On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 10:23 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:

> Hi, > > To add to John Mikes' point, it is being assumed that there is an > invariance of consiousness under the copy and paste operations. > This invariance follows from the COMP hypothesis. It really is that simple. None of the mathematics you discuss below has any relation (that I can see) to this point. > What is the nature of this continuity? It might help to keep in mind > exactly what generates said continuity. This reminds me a lot of the notion > of a connection that is used in presheaves and fiber bundles. The > continuity in is induced to mappings to elements of a continuous index set. > Does the UD provide such a base space? The difficulty is that there are no > unique paths in the base space (assuming that it is the UD) unless we > arbitrarily introduce a measure on the UD. Where does it come from? We seem > to be making a bunch of distracting arguments and hand waving to distract > that we are basically putting in by hand a continuity and yet claiming that > there is none occurring naturally. > If we just assume the set of the natural numbers (via Borel sets), > isn't this just an arbitrary bias toward a particular measure and not > something natural? Where is the transitivity or ordering of the numbers > coming from? We could we be operating on a set of p-adic numbers of a very > large prime... Put all the names of cities aside for a moment, we are > really taking about movement in space-time. So my question is, why are we > putting our selves through such convoluted abstractions to talk about the > simple idea of moving though space-time? > > Onward! > > Stephen > > > On 3/18/2012 6:45 PM, John Mikes wrote: > > I think (?) it is Bruno's sentece: > *"They can perceive the difference, not the duplication" * > (if not, I apologize, but my remark is still on) > To perceive a difference goes with full knowledge of the comparison, > knowing the 'previous' format (existence). They (and I am indeed not for > the entire > thought-play) can notice *"a"* state - irrespectively from any former > history. > > Sorry to embarge into this time- and energy wasting strawmanship. > > John Mikes > > > > On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 5:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 17 Mar 2012, at 05:05, John Clark wrote: >> >> Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >> >>If he knew he was duplicated both would mention it, if he didn't >>>> neither would. >>>> >>> >>> >The point is that he cannot perceive it. he can not known it by any >>> personal observation, >>> >> >> So you're saying that neither the original nor the copy can feel the >> duplication, it does not enter their consciousness, it does not change >> their consciousness, and so far I agree with you completely; but then in >> the next breath you say it DOES change their consciousness and the change >> is about as dramatic as a change can get, it's so ENORMOUS that a new >> individual is created. So do you believe they can perceive the duplication >> or do you not? >> >> >> They can perceive the difference, not the duplication. >> >> >> >> >> > You misunderstand Everett. he said that we cannot feel the split ever >>> after the differentiation occurred. >>> >> >> Everett said they would not feel the split but they would certainly feel >> other things, >> >> >> Sure, me too. >> >> >> and there would not even be a differentiation unless there was >> something different about them to differentiate. Everett would also say >> that talking about 2 absolutely identical points of view is silly, if there >> is no difference between them then there is only one point of view. >> >> >> Me too. >> >> >> >> > Now you come back to the idea that if I throw a dice, the notion of >>> probability does not apply because the guy looking at the dice is not the >>> same that the guy who threw it, which is straw man. >>> >> >> I know you like the phrase but when asked to calculate probabilities, or >> anything else for that matter, it is not a straw man to ask just what you >> want me to calculate; the probability that the guy who sees 12 on the dice >> will see 12 is 100%, the probability that the guy who does not see 12 on >> the dice will see 12 is 0%, the probability that right now John K Clark >> will see 12 when he throes the dice in his hand is 1 in 36. >> >> > So it looks you can give us an algorithm to predict what you will feel >>> with certainty the result of your future self-localization. But I have >>> already explain why it does not work. >>> >> >> I know that there is one chance in 36 that my future self (I don't see >> the need of the word "localization") will be certain the dice gave him a >> 12, and the algorithm to calculate this has been well known for centuries. >> >> >> I was illustrating a point. If the dices are medelt long enough the >> quantum uncertainties adds up and generates the 36 (* a continuum) >> possibilities, in which case quantum indeterminacy, which is different from >> the classical statistical one, and different from the comp 1-indeterminacy. >> The indeterminacies looks alike, but have different explanations, and >> different consequences. >> >> >> >> >> > *in both cities* he will feel to survive *one and entire in only one >>> city*. >>> >> >> Correct, therefore we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel he has >> survived in both cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now *in both >> cities*. >> >> >> But he feels he is in only one city. He used your trick to predict >> that he will be in Moscow with 100%, but he woke in Washington. >> Ah! But you say he know that he has been duplicated and that he is in >> Washington AND in Moscow. >> But how could he *know* that? He can only *verifie* that. The presence, >> or not, or the other, the doppelganger, is like a scientific needing some >> confirmation. He can give a call to Moscow, to say hello to "himself", but >> bad luck, he just learned that the reconstitution machine failed in Moscow. >> This illustrates that each copies can know where they are, but can only >> believe the other copy is or not in the other city. They personal >> perspective are different, they knew this in advance, they perceive the >> difference, but they can only bet on the duplication, not experience them. >> The experiences they (can) get are only "I wake up in Moscow", OR "I wake >> up in Washington", and never "I wake up in washington and I wake in >> Moscow". The probability here on those future personal experiences. >> >> >> >> >> > But the obvious point here is that he will not FEEL having survived in >>> both cities. >>> >> >> Just ask them! Ask the Moscow man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is >> experiencing Moscow and he will answer "yes" to both questions. Ask the >> Washington man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is experiencing >> Washington and he will answer "yes" to both questions. Therefore it doesn't >> take rocket science to conclude that the Helsinki man experienced Moscow >> AND Washington. >> >> >> Then, given that you and me are already the result of the many >> duplication since the first amoeba, we have all the life "at once". I love >> the idea, and I think we might have a very deep common first person indeed, >> but this is not relevant for the question of predicting, for example the >> "movie" you will feel to see in the multiplication-movie thought >> experience. Here the answer is "white noise", because it will be lived by >> the vast majority of the copies. >> >> >> >> >> > Both copies will FEEL having survive in only one city, >>> >> >> Yes, but it doesn't matter because BOTH are the Helsinki man who just >> happens to be in another place, and we change our position all the time >> without loss of identity. >> >> >> You are incredible. Of course it does matter, given that the question >> is explicitly about those personal feelings. >> >> You look like "I don't want to talk about that". >> >> >> >> > Each of them cannot know what the other feels. >>> >> >> True, so the Washington man is not the Moscow man, although both are the >> Helsinki man. For some things like the integers H, M and W if H=M and H= W >> then M=W, but that does not work for everything, for example a watermelon >> is green and a pea is green but a watermelon is not a pea; it doesn't work >> for personal identity either. >> >> > You know perfectly well who you are, and the duplication will not >>> change this. >>> >> >> Yes I will always know who I am, I will know I am in Moscow and only >> Moscow and I will know I am in Washington and only Washington and I will >> know I am in Helsinki and only Helsinki. Odd yes, contradictory no because >> there are 3 I's. >> >> > You are back to the confusion between a 3-view on 1-views and the >>> 1-views themselves. >>> >> >> One of us is very confused indeed over this point, but I don't believe >> its me. >> >> >> This is equivalent with saying "I am right". >> >> >> >> > Ask them if they have seen, from their own eyes, Washington AND Moscow. >>> They will deny this, >>> >> >> Sure, but each has seen one of those cities and both are the Helsinki man >> (although they are not each other), therefore the Helsinki man saw >> Washington AND Moscow; the Washington man didn't and the Moscow man didn't >> but the Helsinki man did. >> >> >> Lol >> >> >> >> >> > unless you introduce magical telepathy between them. >>> >> >> Now THAT is a straw man! Telepathy has nothing to due with it. >> >> >> Then you avoid the necessary ignorance of most copies, ignorance on >> which experience they will "actually" live and have lived. Think about the >> multiplication movie experience. You predict that you will see all movie, >> and I agree if "you" means the 1-you that you can attribute to those >> people, but I disagree if by "you" you mean each of those persons as they >> will experience. They discourse is simple, formally, because those >> experience are given by *each* movie (not *all* movie). >> >> >> >> >> > You are just avoiding putting yourself at the place of each copies >>> >> >> I the Helsinki man walk into the duplicating chamber and walk right out >> and find that I the Helsinki man am now in Moscow, and I the Helsinki man >> walk into the duplicating chamber and walk right out and find that I the >> Helsinki man is now in Washington, and I the Helsinki man walk into the >> duplicating chamber and walk right out and find that I the Helsinki man am >> still right here in Helsinki and wonder if the duplicating chamber has >> malfunctioned. All three are me the Helsinki man and there is a 100% chance >> I will go to Moscow only and a 100% chance I will go to Washington only and >> a 100% chance I will remain in Helsinki. There is a 0% chance that I the >> Helsinki man in Moscow will see Washington and there is a 0% chance that I >> the Helsinki man in Washington will see Moscow. What have I avoided? >> >> >> First, that in the protocol you are annihilated in Helsinki, so there >> is 0% you will wake up in Helsinki. Then you confuse an intellectual hybrid >> of your 1-you with the set {3-you in M, 3-you in W}, to be able to predict >> that you will be in both city. You avoid the question which concerns your >> present feeling as anticipated by your older Helsinki. If he predicted 100% >> for Moscow, then he was wrong for the guy who feel to be in Washington, and >> why not to listen to him? >> >> The repetition of the experiences explains that the majority of W-M >> strings will be random, even incompressible. So the bet on the actual lived >> futures, in that multiplication-movie experience, is white noise. >> With this protocol, seeing Flying circus is a white rabbit phenomenon. >> >> >> >> >> > You forget to say that neither the W-man nor the M-man could have guess >>> in advance to be those one, from the complete protocol information he got >>> in Helsinki. >>> >> >> Guessing is not necessary, >> >> >> Well, this is what is asked!!! >> >> >> >> the Helsinki man could have assigned a probability of 100% that if he >> sees Moscow then he will become the Moscow >> >> >> >> But that is not the question!!! >> >> >> >> man because that's what the Moscow man is, the Helsinki man who saw >> Moscow. And what is the probability that the Helsinki man will actually see >> Moscow? 100% of course. >> >> >> By definition of first person (content or sequence of content of the >> diary), if you say 100% for each step of the duplication experience, then >> you are predicting that you will see "flying circus", and the 2^(16180 * >> 10000) * (90 * 60) * 24 other copies will laugh at you. Ok, you will have >> some neighbors who saw "Flying circus" with (correct, wrong) subtitles, and >> those who say the beginning, or the movie, or the trailer in Chinese with >> Korean subtitles, etc. >> Don't count on it! >> >> You avoid to answer the question which concerns the futures 1-view on >> the 1-view, by avoiding doing the experience, and defining an abstract >> notion of person distributed in the copies to avoid the simple fact that we >> will just look at the diaries which describe the experiences, and that with >> the movie-multiplication protocol, they almost all describes "white noise". >> The number of "senseful movie grows linearly", the number of white noise >> movie grows exponentially. >> >> I said it precisely in the protocol, you have to bet which movie you >> will describe in the diary after the experience. Obviously after the >> experience they have all view ONE movie. OK, there is one "winner", having >> seen a perfect version of "flying circus", but the vast majority have not. >> In those thought experiments, you have to put yourself coldly at the place >> of some sample of those person. >> >> With the quantum multiplication movie experience, the pixels are in >> quantum superposition which contagiate to the spectator, so that the >> quantum wave describes the spectator seeing all the movies, but again, the >> spectators does not feel the split nor the superposition, and see only >> *one* movie, and most of them will see white noise, for the same reason >> that beam splitters split the intensity into 1/2. >> >> So logically, it is just plausible that the quantum indeterminacy might >> be an instance of the comp first person plural (with duplication of >> populations) indeterminacy. But we are not yet there. >> >> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1-indeterminacy, >> because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an indeterminacy (but it is >> trivial, nothing new). >> >> Let us assume you accept the 1-indeterminacy (trivial or not might be >> just another topic), might we move to step 4? Hint: revise step 0, 1, 2. >> Step zero is the definition of comp. >> >> Bruno >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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