On Sunday, January 13, 2019 at 9:22:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Jan 2019, at 23:36, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Why - in numerical reality (UD) - can't there be vampires, >>>>>>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in >>>>>>> computer simulations of stories of them … >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of >>>>>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of >>>>>>> observable, you can infer that either: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mechanism is false, or >>>>>>> You are dreaming, or >>>>>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry >>>>>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we >>>>>>> see exactly what mechanism predicts. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical >>>>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so >>>>>> low >>>>>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the >>>>>> observable >>>>>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also >>>>>> problematical >>>>>> to me. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta >>>>>> as the fundamental elements of nature. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an >>>>>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without >>>>>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if >>>>>> invisible horses pull the car? >>>>>> >>>>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence >>>>>> of nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are >>>>>> not the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, >>>>>> which >>>>>> is inconsistent with mechanism. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing >>>>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) >>>>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary >>>>>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would >>>>>> entail >>>>>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both >>>>>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who >>>>>> make up stories about vampires and werewolves. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the >>>>>> computationalist hypothesis. >>>>>> >>>>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. >>>>>> To avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a >>>>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, >>>>>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way >>>>>> (as >>>>>> your use of many links illustrates). >>>>>> >>>>>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in >>>>>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts >>>>>> go >>>>>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of >>>>>> primary >>>>>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, >>>>>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves >>>>>> Mechanism. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would >>>>> be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from >>>>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I >>>>> do >>>>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any >>>>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that >>>>> they >>>>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical >>>>> laws. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a >>>>> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which >>>>> *takes >>>>> place in matter*. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to >>>>> rough for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory >>>>> implies it appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and >>>>> machine’s physics, it will make sense to suppose some matter, and >>>>> mechanism >>>>> false, but that is, before having evidences, quite speculative, and >>>>> conceptually unclear. It is almost like invoking a god in an explanation, >>>>> to avoid an explanation. >>>>> >>>>> You added: <<A better way: *Matter does explain consciousness, once >>>>> the true nature of matter is appreciated.>>* >>>>> >>>>> What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it >>>>> looks we avoid the question of its “true nature”, which with mechanism is >>>>> purely phenomenological. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> There are always different perspectives. Take the PLT (programming >>>> language theory) perspective, or at UCNC 2019, (unconventional) UPLT. >>>> >>>> Consider immersive virtual reality (IVR) programs. An IVR program will >>>> compile into an object (code) that does a whole bunch of stuff with a >>>> whole >>>> bunch of electronics attached to your head and maybe whole body. It can >>>> have a denotational semantics, which, in a gaming context (game your >>>> semantics) could involve modal logics. But there is also its operational >>>> semantics, and then physical semantics (the power consumption of the >>>> apparatus, its graphical grade of quality, ...) which depends on the >>>> physical substrate of the program, and, potentially, its experiential >>>> semantics (as you yourself become immersed in its environment). >>>> >>>> The point is that a denotational semantics, like the Gödel-Löb type >>>> modal logics for agent programs, is an important part of (intelligent to >>>> conscious) agent programming, but there is more to semantics (as in PLT >>>> semantics), like physical and experiential semantics, especially as agents >>>> will be produced by new technologies like nanotechnology and synthetic >>>> biology. >>>> >>>> As for matter, to quote a line from W.H. Auden, "... Matter is / Odder >>>> that we thought.” >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Why to invoke them? You don’t answer my question. I have really no clue >>>> what you mean by matter, and why you want it to be a primary notion >>>> (besides 1500 years of dogmatic brainwashing on it). >>>> >>>> If you think that nanotechnology or synthetic biology violate Church’s >>>> thesis, then that would refute Mechanism, and would makes primary matter >>>> consistent with the fact, but still very doubtable. If mechanism is true, >>>> on the contrary, the problem is solved, even constructively, so that we >>>> can >>>> test it. Today, the evidences are for mechanism. I have never heard about >>>> an evidence for materialism, no more than for vitalism. Those are >>>> simplifying idea, useful methodologically in applied science, but they >>>> should not be taken literally when doing metaphysics with the scientific >>>> method. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> The ultimate dogmatic brainwashing of course is *Platonism* - the >>> Platonism of mathematics in particular - that mathematical objects have a >>> real existence. Generations of school children are brainwashed by Platonism. >>> >>> >>> Platonism (in metaphysics) is under the rug since 1500 years. The >>> platonism have escaped to the Middle-East, where Plato will not be >>> completely forgotten up to 1258. >>> >>> Platonism of mathematics should be called realism in mathematics, as the >>> relation with Plato’s philosophy is a complex domain. But I don’t see any >>> brainwashing here. It is not taught at all, and in europa, it is not even >>> well seen, as compared to Aristotle’s naturalism. >>> >>> Anyway, the question is if it is true or false. In mathematics, >>> mechanism restricts realism only to finite mathematics, or arithmetic. This >>> is basically the idea that 2+2=4, and that this is true independently of >>> me. If you have a reason to doubt that, you can give it, but usually this >>> is not problematical. It is taught at primary school, and I have never >>> heard anyone contesting it outside philosophers who want to avoid >>> metaphysical consequences for reason of personal taste. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on the >> evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by saying >> that the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the one we >> search. >> >> Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed, and >> badly seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle did not >> understood Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics” where he >> seems to suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to Plato without >> saying (but that is an optimistic reading of Aristotle’s metaphysics, To be >> sure I found some scholars who saw that too, like Gerson. >> >> That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because “truth” >> when encompassing the description of a machine at its correct substitution >> level, is no more definable by that machine. Yes, Truth, and semantics, is >> very much like the platonician notion of God. You force me to agree with >> Rorty on this! >> >> >> Bruno >> >> > I read some philosophy (particularly of mathematics) before my 1979 Ph.D. > After that was out of the way, I began to read a lot more. Two books came > out in 1979 which impacted me early: > > GEB: Gödel, Escher, Bach ( Douglas Hofstadter) > > > That is a rather good book. It contains a valid refutation of Lucas use of > Gödel against Mechanism. It shows also that some physicist get Gödel right! > Now, it scratch only the surface of incompleteness and of its importance > in Mechanist theories. > Another excellent book is the book by Judson Webb “Mechanism, Mentalism > and Metamathematics; an essay on finitism” (D. Reidel Publishing Company, > Dordrecht (Holland) 1980). My own work can be seen as a continuation, with > an emphasis on the Mind-Body problem and the origin of the physical laws). > > > PMN: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Richard Rorty) > > > I read it. > > > > > After 40 years now, "Rortian" is as succinct a term as any (if I had to > choose one word) to say what my philosophy is. > > > We have to much dissimilar premises, but you are coherent with respect to > computationalism, although I am still not entirely sure. I still don’t know > how to relate mind to matter, nor why you seem to introduce primary matter. > > You should try to describe your view, without any links, or with links > only in footnotes for those who would dig deeper. > > Bruno > >
My only link here is to my notebook: https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/ 102 notes so far. What I've though of is there somewhere. But in summary I adopt: - an *unconventional computationalism* (where psychical/experiential modalities are entities of machine operation, vs. just logical/numerical modalities) - a *PLTOS* (program-language-translator/compiler-object-substrate) framework, where conventional PLT - programming language theory - is extended to substrate-dependency, resulting in an (unconventional) UPLT - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
