On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 10:23 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
> Hi,
>
> To add to John Mikes' point, it is being assumed that there is an
> invariance of consiousness under the copy and paste operations.
>
This invariance follows from the COMP hypothesis. It really is that simple.
None of the mathematics you discuss below has any relation (that I can see)
to this point.
> What is the nature of this continuity? It might help to keep in mind
> exactly what generates said continuity. This reminds me a lot of the notion
> of a connection that is used in presheaves and fiber bundles. The
> continuity in is induced to mappings to elements of a continuous index set.
> Does the UD provide such a base space? The difficulty is that there are no
> unique paths in the base space (assuming that it is the UD) unless we
> arbitrarily introduce a measure on the UD. Where does it come from? We seem
> to be making a bunch of distracting arguments and hand waving to distract
> that we are basically putting in by hand a continuity and yet claiming that
> there is none occurring naturally.
> If we just assume the set of the natural numbers (via Borel sets),
> isn't this just an arbitrary bias toward a particular measure and not
> something natural? Where is the transitivity or ordering of the numbers
> coming from? We could we be operating on a set of p-adic numbers of a very
> large prime... Put all the names of cities aside for a moment, we are
> really taking about movement in space-time. So my question is, why are we
> putting our selves through such convoluted abstractions to talk about the
> simple idea of moving though space-time?
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
> On 3/18/2012 6:45 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>
> I think (?) it is Bruno's sentece:
> *"They can perceive the difference, not the duplication" *
> (if not, I apologize, but my remark is still on)
> To perceive a difference goes with full knowledge of the comparison,
> knowing the 'previous' format (existence). They (and I am indeed not for
> the entire
> thought-play) can notice *"a"* state - irrespectively from any former
> history.
>
> Sorry to embarge into this time- and energy wasting strawmanship.
>
> John Mikes
>
>
>
> On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 5:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 17 Mar 2012, at 05:05, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>> >>If he knew he was duplicated both would mention it, if he didn't
>>>> neither would.
>>>>
>>>
>>> >The point is that he cannot perceive it. he can not known it by any
>>> personal observation,
>>>
>>
>> So you're saying that neither the original nor the copy can feel the
>> duplication, it does not enter their consciousness, it does not change
>> their consciousness, and so far I agree with you completely; but then in
>> the next breath you say it DOES change their consciousness and the change
>> is about as dramatic as a change can get, it's so ENORMOUS that a new
>> individual is created. So do you believe they can perceive the duplication
>> or do you not?
>>
>>
>> They can perceive the difference, not the duplication.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > You misunderstand Everett. he said that we cannot feel the split ever
>>> after the differentiation occurred.
>>>
>>
>> Everett said they would not feel the split but they would certainly feel
>> other things,
>>
>>
>> Sure, me too.
>>
>>
>> and there would not even be a differentiation unless there was
>> something different about them to differentiate. Everett would also say
>> that talking about 2 absolutely identical points of view is silly, if there
>> is no difference between them then there is only one point of view.
>>
>>
>> Me too.
>>
>>
>>
>> > Now you come back to the idea that if I throw a dice, the notion of
>>> probability does not apply because the guy looking at the dice is not the
>>> same that the guy who threw it, which is straw man.
>>>
>>
>> I know you like the phrase but when asked to calculate probabilities, or
>> anything else for that matter, it is not a straw man to ask just what you
>> want me to calculate; the probability that the guy who sees 12 on the dice
>> will see 12 is 100%, the probability that the guy who does not see 12 on
>> the dice will see 12 is 0%, the probability that right now John K Clark
>> will see 12 when he throes the dice in his hand is 1 in 36.
>>
>> > So it looks you can give us an algorithm to predict what you will feel
>>> with certainty the result of your future self-localization. But I have
>>> already explain why it does not work.
>>>
>>
>> I know that there is one chance in 36 that my future self (I don't see
>> the need of the word "localization") will be certain the dice gave him a
>> 12, and the algorithm to calculate this has been well known for centuries.
>>
>>
>> I was illustrating a point. If the dices are medelt long enough the
>> quantum uncertainties adds up and generates the 36 (* a continuum)
>> possibilities, in which case quantum indeterminacy, which is different from
>> the classical statistical one, and different from the comp 1-indeterminacy.
>> The indeterminacies looks alike, but have different explanations, and
>> different consequences.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > *in both cities* he will feel to survive *one and entire in only one
>>> city*.
>>>
>>
>> Correct, therefore we can conclude that the Helsinki man will feel he has
>> survived in both cities because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED and is now *in both
>> cities*.
>>
>>
>> But he feels he is in only one city. He used your trick to predict
>> that he will be in Moscow with 100%, but he woke in Washington.
>> Ah! But you say he know that he has been duplicated and that he is in
>> Washington AND in Moscow.
>> But how could he *know* that? He can only *verifie* that. The presence,
>> or not, or the other, the doppelganger, is like a scientific needing some
>> confirmation. He can give a call to Moscow, to say hello to "himself", but
>> bad luck, he just learned that the reconstitution machine failed in Moscow.
>> This illustrates that each copies can know where they are, but can only
>> believe the other copy is or not in the other city. They personal
>> perspective are different, they knew this in advance, they perceive the
>> difference, but they can only bet on the duplication, not experience them.
>> The experiences they (can) get are only "I wake up in Moscow", OR "I wake
>> up in Washington", and never "I wake up in washington and I wake in
>> Moscow". The probability here on those future personal experiences.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > But the obvious point here is that he will not FEEL having survived in
>>> both cities.
>>>
>>
>> Just ask them! Ask the Moscow man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is
>> experiencing Moscow and he will answer "yes" to both questions. Ask the
>> Washington man if he is the Helsinki man and if he is experiencing
>> Washington and he will answer "yes" to both questions. Therefore it doesn't
>> take rocket science to conclude that the Helsinki man experienced Moscow
>> AND Washington.
>>
>>
>> Then, given that you and me are already the result of the many
>> duplication since the first amoeba, we have all the life "at once". I love
>> the idea, and I think we might have a very deep common first person indeed,
>> but this is not relevant for the question of predicting, for example the
>> "movie" you will feel to see in the multiplication-movie thought
>> experience. Here the answer is "white noise", because it will be lived by
>> the vast majority of the copies.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > Both copies will FEEL having survive in only one city,
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but it doesn't matter because BOTH are the Helsinki man who just
>> happens to be in another place, and we change our position all the time
>> without loss of identity.
>>
>>
>> You are incredible. Of course it does matter, given that the question
>> is explicitly about those personal feelings.
>>
>> You look like "I don't want to talk about that".
>>
>>
>>
>> > Each of them cannot know what the other feels.
>>>
>>
>> True, so the Washington man is not the Moscow man, although both are the
>> Helsinki man. For some things like the integers H, M and W if H=M and H= W
>> then M=W, but that does not work for everything, for example a watermelon
>> is green and a pea is green but a watermelon is not a pea; it doesn't work
>> for personal identity either.
>>
>> > You know perfectly well who you are, and the duplication will not
>>> change this.
>>>
>>
>> Yes I will always know who I am, I will know I am in Moscow and only
>> Moscow and I will know I am in Washington and only Washington and I will
>> know I am in Helsinki and only Helsinki. Odd yes, contradictory no because
>> there are 3 I's.
>>
>> > You are back to the confusion between a 3-view on 1-views and the
>>> 1-views themselves.
>>>
>>
>> One of us is very confused indeed over this point, but I don't believe
>> its me.
>>
>>
>> This is equivalent with saying "I am right".
>>
>>
>>
>> > Ask them if they have seen, from their own eyes, Washington AND Moscow.
>>> They will deny this,
>>>
>>
>> Sure, but each has seen one of those cities and both are the Helsinki man
>> (although they are not each other), therefore the Helsinki man saw
>> Washington AND Moscow; the Washington man didn't and the Moscow man didn't
>> but the Helsinki man did.
>>
>>
>> Lol
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > unless you introduce magical telepathy between them.
>>>
>>
>> Now THAT is a straw man! Telepathy has nothing to due with it.
>>
>>
>> Then you avoid the necessary ignorance of most copies, ignorance on
>> which experience they will "actually" live and have lived. Think about the
>> multiplication movie experience. You predict that you will see all movie,
>> and I agree if "you" means the 1-you that you can attribute to those
>> people, but I disagree if by "you" you mean each of those persons as they
>> will experience. They discourse is simple, formally, because those
>> experience are given by *each* movie (not *all* movie).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > You are just avoiding putting yourself at the place of each copies
>>>
>>
>> I the Helsinki man walk into the duplicating chamber and walk right out
>> and find that I the Helsinki man am now in Moscow, and I the Helsinki man
>> walk into the duplicating chamber and walk right out and find that I the
>> Helsinki man is now in Washington, and I the Helsinki man walk into the
>> duplicating chamber and walk right out and find that I the Helsinki man am
>> still right here in Helsinki and wonder if the duplicating chamber has
>> malfunctioned. All three are me the Helsinki man and there is a 100% chance
>> I will go to Moscow only and a 100% chance I will go to Washington only and
>> a 100% chance I will remain in Helsinki. There is a 0% chance that I the
>> Helsinki man in Moscow will see Washington and there is a 0% chance that I
>> the Helsinki man in Washington will see Moscow. What have I avoided?
>>
>>
>> First, that in the protocol you are annihilated in Helsinki, so there
>> is 0% you will wake up in Helsinki. Then you confuse an intellectual hybrid
>> of your 1-you with the set {3-you in M, 3-you in W}, to be able to predict
>> that you will be in both city. You avoid the question which concerns your
>> present feeling as anticipated by your older Helsinki. If he predicted 100%
>> for Moscow, then he was wrong for the guy who feel to be in Washington, and
>> why not to listen to him?
>>
>> The repetition of the experiences explains that the majority of W-M
>> strings will be random, even incompressible. So the bet on the actual lived
>> futures, in that multiplication-movie experience, is white noise.
>> With this protocol, seeing Flying circus is a white rabbit phenomenon.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > You forget to say that neither the W-man nor the M-man could have guess
>>> in advance to be those one, from the complete protocol information he got
>>> in Helsinki.
>>>
>>
>> Guessing is not necessary,
>>
>>
>> Well, this is what is asked!!!
>>
>>
>>
>> the Helsinki man could have assigned a probability of 100% that if he
>> sees Moscow then he will become the Moscow
>>
>>
>>
>> But that is not the question!!!
>>
>>
>>
>> man because that's what the Moscow man is, the Helsinki man who saw
>> Moscow. And what is the probability that the Helsinki man will actually see
>> Moscow? 100% of course.
>>
>>
>> By definition of first person (content or sequence of content of the
>> diary), if you say 100% for each step of the duplication experience, then
>> you are predicting that you will see "flying circus", and the 2^(16180 *
>> 10000) * (90 * 60) * 24 other copies will laugh at you. Ok, you will have
>> some neighbors who saw "Flying circus" with (correct, wrong) subtitles, and
>> those who say the beginning, or the movie, or the trailer in Chinese with
>> Korean subtitles, etc.
>> Don't count on it!
>>
>> You avoid to answer the question which concerns the futures 1-view on
>> the 1-view, by avoiding doing the experience, and defining an abstract
>> notion of person distributed in the copies to avoid the simple fact that we
>> will just look at the diaries which describe the experiences, and that with
>> the movie-multiplication protocol, they almost all describes "white noise".
>> The number of "senseful movie grows linearly", the number of white noise
>> movie grows exponentially.
>>
>> I said it precisely in the protocol, you have to bet which movie you
>> will describe in the diary after the experience. Obviously after the
>> experience they have all view ONE movie. OK, there is one "winner", having
>> seen a perfect version of "flying circus", but the vast majority have not.
>> In those thought experiments, you have to put yourself coldly at the place
>> of some sample of those person.
>>
>> With the quantum multiplication movie experience, the pixels are in
>> quantum superposition which contagiate to the spectator, so that the
>> quantum wave describes the spectator seeing all the movies, but again, the
>> spectators does not feel the split nor the superposition, and see only
>> *one* movie, and most of them will see white noise, for the same reason
>> that beam splitters split the intensity into 1/2.
>>
>> So logically, it is just plausible that the quantum indeterminacy might
>> be an instance of the comp first person plural (with duplication of
>> populations) indeterminacy. But we are not yet there.
>>
>> You seem to continue to oscillate between there is no 1-indeterminacy,
>> because ... 100% for Moscow, and there is an indeterminacy (but it is
>> trivial, nothing new).
>>
>> Let us assume you accept the 1-indeterminacy (trivial or not might be
>> just another topic), might we move to step 4? Hint: revise step 0, 1, 2.
>> Step zero is the definition of comp.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
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