On Thursday, November 8, 2018 at 5:23:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 7 Nov 2018, at 21:40, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, November 7, 2018 at 9:31:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 6 Nov 2018, at 10:58, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, November 6, 2018 at 2:52:23 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 5:39:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 4 Nov 2018, at 14:53, John Clark <johnk...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 6:23 AM Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> *> If experience (Galen Strawson, The Subject of Experience) is the >>>>> result of information (only) processing, * >>>>> >>>> >>>> If? If information is not the thing that needs processing to produce >>>> intelligence then what is? >>>> >>>> > then the argument for arithmetical (Platonic) reality holds. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Only if somebody can show how information, or anything else, can be >>>> processed without using matter that obeys the laws of physics. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Information processing (computation) has been first discovered in >>>> arithmetic, where there is no matter. >>>> >>>> The fact that the physical reality is Turing-complete explains how we >>>> can build machine doing it, but unfortunately, if “matter” is taken >>>> seriously as primitive, the person itself can no more be attached to any >>>> particular body. >>>> >>>> Eventually, it is the very notion of primitive matter, or physicalism, >>>> which needs to be abandonned if we assume Mechanism or Computationalism. >>>> >>>> Of course to get this, you need a bit more than the UDA step 3 … >>>> >>>> Please, try to convince someone else to explain what is wrong in the >>>> step 3, as you did not succeed in making your point up to now. >>>> >>>> >>>> And, despite the existence of books made of dead trees with black >>>> squiggles made of ink with a high Carbon content pressed onto them, nobody >>>> has even come close to doing that. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> It is born in that way. Study any book in the field. You are confusing >>>> everyone on this. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>> >>> >>> "Physics" to me is physics theories written in some language (in 2018, >>> who knows what language it will be in 2118). >>> >>> It is a language that can be used to write the Standard Model and >>> Einstein equation(s). >>> >>> *e.g.* >>> *This version of the Standard Model is written in the Lagrangian form.* >>> >>> https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/the-deconstructed-standard-model-equation >>> >>> The language and the models written in the language are not the reality >>> itself. >>> >>> It is a mistake to use "physical reality" to correspond to material >>> reality. Material reality may not be be Turing computable. >>> >>> - pt >>> >> >> A better way: >> >> Let I = Information, E = Experience. Material reality may not be >> I-computable, but may be (I,E)-computable. >> >> All information (I) in the universe *is* Turing computable (nothing >> super-Turing), but experience (E) is missing. >> >> >> >> Take the duplication experience, either physical, or through the looking >> at a spin in some superposition state. We cannot, in both case, compute the >> results, but this allows us to introduce the experience by using only the >> indexical notion of “I”. That “I” is indeed not Turing computable, but it >> is still explainable entirely in term of Turing machine. A lot of things >> about Turing machine is not computable, so that is not so astonishing. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Hence I am (somewhere) on the same page as Philip Goff. >> >> *Panpsychism is crazy, but it’s also most probably true* >> - >> https://aeon.co/ideas/panpsychism-is-crazy-but-its-also-most-probably-true >> >> >> This assume a physical universe which cannot be done if we assume >> mechanism and which is what I want to explain, then, yes it is crazy. It >> trivialises consciousness, and this does not seem to be able to make >> progress on the mind-body problem. It eludes it, it seems to me. >> Consciousness needs some ability to refer to oneself, implicitly, like >> plants and worms, or explicitly, like most “higher” animals. >> >> Bruno >> >> > > Re: *That “I” is indeed not Turing computable, but it is still > explainable entirely in term of Turing machine. A lot of things about > Turing machine is not computable, so that is not so astonishing.* > > I'm not sure I follow that (with respect to Ton-Turing computing), but > here is where I think there could be progress: > > > The late Turing scholar S. Barry Cooper: > > *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails > higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for > embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic > content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.* > * > > Here I would add *modal *to *higher-type*, and assert that *experience > processing* is non-Turing (unconventional) computing [ and maybe develop > this into a conference paper ]. > > > The question will be which modal logic. Of course, the theology of > machines does answer that question. > > > > > > > * *What Makes a Computation Unconventional? or, there is no such thing as > Non Turing Computation* > S. Barry Cooper > - > https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8c56/91dbcfd9751d4ef87135baf89ad5e64d83c2.pdf > > cf. *Incomputability In Nature* > S. Barry Cooper > - > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2829873_Incomputability_In_Nature > *To what extent is incomputability relevant to the material Universe? We > look at ways in which this question might be answered, and the extent to > which the theory of computability, which grew out of the work of Godel, > Church, Kleene and Turing, can contribute to a clear resolution of the > current confusion. It is hoped that the presentation will be accessible to > the non-specialist reader.* > > > > Late Barry Cooper was a very nice guy. But he is not really aware of the > mind-body problem (despite publishing one my paper at the ACCE meeting). I > do agree with his assertion that there is no such thing as a non Turing > computation, in nature. In arithmetic, you have the relativise computations > with oracle, but up to now, only the random oracle makes sense (it is a by > product of the first person indeterminacy, as well as the halting oracle, > which is just “time”). > > You better should make your argument straight instead of referring to > papers, which relevance does not strike the eyes. Keep in mind that we are > in the Aristotelian Era since long, with an implicit or explicit assumption > that there is a physical universe being ontologically “real”? Read my > papers for an explanation of why this is incompatible with Mechanism. Then, > there is no evidence at all fors such kind of matter, beyond the fact that > is rarely defined at all, and based on a non valid metaphysical > extrapolation. > > Bruno > > > The paper would start with

https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ combined with https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ and others I have written but I doubt that a paper I would send to an AAAI conference on conscious systems would have any point-of-view that matter does not exist. :) - pt - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.