds or subsets of them. > > In the copy of your note, included below, please note that the five EGs > are *BETA *graphs. The lines of identity refer to things that Peirce > called circumstances. A circumstance is a *THING *that is > indistinguishable from a context by McCarthy or a situation by Barwise. > In fact, a possible world can also be called a *THING*. Peirce's > tinctured graphs of 1906 had a notation that he later rejected -- not > because they referred multiple possible worlds, but because the notation > was bad. He improved the notation in R514 and L231. I don't have the page > number of R514 in front of me, but I remember that the following sentence > ended in the middle with [end]. > > As for McCarthy's circumstances, please note his article titled "Modality > Si! Modal Logic No!" I don't have that article in front of me at the > moment, but you can google it by typing "McCarthy" and "modality si". And > by the way, both McCarthy and Barwise had invited me to give talks in their > seminars at Stanford. That suggests that they did not reject my > interpretation. > > Saul Kripke showed how to define a semantics for any version of modal > logic by allowing quantifiers to range over possible worlds. Dunn (1973) > showed that it was possible to simplify and generalize the method by using > metalanguage and quantifiers to range over worlds, contexts, circumstances, > situations or anything you wanted to call them. The many different axioms > for modal logic that had been defined over the years were constrains on the > domain of quantification. But those constraints were just useless > baggage. You could keep them, reject them, or replace them with any kind > of constraints that were relevant to the problem(s) being considered. That > is what Peirce was specifying in L376. > > In December 1911, Peirce did not have any knowledge of the following > century of logic. But he had a deep insight into the issues, which led him > to a version that is very similar to the logics cited above. I recommend > that you read the references. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was Delta Existential Graphs
John, List: JFS: In his letter on Delta graphs, Peirce was breaking new ground. He was proposing a totally new foundation for modal logic, based on metalanguage. There is no "letter on Delta graphs." Peirce wrote only *one sentence* that mentions them in a letter to Risteen (R L376, 1909 Dec 6), and he was *not *"proposing a totally new foundation for modal logic, based on metalanguage." He simply expresses the need to "add a *Delta *part [to EGs] in order to deal with modals," and nothing else in the 19 extant pages is about modal logic or unique to Delta. JFS: The full letter [to James], which mentions the Big Book that Peirce had in mind, is in NEM 3:867-875. That is quite a lot of text to wade through, so it would still be very helpful if you could provide exact quotations of what you consider to be the most relevant portions to support the points that you wish to make. JFS: The outline for the Big Book has a large overlap with L231 and with topics in his last long letter of 1913. That suggests that the Big Book was intended to be the long awaited proof of pragmatism. That also suggests that he intended Delta graphs to be the logic for his proof. Peirce only briefly discusses EGs near the end of the letter to James. In fact, that is where he states, "This ought to be the Logic of the Future" (NEM 3:874, 1909 Dec 28), supplying Pietarinen's title for his five-volume comprehensive collection of Peirce's writings about them. His sole mention of the Big Book comes several sentences later--"I have done a lot of work in Methodeutic that is valuable and very little of it is printed. This will be the most widely useful part of my Big Book" (ibid). Pragmatism falls within methodeutic in Peirce's architectonic classification of the sciences, but he does not say anything about *proving *it in this letter, let alone using EGs to do so, much less a new Delta part that he would not even give that name until two years later. JFS: Peirce's Delta graphs and the IKL logic have very similar goals. Is the *only *goal of the IKL logic "to deal with modals"? That is Peirce's *only *stated goal for Delta EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 6, 2024 at 1:26 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Gary, > > In his letter on Delta graphs, Peirce was breaking new ground. He was > proposing a totally new foundation for modal logic, based on metalanguage. > The important references are in the future, not the past. For Peirce's > past, the most relevant references were cited and discussed many times: > His 1903 Lowell lectures, his tinctured graphs of 1906, and the references > in R514, L231, and the primary source L376. > > For modern references, I have cited quite a few. The most important one > is to the IKL logic of 2006. For that, I repeatedly pointed to the web > page, which has hundreds of references: https://jfsowa.com/ikl/ . > > The title of that web page is "Semantics for Interoperable Systems" with > four sections. Each section has multiple short paragraphs with several > links for individual systems of that type: > > 1. From the conceptual schema to the semantic web. > 2. The IKRIS project > 3. A foundation for multiple projects > 4. Supporting an open-ended diversity > > Section 1 is historical, but many of the systems mentioned there are still > in use or are the foundation for later developments. Section 2 and the > references there are the basis for IKL and related projects that build on > the IKL base. Section 3 also includes some projects that use IKL. And > Section 4 discusses issues that are still being debated and developed > today. Every section has multiple references. Just look at that article > and note all the phrases in blue. Each one is clickable. > > As for the letter to William James, I was in a hurry, and I didn't have > the time to dig up references to a point that was not directly relevant to > the topic of the letter. For the record, it's the last letter to WJ in > EP2. Unfortunately, the end of the letter was deleted in EP2. The full > letter, which mentions the Big Book that Peirce had in mind, is in NEM > 3:867-875. > > Now that I dug up that reference, I realize that I should have mentioned > something I wrote in an unfinished article. I think I'll include it in my > article on Delta graphs. It shows why Peirce realized the need for a new > approach to modality, and it certainly goes far beyond Alpha graphs. I'll > say more in another note. > > And by the way, that letter was written on 25 Dec 1909. In the part that > was deleted in EP2, Peirce wrote that he was planning to include a section > of the Big Book in
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was Delta Existential Graphs
John, List: JFS: One reason why I did not respond in detail to your previous note (copied below) is that your citations to the writings by Dunn and Goble only apply to PROPOSITIONAL modal logic (no quantifiers). I have acknowledged this all along--my candidate for Delta EGs is an extension of *Alpha *EGs, not *Beta *EGs. After all, the various modal axioms are formulated as extensions of classical *propositional *logic, not first-order *predicate *logic (FOPL). The heavy lines of compossibility (LoCs) in my Delta EGs represent possible states of things (PSTs) in which propositions denoted by attached letters would be true, while the heavy lines of identity (LoIs) in Beta EGs represent indefinite individuals to which general concepts denoted by attached names are attributed. Roberts suggests that these two notations *could *be combined, with LoCs attached to the top of names that are also attached to LoIs (1973, pp. 99-100); but as you rightly observe later in your post, this "opens up a huge can of worms." I have mentioned previously an exception to this cautionary note, which is implementing system *P* with no iterated modalities. LoCs are then attached to letters for propositions on the one sheet for the *actual *state of things (AST), which are keyed to different Beta graphs with LoIs on the various sheets for PSTs. This demonstrates the sense in which formal propositional logic as implemented by Alpha EGs is a simple metalanguage for reasoning *about *propositions, each of which can then be more informatively represented in FOPL as implemented by Beta EGs. JFS: And the E of EG refers to the existential quantifier, which corresponds to a universal quantifier in a negated area. Not exactly, since Alpha EGs are (obviously) *existential *graphs despite not having *any *quantifiers at all. Moreover, although Peirce invented/discovered quantifiers independently of Frege, and his algebraic notation for them was the basis for what subsequently became the standard one, he apparently never uses the term "existential quantifier" in any of his writings. In fact, I have found only one place where he gives it a name at all, calling it "the *particular *quantifier" (CP 2.339, c. 1895). Regardless, we do not need to guess at Peirce's reason for giving EGs their name--he tells us plainly, "I call it the system of Existential Graphs, because its fundamental symbol expresses the relation of existence" (R 485, LF 1:312, c. 1898). Also, "In order to draw such a graph, the first step is to assign some sheet of paper or enclosure upon a sheet, marked out by a bounding line, to represent so much as we know or recollect of the universe. If on that sheet or in that enclosure we draw a picture, or write a general description, or a letter which is an abbreviation for a general description, the effect is to be understood and agreed upon as being that we *assert* that to something in the universe that picture or description applies. We aver that such a thing *exists*. Hence, I call this the system of *existential* graphs" (R 513, LF 1:316-317, 1898). JFS: Solution: Add metalanguage to a conventional (non-modal) logic. ... That happens to be the solution adopted for the IKL logic of 1906, which appears to be a superset of Peirce's Delta graphs. Again, there is no evidence in R L436 nor elsewhere in Peirce's writings that what he has in mind for Delta EGs is adding metalanguage to classical logic, other than what Alpha EGs already provide for reasoning *about *propositions and an additional sign for asserting them as possibly (or necessarily) true/false instead of actually true/false. All we can say with certainty is that he recognizes the need for "a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals," and my candidate achieves this purpose by implementing various formal systems of modal logic that have been introduced over the last century. As I said yesterday, I am still wondering exactly how your candidate would represent the five modal propositions that Peirce wrote in his Logic Notebook, if not exactly as he scribed them on that page (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). JFS: As for the two quotations by Peirce below, (1) they're irrelevant to the issues about Delta graphs, and (2) they are not consistent with modern developments in physics and astronomy. My only point in presenting those two quotations was to show a potential *application *of formal modal logic--system *S4*, with a reflexive and transitive alternativeness relation (AR) such that the model set of law-propositions never shrinks but can grow with each iteration of PSTs, is reminiscent of Peirce's hyperbolic cosmology. This is a *metaphysical *hypothesis grounded in synechism, tychism, and objective idealism--not a finding of the *special *sciences, which have largely adopted the opposite assumptions of reductionism, determinism, and materialism. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA St
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
n his Logic Notebook, if not exactly as he scribed their EGs on that page (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Mar 2, 2024 at 5:18 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > There are several points that must be considered. The first is that all > modern versions of modal logic after C. I. Lewis (including those based on > post-1970 methods) are consistent with or variations of one or more of the > versions specified by Lewis). That includes the versions of modal logic > supported by the IKL logic of 2006. Further qualifiers such as wishing, > hoping, fearing, specified in Holy Scriptures. . . may be *ADDED *to the > specifications that determine possibility, actuality, or necessity. > > Second, Lewis was inspired by Peirce's 1903 specifications, and no one > knows how many other MSS Lewis may have read. But Lewis adopted the much > more readable basic operators, represented by □ and ◇. For readability, > they correspond to the words 'necessary' and 'possible' in English or their > equivalents in other languages. > > Third, all of Peirce's 1903 combinations can be represented by > combinations of those two symbols and negation. But the papers of Delta > graphs can represent more information about each world, including the > reasons why it happens to be possible, actual, necessary, or impossible. > That is also true of the worlds specified by Hintikka, Dunn, IKL, and > others. The specifications of those worlds can also add further > information beyond just those two operators plus negation. > > Fourth, more issues of modality related to Peirce and modern variations > were discussed at a workshop in Bogota hosted by invitation of Zalamea. > Some of the presentations were published in the *Journal of Applied > Logics* *5:5*, 2018. > http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00025.pdf . Others > in the Journal Zalamea edited, *Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana* *8*, > 2016. https://ucaldas.academia.edu/CuadernosSistem%C3%A1ticaPeirceana . > (Although this version is dated 2016, it was delayed by late submissions > and editing until 2019.) > > Fifth, Risteen's background was significant. He was a former student of > Peirce's at Johns Hopkins, and he was a paid assistant to Peirce for > definitions in the *Century Dictionary* from S to Z. His most important > contribution (at least for Delta graphs) was his note about Cayley's > mathematical trees for the dictionary entry and in the discussions with > Peirce in December 1911. It would have been wonderful to have a YouTube of > their discussions on 3 Dec. 1911. > > The specifications about papers in L376 would allow a tree structure of > papers. Risteen's knowledge of mathematical trees is a likely reason why > Peirce had invited him to visit in December and why he was writing that > letter to him shortly after the visit. > > And note the very strange coincidence that occurred shortly after Peirce > began the letter L376: Juliette had washed and scrubbed the floor in > December after a visitor had left. There were papers on the floor. Peirce > slipped on the floor in an unusual fall that caused the kind of injury that > occurs in a twisting motion. And the injury took six months to heal. > > Scientists, engineers, and crime investigators do not believe in strange > coincidences that involve two or more unusual causes. They search for a > hidden connection. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
ified by > John L. Pollock in 1967 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2270778). It > includes modal axioms K and T, as well as all the theorems of standard > systems *S1*-*S5*, *T*, and *B* that have no iterated modalities, which > they have in common--as Pollock notes, these constitute "the core of > theorems that everyone accepts" (p. 363). Again, the only *absolute* > necessities are the tautologies of classical logic; all other > law-propositions for the AST are *conditional* necessities, i.e., strict > implications. Pollock calls this system *B* for "basic modal logic," but > since that identifier is now widely used for another system inspired by L. > E. J. Brouwer, I advocate instead calling it *P* for Parry, Pollock, > Peirce, and pragmaticism. > > *Here is an illustration of how this translates to my candidate for Delta > EGs, with the AST sheet in the middle and (arbitrarily) eight PST sheets > arranged around it, distinguished by having shaded margins. > > [image: image.png] > > On the AST sheet with modal axioms K and T to implement system *T* (with > iterated modalities) or *P* (without them), my new permissions allow > extending the unshaded LoC (attached to *p*) into the shaded area and > joining it to the one there (attached to *p* and *q*), deiterating the > shaded *p*, removing the now-empty ring-shaped shaded area, and erasing > *p* to derive ◇*q*. Likewise, on any PST sheet where *p* appears, the > usual permissions allow the last three transformations to derive *q*. > > [image: image.png] > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Sun, Feb 25, 2024 at 10:02 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> List: >> >> The sole reason that Peirce expresses in R L376 (1911 Dec 6) for needing >> to add a Delta part to EGs is "in order to deal with modals," which he >> explicitly and repeatedly defines elsewhere as propositions involving >> possibility or necessity. As I spell out in detail in my forthcoming paper, >> "Peirce and Modal Logic: Delta Existential Graphs and Pragmaticism," the >> five modal EGs scribed in R 339:[340r] (1909 Jan 7) can serve as a basis >> for implementing various formal systems of modal logic. The sheet >> represents the actual state of things (AST), heavy lines of compossibility >> (LoCs) represent possible states of things (PSTs), letters attached to LoCs >> denote atomic non-modal propositions that would be true or false in those >> PSTs, and new transformation rules for LoCs correspond to various modal >> axioms for reasoning *about *those PSTs. >> >> A new wrinkle occurred to me yesterday, thanks to my exchanges with John >> Sowa. Each PST has its own separate sheet, and together, the AST sheet and >> all the PST sheets--potentially, an infinite number of them--comprise the >> "many papers" that Peirce mentions in R L376. In accordance with the >> Dunn/Goble semantics using Hintikka's model sets as described in my other >> forthcoming paper, "Laws and Facts Semantics for Modal Logic," the AST and >> every PST has both *laws *and *facts*, with the binary >> alternativeness/accessibility relation (AR) defined as requiring every >> law-proposition for the AST to be a fact-proposition in every PST. On the >> AST *every* sheet, law-graphs have oddly enclosed *outermost* LoCs and >> fact-graphs have no LoCs. Each PST sheet has a red line just inside its >> edges as proposed in R 514 (1909)--or rather, as I suggested yesterday, a >> shaded margin with its law-graphs, the remaining unshaded area with its >> fact-graphs, *to convey that any graphs scribed on it are "merely >> asserted as possible"--*and (mostly) the usual transformation rules for >> reasoning *within* that PST. >> >> Each modal axiom assigns a specific property to the AR, which in the >> Dunn/Goble semantics dictates containment relations between the different >> sets of law-propositions and fact-propositions. For example, Peirce's >> erasure/insertion rule for broken cuts in Gamma EGs implements axiom T, >> making the AR *reflexive*--every law-graph on the AST sheet or any PST >> sheet is also a fact-graph on that same sheet. This is consistent with >> the usual permission for iterating graphs from the shaded margin of a PST >> sheet to its unshaded area, so for formal systems where the AR is *not >> *reflexive--such >> as deontic logic, where possibility and necessity are replaced with >> permission and obligation--this specific transformation is prohibited on >> PST sheets. Another example is axiom 4, which makes the AR >> *transitive*--every >>
[PEIRCE-L] Definitions, Axioms, and Postulates (was Delta Existential Graphs)
itial hypothesis" that "may be arbitrarily assumed," so in accordance with R 514, it is scribed in the (shaded) margin of the sheet for a *possible *state of things and thereby "merely asserted to be possible." An axiom is "a self-evident truth," "generally a truth of observation," so it is scribed on the (unshaded) sheet for the *actual *state of things and thereby asserted to be true, often as an if-then proposition represented by a scroll. Notice how the if-then operation is integral to all three of these. JFS: After re-reading Don Roberts' chapter on Gamma graphs (which I hadn't read for years), I realize that there is no conflict between that chapter and his writings about Delta graphs in L376. ... Furthermore, what Peirce wrote about Delta graphs in L376 is consistent with his 1903 version of modal logic in every possible world. Again, what Peirce writes about Delta graphs in R L376 is *only *the single statement, "I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals." Everything else in the 19 extant pages of that letter to Risteen is applicable to *every *part of EG--there is nothing dealing with modals or otherwise unique to Delta. As Roberts summarizes it, "Peirce gives a sketch of the history of EG, reaffirms his opinion that all reasoning is dialogical, and points out that the purpose of EG was not to serve as a calculus, but 'to facilitate the anatomy, and thereby the physiology of deductive reasonings.' This manuscript contains the only reference I have found to a proposed Delta part of EG which would deal with modal logic" (p. 135). JFS: But the "papers" of L376 allow the "postulates" in the margins to state additional information about the nested graphs. For example that the nested graphs, may be wished, hoped, feared, imagined, or occurring at some time in the past, present, future in the real word or in heaven, hell, Wonderland, or the Looking Glass. Again, that is *not *how postulates work. They are not metalanguage *about *other propositions, they are hypothetical premisses from which other propositions would *follow necessarily* as conclusions; or in an if-then proposition, they constitute the antecedent (in the shaded margin) from which other propositions *follow necessarily* as the consequent (in the remaining unshaded area). That is how *all *the theorems of Euclidean geometry are derived from its five postulates. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 29, 2024 at 6:15 PM John F Sowa wrote: > John, > > Some observations: For any theory of any kind with any logic of any kind, > axioms are always stated in an if-then form. The if-part (shaded) states > the condition, and the then part states the conclusion. Even definitions > are stated as if-then statements in EGs. For example: > > "If x=y and y=z, then x=z." > "Every triangle has three sides" is equivalent to "If x is a triangle, x > has three sides." > > In that example, the proposition (pheme) about equality is an axiom, since > it must be true of every possible world. But the pheme about triangles is > a postulate that is true in geometry, but it might not be a postulate in > some other possible world. The distinction between axioms and postulates > is one that Peirce adopted from Euclid, but modern logicians use the word > 'axiom' for the starting assumptions of any theory. They rarely use the > word 'postulate. > > After re-reading Don Roberts' chapter on Gamma graphs (which I hadn't read > for years), I realize that there is no conflict between that chapter and > his writings about Delta graphs in L376. > > And L376 is completely consistent with the IKL logic of 2006. But IKL has > some features that go beyond L376. Anything stated in Delta graphs may be > mapped to IKL, but some IKL statements cannot be mapped to Delta graphs. > > Furthermore, what Peirce wrote about Delta graphs in L376 is consistent > with his 1903 version of modal logic in every possible world. But the > "papers" of L376 allow the "postulates" in the margins to state additional > information about the nested graphs. For example that the nested graphs, > may be wished, hoped, feared, imagined, or occurring at some time in the > past, present, future in the real word or in heaven, hell, Wonderland, or > the Looking Glass. > > Wonderland, for example, would be a possible world that could not be > actualized -- as Peirce said in CP 8.192, stated below. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / updat
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
classical logic; all other law-propositions for the AST are *conditional* necessities, i.e., strict implications. Pollock calls this system *B* for "basic modal logic," but since that identifier is now widely used for another system inspired by L. E. J. Brouwer, I advocate instead calling it *P* for Parry, Pollock, Peirce, and pragmaticism. *Here is an illustration of how this translates to my candidate for Delta EGs, with the AST sheet in the middle and (arbitrarily) eight PST sheets arranged around it, distinguished by having shaded margins. [image: image.png] On the AST sheet with modal axioms K and T to implement system *T* (with iterated modalities) or *P* (without them), my new permissions allow extending the unshaded LoC (attached to *p*) into the shaded area and joining it to the one there (attached to *p* and *q*), deiterating the shaded *p*, removing the now-empty ring-shaped shaded area, and erasing *p* to derive ◇*q*. Likewise, on any PST sheet where *p* appears, the usual permissions allow the last three transformations to derive *q*. [image: image.png] Regards, Jon On Sun, Feb 25, 2024 at 10:02 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > List: > > The sole reason that Peirce expresses in R L376 (1911 Dec 6) for needing > to add a Delta part to EGs is "in order to deal with modals," which he > explicitly and repeatedly defines elsewhere as propositions involving > possibility or necessity. As I spell out in detail in my forthcoming paper, > "Peirce and Modal Logic: Delta Existential Graphs and Pragmaticism," the > five modal EGs scribed in R 339:[340r] (1909 Jan 7) can serve as a basis > for implementing various formal systems of modal logic. The sheet > represents the actual state of things (AST), heavy lines of compossibility > (LoCs) represent possible states of things (PSTs), letters attached to LoCs > denote atomic non-modal propositions that would be true or false in those > PSTs, and new transformation rules for LoCs correspond to various modal > axioms for reasoning *about *those PSTs. > > A new wrinkle occurred to me yesterday, thanks to my exchanges with John > Sowa. Each PST has its own separate sheet, and together, the AST sheet and > all the PST sheets--potentially, an infinite number of them--comprise the > "many papers" that Peirce mentions in R L376. In accordance with the > Dunn/Goble semantics using Hintikka's model sets as described in my other > forthcoming paper, "Laws and Facts Semantics for Modal Logic," the AST and > every PST has both *laws *and *facts*, with the binary > alternativeness/accessibility relation (AR) defined as requiring every > law-proposition for the AST to be a fact-proposition in every PST. On the > AST *every* sheet, law-graphs have oddly enclosed *outermost* LoCs and > fact-graphs have no LoCs. Each PST sheet has a red line just inside its > edges as proposed in R 514 (1909)--or rather, as I suggested yesterday, a > shaded margin with its law-graphs, the remaining unshaded area with its > fact-graphs, *to convey that any graphs scribed on it are "merely > asserted as possible"--*and (mostly) the usual transformation rules for > reasoning *within* that PST. > > Each modal axiom assigns a specific property to the AR, which in the > Dunn/Goble semantics dictates containment relations between the different > sets of law-propositions and fact-propositions. For example, Peirce's > erasure/insertion rule for broken cuts in Gamma EGs implements axiom T, > making the AR *reflexive*--every law-graph on the AST sheet or any PST > sheet is also a fact-graph on that same sheet. This is consistent with > the usual permission for iterating graphs from the shaded margin of a PST > sheet to its unshaded area, so for formal systems where the AR is *not > *reflexive--such > as deontic logic, where possibility and necessity are replaced with > permission and obligation--this specific transformation is prohibited on > PST sheets. Another example is axiom 4, which makes the AR *transitive*--every > law-graph on the AST sheet is also a law-graph on every PST sheet, so every > graph with an oddly enclosed LoC on the AST sheet is reproduced without > that *same* LoC in the shaded margin of every PST sheet. > > With this specification, Peirce's five modal propositions in R 339:[340r] > are represented on PST sheets as follows. > >1. ◇*p* = *p* is on at least one PST sheet. >2. ¬◇¬*p* = □*p* = *p* is on every PST sheet. >3. ◇*p* ∧ ◇*q* = *p* is on at least one PST sheet, and *q* is on at >least one PST sheet. >4. ◇(*p* ∧ *q*) = *p* and *q* are together on at least one PST sheet. >5. ◇*p* ∧ ◇*q* ∧ ¬◇(*p* ∧ *q*) = *p* is on at least one PST sheet, and >*q* is on at least one PST sheet, but *p* and *q* are not together on >any P
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
John, List: JFS: This is my last note on this thread until 2/29 or later. Understood, and at this point, I doubt that there is much more for either of us to say without further repeating ourselves anyway. JFS: Metalanguage is the only feature required to define modality. Peirce never said anything about needing a Delta part of EGs to *define* modality, he said only that he needed it to *deal with* modals, i.e., modal propositions. Accordingly, I am primarily interested in developing a version of EGs for *reasoning about* modality--possibility and necessity, or analogous concepts like permission and obligation--by implementing the now-standard formal systems of modal logic. JFS: That sentence "The quantified subject of a hypothetical proposition is a possibility, or possible case, or possible state of things" (CP 2.347, c. 1895) does not imply that the postulates in the margin of a sheet are inside a negation. It simply means that the postulates are true of a possible world described in the nested statements on that sheet. And there is no negation of the nested statements. A hypothetical proposition is a *conditional *proposition (e.g., see CP 3.374, 1885), which is represented in all parts of EGs by nested cuts until Peirce introduces shading in June 1911. The postulates in the margin are not "inside a negation," they are inside the outer close--the red line of R 514 (1909) is the inner cut, and the physical edges of the page constitute the outer cut. Hence, the postulates are not asserted to be false, but they are also not asserted to be true--they are "merely asserted to be possible." The nested statements are also not asserted to be true or false in the *actual *state of things; instead, what is asserted is that *if *the postulates in the margin are true, *then *the nested statements are also true. In other words, the postulates in the margin and the nested statements *together *describe a possible state of things--the postulates are its law-propositions, and the nested statements are its fact-propositions. JFS: The text in the margin is metalanguage asserted about the nested text. ... With his [Peirce's] notation of R514, he can state any kind of modality with an appropriate choice of postulates in the margin of the sheet. That is *not *how postulates work. As an obvious example, Euclid's five postulates are not metalanguage asserted *about *the theorems that follow from them, they are pure possibilities (antecedent) from which those theorems are derived as deductively necessary conclusions (consequent). In accordance with R 514 but adopting Peirce's 1911 notation, we can write the five postulates in the *shaded *margin of a sheet and the theorems inside its *unshaded *area, thus asserting the conditional proposition that *if *the postulates are true, *then *the theorems are also true. The postulates and theorems *together *describe the possible world of Euclidean geometry, with the postulates as its law-propositions and the theorems as its fact-propositions. JFS: I thank you for raising all those objections. Likewise, I thank you for the exchange. As I acknowledge in the other thread, it is what prompted me to develop an interesting extension of my candidate for Delta EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Feb 26, 2024 at 3:58 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I am preparing slides for a Zoom talk on 2/28. (I'll send the abstract > and link tomorrow.) This is my last note on this thread until 2/29 or > later. > > JAS> Even in the printed book, the line attached to the first oval on page > 151 is *thinly *drawn, exactly like the oval itself, while the lines of > identity on pages 153ff... > > That's too bad for an elegant notation. But it reinforces the point that > Peirce was using the same methods for representing metalanguage in 1898 as > in 1911. Metalanguage is the only feature required to define modality. > Please read my brief summary about the IKRIS project in > https://jfsowa.com/ikl . You don't have to believe anything I wrote. > There are many, many references on that page to IKRIS reports written by > other authors (almost all of whom have a PhD in logic, computer science, or > some other branch of science or philosophy). > > JAS> I suspect that you were reading back into his text what you had > already decided for yourself when you changed your mind regarding Carnap > vs. Quine, namely, that modal logic is "just metalanguage about logic." > Peirce never states nor implies this--not in R L376, and as far as I know, > not anywhere else. > > It's not something I decided for myself. It's something I learned from > professional logicians from 1973 onwards. Please read the references. > Tha
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
John, List: JFS: I admit that I was looking at the printed book, Reasoning and the logic of things. In that book, the transcription shows a clearly drawn line that connects the oval to the word 'is'. Even in the printed book, the line attached to the first oval on page 151 is *thinly *drawn, exactly like the oval itself, while the lines of identity on pages 153ff are unambiguously *heavy*; and again, there is no line attached to the second oval on page 151. Here are those images. [image: image.png] [image: image.png] [image: image.png] JFS: But the two sentences enclosed in ovals are equivalent to what Peirce proposed in R514: Draw a line around the proposition(s) about which the text outside the oval is making assertions. According to R 514, the text in the margin is *not* making assertions about the propositions inside the red line, it consists of "postulates" that are "merely asserted to be possible," i.e., the hypothetical antecedent from which those propositions would follow necessarily as the consequent. This is a *completely different* notation from the unique EGs on RLT 151, where the proposition written inside the oval fills the blank in the rheme written outside the oval. JFS: When I studied Peirce's L376 in detail, it was obvious that he was thinking along the same lines. I suspect that you were reading back into his text what you had already decided for yourself when you changed your mind regarding Carnap vs. Quine, namely, that modal logic is "just metalanguage about logic." Peirce never states nor implies this--not in R L376, and as far as I know, not anywhere else. On the contrary, he anticipates the future *formalization *of modal logic when he states, "The quantified subject of a hypothetical proposition is a *possibility*, or *possible case*, or *possible state of things*" (CP 2.347, c. 1895). Even more specifically, he anticipates C. I. Lewis's development and advocacy of strict implication in the following passage. CSP: The consequence *de inesse* [material implication], "if *A* is true, then *B* is true," is expressed by letting *i* denote the actual state of things, *Ai* mean that in the actual state of things *A* is true, and *Bi* mean that in the actual state of things *B* is true, and then saying "If *Ai* is true then *Bi* is true," or, what is the same thing, "Either *Ai* is not true or *Bi* is true." But an *ordinary* Philonian conditional [strict implication] is expressed by saying, "In *any* possible state of things, *i*, either *Ai* is not true, or *Bi* is true." (CP 3.444, 1896) Peirce *might *have changed his mind about this (like you did) sometime over the next 15 years, but only an exact quotation to that effect from his later writings could warrant such a claim. Can you provide one? JFS: And his description of the phemic sheet as a collection of papers was in line with the specification of papers in R514. What "specification of papers in R 514"? Peirce says nothing in that text about multiple sheets. If you are simply affirming that the "red pencil" operation of R 514 could be applied to each of the "many pages" of R L376, then we agree about that. However, I now advocate *shading *the margin instead of marking its boundary with a red line, consistent with Peirce's other writings about EGs in 1911 that you have often emphasized. Again, it is a more iconic way of conveying that the margin is a *different surface* from the interior--it "represents a universe of possibility" (CP 4.579, 1906), while "the main part of the sheet represents existence or actuality" (CP 4.577). In my updated candidate for Delta EGs as outlined last night, there is a separate sheet for each possible state of things (PST), with its law-graphs in the shaded margin and its fact-graphs in the unshaded interior. After all, Goble refers to laws for a possible world as "*the fundamental postulates of that world*" ( https://projecteuclid.org/journalArticle/Download?urlId=10.1305%2Fndjfl%2F1093890890, p. 153), and the fact-graphs on a PST sheet represent what *would *be fact-propositions *if *that PST were actualized. By the way, a few paragraphs before the "red pencil" discussion in R 514--the fragmented 1909 manuscript itself, not the misfiled June 1911 letter to J. H. Kehler with its EG tutorial (R L231)--Peirce states, "So much, to explain in the second mode of clearness the three Modalities. The May be, The Actually is, The Would be." In other words, he explicitly reaffirms his definition of modality as possibility/actuality/necessity, although we do not have the preceding pages that presumably provide more details. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 25, 2024 at 10:05
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
List: The sole reason that Peirce expresses in R L376 (1911 Dec 6) for needing to add a Delta part to EGs is "in order to deal with modals," which he explicitly and repeatedly defines elsewhere as propositions involving possibility or necessity. As I spell out in detail in my forthcoming paper, "Peirce and Modal Logic: Delta Existential Graphs and Pragmaticism," the five modal EGs scribed in R 339:[340r] (1909 Jan 7) can serve as a basis for implementing various formal systems of modal logic. The sheet represents the actual state of things (AST), heavy lines of compossibility (LoCs) represent possible states of things (PSTs), letters attached to LoCs denote atomic non-modal propositions that would be true or false in those PSTs, and new transformation rules for LoCs correspond to various modal axioms for reasoning *about *those PSTs. A new wrinkle occurred to me yesterday, thanks to my exchanges with John Sowa. Each PST has its own separate sheet, and together, the AST sheet and all the PST sheets--potentially, an infinite number of them--comprise the "many papers" that Peirce mentions in R L376. In accordance with the Dunn/Goble semantics using Hintikka's model sets as described in my other forthcoming paper, "Laws and Facts Semantics for Modal Logic," the AST and every PST has both *laws *and *facts*, with the binary alternativeness/accessibility relation (AR) defined as requiring every law-proposition for the AST to be a fact-proposition in every PST. On the AST sheet, law-graphs have oddly enclosed LoCs and fact-graphs have no LoCs. Each PST sheet has a red line just inside its edges as proposed in R 514 (1909)--or rather, as I suggested yesterday, a shaded margin with its law-graphs, the remaining unshaded area with its fact-graphs, and (mostly) the usual transformation rules for reasoning *within* that PST. Each modal axiom assigns a specific property to the AR, which in the Dunn/Goble semantics dictates containment relations between the different sets of law-propositions and fact-propositions. For example, Peirce's erasure/insertion rule for broken cuts in Gamma EGs implements axiom T, making the AR *reflexive*--every law-graph on the AST sheet or any PST sheet is also a fact-graph on that same sheet. This is consistent with the usual permission for iterating graphs from the shaded margin of a PST sheet to its unshaded area, so for formal systems where the AR is *not *reflexive--such as deontic logic, where possibility and necessity are replaced with permission and obligation--this specific transformation is prohibited on PST sheets. Another example is axiom 4, which makes the AR *transitive*--every law-graph on the AST sheet is also a law-graph on every PST sheet, so every graph with an oddly enclosed LoC on the AST sheet is reproduced without that LoC in the shaded margin of every PST sheet. With this specification, Peirce's five modal propositions in R 339:[340r] are represented on PST sheets as follows. 1. ◇*p* = *p* is on at least one PST sheet. 2. ¬◇¬*p* = □*p* = *p* is on every PST sheet. 3. ◇*p* ∧ ◇*q* = *p* is on at least one PST sheet, and *q* is on at least one PST sheet. 4. ◇(*p* ∧ *q*) = *p* and *q* are together on at least one PST sheet. 5. ◇*p* ∧ ◇*q* ∧ ¬◇(*p* ∧ *q*) = *p* is on at least one PST sheet, and *q* is on at least one PST sheet, but *p* and *q* are not together on any PST sheet. It gets more complicated for iterated modalities, where a non-modal proposition (such as *p* or *q*) is within the scope of more than one modal operator (such as ◇ for possibility or □ for necessity). The letter would then be attached to more than one LoC on the AST sheet and at least one LoC on each PST sheet, which would have its own set of multiple PST sheets--potentially, an infinite number of them--and so on. Peirce scribed several Gamma EGs with iterated modalities while preparing for the 1903 Lowell Lectures (R S-1:[74], LF 2/2:398), but there are reasons to suspect that he ultimately would have dispensed with them in accordance with pragmaticism. That is a subject for another post. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
John, List: JFS: I already answered these points. I could say the same thing, but I will likewise give it another try. JFS: Please look at the example in RLT. A line of identity by itself is a complete, fully formed EG. There is no line of identity in that one-of-a-kind EG. The line connecting "is much to be wished" to the oval is lightly drawn, just like the oval itself; and in the very next EG, there is no line at all connecting the oval with "is false." At this point in the lecture, Peirce has not even introduced the line of identity yet. When he subsequently does so, he calls it "a heavy line" (RLT 153) and then consistently draws it accordingly. Here are the relevant manuscript images so that you can see the difference for yourself. [image: image.png] [image: image.png] [image: image.png] JFS: According to the way Peirce defined that notation and translated it to English, he chose the word 'that' as the English word that represents that construction (an oval with an attached line of identity). Please look at the actual text of RLT 151. Again, Peirce himself does not provide an English translation of that one-of-a-kind EG; and again, the line attached to the oval is *lightly *drawn, not a *heavy *line of identity. Why do you keep claiming otherwise? JFS: I am not asking you to believe anything I say. But I am asking you to look at the references I cited. I am asking you to look carefully at Peirce's own texts, and to set aside your preconceptions about what they say and show. JFS: The postulates of geometry are asserted to be true of whatever version of geometry they define. Peirce explicitly states in R 514 that "in the margin outside the red line, whatever is scribed is merely asserted to be possible. Thus, if the subject were geometry, I could write in that margin the postulates, and any pertinent problems stated in the form of postulates ..." Geometry falls within pure mathematics, which is a strictly hypothetical science that draws necessary conclusions about pure possibilities, as you yourself have observed on multiple occasions. JFS: All the evidence shows that L376 is the definition of Delta graphs. He is clearly defining a new version of modal logic in the same document in which he said that he needed to define a new version of modal logic. To deny that he was defining Delta graphs just does not make any sense of what he was writing. Peirce never says or implies in R L376 (1911) or elsewhere that he needs "to define a new version of modal logic." He simply states, "I shall now have to add a *Delta* part in order to deal with modals," because he was dissatisfied with his earlier attempts--first broken cuts in Gamma (1903), then tinctures (1906). To claim that he was defining Delta graphs in the 19 manuscript pages that are extant goes far beyond anything that he actually wrote on them. Perhaps he did go on to define Delta graphs in the subsequent pages that are missing, but unless and until someone finds them, we can only speculate. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 25, 2024 at 4:44 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I already answered these points. I'll restate them more clearly: > > JAS> "X is something to be wished" is not a proposition, it is a rheme. X > is a variable, logically equivalent to a blank. The proposition within the > oval replaces X, i.e., fills the blank. > > Please look at the example in RLT. A line of identity by itself is a > complete, fully formed EG. It may be translated to the English sentence > "There exists something X." When attached to a verb phrase, the complete > fully formed EG states "Something X is much to be wished." While looking > at the example in RLT, hold you hand over the oval, and the remainder that > you see is a complete EG. > > Now hold your hand over the verb phrase "is much to be wished." What you > see is a line of identity attached to an oval that contains another EG. As > Peirce explained, that is his convention for designating a proposition p, > and the line of identity attached to the oval represents p. When you raise > your hand that has the effect of a ligature that connects two lines of > identity. That has the effect of asserting p=X. > > According to the way Peirce defined that notation and translated it to > English, he chose the word 'that' as the English word that represents that > construction (an oval with an attached line of identity). Not by > coincidence, the same word 'that' was chosen by the nine logicians and > computer scientists who specified the IKL logic for an exactly equivalent > process in 1906. > > I am not asking you to believe anything I s
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
JFS: Please do not make any assumptions about what Peirce did or did not intend. I am not the one making any such assumptions, I am simply drawing reasonable interpretive conclusions based on exact quotations. Peirce explicitly and repeatedly *defines *modal propositions as those involving possibility and necessity, i.e., "proposition A is possibly true" and "proposition B is necessarily (or certainly) true." As far as I know, he *never *refers to propositions involving other expressions like "proposition C is written in Holy Scriptures" or "proposition D is much to be wished" as "modal." Can you provide any exact quotations where he does so? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Feb 24, 2024 at 11:12 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I appreciate your comments, even though they disagree with what I believe > Peirce intended. But I can see that I need to respond to the questions you > raise in the article I'm writing. > > JAS> In the RLT example, what is written outside the "lightly drawn oval" > does not govern what is written inside the oval, at least not in the same > sense. After all, what is written outside the oval is not a proposition at > all. > > It most certainly is a proposition. Outside the oval, there is a line of > identity attached to a verb phrase "is much to be wished." That forms a > complete sentence "X is something to be wished." The other end of the line > is attached to the oval which contains the proposition that is to be wished. > > To express the complete graph, Peirce introduced the word 'that' to create > the complete sentence "That you are a good girl is much to be wished." > > You could express the same point in the notation of R514. In the margin, > you write an EG that states "The proposition stated below is much to be > wished," Inside the content circled in red, you write "You are a good > girl." > > As for my description in the slides presented in 2020, I was not lecturing > to Peirce scholars. I started with a summary of the EG notation of 1911. > Then slide 30 is stated in the terms introduced in slides15, 16, 17... > Therefore, > my later discussion is stated in those terms. > > JAS> the sole reason that Peirce expresses for needing to add a Delta part > to EGs is "in order to deal with modals," which for him are propositions > involving possibility and necessity. > > Please do not make any assumptions about what Peirce did or did not > intend. As you know, Peirce had the most complete collection of MSS on > medieval logic in the Boston area -- he had more than the Harvard > libraries. Among the authors were logicians call the "Modistae". They had > a huge number of modes, including "written in Holy Scriptures". We don't > know exactly what Peirce read, but It's quite likely that he had read > something by or about them. And we don't know what he thought about them. > > In any case, such modes may be possible, actual, or necessary. The > additional information, such as "written in Holy scriptures" or "is much to > be wished" is descriptive, but it's independent of the state of those > worlds as possible, actual, or necessary. > > As more examples, look at the three ways of describing the diagrams in > slide 31. To start, let's assume that Pierre is sitting in the actual > world. The content of the thought balloons may be actual or possible. His > thoughts about them, such as wishing or hoping, add information, but they > don't change their status as actual or possible. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
John, List: JFS: The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line. Actually, Peirce *does not* use the word "paper" in the "red pencil" passage of R 514, he uses the word "sheet." However, this is just a quibble--I now recognize that every individual page in the R L376 approach could have a red line drawn just inside its edges, with different postulates in its margin and thus different graphs within its red line. I also heartily agree that the postulates in the margin *govern *the graphs inside the red line, which is why I continue to disagree with this subsequent statement. JFS: But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent--in the sense that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the phemic sheet. In the RLT example, what is written outside the "lightly drawn oval" *does not* govern what is written inside the oval, at least not in the same sense. After all, what is written outside the oval is not a *proposition *at all, so it cannot be a postulate or express a special understanding between the utterer and interpreter. It is merely a *rheme*, and its blank is filled by the proposition written inside the oval. As far as I know, this is a *completely different* notation from anything that Peirce presents in his other writings about EGs, and he uses it in RLT only as a step toward explaining the cut for negation. JFS: I strongly recommend three slides--29, 30, and 31. If you don't read all (or even any) of the others, please look at the diagrams and read the text of those three. I already did so, after you provided the link in your earlier post. I agree that the RLT example is consistent with what you say about metalanguage, but it is still *not *equivalent to the "red pencil" operation in R 514 nor the "many papers" concept in R L376. Moreover, it is misleading to state on slide 30, "A shaded oval negates the nested EG. Without shading, the EG expresses a proposition that is neither asserted nor negated." As you know very well, Peirce did not introduce shading for negation until 1911. Up until then, *any *oval--except the one-of-a-kind RLT example, where a rheme is attached to it--negates the nested EG. Again, the sole reason that Peirce expresses for needing to add a Delta part to EGs is "in order to deal with modals," which for him are propositions involving possibility and necessity. The synthesis that I am now contemplating would satisfy that one criterion by combining the graphs scribed in R 339:[340r] with the "red pencil" improvement in R 514 and the "many papers" concept in R L376. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Feb 24, 2024 at 6:12 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > Please note the phrase "a special understanding between utterer and > interpreter" in the excerpt below. And note that different "papers" of the > phemic sheet may have different special understandings. Although Peirce > did not coin the term 'metalanguage', that is the word that has been used > for such texts from the 1930s to today. Since the word 'metalanguage' is > far more widely used than 'special understandings', Peirce's ethics of > terminology would require us to adopt that term for the special > understandings that determine the interpretation of any paper of the phemic > sheet. > > The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with > postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line. Note > that R514 also contains a draft of the EG specifications that he uses in > every MS from June 1911 to November 1913. It is quite likely that Peirce > would have used the R514 conventions to specify the metalanguage. Since he > didn't finish L376, we can only guess what notation he might have chosen > for his "papers". The best guess is the notation for "papers" in R514. > But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent -- in the sense > that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in > either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the > phemic sheet. > > In my previous notes, I included many references, each of which includes > many more references. For simplicity, I recommend the slides of > https://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf starting at slide 14, which begins with > a short review of EG notation and continues with applications of EGs for > representing the semantics of natural languages. > >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
erts should be both at once true. ... On the other hand, an assertion is said to be made in "the mode of necessity," if, and only if, the affirmation and the denial of that which is so asserted could conceivably be both alike *false*. Thus if a person says "it will certainly rain tomorrow," it may be alike false that it is certain to rain and that it is certain not to rain. (R 678, LF 1:158-159, 1910) Nevertheless, as I observe in both of my forthcoming papers, other modalities can be incorporated into the various formal systems, as long as they are *analogous* to possibility and necessity. Peirce hints at *epistemic *logic here, and in my semantics paper, I mention your own example of *deontic *logic, which replaces them with permission and obligation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 23, 2024 at 5:22 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, Jerry, List, > > My interpretation of L376 depends on two ways of interpreting Peirce's > L376. The first way is the one followed by most scholars: Comparing the > content to an MS to everything written by Peirce and his sources prior to > the date of the MS and to everything written later by him. Since the > content of L376 is very different from his sources and from his own > writings before and after, that provides very little guidance. That's why > nobody was able to interpret L376 to determine what Peirce wrote and how he > intended to use what he was specifying. > > JFS> The single most important innovation of Delta graphs is an operator > for metalanguage or metalogic. > > JAS> That is *not* what Peirce says about Delta EGs in the letter to > Risteen. He simply states, "I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in > order to deal with modals..." > > That is true. > > The second way of interpreting Peirce is to look backwards from the > developments in logic in the century or more after Peirce and interpreting > what he wrote in comparison to *ALL *developments in the same or similar > subjects. The words 'metalanguage' and 'metalogic' were coined by > Tarski and Carnap a few decades after Peirce died. > > But the that-operator in RLT (1898) can support the methods they used for > metalanguage. It is logically identical to writing postulates in the > margin of a paper in R514 (June 1911) and to the "papers" of a phemic sheet > in L376 (December 1911). It is also identical to methods used by Hintikka > and others from the 1970s and later. > > It's not possible to interpret what Peirce intended in L376 with just the > vocabulary he used. It's likely that he would have coined more terminology > if he had been able to finish that MS. But his accident and the six months > of morphine by the "quack" who treated him prevented him from finishing it > and explaining his intentions and applications in detail. > > JLRC> First, the question of modern modal symbolic logic is remote from > probability theory and even remoter from the Peircian notion of “qualisign, > sinsign, legisign” > > That is true of Peirce's modal logic of 1903, which was the mainstream of > modal logic for most of the 20th C and which is still taught in > introductory courses. But Peirce became very interested in probability > theory, as shown in his writings in the Logic Notebook. The that-operator > from 1898 and the "papers" of June and December 1911 can support the kind > of metalanguage that is widely used today for computational and theoretical > methods for either or both possibilities and probabilities. > > JLRC> Is not the distinction between logic of syntax and the logic of > semantics? Is not the semantic gap in the meanings of signs was probably > a constitutive factor in the categorization of signs, would you agree? > > I agree that those distinctions are important. But any operators for > metalanguage, including Peirce's three versions, can be and are used to > represent, reason about, and compute with representations for syntax and/or > semantics of any notation of any kind. See the many references in > https://jfsowa.com/ikl . > > That text, by me, is very short. I wrote it as a guide to a wide range of > documents from the 1980 to 2010. I haven't added anything since then > because the amount of publication is huge. But it is still a useful guide > to 30 years of developments, many of which take advantage of various > methods of metalanguage. And Peirce's three notations for metalanguage are > logically equivalent to methods that have been reinvented in several > versions since the 1970s. > > The second way is to look backwards from the develop
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
Jerry, List: JLRC: First, the question of modern modal symbolic logic is remote from probability theory and even remoter from the Peircian notion of “qualisign, sinsign, legisign” Peirce developed Existential Graphs (EGs) as a diagrammatic notation for formal systems of deductive logic. As such, within his architectonic classification of the sciences, it falls under the hypothetical science of mathematics, not the normative science of logic as semeiotic. That is why EGs can be utilized in the primal positive science of phaneroscopy. The chief advantage of EGs over algebraic notations for modern symbolic logic is their iconicity. Every explicitly scribed EG is a replica (instance), a sinsign (token) of a peculiar kind that embodies a legisign (type). JLRC: Is not the distinction between logic of syntax and the logic of semantics? Could you please elaborate on exactly what you have in mind by "logic of syntax" vs. "logic of semantics"? For EGs vs. algebraic notations implementing formal systems of deductive logic (modal or otherwise), the syntax is obviously very different, but the semantics is the same. More generally, it seems to me that both syntax and semantics would have to do with interpretants--for a proposition, syntax corresponds to its overall interpretant by signifying its pure/continuous predicate, while semantics perhaps corresponds to the interpretants of the individual names/rhemes/semes that denote its subjects. JLRC: The semantic gap in the meanings of signs was probably a constitutive factor in the categorization of signs, would you agree? Could you please elaborate on exactly what you have in mind by "the semantic gap in the meanings of signs"? For Peirce, "meaning" is roughly synonymous with "interpretant," but he also classifies signs on the basis of their objects and relations. JLRC: What particular texts of CSP were you referring to when you listed five modal phrases? I am referring to a specific page in Peirce's Logic Notebook (R 339:[340r], LF 1:624, 1909 Jan 7) where he provides five EGs with their direct translations into modal propositions. Here again is the image that I included in my post last night. [image: image.png] In my post earlier today, I restated these five modal propositions using modern standard notation--(1) ◇*p*, (2) ¬◇¬*p* = □*p*, (3) ◇*p* ∧ ◇*q*, (4) ◇(*p* ∧ *q*), and (5) ◇*p* ∧ ◇*q* ∧ ¬◇(*p* ∧ *q*); again, in each case, *p* and *q* are atomic non-modal propositions. JLRC: Do either of you feel that your interpretations of "delta graphs" bridge the yawning gaps between semiotics and semiology? I doubt it since that is not the purpose of EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 23, 2024 at 2:08 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Jon, John, List: > > Thanks to both of you for pushing the discourse toward the potential > modern interpretations of CSP’s thoughts (semes?). > > I only have time for a couple of feedbacks, although your texts motivated > deeper deliberations. > > 1. First, the question of modern modal symbolic logic is remote from > probability theory and even remoter from the Peircian notion of “qualisign, > sinsign, legisign” > > Is not the distinction between logic of syntax and the logic of > semantics? The semantic gap in the meanings of signs was probably a > constitutive factor in the categorization of signs, would you agree? > > 2. Jon: What particular texts of CSP were you referring to when you listed > five modal phrases? I am more than a little skeptical that this is both > sound and complete interpretations of CSP’s texts but I am open to > persuasion! You might look at my online paper, An Introduction to > Chemical Information Theory, where I search for a Peircian approach from a > Natural science perspective. > > 3. Do either of you feel that your interpretations of "delta graphs" > bridge the yawning gaps between semiotics and semiology? > > Cheers > > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
John, List: I fully agree with your comment last week that "Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition," and I hope that you will receive this response in that spirit. My questions are genuinely intended to help me (and others) better understand your position, and I would appreciate direct answers. JFS: The single most important innovation of Delta graphs is an operator for metalangage or metalogic. That is *not* what Peirce says about Delta EGs in the letter to Risteen. He simply states, "I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals," and we do not have to guess at what he means by "modals" since he provides a straightforward definition elsewhere. "A modal proposition takes account of a whole range of possibility. According as it asserts something to be true or false throughout the whole range of possibility, it is *necessary *or *impossible*. According as it asserts something to be true or false within the range of possibility (not expressly including or excluding the existent state of things), it is *possible *or *contingent*" (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903). Hence, the 1898 example--"That you are a good girl is much to be wished"--is *not *what Peirce considered to be a modal proposition; only something like "That you are a good girl is possible" would qualify. Where exactly do you see anything about "an operator for metalanguage or metalogic" in the letter to Risteen? Again, what does Peirce say in that text that would *not *be fully applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma EGs as he had described them previously? Please provide exact quotations. JFS: Although Peirce never developed it further (as far as I know), the option of attaching a line of identity to an oval is exactly the same operation as taking a sheet of paper, drawing a line around the nested text (You are a good girl), and stating postulates in the margin (as in R514 and L376). It is *not *the same operation at all since "--is much to be wished" is not a postulate from which "you are a good girl" follows necessarily. As I explained before, Peirce's "red pencil" operation in R 514 effectively turns each individual sheet of paper on which EGs are scribed into a *conditional *proposition. Its physical edges and the red line drawn just inside them are cuts, the latter nested within the former, so that the margin is the outer close (antecedent) and the area within the red line is the inner close (consequent). Any propositions in the margin (postulates) are "merely asserted to be possible," and if they are all true, then all the propositions within the red line (theorems) are also true. There is no "line of identity" connecting the red line to the postulates in the margin. Where exactly do you see anything about "stating postulates in the margin" in R L376? Please provide exact quotations. JFS: As for the five EGs from 1909, quoted below, none of them express modal logic. All five of them can be translated to statements in first-order logic: Those translations are incorrect. It is unambiguous from Peirce's own handwritten translations that the EGs scribed on that Logic Notebook page are not Beta graphs with heavy lines for indefinite individuals attached to lowercase letters for general concepts being attributed to them. Instead, the heavy lines are for "circumstances," and they are attached to lowercase letters for propositions (as in Alpha) that would be true in them. There is an *analogy *between quantifying predicates over subjects in first-order predicate logic and quantifying propositions over possible states of things in propositional modal logic--in Peirce's words, "The distinction between the Indefinite, the Singular, and the General ls obviously only another application of the distinction between the Possible, the Actual, and the Necessary, for which the Germans have invented the convenient name *Modality*" (NEM 3:814, 1905)--but they still require different formal systems. In modern standard notation, Peirce's five modal propositions are (1) ◇*p*, (2) ¬◇¬*p* = □*p*, (3) ◇*p* ∧ ◇*q*, (4) ◇(*p* ∧ *q*), and (5) ◇*p* ∧ ◇*q* ∧ ¬◇(*p* ∧ *q*); in each case, *p* and *q* are atomic non-modal propositions. How would you represent them in your candidate for Delta EGs? For example, would ◇*p* simply be *p* inside an oval with a heavy line attached to the verb phrase "--is possible," and would □*p* simply be *p* inside an oval with a heavy line attached to the verb phrase "--is necessary"? If so, then that seems much more cumbersome--much less iconic--than my candidate for Delta EGs. Instead of formulating new graphical transformation rules, would you just stipulate the usual modal axioms--for example, "necessary" may always be changed to "possible" (D), "actual" (T), or "necessarily necessary" (4)?
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
the universe of discourse. As he says, "In all
non-trivial cases, we have to do with an infinite model. But ... such
models are nowhere to be found as closed finished totalities. We can never
know more than a finite fragment of a model" ("Form and Content in
Quantification Theory," 1955). After all, as Dunn says, "reality may outrun
the descriptive powers of a given language" ("A Truth Value Semantics for
Modal Logic," 1973); or as Peirce puts it, "The actual world cannot be
distinguished from a world of imagination by any description" (CP 3.363,
1885).
As for your questions about Peirce's unfortunate accident, again, any answers
to them would be pure speculation. I prefer to stick to his writings as we
have them, and as far as I know, he never says anything in them to suggest
that he was "laying out a diagram of papers" for a new version of EGs when
it happened.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 2:57 PM John F Sowa wrote:
> Jon, List
>
> I am now busy preparing slides for a Zoom talk on Feb 28, sponsored by
> Ontolog Forum. (I'll forward a copy of the announcement to P-List, if
> anyone is interested.) But first, I'll respond to some of your doubts.
>
> JFS> The entire letter L376 is about Delta graphs and applications of
> Delta graphs.
>
> JAS> This conjecture is quite a leap, considering that--as you
> acknowledged--Peirce mentions Delta *exactly once* in that entire 19-page
> letter, which he left unfinished...
>
> The primary subject of L376 is Delta graphs. That is the only
> interpretation that unifies every part. In the following excerpt from
> L376, the word '*here*' refers to the content of L376. For emphasis,
> certain passages in this excerpt are printed in *bold*.
>
> "This syntax, which I have hitherto called the "system of Existential
> Graphs" . . . An account of slightly further development of it was given* in
> the Monist of Oct. 1906*. In this *I made an attempt to make the syntax
> cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me*. . . the description fills 55
> pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. The
> necessity for these was chiefly due to *the lines called "cuts" which
> simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of shadings, or
> shaded parts of the sheet*. The better exposition of 1903 divided the
> system into *three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the
> Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have
> to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. *A cross division of
> the description which *here*, as in that of 1903, is given precedence
> over the other is into the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the
> System."
>
> Note that Peirce had made various attempts to go beyond the 1903 version
> of modals, but he was not satisfied with them. Since he never used the
> 1903 version of modals, except for a few pages of the Logic Notebook, there
> is strong evidence that he was looking for a replacement. When he
> mentioned the *division *into Alpha, Beta, and Gamma, he did not say what
> each part included. He had that same division with his algebra of 1885,
> in which the third part was second-order predicate calculus (quantifiers
> that range over relations). Since he planned to keep that division, but
> with a new version of modals, it seems unlikely that he would have kept a
> version of modals that he had never used for any purpose in the previous
> eight years.
>
> In the remainder of L376, note the paragraphs that begin with the phrases
> "The Conventions." and "the Phemic Sheet." The paragraphs that follow
> describe a version of logic that is different from any that Peirce had
> previously specified. Can you suggest any reason why he might be
> specifying a logic other than Delta graphs?
>
> Note that he also mentions probabilities. That suggests another important
> innovation: The use of multiple "papers" for specifying both possible and
> probable parts of the phemic sheet. That would be a unification that goes
> beyond most logics of the 21st C. In fact, it would make a valuable
> contribution to the latest R & D in artificial intelligence. That is a
> topic I mentioned in Section 7 of my recent article on phaneroscopy, and it
> would put Peirce into the forefront of ongoing issues in AI. See the copy
> of Section 7 I sent to both Peirce and CG lists.
>
> The 2006 version of logic that I have in mind is called IKL, which could
> be adapted to the specifications Peirce mentioned in
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
John, List: JFS: The entire letter L376 is about Delta graphs and applications of Delta graphs. This conjecture is quite a leap, considering that--as you acknowledged--Peirce mentions Delta *exactly once* in that entire 19-page letter, which he left unfinished unless additional pages somehow disappeared from the manuscript folder at Harvard's Houghton Library decades ago. Again, here is that lone sentence. CSP: The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals. In the remaining text that we currently have, Peirce never gets around to discussing *any *of the individual parts of EGs and their differences, despite stating plainly that he was going to maintain them as "the better exposition" of the system as a whole. He also says nothing whatsoever about dealing with modals, which is his only stated purpose for adding a Delta part to the other three. JFS: As Peirce wrote, the phemic sheet of a Delta graph contains multiple "papers", each of which represents one possibility specified by "postulates" that govern the remaining content of the sheet. That is *not *what Peirce wrote in his letter to Risteen. Again, here is the exact quotation. CSP: I provide my system with a *phemic sheet*, which is a surface upon which the utterer and interpreter will, by force of a voluntary and actually contracted habit, recognize that whatever is scribed upon it and is interpretable as an assertion is to be recognized as an assertion, although it may refer to a mere idea as its subject. If “snows” is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to relate, it *sometime *does snow. For they two may conceive that the “phemic sheet” embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to one subject and part to another. Again, there is no mention here of Delta, nor of modals. In fact, there is no mention here of *any *of the different parts of EGs, because Peirce is describing the phemic sheet as employed in *every *part. He also does not say that the different "papers" correspond to different *possibilities*, he says that they correspond to different *subjects*--different universes of discourse--to which the utterer and interpreter together pay attention at different times. So I ask again, how exactly would the use of multiple "papers" and/or the "red pencil" operation of R 514 facilitate implementing formal systems of modal logic with EGs? Which specific one, "invented in 2006," do you have in mind? JFS: Meanwhile, there are some questions to ponder: Any answers to such questions about the details of Peirce's unfortunate accident are pure speculation. It seems to me that if it had happened while he was "laying out a diagram of papers" for a new version of EGs, then he likely would have said so somewhere. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 9:18 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > The entire letter L376 is about Delta graphs and applications of Delta > graphs. Since Peirce began the letter to Risteen shortly after his visit, > he was assuming that Risteen knew a great deal about the material they had > discussed. Therefore, he plunged into examples without much of an intro. > > As Peirce wrote, the phemic sheet of a Delta graph contains multiple > "papers", each of which represents one possibility specified by > "postulates" that govern the remaining content of the sheet. There are > many ways of partitioning a sheet of paper to distinguish the postulates > from the content they govern. The excerpt from R514 is one method, and it > happens to fill an entire sheet of paper. He may have thought of some > other notation for partitioning the paper, but the logical result would be > equivalent. > > There is much more to say, and I'll send the full preview later this week. > > Meanwhile, there are some questions to ponder: Why did Juliette scrub and > polish the floor in December? Spring cleaning is rarely done in December. > Why was there some paper on the floor? Why did Peirce slip n it? Didn't > he see it? Why was his accident so serious? If he had been walking in a > straight line, he might have fallen on his rear. That might have been > painful, but it wouldn't cause a seriou
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Language as Semiosis
Michael, List: Thanks for sharing the article. Although it seems incidental to your overall project, footnote 2 caught my eye. MS: The use by Peirce of the form "rationalized" (rather than "rational") as a modifier of "variety" in the quotation above should be taken advisedly. This use of the participial form, with its adversion to process, should serve as a caveat that when Peirce talks about "object*ive* idealism," what he ought to have said is "object*ified* idealism." This slight grammatical change puts the meaning of the phrase (and the doctrine!) in a whole new--and completely acceptable--light. Could you please elaborate on this? What specific difference are you emphasizing here between objectIVE idealism and objectIFIED idealism? Since you describe the latter as "completely acceptable," what do you find UNacceptable about the former as Peirce's own term for his metaphysical doctrine in 1891? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 2:35 AM Michael Shapiro wrote: > John Sowa et al., > > > > In case y'all would like to read something of what I've had to say more > recently (as in my last book, *The Logic of Language*, 2022), attached > herewith is an article. > > M. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
tterer and an interpreter may use Delta graphs in an > investigation. Further hints may be found in several manuscripts he wrote > in the previous six months. As another hint, the intended recipient of the > letter was Allan Risteen. When that letter is combined with information > about Risteen’s expertise and Peirce’s work on a proof of pragmaticism, it > suggests that the phemic sheet of a Delta graph consists of multiple > “papers”, each of which represents a different time, aspect, or modality of > some universe of discourse. Although Peirce did not specify the details of > Delta graphs, a combination of features mentioned in several 1911 > manuscripts would satisfy the hints about Delta graphs. The result would be > similar or perhaps equivalent to a logic for modality that was invented in > 2006. > > John > > -- > *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > *Sent*: 2/18/24 8:08 PM > *To*: Peirce-L > *Subject*: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in > Logic) > > John, List: > > JFS: I am now writing the article on Delta Graphs. That is an example > where Peirce was on solid ground with his deep understanding of logic and > mathematics. Next week, I'll send the abstract and preview of the new > article, which shows how Peirce anticipated a version of logic that was > developed in the 21st century (2006 to be exact). ( > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00038.html) > > > JFS: I'm moving on to the the article on Delta graphs. I'll send a note > with a preview of that article later this week. ( > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00104.html) > > > I am admittedly curious about the content of your new article. As you > know, there is only one place in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings > where he mentions Delta. > > CSP: In this ["Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," CP 4.530-572, > 1906] I made an attempt to make the syntax [of Existential Graphs] cover > Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as > bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected > [in 1897]. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, > the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms > applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to the lines called > "cuts" which simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of > shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet. The better exposition of 1903 > divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, > and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall > now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals. (R L376, R > 500:2-3, 1911 Dec 6) > > > For EGs as described in "the better exposition of 1903," modal logic is > implemented with *broken *cuts in Gamma. However, by the time Peirce > wrote this letter to Allan Douglas Risteen, he had abandoned cuts in > general, having replaced them with more iconic shading for negation. > Consequently, he needed a new way to "deal with modals," and this is the > sole purpose that he states for adding a Delta part. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
John, List: JFS: I am now writing the article on Delta Graphs. That is an example where Peirce was on solid ground with his deep understanding of logic and mathematics. Next week, I'll send the abstract and preview of the new article, which shows how Peirce anticipated a version of logic that was developed in the 21st century (2006 to be exact). ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00038.html) JFS: I'm moving on to the the article on Delta graphs. I'll send a note with a preview of that article later this week. ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00104.html) I am admittedly curious about the content of your new article. As you know, there is only one place in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings where he mentions Delta. CSP: In this ["Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," CP 4.530-572, 1906] I made an attempt to make the syntax [of Existential Graphs] cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected [in 1897]. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to the lines called "cuts" which simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet. The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals. (R L376, R 500:2-3, 1911 Dec 6) For EGs as described in "the better exposition of 1903," modal logic is implemented with *broken *cuts in Gamma. However, by the time Peirce wrote this letter to Allan Douglas Risteen, he had abandoned cuts in general, having replaced them with more iconic shading for negation. Consequently, he needed a new way to "deal with modals," and this is the sole purpose that he states for adding a Delta part. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
John, List: JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and different theories about time. I wrote a lengthy paper on this subject, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm). JFS: Since every hypothesis is stated as a proposition, asking the question "Why?" about any 3ns would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the reason that explains why the first and second are related. This is getting closer to the phaneroscopic essence of 3ns as *mediation*, and it is fully consistent with one of Peirce's own examples that I quoted previously. CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law according to which she acts. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7) Why did the gunpowder explode? Because a spark ignited it. Indeed, the third (spark) explains why the first (gunpowder) and second (explosion) are related, reflecting the *intelligibility *of that relation. Nevertheless, this answer does not require a verb that names a *triadic *relation; and although it provides a *reason *for what happened, it does not identify a rational agent's goal, purpose, or intention behind it. After all, the explosion might have been entirely accidental, not the result of *any *goal/purpose/intention at all. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 18, 2024 at 3:05 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Edwina, Jon, List, > > I'm sorry for not responding sooner to this note. But now that I finished > the article on phaneroscopy, I'm moving on to the the article on Delta > graphs. I'll send a note with a preview of that article later this week. > > In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and > different theories about time. The important point about Thirdness is that > the Third is always an abstract reason (or theory) for relating the first > and second.That is why the most direct way to formalize any instance of > Thirdness is to clarify and determine that reason. And the starting point > for any such determination is to ask a question. > > The method of asking questions is as old as Socrates. Aristotle adopted > and systematized the questions -- every one of his 10 categories is the > answer to a question. The medieval Scholastics, which Peirce studied in > detail, developed many systematic methods for asking questions. If you > search for "question" in CP, you'll get over 1500 answers. I haven't > checked every one, but the ones I did check usually lead to the initial > stages of an investigation of some sort. > > As for time, questions about time do not rule out an open-ended variety of > answers, In fact, Einstein's questions about time were the starting point > of his theory of relativity. Peirce also asked questions about time and > space that indicated options that were distinctly different from Newton's > assumptions. They were closer to Einstein's, but there was much more work > to do -- as Einstein and others showed. > > There is much more to say about these issues. But the method of asking > "Why?" to begin an investigation of Thirdness is consistent with Peirce's > method of beginning any kind of investigation. Just look at the many > occurrences of the word "question" in CP. > > There are also 332 instances of 'why' and 1193 instances of 'how' in CP. > As just one example of both, note CP 2.717: > > "The distinction between the 'Why' of hypothesis and the 'How' of > induction is not very great; both ask for a statistical > syllogism, of which the observed fact shall be the conclusion, the known > conditions of the observation one premiss, and the inductive or hypothetic > inference the other. This statistical syllogism may be conveniently termed > the explanatory syllogism." > > Note that Peirce wrote "the 'why' of hypothesis'. Since every hypothesis > is stated as a proposition, asking the question "Why?" about any Thirdness > would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the reason that explains > why the first and second are related. Therefore, CP 2.717 justifies my > claim about asking a question Why about any instance of Thirdness. It is > the beginning of an investigation to determine the reason, goal, purpose, > or intention that relates the first and second. QED (Quite Easily Done). > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
John, List: JFS: We were talking about a method that a student or scholar of Peirce may use for testing a sign to determine whether it is an instance of 1ns, 2ns, or 3ns. Again, according to Peirce, there are *ten different respects* by which a sign can be classified as an instance of 1ns/2ns/3ns (or possible/existent/necessitant). Again, none of them directly corresponds to naming a monadic/dyadic/triadic relation. JFS: The test is not a method of communication by means of sentences. It is a method for determining the structure of a sign. Here is your original claim ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00080.html). JFS: And there are six kinds of reference that a sign may have to its interpretants. Each kind corresponds to one of the six basic question words ... In short, that is the distinction between Peirce's 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. The monadic relations of 1ns express answers to the words Who, What, When, or Where. The dyadic relations of 2ns express answers to the word How. And the triadic relations of 3ns answer questions to the word Why. This approach explicitly requires questions that start with specific words to have answers that correspond to specific relational valencies. Setting aside the fact that I have provided various counterexamples demonstrating the absence of such a definitive alignment, dialogue (real or imagined) is obviously essential to your proposed "test," although not necessarily between two *different *people. "Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a *Quasi-utterer* and a *Quasi-interpreter*; and although these two are at one (*i.e.*, are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, *welded*. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic" (CP 4.551, 1906). "All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent" (CP 6.338, 1907). As I pointed out in my initial reply, the external (dynamical or final) interpretant of a sincere (not rhetorical) question is *not *the answer given (actually or ideally) as another sign, but an interpreter's *exertion *in giving that answer. Hence, the only interpretant that *might *correspond to the type of question being asked is the *immediate *interpretant. However, we agree that for *who* and *what *questions, the initial word functions as a *pronoun *denoting the blank in a rheme that the utterer is asking the interpreter to fill. Similarly, *when*, *where*, *how*, or *why *at the beginning of a question functions as a substitute for a *prepositional phrase*--e.g., "on Valentine's Day," "in the eye," "by receiving it," "because a spark ignited it"--which Peirce likewise characterizes as an *indexical *sign (CP 2.290, EP 2:16, 1895). As such, the first word of a question is always *designative *and thus belongs to its immediate *object*, not its immediate *interpretant*. Instead, I suggest that the logical relations represented by the syntax of the relevant proposition as a general *type *(pure/continuous predicate), along with the punctuation marks or voice inflections that are incorporated into an individual *token *as qualitative *tones *to reflect the fact that it is being posed as a question (not stated as an assertion), serve as the immediate interpretant. After all, the intention of someone asking a question is to obtain an answer, and "So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant" (R 339, 1906 Apr 2). Regards, Jon On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 9:31 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I completely agree with the following paragraph: > > JAS> Put another way, a who or what question is often a *rheme*, such > that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ > retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his > wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word > that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of > the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent. > > But your paragraph is a discussion of a dialog between two two persons: > an inquirer and an respondent. One of them is uttering a sentence > (complete or partial) and the other is interpreting it. > > But Helmut and I were not talking about a dialog between two people. We > were talking about a method that a student or scholar of Peirce may use for > testing a sign to determine whether it is an instance of 1-ness, 2-ness, or > 3-ness. Those are two totally different activities. The test is not a > method of communication by means of sentences. It is a method for > determining the structure of a sign. > > John >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
John, List: At the risk of belaboring the point, I will take one more stab at showing why I think that Peirce would *not *have agreed with distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns by aligning them with the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why questions as (allegedly) monadic, dyadic, and triadic. If I ask, "Who retrieved the book?" and you reply, "My dog," then from a *logical *standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a *monadic *relation, you are asserting the *dyadic *proposition that your dog retrieved the book. If I ask, "What did the man give his wife?" and you reply, "A brooch," then from a *logical *standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a *monadic *relation, you are asserting the *triadic *proposition that the man gave his wife a brooch. Put another way, a who or what question is often a *rheme*, such that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent. In fact, sometimes the answer to a what question is the name of a dyadic or triadic relation. "What did your dog do with the book?" "My dog *retrieved *the book." "What did the man do with the brooch?" "He *gave *it to his wife." A when or where question is even less straightforward. If I ask, "When did the man give his wife the brooch?" and you reply, "On Valentine's Day," this is only informative if I already know that Valentine's Day is February 14 and what today's date is--there is an unavoidably indexical aspect here. If I ask, "Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee?" and you reply, "In the eye," this just changes the relevant proposition from "The datestone hit the Jinnee" to "The datestone hit the Jinnee's eye." Again, a how question need not have a dyadic answer. If I ask, "How are you?" and you reply, "I am cold" (after shoveling snow), then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "How did the man celebrate Valentine's Day?" and you reply, "He gave his wife a brooch," then you are obviously asserting a triadic proposition. Likewise, a why question need not have a triadic answer. If I ask, "Why are you shivering?" and you reply, "I am cold," then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "Why did the man give his wife a brooch?" and you reply, "He was celebrating Valentine's Day," then you are obviously asserting a dyadic proposition. These examples illustrate the imprecision and resulting flexibility of natural languages. The fact that information can be added to or subtracted from someone's answer to a question in ordinary conversation reflects the context-dependency of both utterances, as well as the dialogic nature of human semiosis. Consequently, it is better to stick with Peirce's own paradigmatic conceptions for distinguishing 1ns/2ns/3ns as discovered in phaneroscopy, namely, quality/reaction/mediation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 3:32 PM John F Sowa wrote: > I have to shovel snow right now, but I'll briefly explain the two > sentences. > > JAS> > JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to > her. > > JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer > (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the > transfer was made. > > > The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own > admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your > criterion. "*Why* did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a > completely different question that would require a completely different > answer. > > By including the verb 'give' in the answer, her husband gave a triadic > answer to a dyadic question. That includes more information than was > requested. In the other question, with the word 'why', the answer stated > less information, and the person who asked would typically ask a follow-on > question to get the reason why. > > The possibility that the answer might not contain exactly the requested > information is one reason why Helmut's criterion, although equivalent to a > why-question, may be a better way to elicit the correct information. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirc
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Helmut, List: Peirce's three universal categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) are discovered in the primal positive science of phaneroscopy (quality/reaction/mediation) and diagrammatized in the hypothetical science of mathematics (monadic/dyadic/triadic relations). I do not know whether anyone has posted a mathematical proof of Peirce's reduction thesis on the Internet. Robert Burch wrote an entire book to present his ( https://books.google.com/books/about/A_Peircean_Reduction_Thesis.html?id=MK-EIAAJ) and provides a very brief summary in his SEP entry about Peirce ( https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#red), while Sergiy Koshkin purports to demonstrate it even more rigorously in a recent paper ( https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/article/886447). Personally, I find Peirce's own diagrammatic demonstration to be simple and persuasive enough--relations of any adicity can be built up of triads, but triads cannot be built up of monads or dyads despite involving them (EP 2:364, 1905). [image: image.png] I likewise noticed that the Commens website (http://www.commens.org/) was down for a while, so I was using the 12/31/23 Internet Archive version ( https://web.archive.org/web/20231231054741/http://www.commens.org/), but it came back up a couple of days ago. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 1:37 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Supplement: Ok, I can access Commens Dictionary again! > John, List, > The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself > being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just > say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". > Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something > (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the > secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of > inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness > can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two > sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean > categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. > BTW, I have two questions: > > -Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad > is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible? > > -I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong > with my computer, or with the website? > > Best, helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
List is a collaboration, not a > competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank > them for the correction. For example, I thank you for correcting my > mistake below: > > JFS> Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the > answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can > anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to > a question that begins with the word 'Why'? > > JAS> These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to > be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins > with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?" > > Yes, indeed. I admit that I made a mistake in that statement. But > insults are never appropriate in any collaboration. You have every right > to state your opinions, right or wrong. But an insult is never > appropriate. And by the way, you prefixed your insult with a mistaken > claim: > > JAS> Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my > counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. > > John > > -- > *From*: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > > Gary: > > As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if > my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on > speculative grammar. > > JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it > to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along > with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be > interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might > eventually send it to the List after all. > > JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be > explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'. > > > Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would > readily see that for themselves. > > JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have > been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it. > > JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word > 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that > connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that > simple test. > > > I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or > anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a serious > misunderstanding of both his categories and his semeiotic. So much for not > putting words in his mouth, claiming to know what he intended, or (in this > case) attributing specific sentiments to him without exact quotations. Just > imagine how JFS would have reacted if I had said in my post, "I realize > that Peirce did not specify the logical order of determination for all ten > trichotomies in sign classification, but I think that he would have been > delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested this > solution." > > JAS: On the contrary, every answer to every question is an example of 3ns, > because every sign is in the genuine triadic relation of mediating between > its object and its interpretant. > > JFS: That point, although true, does not distinguish the three kinds of > answers. > > > Exactly--there is no distinction between the three kinds of answers that > corresponds to Peirce's three categories. All signs, including every answer > to every question, are examples of 3ns. Qualities and reactions are > examples of 1ns and 2ns, respectively, not any answers to any questions. > > JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the > answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can > anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to > a question that begins with the word 'Why'? > > > These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, > "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with > the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?" Of course, I already > fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch > of hand-waving. > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 6:29 PM John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, > > Your comments confirm the fact that every example of
[PEIRCE-L] OFF-LIST Re: Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Gary: As always, I appreciate your positive feedback. I am starting to wonder if my recent flurry of List activity might finally result in a paper on speculative grammar. JFS already replied to my post (see below) but did so off-List, sending it to me only, without changing the subject line or otherwise saying so. Along with his questions at the end that are directed to "anybody else who may be interested," this suggests that it was unintentional, such that he might eventually send it to the List after all. JFS: Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'. Obviously, my comments do no such thing, and hopefully, others would readily see that for themselves. JFS: Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it. JFS: I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that simple test. I honestly suspect that Peirce would have bluntly told JFS, Lady Welby, or anyone else making such a suggestion that it indicates a serious misunderstanding of both his categories and his semeiotic. So much for not putting words in his mouth, claiming to know what he intended, or (in this case) attributing specific sentiments to him without exact quotations. Just imagine how JFS would have reacted if I had said in my post, "I realize that Peirce did not specify the logical order of determination for all ten trichotomies in sign classification, but I think that he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested this solution." JAS: On the contrary, every answer to every question is an example of 3ns, because every sign is in the genuine triadic relation of mediating between its object and its interpretant. JFS: That point, although true, does not distinguish the three kinds of answers. Exactly--there is no distinction between the three kinds of answers that corresponds to Peirce's three categories. All signs, including every answer to every question, are examples of 3ns. Qualities and reactions are examples of 1ns and 2ns, respectively, not any answers to any questions. JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'? These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?" Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 6:29 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be > explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'. > Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been > delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it. > > JFS: The monadic relations of 1ns express answers to the words Who, What, > When, or Where. The dyadic relations of 2ns express answers to the word > How. And the triadic relations of 3ns express answers to the word Why. In > particular, all examples of 3ns can be expressed as answers to > Why-questions. > > JAS> On the contrary, every answer to every question is an example of > 3ns, because every sign is in the genuine triadic relation of mediating > between its object and its interpretant. > > That point, although true, does not distinguish the three kinds of > answers. > > For the first four question words (who, what, when, where), the words in > parentheses in your answers are irrelevant, since the single word or phrase > is sufficient. > > JAS> Who retrieved the book? My dog (retrieved the book). What did the man > give his wife? (He gave her) a brooch. When did he give it to her? (He gave > it to her) on Valentine's Day. Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee? (It > hit him) in the eye. > > The next two sentences show that sentences given as answers may include > more or less than what was asked. The person who asked the question may > ask a follow-up question if more information is necessary. > > JAS> How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. > > The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dya
[PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
lied proposition that includes a dyadic or triadic relation, some answers to how questions include triadic relations, and some answers to why questions do not require triadic relations. Who retrieved the book? My dog (retrieved the book). What did the man give his wife? (He gave her) a brooch. When did he give it to her? (He gave it to her) on Valentine's Day. Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee? (It hit him) in the eye. How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. Why did the gunpowder explode? A spark ignited it. By the way, the dynamical interpretant of a question is not the answer itself as another sign, it is the *exertion *of someone giving that answer. "For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my bedfellow, and that afterwards she wakes up and inquires, 'What sort of a day is it?' *This *is a Sign ... whose Dynamical Interpretant is *my answering her question*. ... The *Dynamical Interpretant* is the actual effect that it has upon me, its interpreter" (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909 Mar 14). Hence, a sincere (not merely rhetorical) question is a suggestive phemic actuous symbol, a proposition presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce action (elicit an answer). By contrast, a command is an imperative phemic actuous symbol, a proposition urged by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce action; a hypothesis is a suggestive phemic temperative, a proposition presented for contemplation whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control; and an assertion is an imperative phemic temperative, a proposition urged by an act of insistence whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control. JFS: They all express some kind of intention or purpose or explanation or reason for the triadic connection. Again, defining 3ns in terms of explanation or reason (intelligibility) is more generally accurate than defining 3ns in terms of (conscious) intentionality or purpose. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 9:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I completely agree with the following principle: > > JA> Another aspect of a sign's complete meaning concerns the reference a > sign has to its interpretants... > > And there are six kinds of reference that a sign my have to its > interpretants. Each kind corresponds to one of the six basic question > words in English (or their equivalents in other languages). Questions that > begin with the first four question words may be answers with one word or > phrase: Who, What, When, and Where. Any such question may be answered > with one word or phrase and a *MONADIC *relation. > > Questions that begin with How can be answered in a sentence with a dyadic > verb, a *DYADIC *relation. > > And questions that begin with Why require require a sentence with a verb > that requires a subject, object, and an indirect object or a prepositional > phrase: a *TRIADIC *relation. > > In short, that is the distinction between Peirce's Firstness, Secondness, > and Thirdness. The monadic relations of Firstness express answers to the > words Who, What, When, or Where, The dyadic relations of Secondness > express answers to the word How. And the triadic relations of Thirdness > answer questions to the word Why. > > In summary. all examples of Thirdness are answers to Why-questions. They > all express some kind of intention or purpose or explanation or reason for > the triadic connection. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)
Mike, List: Indeed, the online Commens Dictionary entry for 3ns ( http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/thirdness) consists of 21 Peirce quotations, none of which includes the word "intentionality." Two of them do have the word "intention," and here is the first. CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law according to which she acts. If two forces are combined according to the parallelogram of forces, their resultant is a real 3rd. Yet any force may, by the parallelogram of forces, be mathematically resolved into the sum of two others, in an infinity of different ways. Such components, however, are mere creations of the mind. What is the difference? As far as one isolated event goes, there is none; the real forces are no more present in the resultant than any components that the mathematician may imagine. But what makes the real forces really there is the general law of nature which calls for them, and not for any other components of the resultant. Thus, intelligibility, or reason objectified, is what makes 3ns genuine. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7) In this excerpt, it is *intelligibility *that is essential for genuine 3ns, not intentionality; at least, not "the intention of a rational agent." Anything that occurs "by virtue of an intelligible law"-- including a spark causing gunpower to explode, as well as (presumably) graphite crystals forming in soot or those same crystals becoming diamonds under high pressure and temperature--is an example of 3ns. Peirce says much the same thing many years later. CSP: The third element of the phenomenon is that we perceive it to be intelligible, that is, to be subject to law, or capable of being represented by a general sign or Symbol. But I say the same element is in all signs. The essential thing is that it is capable of being represented. Whatever is capable of being represented is itself of a representative nature. (CP 8.268, 1903) As I noted earlier in this thread (quoting that last sentence), for Peirce, although "*really being* and *being represented* are very different" (EP 2:303, c. 1901), really being and being representable--and thus being of the nature of a sign--are the same. "The very entelechy of being lies in being representable. ... This appears mystical and mysterious simply because we insist on remaining blind to what is plain, that there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol" (EP 2:324, c. 1901). After all ... CSP: [T]he Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903). CSP: [T]he explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth,"--that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906) Here is the second quotation for 3ns with the word "intention." CSP: Let us now take up being *in futuro*. As in the other cases, this is merely an avenue leading to a purer apprehension of the element it contains. An absolutely pure conception of a Category is out of the question. Being *in futuro* appears in mental forms, intentions and expectations. Memory supplies us a knowledge of the past by a sort of brute force, a quite binary action, without any reasoning. But all our knowledge of the future is obtained through the medium of something else. ... Intellectual triplicity, or Mediation, is my third category. (CP 2.86, 1902) In this excerpt, the emphasis is ultimately on *mediation*, which is what Peirce describes elsewhere as the purest conception of 3ns one can have (CP 1.530, 1903). However, the ellipsis omits a considerable amount of text, including a few examples where intention is indeed the hallmark of 3ns--a dog fetching a book for its master, a man giving a brooch to his wife, and a merchant throwing a datestone that hits a Jinee. The absence of intention *in these specific cases* would render them "purely mechanical actions," dyadic instead of triadic, 2ns rather than 3ns. Nevertheless, as already noted, there are abundant passages (like the first quotation above) where Peirce treats other ideas, where intentionality is lacking, as paradigmatic of 3ns--suc
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
w we might say: If we are able to have the idea of a continuum, then > there must be one. This argument is similar with Anselm´s proof of God. Ok, > our world may be pixeled or quantized, but God´s realm is continuous. My > Ockham´s-razor-argument in my last post neither is a proof for a real > continuum, and whether Anselm´s proof is a proof, I don´t know. I sense > platonism in the idea, that we cannot get an idea of something that does > not exist. I am not totally convinced anymore about the reality of > continuum. The question seems quasi-theological to me. > > Best, Helmut > *Gesendet:* Montag, 12. Februar 2024 um 20:57 Uhr > *Von:* "Jon Alan Schmidt" > *An:* "Peirce-L" > *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing > Semiotic Project) > Helmut, List: > > According to Peirce, "Continuity represents 3ns almost to perfection" (CP > 1.337, c. 1882). When we prescind discreteness from continuity, we are > prescinding 2ns from 3ns, and we cannot prescind continuity from > discreteness because we cannot prescind 3ns from 2ns. Since prescission > "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present > without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP > 2:270, 1903), the upshot is that 2ns is logically possible without 3ns, but > 3ns is not logically possible without 2ns. Put another way, 3ns always > *involves > *2ns as well as 1ns, and 2ns always *involves *1ns. Nevertheless, 2ns > cannot be *built up* from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be *built up* from 1ns > and/or 2ns. > > For example, a continuous line involves any discrete points within it, but > it cannot be built up from any multitude of such points. The continuous > whole (line) is ontologically prior to any discrete parts (points), which > are indefinite (infinitesimal "linelets") unless and until they are > deliberately marked off within it. Likewise, as I said before, the entire > universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities > (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). In Peirce's words, "The whole > universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which this > Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential 2ns of > Existence, a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of > the blackboard" (NEM 4:345, 1898; see also CP 6.203-209, 1898). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 11:01 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > >> >> List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by >> supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical >> or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So >> everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it >> requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, >> because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be >> prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from >> continuity, to logically handle it. >> >> Best, Helmut >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
Helmut, List: According to Peirce, "Continuity represents 3ns almost to perfection" (CP 1.337, c. 1882). When we prescind discreteness from continuity, we are prescinding 2ns from 3ns, and we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness because we cannot prescind 3ns from 2ns. Since prescission "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903), the upshot is that 2ns is logically possible without 3ns, but 3ns is not logically possible without 2ns. Put another way, 3ns always *involves *2ns as well as 1ns, and 2ns always *involves *1ns. Nevertheless, 2ns cannot be *built up* from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be *built up* from 1ns and/or 2ns. For example, a continuous line involves any discrete points within it, but it cannot be built up from any multitude of such points. The continuous whole (line) is ontologically prior to any discrete parts (points), which are indefinite (infinitesimal "linelets") unless and until they are deliberately marked off within it. Likewise, as I said before, the entire universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). In Peirce's words, "The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential 2ns of Existence, a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the blackboard" (NEM 4:345, 1898; see also CP 6.203-209, 1898). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Feb 12, 2024 at 11:01 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > > List, I think, we can prescind discreteness from continuity, e.g. by > supposing the formation of attractors, or coagulation, or reentry (logical > or actual loops), but we cannot prescind continuity from discreteness. So > everything including thirdness is at first based on continuity, even if it > requires discreteness. I think, that thirdness requires discreteness, > because a relation as part of structure, and a habit too, can and has to be > prescinded (or discriminated, or dissociated) as something discrete from > continuity, to logically handle it. > > Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
th at least two lines of identity could be scribed on the sheet of assertion. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 7:37 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > List, Edwinia, Mike > > First, thanks to JAS for his well crafted initial post and an a direct > inquiry to him if those are the only relevant citations to the > intermingling of grammatical semantics with CSP’s notion of a copulant. > I strongly suspect a deeper meaning is to be found in other manuscripts. I > would suggest that extension of trichotomy to ’n’ other semantic terms > (scores, hundreds of different names) demands further attachments of > meanings or augmentations to the notions of copulant <—> predicate > illations and illationships. Just a feeling. > > Edwinia and Mike: > > The following comments are motivated by subtle “differences that make a > difference” between the vernacular scientific usages in the 19th Century > and current (21 st century) partitions of disciplinary languages into > various ‘levels’ of semiotic meanings (as given by the imaginative but > perhaps not meaningful jargon “inter-theoretic modalities of reasoning”.) > > I presuppose that “The Proper Way in Logic” was a bit hasty and the > intended meaning was “A Proper Way…) > > I believe that both of you are missing, relative to 21st Century logic, > the crucial distinctions in CSP’s text that motivated the historical > developments of Russell / Quine notions of relational logics in the first > half of the 20 th Century. (As a remote yet pertinent aside, according to > R. Cook), the symbolic logics used today, can be separated into four > dialects: mathematics, computer science, formal logics and linguistics > (see, for example, the book by Skardowska, Logic - Language -Ontology > (2022), but that is a topic for another day.) > > The modal logics of modern form (see, Non-Classical Logics by Graham > Preist and Relevant Logics by Stephen Read.) are remote from these > citations. The reason they are is very simple. > > The developments of symbolic logics introduced a “sound and complete” set > of symbols to relate the object language to the interpretant language(s). > The relationships between subject and predicate are symbolically remote > from CSP’s assertions about the linguistic consequences of the antecedents > of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness as adjectives. > > Furthermore, among the principle reasons I invested years in the > construction of the logics of chemistry was because of the foundational > differences between the copula and the predicate in vernacular English that > ascribes meanings to chemical sentences. > > The citations unearthed by Jon are vaguely in the neighborhood of current > molecular-biological usage of material illations respecting empirical > causal measurements and consistencies. Minor, but significant editorial > changes could conjoin CSP’s texts to modern chemical grammars describing > chemical structures. > > Secondly, I ask, is everyone conflating the subtle distinctions between > CSP’s usage of continuants and mathematical continuity? This remains one > of the modern dilemmas in distinguishing quanta theories of science (QM) > from continuous variables of physical semiotics (such as thermodynamics.) > > Looking forward to future developments of Jon’s unearthings. > > Cheers > > Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
Mike: I do not know what you mean by "penultimate" in this context. As I have said on the List many times before, as well as in my published work, my understanding of synechism as applied in metaphysics is that the entire universe is an inexhaustible continuum (3ns) of indefinite possibilities (1ns), some of which are actualized (2ns). Again, discrete things and their dyadic reactions, as well as monadic qualities and their inherence in discrete things, are degenerate outcomes of continuous and triadic semiosis. Regards, Jon On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM Mike Bergman wrote: > Hi Jon, > > To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the > guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be > elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the > discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.) > > Best, Mike > On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Mike: > > I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake > to treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, > and that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the > hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of > phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle. > > However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought *synechism > *suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in > philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he also stated, "I > carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole > domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This > has implications for semiosis as I have already outlined, as well as the > categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from > 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from > 1ns and 2ns. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman wrote: > >> Hi Jon, >> >> Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say >> I suspect Edwina does as well): >> >> What I *can *say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines >> semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the >> entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if >> it is not composed exclusively of signs." >> >> Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on >> evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs the >> classical. These are a focus of my current studies. >> >> One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their >> too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis >> as a Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal >> categories to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of >> Nature and its manifestations. >> >> Best, Mike >> > -- > __ > > Michael K. Bergman > 319.621.5225http://mkbergman.comhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman > __ > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
Mike: I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the hypothetical science of mathematics and the primal positive science of phaneroscopy--are even more central, especially as an organizing principle. However, Peirce's preference to call his overall system of thought *synechism *suggests that he regarded "continuity as an idea of prime importance in philosophy" (CP 6.103, EP 1:313, 1892)--especially since he also stated, "I carry the doctrine so far as to maintain that continuity governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it" (CP 7.566, EP 2:1, 1893). This has implications for semiosis as I have already outlined, as well as the categories--1ns is prescinded from 2ns and 3ns, and 2ns is prescinded from 3ns; but 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 11, 2024 at 3:13 PM Mike Bergman wrote: > Hi Jon, > > Here is a point with which I have vehement agreement with you (dare I say > I suspect Edwina does as well): > > What I *can *say is that I obviously disagree with anyone who confines > semiosis to the biological realm, since I maintain with Peirce that the > entire universe is "a vast representamen" that is "perfused with signs, if > it is not composed exclusively of signs." > > Further keys to this assertion are found in Peirce's writings on > evolution, emergence, cosmogony, and his anticipation of the quantum vs the > classical. These are a focus of my current studies. > > One of the bones I have to pick with many scholars of semiosis is their > too literal restriction to human signs and perhaps even elevating semiosis > as a Peircean thesis first among others. I have found the universal > categories to be a more robust grounding to generalize to the entirety of > Nature and its manifestations. > > Best, Mike > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
of being represented is itself of a representative nature" (CP 8.268, 1903). Whenever we prescind such subjects from the continuous flow of semiosis as if they were *individual *constituents of the universe, we also need to account for their general logical relations with each other, and that is where pure/continuous predicates come into play. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 11:23 PM Gary Richmond wrote: > Jon, List, > > Thanks for these additional comments and examples as they further clarify > Peirce's bold logical move. As you noted: > > JAS: Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the > *indexical *nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, > since one must already be acquainted with their objects in order to > understand them--and leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the > *iconic *part of the proposition. > > > Since you mentioned Frederik Stjernfelt, I've been wondering how this move > of Peirce might figure in consideration of what Stjernfelt called "Natural > Propositions." In his extraordinary book, *Natural Propositions: The > Actuality of Peirce's Doctrine of Dicisigns*, Stjernfelt takes Peirce at > his word, so to speak, and generalizes the meaning of *proposition* well > beyond the logical-linguistic into the natural world, that which > biosemioticians naturally have a particular interested in. I don't know > what lasting impact -- if any -- his book has had in that community since, > as far as I can tell, it has been somewhat resistant to Peircean thinking. > This antipathy was suggested to me when I attended a Biosemiotics Gathering > at Roosevelt University in NYC some years ago (I was asked by Vinicius > Romanini to read a paper he himself could not deliver since officials > refused to allow him to board a plane to the USA because he'd brought his > Italian, rather than his Brazilian, passport to the airport) as the several > Peircean-inspired biosemioticians present seemed to be contradicted at > every turn. > > Be that as it may, Stjernfelt argues in *Natural Propositions* that > Peirce's generalization of the logical concept of *proposition* to > *dicisign *as to include semiosis that occurs in the natural world, is of > the greatest consequence for our understanding of reality beyond our > specie's intellectual/logical conception of it. For dicisigns do not > necessarily require human language, thought, and logic -- not human > consciousness -- whatsoever. > > I'm not a biosemiotician -- although I find the field of considerable > interest -- and I know that you aren't either, Jon. But I'd be most > interested in what you or others on the List might think regarding the > generalization of Peirce's furthest thinking as regards propositions into > the natural world. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
Gary, List: GR: It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in Logic," which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking. Of course, that characterization is Peirce's own, again written in late 1908 (NEM 3:885) when he evidently adopted it rather suddenly and decisively. Throwing everything possible into the subject recognizes the *indexical *nature of most words--functioning much like proper names, since one must already be acquainted with their objects in order to understand them--and leaves only the pure/continuous predicate as the *iconic *part of the proposition. By contrast, standard first-order predicate logic goes the other way, throwing everything possible into the predicate and leaving only quantified variables as the subjects. Peirce himself endorses that approach in some earlier writings. CSP: The most perfectly thorough analysis throws the whole substance of the Dicisign into the Predicate. (CP 2.318, 1903) CSP: It has been shown that in the formal analysis of a proposition, after all that words can convey has been thrown into the predicate, there remains a subject that is indescribable and that can only be pointed at or otherwise indicated, unless a way, of finding what is referred to, be prescribed. (CP 5.525, c. 1905) CSP: Take the proposition "Burnt child shuns fire." ... On this view, the predicate is, "is either not a child or has not been burned, or has no opportunity of shunning fire or does shun fire"; while the subject is "any individual object the interpreter may select from the universe of ordinary everyday experience." (CP 5.473, 1907) "Cain killed Abel" becomes "there exists an *x* and there exists a *y* such that *x* is Cain and *y* is Abel and *x* stands in the relation of killing to *y*." It is an interesting historical fact that the usual abbreviated notation for such formulations is derived from one developed by Peirce--for these two examples, ∀*x* (¬C*x* ∨ ¬B*x* ∨ S*x*) = ∀*x* ((C*x* ∧ B*x*) → S*x*) and ∃*x *∃*y *(C*x* ∧ A*y* ∧ K*xy*). Still, notice how compact the natural language expressions are, by virtue of utilizing syntax that iconically matches the flow of causation instead of spelling everything out with symbols. Likewise, as Frederik Stjernfelt observes on pages 138 and 172 of his 2022 book, *Sheets, Diagrams, and Realism in Peirce*, EGs are more iconic than the corresponding algebraic expressions in the specific sense that each indefinite individual--now a line of identity instead of a variable--always appears *exactly once*, instead of at least twice; in these cases, four and three times, respectively. [image: image.png] Technically, in "burnt child shuns fire," shunning is a *dyadic *relation whose additional correlate is fire. That makes the algebraic notation ∀*x* ∀ *y* (¬C*x* ∨ ¬B*x* ∨ ¬F*y* ∨ S*xy*)) = ∀*x* ∀*y* ((C*x* ∧ B*x* ∧ F*y*) → S *xy*). Throwing everything possible into the predicate, there are now two subjects (lowercase letters) and four predicates (uppercase letters). Throwing everything possible into the subject, there are six subjects--four general concepts (names) and two indefinite individuals (lines of identity)--and a single pure/continuous predicate (syntax). [image: image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Feb 10, 2024 at 4:12 PM Gary Richmond wrote: > Jon, > > Your post sheds light on both associated matters that you discussed in it. > This snippet of a quotation -- and which I've reflected on a number of > times previously -- represents for me something of a succinct summary of > the matter, especially as emphasizing the need for collateral knowledge. > > CSP: A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more > ways than one. But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject > whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the > proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its > interpreter is requisite. ... The result is that everything in a > proposition that possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving > the *pure *predicate a mere form of connection, such as 'is,' 'possesses > (as a character),' 'stands in the dyadic relation ___ to ___ ,' 'and' = 'is > at once ___ and ___ ,' etc. > > > It makes clear why you titled this new thread "The Proper Way in Logic," > which, when I first read it, sounded quite shocking. But it becomes > understandable that "a proposition may have any number of subjects but > can have but one predicate which is invariably general, namely, a *pure * > or *continuous *predicate that cannot be analyzed further and expresses > the logical relations between the subjects." > > > As
[PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
es its implication of *B*," etc. So with "It rains and hails," "It rains concurrently with hailing," "It rains concurrently with the concurrence of hailing," and so forth. I call all such signs Continuants. They are all Copulants and are the only *pure* Copulants. These signs *cannot be explicated*: they must convey Familiar universal elementary relations of logic. We do not derive these notions from observation, nor by any sense of being opposed, but from our own reason. (EP 2:484-485, 1908 Dec 25) When a proposition is expressed linguistically in a sentence, the subjects that denote its objects are either *descriptive* names or *designative* pronouns or gestures, while the pure/continuous predicate that signifies its interpretant is often a *copulant* sign. But what about a sentence like "Cain killed Abel," which includes no words except those serving as its subjects? Peirce answers this question nearly two years later. CSP: A single Assertion has but a single Predicate; but the simplest Assertion has more than one Subject, unless it be such a statement as "It rains," where one of the Subjects is expressed otherwise than in words. But I must explain myself more fully, and in the way which alone will be truly expressive, namely, by examples. I will, however, first remark that the Proposition that embodies an Assertion has the same Subjects and Predicate as the Assertion itself. Take the Proposition "Cain killed Abel." This is identically the same Proposition as "Abel was killed by Cain": It is only the grammatical dress that is different. Other things being equal, everybody will prefer the former. Why? Because it is simpler; but why is it simpler? Because in putting the cause before the effect, it in that respect diagrammatizes the truth. What are the Subjects of this Proposition[?] Cain, first: that is not only a Subject of the Proposition, but is the principal Subject of the Assertion which a historian would naturally make. But in the Proposition Cain and Abel are, as Subjects, on one footing precisely (or almost precisely, for Cain is preponderant in causality). But besides these, "killed" = committed *murder* upon, is a third Subject, since no study of the words alone, without extraneous experience, would enable the Ad[d]ressee to understand it. What, then, is left to serve as Predicate? Nothing but the *flow of causation*. It is true that we are more acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a babe in its cradle bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of exultation plays upon its features, it is making acquaintance with the flow of causation. So acquaintance with the flow of causation so early as to make it familiar before speech is so far acquired that an assertion can be syntactically framed, and it is embodied in the syntax of every tongue. (R 664, 1910 Nov 26-27) Pure/continuous predicates are sometimes conveyed entirely by *syntax*, which in natural languages tends to reflect "the flow of causation." As another example, there are exactly two kinds of subjects that indexically denote the objects of the proposition that an EG represents--descriptive names for general concepts, and designative lines of identity for indefinite individuals. The pure/continuous predicate that signifies the proposition's interpretant is *always* iconically diagrammatized by the syntax--the arrangement on the sheet of assertion of the names and lines, as well as any shaded areas for negation. Specifically, attributing concepts to individuals by attaching names to lines makes those individuals *more* definite and those concepts *more* determinate in the mind of an interpreter. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 9:06 PM Gary Richmond wrote: > Jon, > > I would tend to strongly agree with what you've written. However, this > passage seems to me to need a bit of 'unpacking' to be entirely clear. > > JAS: The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be > understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the > recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically > denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that > iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical > relations > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Gary, List: Indeed, as I have said before, usefulness is in the eye of the beholder; and as Peirce himself said, "True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). Nobody should disparage one particular field of study merely because that person does not happen to find it useful for his/her peculiar purposes. Moreover, Peirce's entire architectonic classification of the sciences is based on "the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other" (CP 1.180, EP 2:258, 1903). Accordingly, *all *the special sciences--including cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology--depend on the normative science of logic as semeiotic for fundamental principles, but do not furnish such principles to semeiotic. That being the case, the generality of semeiotic is a feature, not a bug--like the other branches of philosophy, it "contents itself with observations such as come within the range of every man's normal experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his life" (CP 1.241, 1902). Of course, Peirce famously calls himself "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call *semiotic*, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413, 1907). I agree with Houser--by the way, the quoted paper is excellent, and I commend it to anyone who can get their hands on it--that there is still plenty of work to be done, and we would be foolish to start over from scratch instead of forging ahead from the ground that Peirce has already cleared for us, however incompletely. Regarding his theory of interpretants, I appreciate the reference to my own paper on that topic. In addition, I find it quite baffling that anyone would suggest that the context-dependence of uttered signs is somehow inconsistent with it. On the contrary, the necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical relations (CP 5.542, c. 1902-3; CP 5.151, EP 2:208, 1903; R 611, 1908 Oct 28; NEM 3:885-886, 1908 Dec 5; SS 70-72, 1908 Dec 14; R 664, 1910 Nov 26-27). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 6:08 PM Gary Richmond wrote: > List, John, Edwina, Jon, > > How differently some other distinguished scholars see this matter of the > 'usefulness' of Peirce's semeiotic project than John Sowa appears to. > Consider this passage near the conclusion of a paper by Nathan Houser in a > festschrift for Lucia Santaella published just last year, a passage near > the end which would seem to contradict even John's conclusion regarding Tom > Short's take on especially Peirce's late taxonomy of signs. I've subdivided > the long paragraph in the interest of readability on the List and in order > to emphasize certain salient points. Houser writes (emphasis added by me): > > > *Conclusion (and Call to Carry On)* > > After devoting a great deal of care to Peirce’s later efforts to unravel > the puzzle of semiosis and to produce an extended classification of the > fundamental varieties of possible signs, *T. L. Short concluded that > Peirce’s later taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make > out, incoherent” (Short 2007, p. 260). But he *[GR, Short] *quickly went > on to point out that it is not the inconclusiveness of Peirce’s own > findings but “the kind of project” he had conceived and was pursuing that > is important.* This reflects Peirce’s candid assessment that the semiotic > project he had launched was a great undertaking, far too large for a lone > inquirer, and that *he must commend it to “future explorers”* (Peirce > 1907, EP 2: 413, 482). > > In looking back over his own explorations with signs, from his “New List” > to his Lowell Lectures of 1903 and the many relevant pages in his Logic > Notebook and late correspondence, Peirce likely would not have assessed the > record of his explorations, even the rapid-fire tries and retries in his > Logic Notebook, to be “incoherent,” but he might have been forced to admit > that it was all “a very snarl of twine,” as he had described himself in > contrast to his life-long friend, William James (CP 6.184). But
Re: [PEIRCE-L] further to the recent d iscussion of markednss
Michael, List: Thanks for the additional reference. Does it reflect a change in your views about interpretants sometime between 1983 and 2002? Note 1 favorably cites Short 1996:511-512, which includes the following. TS: I am dwelling on this point less in self-defense than because the confusion of interpretants with rules of interpretation is common among commentators on Peirce's semeiotic and is a serious error. It leads to, and perhaps it stems from, a conflation of Peirce's semeiotic with Ferdinand de Saussure's quite different "semiology." Saussure defined a sign dyadically as consisting of a signifier coupled with a signified; that is to say, a sign *is *a dyad. And that, already, is two differences from Peirce's view, in which a sign is defined triadically but not as a triad; instead, Peirce made a sign to be just *one of* a triad. ... Conversely, to treat Peirce's interpretant as a rule--worse yet, an invariably conventional rule--that determines a sign's object, would be to assimilate his semeiotic to Saussure's conventionalist system. And that would be to make nonsense of semeiotic, which embraces all manner of natural signs and nonhuman interpreters and *a fortiori* modes of interpretation not governed by conventions and sometimes not governed by rules of any kind. These remarks are fully consistent with the specific objections to your earlier book chapter that I raised in my last post--rules of interpretation are not *themselves *interpretants, they are the habits by means of which symbols *determine *their interpretants; a sign is not *itself *a triad, it is one *correlate *of a genuine triadic relation, along with its object and its interpretant; *interpretants *do not mediate between signs and their objects, *signs *mediate between their objects and their interpretants; and interpretants are not limited to *conceptual *phenomena (other signs), they can also be physical events or qualitative feelings. In fact, I generally agree with the article's one-paragraph summary of Peirce's theory of signs, each of which has two objects and three interpretants (pages 109-110). My only quibble, which is admittedly pedantic, is with the statement, "A sign is something non-arbitrarily interpretable as signifying an object (real or unreal)." For Peirce, a sign does not *signify *its object, it *denotes *its object and signifies its interpretant. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Feb 6, 2024 at 8:10 AM Michael Shapiro wrote: > Those who are interested in exploring the concept of markedness as it > operates in the so-called "pass-key" of language as semeiotic, see the > attached article. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Michael, List: Thanks for the confirmation. Unfortunately, although I acknowledge again my relative ignorance about linguistics as a *special *science, unless I am badly misunderstanding what that online chapter outlines, there are some major discrepancies with Peirce's semeiotic as a *normative *science. MS: Corresponding to Peirce’s fundamental tripartition into Sign, Object, and interpretant, all linguistic entities are *signa *(signs) comprised by (1) a material or perceptible *signans*, (2) an intelligible or translatable *signatum*, and (3) an *interpretant *(rule) governing the relation between signans and signatum. ... The interpretant has no material or perceptible shape of its own apart from the signans to which it stands as its evaluative correlate vis-à-vis the conjugate signatum. The absence of corporality in an interpretant of a linguistic sign is totally expected, since *all *interpretants, qua values, inhere totally in the conceptual side of phenomena ... In exactly the same way that signification results from the patterned conjunction of signata and signantia via the mediation of the all-important Third, the interpretant, so all of linguistic content is rendered manifest in the structure of language by series of interpretants that have the form ‘If content A, then expression B.’ These excerpts seem to be saying that (1) a linguistic sign is *comprised *of a sign token (signans), its object (signatum), and its interpretant; (2) an interpretant of a linguistic sign is *never *a physical manifestation, *always* a strictly conceptual phenomenon; and (3) the *interpretant *mediates between the sign token and its object. By contrast, Peirce explicitly and consistently maintains instead that (1) a sign, whether linguistic or otherwise, is one *correlate *of a genuine triadic relation, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant; (2) an interpretant can be *either* another sign, a physical event, or a qualitative feeling; and (3) the *sign *mediates between its object and its interpretant. For example ... CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) CSP: I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. (CP 4.536, 1906) CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign.(EP 2:410, 1907) Accordingly, if it is true that "Markedness in language is the epitome of the relationship between sign and object" (post quoted below), then it is false that "markedness and interpretant are synonymous where the structure of the linguistic sign is concerned" (linked online chapter). Instead, I suggest that markedness corresponds to the fact that every linguistic sign is a *symbol *(vs. index or icon) and thus "refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object" (CP 2.249, EP 2:292, 1903). This rule or law *itself *is not the symbol's interpretant--it describes the habit by means of which the symbol *determines *its interpretant, which is its *effect *on an interpreter. Regards, Jon On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 1:49 PM Michael Shapiro wrote: > Yes, it does, Jon. > > M. > > -Original Message- > From: Jon Alan Schmidt > Sent: Feb 3, 2024 2:04 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants > > > Michael, List: > > I honestly do not know much about linguistics, but I wonder if this online > chapter from your 1983 book, *The Sense of Grammar: Language as Semiotic*, > is still a good summary of your relevant views. > > https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/oa_monograph/chapter/3056317 > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 12:43 PM Gary Richmond > wrote: >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Michael, List: I honestly do not know much about linguistics, but I wonder if this online chapter from your 1983 book, *The Sense of Grammar: Language as Semiotic*, is still a good summary of your relevant views. https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/oa_monograph/chapter/3056317 Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 12:43 PM Gary Richmond wrote: > Edwina, List, > > I too hope that Michael might summarize at least some relevant aspects of > his work in 'markedness' for the List, or at least offer a few excerpts > from his several books and papers which take up the topic. Having read some > of Michael's work on markedness, its connection to meaning in Peirce's > sense seems to me patent as this excerpt from the Wikipedia article, > "Markedness," suggests. > > The work of Cornelius van Schooneveld, Edna Andrews > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edna_Andrews>, Rodney Sangster, Yishai > Tobin and others on 'semantic invariance' (different general meanings > reflected in the contextual specific meanings of features) has further > developed the semantic analysis > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_analysis_(linguistics)> of > grammatical items in terms of marked and unmarked features. Other > semiotically-oriented work has investigated the isomorphism of form and > meaning with less emphasis on invariance, including the efforts of Henning > Andersen, Michael Shapiro, and Edwin Battistella. Shapiro and Andrews have > especially made connections between the semiotic of C. S. Peirce > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C._S._Peirce> and markedness, treating it > "as species of interpretant" in Peirce's sign–object–interpretant triad. > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness > > > I do not know Edna Andrew's work in this area. > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > > On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 1:25 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > >> Michael - Why not instead provide us with a brief discussion of your >> discussion? >> >> Edwina >> >> On Feb 3, 2024, at 1:14 PM, Michael Shapiro wrote: >> >> To all participants in this discussion of interpretants I would like to >> recommend that they take a look at my discussion of markedness in one or >> more of my books, the latest being *The Logic of Lasnguage* (New York: >> Springer, 2022). Markedness in language is the epitomre of the relationship >> between sign and object. >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Gary R., List: Indeed, importance and usefulness are in the eye of the beholder, and predictive success is only one measure. As you rightly point out, the burden of justification is on anyone who would attempt to disparage, discourage, or even foreclose further investigation of any given matter, not on those who wish to continue pursuing it. In this case, if triadic semiosis is a real phenomenon, such that the universe is not reducible to dyadic reactions and monadic qualities, then the importance and usefulness of a theory of interpretants--the *effects *of signs, whether possible (immediate), actual (dynamical), or ideal (final)--should be obvious to anyone. After all, pragmatism--the most famous product of Peirce's thought--falls under the third branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic, namely, speculative rhetoric (or methodeutic), "the science of the essential conditions under which a sign may determine an interpretant sign of itself and of whatever it signifies, or may, as a sign, bring about a physical result" (EP 2:326, 1904). Moreover, if the entire universe is conceived as one immense sign, a semiosic continuum--"a vast representamen ... working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903), and thus "perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906)--then *every event* can be analyzed as the interpretant of a sign. From that standpoint, what could be *more *important or useful than a theory of interpretants? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:22 PM Gary Richmond wrote: > John, Jon, Edwina, Helmut, List, > > JFS (1/31): "I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing > interpretants." > JFS (2/2): "Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP)." > and "Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the > theory to make useful predictions about anything." > > > I would like to suggest that merely because Peirce's writings on > interpretants -- which he worked on until near the end of his life and > which many scholars see as an* integral* aspect of his semeiotic -- have > not been fully developed is no reason to think that may not be in the > future; and no reason for those who remain interested in the possibility of > their development to cease their inquiry. > > "[W]e see arguments that Peirce’s later typology is crucial to a full > understanding and application of semiotics (see Quieroz 2012), or claims > that it whilst underdeveloped, it holds promise and deserves serious effort > and attention (see Houser 1992 and Jappy 2017). [I would especially > recommend: Houser, N., 1992. “On Peirce’s theory of Propositions: A > response to Hilpinen” GR]. *Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society*. > 28:3, 489–504.] > > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/#DivIntot > > > And Edwina's post -- which I just read -- points to the potential value of > all three semeiotic elements "for analysis of both biological and > societal systems." I agree. > > My recommendation: Let scholars pursue the inquiries which interest them > and which they see potential value in pursuing. To suggest otherwise is > to "block the way of inquiry." > > Best, > > Gary Richmond > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Helmut, List: I am not aware of anything in Peirce's writings that would warrant such an interpretation. Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating establishes that any one sign is determined by its two objects (genuine = dynamical, degenerate = immediate) and determines its three interpretants (genuine = final, degenerate = dynamical, doubly degenerate = immediate). Again, I understand the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the concrete manifestations of the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants in *human * semiosis. I also discuss the intentional/effectual/communicational interpretants in my *Semiotica *paper (link below). Peirce evidently changed his mind about the first of these soon after introducing them (EP 2:478, 1906 Mar 9)--"I have thus omitted the *intended *interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of *another *sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that *sign" (R 339, 1906 Apr 2). In other words, since the intentional interpretant is "a determination of the mind of the utterer," it cannot be an interpretant of the sign being analyzed; instead, it must be the dynamical interpretant of a *previous *sign of the same object. On the other hand, since the effectual interpretant is "a determination of the mind of the interpreter," it clearly corresponds to the dynamical interpretant of the sign being analyzed; and since the communicational interpretant is "a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place," I argue that it must be *internal *to the sign being analyzed and thus corresponds to the immediate interpretant. The final interpretant is absent here, because this is an analysis of a discrete "event of semiosis" as an *ens rationis* prescinded from the real and continuous process. Regards, Jon On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:24 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Jon, List, > > we have three classes of context, in which we "either-or-or" divide the > interpretant into > > -immediate, dynamical, final > > -emotional, energetic, logical > > -intentional, effectual, communicational. > > Maybe these threee classes of context are categorially 1ns, 2ns, 3ns? > > And if, I think, there should be a second context for the object too, in > which it is divided other than into immediate and dynamical. > > Best, Helmut > *Gesendet:* Freitag, 02. Februar 2024 um 00:07 Uhr > *Von:* "Jon Alan Schmidt" > *An:* "Peirce-L" > *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants > Helmut, List: > > > HR: But why are there more than three interpretants? > > > There are *not *more than three interpretants, just multiple ways of > naming them in different contexts. The relevant debates among Peirce > scholars have to do with whether "the divisions of interpretant into > immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being > relatively synonymous with these categories" (Liszka as quoted by Atkin, > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/). I have come to > agree with this "received view." > > One alternative that I used to find persuasive is that the > emotional/energetic/logical interpretants are *orthogonal *to the > immediate/dynamical/final interpretants (Short), supposedly based on CP > 4.536 (1906). However, this passage says only that the *actual *effect of > a sign on an interpreter--its *dynamical *interpretant--is either a > feeling, an exertion, or another sign. As I discuss at length in my *Semiotica > *paper, "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" ( > https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPEI-12), after carefully studying the only > texts where Peirce employs the specific terminology of > emotional/energetic/logical interpretants (or meanings)--his various > manuscript drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907)--it seems clear to me that these > are the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely experience as > "modifications of consciousness," while the immediate/dynamical/final > interpretants are the *corresponding *effects of signs in general. > > Please note, no one is claiming anything about Peirce's *intentions*. > Like other scholars of his thought (including Liszka and Short), I am > merely offering a plausible interpretive hypothesis grounded firmly in his > own words. As William J. Abraham rightly observes ( > https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421=asburyjournal), > "Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as the > study of what the author achieved.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Helmut, List: HR: But why are there more than three interpretants? There are *not *more than three interpretants, just multiple ways of naming them in different contexts. The relevant debates among Peirce scholars have to do with whether "the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories" (Liszka as quoted by Atkin, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/). I have come to agree with this "received view." One alternative that I used to find persuasive is that the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants are *orthogonal *to the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants (Short), supposedly based on CP 4.536 (1906). However, this passage says only that the *actual *effect of a sign on an interpreter--its *dynamical *interpretant--is either a feeling, an exertion, or another sign. As I discuss at length in my *Semiotica *paper, "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" (https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHPEI-12), after carefully studying the only texts where Peirce employs the specific terminology of emotional/energetic/logical interpretants (or meanings)--his various manuscript drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907)--it seems clear to me that these are the familiar effects of signs that humans routinely experience as "modifications of consciousness," while the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants are the *corresponding *effects of signs in general. Please note, no one is claiming anything about Peirce's *intentions*. Like other scholars of his thought (including Liszka and Short), I am merely offering a plausible interpretive hypothesis grounded firmly in his own words. As William J. Abraham rightly observes ( https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421=asburyjournal), "Hermeneutics is not so much the study of what an author intended as the study of what the author achieved. If meaning has an equivalence, it is to be located less in intention and more in achievement. What is achieved may be more or less than what the author intended; happily we can be generous and charitable in our initial judgments and trust that intention and achievement may coincide more often than not." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 1, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > John, List, > > I vaguely remember, that at some point in the last weeks, somebody quoted > somebody, who said, that the theory is more complicated than the reality it > is for. I think, it (the theory) is a fractal. A fractal looks very > complicated, but it has a very simple generator formula (like Mandelbrot´s > appleman). > > From Peirce we know, that a firstness has one part (itself), a secondness > has two, and a thirdness three. For example, this is so with S-O-I, and > with primisense, altersense, medisense. But why are there more than three > interpretants? > > I tentatively propose an elaboration of this generator: A secondness has > two ways of dividing it into two parts, and a thirdness has three ways of > dividing it into three parts. These two respectively three ways are also > categorial: the two ways of dividing a secondness are firstnessal and > secondnessal, and the three ways of dividing a thirdness into three parts > are of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. > > Like this, there are three times three interpretants. > > Or many more, if you keep on divi(di)ng. > > Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Helmut, List: HR: it is the interpreter, who does the inference ... it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant As I have said before, this is true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is *another *sign, which *co-determines* the dynamical interpretant along with the individual sign being analyzed. That is why the *same *individual sign can have *different *dynamical interpretants--different interpreters have different collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Any *dynamical *interpretant of an individual sign (the effect that it *actually does* have) is a *misinterpretation *to the extent that it deviates from the *final* interpretant of that sign (the effect that it *ideally would* have), which obviously must be consistent with its *immediate *interpretant (the range of effects that it *possibly could* have). The proper aim of inquiry in accordance with the normative science of logic as semeiotic is conforming all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, i.e., adopting only true beliefs such that the corresponding habits of conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience. HR: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. ... Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. Again, in my view, each *individual *genuine triadic relation with its three *individual *correlates is prescinded from the *continuous *process of semiosis. Prescission should *not *be seen as an error--it "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903). We can suppose an individual sign with its individual object and its individual interpretant being present, apart from other signs with their own objects and interpretants, because these are all *entia rationis*--"fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions" (R 295, 1906). As an engineer, I routinely employ prescission to create diagrams of buildings that include only their primary members and connections, omitting everything else that is really present but incidental to their structural behavior. Such a model is not *erroneous *as long as it adequately captures every aspect that is significant for the analysis being performed ( https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 9:13 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Jon, Cecile, List, > > Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore > I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the > interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who > does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the > semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from > the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives > the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the > interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this > skipping is only justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it > (the interpretant) is a subset of the final interpretant, and not a > misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted? > > Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in > reality not reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded > determines something else, this determination too is prescinded. > Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. That, > i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is somehow > confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I mean, > if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been > trying very hard to not contradict Peirce. > > Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
ecisely an argument. (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903) CSP: There is a science of semeiotics whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion than do those of mathematics, and one of its theorems ... is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign ... and the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected. (R 1476, 1904) CSP: Consider then the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it. This aggregate will itself be a sign; and we may call it a *perfect *sign, in the sense that it involves the present existence of no other sign except such as are ingredients of itself. (EP 2:545n25, 1906) CSP: [T]he explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth,"--that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs. (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1906) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 4:51 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Edwina, List, > > Your explanation is certainly helpful, though it is quite a lot to take > in. I can see clearly that "his ten classes are set up as > Interpretant-Object-Representamen. [CP 2.264]" and that "the triad of VI, > the Rhematic Indexical Legissign [...] operates in modes of - in order: > Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness" but I don't see why "this certainly > doesn’t fit in with Peirce’s outline of Determination" nor why "The > process of semiotic determination does indeed begin with the Object". It > seems to me that there are lots of objects everywhere and they don't get to > begin the process of semiotic determination. Objects can only take part in > the process of semiotic determination insofar as they are referred to by a > sign for an interpretant. There are no objects *per se* in signs, only > immediate and dynamical objects that the sign (or representamen) stands for > to some interpretant sign. There's only signs in a semiosis. And my seeing > an object as the object of a sign is itself a sign, or representamen; the > starting point of semiosic determination. > > It's like saying that the function of a language is to refer to the world > (or that we use words to talk about the world), when in fact the function > of a language is to refer to our interpretation of the world (we use words > to talk about the way we see the world). I don't think objects create signs > / representamens. I think we see signs / representamens / representations > that we interpret as referring to objects, and it is the way we look at > things that make us see them as signs (and through signs), not the things > around us that impose themselves as signs. > > This why my understanding is that a sign is a triadic relation in which a > representamen is a first that stands for a second, its object, to a third, > its interpretant. And the more I think about it, the more it seems logical > to me (but of course I'll keep thinking and might always end up seeing > things differently) that Peirce's ten classes be set up as > Interpretant-Object-Representamen and operate in modes of Firstness, > Secondness, and Thirdness. > > Warm regards, > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: CC: Would it be too much of a stretch, in the interest of clarity (while still respecting the essential nature of Peirce's work), to consider the following equivalences as relatively acceptable? This is precisely the mistake that I have been trying to help you avoid. (1) below is true, but (2) and (3) are false. Icon/index/symbol is is the 2nd trichotomy in 1903 and the 4th trichotomy in 1908, while abstractive/concretive/collective is the 3rd trichotomy in 1908. Rheme/dicent/argument is the 3rd trichotomy in 1908 and the 9th trichotomy in 1908--generalized to seme/pheme/delome (see CP 5.438, 1906)--while gratific/actuous/temperative is the 8th trichotomy in 1908. Again, the fundamental difference here is that the 2nd and 3rd trichotomies in 1903 are for the sign's *relations *to its (dynamical) object and (final) interpretant, while the 1st and 3rd trichotomies in the 1908 diagram are for the dynamical object and final interpretant *themselves *(as correlates). CC: If this is not too far-fetched, then the rhematic indexical legisign (321 in the 1903 taxonomy) is relatively similar to the collective gratific token (321 in the 1908 diagram), isn't it? No, the only way that a rhematic indexical *legisign *(1903) can be a collective gratific *token* (1908) is if the latter happens to be a rhematic indexical *sinsign *that is a replica of the former (CP 2.259, EP 2:294). A legisign is a type, not a token; an index can be a concretive, not just a collective; and a rheme is not necessarily a gratific, unless the S-FI trichotomy comes *before *the FI trichotomy, which seems unlikely since it is reasonable to expect each relation trichotomy to come *after *the ones for its constituent correlates. Regards, Jon On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 3:52 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Would it be too much of a stretch, in the interest of clarity (while still > respecting the essential nature of Peirce's work), to consider the > following equivalences as relatively acceptable? > > 1) Regarding the sign (or representamen) itself: qualisign / sinsign / > legisign are essentially of the same nature as tone / token / type. > 2) Regarding the sign (or representamen)'s dyadic relation to its > object: icon / index / symbol are essentially of the same nature as > abstractive / concretive / collective (CP 8.366). > 3) Regarding the sign (or representamen)'s triadic relation to its > interpretant via its object: rheme / dicisign / argument are essentially of > the same nature as gratific / to produce action / to produce self-control > (CP 8.372). > > If this is not too far-fetched, then the rhematic indexical legisign (321 > in the 1903 taxonomy) is relatively similar to the collective gratific > token (321 in the 1908 diagram), isn't it? > > Best regards, > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > > -- > *De: *"Jon Alan Schmidt" > *À: *"Peirce-L" > *Envoyé: *Lundi 22 Janvier 2024 22:13:05 > *Objet: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908) > > Cécile, List: > > 321 in the 1903 taxonomy (R 799) is a rhematic indexical legisign. The > sign itself is a general law (3 for legisign), its dyadic *relation *to > its object is existential (2 for indexical), and its dyadic *relation *to > its interpretant is a qualitative possibility (1 for rhematic). > > 321 in the 1908 diagram (CP 8.376/EP 2:491) is a collective gratific > token. The dynamical object *itself *is a necessitant (3 for collective), > the sign itself is an existent (2 for token), and the final interpretant > *itself > *is a possible (1 for gratific). > > In both cases, Peirce's "rule of determination" (EP 2:491) is such that > each successive digit always must be equal to or less than its predecessor. > Consequently, there is no class 223 in either taxonomy--the dicent > indexical legisign is 322 in the 1903 taxonomy as explicitly shown in R > 799, while 322 in the 1908 taxonomy is a collective actuous token. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 2:55 PM Cécile Cosculluela < > cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > >> Thank you Edwina. I'd like to ask another question relative to your third >> point: >> >> "3] Peirce’s outline in 2.264 of the ten classes begins with the >> Interpretant relation, then the Object
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: On the contrary ... - The 1st trichotomy in 1903 (sign itself) is also the 1st trichotomy in 1908 (sign itself). - The 2nd trichotomy in 1903 (sign's *relation *to its object) is the 4th trichotomy in 1908 (sign's relation to its *dynamical *object). - The 3rd trichotomy in 1903 (sign's *relation *to its interpretant) is the 9th trichotomy in 1908 (sign's relation to its *normal/final* interpretant). However, the 1st and 3rd trichotomies in the 1908 triangular diagram are *not *the 2nd and 3rd trichotomies in the 1903 taxonomy, *nor *the 4th and 9th trichotomies in the 1908 taxonomy. - The 1st trichotomy in the diagram is the 3rd trichotomy overall (dynamical object *itself*). - The 2nd trichotomy in the diagram is the 1st trichotomy overall (sign itself). - The 3rd trichotomy in the diagram is the 8th trichotomy overall (normal/final interpretant *itself*). Peirce's numbering of the ten trichotomies in CP 8.344/EP 2:482-483 and EP 2:483-490 is *not *their proper logical order for ascertaining sign classes in accordance with his "rule of determination" (EP 2:481). We know from the 1903 taxonomy that 1st (S) comes before 4th (DO-S), which comes before 9th (S-FI). We know from the triangular diagram that 3rd (DO) comes before 1st (S), which comes before 8th (FI). We know from EP 2:481 that 3rd (DO) comes before 2nd (IO), which comes before 1st (S), which comes before all three interpretants--8th (FI), 6th (DI), and 5th (II), although there is ongoing debate over whether "destinate" and "explicit" correspond to "final" and "immediate" (my view) or vice-versa. And we know from a 1904 letter to Lady Welby (CP 8.338) that 9th (S-FI) comes before 7th (S-DI). In summary, we know that a partial logical order of the trichotomies is 3rd (DO), 2nd (IO), 1st (S), 4th (DO-S), 9th (S-FI), 7th (S-DI). We do not know for sure where to insert the three interpretant trichotomies--5th (II), 6th (DI), 8th (FI)--except that they must come after 1st (S). We also do not know for sure where to insert 10th (DO-S-FI), although Peirce's corresponding names in some versions (abducent/inducent/deducent) suggest that it is a division of arguments, so it presumably comes after 9th (S-FI). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 3:17 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Thank you Jon for clarifying those points. I'd like to make sure I > understand correctly. Would you please confirm that the 1st, 4th, and 9th > respects according to which the chief divisions of signs are determined in > CP 8.344 are not essentially the same ones as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd > trichotomies respectively in CP 2.244, 247 & 250 ? > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: 321 in the 1903 taxonomy (R 799) is a rhematic indexical legisign. The sign itself is a general law (3 for legisign), its dyadic *relation *to its object is existential (2 for indexical), and its dyadic *relation *to its interpretant is a qualitative possibility (1 for rhematic). 321 in the 1908 diagram (CP 8.376/EP 2:491) is a collective gratific token. The dynamical object *itself *is a necessitant (3 for collective), the sign itself is an existent (2 for token), and the final interpretant *itself *is a possible (1 for gratific). In both cases, Peirce's "rule of determination" (EP 2:491) is such that each successive digit always must be equal to or less than its predecessor. Consequently, there is no class 223 in either taxonomy--the dicent indexical legisign is 322 in the 1903 taxonomy as explicitly shown in R 799, while 322 in the 1908 taxonomy is a collective actuous token. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 2:55 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Thank you Edwina. I'd like to ask another question relative to your third > point: > > "3] Peirce’s outline in 2.264 of the ten classes begins with the > Interpretant relation, then the Object Relation..endiing with the > Representamen. So - 223 = a Dicent Indexical Legisign. > > Class VI is a Rhematic Indexical Legisign 321 - and it starts with the > Interpretant [rhematic] ..then the Object Relation and finally- the > Representamen. So, the number 3 refers to the Representamen." > > 321 is indeed the Rhematic Indexical Legisign according to CP 2.264, which > starts with the Interpretant, then the Object, and finally the > Representamen. But doesn't 321 according to CP 8.376 start with the object, > then the Representamen, and finally the Interpretant? > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: I should add that the three-digit sign class identifiers in manuscript R 799 (undated by Robin) are for the 1903 taxonomy as indicated by the accompanying text, not the (abbreviated) 1908 taxonomy as shown in the triangular diagram. Again, in R 799, the first number is for the sign itself, the second is for its *relation *to its object, and the third is for its *relation *to its interpretant; while in CP 8.376/EP 2:491, the first number is for the object *itself*, the second is for the sign itself, and the third is for the interpretant *itself*. Regards, Jon On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 1:21 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Cécile, List: > > As Peirce states in the accompanying text, the triangular diagram in CP > 8.376 (also EP 2:491) indicates ten sign classes that can be obtained from > three trichotomies--one for the object, one for the interpretant, and one > for the sign itself. It is very important to recognize two facts about > this. First, he does not stipulate the *order *of these trichotomies for > obtaining the ten classes; but in accordance with what I call the "rule of > determination" (EP 2:481), the numbers in the diagram are *only *consistent > with it being first the one for the object (upper left), then the one for > the sign (bottom), and finally the one for the interpretant (upper right). > Second, these are *not *the same three trichotomies that he uses to > obtain ten classes of signs in 1903; those are first the one for the > representamen *itself* (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), then the one for its > *dyadic relation > *to its object (icon/index/symbol), and finally the one for its *dyadic > relation > *to its interpretant (rheme/dicisign/argument). > > Consequently, it is a mistake to assign *any *of the 1903 class names to *any > *of the ten numbered combinations in the 1908 diagram--they are very > different taxonomies. After all, the 1908 diagram is in a postscript > written just three days after Peirce spells out *ten *trichotomies (EP > 2:479-480) from which *66 *sign classes can be obtained, once their > proper logical order is established--the subject of ongoing investigation > and considerable debate by Peirce scholars, because he never fully worked > it out himself. Six of the ten trichotomies are for the correlates > themselves--the sign (now synonymous with representamen), its two objects, > and its three interpretants. Three are for the sign's external dyadic > relations--to its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its > final interpretant. The last is for the sign's genuine triadic relation to > its dynamical object and its final interpretant. > > If we take the three trichotomies in the 1908 diagram as being for the > *genuine > *correlates--the dynamical object (abstractive/concretive/collective), > the sign itself (tone/token/type), and the final interpretant > (gratific/actuous=to produce action/temperative=to produce > self-control)--then the ten classes that result would be the following, > from left to right and from bottom to top. > >1. 333 - Collective Temperative Type >2. 332 - Collective Actuous Type >3. 331 - Collective Gratific Type >4. 322 - Collective Actuous Token >5. 321 - Collective Gratific Token >6. 311 - Collective Gratific Tone >7. 222 - Concretive Actuous Token >8. 221 - Concretive Gratific Token >9. 211 - Concretive Gratific Tone >10. 111 - Abstractive Gratific Tone > > Peirce names the 1903 classes in reverse order of the > trichotomies--interpretant relation, then object relation, then sign > itself--while my suggested names here correspond to dynamical object, then > final interpretant, then sign itself. The 1903 taxonomy has one class of > qualisigns, three classes of sinsigns, and six classes of legisigns; but > this (abbreviated) 1908 taxonomy has three classes of tones, four classes > of tokens, and three classes of types--again, the two taxonomies are very > different. > > In any case, I have come to agree with James Liszka ( > https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that increasingly elaborate > classifications of *individual *signs result from a "reductionist > approach to sign analysis that loses the holistic and integrative aspects > of its triadic character," with the problematic outcome that “the theory is > more complex than the phenomenon it hopes to explain." As he proposes, "the > remedy is to re-emphasize the processual and functional view of semiosis, > rather than to focus on particular classes of signs." Accordingly, I > advocate conceiving the entire universe as one immense sign--a vast > semiosic continuum in which the whole is ontologically prior to its parts, > which are likewise signs but indefinite unle
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, List: As Peirce states in the accompanying text, the triangular diagram in CP 8.376 (also EP 2:491) indicates ten sign classes that can be obtained from three trichotomies--one for the object, one for the interpretant, and one for the sign itself. It is very important to recognize two facts about this. First, he does not stipulate the *order *of these trichotomies for obtaining the ten classes; but in accordance with what I call the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481), the numbers in the diagram are *only *consistent with it being first the one for the object (upper left), then the one for the sign (bottom), and finally the one for the interpretant (upper right). Second, these are *not *the same three trichotomies that he uses to obtain ten classes of signs in 1903; those are first the one for the representamen *itself* (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), then the one for its *dyadic relation *to its object (icon/index/symbol), and finally the one for its *dyadic relation *to its interpretant (rheme/dicisign/argument). Consequently, it is a mistake to assign *any *of the 1903 class names to *any *of the ten numbered combinations in the 1908 diagram--they are very different taxonomies. After all, the 1908 diagram is in a postscript written just three days after Peirce spells out *ten *trichotomies (EP 2:479-480) from which *66 *sign classes can be obtained, once their proper logical order is established--the subject of ongoing investigation and considerable debate by Peirce scholars, because he never fully worked it out himself. Six of the ten trichotomies are for the correlates themselves--the sign (now synonymous with representamen), its two objects, and its three interpretants. Three are for the sign's external dyadic relations--to its dynamical object, its dynamical interpretant, and its final interpretant. The last is for the sign's genuine triadic relation to its dynamical object and its final interpretant. If we take the three trichotomies in the 1908 diagram as being for the *genuine *correlates--the dynamical object (abstractive/concretive/collective), the sign itself (tone/token/type), and the final interpretant (gratific/actuous=to produce action/temperative=to produce self-control)--then the ten classes that result would be the following, from left to right and from bottom to top. 1. 333 - Collective Temperative Type 2. 332 - Collective Actuous Type 3. 331 - Collective Gratific Type 4. 322 - Collective Actuous Token 5. 321 - Collective Gratific Token 6. 311 - Collective Gratific Tone 7. 222 - Concretive Actuous Token 8. 221 - Concretive Gratific Token 9. 211 - Concretive Gratific Tone 10. 111 - Abstractive Gratific Tone Peirce names the 1903 classes in reverse order of the trichotomies--interpretant relation, then object relation, then sign itself--while my suggested names here correspond to dynamical object, then final interpretant, then sign itself. The 1903 taxonomy has one class of qualisigns, three classes of sinsigns, and six classes of legisigns; but this (abbreviated) 1908 taxonomy has three classes of tones, four classes of tokens, and three classes of types--again, the two taxonomies are very different. In any case, I have come to agree with James Liszka ( https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0089) that increasingly elaborate classifications of *individual *signs result from a "reductionist approach to sign analysis that loses the holistic and integrative aspects of its triadic character," with the problematic outcome that “the theory is more complex than the phenomenon it hopes to explain." As he proposes, "the remedy is to re-emphasize the processual and functional view of semiosis, rather than to focus on particular classes of signs." Accordingly, I advocate conceiving the entire universe as one immense sign--a vast semiosic continuum in which the whole is ontologically prior to its parts, which are likewise signs but indefinite unless and until deliberately marked off for a particular purpose. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 9:22 AM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Dear all, > > In CP 8.376 (1908), the order in which to read the three numbers > (mentioned in the small triangles that make up the triangle with the ten > classes of signs) is not obvious because they are not written > sequentially on a line. Yet, to respect the logic of phaneroscopic > categories, the only possible order is to start with the object (top left), > then the representamen (bottom), and finally the interpretant (top > right). Not only is this not the order in which Peirce mentions them in > CP 8.376 (where, as underlined in the attached document), he mentions the > object, then the interpretant,
[PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships)
Jerry, List: Here is the entire referenced paragraph. CSP: There are no other forms of consciousness except the three that have been mentioned, Feeling, Altersense, and Medisense. They form a sort of system. Feeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. It is consciousness in its first state, and might be called *primisense*. *Altersense* is the consciousness of a directly present other or second, withstanding us. *Medisense *is the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter. It is the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind. Feeling, or *primisense*, is the consciousness of 1ns; altersense is consciousness of otherness or 2ns; medisense is the consciousness of means or 3ns. Of *primisense *there is but one fundamental mode. *Altersense* has two modes, Sensation and Will. *Medisense *has three modes, *Abstraction*, *Suggestion*, *Association*. (CP 7.551, c. 1896) This is effectively the conclusion of a much longer passage (CP 7.539-552) in which Peirce spells out in detail what he only summarizes here. He indeed describes primisense (or feeling), altersense, and medisense as "forms of consciousness" and asserts that there are no others. They are not tones, tokens, or types because they are not *signs*. Although this text predates Peirce's incorporation of phaneroscopy into his architectonic by several years, it nevertheless exhibits his characteristic categorial analysis of phenomena such that primisense has only one mode, altersense has two modes, and medisense has three modes. Note also that he explicitly identifies sensation as one of the two modes of altersense, thus corresponding to 2ns rather than 1ns--the *feeling *of a sensation as prescinded from it is 1ns (quality), while the *actual *sensation itself is 2ns (reaction). CSP: The sensation has two parts: first, the feeling, and second, the sense of its assertiveness, of my being compelled to have it. The consequence is that remembering a sensation is not at all the same thing as having it. For though there is some vestige of compulsiveness, even in the memory, it is not at all comparable to the compulsiveness of the actual sensation. But if I remember, or imagine a feeling, whatever I remember or imagine is a feeling, and I cannot remember or imagine or anywise represent to myself a feeling without having that very feeling then and there. All the existence a feeling can have is had the moment it is thought. But a sensation is not had until I am really acted upon by something out of my control. (CP 7.543) In accordance with this distinction, perhaps people with aphantasia *have *visual sensations of images at each moment while looking at them, but then are unable to *remember *them afterwards due to the merely vestigial compulsiveness of such memories and/or an incapacity in their imaginative faculties. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 9:45 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > List: > > On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, > Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just > as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to > speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes > [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, > Suggestion, Association’. 7.551. > > I am curious about your reasoning here. > > In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency > of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures). > > Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? > Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations? > Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem > inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from > alphabetic symbols). > > Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” > properly…. > > Cheers > > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Jerry, List: JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, with the others being derived from them. CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902) For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional logic, the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as juxtaposition for conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such that disjunction is then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded area, material conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a shaded area (scroll), and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the antecedent and consequent reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate logic adds one more primitive, the line of identity for existential quantification such that universal quantification is then defined as a line of identity whose outermost part is within a shaded area. *As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on several occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the scroll for material implication as the second primitive such that negation is then defined as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to infinitesimal size, signifying that *every *proposition is true if the antecedent is true (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51], 1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 12:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > But you already know this > > Edwinia: > > If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste > my time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the > grammatical structures of your and other responses. > > Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between > *ordered > pair*s. > > The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - > negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and > bi-conditional. > > These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian > syllogisms. Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence > grammars. For a discussion of Peircian *“tokens and types” *from a > categorical perspective, see the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - > Language - Ontology. 2022. > > Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation > constrained to multi-valued logics? > > My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that > the classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of > molecular sentences. (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert > Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy > or dogmas or…. Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my > research. > > Cheers > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
the latter more definite. The logical meaning of a concept (second grade of clearness) is the continuum of all possible propositions that would truthfully affirm or deny it of something, while its pragmatistic meaning (third grade of clearness) is a general mental habit described by a subjunctive conditional proposition. CSP: Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have: then the general mental habit that consists in the production of these effects is the whole meaning of your concept. (R 318, 1907) CSP: I do not deny that a concept, proposition, or argument may be a logical interpretant. I only insist that it cannot be the final logical interpretant, for the reason that it is itself a sign of that very kind that has itself a logical interpretant. The habit alone, though it may be a sign in some other way, is not a sign in that way in which the sign of which it is the logical interpretant is a sign. The habit conjoined with the motive and the conditions has the action for its energetic interpretant; but action cannot be a logical interpretant, because it lacks generality. The concept which is a logical interpretant is only imperfectly so. It somewhat partakes of the nature of a verbal definition, and is as inferior to the habit, and much in the same way, as a verbal definition is inferior to the real definition. The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit,--self-analyzing because formed by the aid of analysis of the exercises that nourished it,--is the living definition, the veritable and final logical interpretant. Consequently, the most perfect account of a concept that words can convey will consist in a description of the habit which that concept is calculated to produce. But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it gives rise, with the specification of the conditions and of the motive? (EP 2:418, 1907) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 9:00 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > List: > > Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic expression for my > feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. > Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a > critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or > controversial (outside the CSP community.) > The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of > mathematics. > The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” > (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to > carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological > sense. That is, in the genetic sense. In mathematics, it may mean to > “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a > sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic > (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations. > > From these perspectives, I now give an examples. > When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning > interpreted as a “triadic relation”. > > “HEADACHE”. > > Or > > “ORANGE” > > How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of > interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ? (Or any other > sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.) > > In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) > (Or, what locates the three subjects?) Or are the three terms of the > triadic relations merely adjectives? > > Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s > phrases are welcome. > > (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of > “ordered pairs” in set theory.) > (Ben: In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is > correctly remembered.) > > Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum? > > Cheers > > Jerry > Participle > > *relātus* (*feminine* *relāta > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/relata#Latin>*, *neuter* *relātum > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/relatum#Latin>*); *first > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:Latin_first_declension>/second-declension > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Appendix:Latin_second_declension> participle* > >1. Perfect passive participle of *referō ><https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/refero>* > 1. (having been) driven <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/driven> or > carried <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/carried> back > 2. (having been) returned <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/returned> >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut, List: HR: A sign (1) cannot determine an interpretant (3). On the contrary, the sign not only *can*, but *always does* determine the interpretant. One more time ... CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and *determines the interpretant* *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907; bold added) This is an analysis of what happens in an individual *event of semiosis* as prescinded from the real and continuous process. What I call Peirce's "rule of determination"--"It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908)--applies specifically within the logical order of the various trichotomies for *sign classification*. His 1903 taxonomy has three of them--for the nature of the sign itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), its relation with its object (iconic/indexical/symbolic), and its relation with its interpretant (rheme/dicisign/argument). A qualisign can determine nothing but an icon, which can determine nothing but a rheme; and an argument can be determined by nothing but a symbol, which can be determined by nothing but a legisign. The upshot is that there are only ten classes of signs, not 27 as would be the case if all combinations were possible. That said, Peirce's three universal categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) have much broader application than these "categorical modes," including phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating that yields one sign with two objects and three interpretants. HR: Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. This is also true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is *another *sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant--its actual effect on that individual interpreter--along with the sign being analyzed. Hence, the *same *sign can have *different *dynamical interpretants for different interpreters who have different collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Suppsupplement: And I am not the only one: Vincent Colapietro in a paper > in the internet wrote: > "So, Peirce in his investigation of signs considered signs in themselves, > in their secondness (i.e., in relationship to their object or other), and > in their thirdness (i.e., in relationship to their interpretant or as a > factor in a complex, ongoing process of mediation)" > > So, where i still may be completely wrong, is, that I didn´t call the > relations (sign itself, sign-object, sign-interpretant) categorial, but > sign, object, interpretant. But why not prescind e.g. an interpretant from > its relation with the sign, and then say, that it is thirdness? To say, > that that is forbidden, is a bit too strict, I think. > > Later Colapietro writes, that in this case it is not modes of being, but > modes of knowledge. I find the term "mode" or "modality" too unexact, and, > as I said, have for me replaced it with classification versus composition. > Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third" > belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the > difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad. > Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, > as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) > cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the > interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, > that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist > alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so. > Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
List: For the record, Peirce describes the first, second, and third correlates of a triadic relation as "simplest," "of middling complexity," and "most complex" right before explicitly identifying the representamen/sign, object, and interpretant as the three correlates of one such relation (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903); and he later outlines the two objects and three interpretants in terms of genuine and degenerate in his Logic Notebook, as follows. CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the *immediate*, to which it is *degenerately* Secundan, the *dynamic*, to which it is *genuinely* Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the *immediate*, to which it is primarily Tertian, the *dynamic*, to which it is secundally Tertian, the *rational*, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7) CSP: The Interpretant is Threefold. The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that the Sign could reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind, being more than any mind, however penetrating, could conclude from it, since there is no end to the distinct conclusions that could be drawn concerning the Object from any Sign. ... This triplet concerns the Dynamical, or Genuine Object. It is misleading to call it the *real* object, since it may be unreal. It is the object that truly determines the sign. (R 339:277r&279r, 1906 Apr 2-3) It seems clear that the rational and normal interpretants in these passages correspond directly to what Peirce calls the eventual and final interpretants elsewhere, reflecting his confession "that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536, 1906). In context, "primarily Tertian" clearly corresponds to doubly degenerate (1ns of 3ns) and "secundally Tertian" corresponds to degenerate (2ns of 3ns). Again, these are results of phaneroscopic analysis--1ns, 2ns, and 3ns are "the most universal categories of elements of all experience" (CP 1.417, c. 1896), by no means limited to Peirce's various trichotomies for sign classification. Note also that the three divisions in his best-known taxonomy are according to the nature of the representamen/sign *itself*, its *relation *to its object, and its *relation *to its interpretant (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903). The representamen/sign, object, and interpretant are all *correlates*, not relations, although they only serve as such *within *their genuine triadic relation to each other. As Peirce states repeatedly (bold added in quotations below), the representamen/sign *stands in *or *has *that relation to its object and interpretant, it is not that relation *itself*. CSP: A *representamen*, or sign, is anything which *stands, in any respect, at once in a relation* of correspondence to a *correlate*, called its *object* and to another *correlate*, its *interpretant*. which is a possible representamen determined by the first and referring to the same object. (R 1147, c. 1901-2) CSP: A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which *stands in such a genuine triadic relation* to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-273, 1903) CSP: A *Representamen *is the First *Correlate of a triadic relation*, the Second *Correlate *being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third *Correlate *being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290, 1903) CSP: A sign therefore is *an object which is in relation* to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object. (CP 8.332, 1904) CSP: As a *medium*, the Sign is *essentially in a triadic relation*, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. (EP 2:544n22, 1906) CSP: A sign, therefore, *has a triadic relation* to its Object and to its Interpretant. (CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908) Again, although that relation can be called "representing," I prefer to call it "mediating" because Peirce more generally defines a sign as "anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant" (EP 2:410, 1907). Regards, Jon On Tue, Jan 9, 2024 at 5:08 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Jerry, List: > > I am honestly not sure exactly what all you are asking me to address here > and how my engineering background is relevant. What do you mean by "the > origins of t
