On Friday, November 9, 2018 at 11:38:51 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 8 Nov 2018, at 14:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, November 8, 2018 at 5:23:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 7 Nov 2018, at 21:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, November 7, 2018 at 9:31:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 6 Nov 2018, at 10:58, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, November 6, 2018 at 2:52:23 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 5:39:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 4 Nov 2018, at 14:53, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 6:23 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> *> If experience (Galen Strawson, The Subject of Experience) is the >>>>>> result of information (only) processing, * >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If? If information is not the thing that needs processing to produce >>>>> intelligence then what is? >>>>> >>>>> > then the argument for arithmetical (Platonic) reality holds. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Only if somebody can show how information, or anything else, can be >>>>> processed without using matter that obeys the laws of physics. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Information processing (computation) has been first discovered in >>>>> arithmetic, where there is no matter. >>>>> >>>>> The fact that the physical reality is Turing-complete explains how we >>>>> can build machine doing it, but unfortunately, if “matter” is taken >>>>> seriously as primitive, the person itself can no more be attached to any >>>>> particular body. >>>>> >>>>> Eventually, it is the very notion of primitive matter, or physicalism, >>>>> which needs to be abandonned if we assume Mechanism or Computationalism. >>>>> >>>>> Of course to get this, you need a bit more than the UDA step 3 … >>>>> >>>>> Please, try to convince someone else to explain what is wrong in the >>>>> step 3, as you did not succeed in making your point up to now. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> And, despite the existence of books made of dead trees with black >>>>> squiggles made of ink with a high Carbon content pressed onto them, >>>>> nobody >>>>> has even come close to doing that. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It is born in that way. Study any book in the field. You are confusing >>>>> everyone on this. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> "Physics" to me is physics theories written in some language (in 2018, >>>> who knows what language it will be in 2118). >>>> >>>> It is a language that can be used to write the Standard Model and >>>> Einstein equation(s). >>>> >>>> *e.g.* >>>> *This version of the Standard Model is written in the Lagrangian form.* >>>> >>>> https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/the-deconstructed-standard-model-equation >>>> >>>> The language and the models written in the language are not the reality >>>> itself. >>>> >>>> It is a mistake to use "physical reality" to correspond to material >>>> reality. Material reality may not be be Turing computable. >>>> >>>> - pt >>>> >>> >>> A better way: >>> >>> Let I = Information, E = Experience. Material reality may not be >>> I-computable, but may be (I,E)-computable. >>> >>> All information (I) in the universe *is* Turing computable (nothing >>> super-Turing), but experience (E) is missing. >>> >>> >>> >>> Take the duplication experience, either physical, or through the looking >>> at a spin in some superposition state. We cannot, in both case, compute the >>> results, but this allows us to introduce the experience by using only the >>> indexical notion of “I”. That “I” is indeed not Turing computable, but it >>> is still explainable entirely in term of Turing machine. A lot of things >>> about Turing machine is not computable, so that is not so astonishing. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Hence I am (somewhere) on the same page as Philip Goff. >>> >>> *Panpsychism is crazy, but it’s also most probably true* >>> - >>> https://aeon.co/ideas/panpsychism-is-crazy-but-its-also-most-probably-true >>> >>> >>> This assume a physical universe which cannot be done if we assume >>> mechanism and which is what I want to explain, then, yes it is crazy. It >>> trivialises consciousness, and this does not seem to be able to make >>> progress on the mind-body problem. It eludes it, it seems to me. >>> Consciousness needs some ability to refer to oneself, implicitly, like >>> plants and worms, or explicitly, like most “higher” animals. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >> >> Re: *That “I” is indeed not Turing computable, but it is still >> explainable entirely in term of Turing machine. A lot of things about >> Turing machine is not computable, so that is not so astonishing.* >> >> I'm not sure I follow that (with respect to Ton-Turing computing), but >> here is where I think there could be progress: >> >> >> The late Turing scholar S. Barry Cooper: >> >> *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails >> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for >> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic >> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.* >> * >> >> Here I would add *modal *to *higher-type*, and assert that *experience >> processing* is non-Turing (unconventional) computing [ and maybe develop >> this into a conference paper ]. >> >> >> The question will be which modal logic. Of course, the theology of >> machines does answer that question. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> * *What Makes a Computation Unconventional? or, there is no such thing >> as Non Turing Computation* >> S. Barry Cooper >> - >> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8c56/91dbcfd9751d4ef87135baf89ad5e64d83c2.pdf >> >> cf. *Incomputability In Nature* >> S. Barry Cooper >> - >> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2829873_Incomputability_In_Nature >> *To what extent is incomputability relevant to the material Universe? We >> look at ways in which this question might be answered, and the extent to >> which the theory of computability, which grew out of the work of Godel, >> Church, Kleene and Turing, can contribute to a clear resolution of the >> current confusion. It is hoped that the presentation will be accessible to >> the non-specialist reader.* >> >> >> >> Late Barry Cooper was a very nice guy. But he is not really aware of the >> mind-body problem (despite publishing one my paper at the ACCE meeting). I >> do agree with his assertion that there is no such thing as a non Turing >> computation, in nature. In arithmetic, you have the relativise computations >> with oracle, but up to now, only the random oracle makes sense (it is a by >> product of the first person indeterminacy, as well as the halting oracle, >> which is just “time”). >> >> You better should make your argument straight instead of referring to >> papers, which relevance does not strike the eyes. Keep in mind that we are >> in the Aristotelian Era since long, with an implicit or explicit assumption >> that there is a physical universe being ontologically “real”? Read my >> papers for an explanation of why this is incompatible with Mechanism. Then, >> there is no evidence at all fors such kind of matter, beyond the fact that >> is rarely defined at all, and based on a non valid metaphysical >> extrapolation. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> The paper would start with > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ > > combined with > > https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ > > and others I have written > > but I doubt that a paper I would send to an AAAI conference on conscious > systems would have any point-of-view that matter does not exist. :) > > > > Me too. Why would a paper think? > > Bruno > > > But maybe it [proto]experiences.
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