subject:"Re\: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness"



On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:18, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/16/2015 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 05:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett  
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
wrote:

  LizR wrote:
  On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
  mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
  mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
  Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing  
that

  Bruno
  had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
  uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.  
Step 3 is only a small
  step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday

  consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
  duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
  duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
  what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
  You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
  case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large  
distance
  and don't further interact. You might come to a different  
conclusion

  if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the  
copy sitting in the chair on the left? is less dramatic than  
Will I be transported to Moscow or Washington? and hence, I  
suspect, might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the  
argument goes through either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not  
agree that they were the same person.



  Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
  worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this  
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical  
computation (which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable  
assumption for brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was  
repeated made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.  
Step 3 is basically to introduce the idea of FPI, and hence form a  
link with the MWI of quantum mechanics. This may not always have  
been made explicit, but the intention is clear.


It is not made at all. people who criticize UDA always criticize  
what they add themselves to the reasoning. This is not valid.  
People who does that criticize only themselves, not the argument  
presented.



Step 3 does not succeed in this because the inference to FPI  
depends on a flawed concept of personal identity.



Step 3 leads to the FPI, and to see what happens next, there is  
step 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Then the translation in arithmetic show how  
to already extract the logic of the observable so that we might  
refute a form of comp (based on comp + the classical theory of  
knowledge). That main point there is that incompleteness refutes  
Socrates argument against the Theaetetus,


Which argument do you refer to?  Theaetetus puts forward several  
theories of knowledge which Socrates attempts to refute.


That's true.
I was referring to the definition of knowledge by true justified  
opinion: the passage from []A (rational opinion, justified  
proposition)  to []A  A (justified opinion which is also true).


Incompleteness (the impossibility to prove []f - f) gives an  
arithmetical sense to that move, as the logic of []A, which is G, will  
obey to a different logic than the logic of []A  A.  []f does not  
imply f, from the machine's view, but []f  f does trivially imply f.


Bruno





Brent

and we can almost directly retrieve the Parmenides-Plotinus  
theology in the discourse of the introspecting universal (Löbian)  
machine.


Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 meekerdb wrote:

 On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
 philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
 by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
 discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
 an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
 metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.

 Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the
 reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of
 unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)


 And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much an
 unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


 But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it, his
 theory in outline is:

 1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
 2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
 3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
 4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that
 correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
 5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by
 computed relations between the computed physics and our computed thoughts.
 6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so
 realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces the
 multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other worlds which he
 hopes to show have low measure.


 I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of his
 theory. I have difficulties with several of the points you list. But that
 aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even if all of this
 goes through? I do not think it explains consciousness. It seems to stem
 from the idea that consciousness is a certain type of computation (that can
 be emulated in a universal Turing machine, or general purpose computer.)
 This is then developed as a form of idealism (2 above) to argue that the
 physical world and our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about that world,
 are also certain types of computations.

 But this is no nearer to an explanation of consciousness than the
 alternative model of assuming a primitive physical universe and arguing
 that consciousness supervenes on the physical structure of brains, and that
 mathematics is an inference from our physical experiences. Consciousness
 supervenes on computations? What sort of computation? Why on this sort and
 not any other sort? Similar questions arise in the physicalist account of
 course, but proposing a new theory that does not answer any of the
 questions posed by the original theory does not seem like an advance to me.
 At least physicalism has evolutionary arguments open to it as an
 explanation of consciousness

 The physicalist model has the advantage that it gives the physical world
 directly -- physics does not have to be constructed from some abstract
 computations in Platonia (even if such a concept can be given any meaning.)
 If you take the degree of agreement with observation as the measure of
 success of a theory, then physicalism wins hands down. Bruno's theory does
 not currently produce any real physics at all.

 The discussion of the detailed steps in the argument Bruno gives is merely
 a search for clarification. As I have said, many things seem open to
 philosophical discussion, and some of Bruno's definitions seem
 self-serving. When I seek clarification, the ground seems to move beneath
 me. The detailed argument is hard to pin down for these reasons.


Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the brain is
Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's reasoning in the
UDA computationalism leads to elimination of a primary physical world.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 20:24, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett  
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
wrote:


   Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific  
finding by
   philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific  
observation

   by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
   discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation.  
In

   an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
   metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.


Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the  
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis  
of unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as  
much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it,  
his theory in outline is:


1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that  
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by  
computed relations between the computed physics


Computed or not.




and our computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so  
realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces the  
multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other worlds  
which he hopes to show have low measure.


Well, better to talk in term of the continuations. The indeterminacy  
is relative, for the physics. There is another more geographical  
indterminacy, which is more Bayesian, like if there are carbon atoms,  
I have to find myself in a reality with carbon maker (like stars).  
That indeterminacy still requires a notion of normal (Gaussian)  
reality, and thus a solution to the general measure problem.


Rather good summary Brent!

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.

Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the 
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of 
unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much 
an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it, his 
theory in outline is:


1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that 
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by 
computed relations between the computed physics and our computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so 
realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces the 
multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other worlds which 
he hopes to show have low measure.


I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of his 
theory. I have difficulties with several of the points you list. But 
that aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even if all of 
this goes through? I do not think it explains consciousness. It seems to 
stem from the idea that consciousness is a certain type of computation 
(that can be emulated in a universal Turing machine, or general purpose 
computer.) This is then developed as a form of idealism (2 above) to 
argue that the physical world and our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs 
about that world, are also certain types of computations.


But this is no nearer to an explanation of consciousness than the 
alternative model of assuming a primitive physical universe and arguing 
that consciousness supervenes on the physical structure of brains, and 
that mathematics is an inference from our physical experiences. 
Consciousness supervenes on computations? What sort of computation? Why 
on this sort and not any other sort? Similar questions arise in the 
physicalist account of course, but proposing a new theory that does not 
answer any of the questions posed by the original theory does not seem 
like an advance to me. At least physicalism has evolutionary arguments 
open to it as an explanation of consciousness


The physicalist model has the advantage that it gives the physical world 
directly -- physics does not have to be constructed from some abstract 
computations in Platonia (even if such a concept can be given any 
meaning.) If you take the degree of agreement with observation as the 
measure of success of a theory, then physicalism wins hands down. 
Bruno's theory does not currently produce any real physics at all.


The discussion of the detailed steps in the argument Bruno gives is 
merely a search for clarification. As I have said, many things seem open 
to philosophical discussion, and some of Bruno's definitions seem 
self-serving. When I seek clarification, the ground seems to move 
beneath me. The detailed argument is hard to pin down for these reasons.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 19:19, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as  
the original.


 No one assume that.

 John Clark assumes this,

Of course I assume it, it's the only logical conclusion and I assume  
that logic is more likely to find the truth than illogic, although  
Quinton has publicly stated other ideas on that subject.


 I have locally assume it too, but only to refute Clark argument.  
That might explain your confusion,


But it doesn't explain my confusion,


The post was addressed to Bruce.



do you agree that both copies are equally the same person as the  
original or do you not?



I do.
They are the same person in the sense that I am the same person as  
yesterday. So we can say that the W-man and the M-man are both the H- 
man, but put in different cities. That is the reason of the  
indeterminacy lived by the H-man beore he pushes on the button: he  
knows (with the computationalist assumption and the default  
hypotheses) that he will be in both city, but that with a probability  
one he will feel, in both cities, to be in only one city.  The H-man,  
when still in helsinki, can predict that when he will be reconstituted  
in the boxes, he will be unable to know if he will see M, or W, before  
opening the door. But he knows that after the door will be opened, he  
will see only once city. By a simple reasoning, he knows all this in  
advance, so he is aware of that indeterminacy before pushing the button.


Bruno





  John K Clark




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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:

On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a
scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a
scientific observation
by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a
philosophical
discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an
observation. In
an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his
discourse.

Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that -
quite the reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno
often do so on the basis of unexamined metaphysical
assumptions (like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just
as much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand
it, his theory in outline is:

1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled
by computed relations between the computed physics and our
computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and
so realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces
the multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other
worlds which he hopes to show have low measure.


I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of
his theory. I have difficulties with several of the points you list.
But that aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even
if all of this goes through? I do not think it explains
consciousness. It seems to stem from the idea that consciousness is
a certain type of computation (that can be emulated in a universal
Turing machine, or general purpose computer.) This is then developed
as a form of idealism (2 above) to argue that the physical world and
our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about that world, are also
certain types of computations.

But this is no nearer to an explanation of consciousness than the
alternative model of assuming a primitive physical universe and
arguing that consciousness supervenes on the physical structure of
brains, and that mathematics is an inference from our physical
experiences. Consciousness supervenes on computations? What sort of
computation? Why on this sort and not any other sort? Similar
questions arise in the physicalist account of course, but proposing
a new theory that does not answer any of the questions posed by the
original theory does not seem like an advance to me. At least
physicalism has evolutionary arguments open to it as an explanation
of consciousness

The physicalist model has the advantage that it gives the physical
world directly -- physics does not have to be constructed from some
abstract computations in Platonia (even if such a concept can be
given any meaning.) If you take the degree of agreement with
observation as the measure of success of a theory, then physicalism
wins hands down. Bruno's theory does not currently produce any real
physics at all.

The discussion of the detailed steps in the argument Bruno gives is
merely a search for clarification. As I have said, many things seem
open to philosophical discussion, and some of Bruno's definitions
seem self-serving. When I seek clarification, the ground seems to
move beneath me. The detailed argument is hard to pin down for these
reasons.


Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the brain is 
Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's reasoning in the 
UDA computationalism leads to elimination of a primary physical world.


But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of 
quantum physics precludes it.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:18, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/16/2015 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:52, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou  
stath...@gmail.com a écrit :


 Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow  
copying, but

 that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
 logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper  
paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be  
selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say  
consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about  
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a  
metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you  
assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm  
saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is  
obviously duplicatable.


Quentin
In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether  
it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of  
it.  Not just, an instrospective well everybody knows what it is.


Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some  
level. Is that enough to be a propositional definition?


I don't think it's specific enough because it isn't clear whether  
computational process means a physical process or an abstract  
one.  If you take computational process to be the abstract  
process in Platonia then it would not be duplicable;


?

The UD copied the abstract process an infinity of times. It  
might appear in


phi_567_(29)^45, phi_567_(29)^46, phi_567_(29)^47, phi_567_(29)^48,  
phi_567_(29)^49, phi_567_(29)^50, ... and in


phi_8999704_(0)^89,   phi_8999704_(0)^90,  phi_8999704_(0)^91,   
phi_8999704_(0)^92,  phi_8999704_(0)^93,


I don't understand your notation here.  Does phi_i(x) refer to the  
ith function in some list of all functions?


Yes. The computably enumerable (with repetitions) list of the partial  
computable functions. You get one, you choose your favorite universal  
programming language, and order the programs lexicographically. This  
determines a list of the phi_i.




And does the exponent refer to repeated iteration: phi_i(x)^n+1 :=  
phi_i(phi_i(x)^n)?


No. phi_i(x)^n represents the nth first step of the computation.

A universal dovetailer is given by the following program:

FOR ALL x, y, z
compute phi_x(y)^z
END

Here the dovetailing is managed by the infinite FOR ALL.

Bruno










every copy would just be a token of the same process.  I think  
that's what Bruno means.


The consciousness will be the same, but it is multiplied (in some  
3-1 sense) in UD* (sigma_1 truth).


Are you saying that identity of indiscernibles doesn't apply to  
these computations?


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/16/2015 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as  
having been duplicated in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.


How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?


By associating it with different token of the machinery  
implementing it.




Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having different  
spacetime location can distinguish two otherwise indiscernible set  
of thoughts?


No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?


I'm not sure what 3-1 view means,


It is the content of the diary of the observer outside the box (like  
in sane04), but on the consciousness of the copies involved. This is  
for the people who say that they will be conscious in W and M. That is  
true, but the pure 1-view is that they will be conscious in only one  
city (even if that happens in both cities).


In the math part, this is captured by [1][0]A, with [0]A = the usual  
bewesibar of Gödel, and [1]A = [0]A  A (Theaetetus).



but if you mean in the sense of running on two different machines  
then I agree.


OK.


That means duplication of consciousness/computation depends on  
distinguishability of the physical substrate with no distinction in  
the consciousness/computation.


OK. Like when the guy has already been multiplied in W and M, but has  
not yet open the door. We assume of course that the two boxes are  
identical from inside, no windows, and the air molecules at the same  
place (for example). That can be made absolutely identical in the step  
6, where the reconstitutions are made in a virtual environment.




  But is that the duplication envisioned in the M-W thought  
experiment?


Yes, at different steps.




I find I'm confused about that.  In our quantum-mechanical world it  
is impossible to duplicate something in an unknown state.  One could  
duplicate a human being in the rough classical sense of structure at  
the molecular composition level, but not the molecular states.  Such  
duplicates would be similar as I'm similar to myself of yesterday -  
but they would instantly diverge in thoughts, even without seeing  
Moscow or Washington.


In practice, yes. Assuming the duplication is done in a real world,  
and assuming QM. But in step six, you can manage the environments to  
be themselves perfectly emulated and 100% identical. That is all what  
is needed for the reasoning.





Yet it seems Bruno's argument is based on deterministic computation


At my substitution level. But this will entail that the real world,  
whatever it can be, is non deterministic. We WM duplicate on all the  
different computations in the UD* (in arithmetic) which go through my  
local current state.



and requires the duplication and subsequent thoughts to be  
duplicates at a deterministic classcial level so that the M-man and  
W-man on diverge in thought when they see different things in their  
respective cities.


Yes. That is why the H-man cannot predict which divergence he will  
live. But sometimes we mention the state of the person before he or  
she open the doors, for example to address a question like would a  
tiny oxygen atom in the box makes a difference in the measure or  
not,  Here there is almost a matter of convention to say that there  
are two or one consciousness. We can ascribe consciousness to the  
different people in the different box, but that is a 3-1 view. The 1- 
views feels to be in once city, and not in the other.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 23:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/16/2015 6:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 13:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks  
philosophical sophistication. Computationalism is based on the  
idea that human consciousness is Turing emulable,
This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some  
point you might understand that this is not really the case. Comp  
assumes only that we can survive ith a digital brain, in the  
quasi-operational meaning of the yes doctor scenario.  
Consciousness is a first person notion, and that is not Turing  
emulable per se, in fact that is not even definable in any 3p  
term. That is part of the difficulty of the concept.


In COMP(2013) you write:
The digital mechanist thesis (or computationalism, or just  
comp) is then equivalent to the hypothesis that there is a level  
of description of that part of reality in which my consciousness  
remains invariant through a functional digital emulation of that  
generalized brain at that particular level.


I think this is saying that human consciousness is Turing emulable.


Only by using an identity thesis, which later will need to be  
abandonned. My consciousness is in Platonia, out of time and space,  
and might rely on infinities of computations. What the brain does   
consists in making it possible for that consciousness to manifest  
itself.


That seems problematic.  What is a consciousness conscious of when  
it is not manifesting itself?


It means it manifest itself elsewhere. It can be in a dream, like a  
sleepy person, or in a parallel universe, or in heaven or God knows  
what.


It can also be conscious of nothing, like with some powerful amnesia  
drug, like Salvia, which put yourself in the state of a sort of baby  
having not yet live any experience, but this is not needed to get the  
points, so I would prefer not insist on this in this thread, as it  
mention a consciousness state in which I would not have believed  
before trying salvia. We can indeed be conscious, and highly  
conscious, yet without any memory. That is even more spectacular with  
only a dissociative state, where you keep your memory, but stop  
completely to identify yourself with those memory. In that state, you  
get the higher self experience: where your memories, and your body  
appears to be like a window through which the real person you are can  
observe a world, but knows that such meories are just contingent and  
play no part in defining what you are (the Plotinus and mystic notion  
of inner god).




 To whom does it manifest itself when it is manifest?  ISTM it's  
only manifest to itself - which on your theory wouldn't require a  
brain.


You alway need a relative brain to manifest yourself with respect to  
some other universal number (a physical universe, a friend, a  
correspondent on a list, etc.). But the real you need only the  
arithmetical reality, and you can dissociate yourself from your  
infinitely many brains in arithmetic, and get the consciousness state  
of the most elementary virgin (unprogrammed, unexperienced) universal  
numbers, which is common among all living organism.


Here salvia is more amazing than comp, as it suggests intermediate  
realms, where that virgin consciousness can experience heaven or  
hellish sort of dreams. The most amazing thing is that you experience  
or hallucinate that this is your normal state, and that your live here  
was a sort of dream. The feeling of realness is vastly superior than  
the feeling of realness we usually experience in life, and this can be  
frightening for people who believe we can know that we are awake by  
introspection, like with the people who believe that reality is  
WYSIWYG. As a friend of mine said after a salvia experience, you get  
new doubts, new fears, etc.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the
brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's
reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to elimination of a
primary physical world.

But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of
quantum physics precludes it.

Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical state? That 
doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a whole cannot be 
emulated. And if it turns out that physics is continuous rather than 
than discrete you could still come arbitrarily close with digital models 
of the brain; if that was not good enough you would be saying that the 
brain is a machine with components of zero engineering tolerance. 


An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most 
certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be 
emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of pairs 
of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the position and 
momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision simultaneously, we 
find that there are two complementary descriptions of the physical 
system -- the description in position space and the description in 
momentum space. These are related by Fourier transforms. Any complete 
description of the physical world must take this into account.


If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure position 
exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact values for these 
two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of quantum mechanics. 
And there are very good arguments for the view that the world is at base 
quantum: the classical picture only emerges from the quantum at some 
coarse-grained level of description. You cannot describe everything that 
happens in the physical world from this classical, coarse-grained 
perspective.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 17 Apr 2015, at 07:12, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 06:34, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
 wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing  
that

Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.  
Step 3 is only a small
step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday

consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large  
distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different  
conclusion

if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the  
copy sitting in the chair on the left? is less dramatic than Will  
I be transported to Moscow or Washington? and hence, I suspect,  
might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument  
goes through either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree  
that they were the same person.


Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this  
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation  
(which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for  
brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated  
made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.


Discussion or fruitful argument assume mutual respect. The respect/ 
civility in the exchange is one-sided however, and has remained so  
for years. It's not an argument; closer to an experiment of John to  
see how often he can get away with airing personal issues clothed  
in sincerity of intellectual debate.


This occupies too much bandwidth and is a turn off from where I'm  
sitting. I'd much rather see the comp related discussions go to  
address say Telmo's request for clarification in Bruno's use of  
phi_i, or G/G* distinctions, or pedagogical demonstrations on the  
work arithmetic existentially actualizes/gets done, clarification  
on Russell's use of robust, physicalist theories that don't  
eliminate consciousness etc.


Good and interesting questions indeed.

I, of course would be delighted if people try to really grasp the  
phi_i, the G/G* distinction, and the subtle but key point of the  
fact that the arithmetical reality simulates computations, as  
opposed to merely generates descriptions of them.


I am bit buzy right now.  Feel free to tell me which one of those  
point seems to you the more interesting, or funky.


Funkiest would be arithmetical reality simulates computations aka  
free lunch :)


OK, that is important, also. And it is is importantly related to the  
difference between a computation and a description of a computation,  
which is important in step 8, but also for the very meaning of what a  
computation can be.






But I've picked up and guess that people seem to miss use of phi_i  
or Sigma 1 sentences and such terms.


Are you sure? that is mathematics which frighten sometimes people.




So, you thought you could offer me a hand and... I take the arm and  
more: 1 of those point = 3 + infinite possibility of other such  
terms. PGC- Zombie hunting armchair ninja of numbers.


OK. Not today, as my deadline for the paper which has been asked by  
very nice people, is ... today.
But I will create a thread on the first question above. A difficult  
point ...


Liz, it is time to find back your notes, or buy a new diary :)

Don't worry, Liz, I will try to annoy/shake everyone this time ...

Thanks for the suggestion PGC,

Bruno





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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



 On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 meekerdb wrote:

 On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett
 bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a
 scientific finding by
 philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a
 scientific observation
 by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a
 philosophical
 discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an
 observation. In
 an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question
 the
 metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his
 discourse.

 Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that -
 quite the reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno
 often do so on the basis of unexamined metaphysical
 assumptions (like primary materialism)


 And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just
 as much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


 But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand
 it, his theory in outline is:

 1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
 2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
 3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
 4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that
 correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
 5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled
 by computed relations between the computed physics and our
 computed thoughts.
 6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and
 so realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces
 the multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other
 worlds which he hopes to show have low measure.


 I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of
 his theory. I have difficulties with several of the points you list.
 But that aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even
 if all of this goes through? I do not think it explains
 consciousness. It seems to stem from the idea that consciousness is
 a certain type of computation (that can be emulated in a universal
 Turing machine, or general purpose computer.) This is then developed
 as a form of idealism (2 above) to argue that the physical world and
 our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about that world, are also
 certain types of computations.

 But this is no nearer to an explanation of consciousness than the
 alternative model of assuming a primitive physical universe and
 arguing that consciousness supervenes on the physical structure of
 brains, and that mathematics is an inference from our physical
 experiences. Consciousness supervenes on computations? What sort of
 computation? Why on this sort and not any other sort? Similar
 questions arise in the physicalist account of course, but proposing
 a new theory that does not answer any of the questions posed by the
 original theory does not seem like an advance to me. At least
 physicalism has evolutionary arguments open to it as an explanation
 of consciousness

 The physicalist model has the advantage that it gives the physical
 world directly -- physics does not have to be constructed from some
 abstract computations in Platonia (even if such a concept can be
 given any meaning.) If you take the degree of agreement with
 observation as the measure of success of a theory, then physicalism
 wins hands down. Bruno's theory does not currently produce any real
 physics at all.

 The discussion of the detailed steps in the argument Bruno gives is
 merely a search for clarification. As I have said, many things seem
 open to philosophical discussion, and some of Bruno's definitions
 seem self-serving. When I seek clarification, the ground seems to
 move beneath me. The detailed argument is hard to pin down for these
 reasons.


 Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the brain is
 Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's reasoning in the UDA
 computationalism leads to elimination of a primary physical world.


 But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of
 quantum physics precludes it.


Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the
 brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's
 reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to elimination of a
 primary physical world.

 But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of
 quantum physics precludes it.

 Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical state? That
 doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a whole cannot be emulated.
 And if it turns out that physics is continuous rather than than discrete
 you could still come arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if
 that was not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a machine
 with components of zero engineering tolerance.


 An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
 certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be emulated.
 Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of pairs of conjugate
 variables. Because you cannot measure both the position and momentum of a
 quantum state to arbitrary precision simultaneously, we find that there are
 two complementary descriptions of the physical system -- the description in
 position space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
 Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world must
 take this into account.


You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by
emulating a series of quantum states.


 If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure position
 exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact values for these two
 variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of quantum mechanics. And
 there are very good arguments for the view that the world is at base
 quantum: the classical picture only emerges from the quantum at some
 coarse-grained level of description. You cannot describe everything that
 happens in the physical world from this classical, coarse-grained
 perspective.


If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by brute
force emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If you car needs
a part replaced, you don't need to get a replacement exactly the same down
to the quantum level. This is the case every machine, and there is no
reason to believe biological machines are different: infinite precision
parts would mean zero robustness.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics
in the
brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's
reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to
elimination of a
primary physical world.

But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning
theorem of
quantum physics precludes it.

Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical
state? That doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a
whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out that physics is
continuous rather than than discrete you could still come
arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if that was
not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a machine
with components of zero engineering tolerance.

An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be
emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of
pairs of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the
position and momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision
simultaneously, we find that there are two complementary
descriptions of the physical system -- the description in position
space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world
must take this into account.

You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by 
emulating a series of quantum states.


?


If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure
position exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact values
for these two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of
quantum mechanics. And there are very good arguments for the view
that the world is at base quantum: the classical picture only
emerges from the quantum at some coarse-grained level of
description. You cannot describe everything that happens in the
physical world from this classical, coarse-grained perspective.

If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by 
brute force emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If you 
car needs a part replaced, you don't need to get a replacement exactly 
the same down to the quantum level. This is the case every machine, and 
there is no reason to believe biological machines are different: 
infinite precision parts would mean zero robustness.


I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a biological 
machine, then some classical level of exactness would suffice. But the 
issue is the wider program that wants to see the physical world in all 
its detail emerge from the digital computations of the dovetailer. If 
that is your goal, then you need to emulate the finest details of 
quantum mechanics. This latter is not possible on a Turing machine 
because of the theorem forbidding the cloning of a quantum state. 
Quantum mechanics is, after all, part of the physical world we observe.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett
 bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 wrote:
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics
 in the
 brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's
 reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to
 elimination of a
 primary physical world.

 But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning
 theorem of
 quantum physics precludes it.

 Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical
 state? That doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a
 whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out that physics is
 continuous rather than than discrete you could still come
 arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if that was
 not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a machine
 with components of zero engineering tolerance.

 An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
 certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be
 emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of
 pairs of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the
 position and momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision
 simultaneously, we find that there are two complementary
 descriptions of the physical system -- the description in position
 space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
 Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world
 must take this into account.

 You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by
 emulating a series of quantum states.


 ?

  If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure
 position exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact values
 for these two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of
 quantum mechanics. And there are very good arguments for the view
 that the world is at base quantum: the classical picture only
 emerges from the quantum at some coarse-grained level of
 description. You cannot describe everything that happens in the
 physical world from this classical, coarse-grained perspective.

 If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by
 brute force emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If you car
 needs a part replaced, you don't need to get a replacement exactly the same
 down to the quantum level. This is the case every machine, and there is no
 reason to believe biological machines are different: infinite precision
 parts would mean zero robustness.


 I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a biological
 machine, then some classical level of exactness would suffice. But the
 issue is the wider program that wants to see the physical world in all its
 detail emerge from the digital computations of the dovetailer. If that is
 your goal, then you need to emulate the finest details of quantum
 mechanics. This latter is not possible on a Turing machine because of the
 theorem forbidding the cloning of a quantum state. Quantum mechanics is,
 after all, part of the physical world we observe.


Although you cannot clone an arbitrary quantum state, you might be able
to simulate the set of all possible quantum states of which the unknown
state is one. No cloning is needed.

However, for Bruno's argument this level of simulation is not needed. What
is needed is a level of simulation sufficient to reproduce consciousness,
and this may be well above the quantum level.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-17 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  Even if the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric
  events would still not be time symmetrical if the initial condition was a
 state of minimum entropy because then any change in that state would lead
 to a increase in entropy, and the arrow of time would be born.


  In a deterministic, time-symmetric system  there is no information loss
 with evolution either to the past or future.


True there is no information loss, in fact there is a information increase
and thus a entropy increase because it would take more information to
describe the new more complex higher entropy state than the previous
simpler state.

Well OK I've over simplified a bit, when entropy gets high enough it
actually takes less information to describe it, although the present
universe is nowhere near that point yet. Maximum information is about
midway between maximum and minimum entropy. Put some cream in a glass
coffee cup and then very carefully put some coffee on top of it. For a
short time the 2 fluids will remain segregated and the entropy will be low
and the information needed to describe it would be low too, but then
tendrils of cream will start to move into the coffee and all sorts of
spirals and other complex patterns will form, the entropy is higher now and
the information needed to describe it is higher, but after that the fluid
in the cup will reach a dull uniform color that is darker than coffee but
lighter than cream, the entropy has reached a maximum but it would take
less information to describe it. Another example is smoke from a cigarette
in a room with no air currents, it starts out as a simple smooth laminar
flow but then turbulence kicks in and very complex patterns form, and after
that it diffuses into uniform featureless fog.


  So the entropy is zero and stays zero


That doesn't follow. If you knew all the information in the present state
(but both Many Worlds and Copenhagen agree that can never happen) you could
calculate from that the initial conditions of the original very low entropy
state, but calculations are physical and calculations take energy give off
heat and thus increase entropy. Yes you could use reversible computing and
reduce the energy needed to perform a calculation to an arbitrarily low
figure, but the less energy you use the slower the calculation is, so by
the time you've finished the calculation about how to put things back to
their original simple state the universe has kept on evolving and is now in
a new much more complex state than when you started. So you'd have to start
all over again.

But all that is just hypothetical because although they think so for
different reasons both Many Worlds and Copenhagen agree that you can never
have complete information even in theory.

  John K Clark

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 17 Apr 2015, at 18:55, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics
in the
brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow
Bruno's

reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to
elimination of a
primary physical world.

But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning
theorem of
quantum physics precludes it.

Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical
state? That doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a
whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out that physics is
continuous rather than than discrete you could still come
arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if that
was
not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a
machine

with components of zero engineering tolerance.

An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be
emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of
pairs of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the
position and momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision
simultaneously, we find that there are two complementary
descriptions of the physical system -- the description in position
space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world
must take this into account.

You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by
emulating a series of quantum states.

If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure
position exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact
values

for these two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of
quantum mechanics. And there are very good arguments for the view
that the world is at base quantum: the classical picture only
emerges from the quantum at some coarse-grained level of
description. You cannot describe everything that happens in the
physical world from this classical, coarse-grained perspective.

If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by
brute force emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If
you car needs a part replaced, you don't need to get a replacement
exactly the same down to the quantum level. This is the case every
machine, and there is no reason to believe biological machines are
different: infinite precision parts would mean zero robustness.

I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a
biological machine, then some classical level of exactness would
suffice. But the issue is the wider program that wants to see the
physical world in all its detail emerge from the digital
computations of the dovetailer. If that is your goal, then you need
to emulate the finest details of quantum mechanics. This latter is
not possible on a Turing machine because of the theorem forbidding
the cloning of a quantum state. Quantum mechanics is, after all,
part of the physical world we observe.

Although you cannot clone an arbitrary quantum state, you might be
able to simulate the set of all possible quantum states of which the
unknown state is one. No cloning is needed.

However, for Bruno's argument this level of simulation is not
needed. What is needed is a level of simulation sufficient to
reproduce consciousness, and this may be well above the quantum level.

That is certainly needed for the first six steps, but at step seven,
we can relax comp up to the quantum level, and below. The UD emulates
all programs, including all quantum computer, because the quantum
computer are Turing emulable, sure with an exponential slow down, but
the UD does not care, as, in arithmetic, it has all the time.

In fact, as I said to Bruce, at step seven, we can understand why
matter cannot be duplicated exactly, because matter, in term of
computation, is the result of the FPI on the whole work of the UD.
Below your substitution level, you cannot entangle yourself with token
facts, as they are not relevant for your most probable computational
history, so you multiply yourself more and more on the details.
Eventually, to get all the decimal exact, you need to run the entire
dovetailing, which is impossible.

Bruno

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Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 17 Apr 2015, at 14:35, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

   Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett
   bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
   wrote:
   Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics
   in the
   brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow  
Bruno's

   reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to
   elimination of a
   primary physical world.
   But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning
   theorem of
   quantum physics precludes it.
   Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical
   state? That doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a
   whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out that physics is
   continuous rather than than discrete you could still come
   arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if that  
was
   not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a  
machine

   with components of zero engineering tolerance.
   An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
   certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be
   emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of
   pairs of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the
   position and momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision
   simultaneously, we find that there are two complementary
   descriptions of the physical system -- the description in position
   space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
   Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world
   must take this into account.
You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by  
emulating a series of quantum states.


?


   If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure
   position exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact  
values

   for these two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of
   quantum mechanics. And there are very good arguments for the view
   that the world is at base quantum: the classical picture only
   emerges from the quantum at some coarse-grained level of
   description. You cannot describe everything that happens in the
   physical world from this classical, coarse-grained perspective.
If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could  
by brute force emulate everything. However, that is not the point.  
If you car needs a part replaced, you don't need to get a  
replacement exactly the same down to the quantum level. This is the  
case every machine, and there is no reason to believe biological  
machines are different: infinite precision parts would mean zero  
robustness.


I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a  
biological machine, then some classical level of exactness would  
suffice. But the issue is the wider program that wants to see the  
physical world in all its detail emerge from the digital  
computations of the dovetailer.


By the FPI on all computations. This will be a priori not computable.  
That the universe looks some much predictable is the mystery with  
comp. We must fight the white rabbits away.





If that is your goal,


The result is that we have to do that if we assume computationalism in  
the cognitive science.




then you need to emulate the finest details of quantum mechanics.


Comp explains why this is impossible. The finest details of physics  
are given by sum on many computations, the finer the details, the more  
there are. To get the numbers right up to infinite decimals, you need  
to run the entire dovetailer in a finite time. We can't do that.



This latter is not possible on a Turing machine because of the  
theorem forbidding the cloning of a quantum state.


Same with comp.


Quantum mechanics is, after all, part of the physical world we  
observe.


It might be part of the reality we live, but it might be explained by  
the arithmetical FPI on the computations seen from inside. IF QM is  
correct, and if comp is correct, QM has to be a theorem in comp, that  
is, the logic of []p  t have to give a quantization on the sigma_1  
arithmetical sentences. And that is the case.


([]p is Gödel's beweisbar(x), meaning provable(x), and t is the dual  
~beweisbar('~(1=1)').


Don't confuse Digital physics (the universe is a machine) and comp (my  
body/brain is a machine), as they are incompatible (and as Digital  
physics entails comp, but comp entails ~Digital-physics, so digital  
physics entails ~digital physics, so digital physics is self- 
contradictory. With, or without comp, we are confronted to something  
non Turing emulable. No need to go outside arithmetic, as we know  
since Gödel,

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 17 Apr 2015, at 08:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett  
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
wrote:


   Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific  
finding by
   philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific  
observation

   by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
   discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an  
observation. In

   an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
   metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.

Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the  
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the  
basis of unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary  
materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as  
much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.
But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it,  
his theory in outline is:

1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that  
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by  
computed relations between the computed physics and our computed  
thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so  
realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces the  
multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other worlds  
which he hopes to show have low measure.


I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of  
his theory.


It is not a theory. It is an argument. it is dangerous to sum it by  
thought = computation . The only axiom is that consciousness is  
locally invariant for a digital substitution made at some level. It is  
a very weak version of Descartes Mechanism. It implies all form of  
mechanism and computationalism studied in the literature. It is my  
theory if you want, but my theory is believed by basically all  
rationalists by default. Only precise and rare people, usually  
philosophers, but also some scientists, like Penrose, defends  
different theory.
What makes it stronger than the STRONG AI thesis, is that it is  
supposed to apply to us.
What makes it weaker than most computationalist thesis, is that there  
is no bound delimited for the substitution level.


Then, I argue that this leads to the fact that all first order  
specification of any universal machine/program/number gives a TOE. In  
particular the laws of physics have to de derived in any of those  
TOEs. It gives actually much more and the whole stuff I like to call  
it theology, because it is arguably isomorphic to Proclus theology,  
and Plotinus, Plato. But all this are in the results. The theory is  
only that I am Turing emulable. Even if the brain is a quantum  
computer (which I doubt), I remain Turing emulable, (see the paper of  
Deutsch).







I have difficulties with several of the points you list. But that  
aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even if all of  
this goes through?


Everyone knows that Aristotle physics has been refuted. Already by  
Galilee.
The achievement here is a refutation of Aristotle's theology, in  
computationalist frame (the one believed usually by materialist,  
atheists, but also many religious people).






I do not think it explains consciousness.


That was not the goal. But yet, I can argue that 99% of the conceptual  
problem is solved, and that the remaining 1% is simply unsolvable. But  
for the origin of matter appearances, the explanation is conceptually  
100% solved. In that frame, and assuming it true, as the result is  
also that this can be tested.




It seems to stem from the idea that consciousness is a certain type  
of computation (that can be emulated in a universal Turing machine,  
or general purpose computer.)


Not really. Consciousness is 1p, and it the math explains why  
consciousness, like truth, are not definable in arithmetic, unlike  
computations. In fact consciousness is not definable in any third  
person way.


It certainly does not ring right, that consciousness would be a  
computation, and already the FPI suggests that consciousness is  
related to infinities of computations, and in the meaning or semantic  
of those computation, which the machine are unable to define entirely  
by themselves.





This is then developed as a form of idealism (2 above) to argue that  
the physical world and our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about  
that world, are also certain types of computations.


Not at all. It is just that if your brain is Turing emulable, it is  
Turing emulated infinitely often in arithmetic (in a tiny part of the  
standard

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/17/2015 5:35 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by brute force
emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If you car needs a part replaced,
you don't need to get a replacement exactly the same down to the quantum level. This is
the case every machine, and there is no reason to believe biological machines are
different: infinite precision parts would mean zero robustness.

I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a biological machine, then
some classical level of exactness would suffice. But the issue is the wider program that
wants to see the physical world in all its detail emerge from the digital computations
of the dovetailer. If that is your goal, then you need to emulate the finest details of
quantum mechanics. This latter is not possible on a Turing machine because of the
theorem forbidding the cloning of a quantum state. Quantum mechanics is, after all, part
of the physical world we observe.

But the goal is not to emulate an existing physical world, it's to instantiate a physical
world as a computation. There's no requirement to measure a quantum state and reproduce it.

Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/17/2015 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Comp explains why this is impossible. The finest details of physics are given by sum on 
many computations, the finer the details, the more there are. To get the numbers right 
up to infinite decimals, you need to run the entire dovetailer in a finite time. We 
can't do that. 


?? The UD runs in Platonia, so what does a finite time refer to?

Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/17/2015 12:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of 
quantum physics
precludes it.


Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical state? That doesn't 
necessarily mean the physical world as a whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out 
that physics is continuous rather than than discrete you could still come arbitrarily 
close with digital models of the brain; if that was not good enough you would be saying 
that the brain is a machine with components of zero engineering tolerance.


The no-cloning theorem doesn't say you can't produce a copy, it says you can't get the 
information in order to know what the copy should be.  You could make a copy by accident, 
by guess, but you couldn't know it was a correct copy.  It doesn't have anything to do 
with discrete vs continuous.


If consciousness depends on quantum level states then Bruno's duplication machine will 
necessarily introduce a gap or discontinuity in consciousness - but then so does a 
concussion.  And there are good reasons (c.f. Tegmark) to think that, even on a 
supervenience theory, consciousness is a classical phenomenon.


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/17/2015 12:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/16/2015 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as having been
duplicated in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.

How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?

By associating it with different token of the machinery implementing it.

Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having different spacetime location
can distinguish two otherwise indiscernible set of thoughts?

No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?

I'm not sure what 3-1 view means,

It is the content of the diary of the observer outside the box (like in sane04), but on
the consciousness of the copies involved. This is for the people who say that they will
be conscious in W and M. That is true, but the pure 1-view is that they will be
conscious in only one city (even if that happens in both cities).

In the math part, this is captured by [1][0]A, with [0]A = the usual bewesibar of Gödel,
and [1]A = [0]A A (Theaetetus).

but if you mean in the sense of running on two different machines then I agree.

OK.

That means duplication of consciousness/computation depends on distinguishability of
the physical substrate with no distinction in the consciousness/computation.

OK. Like when the guy has already been multiplied in W and M, but has not yet open the
door. We assume of course that the two boxes are identical from inside, no windows, and
the air molecules at the same place (for example). That can be made absolutely identical
in the step 6, where the reconstitutions are made in a virtual environment.

But is that the duplication envisioned in the M-W thought experiment?

Yes, at different steps.

In practice, yes. Assuming the duplication is done in a real world, and assuming QM. But
in step six, you can manage the environments to be themselves perfectly emulated and
100% identical. That is all what is needed for the reasoning.

Yet it seems Bruno's argument is based on deterministic computation

At my substitution level. But this will entail that the real world, whatever it can be,
is non deterministic. We WM duplicate on all the different computations in the UD* (in
arithmetic) which go through my local current state.

and requires the duplication and subsequent thoughts to be duplicates at a
deterministic classcial level so that the M-man and W-man on diverge in thought when
they see different things in their respective cities.

Yes. That is why the H-man cannot predict which divergence he will live. But sometimes
we mention the state of the person before he or she open the doors, for example to
address a question like would a tiny oxygen atom in the box makes a difference in the
measure or not, Here there is almost a matter of convention to say that there are two
or one consciousness. We can ascribe consciousness to the different people in the
different box, but that is a 3-1 view. The 1-views feels to be in once city, and not in
the other.

No, things like radioactive decay of K40 atoms is the blood will very quickly cause the
W-man and M-man to diverge no matter how precisely the duplicate recievers are made. But
I'm not sure why this would matter to your argument? Is it important to the argument that
they diverge *only* because of a difference in perception?

Brent

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Saturday, April 18, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 4/17/2015 12:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of
 quantum physics precludes it.


  Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical state? That
 doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a whole cannot be emulated.
 And if it turns out that physics is continuous rather than than discrete
 you could still come arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if
 that was not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a machine
 with components of zero engineering tolerance.


 The no-cloning theorem doesn't say you can't produce a copy, it says you
 can't get the information in order to know what the copy should be.  You
 could make a copy by accident, by guess, but you couldn't know it was a
 correct copy.  It doesn't have anything to do with discrete vs continuous.


Yes, that's what I meant. You might not be able to copy a quantum state but
you could create it by creating every possible quantum state. Analogously,
you might not be able to copy a classical system due to chaotic effects but
you could make a similar chaitic system. The difficulty of copying a brain
exactly is sometimes raised as an argument against computationalism but
this is due to a misapprehension.


 If consciousness depends on quantum level states then Bruno's duplication
 machine will necessarily introduce a gap or discontinuity in consciousness
 - but then so does a concussion.  And there are good reasons (c.f. Tegmark)
 to think that, even on a supervenience theory, consciousness is a classical
 phenomenon.


And the same consideration applies for classical copying.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread Bruce Kellett


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.


Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the 
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of 
unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much an 
unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread Bruce Kellett


Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett 
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty 
That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small

step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are incompatible. 
Can you formulate a protocol where the copies sit down for a chat and 
arrive at a contradiction of the UDA's conclusion?
 
Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different

worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and 
Washington man. You could have the two reconstructions in the same room 
and label them as machine-A man and machine-B man and let them interact 
immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion, because the conclusion 
does not depend on the copies having a chat or not. It would just make 
the argument harder to follow.


No, the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as the 
original. It is that illusion that is hard to maintain if they have a 
chat and realize that they are different people. The real issue is 
personal identity through time, and in the case of ties for closest 
follower, as in this case, it fits better with the notions of personal 
identity to say that the copies are both new persons -- inheriting a lot 
from the original of course, but the original single person has not 
become two of the *same* person.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread LizR

On 15 April 2015 at 19:58, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:


 Bruno, I can go back as far as 2008 for such discussions with John Clark
 in my gmail archives about step 3... it's useless to continue to answer him
 (at least on your work, and surely on anything else), he will never accept
 anything, and will never go beyond that point, he doesn't want to have a
 genuine discussion... it will go back in circle again, he will mock your
 acronyms, he will say, he doesn't know what step 1,2 are, he will do biased
 comparisons, he will say it's stupid, or false or stupid again etc etc
 etc... you give him hours of your live that he doesn't deserve...

 Jeez, I had no idea. I'd have given up long ago if I was him...




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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread LizR

On 16 April 2015 at 18:16, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
 philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
 by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
 discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
 an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
 metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.


 Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the reverse,
 people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of unexamined
 metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)


 And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much an
 unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


Of course it would be, but no one is assuming that.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:
 johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
 had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
 uncertainty
 That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small step in a
 logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday consciousness is the
 result of computation, then it can be duplicated (in principle - if you
 have a problem with matter duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that
 this leads to what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


 You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the case --
 the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance and don't
 further interact. You might come to a different conclusion if you let the
 copies sit down together and have a chat.


The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are incompatible.
Can you formulate a protocol where the copies sit down for a chat and
arrive at a contradiction of the UDA's conclusion?


 Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different worlds
 idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.


It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and
Washington man. You could have the two reconstructions in the same room and
label them as machine-A man and machine-B man and let them interact
immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion, because the conclusion does
not depend on the copies having a chat or not. It would just make the
argument harder to follow.




 Bruce


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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 05:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

   LizR wrote:
   On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
   mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
   mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
   Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing  
that

   Bruno
   had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
   uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.  
Step 3 is only a small
   step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday

   consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
   duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
   duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
   what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
   You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
   case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large  
distance
   and don't further interact. You might come to a different  
conclusion

   if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the  
copy sitting in the chair on the left? is less dramatic than Will  
I be transported to Moscow or Washington? and hence, I suspect,  
might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument  
goes through either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree  
that they were the same person.



   Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
   worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this  
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation  
(which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for  
brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated  
made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3. Step 3 is  
basically to introduce the idea of FPI, and hence form a link with  
the MWI of quantum mechanics. This may not always have been made  
explicit, but the intention is clear.


It is not made at all. people who criticize UDA always criticize what  
they add themselves to the reasoning. This is not valid. People who  
does that criticize only themselves, not the argument presented.



Step 3 does not succeed in this because the inference to FPI depends  
on a flawed concept of personal identity.



Step 3 leads to the FPI, and to see what happens next, there is step  
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Then the translation in arithmetic show how to  
already extract the logic of the observable so that we might refute a  
form of comp (based on comp + the classical theory of knowledge). That  
main point there is that incompleteness refutes Socrates argument  
against the Theaetetus, and we can almost directly retrieve the  
Parmenides-Plotinus theology in the discourse of the introspecting  
universal (Löbian) machine.


Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 15 Apr 2015, at 09:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2015-04-15 9:35 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

On 15 Apr 2015, at 00:15, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Apr 14, 2015  Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:

 I predict that I will win 1 million dollar by tomorrow. I know my  
prediction is correct because this will happen in one of the  
branches of the multiverse. Do you agree with this statement?


No I do not agree because matter duplicating machines do not exist  
yet so if I check tomorrow the laws of physics will allow me to  
find only one chunk of matter that fits the description of Mr. I  
(that is a chunk of matter that behaves in a  Telmomenezesian way),  
and that particular chunk of matter does not appear to have a  
million dollars. However if the prediction was tomorrow Telmo  
Menezes will win a million dollars then I would agree, provided of  
course that the Many Worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is  
true.


 You are trying to play a game that is absurd, which is to deny  
the first person view.


That is ridiculous, only a fool would deny the first person view  
and John Clark is not a fool. Mr.I can always look to the past and  
see one unique linear sequence of Mr.I's leading up to him, and Mr.  
I can remember being every one of them. But things are very  
different looking to the future, nothing is unique and far from  
being linear things could hardly be more parallel with a  
astronomical and possibly infinite number of branching, and Mr. I  
can't remember being any of them. And that is why the sense of  
first person identity has nothing to do with our expectations of  
the future but is only a function of our memories of the past.


Unfortunately, prediction and probabilities concerns the future.





 You use your crusade against pronouns

If Telmo Menezes thinks that any objection in the use of personal  
pronouns in thought experiments designed to illuminate the  
fundamental nature of personal identity


No, we agree on the personal identity before asking the prediction  
question. The duplication experiement is not designed to illuminate  
the nature of personal identity, which is made clear beforehand,  
with the 1p and 3p diaries.


You often says this, and never reply to the fact that this has been  
debunked.




is absurd then call John Clark's bluff and simply stop using them;  
then if Telmo Menezes can still express ideas on this subject  
clearly and without circularity it would prove that John Clark's  
concern that people who used such pronouns were implicitly stating  
what they were trying to prove were indeed absurd.


You say that you accept the notion of first person, but what telmo  
meant is that you stop using it in the WM-prediction, where you  
agree that you will be in the two places in the 3p view, with unique  
1p, so the P = 1/2 is just obvious. It is not deep: to this why it  
will be deep, you need to move on step 4, step 5, etc.







 Monty Hall knows that when the Helsinki Man in the sealed box in  
Moscow opens the door and sees Moscow the Moscow Man will be born  
from the ashes of the Helsinki Man,


The Helsinki Man in the sealed box in Moscow knows that too. He  
was fully informed of the protocol of the experiment.


OK but it doesn't matter if he knows the protocol of the experiment  
or not, regardless of where he is until The Helsinki Man sees  
Moscow or Moscow the Helsinki Man will remain The Helsinki Man. So  
who will become the Moscow Man?  The one who sees Moscow will  
become the Moscow Man.


Yes, but that is the H-man too, with the 3-1 view. Nothing is  
ambiguous, once we understand and APPLY the 1/3 distinction. That is  
what you never seem to do.





Oh well, the good thing about tautologies is that they're always  
true.


  Verb tenses also become problematic if you introduce time  
machines.


 Douglas Adams had something to say about this in The Hitchhikers  
Guide to the Galaxy:


 Yes, I love it too. Doesn't it worry you a bit that your  
grammatical argument is so similar to one found in an absurdist  
work of fiction?


No because if time machines actually existed then it wouldn't be  
absurd at all, the English language really would need a major  
overhaul in the way it uses verb tenses. And if matter duplicating  
machines existed the English language really would need a major  
overhaul about the way it uses personal pronouns. The only  
difference is that if the laws of physics are what we think they  
are then time machines are NOT possible, but if the laws of physics  
are what we think they are then matter duplicating machines ARE  
possible.


 Show me how to do it. Describe quantum uncertainty according to  
the MWI without personal pronouns. I know you will be able to do it  
because:

a) you like the MWI
b) you hate personal pronouns

CASE #1

Telmo Menezes shoots one photon at 2 slits with a photographic  
plate behind the slits. As the photon approaches the

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:52, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com  
a écrit :


 Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow  
copying, but

 that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
 logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph  
that consciousness could not be copied would be  
selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say  
consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about  
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a  
metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you  
assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm  
saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is  
obviously duplicatable.


Quentin
In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it  
is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it.   
Not just, an instrospective well everybody knows what it is.


Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some  
level. Is that enough to be a propositional definition?


I don't think it's specific enough because it isn't clear whether  
computational process means a physical process or an abstract one.   
If you take computational process to be the abstract process in  
Platonia then it would not be duplicable;


?

The UD copied the abstract process an infinity of times. It might  
appear in


phi_567_(29)^45, phi_567_(29)^46, phi_567_(29)^47, phi_567_(29)^48,  
phi_567_(29)^49, phi_567_(29)^50, ... and in


phi_8999704_(0)^89,   phi_8999704_(0)^90,  phi_8999704_(0)^91,   
phi_8999704_(0)^92,  phi_8999704_(0)^93,





every copy would just be a token of the same process.  I think  
that's what Bruno means.


The consciousness will be the same, but it is multiplied (in some 3-1  
sense) in UD* (sigma_1 truth).


Bruno


But I think Stathis is thinking of a copy of an AI, not just a  
particular computation by that AI.


Brent



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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 08:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
   Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding  
by

   philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
   by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
   discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
   an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
   metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.
Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the  
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis  
of unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much  
an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


Are you doing this on purpose?

The fact that primary materialism is epistemologically contradictory  
is the *result* of the UD Argument (UDA).

It is not an assumption. It is what the whole UDA reasoning is for.

You assume a primary physical universe. You have to explain how  
primary matter makes it possible for a machine to distinguish a  
physical computation from an arithmetical one, and this without  
abandoning comp, to make your point.


Bruno








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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 04:43, LizR wrote:

On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au  
wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com 
 wrote:


Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of  
uncertainty
That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small step in  
a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday  
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be  
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter  
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to what  
looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the  
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance  
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion  
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.


That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the  
copy sitting in the chair on the left? is less dramatic than Will  
I be transported to Moscow or Washington? and hence, I suspect,  
might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes  
through either way.


Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different  
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.


I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this  
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation  
(which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for  
brains).


Good remark, but apparently Bruce did not hear it.

Bruno






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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:50, Bruce Kellett wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a  
person, my consciousness changes from moment to moment with  
changing thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain the same  
person. Can two spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the  
same person? I don't think so, even if they stem from the same  
digital copy at some point. M-man and W-man are different persons,  
and neither is the unique closest continuer of H-man, so it is not  
that H-man is uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.


This differs from MWI in that, in MWI, the continuers are in  
different worlds.

Right. Like AI's in separate but identical worlds.


Don't you then run into the problem of the identity of  
indiscernibles? The programs may be run on different computers in  
our world, and thus discernible, but from inside the program there  
is only one consciousness. Just the same as if you ran the program  
at different times on the same computer. Same inputs -- same  
outputs. Not different from the point of view of the simulation.



Good. But that applies also in the computation emulated by the sigma_1  
truth, which is not physical.


Bruno




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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 10:03 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

 Telmo Menezes wrote:

 On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
 mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
 Bruno
 had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
 uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3
 is only a small
 step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
 consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
 duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
 duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
 what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


 You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
 case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
 and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
 if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

 The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are incompatible.
 Can you formulate a protocol where the copies sit down for a chat and
 arrive at a contradiction of the UDA's conclusion?
  Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
 worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

 It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and
 Washington man. You could have the two reconstructions in the same room and
 label them as machine-A man and machine-B man and let them interact
 immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion, because the conclusion does
 not depend on the copies having a chat or not. It would just make the
 argument harder to follow.


 No, the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as the
 original. It is that illusion that is hard to maintain if they have a chat
 and realize that they are different people.


The argument is that the two copies share the same personal diary
pre-duplication, nothing more. A chat will only confirm this.


 The real issue is personal identity through time, and in the case of ties
 for closest follower, as in this case, it fits better with the notions of
 personal identity to say that the copies are both new persons -- inheriting
 a lot from the original of course,


I think it's important to avoid mushiness. The copies inherit *everything*
from the original because we assume comp (the hypothesis that there is some
level of substitution at which a mind can be replaced with an equivalent
computation). The moment immediately after the duplication the copies start
diverging -- it is not longer the same computation. But they will share all
memories before the duplication event.


 but the original single person has not become two of the *same* person.


This is never claimed.

Telmo.




 Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread Telmo Menezes


 My problem with any view based on entropy is that entropy doesn't appear
 to be fundamental to physics; it is the statistically likely result when
 objects are put in a certain configuration and allowed to evolve randomly.


 There is, however, an interesting parallel to be made with Shannon's
 entropy, which is a measure of information content and not just a
 statistical effect. Once in the realm of digital physics, it becomes
 questionable if physical entropy and information entropy are separate
 things.


 Yes, and there is also black hole entropy. It's POSSIBLE that Boltzmann
 stumbled on something fundamental via a route that doesn't lead via
 fundamental physics (B's entropy is only apparent to macroscopic beings) I
 don't know if the jury has come down in favour of entropy being in some way
 fundamental to the universe, but it's certainly possible. (Though not the
 thermodynamic sort.)


I find that this fundamental physics business begs the question. It
assumes that particles and forces are fundamental and then works from
there. Interestingly, particles themselves can only be observed in the
macro world by way of statistical measures (I believe, please correct me if
I'm wrong). Here I agree with John. Labelling particles as fundamental and
mechanisms like there are more ways to be complicated than simple as
non-fundamental seems arbitrary.




 However the laws of physics are (mainly) time-symmetric, with the
 definite exception of neutral kaon decay and the possible exception of
 wave-function collapse, and an ordered state could evolve to become more
 disordered towards the past (although that would make the past appear the
 future for any beings created within that ordered state). Yet we never see
 that happening, and there is an elephant in the cosmic room, namely the
 expansion of the universe, which (istm) must always proceed in the
 direction of the AOT.


 What if the AOT is a purely 1p phenomena?


 Well, it's clearly a 3p phenomenon in that we all agree that things age
 etc. But it's perhaps purely a macroscopic creature phenomenon


Ok, this is what I meant. I was going for a multiverse-3p, not just the
all the things we can agree on-3p.



 Hence the appeal to boundary conditions. If something forces the
 universe to have zero (or very low) radius at one time extremity but not at
 the other, this asymmetry could be sufficient to drive the arrow of time in
 a particular direction.

 I've (as it were) expanded on this idea before, however, so I won't go
 on at length about it again.


 I'll search the archives when I have a bit of time.


 Briefly, the boundary condition on the universe appears to be that it has
 a big bang at one time extremity (or something like one) but not a
 corresponding crunch at the other. This alone means that the density of the
 contents of the universe is constrained to decrease globally along the time
 axis as you move away from the BB, and my contention is that this is
 probably enough to create an AOT even with the laws of physics operating -
 by assumption - time-symmetrically, when you look at the various processes
 that result from a decrease in density (and temperature, effectively, since
 particles tend to move until they reach a patch of the background fluid
 which is moving at their speed). Such outcomes include the formation of
 nuclei, atoms, and eventually gravitationally bound states like galactic
 clusters etc.


Thanks Liz. Yes, I think this makes a lot of sense. I would point out that
you are talking about entropy, even though you don't call it by name.

Telmo.



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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 15 Apr 2015, at 21:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2015-04-15 20:51 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/14/2015 11:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-04-15 4:53 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/14/2015 12:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a
married bachelor.

Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God.  
God is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your  
prejudice... and using miracles to justify your thinking is a  
logical fallacy... you can with that same argument *justify  
anything*.


That makes no sense.  Even theologians can't bring themselves to  
say that God can do something self-contradictory.  Suppose God did  
Y=(X and not-X), what would Y consist of?


I don't know we as human cannot do it... But I don't see why not,  
and that's false that theologians (at least some) never say that  
god can't do self-contradictory thing... have you never heard god  
is not bound to logic


Yes, from people who don't know what logic is.

So logic is above God... that's not the common believe in God...


Only in some popularization of the idea of God. Augustin, St-Thomas,  
and most theologian since agree that truth and logic is above God,  
although they would say this differently. Al Gazhali did the same for  
Islam, and Jean-Paul II repeated this recently.


I don't think you will find one theologian believing the contrary. But  
I agree that the religious institution, like the health institutation  
are inconsistent, and indeed are blaspheming, using their own notion  
of blasphem, and that is what happen when a religion, or even a  
science or an art (like health) is put in the hand of politics (be it  
by force like with Islam and christianismm, or by financial lobbying  
(and propaganda) with politics.



what about what you think is logical is in fact illogical because  
God made you so that you can transcend that... If God is all, and  
transcend everything then logic is nothing. I don't believe in God  
be it bound or not to logic.


For the greek, God is by definition the reality at the origin of your  
conscience. The idea to use fairy tales does not come from theologian,  
but from dishonest politicians, which use the notion as a mean of  
power and violence. It is the opposite of religion, as defined  
originally.





But an unthinkable all powerfull thing that cant transcend  
everything can surely do anything, and be bound and not bound and  
whatever to logic as anything.


For the greeks God has no power. It is the explanation that we search.  
The debate God/Not-God is a fake debate among aristotelian to hide the  
real question: PrimaryUniverse/Not-primary-Universe.


Bruno





and for example, god could create two universe, one where he  
destroys the earth, one where he does not...


But that's not a logical contradiction.

It would be in a one world view where it happens and it does not.

It's making two things and destroying one of them.  A contradiction  
would be for him to both create the Earth and not create the Earth.   
I'm afraid you're one of those theologians who doesn't know what  
logic is.


(but that something we human could comprehend). I *don't* believe  
in god, but I can imagine such a being with no limit in power if it  
existed, and that could transcend *everything*, after all he's god !.


Really?  You can imagine a being who can do Y where X=fly and Y=(X  
and not-X)?  I don't think so.


I cannot image it does it, I can image a being who transcend  
anything and I could not comprehend and so it's meaningless for me  
to ascribe anything on it.






Logical contradiction is a matter of language; it can't refer  
because it has no meaning.


If there is a god, meaning comes from god, not from the language or  
from you. god transcend reality.


Nonsense.

You don't believe in God, I don't too, so yes it's nonsense... I  
starting to thing you can't read what I'm saying... Some conception  
of god is a thing who transcend everything, if the reality is an  
emanation of that thing, so is your language, so is your thoughts,  
so is your ability to comprehend the reality, so is your ability to  
comprehend that thing who transcend everything... I understand you  
don't believe in such god... **I DON'T TOO** **I'M NOT STATING HERE  
WHAT I BELIEVE**


Language is words we make up

Not in a reality who would be an emanation of an all transcending  
being, word like you like everything else even what is not, would  
be from that god.


and so we give them what ever meaning they have.  A contradiction is  
a relation between two propositions.  You can't have a contradiction  
without language.





A miracle is ordinarily understood as an occurrence which is  
*nomologically* impossible.


A miracle is understood as a miracle, it could be anything not  
possible without it... like *magic*.


Not possible means nomologically impossible; not

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But the question of the number of person is a different  
discussion. If you agree that the W-guy, who stays in W and  
marries a girl in W, is the same person as the guy in M, who  
marries a woman in M, are the same person ... as the H-guy, the, I  
claim, we are already all the same person, despite different lives  
and consciousness.
But then you're just mucking up the meaning of the same person,  
giving it a special metaphorical poetic meaning, unrelated to  
common usage.


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical  
sophistication. Computationalism is based on the idea that human  
consciousness is Turing emulable,


This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some point you  
might understand that this is not really the case. Comp assumes only  
that we can survive ith a digital brain, in the quasi-operational  
meaning of the yes doctor scenario. Consciousness is a first person  
notion, and that is not Turing emulable per se, in fact that is not  
even definable in any 3p term. That is part of the difficulty of the  
concept.




which just says that human-like AI is possible on a sufficiently  
sophisticated computer. But,as Bruno says, consciousness is not  
duplicable -- we cannot know, for ourselves, what another's  
consciousness is, so we cannot know whether it is a duplicate or not.


OK.


My feeling is that even a digital copy from a computer-based AI will  
diverge so rapidly from the original once it is installed and run on  
another computer that there is no sense in which it is ever the  
'same' consciousness.


That will not work on a virtual AI, which are purely deterministic.



That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person,  
my consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing  
thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain the same person. Can two  
spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the same person? I don't  
think so, even if they stem from the same digital copy at some  
point. M-man and W-man are different persons, and neither is the  
unique closest continuer of H-man, so it is not that H-man is  
uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.


That is equivalent with saying that you would not die if teleported  
from here to 2 mm away, but would die from teleportation from here to  
mars, so you reject step 2. This does not make sense with  
computationalism, as the brain would notice a difference that a  
computer could not notice by construction, unless you add releveant  
but non Turing emulable magical properties in the wires.






This differs from MWI


UDA is not about the MWI. It is just that in list of people supposed  
to accept the MWI, the MWI can be used to illustrate a special case of  
self-multiplication.


Bruno



in that, in MWI, the continuers are in different worlds. In each  
world there is a unique closest continuer and the ambiguity doesn't  
arise. Worlds, by definition, don't interfere.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 15 Apr 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Apr 2015, at 01:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Apr 2015, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:


It's stubborn, even if an illusion, eh? If you were duplicated,  
would you be prepared to kill your duplicate? Who would you kill?
It can be shown that, indeed, killing someone with comp is  
equivalent with an amnesia. Dying is forgetting or refreshing  
memories.
If you decide to kill a copy, you have to cautiously agree (with  
yourself) on the procedure (and who will be killed) before the  
duplication. After the duplication, it is preferable to treat the  
copy as a new person, for all practical and ethical purposes.


I think there are even stronger reasons for treating copies as new  
persons. In practical terms, if it came to ethical and legal  
matters, the law is currently no able to recognize the existence  
of two separate bodies as the same person. And physically, I think  
the divergence necessitated by different physical bodies in  
different spatial locations is going to lead to significant  
divergence sufficiently rapidly for the concept of 'the same  
person' to cease to be applicable after an extremely short time.  
The effects of simple thermal noise would be sufficient for the  
'persons' to decohere within milliseconds.


No problem with this.

I think that the discussion between Stathis and Quentin relies on a  
confusion between the 3-1 views and the 1-views. We cannot  
duplicate the 1-views (= the 1-1-views = the 1-1-1-views): we feel  
always unique. But in the 3-1 view we can ascribe the same  
consciousness to (identical) exemplars, and this can play a rôle in  
the measure problem, although this needs some later differentiation  
and the rule Y = II. In practice, thermal noise will indeed  
decohere the consciousness very quickly. I use quote as we are  
not in the quantum setting here, but it is (here) the same thing.


But the question of the number of person is a different discussion.  
If you agree that the W-guy, who stays in W and marries a girl in  
W, is the same person as the guy in M, who marries a woman in M,  
are the same person ... as the H-guy, the, I claim, we are already  
all the same person, despite different lives and consciousness.


But then you're just mucking up the meaning of the same person,  
giving it a special metaphorical poetic meaning, unrelated to common  
usage.


I just said that IF you take the M and W man as being the same person,  
then we are all the same person. Nothing more. Personal identity is  
not in my topics here. I am interested in that topic, but I avoid it  
in the whole work, as it is difficult, and the result are quite  
counter-intuitive. Fortunately we don't need them at all to get the  
fact that if comp is true, physics has to emerge from addition and  
multiplication, without adding anything.


Bruno





Brent

Here there is a matter of almost conventional decision, to relate  
or not individuality to personal identity. With comp and AUDA, we  
can say we are all the universal baby describes by the 8  
arithmetical hypostases, so we are the same person, put in (quite)  
different context (the genes, the culture, ...). We are all the  
same amoeba, in that case. If Aliens exist, we are them too.


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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 15 Apr 2015, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Apr 2015, at 05:12, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou  
stath...@gmail.com a écrit :


 Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow  
copying, but

 that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
 logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper  
paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be  
selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say  
consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about  
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a  
metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you  
assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm  
saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is  
obviously duplicatable.


Quentin
In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether  
it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of  
it.  Not just, an instrospective well everybody knows what it is.



It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to  
Stathis ?




No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're  
using.  Are you supposing that two streams of thought which are  
identical would constitute two different consciousness'es?


In the 1-view (or 1-1-view, ...) : the answer is no.


I agree.



In the 3--1 view, we can say yes, as we can see the diverging  
conditions, like knowing that each duplicated H-man will diverge  
once opening their reconstitution box.


But in that case we've duplicated the machinery of consciousness,  
e.g. the AI program that instaniated the consciousness.  It can  
bethe same program which is now running in two different  
machines and is diverging because of spacetime and environmental  
differences.


Right. Like it can be different programs in the UD, but doing the same  
relevant activity with respect to my personal experience, and it can  
diverge, or not.







So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as  
having been duplicated in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.


How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?


By associating it with different token of the machinery implementing it.



Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having different  
spacetime location can distinguish two otherwise indiscernible set  
of thoughts?


No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?

Bruno




Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:53, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com 
 wrote:

   Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
   had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of  
uncertainty  That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a  
small step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be  
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter  
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to what  
looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the  
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance  
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion  
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.


Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different  
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.


I did not even knew the existence of the MWI when I got the idea 40  
years ago, when trying to figure out what it is like to be an amoeba.


You would have studied the reasoning up to step seven, you would  
understand the non relevance of your point.


Bruno



Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 10:03, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

   LizR wrote:
   On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
   mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
   mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
   Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing  
that

   Bruno
   had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
   uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.  
Step 3 is only a small
   step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday

   consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
   duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
   duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
   what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
   You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
   case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large  
distance
   and don't further interact. You might come to a different  
conclusion

   if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are  
incompatible. Can you formulate a protocol where the copies sit  
down for a chat and arrive at a contradiction of the UDA's  
conclusion?

Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
   worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and  
Washington man. You could have the two reconstructions in the same  
room and label them as machine-A man and machine-B man and let them  
interact immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion, because  
the conclusion does not depend on the copies having a chat or not.  
It would just make the argument harder to follow.


No, the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as  
the original.


No one assume that.

John Clark assumes this, and in that case, I have locally assume it  
too, but only to refute Clark argument. That might explain your  
confusion, but it is better to stick to the original proof, instead of  
speculating from local answer to local refutation.


We assume only that the (generalized) brain is Turing emulable at some  
level such that consciousness remains invariant.


Bruno


It is that illusion that is hard to maintain if they have a chat and  
realize that they are different people. The real issue is personal  
identity through time, and in the case of ties for closest follower,  
as in this case, it fits better with the notions of personal  
identity to say that the copies are both new persons -- inheriting a  
lot from the original of course, but the original single person has  
not become two of the *same* person.







Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread Bruce Kellett


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical 
sophistication. Computationalism is based on the idea that human 
consciousness is Turing emulable,


This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some point you 
might understand that this is not really the case. Comp assumes only 
that we can survive ith a digital brain, in the quasi-operational 
meaning of the yes doctor scenario. Consciousness is a first person 
notion, and that is not Turing emulable per se, in fact that is not even 
definable in any 3p term. That is part of the difficulty of the concept.


In COMP(2013) you write:
The digital mechanist thesis (or computationalism, or just comp) is 
then equivalent to the hypothesis that there is a level of description 
of that part of reality in which my consciousness remains invariant 
through a functional digital emulation of that generalized brain at that 
particular level.


I think this is saying that human consciousness is Turing emulable. A 
consequence of this is, of course, that we can survive in a digital 
brain: ...I can survive, in the usual clinical sense, with an 
artificial digital (generalized) brain.


I think you are just shuffling words when you then say that 
consciousness is not Turing emulable per se.



which just says that human-like AI is possible on a sufficiently 
sophisticated computer. But,as Bruno says, consciousness is not 
duplicable -- we cannot know, for ourselves, what another's 
consciousness is, so we cannot know whether it is a duplicate or not.


OK.


My feeling is that even a digital copy from a computer-based AI will 
diverge so rapidly from the original once it is installed and run on 
another computer that there is no sense in which it is ever the 'same' 
consciousness.


That will not work on a virtual AI, which are purely deterministic.


But the copies are in different environments, even in virtual worlds.


That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person, my 
consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing thoughts and 
external stimuli, but I remain the same person. Can two spatially 
distinct consciousnesses ever be the same person? I don't think so, 
even if they stem from the same digital copy at some point. M-man and 
W-man are different persons, and neither is the unique closest 
continuer of H-man, so it is not that H-man is uncertain of his future 
-- he doesn't have one.


That is equivalent with saying that you would not die if teleported from 
here to 2 mm away, but would die from teleportation from here to mars, 
so you reject step 2.


I don't know what you are talking about. The distance of the 
teleportation is not an issue. If you take the closest continuer notion 
of personal identity, then the being reconstructed from the teleported 
AI program corresponding to me will be my unique closest continuer. This 
remains true even if there is a time delay of centuries before the 
reconstruction. The only requirement is that there is no closer 
continuer of my person, and no closer predecessor of the new 
reconstruction than the original me.


If you continue this to step 5, where you take the copy and install that 
in a new body without destroying the original, then there is a unique 
continuer -- the continuing body and mind. The copy is a new person. 
Similarly, if you reconstruct now a copy of me taken a year ago, that 
copy bears even less relation to the /me/ of now than one reconstructed 
from a recent copy.


Closer continuer theory makes sense of these permutations. The only 
stipulation is that in the case of ties for closest continuer, totally 
new persons are created. Using shared memories as your only criterion 
for personhood leads to many difficulties.


This does not make sense with computationalism, as 
the brain would notice a difference that a computer could not notice by 
construction, unless you add releveant but non Turing emulable magical 
properties in the wires.


I don't see this at all. We are talking about emulating people, which 
includes sense data inputs from an external world with which the person 
can interact. This can be a physical world or a virtual world, but such 
a world is required for your talk about consciousness to make sense. 
Remember, you assured me that there was no sensory deprivation involved 
in any of this. External worlds tend to have calendars, clocks, and 
geography -- we can readily tell if we have been transported through 
space and/or time.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 11:55, LizR wrote:


On 15 April 2015 at 19:58, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

Bruno, I can go back as far as 2008 for such discussions with John  
Clark in my gmail archives about step 3... it's useless to continue  
to answer him (at least on your work, and surely on anything else),  
he will never accept anything, and will never go beyond that point,  
he doesn't want to have a genuine discussion... it will go back in  
circle again, he will mock your acronyms, he will say, he doesn't  
know what step 1,2 are, he will do biased comparisons, he will say  
it's stupid, or false or stupid again etc etc etc... you give him  
hours of your live that he doesn't deserve...


Jeez, I had no idea. I'd have given up long ago if I was him...


... and it started a long time before on the FOR list.  I suggested to  
John to continue the discussion on the everything-list.

I should have avoided that proposition, perhaps.

The problem is that when you don't debunk lies and rhetorical hand  
waving, they can stay for a very long time. The lies started in 1973.  
The price LE MONDE made them spreading since 1998.


A part of the academical world does not appreciate I have witnessed  
the existence of moral harassment in university. But those who gave me  
the price in Paris insisted that  I describe this in a book, as they  
knew it is a real big problem in many social and professional circles.
Things have progressed, as now moral harassment is legally punishable,  
and some people have won trial in my country.


In most academies, like in the church, such moral and sexual  
harassment remains taboo, and frequent.



Bruno






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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 16 Apr 2015, at 06:34, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing
that

Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.
Step 3 is only a small
step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal
everyday

consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.

You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large
distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different
conclusion

if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the
copy sitting in the chair on the left? is less dramatic than Will
I be transported to Moscow or Washington? and hence, I suspect,
might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes
through either way.

No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree
that they were the same person.

Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation
(which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for
brains).

In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated
made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.

Discussion or fruitful argument assume mutual respect. The respect/
civility in the exchange is one-sided however, and has remained so
for years. It's not an argument; closer to an experiment of John to
see how often he can get away with airing personal issues clothed in
sincerity of intellectual debate.

This occupies too much bandwidth and is a turn off from where I'm
sitting. I'd much rather see the comp related discussions go to
address say Telmo's request for clarification in Bruno's use of
phi_i, or G/G* distinctions, or pedagogical demonstrations on the
work arithmetic existentially actualizes/gets done, clarification
on Russell's use of robust, physicalist theories that don't
eliminate consciousness etc.

Good and interesting questions indeed.

I, of course would be delighted if people try to really grasp the
phi_i, the G/G* distinction, and the subtle but key point of the fact
that the arithmetical reality simulates computations, as opposed to
merely generates descriptions of them.

I am bit buzy right now. Feel free to tell me which one of those
point seems to you the more interesting, or funky.

My problem is that the difficulties reside here in the logic-branch-of-
math, not really in my work, and attempt to dig in the math on a forum
is difficult.

Bruno

I enjoy when the list gets funky in such direction, and even though
I am invested in environmental sector professionally, perhaps some
of the climate change stuff is a bit out of topic. This as pure
opinion. Nobody gets two cents from me as I'd be poor if
consistent ;-) PGC

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Thursday, April 16, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 15 April 2015 at 19:58, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allco...@gmail.com'); wrote:


 Bruno, I can go back as far as 2008 for such discussions with John Clark
 in my gmail archives about step 3... it's useless to continue to answer him
 (at least on your work, and surely on anything else), he will never accept
 anything, and will never go beyond that point, he doesn't want to have a
 genuine discussion... it will go back in circle again, he will mock your
 acronyms, he will say, he doesn't know what step 1,2 are, he will do biased
 comparisons, he will say it's stupid, or false or stupid again etc etc
 etc... you give him hours of your live that he doesn't deserve...

 Jeez, I had no idea. I'd have given up long ago if I was him...


There's something about participants in lists like this: they tend to have
a far, far greater tolerance for debating the same thing over and over.
It's a bit like gamblers - they may know rationally they probably won't
win, but they do it anyway.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as the
 original.



 No one assume that.



 John Clark assumes this,


Of course I assume it, it's the only logical conclusion and I assume that
logic is more likely to find the truth than illogic, although Quinton has
publicly stated other ideas on that subject.


  I have locally assume it too, but only to refute Clark argument. That
 might explain your confusion,


But it doesn't explain my confusion, do you agree that both copies are
equally the same person as the original or do you not?

  John K Clark




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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  If the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric


Even if the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric  events
would still not be time symmetrical if the initial condition was a state of
minimum entropy because then any change in that state would lead to a
increase in entropy, and the arrow of time would be born.


  From a Copenhagen perspective QM prevents us from ever having complete
 information


And from a Many Worlds perspective too.  Copenhagen says the information
just does not exist and Many Worlds says the information exists but we can
never have access to it even in theory. Either way we will never have the
information and because it makes no operational difference who is right
explains why so many physicists are uninterested in the Copenhagen / Many
Worlds debate.

  John K Clark

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 13:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical  
sophistication. Computationalism is based on the idea that human  
consciousness is Turing emulable,
This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some point  
you might understand that this is not really the case. Comp assumes  
only that we can survive ith a digital brain, in the quasi- 
operational meaning of the yes doctor scenario. Consciousness is  
a first person notion, and that is not Turing emulable per se, in  
fact that is not even definable in any 3p term. That is part of the  
difficulty of the concept.


In COMP(2013) you write:
The digital mechanist thesis (or computationalism, or just comp)  
is then equivalent to the hypothesis that there is a level of  
description of that part of reality in which my consciousness  
remains invariant through a functional digital emulation of that  
generalized brain at that particular level.


I think this is saying that human consciousness is Turing emulable.


Only by using an identity thesis, which later will need to be  
abandonned. My consciousness is in Platonia, out of time and space,  
and might rely on infinities of computations. What the brain does   
consists in making it possible for that consciousness to manifest  
itself.


Saying that consciousness is Turing emulable is only a way to sum up  
the idea, but taken too much literally, it will create a problem later.




A consequence of this is, of course, that we can survive in a  
digital brain: ...I can survive, in the usual clinical sense, with  
an artificial digital (generalized) brain.


I think you are just shuffling words when you then say that  
consciousness is not Turing emulable per se.


Read further. You don't act like someone trying to understand, but  
like someone wanting to not understand.








which just says that human-like AI is possible on a sufficiently  
sophisticated computer. But,as Bruno says, consciousness is not  
duplicable -- we cannot know, for ourselves, what another's  
consciousness is, so we cannot know whether it is a duplicate or  
not.

OK.


My feeling is that even a digital copy from a computer-based AI  
will diverge so rapidly from the original once it is installed and  
run on another computer that there is no sense in which it is ever  
the 'same' consciousness.

That will not work on a virtual AI, which are purely deterministic.


But the copies are in different environments, even in virtual worlds.


In virtual worlds, we can make the environment identical, for some  
times.






That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a  
person, my consciousness changes from moment to moment with  
changing thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain the same  
person. Can two spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the  
same person? I don't think so, even if they stem from the same  
digital copy at some point. M-man and W-man are different persons,  
and neither is the unique closest continuer of H-man, so it is not  
that H-man is uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.
That is equivalent with saying that you would not die if teleported  
from here to 2 mm away, but would die from teleportation from here  
to mars, so you reject step 2.


I don't know what you are talking about. The distance of the  
teleportation is not an issue. If you take the closest continuer  
notion of personal identity, then the being reconstructed from the  
teleported AI program corresponding to me will be my unique closest  
continuer. This remains true even if there is a time delay of  
centuries before the reconstruction. The only requirement is that  
there is no closer continuer of my person, and no closer predecessor  
of the new reconstruction than the original me.


If you continue this to step 5, where you take the copy and install  
that in a new body without destroying the original, then there is a  
unique continuer -- the continuing body and mind. The copy is a new  
person. Similarly, if you reconstruct now a copy of me taken a year  
ago, that copy bears even less relation to the /me/ of now than one  
reconstructed from a recent copy.


Closer continuer theory makes sense of these permutations. The only  
stipulation is that in the case of ties for closest continuer,  
totally new persons are created. Using shared memories as your only  
criterion for personhood leads to many difficulties.


So in step 4, where a delay of reconstitution is introduced in Moscow,  
you say that the probability is higher to be the person reconstituted  
in W than in Moscow?







This does not make sense with computationalism, as the brain would  
notice a difference that a computer could not notice by  
construction, unless you add releveant but non Turing emulable  
magical properties in the wires.


I don't see this at all. We are talking about

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/16/2015 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as having been duplicated
in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.

How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?

By associating it with different token of the machinery implementing it.

Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having different spacetime location
can distinguish two otherwise indiscernible set of thoughts?

No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?

I'm not sure what 3-1 view means, but if you mean in the sense of running on two different
machines then I agree. That means duplication of consciousness/computation depends on
distinguishability of the physical substrate with no distinction in the
consciousness/computation. But is that the duplication envisioned in the M-W thought
experiment?

I find I'm confused about that. In our quantum-mechanical world it is impossible to
duplicate something in an unknown state. One could duplicate a human being in the rough
classical sense of structure at the molecular composition level, but not the molecular
states. Such duplicates would be similar as I'm similar to myself of yesterday - but they
would instantly diverge in thoughts, even without seeing Moscow or Washington. Yet it
seems Bruno's argument is based on deterministic computation and requires the duplication
and subsequent thoughts to be duplicates at a deterministic classcial level so that the
M-man and W-man on diverge in thought when they see different things in their respective
cities.

Brent

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/16/2015 1:03 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is
only a small
step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.

You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

The conclusion of the UDA is that comp and materialism are incompatible. Can you
formulate a protocol where the copies sit down for a chat and arrive at a contradiction
of the UDA's conclusion?

Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

It's just a simple way to label the two duplicates: Moscow man and Washington man. You
could have the two reconstructions in the same room and label them as machine-A man and
machine-B man and let them interact immediately. It wouldn't change the conclusion,
because the conclusion does not depend on the copies having a chat or not. It would
just make the argument harder to follow.

No, the argument is that both copies are equally the same person as the original. It is
that illusion that is hard to maintain if they have a chat and realize that they are
different people. The real issue is personal identity through time, and in the case of
ties for closest follower, as in this case, it fits better with the notions of personal
identity to say that the copies are both new persons -- inheriting a lot from the
original of course, but the original single person has not become two of the *same* person.

It just seems like a semantic problem to me. We use same in two different senses. I'm
the same-1 person I was yesterday, but I'm not identical, same-2, with that person. So
the M-man and W-man are the same-1 person as the H-man, but they are not the same-2 as
each other.

Brent

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/16/2015 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:52, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com a écrit :

 Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
 that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
 logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to 
see
that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things 
about
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical
commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and 
the
reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is 
true
consciousness is obviously duplicatable.

Quentin


In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it.  Not just, 
an
instrospective well everybody knows what it is.


Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some level. Is that enough 
to be a propositional definition?


I don't think it's specific enough because it isn't clear whether computational process 
means a physical process or an abstract one.  If you take computational process to be 
the abstract process in Platonia then it would not be duplicable;


?

The UD copied the abstract process an infinity of times. It might appear in

phi_567_(29)^45, phi_567_(29)^46, phi_567_(29)^47, phi_567_(29)^48, phi_567_(29)^49, phi_567_(29)^50, 
... and in


phi_8999704_(0)^89,   phi_8999704_(0)^90,  phi_8999704_(0)^91,  phi_8999704_(0)^92, 
 phi_8999704_(0)^93,


I don't understand your notation here.  Does phi_i(x) refer to the ith function in some 
list of all functions?  And does the exponent refer to repeated iteration: phi_i(x)^n+1 := 
phi_i(phi_i(x)^n)?








every copy would just be a token of the same process.  I think that's what 
Bruno means.


The consciousness will be the same, but it is multiplied (in some 3-1 sense) in UD* 
(sigma_1 truth).


Are you saying that identity of indiscernibles doesn't apply to these 
computations?

Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/16/2015 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 05:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

   LizR wrote:
   On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
   mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
   mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
   Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
   Bruno
   had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
   uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only 
a small
   step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
   consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
   duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
   duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
   what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
   You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
   case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
   and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
   if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the copy sitting in the 
chair on the left? is less dramatic than Will I be transported to Moscow or 
Washington? and hence, I suspect, might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise 
the argument goes through either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree that they were the 
same person.



   Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
   worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ? This is a 
classical result, assuming classical computation (which according to Max Tegmark is a 
reasonable assumption for brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated made that he 
accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3. Step 3 is basically to introduce the idea 
of FPI, and hence form a link with the MWI of quantum mechanics. This may not always 
have been made explicit, but the intention is clear.


It is not made at all. people who criticize UDA always criticize what they add 
themselves to the reasoning. This is not valid. People who does that criticize only 
themselves, not the argument presented.



Step 3 does not succeed in this because the inference to FPI depends on a flawed 
concept of personal identity.



Step 3 leads to the FPI, and to see what happens next, there is step 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
Then the translation in arithmetic show how to already extract the logic of the 
observable so that we might refute a form of comp (based on comp + the classical theory 
of knowledge). That main point there is that incompleteness refutes Socrates argument 
against the Theaetetus, 


Which argument do you refer to?  Theaetetus puts forward several theories of knowledge 
which Socrates attempts to refute.


Brent

and we can almost directly retrieve the Parmenides-Plotinus theology in the discourse 
of the introspecting universal (Löbian) machine.


Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/16/2015 6:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 13:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical sophistication. 
Computationalism is based on the idea that human consciousness is Turing emulable,
This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some point you might 
understand that this is not really the case. Comp assumes only that we can survive ith 
a digital brain, in the quasi-operational meaning of the yes doctor scenario. 
Consciousness is a first person notion, and that is not Turing emulable per se, in 
fact that is not even definable in any 3p term. That is part of the difficulty of the 
concept.


In COMP(2013) you write:
The digital mechanist thesis (or computationalism, or just comp) is then equivalent 
to the hypothesis that there is a level of description of that part of reality in which 
my consciousness remains invariant through a functional digital emulation of that 
generalized brain at that particular level.


I think this is saying that human consciousness is Turing emulable.


Only by using an identity thesis, which later will need to be abandonned. My 
consciousness is in Platonia, out of time and space, and might rely on infinities of 
computations. What the brain does  consists in making it possible for that consciousness 
to manifest itself.


That seems problematic.  What is a consciousness conscious of when it is not manifesting 
itself?  To whom does it manifest itself when it is manifest?  ISTM it's only manifest to 
itself - which on your theory wouldn't require a brain.


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/16/2015 9:54 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

 If the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric


Even if the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric  events would still not 
be time symmetrical if the initial condition was a state of minimum entropy because then 
any change in that state would lead to a increase in entropy, and the arrow of time 
would be born.


In a deterministic, time-symmetric system  there is no information loss with evolution 
either to the past or future. So the entropy is zero and stays zero - unless you choose 
some incomplete/approximate specification of the initial condition.  But of course that 
won't be a state of minimum entropy because the minimum was zero.


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 16 Apr 2015, at 06:34, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:



 On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
 mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
 Bruno
 had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
 uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3
 is only a small
 step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
 consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
 duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
 duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
 what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


 You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
 case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
 and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
 if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

 That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the copy
 sitting in the chair on the left? is less dramatic than Will I be
 transported to Moscow or Washington? and hence, I suspect, might not make
 the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes through either way.


 No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree that
 they were the same person.

  Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
 worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

 I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ?
 This is a classical result, assuming classical computation (which according
 to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for brains).


 In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated made
 that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.


 Discussion or fruitful argument assume mutual respect. The
 respect/civility in the exchange is one-sided however, and has remained so
 for years. It's not an argument; closer to an experiment of John to see how
 often he can get away with airing personal issues clothed in sincerity of
 intellectual debate.

 This occupies too much bandwidth and is a turn off from where I'm sitting.
 I'd much rather see the comp related discussions go to address say Telmo's
 request for clarification in Bruno's use of phi_i, or G/G* distinctions, or
 pedagogical demonstrations on the* work* arithmetic existentially 
 *actualizes/gets
 done*, clarification on Russell's use of robust, physicalist theories
 that don't eliminate consciousness etc.


 Good and interesting questions indeed.

 I, of course would be delighted if people try to really grasp the phi_i,
 the G/G* distinction, and the subtle but key point of the fact that the
 arithmetical reality simulates computations, as opposed to merely generates
 descriptions of them.

 I am bit buzy right now.  Feel free to tell me which one of those point
 seems to you the more interesting, or funky.


Funkiest would be arithmetical reality simulates computations aka free
lunch :)

But I've picked up and guess that people seem to miss use of phi_i or
Sigma 1 sentences and such terms.

So, you thought you could offer me a hand and... I take the arm and more: 1
of those point = 3 + infinite possibility of other such terms. PGC-
Zombie hunting armchair ninja of numbers.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-16 Thread LizR

On 17 April 2015 at 04:54, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


  If the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric


 Even if the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric  events
 would still not be time symmetrical if the initial condition was a state of
 minimum entropy because then any change in that state would lead to a
 increase in entropy, and the arrow of time would be born.


Yes you also have to consider global boundary conditions.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In
an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.


Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the reverse, people who 
argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis of unexamined metaphysical assumptions 
(like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as much an unevidenced 
metaphysical assumption.


But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it, his theory 
in outline is:

1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that correspond to 
intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by computed relations 
between the computed physics and our computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so realizes the model 1-5 
in all possible ways and this produces the multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely 
many other worlds which he hopes to show have low measure.


Brent


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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-15 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Apr 14, 2015  meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  there a difference between the past and the future and if Many Worlds
 is correct then unlike the past there is nothing linear and nothing unique
 about Mr.You's future.




  Except the disciples of MWI insist that the SWE (without collapse)
 includes the totality of physical evolution.  Since the SWE is time
 reversible this implies that the past is just as branching as the future.


Yes there are a astronomical and possibly infinite number of branches in
the past, but only one of them led to Mr. You.   Mr. You can remember
everything in one particular path and absolutely nothing in any of the
others, so one path is unique and as far as Mr. You is concerned the past
is one and only one linear sequence. But the future is massively parallel
not linear and Mr. You can't remember anything in any of them so none of
them are unique.

  John k Clark

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/14/2015 11:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-04-15 4:53 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:

On 4/14/2015 12:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a
married bachelor.


Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God is 
not bound
to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and using miracles to
justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can with that same 
argument
*justify anything*.


That makes no sense.  Even theologians can't bring themselves to say that 
God can do
something self-contradictory. Suppose God did Y=(X and not-X), what would Y 
consist of?


I don't know we as human cannot do it... But I don't see why not, and that's false that 
theologians (at least some) never say that god can't do self-contradictory thing... have 
you never heard god is not bound to logic


Yes, from people who don't know what logic is.

and for example, god could create two universe, one where he destroys the earth, one 
where he does not...


But that's not a logical contradiction.  It's making two things and destroying one of 
them.  A contradiction would be for him to both create the Earth and not create the 
Earth.  I'm afraid you're one of those theologians who doesn't know what logic is.


(but that something we human could comprehend). I *don't* believe in god, but I can 
imagine such a being with no limit in power if it existed, and that could transcend 
*everything*, after all he's god !.


Really?  You can imagine a being who can do Y where X=fly and Y=(X and not-X)?  I don't 
think so.



Logical contradiction is a matter of language; it can't refer because it 
has no meaning.


If there is a god, meaning comes from god, not from the language or from you. god 
transcend reality.


Nonsense.  Language is words we make up and so we give them what ever meaning they have.  
A contradiction is a relation between two propositions.  You can't have a contradiction 
without language.




A miracle is ordinarily understood as an occurrence which is 
*nomologically* impossible.


A miracle is understood as a miracle, it could be anything not possible without it... 
like *magic*.


Not possible means nomologically impossible; not self-contradictory.

Using miracles or magics to say a logical reasoning is correct, is a fallacy... I won't 
agree it's correct reasoning to do that.


I can't even parse that.  One can logical reasoning is *valid* without reference to 
anything else.  I don't know how miracles or magic could contribute?


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Apr 2015, at 01:58, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Apr 2015, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:


It's stubborn, even if an illusion, eh? If you were duplicated, would you be prepared 
to kill your duplicate? Who would you kill?
It can be shown that, indeed, killing someone with comp is equivalent with an 
amnesia. Dying is forgetting or refreshing memories.
If you decide to kill a copy, you have to cautiously agree (with yourself) on the 
procedure (and who will be killed) before the duplication. After the duplication, it 
is preferable to treat the copy as a new person, for all practical and ethical purposes.


I think there are even stronger reasons for treating copies as new persons. In 
practical terms, if it came to ethical and legal matters, the law is currently no able 
to recognize the existence of two separate bodies as the same person. And physically, I 
think the divergence necessitated by different physical bodies in different spatial 
locations is going to lead to significant divergence sufficiently rapidly for the 
concept of 'the same person' to cease to be applicable after an extremely short time. 
The effects of simple thermal noise would be sufficient for the 'persons' to decohere 
within milliseconds.


No problem with this.

I think that the discussion between Stathis and Quentin relies on a confusion between 
the 3-1 views and the 1-views. We cannot duplicate the 1-views (= the 1-1-views = the 
1-1-1-views): we feel always unique. But in the 3-1 view we can ascribe the same 
consciousness to (identical) exemplars, and this can play a rôle in the measure problem, 
although this needs some later differentiation and the rule Y = II. In practice, 
thermal noise will indeed decohere the consciousness very quickly. I use quote as we 
are not in the quantum setting here, but it is (here) the same thing.


But the question of the number of person is a different discussion. If you agree that 
the W-guy, who stays in W and marries a girl in W, is the same person as the guy in M, 
who marries a woman in M, are the same person ... as the H-guy, the, I claim, we are 
already all the same person, despite different lives and consciousness. 


But then you're just mucking up the meaning of the same person, giving it a special 
metaphorical poetic meaning, unrelated to common usage.


Brent

Here there is a matter of almost conventional decision, to relate or not individuality 
to personal identity. With comp and AUDA, we can say we are all the universal baby 
describes by the 8 arithmetical hypostases, so we are the same person, put in (quite) 
different context (the genes, the culture, ...). We are all the same amoeba, in that 
case. If Aliens exist, we are them too.


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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/15/2015 12:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Apr 2015, at 08:33, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net 
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:

On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:

On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com a écrit :

 Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
 that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
 logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You 
have to
see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of
things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a
metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the 
real
to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if
computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable.

Quentin


In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it.  Not 
just, an
instrospective well everybody knows what it is.


It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to Stathis ?



No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're using.  
Are you
supposing that two streams of thought which are identical would constitute 
two
different consciousness'es?


I have don't have to have one, I don't pretend anything about consciousness, I'm saying 
Stathis does have one *to pretend* consciousness is duplicable; and that his statement 
consciousness is duplicable is rooted in a metaphysical commitment to one (o
r more) theorie(s) about reality, without that commitment consciousness is duplicable 
has no meaning by itself and is not an absolute truth... are you really reading what I 
write, or only what you want to read ?


Consciousness is pure 1p view, and as such is not duplicable, nor localizable. It is not 
in the brain, nor in the physical activity of a brain, but in the  (infinity) of the 
relevant number relations. But we are used to ascribe consciousness to bodies (which 
don't really exist), and so we can say in the local 3-1 view, that a consciousness has 
been duplicated. That will just means that the relative conditions in which that 
consciousness can manifest itself have been duplicated, like there are infinitely 
multiplied and distributed in arithmetic.


In fact if we refer to bodies, the 3p is here a 1p-plural-1p-singular view, really, but 
this is not relevant (especially if the discussion is on a point before step 8/MGA).


If we think of an AI, which can be run on different hardware, then when it is running on 
different hardware in different circumstances it will have different thoughts and if it 
is conscious will have different qualia.  But in a sense it will be the same 
consciousness, i.e. the same person, just in different environments.


Brent



I don't remember the motivation of the discussion, to see if the difference of terming 
is relevant or not.


Bruno





Quentin


Computationalism would say that a brain is duplicable, but as soon as the 
copy had
a different thought there would be two different consciousnesses.

Brent


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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/15/2015 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Apr 2015, at 05:12, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:

On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com a écrit :

Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to
see
that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things
about
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical
commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and
the
reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is
true
consciousness is obviously duplicatable.

Quentin

In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not just,
an
instrospective well everybody knows what it is.

It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to Stathis ?

No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're using. Are you
supposing that two streams of thought which are identical would constitute two
different consciousness'es?

In the 1-view (or 1-1-view, ...) : the answer is no.

I agree.

In the 3--1 view, we can say yes, as we can see the diverging conditions, like knowing
that each duplicated H-man will diverge once opening their reconstitution box.

But in that case we've duplicated the machinery of consciousness, e.g. the AI program
that instaniated the consciousness. It can be the same program which is now running in
two different machines and is diverging because of spacetime and environmental differences.

So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as having been duplicated in
some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.

How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges? Are you assuming consciousness is
physical and so having different spacetime location can distinguish two otherwise
indiscernible set of thoughts?

Brent

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2015-04-15 20:55 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:

  On 4/14/2015 11:33 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:

  On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:

  On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a
 écrit :

   Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
  that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
  logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

 I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
 consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to
 see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of
 things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a
 metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the
 real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if
 computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable.

 Quentin

 In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
 non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it.  Not just,
 an instrospective well everybody knows what it is.


  It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to
 Stathis ?


 No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're using.
 Are you supposing that two streams of thought which are identical would
 constitute two different consciousness'es?


  I have don't have to have one, I don't pretend anything about
 consciousness, I'm saying Stathis does have one *to pretend* consciousness
 is duplicable; and that his statement consciousness is duplicable is
 rooted in a metaphysical commitment to one (o
 r more) theorie(s) about reality,


 I agree that Stathis must be using some unexpressed definition in order to
 assert that consciousness is duplicable.  But also that you must being
 using some different definition to assert that it is not.


Here I'm sure you don't read what I'm writing, so I will put it in CAPS
I DON'T PRETEND THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS DUPLICABLE OR NOT DUPLICABLE, STATHIS
PRETEND IT IS AND THAT ANY THEORIES WHO WOULD SAY IT IS NOT MUST BE
LOGICALLY INCONSISTENT.. I REPEAT ***I*** DON'T PRETEND THAT CONSCIOUSNESS
*IS* DUPLICABLE *OR IS NOT* DUPLICABLE... IF YOU WANT TO KNOW WHAT I
BELIEVE I WOULD TEND TOWARD IT IS DUPLICABLE BECAUSE I BELIEVE
COMPUTATIONALISM TO BE TRUE, SO I WOULD CERTAINLY NOT HOLD THE THEORY THAT
IT IS NOT DUPLICABLE BUT ALSO I DON'T SAY LIKE STATHIS DOES THAT THE
POSSIBILITY THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS DUPLICABLE IS TRUE WHATEVER METAPHYSICAL
ASSUMPTION YOU MAKE ABOUT REALITY, BECAUSE THAT'S THAT ASSUMPTION THAT MAKE
THE STATEMENT 'CONSCIOUSNESS IS DUPLICABLE' MEANINGFUL OR NOT. SO I REPEAT
I'M NOT USING SOME DEFINITION ON CONSCIOUSNESS TO PRETEND IT IS OR IT IS
NOT DUPLICABLE, I'M SAYING THAT THE MEANINGFULNESS OF THE STATEMENT DEPEND
ON AN UNSTATED ASSUMPTION STATHIS IS MAKING.

Quentin



   So I'm asking which one you are using?

 Brent

   without that commitment consciousness is duplicable has no meaning by
 itself and is not an absolute truth... are you really reading what I write,
 or only what you want to read ?

  Quentin


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Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/14/2015 11:33 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-04-15 5:12 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:

On 4/14/2015 9:47 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2015-04-14 18:40 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net:

On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com a écrit :

Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You
have to
see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of
things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a
metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the
real
to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if
computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable.

Quentin

In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it. Not
just, an
instrospective well everybody knows what it is.

It seems that's what I was explaining... or are you answering to Stathis ?

No, it's not clear to me what definition of consciousness you're using.
Are you
supposing that two streams of thought which are identical would constitute
two
different consciousness'es?

I have don't have to have one, I don't pretend anything about consciousness, I'm saying
Stathis does have one *to pretend* consciousness is duplicable; and that his statement
consciousness is duplicable is rooted in a metaphysical commitment to one (o

r more) theorie(s) about reality,

I agree that Stathis must be using some unexpressed definition in order to assert that
consciousness is duplicable. But also that you must being using some different definition
to assert that it is not. So I'm asking which one you are using?

Brent

without that commitment consciousness is duplicable has no meaning by itself and is
not an absolute truth... are you really reading what I write, or only what you want to
read ?

Quentin

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2015-04-15 20:51 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:

  On 4/14/2015 11:29 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



 2015-04-15 4:53 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:

  On 4/14/2015 12:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

 No, a miracle cannot be logically contradictory. God cannot make a
 married bachelor.


  Yes it can.. that's the whole point of what is a miracle and God. God
 is not bound to logic, what you can't conceive is your prejudice... and
 using miracles to justify your thinking is a logical fallacy... you can
 with that same argument *justify anything*.


 That makes no sense.  Even theologians can't bring themselves to say that
 God can do something self-contradictory.  Suppose God did Y=(X and not-X),
 what would Y consist of?


  I don't know we as human cannot do it... But I don't see why not, and
 that's false that theologians (at least some) never say that god can't do
 self-contradictory thing... have you never heard god is not bound to
 logic


 Yes, from people who don't know what logic is.


So logic is above God... that's not the common believe in God... what about
what you think is logical is in fact illogical because God made you so that
you can transcend that... If God is all, and transcend everything then
logic is nothing. I don't believe in God be it bound or not to logic. But
an unthinkable all powerfull thing that cant transcend everything can
surely do anything, and be bound and not bound and whatever to logic as
anything.




and for example, god could create two universe, one where he destroys
 the earth, one where he does not...


 But that's not a logical contradiction.


It would be in a one world view where it happens and it does not.


 It's making two things and destroying one of them.  A contradiction would
 be for him to both create the Earth and not create the Earth.  I'm afraid
 you're one of those theologians who doesn't know what logic is.

   (but that something we human could comprehend). I *don't* believe in
 god, but I can imagine such a being with no limit in power if it existed,
 and that could transcend *everything*, after all he's god !.


 Really?  You can imagine a being who can do Y where X=fly and Y=(X and
 not-X)?  I don't think so.


I cannot image it does it, I can image a being who transcend anything and I
could not comprehend and so it's meaningless for me to ascribe anything on
it.






 Logical contradiction is a matter of language; it can't refer because it
 has no meaning.


  If there is a god, meaning comes from god, not from the language or from
 you. god transcend reality.


 Nonsense.


You don't believe in God, I don't too, so yes it's nonsense... I starting
to thing you can't read what I'm saying... Some conception of god is a
thing who transcend everything, if the reality is an emanation of that
thing, so is your language, so is your thoughts, so is your ability to
comprehend the reality, so is your ability to comprehend that thing who
transcend everything... I understand you don't believe in such god... **I
DON'T TOO** **I'M NOT STATING HERE WHAT I BELIEVE**


 Language is words we make up


Not in a reality who would be an emanation of an all transcending being,
word like you like everything else even what is not, would be from that god.


 and so we give them what ever meaning they have.  A contradiction is a
 relation between two propositions.  You can't have a contradiction without
 language.




 A miracle is ordinarily understood as an occurrence which is
 *nomologically* impossible.


  A miracle is understood as a miracle, it could be anything not possible
 without it... like *magic*.


 Not possible means nomologically impossible; not self-contradictory.


No, not possible, is anything.




   Using miracles or magics to say a logical reasoning is correct, is a
 fallacy... I won't agree it's correct reasoning to do that.


 I can't even parse that.  One can logical reasoning is *valid* without
 reference to anything else.


For *god* sake.. I'm not the one who use *miracles* in the argument... It's
*Stathis*, do you read the thread or only your own mind and what you want
to read... ?


 I don't know how miracles or magic could contribute?


*THAT'S STATHIS ARGUMENT*



 Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/15/2015 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But the question of the number of person is a different discussion. If you agree that 
the W-guy, who stays in W and marries a girl in W, is the same person as the guy in M, 
who marries a woman in M, are the same person ... as the H-guy, the, I claim, we are 
already all the same person, despite different lives and consciousness. 


But then you're just mucking up the meaning of the same person, giving it a special 
metaphorical poetic meaning, unrelated to common usage.


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical sophistication. 
Computationalism is based on the idea that human consciousness is Turing emulable, which 
just says that human-like AI is possible on a sufficiently sophisticated computer. 
But,as Bruno says, consciousness is not duplicable -- we cannot know, for ourselves, 
what another's consciousness is, so we cannot know whether it is a duplicate or not.


My feeling is that even a digital copy from a computer-based AI will diverge so rapidly 
from the original once it is installed and run on another computer that there is no 
sense in which it is ever the 'same' consciousness.


Right.  They could only remain the same if they were in separate but identical worlds, as 
would be possible for AI's in simulated worlds.




That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person, my consciousness 
changes from moment to moment with changing thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain 
the same person. Can two spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the same person? I 
don't think so, even if they stem from the same digital copy at some point. M-man and 
W-man are different persons, and neither is the unique closest continuer of H-man, so it 
is not that H-man is uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.


This differs from MWI in that, in MWI, the continuers are in different worlds. 


Right. Like AI's in separate but identical worlds.

Brent

In each world there is a unique closest continuer and the ambiguity doesn't arise. 
Worlds, by definition, don't interfere.


Bruce



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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-15 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:


  that's false that theologians (at least some) never say that god can't
 do self-contradictory thing.


I think you're right, theologians do say such things. Have you even
wondered why Thomas Jefferson insisted that the new university he founded
should NOT have a school of theology? Theology and theologians are stupid
that is why.


 If God is all, and transcend everything then logic is nothing.


Logic is nothing and yet you used logic (or rather tried to use logic)  to
deduce a if-then logical statement. You failed rather spectacularly but
logic is nothing so why did you even try to use it?


  an unthinkable all powerfull thing that cant transcend everything can
 surely do anything


Can God make a rock so heavy He can't lift it?


  I can image a being who transcend anything


Wow, you can imagine that! I can't do it but you can use your imagination
to visualize the above scenario, so you must know the answer. So what is
it, can God make a rock so heavy He can't lift it or can He not?


  Some conception of god is a thing who transcend everything,


God can even transcend everyday stupidity and enter the realm if
hyper-mega-stupidity.

  John K Clark

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But the question of the number of person is a different discussion. If 
you agree that the W-guy, who stays in W and marries a girl in W, is 
the same person as the guy in M, who marries a woman in M, are the 
same person ... as the H-guy, the, I claim, we are already all the 
same person, despite different lives and consciousness. 


But then you're just mucking up the meaning of the same person, giving 
it a special metaphorical poetic meaning, unrelated to common usage.


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical 
sophistication. Computationalism is based on the idea that human 
consciousness is Turing emulable, which just says that human-like AI is 
possible on a sufficiently sophisticated computer. But,as Bruno says, 
consciousness is not duplicable -- we cannot know, for ourselves, what 
another's consciousness is, so we cannot know whether it is a duplicate 
or not.


My feeling is that even a digital copy from a computer-based AI will 
diverge so rapidly from the original once it is installed and run on 
another computer that there is no sense in which it is ever the 'same' 
consciousness.


That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person, my 
consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing thoughts and 
external stimuli, but I remain the same person. Can two spatially 
distinct consciousnesses ever be the same person? I don't think so, even 
if they stem from the same digital copy at some point. M-man and W-man 
are different persons, and neither is the unique closest continuer of 
H-man, so it is not that H-man is uncertain of his future -- he doesn't 
have one.


This differs from MWI in that, in MWI, the continuers are in different 
worlds. In each world there is a unique closest continuer and the 
ambiguity doesn't arise. Worlds, by definition, don't interfere.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/15/2015 3:37 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com 
wrote:

 ..
Can God make a rock so heavy He can't lift it?

 I can image a being who transcend anything


Wow, you can imagine that! I can't do it but you can use your imagination to visualize 
the above scenario, so you must know the answer. So what is it, can God make a rock so 
heavy He can't lift it or can He not?


Quentin's god can make a rock so heavy that he can lift it and not lift it at the same 
time - which must be interesting to witness.


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


 Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno had
 discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of uncertainty

 That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small step in a
logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday consciousness is the
result of computation, then it can be duplicated (in principle - if you
have a problem with matter duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that
this leads to what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.

You have to follow the rest of the argument to find out what Bruno is
claiming.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/15/2015 5:33 PM, LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 05:40, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
mailto:te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:

My problem with any view based on entropy is that entropy
doesn't appear to be fundamental to
physics; it is the statistically likely result when objects are put
in a
certain configuration and allowed to evolve randomly.

There is, however, an interesting parallel to be made with Shannon's
entropy, which is a measure of
information content and not just a statistical effect. Once in the
realm of
digital physics, it becomes questionable if physical entropy and
information
entropy are separate things.

I think the second law of thermodynamics is the most fundamental law of
physics, in
fact it's almost a law of logic rather than physics; entropy will always
increase
just says that there are more ways to be complicated than simple, so any
change in a
system will probably make it more complicated and not simpler. Or to put it
in
Shannon's language, it takes more information to describe a complicated
thing than a
simple thing.

This is my point - it is not a law of physics, it's a law of logic.

To be exact, the second law will almost certainly exist in any universe with any laws of
physics that allow for the existence of complex structures, bound systems, etc.

The second law depends on approximation and ignorance as well as complexity. If the laws
of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric (as MWI advocates suppose) then the second
law works because we never have perfect information (and often we don't even want to use
all the information we have; we're happy with an approximation) so from the information we
have we can only predict statistical regularities. From a Copenhagen perspective QM
prevents us from ever having complete information of the state and so we only have
statistical prediction and retrodiction.

Brent

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 16 April 2015 at 14:44, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On 16 April 2015 at 09:51, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 wrote:
  
   Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical
   sophistication.

 A rigorous philosophical analysis usually starts with a definition,


 I disagree. Philosophical discussion will often start from a loosely
 defined or understood concept, such as 'personal identity', and seek, by
 detailed analysis, to tease out the possible meanings of this term and how
 we can make it more precise. Definitions do not necessarily play a
 substantial role in this.


Bruno claims in the 2013 paper that comp is science, not philosophy (it
starts from some definitions and assumptions, and proceeds to build a
theory with testable consequences).




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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-15 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
 mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
 mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
 mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
 Bruno
 had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
 uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3
 is only a small
 step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
 consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
 duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
 duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
 what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


 You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
 case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
 and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
 if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

 That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the copy
 sitting in the chair on the left? is less dramatic than Will I be
 transported to Moscow or Washington? and hence, I suspect, might not make
 the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes through either way.


 No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree that
 they were the same person.

  Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
 worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

 I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ?
 This is a classical result, assuming classical computation (which according
 to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for brains).


 In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated made
 that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.


Discussion or fruitful argument assume mutual respect. The respect/civility
in the exchange is one-sided however, and has remained so for years. It's
not an argument; closer to an experiment of John to see how often he can
get away with airing personal issues clothed in sincerity of intellectual
debate.

This occupies too much bandwidth and is a turn off from where I'm sitting.
I'd much rather see the comp related discussions go to address say Telmo's
request for clarification in Bruno's use of phi_i, or G/G* distinctions, or
pedagogical demonstrations on the* work* arithmetic existentially
*actualizes/gets
done*, clarification on Russell's use of robust, physicalist theories
that don't eliminate consciousness etc.

I enjoy when the list gets funky in such direction, and even though I am
invested in environmental sector professionally, perhaps some of the
climate change stuff is a bit out of topic. This as pure opinion. Nobody
gets two cents from me as I'd be poor if consistent ;-) PGC

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-15 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le 16 avr. 2015 01:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net a écrit :

 On 4/15/2015 3:37 PM, John Clark wrote:

 On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  ..
 Can God make a rock so heavy He can't lift it?


  I can image a being who transcend anything


 Wow, you can imagine that! I can't do it but you can use your
imagination to visualize the above scenario, so you must know the answer.
So what is it, can God make a rock so heavy He can't lift it or can He not?


 Quentin's god

That's not my god, I have no god. But yes, if such a god is, then
everything is possible, and that means what we're writing here about it
using deduction and logic is gibberish, but that idra of god I can imagine
it.

Quentin

can make a rock so heavy that he can lift it and not lift it at the same
time - which must be interesting to witness.

 Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 16 April 2015 at 12:52, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 4/15/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a
 écrit :

   Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
  that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
  logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

 I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
 consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to
 see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of
 things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a
 metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the
 real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if
 computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable.

 Quentin

 In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
 non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it.  Not just,
 an instrospective well everybody knows what it is.


  Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some level.
 Is that enough to be a propositional definition?

 I don't think it's specific enough because it isn't clear whether
 computational process means a physical process or an abstract one.  If you
 take computational process to be the abstract process in Platonia then
 it would not be duplicable; every copy would just be a token of the same
 process.  I think that's what Bruno means.  But I think Stathis is thinking
 of a copy of an AI, not just a particular computation by that AI.


If I understand correctly, comp starts by assuming that the process is
physical, but eventually deduces that it has to be abstract. Hence you can
assume physical for the steps up to the MGA, I think.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 16 April 2015 at 12:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 4/15/2015 5:33 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 15 April 2015 at 05:40, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

  On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 12:39 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com
 wrote:

   My problem with any view based on entropy is that entropy
 doesn't appear to be fundamental to physics; it is the statistically likely
 result when objects are put in a certain configuration and allowed to
 evolve randomly.


   There is, however, an interesting parallel to be made with Shannon's
 entropy, which is a measure of information content and not just a
 statistical effect. Once in the realm of digital physics, it becomes
 questionable if physical entropy and information entropy are separate
 things.


  I think the second law of thermodynamics is the most fundamental law of
 physics, in fact it's almost a law of logic rather than physics; entropy
 will always increase just says that there are more ways to be complicated
 than simple, so any change in a system will probably make it more
 complicated and not simpler. Or to put it in Shannon's language, it takes
 more information to describe a complicated thing than a simple thing.

This is my point - it is not a law of physics, it's a law of logic.

  To be exact, the second law will almost certainly exist in any universe
 with any laws of physics that allow for the existence of complex
 structures, bound systems, etc.

 The second law depends on approximation and ignorance as well as
 complexity.  If the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric
 (as MWI advocates suppose) then the second law works because we never have
 perfect information (and often we don't even want to use all the
 information we have; we're happy with an approximation) so from the
 information we have we can only predict statistical regularities.  From a
 Copenhagen perspective QM prevents us from ever having complete information
 of the state and so we only have statistical prediction and retrodiction.


True. I just didn't want to get bogged down with too many details (unless
Mr Clark still didn't get the point about it not being a law of physics).

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


 Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com a
 écrit :

  Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
  that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
  logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

 I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
 consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to
 see that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of
 things about the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a
 metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the
 real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if
 computationalism is true consciousness is obviously duplicatable.

 Quentin

 In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
 non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it.  Not just,
 an instrospective well everybody knows what it is.


Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some level. Is
that enough to be a propositional definition?

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 15 April 2015 at 04:39, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote:

 Hi Liz,


 Ok. I have an idea about that, it is probably not original. Tell me what
 you think:
 The universe was not created. All possible states just exist. The moment
 of the big bang is one of the many possible states. What we call the past
 is a sequence of steps in the state graph that are coherent predecessor of
 each other, in the sense that they contain less and less information. Given
 that the moment of the big bang is the lowest entropy state conceivable,
 all history lines will originate there.

 My problem with any view based on entropy is that entropy doesn't appear
 to be fundamental to physics; it is the statistically likely result when
 objects are put in a certain configuration and allowed to evolve randomly.


 There is, however, an interesting parallel to be made with Shannon's
 entropy, which is a measure of information content and not just a
 statistical effect. Once in the realm of digital physics, it becomes
 questionable if physical entropy and information entropy are separate
 things.


Yes, and there is also black hole entropy. It's POSSIBLE that Boltzmann
stumbled on something fundamental via a route that doesn't lead via
fundamental physics (B's entropy is only apparent to macroscopic beings) I
don't know if the jury has come down in favour of entropy being in some way
fundamental to the universe, but it's certainly possible. (Though not the
thermodynamic sort.)



 However the laws of physics are (mainly) time-symmetric, with the
 definite exception of neutral kaon decay and the possible exception of
 wave-function collapse, and an ordered state could evolve to become more
 disordered towards the past (although that would make the past appear the
 future for any beings created within that ordered state). Yet we never see
 that happening, and there is an elephant in the cosmic room, namely the
 expansion of the universe, which (istm) must always proceed in the
 direction of the AOT.


 What if the AOT is a purely 1p phenomena?


Well, it's clearly a 3p phenomenon in that we all agree that things age
etc. But it's perhaps purely a macroscopic creature phenomenon


 Hence the appeal to boundary conditions. If something forces the universe
 to have zero (or very low) radius at one time extremity but not at the
 other, this asymmetry could be sufficient to drive the arrow of time in a
 particular direction.

 I've (as it were) expanded on this idea before, however, so I won't go on
 at length about it again.


 I'll search the archives when I have a bit of time.


Briefly, the boundary condition on the universe appears to be that it has a
big bang at one time extremity (or something like one) but not a
corresponding crunch at the other. This alone means that the density of the
contents of the universe is constrained to decrease globally along the time
axis as you move away from the BB, and my contention is that this is
probably enough to create an AOT even with the laws of physics operating -
by assumption - time-symmetrically, when you look at the various processes
that result from a decrease in density (and temperature, effectively, since
particles tend to move until they reach a patch of the background fluid
which is moving at their speed). Such outcomes include the formation of
nuclei, atoms, and eventually gravitationally bound states like galactic
clusters etc.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/15/2015 5:50 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person, my consciousness 
changes from moment to moment with changing thoughts and external stimuli, but I 
remain the same person. Can two spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the same 
person? I don't think so, even if they stem from the same digital copy at some point. 
M-man and W-man are different persons, and neither is the unique closest continuer of 
H-man, so it is not that H-man is uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.


This differs from MWI in that, in MWI, the continuers are in different worlds. 


Right. Like AI's in separate but identical worlds.


Don't you then run into the problem of the identity of indiscernibles? The programs may 
be run on different computers in our world, and thus discernible, but from inside the 
program there is only one consciousness. Just the same as if you ran the program at 
different times on the same computer. Same inputs -- same outputs. Not different from 
the point of view of the simulation.


Yes, you're right. I should have said like AI's in separate worlds that are identical 
except for the observation that split the MW.


Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 16 April 2015 at 09:51, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
javascript:; wrote:
 meekerdb wrote:

 On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 But the question of the number of person is a different discussion. If
 you agree that the W-guy, who stays in W and marries a girl in W, is the
 same person as the guy in M, who marries a woman in M, are the same
person
 ... as the H-guy, the, I claim, we are already all the same person,
despite
 different lives and consciousness.


 But then you're just mucking up the meaning of the same person, giving
 it a special metaphorical poetic meaning, unrelated to common usage.


 Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical
 sophistication.

A rigorous philosophical analysis usually starts with a definition, but
it's very difficult to define consciousness. However, you can have a quite
fruitful discussion about consciousness without explicitly defining,
implicitly using a minimal operational definition: you know it if you have
it. Surprisingly, even the consciousness deniers and consciousness
eliminators seem to know exactly what it is we are talking about!

 Computationalism is based on the idea that human
 consciousness is Turing emulable, which just says that human-like AI is
 possible on a sufficiently sophisticated computer. But,as Bruno says,
 consciousness is not duplicable -- we cannot know, for ourselves, what
 another's consciousness is, so we cannot know whether it is a duplicate or
 not.

That we cannot know does not mean it isn't possible. We cannot know that a
world exists outside our minds, but it is still possible. That aside, we
*can* know, from our own introspection, that the brain replacement has
worked to the same extent that we can know we are the same person from
moment to moment. It's unreasonable to require a higher standard of proof
than this.

 My feeling is that even a digital copy from a computer-based AI will
diverge
 so rapidly from the original once it is installed and run on another
 computer that there is no sense in which it is ever the 'same'
 consciousness.

You could run the AI in a virtual environment with the same starting
parameters and no external inputs and be confident that it will have the
same consciousness. Also, in a large enough universe a finite consciousness
(implemented on a finite state machine) will repeat.


--
Stathis Papaioannou


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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-15 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Apr 15, 2015  Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


 Right. Like AI's in separate but identical worlds.


  Don't you then run into the problem of the identity of indiscernibles?


Yes exactly, that idea of Leibniz has proved to be amazingly useful. If you
exchanged the position of the 2 AI's nothing in either world would notice
any difference because the AI's are identical, and the AI's themselves
would notice no difference because the worlds are identical. So if
subjectively it make no difference and objectively it makes no difference I
think it's safe to say there is no difference.

So there may be 2 identical computers running the same AI program but there
is only one AI individual, and if you destroyed one computer the AI
individual would not die, he wouldn't even notice anything had changed. If
2 phonographs are playing the same symphony and you destroy one machine the
music would not stop.

  John K Clark

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that
Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty 
That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small

step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday
consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different conclusion
if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the copy 
sitting in the chair on the left? is less dramatic than Will I be 
transported to Moscow or Washington? and hence, I suspect, might not 
make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes through 
either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree that 
they were the same person.



Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ? 
This is a classical result, assuming classical computation (which 
according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated made 
that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3. Step 3 is basically 
to introduce the idea of FPI, and hence form a link with the MWI of 
quantum mechanics. This may not always have been made explicit, but the 
intention is clear. Step 3 does not succeed in this because the 
inference to FPI depends on a flawed concept of personal identity.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
 philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation by
 philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical discussion of the
 meaning and interpretation of an observation. In an argument like Bruno's,
 one can certainly question the metaphysical and other presumptions that go
 into his discourse.


Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the reverse,
people who argue *against *Bruno often do so on the basis of unexamined
metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/15/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net 
wrote:


On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
mailto:stath...@gmail.com a écrit :

 Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow copying, but
 that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
 logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper paragraph that
consciousness could not be copied would be selfcontradictory... You have to 
see
that when you say consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things 
about
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a metaphysical
commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you assume the real to be and 
the
reality itself. That's all I'm saying, but clearly if computationalism is 
true
consciousness is obviously duplicatable.

Quentin


In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether it is
non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of it.  Not just, 
an
instrospective well everybody knows what it is.


Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some level. Is that enough 
to be a propositional definition?


I don't think it's specific enough because it isn't clear whether computational process 
means a physical process or an abstract one. If you take computational process to be the 
abstract process in Platonia then it would not be duplicable; every copy would just be a 
token of the same process.  I think that's what Bruno means.  But I think Stathis is 
thinking of a copy of an AI, not just a particular computation by that AI.


Brent


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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 15 April 2015 at 04:36, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Mon, Apr 13, 2015  Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

  If I commit suicide the illusion of persisting through time is
 destroyed.


 Whenever somebody says X is an illusion the first question that should be
 asked is how would things be different if X were not an illusion; so how
 would things be different if persisting through time were not an illusion?


I answered that question a while back.

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person, my 
consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing thoughts and 
external stimuli, but I remain the same person. Can two spatially 
distinct consciousnesses ever be the same person? I don't think so, 
even if they stem from the same digital copy at some point. M-man and 
W-man are different persons, and neither is the unique closest 
continuer of H-man, so it is not that H-man is uncertain of his future 
-- he doesn't have one.


This differs from MWI in that, in MWI, the continuers are in different 
worlds. 


Right. Like AI's in separate but identical worlds.


Don't you then run into the problem of the identity of indiscernibles? 
The programs may be run on different computers in our world, and thus 
discernible, but from inside the program there is only one 
consciousness. Just the same as if you ran the program at different 
times on the same computer. Same inputs -- same outputs. Not different 
from the point of view of the simulation.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 5:50 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person, 
my consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing 
thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain the same person. Can two 
spatially distinct consciousnesses ever be the same person? I don't 
think so, even if they stem from the same digital copy at some 
point. M-man and W-man are different persons, and neither is the 
unique closest continuer of H-man, so it is not that H-man is 
uncertain of his future -- he doesn't have one.


This differs from MWI in that, in MWI, the continuers are in 
different worlds. 


Right. Like AI's in separate but identical worlds.


Don't you then run into the problem of the identity of indiscernibles? 
The programs may be run on different computers in our world, and thus 
discernible, but from inside the program there is only one 
consciousness. Just the same as if you ran the program at different 
times on the same computer. Same inputs -- same outputs. Not 
different from the point of view of the simulation.


Yes, you're right. I should have said like AI's in separate worlds that 
are identical except for the observation that split the MW.


It's not really the observation itself that splits the worlds in MWI -- 
it is decoherence and irreversibility: the multiple independent records 
of the experimental result in the environment suggested by Zurek's 
einvariance.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 14:44, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 16 April 2015 at 09:51, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
 
  Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical
  sophistication.

A rigorous philosophical analysis usually starts with a definition,

I disagree. Philosophical discussion will often start from a loosely
defined or understood concept, such as 'personal identity', and
seek, by detailed analysis, to tease out the possible meanings of
this term and how we can make it more precise. Definitions do not
necessarily play a substantial role in this.

Bruno claims in the 2013 paper that comp is science, not philosophy (it 
starts from some definitions and assumptions, and proceeds to build a 
theory with testable consequences).


Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by 
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation by 
philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical discussion of 
the meaning and interpretation of an observation. In an argument like 
Bruno's, one can certainly question the metaphysical and other 
presumptions that go into his discourse.


So philosophy is important, even if just to keep the protagonists honest 
in the terms they are using.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:

 LizR wrote:

 On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:
 johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
 had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
 uncertainty
 That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small step in a
 logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday consciousness is the
 result of computation, then it can be duplicated (in principle - if you
 have a problem with matter duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that
 this leads to what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


 You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the case --
 the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance and don't
 further interact. You might come to a different conclusion if you let the
 copies sit down together and have a chat.


That doesn't make any difference to the argument. Will I be the copy
sitting in the chair on the left? is less dramatic than Will I be
transported to Moscow or Washington? and hence, I suspect, might not make
the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument goes through either way.


 Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different worlds
 idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

 I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this stage) ?
This is a classical result, assuming classical computation (which according
to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for brains).

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 16 April 2015 at 09:51, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
 
  Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical
  sophistication.

A rigorous philosophical analysis usually starts with a definition,


I disagree. Philosophical discussion will often start from a loosely 
defined or understood concept, such as 'personal identity', and seek, by 
detailed analysis, to tease out the possible meanings of this term and 
how we can make it more precise. Definitions do not necessarily play a 
substantial role in this.


but 
it's very difficult to define consciousness. However, you can have a 
quite fruitful discussion about consciousness without explicitly 
defining, implicitly using a minimal operational definition: you know it 
if you have it. Surprisingly, even the consciousness deniers and 
consciousness eliminators seem to know exactly what it is we are talking 
about!


It is such a discussion based on the fact that we all imagine that we 
are conscious that is the basis of a philosophical analysis.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com 
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:


Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of uncertainty  

That's hardly what Bruno is claiming. Step 3 is only a small step in a 
logical argument. It shows that if our normal everyday consciousness is 
the result of computation, then it can be duplicated (in principle - if 
you have a problem with matter duplicators, consider an AI programme) 
and that this leads to what looks like uncertainty from one person's 
perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the case -- 
the two copies are immediately separated by a large distance and don't 
further interact. You might come to a different conclusion if you let 
the copies sit down together and have a chat.


Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different worlds 
idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness