On Thursday, November 8, 2018 at 5:23:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 7 Nov 2018, at 21:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, November 7, 2018 at 9:31:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 6 Nov 2018, at 10:58, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, November 6, 2018 at 2:52:23 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, November 5, 2018 at 5:39:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 4 Nov 2018, at 14:53, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 6:23 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> *> If experience (Galen Strawson, The Subject of Experience) is the >>>>> result of information (only) processing, * >>>>> >>>> >>>> If? If information is not the thing that needs processing to produce >>>> intelligence then what is? >>>> >>>> > then the argument for arithmetical (Platonic) reality holds. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Only if somebody can show how information, or anything else, can be >>>> processed without using matter that obeys the laws of physics. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Information processing (computation) has been first discovered in >>>> arithmetic, where there is no matter. >>>> >>>> The fact that the physical reality is Turing-complete explains how we >>>> can build machine doing it, but unfortunately, if “matter” is taken >>>> seriously as primitive, the person itself can no more be attached to any >>>> particular body. >>>> >>>> Eventually, it is the very notion of primitive matter, or physicalism, >>>> which needs to be abandonned if we assume Mechanism or Computationalism. >>>> >>>> Of course to get this, you need a bit more than the UDA step 3 … >>>> >>>> Please, try to convince someone else to explain what is wrong in the >>>> step 3, as you did not succeed in making your point up to now. >>>> >>>> >>>> And, despite the existence of books made of dead trees with black >>>> squiggles made of ink with a high Carbon content pressed onto them, nobody >>>> has even come close to doing that. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> It is born in that way. Study any book in the field. You are confusing >>>> everyone on this. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>> >>> >>> "Physics" to me is physics theories written in some language (in 2018, >>> who knows what language it will be in 2118). >>> >>> It is a language that can be used to write the Standard Model and >>> Einstein equation(s). >>> >>> *e.g.* >>> *This version of the Standard Model is written in the Lagrangian form.* >>> >>> https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/the-deconstructed-standard-model-equation >>> >>> The language and the models written in the language are not the reality >>> itself. >>> >>> It is a mistake to use "physical reality" to correspond to material >>> reality. Material reality may not be be Turing computable. >>> >>> - pt >>> >> >> A better way: >> >> Let I = Information, E = Experience. Material reality may not be >> I-computable, but may be (I,E)-computable. >> >> All information (I) in the universe *is* Turing computable (nothing >> super-Turing), but experience (E) is missing. >> >> >> >> Take the duplication experience, either physical, or through the looking >> at a spin in some superposition state. We cannot, in both case, compute the >> results, but this allows us to introduce the experience by using only the >> indexical notion of “I”. That “I” is indeed not Turing computable, but it >> is still explainable entirely in term of Turing machine. A lot of things >> about Turing machine is not computable, so that is not so astonishing. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Hence I am (somewhere) on the same page as Philip Goff. >> >> *Panpsychism is crazy, but it’s also most probably true* >> - >> https://aeon.co/ideas/panpsychism-is-crazy-but-its-also-most-probably-true >> >> >> This assume a physical universe which cannot be done if we assume >> mechanism and which is what I want to explain, then, yes it is crazy. It >> trivialises consciousness, and this does not seem to be able to make >> progress on the mind-body problem. It eludes it, it seems to me. >> Consciousness needs some ability to refer to oneself, implicitly, like >> plants and worms, or explicitly, like most “higher” animals. >> >> Bruno >> >> > > Re: *That “I” is indeed not Turing computable, but it is still > explainable entirely in term of Turing machine. A lot of things about > Turing machine is not computable, so that is not so astonishing.* > > I'm not sure I follow that (with respect to Ton-Turing computing), but > here is where I think there could be progress: > > > The late Turing scholar S. Barry Cooper: > > *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails > higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for > embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic > content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.* > * > > Here I would add *modal *to *higher-type*, and assert that *experience > processing* is non-Turing (unconventional) computing [ and maybe develop > this into a conference paper ]. > > > The question will be which modal logic. Of course, the theology of > machines does answer that question. > > > > > > > * *What Makes a Computation Unconventional? or, there is no such thing as > Non Turing Computation* > S. Barry Cooper > - > https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8c56/91dbcfd9751d4ef87135baf89ad5e64d83c2.pdf > > cf. *Incomputability In Nature* > S. Barry Cooper > - > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2829873_Incomputability_In_Nature > *To what extent is incomputability relevant to the material Universe? We > look at ways in which this question might be answered, and the extent to > which the theory of computability, which grew out of the work of Godel, > Church, Kleene and Turing, can contribute to a clear resolution of the > current confusion. It is hoped that the presentation will be accessible to > the non-specialist reader.* > > > > Late Barry Cooper was a very nice guy. But he is not really aware of the > mind-body problem (despite publishing one my paper at the ACCE meeting). I > do agree with his assertion that there is no such thing as a non Turing > computation, in nature. In arithmetic, you have the relativise computations > with oracle, but up to now, only the random oracle makes sense (it is a by > product of the first person indeterminacy, as well as the halting oracle, > which is just “time”). > > You better should make your argument straight instead of referring to > papers, which relevance does not strike the eyes. Keep in mind that we are > in the Aristotelian Era since long, with an implicit or explicit assumption > that there is a physical universe being ontologically “real”? Read my > papers for an explanation of why this is incompatible with Mechanism. Then, > there is no evidence at all fors such kind of matter, beyond the fact that > is rarely defined at all, and based on a non valid metaphysical > extrapolation. > > Bruno > > > The paper would start with
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ combined with https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ and others I have written but I doubt that a paper I would send to an AAAI conference on conscious systems would have any point-of-view that matter does not exist. :) - pt - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
