On 04 Apr 2012, at 06:05, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> The point is that comp predicts white noise. That something else predicts white noise too is not relevant in the proof.

So in the setup the screen changes at RANDOM and comp predicts white noise will be the most likely result, and you think that is significant?

The WM setup and the Universal waves are deterministic.

Everything predicts that. OK, then I have a marvelous new thought experiment, let X = Y. I maintain that comp predicts that X= Y and I have made a wonderful new discovery too.

>>> you should expect the WM duplication as equivalent with the throw of a random coin, etc. But you don't need to agree with that analysis. You need only to agree that there is an indeterminacy

>>  Of course there is a indeterminacy!

> Don't say of course. That is not so obvious as your posts illustrates.

it's not obvious that the outcome of a RANDOM coin flip is uncertain? I thought it was.

I was clearly talking about the duplication.

> In the 3-view there is no randomness at all. In the protocol, we don't change the pixels randomly, neither in the comp multiplication- movie experience, nor in the quantum wave which evolves deterministically. The point is that the randomness bears on the first person experiences. We get this directly with comp, without assuming QM.

Nothing new. People have only known about Quantum Mechanics for about a century but they've known about randomness for many thousands of years. And you've made randomness a measure of ignorance rather than a property of the thing itself and that's how it should be, and what people have always done. This is demonstrated by the Monty Hall problem, a new car is behind one door and a goat behind the other two, you pick a door at random and Monty opens a door you didn't pick and shows you a goat and gives you the opportunity to change your choice of a door if you wish. Monty knows what door the prize is behind and you do not, so Monty could pick the correct door with a probability of 100% but the best you can do at first is 33.3%, after he lest you change your choice and pick another door you know a little more and your probability increases to 66.6%, Monty's probability stays at 100% and the thing itself, the new car, has no probability at all.

Incidentally the great mathematician Paul Erdos admitted he could never get his head around the Monty Hall problem and it always seemed paradoxical to him, this despite him having no trouble whatsoever in understanding many other things of staggering complexity and of far greater abstraction. It's weird.

He got it eventually, when asked the same question with a bigger number of boxes. But there is nothing relevant to the question I am asking you.

>> so if I told you before the duplication that you would see Washington AND Moscow I would be correct, Bruno Marshal will indeed see both cities.

> That the 3-view on the 1-view.

And that should be more than good enough thank you very much!

Why did you change "Marchal" into "Marshal" in the quote?

> But the probabilities bears on the 1-views themselves.

As I've said many many times before, give me a single concrete example of two things being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will have won this argument, do that and I will publicly declare you've made a major philosophical discovery. Just one example is all I ask. I think this is the key to our disagreement.

The duplication. After the duplication
In the 3 view I am in both cities
In the 1-view I feel oneself in only one city.
Another example is in the step 2.
In fact you ask me what I give in each step, and you don't see it because you persistently confuse them.

> You can ascribe the consciousness of Bruno Marshal to both, but each one will ascribe their present "here and now" type of consciousness only to themselves subjectively.

Why did you change "Marchal" into "Marshal" again in the quote?

I don't know what "here and now type of consciousness" is. We both agree that speaking of consciousness occupying a place in space has little meaning and I would argue a absolute time for a consciousness is not a productive idea either. You could freeze a mind for a billion years and then start it up again and it wouldn't notice it unless it has senses that can detect the outside world, and even then the mind couldn't tell if it had stopped for a billion years or what it was looking at had jumped ahead a billion years.

You confuse "consciousness of being here and now" with "consciousness would be here and now".

>> Asking why you are the Moscow man not the Washington man is exactly like asking why you are Bruno Marshal and not John K Clark.

> Possible. I do agree with this. But there is a difference. John and Bruno have already differentiated. But in the WM duplication experience, we duplicate instantaneous computational state by a special duplicator machine, so that we can ask the question to the guy before the duplication.

And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial application of the anthropic principle, "I will become the Moscow man if events transpire so that I meet the definition of the Moscow man, namely that I see Moscow".

Which avoids again to answer to the question asked.

>> you can give no examples where according to the 3-view things are identical but according to the 1-view they are not, although it's easy to find examples where according to the 1-view things are identical but by the 3-view they are not.

>That's my point.

I really wish it was.

> So you grasp very well the difference between 1-view and 3-view.


> so I have no clue what difficulties you seem to have but never succeed to convey.

Then I will give you a clue of what my difficulty is, it has something to do with "your point", it has too due with what you're saying right now and the contradiction with what you were saying just a few paragraphs ago, "That's the 3-view on the 1-view. But the probabilities bears on the 1-views themselves."

You are not making an atom of sense.

>> If things are identical objectively then they are identical subjectively, the reverse is not necessarily true but it can be.

> We agree on this since the start.

It seems that on even numbered days you agree with that but on odd number days you do not.

You have failed to show me one quote where I disagree with this.

> Which shows that you grasp well the 1-view and the 3-view.

Yes I grasp the difference, a bit better than you do it would seem.

> So it is weird that you still see a problem somewhere, which is just a confusion between the intellectual 3-view on 1-views that we can ascribe to other people and their own "directly knowable by each of them" 1-views.

I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two things being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will have won this argument.

See above. Let me give it again with more detail.

I have been duplicated in W and M and I feel myself in W.
I have been duplicated in W and M and i feel myself in M

Those are different in the 1-views (as different as seeing M and seeing W), But are equal in the 3-view, where I am in both cities.

> If you are read and cut in Helsinki, and pasted two days after on Mars, and three years after on Venus, and nowhere else, your probability, evaluated in Helsinki to find yourself on Mars or on Venus is the same as the probability evaluated if you are pasted at the same time on Venus and Mars. OK?

OK, the probability is the same in both, 100%.

> Do you agree that if the comp-1-indeterminacy is given by P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM-duplication experiment, and thus with annihilation of the "original" (the body of the guy in Helsinki), then the probability is 1/2 to find oneself in Sidney, or in Washington, in this teleportation experiment,

I would agree that probability is a useless concept in situations like this.

We can use your "100%" to proceed. (It is just ridiculous, for it will be refuted by both persons after the duplication, but even with your weird way to quantify the indeterminacy we can still proceed).

> where, I repeat, the original is only read and non cut

Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original is cut or not cut as long as he's read?

If the original is cut, the probability to wake up at Helsinki is 0. If not, I would say it is 1/3, although you would say 100%.

Step 6 (I proceed, normally you will see that your "100%" does not make any sense, because you will have to predict for all experience that the probability of any result will be 100%).

In step 6, we do again all the five preceding steps, but instead of reconstituted you in a "real" environment, like Moscow and Washington, you are reconstituted in virtual environment, generated in one computer. By comp we can simulate Moscow and Washington precisely enough so that you cannot see the difference for some non null interval. The question is "do you agree that this does not change the evaluation of the indeterminacy? You can read the step 6 in sane2004 if I was to short here.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to