> On 8 Nov 2018, at 14:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, November 8, 2018 at 5:23:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 7 Nov 2018, at 21:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, November 7, 2018 at 9:31:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 6 Nov 2018, at 10:58, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, November 6, 2018 at 2:52:23 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 5:39:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 4 Nov 2018, at 14:53, John Clark <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 6:23 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> > If experience (Galen Strawson, The Subject of Experience) is the result >>>> > of information (only) processing, >>>> >>>> If? If information is not the thing that needs processing to produce >>>> intelligence then what is? >>>> >>>> > then the argument for arithmetical (Platonic) reality holds. >>>> >>>> Only if somebody can show how information, or anything else, can be >>>> processed without using matter that obeys the laws of physics. >>> >>> >>> Information processing (computation) has been first discovered in >>> arithmetic, where there is no matter. >>> >>> The fact that the physical reality is Turing-complete explains how we can >>> build machine doing it, but unfortunately, if “matter” is taken seriously >>> as primitive, the person itself can no more be attached to any particular >>> body. >>> >>> Eventually, it is the very notion of primitive matter, or physicalism, >>> which needs to be abandonned if we assume Mechanism or Computationalism. >>> >>> Of course to get this, you need a bit more than the UDA step 3 … >>> >>> Please, try to convince someone else to explain what is wrong in the step >>> 3, as you did not succeed in making your point up to now. >>> >>> >>>> And, despite the existence of books made of dead trees with black >>>> squiggles made of ink with a high Carbon content pressed onto them, nobody >>>> has even come close to doing that. >>> >>> >>> It is born in that way. Study any book in the field. You are confusing >>> everyone on this. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> "Physics" to me is physics theories written in some language (in 2018, who >>> knows what language it will be in 2118). >>> >>> It is a language that can be used to write the Standard Model and Einstein >>> equation(s). >>> >>> e.g. >>> This version of the Standard Model is written in the Lagrangian form. >>> https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/the-deconstructed-standard-model-equation >>> >>> <https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/the-deconstructed-standard-model-equation> >>> >>> The language and the models written in the language are not the reality >>> itself. >>> >>> It is a mistake to use "physical reality" to correspond to material >>> reality. Material reality may not be be Turing computable. >>> >>> - pt >>> >>> A better way: >>> >>> Let I = Information, E = Experience. Material reality may not be >>> I-computable, but may be (I,E)-computable. >>> >>> All information (I) in the universe is Turing computable (nothing >>> super-Turing), but experience (E) is missing. >> >> >> Take the duplication experience, either physical, or through the looking at >> a spin in some superposition state. We cannot, in both case, compute the >> results, but this allows us to introduce the experience by using only the >> indexical notion of “I”. That “I” is indeed not Turing computable, but it is >> still explainable entirely in term of Turing machine. A lot of things about >> Turing machine is not computable, so that is not so astonishing. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Hence I am (somewhere) on the same page as Philip Goff. >>> >>> Panpsychism is crazy, but it’s also most probably true >>> - >>> https://aeon.co/ideas/panpsychism-is-crazy-but-its-also-most-probably-true >>> <https://aeon.co/ideas/panpsychism-is-crazy-but-its-also-most-probably-true> >> >> This assume a physical universe which cannot be done if we assume mechanism >> and which is what I want to explain, then, yes it is crazy. It trivialises >> consciousness, and this does not seem to be able to make progress on the >> mind-body problem. It eludes it, it seems to me. >> Consciousness needs some ability to refer to oneself, implicitly, like >> plants and worms, or explicitly, like most “higher” animals. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Re: That “I” is indeed not Turing computable, but it is still explainable >> entirely in term of Turing machine. A lot of things about Turing machine is >> not computable, so that is not so astonishing. >> >> I'm not sure I follow that (with respect to Ton-Turing computing), but here >> is where I think there could be progress: >> >> >> The late Turing scholar S. Barry Cooper: >> >> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails >> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for >> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic content >> of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.* >> >> Here I would add modal to higher-type, and assert that experience processing >> is non-Turing (unconventional) computing [ and maybe develop this into a >> conference paper ]. > > The question will be which modal logic. Of course, the theology of machines > does answer that question. > > > >> >> >> >> * What Makes a Computation Unconventional? or, there is no such thing as Non >> Turing Computation >> S. Barry Cooper >> - >> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8c56/91dbcfd9751d4ef87135baf89ad5e64d83c2.pdf >> >> <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8c56/91dbcfd9751d4ef87135baf89ad5e64d83c2.pdf> >> >> cf. Incomputability In Nature >> S. Barry Cooper >> - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2829873_Incomputability_In_Nature >> <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2829873_Incomputability_In_Nature> >> To what extent is incomputability relevant to the material Universe? We look >> at ways in which this question might be answered, and the extent to which >> the theory of computability, which grew out of the work of Godel, Church, >> Kleene and Turing, can contribute to a clear resolution of the current >> confusion. It is hoped that the presentation will be accessible to the >> non-specialist reader. > > > Late Barry Cooper was a very nice guy. But he is not really aware of the > mind-body problem (despite publishing one my paper at the ACCE meeting). I do > agree with his assertion that there is no such thing as a non Turing > computation, in nature. In arithmetic, you have the relativise computations > with oracle, but up to now, only the random oracle makes sense (it is a by > product of the first person indeterminacy, as well as the halting oracle, > which is just “time”). > > You better should make your argument straight instead of referring to papers, > which relevance does not strike the eyes. Keep in mind that we are in the > Aristotelian Era since long, with an implicit or explicit assumption that > there is a physical universe being ontologically “real”? Read my papers for > an explanation of why this is incompatible with Mechanism. Then, there is no > evidence at all fors such kind of matter, beyond the fact that is rarely > defined at all, and based on a non valid metaphysical extrapolation. > > Bruno > > > The paper would start with > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ > > combined with > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ > > and others I have written > > but I doubt that a paper I would send to an AAAI conference on conscious > systems would have any point-of-view that matter does not exist. :)
Me too. Why would a paper think? Bruno > > - pt > > - pt > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
