[PEIRCE-L] A note to sign out

Gary, Hereby my wish to sign out from the P-list. Best wishes. Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure and applied mathematics

The answer offered here to Jerry Chandler by John Sowa I find a very good answer. Cheers, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.9.2018 17:33: Jerry LRC, As Kirsti said, the subject line about categories and modes was a long thread about Peirce's 1903 classification of the sciences. I plan to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being

Jerry, John is quoting what Peirce stated in several contexts. So he is right. In other contexts, CSP writes a lot on unconscius (subconscious etc) mind. But he definitely considered his normative logic only applicable to deliberate thought. - He also stated that a person is a bunch of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] On universalism and essentialism

Thank you, Edwina. Kirsti Edwina Taborsky kirjoitti 16.9.2018 17:35: Kirstima Thank you so much for your very astute and wise posts - both of them. You have pointed out, very subtly and yet accurately, the problem [in my view] of the many posts on 'exact terminology'. Edwina On Sun 16/09/18

[PEIRCE-L] On universalism and essentialism

List, After reading some more of the discussion on these threads, I wish to remind all of endless feminist disputes on essentialism and universalism. The answer does not have the form: either/or. Best, Kirsti - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories and Modes of Being (was How should semeiotic be classified?

John, list, First, I wish to thank John for his comments to my earlier post to the list. I agreed with all, but one point. Which consist in an, to my mind, unwarranted focus on classifications. Peirce in several occasions wrote about KINDS. (Should be easy enought to google). - Kinds (as a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Possibility and actuality: What does a variable refer to?

John, P-listers, I wonder why science(s) seems to be left out of the context in the discussions in this thread. To my mind they are direly needed in order to make sense , ecp. of the latter part of the title, to start with. So: What does a variable refer to? Within empirical science(s)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic Open-ended logics?

John, Well put, indeed! Kirsti M. John F Sowa kirjoitti 3.6.2018 00:57: On 6/2/2018 5:33 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I vaguely recall that [Wittgenstein] said like: "About (this or that) you must not speak"... I just remember that when I read it, I thought: "No, you don´t tell me when to shut

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic

Helmut, list, I do not get confused very easily on these topics:) But I think I quite understand your dilemmas. Helmut. Negation is no easy topic. Formal logic may succeed in making it seem easy. To my mind mostly because the sentences to be formalized are invented for the purposes of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Empirical or inductive logic

John, I took up your reference to vol 4 in Chronological ed. - I you can shed any more light on loops and twists in CPS's way to his latest existential graps, I would be most grateful. Greimas, the Lithuanian semiotician I have met and discussed with, used a square similar to the one in

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Roses are red

Helmut, list, Pastness is always relative to present and future, that is what Peirce means. There is a feeling of pastness attacheched to memories and reminiscences. Which is the ground for recognizing them AS memories. Best, Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 3.5.2018 17:40: John, Stephen,

Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

List, I second Gene's views. A most important post.A most important CSP quote! Kirsti Määttänen Eugene Halton kirjoitti 5.3.2018 23:01: Dear Gary R. You mention the problem of greed, Gary, denying that it is a problem of science and claiming that it is a misuse of science by “the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Good points. But both of you seem to move only within the thin air of abstractions. There is a need for concrete demonstrations. Examples to examine, for example. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 19.2.2018 14:47: Jon, Your collection of Peirce quotes deploying the term “quasi-mind” (if

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims and Mediation

Thank you, Jon for bringing up your "Seven major variations..." In it you take up with excellent clarity seven perspectives upon the Maxim, from the standpoint of a philospher. Mentioning year with each quote is very informative in respect of development of CSP's main interests and aims.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell Lectures)

gnox, There must have been some misunderstanding of my post, if you could not find what I meant. Which is foud EP 2, 134-135. Even if CSP states in his Harward Lectures (1903) "I have not succeeded any better than this: Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgement

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell Lectures)

Gary f., list, Your response presented as full an understanding of essential points in my post as I could ever hope. Even more, I was greatly and happily surprised. And yes, of course there are any formulations of the ideas conveyed by the two short expressions he gave a final stamp of his

[PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell Lectures)

List, First I wish to express my appreciation to Gary f., to his lead and his commentaries on LL. - However, it seem to me that the discussions tend to get muddled on certain very, very basic respects. Peirce's first formulation of the Pragmatic Maxims was about "practical bearings". So it

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Note from List Moderator : Frequency of Posting

List, I too second Gary Richmonds note. I'd like to add that multiple postings seem to be adjunct to this problem. People send to personal mailboxes in addtion to the list. If just that gets left out, the mass of mails would not look so awfull, so hopeless. Best, Kirsti Ia mail is sent

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's search for a more iconic notation

To my mind CSP by iconical meant turning into geometrical proof. Not only minute steps written in a very long row according to a large set of rules given by tradition, but difficult or even impossible to convey. A possibility for an overview of logical structures, an overview to be obtained

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

John, list If and when "formal languages" end up with attepts at eliminating flexibility in natural languages, it will not be natural languages which will get defeated. Just take a quick look at the history. All proof lies in the side of natural languages. John wrote: "Since teachers use

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic

Jerry, list, CSP wrote: the meaning of anything lies in what it aims at. - This what teleology is about. The problem lies in that we cannot just just look and see what the aims are. - Can you now just see what my aim now is? - You may and most probably do have thoughts and opinions on the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

In regard of the title in this chain, I'd like add: If anyone has written a huge amount of definitions on anything does not, by itself, prove that those are even on the right tract. Words come easy. Tests on the thougts conveyed do not. Best, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 9.1.2018 16:04:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

Linguistists and lexicographers may be and often are experts in language, but they are no experts in questions on human mind or the nature of human understanding. The best of them acknowledge this fact. No onesided expertice can overcome this dilemma. Both sides of any coin are needed. Just

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Gary f. Now I truly believe you were sincere with your wishes for a happy new year. Thanks. We still do disagree. And I do not think the problems can be reduced into language problems. There are more fundamental issues involved. I am not asking anyone to believe without testing out

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Gary f, Sorry for inexact expressions. I should have made a distinction between just interpreting a quote and going beyond it. Paraphrasing is customarily marked with expressions like "as XXX says elsewhere...". If I had problems with understanding where you were paraphrasing Peirce, and

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Jeffrey, list, A beutiful example of ethics of interpretation you offered, Jeffrey. Thanks. With quotes from Collected Papers my sincere wish is that the year of writing is mentioned, whenever possible. Those are to be found in the small footnotes. Peirce was not just a corpuscular

Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

Jerry, list, JERRY: "Exactly what CSP means by "corpuscular philosophy" is a mystery to me. Was he arguing for the Boscowitz atoms derived from vortices?" No mystery to me what CSP meant with "corpuscular philosphy". - The problem with your question lies in "Exactly what..." - It (logically )

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Gary f, list My source on Eucleides was Grattan-Guinness (The Fontana history of the mathematical sciences) and my thirty years old notes on the topic. (& Liddell and Scott, of course.) It is important to keep in mind that no such divisions (or classifications) between sciences that are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

John, list, I have been out of reach for more than a week. A heap of mails in this thread. My responses may seem to many as ancient history. For that reason I'll leave the comment responded below. And I'll try to be concice. No arguments on words and reference, however detailed, can

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Helmut, I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of course, are deeply related. But how? To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in connection with this phase in the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Gary f., list, g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 21.12.2017 16:39: "Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has points." Yes its does. But that does not answer the questions I posed. Perhaps I should have added: What do you (listers) think? Gary f.: " By the way,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Listers, Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans & later

[PEIRCE-L] Irony and style in CSP (Was: Peirce's adjectives...)

Cassiano, Jon, list I have been studying style in connection with argument analysis for a long time. Recognizing textual markers of irony forms a part of the method I developed in 1990's in my university lectures in Finland. In 2000's I started a slow read on Kaina Stoicheia (New Elements)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.1

Gary f, A kind remark on a typo in lecture 3, which you may wish to correct. It is in short paragraph consisting of three lines. It begins: "A quality, or Firstness, has mere logical..." Third sentence thereof should begin with a capital, but it does not. It should be: "A fact, or

[PEIRCE-L] Contexts and hypostatic abstraction (was Lowell lectures...

John, I'll rephrase my point (which you seem to have missed). We started from your post saying: JFS The distinction between a verb form such as 'asserting' and a noun such as 'assertion' is what Peirce called *hypostatic abstraction*. To illustrate the point, Peirce used a term that Molière

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

List, Peirce did not just "refer to" some well-established "facts" of his time; he has all the time been developing a whole theory. All good and true theories go beyond any number of "facts" (id est: array of empirical findings). It could be called 'hypo-determination' (just a coined word,

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Contexts and hypostatic abstraction (was Lowell lectures...

John, Thanks for changing the subject line! I'm well aware of hypostatic abstraction and I have given a lot of thought to its position in the overall philosophy of CSP. Which is the context for both EG's and his logical graphs in a more general sense. In a certain narrow sense hypostatic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

John, Jon, I agree with John on the issue of "every word.." Opening the pdf by John did not succeed. So a little note on his wording in: JFS; In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs. It's best to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

John & Jon, The two paragraphs offered by John to clarify the meaning of the verb 'to indentify' did not do the job for me. Quite the contrary. Many questions arose. JFS: "In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two structures that are isomorphic. Some mathematicians call

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

John, Jon, list, Thank you for a most interesting discussion. Not being so keen on set theory, or the utterly simple assertions formal logic has so far dealt with, I would like to draw your attention to these assertion of mine: If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

Jon, I agree! Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 27.11.2017 17:30: John, Kirsti, List ... JFS: In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms: 'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one couldn't or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

John, Thank you very much! - I was wondering why I did not find PEG in the list. Now it's all making sense. With gratitude, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 27.11.2017 09:05: Gary F, Mary L, Kirsti, Jerry LRC, and list, In 1911, Peirce presented his clearest and simplest version of EGs. He

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

Gary f. wrote: - “Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness” and “Thirdness” are all technical terms of Peircean phenomenology... Many mistakes in this. - Just offer one example where CSP explicitly states that these are TECHNICAL TERMS. (If you can.) Categories concern definitely

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

Gary f., Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about terminonology. They are not synonyms. But if anyone uses Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness as just names for classes of signs, it may appear so. A

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

Gary f., I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his "categories"??? Insted of... his categories??? Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all about relational logic, is

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.6

Jon, You expressed my point even in what I did not put into words. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 3.11.2017 23:06: Kirsti, List, The Greek “dia-” means across, apart, or through. And Peirce recognizes that one is often talking to oneself or one's future self, so the number of people that one is

Re: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.6

John, Jon, list Some comments in response In Peirce's view logic needs mathematical grounds, but I have not found anything to support the view that there should be such sharp distinction as you propose. – There were many, many classifications of sciences he developed over the years. Of which

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.6

OK. Thanks. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 30.10.2017 20:45: Kirsti, List, It would be more accurate to say, and I'm sure it's what John meant, that Peirce's explanation of logical connectives and quantifiers in terms of a game between two players attempting to support or defeat a proposition,

[PEIRCE-L] A test

- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.6

Thank you very much John for a most enlightening post. Recto/verso issue (in other forms, of course) was taken up & became somewhat popular within feminist philosophy 1980's and 1990's. I felt uncomfortable with it. But could not pinpoint the locical (in the narrow sense) errors. A

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Thank you, John, for clearing the issue. I wholly agree. By the way, using the term 'universe' is fine with me. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 20.10.2017 00:03: Kirsti and Gary R, Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter. My note was based on three lines by Peirce, which Quine

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Ontology/ epistemology taken as it has been does not apply to Peirce. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 19.10.2017 15:53: Jon AS, Edwina, Jerry LRC, Gary R, Mike, and Ben, Jon By Peirce's definitions--at least, the ones that he carefully employed late in his life--the verb "exist" may only be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existence and Reality (was Lowell Lecture 1: overview)

Hah! To the point Ben! Kirsti Ben Novak kirjoitti 19.10.2017 14:30: Dear List: Jon A. writes in his first post on this string: "Some of the difficulty here is likely due to the fact that there is no verb form of "reality," which could then be used to talk about both _actual _things and _real

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

table issues: 'real', 'exist', and 'actual'. To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's dictum: "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable." (And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'. I wrote 'Kirsti' in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many lett

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

John, Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist untill they become actual. Thus a token. There always is the Scylla and Charybnis between understandability and logic. But claiming existance to possibilities just does not hold. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 17.10.2017 05:48: This

Re: LEM Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

k up and see. Seeing just does not happen that way. And to note: my name is NOT kirstima. I am not identical with my e-mail address. I always sign my post with my name. Which is: Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 15.10.2017 01:47: List, John: Comments on “technical” aspects of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

List, John, Jerry and Jon, LEM presents one of the three basic misassuptions in modern logic. For all I know CSP and Brouwer came to similar conclusions independently. They also offered their grounds and conclusions very differently. There was a deep change in math and locic during and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.8

List, Jerry and John Highly problematic, I agree. But it is not true that any contradiction,or all contradictions imply everything. Not logically, not really. Everything does not mean the same as anything. For CSP anything remains an open (vague) question UNTILL further studies &

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

Gary, Is it truly possible to just by defining to make oneself into strictly separate parts? An interesting question. Nevertheless, this discussion does not deserve continuation. All your points have become quite clear. With the undertones. Kirsti Gary Richmond kirjoitti 25.9.2017 05:00:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

Gary R. You misread my message. If it seemed as especially pointing at the snippet you took up, it has been unintentional. As a list manager your concern on the snippet is understandable. However, as an approach by a list manager, I must say I do not feel good about the way you expressed

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

List, I agree with Jerry. Kirsti Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 24.9.2017 22:41: List, Gary: Thanks, Gary for initiating a fresh informative stream. It seems that how one interprets this opening rhetoric stance (“hook”) is rather dependent on the number of symbols systems ( linguistic,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences

There is a link between ideas of recursion and that of cyclical arithmetics. Has this not been recognized? Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.9.2017 20:53: On 9/1/2017 6:37 PM, Tommi Vehkavaara wrote: I do not see how those who take ontology as the first philosophy could be convinced with this

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences

As wished by John, some comments to the jpg, as well as on some comments presented: I find the diagram a misleading, not a clarifying one. I found the quote provided by Tommi a highly relevant problematization of the issue. I also agree with the critical notes provided by Jerry, up to a

Re: CP2.230 (1910) ] Systems of Meaning was Re: [PEIRCE-L] 123, abc

John, Your posts greatly appreciated. But Peirce did write on cyclical arithmetics. With detailed instructions on how demonstrate the rules by experimenting with a pack of cards. Detailed instructions include strict rules on how to achieve a random order with the pack of cards at hand.

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Helmut, Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense (meaning) it is used nowadays. I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in more detail. But I left keeping up with

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Letters to lady Welby need to be interpreted and evaluated on the basis to whom they were addressed to. Lady Welby was highly interested in sign classifications. Classifications were a dominant topic at the times, in vogue. (Remnants of this vogue are still effective.) - Peirce was explaining

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Helmut, That is good to know. Thanks. Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09: Kirsti, you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

List, I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work with sign classifications. Kirsti g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52: I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Jerry, list, It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he found that way a dead end. - Anyone is free to disagree. - But please, leave me out of any expectations of participating in further

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06: Kirsti, you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"." Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). " But, isn´t this a kind of containing or

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Jerry, A misunderstanding here. I did not mean all sign classifications in the world. I meant those parts in CSP's work where he developed more and more complex classification systems; and that taken in the context of all his work. - Also, when said: "I have not found (etc...), I meant in

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Concernig the supplement: Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this "something higher". Kirsti Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 00:12: Supplement: I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s Peirce- reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Helmut, You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of which one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived at from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications. This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only, or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely left this

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A question of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into triads and triadic thinking (as a method). On these issues I have written

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Peirce did not use the term "semantics. But he did use the term: "semeiotics". He even gave advice in spelling the word. This was his advice: " see-my-o-tics". Anyone can google this, I assume. If need be. In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his life after SIGNS.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

A bold interpretation. I wonder whether to quote is enough to give grounds for it. It almost sounds as if stating that the main purpose of CSP was to uphold old, established views. Which is surely not meant to be the message? I do not quite understand what "repurposing" means, especially in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology

Gary, list, First: I did not feel offended, I felt surprised. The expertice and authority of John F. Sowa were so clear to me that I could not think of anyone,least John, to take any offence in my stating my view so bluntly. - Which I apologized. After the suprise I do feel offended. I was

[PEIRCE-L] An apology

Dear John, I sincerely apologize for any negative feelings my latest mail addressed to you may have caused. I have been reprimanded by list managers that my tenor and tone are not tolerated. In a democratic list, so I am told. There have been three complaints. Off-list. So I'm told. My

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Jon, I like your tenor, but do not quite agree. Yes, linguistics has changed just as you say. But logic? In my view, the very grounds of modern logic are groumbling down. But it is an ongoing process, with no predictable end. Now we live in late modern ot early post modern times. Just to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

Hah. The minute I sent my message on no response, I got John's response. This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through. It is not that some

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

Gene, The most important message ever in Peirce-list is this one you posted! I repeat: ever! I am literally schocked by the fact, that I am the first to respond. This late. Am I conversing with human beings? - Or just kinds of extensions to automatization of everyday life & "common sense"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Thank you, John (again) for clearing up the issue with utmost clarity! Gratefully, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 18.6.2017 16:39: On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe the character of the philosophical sciences--as

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Deely & Apel

Hello Brad, A very interesting theme you have taken on. A challenging one, too. Apel and Deely come from very different traditions. I guess about all listers have read Deely (on Peirce), but none to my knowledge has read Apel (on Peirce). Except me. - I'd like to know if there are some other

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

My applauds, Gene! What a great wake-up call. Kirsti Määttänen Eugene Halton kirjoitti 15.6.2017 20:10: Gary f: "I think it’s quite plausible that AI systems could reach that level of autonomy and leave us behind in terms of intelligence, but what would motivate them to kill us? I don’t think

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

Hi, Jerry, Where in earth did you take the "moral authority" you (mistakenly) assume I was refering to? Pity you did not understand my points. But if Hilbert is your leading star in the universe of sciences, then it is understandable that you hold on to his mistakes, as well as his

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

Jerry, When CSP used "ERGO", that was a case of ENTHYMEME (cf. Aristotle). The rheme "If - then" remains implied. One is supposed to regocnize that. Logic is not linguistics, and shluld not be replaced, not even partly, by lingquitics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

Well, it is well known that CSP was not so very keen on existence. Even though he succeeded in completing his Existential Graphs to his full approval. But on being that was not the case. Being was to him the key to what is real. What was real (to him) was effects. Does belief in God have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

Jerry, list Dictionary may not be the source to turn to. ERGO is an abbreviation used by CSP to his audience at the time. There are hidden parts, assumed to be self-evidently known to all his readers. In another parts of his writings CSP tells that the primary and fundamental logical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

John, Actually Sheldrake was able to test a hypothesis (which, to my knowledge he did not himself believe in at the time)on non-local effects. His series of experiments (one will never do) on pidgeons are truly ingenious and suberb AS experimental designs. If that is agreed (after thorough

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

Helmut, Now you are talking! Excellent post. "Interaction" is one way of taking relational logic seriously. But it does not follow that "explanation" (if based on scientific evidence, may not have any objective definition. Or whatever the term used. I would prefer the expression: "objective

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

Jerry R., list The question of "sizing" electromagnetic "fields" is not the kind of question to be posed first. (See e.g. Kaina Stoicheia). If you pose the question, the answer is: Not possible to answer it. The problem of morphic (etc.) resonance must be tackled before any measuring of any

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

Dear Jerry R., list No theoretical paper gives detailed enough description of the experiments, experimental designs & the process of conducting the experiments in order to check its soundness. Which is a time consuming job & which cannot be done without being properly skilled in designing

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

Helmut, "Morphogenetic field" is just a name, a term standing for a theoretical concept. Naming is not explaining. - For explaining anything, a theory is needed, with sound experimental evidence backing it up. Do you think the experimental evidence Sheldrake has been presenting is not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

Clark, I fully agree with your points. Kirsti Clark Goble kirjoitti 1.6.2017 22:33: On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite exactness of conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

Nothing should be does not quite amount to nothing is. CSP was for the first, not for the second. Are there dogmas in science? Could there be? If so, how could one tell? Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 1.6.2017 09:34: On 5/31/2017 10:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: I agree that #3 is not a dogma

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

Jon, Thanks for your prompt response. I've read your mails, I do know you see the problem. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 29.5.2017 18:36: Kirsti, List, I know what you mean about the title but decided to take it more as a reference to the revolution in physics that began with relativity and

Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

Jerry, list, In my view (with no access to the latest writings of CSP) did not just anticipate continuity, but grasped it, both in respect of space and time. But he did not solve the new kinds of problems arising with those. One essential issue, to my mind, is that he advised not to mix them

Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

Alkuperäinen viesti Aihe: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum? Päiväys: 29.5.2017 18:13 Lähettäjä: kirst...@saunalahti.fi Vastaanottaja: Jerry LR Chandler Jerry, Well, stricly speaking you are not taking up a triad,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

Dear listers, I do not think the title of this thread is well-thought. There is nothing such as a "Space-Time Continuum" which could be reasonably discussed about. Even though it is often repeated chain of words. For the first: Continuity does not mean the same as does 'continuum'. - and

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