Re: [MD] What to leave in...
Apologies to list members for the sad antics of this ex-member - whose real name escapes me for the moment! Mark Maxwell I think. Unfortunately, those that are pathetic enough and have too much time on their hands can make up names and use them to create accounts to access this list. I will remove those that do as and when they reveal themselves. Horse On 11/07/2011 00:13, Anthony Black wrote: -- Without music to decorate it, time is just a bunch of boring production deadlines or dates by which bills must be paid. — Frank Zappa Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] question: MOQ, Pirsigism, passionate emotion
Michael (whoever you are) said Almost every discussion of Pirsig, the totality of his thought, and the MOQ (all three of which are separate) that I've seen eventually resemble the Church of Reason intellectualizing criticized so adeptly in ZAMM. I agree, and in fact I believe I've pointed out the irony more than once myself. I don't interact with many of the interminable academic arguments these days, and kinda hope those on the reason trip will eventually grow out of it. It's a learning curve (even) the most intelligent need to go through, including every new MoQ participant, so the mass of debate on MoQ will forever be confined to that church. Ian On Sat, Jul 9, 2011 at 8:37 PM, Michael R. Brown m...@fuguewriter.com wrote: Hello all - I've been on the list before, then left, now returned. I've been reading Bob Pirsig's writing regularly since the mid-1980s, and remain deeply intrigued by him - first as a literary artisan (for which he's not received enough credit) and then as a philosopher. I do think that he has lit on some insights of huge importance, and expressed them in the way they needed to be expressed. But here's something that I have been unable to resolve, so I throw it out here for what it's worth. Almost every discussion of Pirsig, the totality of his thought, and the MOQ (all three of which are separate) that I've seen eventually resemble the Church of Reason intellectualizing criticized so adeptly in ZAMM. And what I have not yet seen, ever, is an expression of passionate emotion. There's obviously passionate emotion in ZAMM, and I've always been grateful that RP touches sexuality in L - so where's the expression of this passion in those who have been influenced by him? Am I missing it? What's the subjective importance of this writer to those who love him? [ For those who are interested in RP's possible literary children, I worked in a commentary and tribute to the closing of ZAMM - which I think one of the most moving things I've ever read - in my last book, a memoir that closes on the opposite shore of the great Bridge that our protagonists are approaching as the book ends. ] MRB Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Not sure I agree Free-Will vs Determinism is a Pirsigian platypus, when looking to make objective definitions and distinctions - the point of calling it a platypus, (which has been thoroughly resolved by evolutionary philosophers). And, the DQ/sq distinction is fundamental to MoQ. Not sure one question replaces the other analogously or otherwise. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding? On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Oh and by the way, well done again for turning the subject immediately away from the point I did make. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Does Lila have free will?
Marsha, (and Steve, for example) Steve said It makes no sense to say that we choose our values when we ARE nothing but our values. Likewise, it makes no sense to say that we are determined by our values when we ARE our values. This is the kind of SOMis intellectual argument that has turned me off MD. (And I'm not picking on Steve, he just happens to be locked in debate with DMB, just picking out a typical example in response to your earlier question Marsha.) It is NOT nonsense to say values choose values, or values determine values - it IS reality. It is only nonsense to SOMist dreams of (discrete, well defined) objectivity, that shun (apparent) logical loops. Some level shifting is required. We cannot solve our problems with the same kind of argumentation that created them. With apologies to Einstein. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Ian, I'm sorry, your point was extremely important. This Church of Reason has gotten pretty nasty. - I had been interpreting Steve as saying that a strategy for becoming more dynamically aware was a better question to be asking. It was on my mind. I wanted to hear your thoughts. I guess it would be better to have Steve answer. Really sorry, as always, your point was absolutely on target and needed to be said. Those of us who think too much can be such blockheads. Marsha On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:41 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Oh and by the way, well done again for turning the subject immediately away from the point I did make. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Thanks Marsha, If that is what Steve is saying, then I'm good with that. As you say, let Steve speak. (Arguing that point with those who are on the academic intellectual - church of reason - trip is patently not a good strategy, unless your objective is insanity. There but for the grace etc.) Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding. On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:58 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Ian, I'm sorry, your point was extremely important. This Church of Reason has gotten pretty nasty. - I had been interpreting Steve as saying that a strategy for becoming more dynamically aware was a better question to be asking. It was on my mind. I wanted to hear your thoughts. I guess it would be better to have Steve answer. Really sorry, as always, your point was absolutely on target and needed to be said. Those of us who think too much can be such blockheads. Marsha On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:41 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Oh and by the way, well done again for turning the subject immediately away from the point I did make. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Does Lila have free will?
On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:57 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Marsha, (and Steve, for example) Steve said It makes no sense to say that we choose our values when we ARE nothing but our values. Likewise, it makes no sense to say that we are determined by our values when we ARE our values. I'd say this is where we are suspended in language This is the kind of SOMis intellectual argument that has turned me off MD. (And I'm not picking on Steve, he just happens to be locked in debate with DMB, just picking out a typical example in response to your earlier question Marsha.) It is NOT nonsense to say values choose values, or values determine values - it IS reality. It is only nonsense to SOMist dreams of (discrete, well defined) objectivity, that shun (apparent) logical loops. Some level shifting is required. I agree about the level shifting. That's the really hard work. ;-) We cannot solve our problems with the same kind of argumentation that created them. With apologies to Einstein. A perfect reminder... Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding? Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] question: MOQ, Pirsigism, passionate emotion
Out of curiosity Michael, I went back into the current threads and this is what I said (to Matt) just 3 weeks ago on 21st June. And your (Nagel) point - the closer we look (analyze) the less actual freedom (DQ) we have. Agreed I find it ironic that the more we have academic arguments about MOQ the further away we are taken from MOQ. Closer to that old church of reason. Thanks for giving me the opportunity to confirm it wasn't just my wishful imagination. No-one responded to it then either ;-) Ian What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding? On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 9:03 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Michael (whoever you are) said Almost every discussion of Pirsig, the totality of his thought, and the MOQ (all three of which are separate) that I've seen eventually resemble the Church of Reason intellectualizing criticized so adeptly in ZAMM. I agree, and in fact I believe I've pointed out the irony more than once myself. I don't interact with many of the interminable academic arguments these days, and kinda hope those on the reason trip will eventually grow out of it. It's a learning curve (even) the most intelligent need to go through, including every new MoQ participant, so the mass of debate on MoQ will forever be confined to that church. Ian On Sat, Jul 9, 2011 at 8:37 PM, Michael R. Brown m...@fuguewriter.com wrote: Hello all - I've been on the list before, then left, now returned. I've been reading Bob Pirsig's writing regularly since the mid-1980s, and remain deeply intrigued by him - first as a literary artisan (for which he's not received enough credit) and then as a philosopher. I do think that he has lit on some insights of huge importance, and expressed them in the way they needed to be expressed. But here's something that I have been unable to resolve, so I throw it out here for what it's worth. Almost every discussion of Pirsig, the totality of his thought, and the MOQ (all three of which are separate) that I've seen eventually resemble the Church of Reason intellectualizing criticized so adeptly in ZAMM. And what I have not yet seen, ever, is an expression of passionate emotion. There's obviously passionate emotion in ZAMM, and I've always been grateful that RP touches sexuality in L - so where's the expression of this passion in those who have been influenced by him? Am I missing it? What's the subjective importance of this writer to those who love him? [ For those who are interested in RP's possible literary children, I worked in a commentary and tribute to the closing of ZAMM - which I think one of the most moving things I've ever read - in my last book, a memoir that closes on the opposite shore of the great Bridge that our protagonists are approaching as the book ends. ] MRB Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Jul 11, 2011, at 6:04 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Thanks Marsha, If that is what Steve is saying, then I'm good with that. As you say, let Steve speak. (Arguing that point with those who are on the academic intellectual - church of reason - trip is patently not a good strategy, unless your objective is insanity. There but for the grace etc.) Hmmm. I don't find those who resort to ad hominem attacks to be very intellectual, certainly not in an academic way. If anything, they are trying to hide their own intellectual incompetence. They are nothing to fear, especially if one is not too vested in one's own ego. And I take RMP's admonition to 'still' all intellectual patterns to be good advice and a good note on which to end LILA. Marsha Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding. On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:58 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: Ian, I'm sorry, your point was extremely important. This Church of Reason has gotten pretty nasty. - I had been interpreting Steve as saying that a strategy for becoming more dynamically aware was a better question to be asking. It was on my mind. I wanted to hear your thoughts. I guess it would be better to have Steve answer. Really sorry, as always, your point was absolutely on target and needed to be said. Those of us who think too much can be such blockheads. Marsha On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:41 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Oh and by the way, well done again for turning the subject immediately away from the point I did make. Ian On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 10:15 AM, MarshaV val...@att.net wrote: On Jul 11, 2011, at 5:05 AM, Ian Glendinning wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding ? Ian, Do you think Steve is replacing the issues, or just stating that its a better question to be asking since the free-will vs. determinism platypus has been removed? Marsha ___ ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 5:39 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Not sure I agree Free-Will vs Determinism is a Pirsigian platypus, when looking to make objective definitions and distinctions - the point of calling it a platypus, (which has been thoroughly resolved by evolutionary philosophers). Steve: How have evolutionary philosophers the than RMP resolved this platypus? Ian: And, the DQ/sq distinction is fundamental to MoQ. Not sure one question replaces the other analogously or otherwise. Steve: I'm not trying to offer any radical idea about whether this question replaces the SOM question. I'm just referring to what RMP does here in response to the SOM question of free will/determinism: To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. (LILA, Chapter 12) Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Steve, On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 12:16 PM, Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 5:39 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Not sure I agree Free-Will vs Determinism is a Pirsigian platypus, when looking to make objective definitions and distinctions - the point of calling it a platypus, (which has been thoroughly resolved by evolutionary philosophers). Steve: How have evolutionary philosophers the than RMP resolved this platypus? [IG] I can come back to this, since it is clearly the more important question, but was an aside here, to the main point which was about the problem of the SOMist style of church of reason argumentation. (Incidentally - ie by way of an aside for now, glad you see Pirsig as one of the evolutionary philosophers - it's where I came in many years ago.) Ian: And, the DQ/sq distinction is fundamental to MoQ. Not sure one question replaces the other analogously or otherwise. Steve: I'm not trying to offer any radical idea about whether this question replaces the SOM question. I'm just referring to what RMP does here in response to the SOM question of free will/determinism: [IG] Good, my overthinking presumably. To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. (LILA, Chapter 12) [IG] This was the basic point of my exchange - to highlight the to the extent that qualification of both sentences - reacting to Dan's suggestion that you had somehow suggested mutual exclusivity of the two halves of the equation. I agree with both of Pirsig's sentences, but - like you it is now clear - don't see this as the entire Free-Will vs Determinism debate in two sentences. (Which we can come back to.) I'm more interested (in this particular exchange) in how Dan saw that exclusivity ? Regards Ian PS What's so funny 'bout peace, love and understanding Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Pirsig in Lila: It isn't Lila that has quality; it's Quality that has Lila. Nothing can have Quality. To have something is to possess it, and to possess something is to dominate it. Nothing dominates Quality. If there's domination and possession involved, it's Quality that dominates and possesses Lila. She's created by it. She's a cohesion of changing static patterns of this Quality. There isn't any more to her than that. The words Lila uses, the thoughts she thinks, the values she holds, are the end product of three and a half billion years of the history of the entire world. She's a kind of jungle of evolutionary patterns of value. She doesn't know how they all got there any more than any jungle knows how it came to be. Steve commented on the quote: In the MOQ, all we are and in fact experience itself is Value. We are not determined by values. We are not free to choose our values. We ARE our values. Choosing is the manifestation of what we ARE as sets of values with the capacity to respond to DQ. In the MOQ, it is the fact of such choices (value patterns) from which the will or the self is inferred rather than the other way around. In contrast, the SOM notion of free will is of an autonomous subject with metaphysical primacy. dmb keeps saying that if we drop the notion of a choosing subject (though he does say he drops the notion of a metaphysical soul), then morality goes out window. I see that as about the most un-MOQish thing one could possibly say. The MOQ is about asserting an understanding of the world as a moral order through _denying_ the subject-object picture. Instead of free will as the possession of a self, Pirsig retools the notion of freedom (note that in the quote you posted he shifts from free will to freedom) as the capacity to respond to DQ. And in LC he says that you are going to talk about free will in MOQ terms as this capacity, then you may as well say that rocks and trees and atoms have free will. But let's not slip the SOM version of a freely choosing subject with metaphysical primacy in through the back door here. Pirsig's notion of freedom associated with DQ is very different from traditional SOM free will that is suppose to distinguish humanity from the animals. dmb says: You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But then you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements contradict each other. Like I said, this looks like some kind of value-determinism wherein the static patterns are the causal forces that determine our thoughts and actions. I think this misconception begins with a misreading of the quote above. William James can help to illuminate the meaning of the quote. In his essay Does Consciousness Exist? James contrasts his own view of consciousness with the idea, to use his analogy, that consciousness and its content are two different things the way paint can be separated into the oil or latex and the pigment suspended therein. In this analogy the thinker is distinct from the thoughts so that we say the mind contains ideas, so that there is a consciousness that has thoughts. This is what Pirsig is denying in the quote above. He's saying Lila doesn't HAVE static values and she doesn't HAVE Dynamic Quality either because there is no Lila above and beyond that. James famously said no, if by consciousness you mean the entity that has the thoughts, there is no such thing. Consciousness, he says, is just a name for the fact the the content is known. After explaining the usual Cartesian and neo-Kantian view of consciousness through the oil and pigment analogy, he says... Now, my contention is exactly the reverse of this. EXPERIENCE, I BELIEVE, HAS NO SUCH INNER DUPLICITY; AND THE SEPARATION OF IT INTO CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONTENT COMES, NOT BY WAY OF SUBTRACTION, BUT BY WAY OF ADDITION - the addition, to a given concrete piece of it, of other sets of experiences, in connection with which severally its use or function may be of two different kinds. (Emphasis is James's, 1144) This is what people are talking about when they say consciousness doesn't exist. This is the ridiculous fictional self that Pirsig rejects and that's what he's denying in the quote about what Lila (and everyone else) is. But, James says, this means that consciousness exists as a process, as the thinking itself. You might know about the ill-fated attempts among European phenomenologists like Husserl who thought they could examine the structures of consciousness itself through careful introspection and he was famous for discovering that consciousness always has a content. He called it intentionality, this idea that consciousness seems to always have a content, like you can never get the pigment (content) to settle to reveal pure oil of consciousness. James was a very different kind of phenomenologist. I think he would have said, had he lived long enough, that you'll never find the
Re: [MD] Free Will
Dan said to Steve: .., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I noticed. dmb says: I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the traditional version of determinism is predicated on the extension of causality into the area of human action and thereby PRECLUDES morality. This is how determinism is framed in every source I've checked, including Pirsig description of the classic dilemma. In this standard framing, freedom and morality go out the window, rules out morality and freedom, which is the opposite of equating morality and causality. That, I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi Dan, Dan: Within the framework of the MOQ, it is not an exclusive, either/or proposition but rather both. From a static quality, conventional point of view, both free will and determinism are seen as correct. From a Dynamic point of view, both free will and determinism are illusions, the result of a dysfunctional narrative in which we have come to believe. . Steve: I still don't follow you on what these two different perspectives are. I never claim to have anything other than a conventional perspective. Dan: Yes, I see. But Robert Pirsig does talk about it quite a lot. From LILA'S CHILD: The MOQ, as I understand it, denies any existence of a “self” that is independent of inorganic, biological, social or intellectual patterns. There is no “self” that contains these patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with both religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen, there is reference to “big self” and “small self.” Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality. “Hunting for weaknesses, [in your paper] I find that on page one, paragraph four, there is a sentence, ‘Fundamentally Pirsig’s term is a mystic one, and refers to the undifferentiated, indeterminate, reality from which the universe has evolved (or grown) from.’ Although this is true at a Buddha’s level of understanding, it would be confusing and illogical in the world of everyday affairs to say that the world is evolving both from and toward the same thing. I have had some reader mail that has pointed out at one place I seem to imply that Quality and chaos are the same and at another that they are different, so I haven’t been clear on this myself and have left an opening to attack. To close it up, let us say that the universe is evolving from a condition of low quality (quantum forces only, no atoms, pre-Big Bang) toward a higher one (birds, trees, societies and thoughts) and that in a static sense (world of everyday affairs) these two are not the same.” (Letter from Robert Pirsig, March 29, 1997. The word “mystic” originally in bold not italics.) DG: ...a materialist might dream that someday science will develop a theory of everything. On the other hand, an idealist might tend to side with the Buddhists in saying intellectual concepts of reality are not central to or even part of reality itself? That we will never develop a theory of everything? That there’s no chance we can ever intellectually know reality? RMP: The confusion here seems to result from the two languages of Buddhism, the language of the Buddha’s world and language of everyday life. In the language of everyday life, reality and intellect are different. From the language of the Buddha’s world, they are the same, since there is no intellectual division that governs the Buddha’s world. Dan comments: From the everyday perspective, free will and determinism are different and mutually exclusive notions. The MOQ brings them together, however, by stating that the dilemma of free will vs determinism doesn't come up. They are both correct in a conventional static quality sense. But from a Dynamic perspective, one free of any intellectual divisions, they are illusions. Does that help you see better what I am getting at? Steve: I Think I have a better idea what you mean by these two perspectives, but I would unpack the perspective of Big Self versus small self to this issue differently. Here is what I wrote on the issue when I first weighted in on the free will debate back in April (!): From: Steven Peterson peterson.st...@gmail.com Date: Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:47 PM Subject: [MD] The MOQ has no soul No, really. The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, do I have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is such a thing as I that has important ontological status that transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. The MOQ makes no such fundamental postulate. Free will is formulated as a question that is asked in the SO context. Instead, in MOQ terns we can reformulate the question where I could refer to the static patterns (small self in Zen terms) or the I could refer to the capacity for change, emptiness, the nothingness that is left when we subtract all the static patterns that is also the generator and sustainer and destroyer of those patterns (big Self in Zen terms). That's what Pirsig did with the question. We can identify with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We are a slave to our
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi dmb, On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 11:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Dan said to Steve: .., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I noticed. dmb says: I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the traditional version of determinism is predicated on the extension of causality into the area of human action and thereby PRECLUDES morality. Steve: A lot of philosophers have thought so anyway, but since we don't accept the underlying premise of the traditional SOM free will/determinism debate, there isn't much of a point of taking sides on the matter. dmb: This is how determinism is framed in every source I've checked, including Pirsig description of the classic dilemma. In this standard framing, freedom and morality go out the window, rules out morality and freedom, which is the opposite of equating morality and causality. That, I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Steve: The MOQ obviously reinterprets (rather than wipes from our vocabularies) EVERYTHING as patterns of preference, so when Pirsig uses the word cause we of course know that he means a stable pattern of preference rather than the law-like obedience of metaphysical objects to cosmic rules. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 11:20 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Pirsig in Lila: It isn't Lila that has quality; it's Quality that has Lila. Nothing can have Quality. To have something is to possess it, and to possess something is to dominate it. Nothing dominates Quality. If there's domination and possession involved, it's Quality that dominates and possesses Lila. She's created by it. She's a cohesion of changing static patterns of this Quality. There isn't any more to her than that. The words Lila uses, the thoughts she thinks, the values she holds, are the end product of three and a half billion years of the history of the entire world. She's a kind of jungle of evolutionary patterns of value. She doesn't know how they all got there any more than any jungle knows how it came to be. Steve commented on the quote: In the MOQ, all we are and in fact experience itself is Value. We are not determined by values. We are not free to choose our values. We ARE our values. Choosing is the manifestation of what we ARE as sets of values with the capacity to respond to DQ. In the MOQ, it is the fact of such choices (value patterns) from which the will or the self is inferred rather than the other way around. In contrast, the SOM notion of free will is of an autonomous subject with metaphysical primacy. dmb keeps saying that if we drop the notion of a choosing subject (though he does say he drops the notion of a metaphysical soul), then morality goes out window. I see that as about the most un-MOQish thing one could possibly say. The MOQ is about asserting an understanding of the world as a moral order through _denying_ the subject-object picture. Instead of free will as the possession of a self, Pirsig retools the notion of freedom (note that in the quote you posted he shifts from free will to freedom) as the capacity to respond to DQ. And in LC he says that you are going to talk about free will in MOQ terms as this capacity, then you may as well say that rocks and trees and atoms have free will. But let's not slip the SOM version of a freely choosing subject with metaphysical primacy in through the back door here. Pirsig's notion of freedom associated with DQ is very different from traditional SOM free will that is suppose to distinguish humanity from the animals. dmb says: You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But then you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements contradict each other. Like I said, this looks like some kind of value-determinism wherein the static patterns are the causal forces that determine our thoughts and actions. Steve: There indeed would be a contradiction in saying that we do not choose our values and are also not determined by our values in SOM, but in the MOQ we ARE our values. So to say that either our values choose or are determined by our values is nonsense or at best an empty tautology like saying we value our values. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steven Peterson said on Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:47 PM: No, really. The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, do I have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is such a thing as I that has important ontological status that transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. ... dmb says: I think that we can reject SOM and the Cartesian self and still ask legitimate questions about freedom and constraint. There is no law that says the issue HAS to be framed around those metaphysical assumptions and in fact Pirsig's reformulation does exactly that. The issue is tackled without those assumptions and he does not let that difference get in the way of asserting human freedom. A human being is a collection of ideas, and these ideas take moral precedence over a society. Ideas are patterns of value. They are at a higher level of evolution than social patterns. ...And beyond that is an even more compelling reason: societies and thoughts and principles themselves are no more than sets of static patterns. These patterns can't by themselves perceive or adjust to Dynamic Quality. Only a living being can do that. The strongest moral argument against capital punishment is that it weakens a society's Dynamic capability - its capability for change and evolution. (Lila 160-161) The increase in versatility is directed toward Dynamic Quality. The increase in power to control hostile forces is directed toward static quality. Without Dynamic Quality the organism cannot grow. Without static quality the organism cannot last. Both are needed. (Lila 147) In traditional, substance-centered metaphysics, life isn't evolving toward anything. Life's just an extension of the properties of atoms, nothing more. It has to be that because atoms and varying forms of energy are all there is, But in the MOQ, what is evolving isn't patterns of atoms. What's evolving is static pattens of value, and while that doesn't change the data of evolution it completely up-ends the interpretation that can be given to evolution. (Lila, 139) Life can't exist on DQ alone. It has no staying power. To cling to DQ alone apart from any static patterns is to cling to chaos. ...Static quality patterns are dead when they are exclusive, when they demand blind obedience and suppress Dynamic change. But static patterns, nevertheless, provide a necessary stabilizing force to protect Dynamic progress from degeneration. Although DQ, the Quality of freedom, creates this world in which we live, these patterns of static quality, the quality of order, preserve our world. Neither static nor Dynamic Quality can survive without the other. (Lila, 121) Steve, by contrast, said: ... We can identify with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. ... Cultivating practices such as meditation that help us be open to change, which is the death and rebirth of small self as old patterns evolve into new patterns, is striving to be more free from the bondage of current value patterns that may be improved. If we succeed in improving them, we still ought not identify with the new and improved small self but rather with improvement itself. That is, if we want to be more free. dmb says: Well if you ever wonder where I got the impression that you're asserting some kind of value determinism, this would be one of many places to point. Your characterization of static quality as bondage, slavery and unfreedom is incompatible with countless statements made by Pirsig, a sampling of which is presently before you. Where you call them a form of bondage, Pirsig calls them a necessary stabilizing force. Where you say we are slaves to these patterns, Pirsig says they are the quality of order that preserves our world, not to mention our integrity as organisms. Where you say we can't choose our preferences, Pirsig says that it takes a living being to perceive and adjust to DQ. For these reasons, and more, I think you're very much at odds with Pirsig on this particular issue and at odds with the MOQ in general. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hello everyone On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 3:05 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. Hi Ian It's the way Steve framed the statement that suggests we cannot follow both static quality and Dynamic Quality at the same time. According to the way I read that statement, we follow one OR the other to some extent. It is entirely possible that I read it wrong, however. Ian: I don't in fact agree with Steve's underlying analogy between DQ/sq and Free-Will / Determinism, or DMB's suggestion that causation is part of one but not the other, causation is just weird and conventional linguistically I'm just pointing out the flaws in the style of argumentation that is happening - in the church of reason, as has been pointed out. Dan: So what do you suggest? If we don't have [the church of] reason, what do we have? Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
dmb said to Steve: You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But then you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements contradict each other. Like I said, this looks like some kind of value-determinism wherein the static patterns are the causal forces that determine our thoughts and actions. Steve replied: There indeed would be a contradiction in saying that we do not choose our values and are also not determined by our values in SOM, but in the MOQ we ARE our values. So to say that either our values choose or are determined by our values is nonsense or at best an empty tautology like saying we value our values. dmb says: I did not assume your statement was predicated on SOM. I still think they are contradictory and logically incoherent even in a world where we are our values. Please explain how the switch from SOM to the MOQ saves your statements from being a logical train wreck. How does this switch allow you to say, at the same time, that we are not free AND we are not determined? Are you NOT saying we are identical to the values over which we have no choice or control? Do you imagine that logic does not obtain anymore once you reject the Cartesian self? Does the rejection of SOM entail the rejection of consistency or clarity of thought? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 9:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Dan said to Steve: .., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I noticed. dmb says: I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the traditional version of determinism is predicated on the extension of causality into the area of human action and thereby PRECLUDES morality. This is how determinism is framed in every source I've checked, including Pirsig description of the classic dilemma. In this standard framing, freedom and morality go out the window, rules out morality and freedom, which is the opposite of equating morality and causality. That, I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:06 PM, Dan Glover daneglo...@gmail.com wrote: Hello everyone On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 3:05 AM, Ian Glendinning ian.glendinn...@gmail.com wrote: Dan responded to Steve: [Dan] You (Steve) said: The question of free will versus determinism gets replaced by the question, to what extent do we follow DQ and to what extent do we follow sq? [Dan] It appears from reading this that these are two mutually exclusive options, hence my observation that they are not. Huh, Dan ? to what extent A and/or B suggests the exact opposite of mutual exclusivity. It correctly implies you generally have a mix of both side by side. Hi Ian It's the way Steve framed the statement that suggests we cannot follow both static quality and Dynamic Quality at the same time. According to the way I read that statement, we follow one OR the other to some extent. It is entirely possible that I read it wrong, however. Again, Dan, I have not set out to formulate the issue. I was relating how Pirsig formulates the issue when he said: To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hello everyone On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 9:35 AM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Dan said to Steve: .., I tend to agree with you that there is no need to equate morality and causality. I addressed this to dmb but he didn't respond, at least not that I noticed. dmb says: I don't know if anyone equated morality and causality. I've been saying the traditional version of determinism is predicated on the extension of causality into the area of human action and thereby PRECLUDES morality. Dan: Yes, exactly. That is what I mean: causality is tantamount to the preclusion of morality. I probably misspoke by saying morality and causality are equal. Sorry for the misunderstanding. dmb: This is how determinism is framed in every source I've checked, including Pirsig description of the classic dilemma. In this standard framing, freedom and morality go out the window, rules out morality and freedom, which is the opposite of equating morality and causality. Dan: But in a sense, in the classical dilemma, they are linked. dmb: That, I keep saying, is WHY Pirsig REPLACES causality with patterns of preference, because that switch denies the central premise of scientific determinism. It takes the law-like mechanical obedience out of the picture even at the physical level and even less so for evolved creatures like us. This switch introduces choice even among the most predictable and regular patterns we know of and the range of freedom only increases from there. Dan: Lets consult LILA in an effort to clear things up. This is what RMP says about replacing causality with value: The only difference between causation and value is that the word cause implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of value is one of preference. Dan comments: Note that he states THE ONLY DIFFERENCE... he says nothing about introducing choice, only preference. And here he is examining determinism vs free will: On the other hand, if the determinists let go of their position it would seem to deny the truth of science. If one adheres to a traditional scientific metaphysics of substance, the philosophy of determinism is an inescapable corollary. If everything is included in the class of substance and its properties, and if substance and its properties is included in the class of things that always follow laws, and if people are included in the class everything, then it is an airtight logical conclusion that people always follow the laws of substance. To be sure, it doesn't seem as though people blindly follow the laws of substance in everything they do, but within a Deterministic explanation that is just another one of those illusions that science is forever exposing. All the social sciences, including anthropology, were founded on the bedrock metaphysical belief that these physical cause-and-effect laws of human behavior exist. Moral laws, if they can be said to exist at all, are merely an artificial social code that has nothing to do with the real nature of the world. A moral person acts conventionally, watches out for the cops, keeps his nose clean, and nothing more. In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free. Dan comments: The way I read this, the switch from causality to value does not introduce choice. It introduces preference. Choice implies certainty, which is not a matter of preference. RMP clearly states that when our behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality we are WITHOUT choice. Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 1:06 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: dmb said to Steve: You say we ARE our values and we are not free to choose those values. But then you also say we are not determined by our values. These statements contradict each other. Like I said, this looks like some kind of value-determinism wherein the static patterns are the causal forces that determine our thoughts and actions. Steve replied: There indeed would be a contradiction in saying that we do not choose our values and are also not determined by our values in SOM, but in the MOQ we ARE our values. So to say that either our values choose or are determined by our values is nonsense or at best an empty tautology like saying we value our values. dmb says: I did not assume your statement was predicated on SOM. I still think they are contradictory and logically incoherent even in a world where we are our values. Please explain how the switch from SOM to the MOQ saves your statements from being a logical train wreck. How does this switch allow you to say, at the same time, that we are not free AND we are not determined? Are you NOT saying we are identical to the values over which we have no choice or control? Do you imagine that logic does not obtain anymore once you reject the Cartesian self? Does the rejection of SOM entail the rejection of consistency or clarity of thought? Steve: If we ARE our values, It simply could not make sense to say we CHOOSE our values anymore than it makes sense to say we are DETERMINED BY our values. Where you see 2 mutually exclusive SOM based options, I see a third option where if accepted denies that the other two even make sense as questions. If we ARE our values, it just doesn't make any sense to ask if we CHOOSE our values or are DETERMINED BY our values. These are just non-questions from the MOQ perspective. If you don't see that, I'm not sure that I can help you. I can see you are struggling (your frustration with these difficult concepts is demonstrated once again with your usual ad hominems), and I really do want to help you understand the MOQ, but I don't know how else to say it. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Dan: But in a sense, in the classical dilemma, they are linked. Steve: Right. This is dennett's point as well. If actions didn't have predictable results, freedom to choose would be pointless. Dan comments: The way I read this, the switch from causality to value does not introduce choice. It introduces preference. Choice implies certainty, which is not a matter of preference. RMP clearly states that when our behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality we are WITHOUT choice. Steve: Another concept that is conspicuously absent once Pirsig makes this switch is the notion of the will. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Hi dmb, On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 12:37 PM, david buchanan dmbucha...@hotmail.com wrote: Steven Peterson said on Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:47 PM: No, really. The MOQ literally does not posit the existence of the reified concept of a chooser, a Cartesian self, a watcher that stands behind the senses and all valuation, the soul. The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred to as I about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, do I have free will? This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent that it needs to be unasked. This question presupposes that there is such a thing as I that has important ontological status that transcends those patterns of value to which it refers. ... dmb says: I think that we can reject SOM and the Cartesian self and still ask legitimate questions about freedom and constraint. Steve: I've never heard anyone say otherwise. dmb: There is no law that says the issue HAS to be framed around those metaphysical assumptions and in fact Pirsig's reformulation does exactly that. The issue is tackled without those assumptions and he does not let that difference get in the way of asserting human freedom. Steve: I agree, of course. dmb quotes: Steve, by contrast, said: ... We can identify with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. ... Cultivating practices such as meditation that help us be open to change, which is the death and rebirth of small self as old patterns evolve into new patterns, is striving to be more free from the bondage of current value patterns that may be improved. If we succeed in improving them, we still ought not identify with the new and improved small self but rather with improvement itself. That is, if we want to be more free. dmb says: Well if you ever wonder where I got the impression that you're asserting some kind of value determinism, this would be one of many places to point. Your characterization of static quality as bondage, slavery and unfreedom is incompatible with countless statements made by Pirsig, a sampling of which is presently before you. Where you call them a form of bondage, Pirsig calls them a necessary stabilizing force. Where you say we are slaves to these patterns, Pirsig says they are the quality of order that preserves our world, not to mention our integrity as organisms. Where you say we can't choose our preferences, Pirsig says that it takes a living being to perceive and adjust to DQ. For these reasons, and more, I think you're very much at odds with Pirsig on this particular issue and at odds with the MOQ in general. Steve: If you read more carefully, you will see that you are misunderstanding and misrepresenting what I said. I did not say, we are not free without qualification. I said TO THE EXTENT THAT we identify with static patterns we are not free and to the extent we identify with DQ we are free. This is what Pirsig says as well. I am doing my best to help you understand the MOQ, but if you don't read carefully you will continue to struggle to get a grip on what Pirsig is saying. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] What to leave in...
Thnx! Anyone that can't move on, on that sort of level can't have much to contribute intellectually. - Original Message From: Horse ho...@darkstar.uk.net To: moq_disc...@moqtalk.org Sent: Mon, July 11, 2011 3:37:38 AM Subject: Re: [MD] What to leave in... Apologies to list members for the sad antics of this ex-member - whose real name escapes me for the moment! Mark Maxwell I think. Unfortunately, those that are pathetic enough and have too much time on their hands can make up names and use them to create accounts to access this list. I will remove those that do as and when they reveal themselves. Horse On 11/07/2011 00:13, Anthony Black wrote: -- Without music to decorate it, time is just a bunch of boring production deadlines or dates by which bills must be paid. — Frank Zappa Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steve: If we ARE our values, It simply could not make sense to say we CHOOSE our values anymore than it makes sense to say we are DETERMINED BY our values. Where you see 2 mutually exclusive SOM based options, I see a third option where if accepted denies that the other two even make sense as questions. If we ARE our values, it just doesn't make any sense to ask if we CHOOSE our values or are DETERMINED BY our values. These are just non-questions from the MOQ perspective. Ron: Oh, if we use prefference, rather than choice then you can chill. we can have a discussion all day about PREFFERING our values but as soon as we use the term choice it becomes meaningless. when we choose/follow the dynamic in our lives, it's not the same as preferring it.. when we choose/follow the determined static in our lives, its not the same as preffering it... I dunno...if we are framing the discussion, note, discussion..not dilemma,, for the DILEMMA disapears.. in MoQ then the terms we use should'nt make a difference, because in a MoQ frame work their meaning is the same. seems like you are the only one hung up and haunted by the terms and their former implications so much so, you cant even submit to the idea that when we speak about the distinction of freewill and determinism we are talking about the distinction between dynamic and static Quality sans the either/or Dilemma. Taking away the either/or Dilemma takes away certainy, absolute truth,, ect..all those conepts you insist are still invoked with the usage of the terms, those terms do not change the context, context changes the usage. .. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
Re: [MD] Free Will
Steve: I am doing my best to help you understand the MOQ, but if you don't read carefully you will continue to struggle to get a grip on what Pirsig is saying. Ron: I just despise this use of rhetorical strategy its infantile.. ...If anything is meaningless its this tripe.. / Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
[MD] self
Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of Self by Miri Albahari This is one incredible book. Could never have imagined the patterns involved in constructing a self... Review 'This is an extraordinary book. It pursues Buddhist thought as a live philosophy, not as an already set belief system. By developing insights from the Buddhist tradition with the analytic tools of modern philosophy, Albahari produces an account of self and self-awareness that is at once continuous with mainstream philosophy of mind and refreshingly original. The result is a novel brand of eliminativism about the self, one that is phenomenologically rather than scientifically inspired.' - Uriah Kriegel, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, US Product Description We spend our lives protecting an elusive self - but does the self actually exist? Drawing on literature from Western philosophy, neuroscience and Buddhism (interpreted), the author argues that there is no self. The self - as unified owner and thinker of thoughts - is an illusion created by two tiers. A tier of naturally unified consciousness (notably absent in standard bundle-theory accounts) merges with a tier of desire-driven thoughts and emotions to yield the impression of a self. So while the self, if real, would think up the thoughts, the thoughts, in reality, think up the self. ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
