On 04 Jul 2011, at 06:37, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:

I just realized that for some reason only half of these posts show up in my e-mail… Bruno, you speak of self-consciousness… do you mean body-image? Or do you mean abstract self-recognition? Or the tendency towards false identification? Or body relation/identification in a combative framework?

`I never need to define consciousness in the reasoning. I just suppose`

`that you understand enough of it to ponder of the consequence of the`

`assumption that you might survive with a computer in place of your`

`brain, like you can survive with a pump in place of your heart.`

`Precisely, I assume that there is a level of description of the brain`

`which is Turing emulable. Then I show that the brain-mind identity`

`breaks down, and that consciousness is related to infinities of`

`computations, and that physics emerges from a competition between`

`infinities of universal machines/numbers. Using results by Gödel, Löb,`

`Solovay, I can use the logic of self-reference in arithmetic to`

`translate the mind body problem into a body problem, expressible in`

`arithmetic.`

`I am a computer scientist, and by making clear all the assumption and`

`the definition, I show that the comp mind body problem is a`

`mathematical problem. Scientist understand, but don't really care, and`

`philosophers are often nervous and hot on this (like always when`

`philosophy is made into science, which is what is possible for the`

`comp philosophy.`

`But I don't need to define consciousness. I bet you know enough to`

`follow the reasoning. Eventually you can understand why consciousness`

`is indeed not definable.`

It seems like your notion of self-acceleration or self-speeding is what some people call psycho-active or psychedelic ….

`I have no clue what you are talking about. Self-speeding is a property`

`of theories (in the mathematical technical sense) or of universal`

`machine (idem).`

Or what others call meditative metamorphoses through concentration. Concentration or the will to power in the Spinoza and Nietzschean sense as self- speeding. The lack of this concentration of the will or self- intensification/force equated to what Kierkegaard called spiritlessness… a symptom of modernity.

`Modernity has disappeared in Occident since the roman closed Plato`

`academy. But let us say I am just provoking here.`

Bruno

On Jul 2, 4:27 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 01 Jul 2011, at 13:23, selva kumar wrote:Is consciousness causally effective ?I found this question in previous threads,but I didn't find aanswer.Was it in the FOR list (on the book Fabric of reality by David Deutsch) ? I thought I did answer this question, which is a very imprtant and fundamental question. It is also a tricky question, which is very similar or related to the question of free-will, and it can lead to vocabulary issue. I often defend the idea that consciousness is effective. Indeed the role I usually defend for consciousness is a relative self-speeding upability. Yet the question is tricky, especially due to the presenceofthe "causally", which is harder to grasp or define than "consciousness" itself.Let me try to explain. For this I need some definition, and I hopeforsome understanding of the UDA and a bit of AUDA. Ask precision if needed.The main ingredient for the explanation are three theorems due toGödel:- the Gödel completeness theorem (available for machine talking first order logic or a sufficiently effective higher order logic). The theorem says that a theory or machine is consistent (syntacticalnotion, = ~Bf) iff the theory has a model (a mathematical structureinwhich it makes sense to say that a proposition is true). I will rephrase this by saying that a machine is consistent if and only if the machine's beliefs make sense in some reality. - the Gödel second incompleteness theorem ~Bf -> ~B(~Bf): if themachine is consistent, then this is not provable by the machine. Soifthe beliefs are real in some reality, the machine cannot prove theexistence of that reality. This is used in some strict way, becausewedon't assume the machine can prove its completeness (despite this has shown to be the case by Orey). This entails that eventually, the machine can add as new axiom its own consistency, but this leads to a new machine, for which a novel notion of consistency appears, and the 'new' machine can still not prove the existence of a reality "satisfying its beliefs. yet that machine can easily prove theconsistency of the machine she was. This can be reitered as manytimesas their are (constructive) ordinals, and this is what I describeas aclimbing from G to G*. The modal logic of self-reference remains unchanged, but the arithmetical interpretation of it expands. An infinity of previously undecidable propositions become decidable, and ... another phenomenon occurs: - Gödel length of proof theorem. Once a machine adds an undecidableproposition, like its own consistency, as a new axiom/belief, notonlyan infinity of (arithmetical) propositions become decidable, but an infinity of already provable propositions get shorter proofs. Indeed, and amazingly enough, for any number x, we can find a proposition which proofs will be x times shorter than its shorter proof in thebeliefs system without the undecidable proposition. A similar, butnotentirely equivalent theorem is true for universal computationability,showing in particular that there is no bound to the rapidity of computers, and this just by change of the software (alas, with finite numbers of exceptions in the *effective* self-speeding up: but evolution of species needs not to be effective or programmable in advance). Now I suggest to (re)define consciousness as a machine (instinctive, preprogrammed) ability to bet on a reality. This is equivalent (stricto sensu: the machine does not need to know this) to an abilityof betting its own consistency (excluding that very new axiom toavoidinconsistency). As a universal system, this will speed-up the machine relatively to the probable local universal system(s) and will in that way augment its freedom degree. If two machines play ping-pong, the machine which is quicker has a greater range of possible moves/ strategy than its opponent. So the answer to the question "is consciousness effective" would be yes, if you accept such definition. Is that consciousness *causally* effective? That is the tricky partrelated to free will. If you accept the definition of free willthat Ioften suggested, then the answer is yes. Causality will have its normal "physical definition", except that with comp such physicalness is given by an arithmetical quantization (based on the material hypostase defined by Bp & Dp): p physically causes q, iff something like BD(BDp -> BDq). I recall Dp = ~B ~p. But of course, in God eyes,there is only true (and false) number relations. The löbianphenomenonthen shows that the consciousness self-speeding up is coupled withthebuilding of the reality that the machine bet on. At that level, it is like if consciousness is the main force, perhaps the only original one, in the physical universe! This needs still more work to make precise enough. There is a complex tradeoff in between the "causally" and the "effective" at play, I think. I hope this was not too technical. The work of Gödel plays a fundamental role. This explanation is detailed in "Conscience etMécanisme", and related more precisely to the inference inductiveframe.To sum up: machine consciousness, in the theory, confers self-speedingup abilities to the machine with respect to the most probable continuation/universal-machine. It is obviously something useful for self-moving creature: to make them able to anticipate and avoid obstacles, which would explain why the self-moving creatures have developed self-reflexive brains, and become Löbian (self-conscious). Note that here the role is attributed to self-consciousness, and not really to consciousness. But you need consciousness to have self- consciousness. Consciousness per se has no role, like in pure contemplation, but once reflected in the Löbian way, it might be the stronger causally effective force operating in the 'arithmetical truth', the very origin of the (self) acceleration/force. Note that the Gödel speed-up theorem is not hard to prove. There is a simple proof of it in the excellent book by Torkel Franzen "Gödel's theorem An Incomplete Guide To Its Use and Abuse" which I recommend the reading (despite it is more on the abuses than the uses). The original paper is in the book by Davis: the undecidable (republished in Dover), and which I consider as a bible for "machine's theology". Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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