> On 13 Jan 2019, at 21:08, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, January 13, 2019 at 9:22:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 23:36, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
>>>>>>>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
>>>>>>>> computer simulations of stories of them …
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>>>>>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>>>>>>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>>>>>> You are dreaming, or
>>>>>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>>>>>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we 
>>>>>>> see exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>>>>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
>>>>>> low that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
>>>>>> observable one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also 
>>>>>> problematical to me.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta 
>>>>>>> as the fundamental elements of nature.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
>>>>>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
>>>>>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
>>>>>> invisible horses pull the car?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>>>>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are 
>>>>>> not the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, 
>>>>>> which is inconsistent with mechanism.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
>>>>>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>>>>>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
>>>>>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would 
>>>>>> entail the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and 
>>>>>> makes both consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is 
>>>>>> the goal?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make 
>>>>>>> up stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>>>>>> hypothesis.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>>>>>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>>>>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>>>>>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way 
>>>>>> (as your use of many links illustrates).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>>>>>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts 
>>>>>> go in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of 
>>>>>> primary matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be 
>>>>>> Newtonian, Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + 
>>>>>> EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would 
>>>>>> be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
>>>>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I 
>>>>> do not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of 
>>>>> any universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) 
>>>>> that they are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the 
>>>>> physical laws.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>>>>>> possible denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes 
>>>>>> place in matter.
>>>>> 
>>>>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough 
>>>>> for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies 
>>>>> it appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s 
>>>>> physics, it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, 
>>>>> but that is, before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually 
>>>>> unclear. It is almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an 
>>>>> explanation. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> You added: <<A better way: Matter does explain consciousness, once the 
>>>>> true nature of matter is appreciated.>>
>>>>> 
>>>>> What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks 
>>>>> we avoid the question of its “true nature”, which with mechanism is 
>>>>> purely phenomenological.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> There are always different perspectives. Take the PLT (programming 
>>>>> language theory) perspective, or at UCNC 2019, (unconventional) UPLT.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Consider immersive virtual reality (IVR) programs. An IVR program will 
>>>>> compile into an object (code) that does a whole bunch of stuff with a 
>>>>> whole bunch of electronics attached to your head and maybe whole body. It 
>>>>> can have a denotational semantics, which, in a gaming context (game your 
>>>>> semantics) could involve modal logics. But there is also its operational 
>>>>> semantics, and then physical semantics (the power consumption of the 
>>>>> apparatus, its graphical grade of quality, ...) which depends on the 
>>>>> physical substrate of the program, and, potentially, its experiential 
>>>>> semantics (as you yourself become immersed in its environment).
>>>>> 
>>>>> The point is that a denotational semantics, like the Gödel-Löb type modal 
>>>>> logics for agent programs, is an important part of  (intelligent to 
>>>>> conscious) agent programming, but there is more to semantics (as in PLT 
>>>>> semantics), like physical and experiential semantics, especially as 
>>>>> agents will be produced by new technologies like nanotechnology and 
>>>>> synthetic biology. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> As for matter, to quote a line from W.H. Auden, "... Matter is / Odder 
>>>>> that we thought.”
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Why to invoke them? You don’t answer my question. I have really no clue 
>>>> what you mean by matter, and why you want it to be a primary notion 
>>>> (besides 1500 years of dogmatic brainwashing on it).
>>>> 
>>>> If you think that nanotechnology or synthetic biology violate Church’s 
>>>> thesis, then that would refute Mechanism, and would makes primary matter 
>>>> consistent with the fact, but still very doubtable. If mechanism is true, 
>>>> on the contrary, the problem is solved, even constructively, so that we 
>>>> can test it.  Today, the evidences are for mechanism. I have never heard 
>>>> about an evidence for materialism, no more than for vitalism. Those are 
>>>> simplifying idea, useful methodologically in applied science, but they 
>>>> should not be taken literally when doing metaphysics with the scientific 
>>>> method.
>>>> 
>>>> Bruno
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> The ultimate dogmatic brainwashing of course is Platonism - the Platonism 
>>>> of mathematics in particular - that mathematical objects have a real 
>>>> existence. Generations of school children are brainwashed by Platonism.
>>> 
>>> Platonism (in metaphysics) is under the rug since 1500 years. The platonism 
>>> have escaped to the Middle-East, where Plato will not be completely 
>>> forgotten up to 1258.
>>> 
>>> Platonism of mathematics should be called realism in mathematics, as the 
>>> relation with Plato’s philosophy is a complex domain. But I don’t see any 
>>> brainwashing here. It is not taught at all, and in europa, it is not even 
>>> well seen, as compared to Aristotle’s naturalism.
>>> 
>>> Anyway, the question is if it is true or false. In mathematics, mechanism 
>>> restricts realism only to finite mathematics, or arithmetic. This is 
>>> basically the idea that 2+2=4, and that this is true independently of me. 
>>> If you have a reason to doubt that, you can give it, but usually this is 
>>> not problematical. It is taught at primary school, and I have never heard 
>>> anyone contesting it outside philosophers who want to avoid metaphysical 
>>> consequences for reason of personal taste.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on the 
>>> evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by saying that 
>> the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the one we search.
>> 
>> Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed, and badly 
>> seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle did not understood 
>> Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics” where he seems to 
>> suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to Plato without saying (but 
>> that is an optimistic reading of Aristotle’s metaphysics, To be sure I found 
>> some scholars who saw that too, like Gerson. 
>> 
>> That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because “truth” when 
>> encompassing the description of a machine at its correct substitution level, 
>> is no more definable by that machine. Yes, Truth, and semantics, is very 
>> much like the platonician notion of God. You force me to agree with Rorty on 
>> this!
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> I read some philosophy (particularly of mathematics) before my 1979 Ph.D. 
>> After that was out of the way, I began to read a lot more. Two books came 
>> out in 1979 which impacted me early:
>> 
>>   GEB: Gödel, Escher, Bach ( Douglas Hofstadter)
> 
> That is a rather good book. It contains a valid refutation of Lucas use of 
> Gödel against Mechanism. It shows also that some physicist get Gödel right!
> Now, it scratch only the surface of incompleteness and of its importance in 
> Mechanist theories. 
> Another excellent book is the book by Judson Webb “Mechanism, Mentalism and 
> Metamathematics; an essay on finitism” (D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
> Dordrecht (Holland) 1980). My own work can be seen as a continuation, with an 
> emphasis on the Mind-Body problem and the origin of the physical laws).
> 
> 
>>   PMN: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Richard Rorty)
> 
> I read it. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> After 40 years now, "Rortian" is as succinct a term as any (if I had to 
>> choose one word) to say what my philosophy is.  
> 
> We have to much dissimilar premises, but you are coherent with respect to 
> computationalism, although I am still not entirely sure. I still don’t know 
> how to relate mind to matter, nor why you seem to introduce primary matter. 
> 
> You should try to describe your view, without any links, or with links only 
> in footnotes for those who would dig deeper.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> My only link here is to my notebook:  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/
> 102 notes so far. What I've though of is there somewhere.
> 
> 
> But in summary I adopt:
> 
> - an unconventional computationalism (where psychical/experiential modalities 
> are entities of machine operation, vs. just logical/numerical modalities)

I can appreciate this. The universal number do appreciate this! The main 
problem of the use of modal logic in philosophy is that there are too many of 
them, but then with mechanism, we got a filter on them, and get the imposed (by 
incompleteness) logics G and G* and their intensional variants, which are very 
rich, and explains what there is a physical universe that we can observe. Now, 
that physical universe loses its ontology, so we are back to Plato (versus 
Aristotle’s materialism, for which there is no evidence at all). 



> 
> - a PLTOS (program-language-translator/compiler-object-substrate) framework, 
> where conventional PLT - programming language theory - is extended to 
> substrate-dependency, resulting in an (unconventional) UPLT

How could a (universal) machine distinguish a substance from an oracle, or from 
a more complex universal number? That seems as much impossible as to be able to 
know that we are not dreaming. But we can know that we are “dreaming", and 
nature confirms that position. “Dreaming” is in quote, because it requires 
infinitely many brains/representation-in-arithmetic, and is different from one 
specific dream made by one machine. The physics comes from the first person 
statistical interference between those dreams.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
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