date:20161104

Jeff, List:

I see that Gary R. started a separate thread for this right after I did.
He suggested that I re-post my cosmological analysis of CP 6.490, but that
dives right into metaphysical matters, so I think that it would be better
just to stick with the text itself initially.

In what I quoted, Peirce defined "super-order" as "a character that is a
generalization of order ... something like uniformity ... that of which
order and uniformity are particular varieties ... Any general state of
things whatsoever would be a super-order and a super-habit."  Early in the
final RLT lecture, Peirce commented on what it means for something to be
general.

CSP:  That which is possible is in so far *general *and, as general, it
ceases to be individual. Hence, remembering that the word "potential"
means *indeterminate
yet capable of determination in any special case*, there may be a potential
aggregate of all the possibilities that are consistent with certain general
conditions ... But being a potential aggregate only, it does not contain
any individuals at all. It only contains general conditions which *permit *the
determination of individuals. (CP 6.185, RLT:247)

A super-order is thus a *potential *aggregate of all *particular *varieties
of order and uniformity; i.e., it contains the *general *conditions which
permit the determination of *individual *cases of order and uniformity.
Peirce went on to identify another property of a potential aggregate.

CSP:  A potential collection, more multitudinous than any collection of
distinct individuals can be, cannot be entirely vague. For the potentiality
supposes that the individuals are determinable in every multitude. That is,
they are determinable as distinct. But there cannot be a distinctive
quality for each individual; for these qualities would form a collection
too multitudinous for them to remain distinct. It must therefore be by
means of relations that the individuals are distinguishable from one
another. (CP 6.188, RLT:248)

Relations constitute a particular variety of order.  Hence there can be no
relations, and therefore no distinguishable individuals, without a
super-order that contains the general conditions which permit their
determination.  After giving the cave illustration, Peirce observed "that
nothing but a rigidly exact logic of relations can be your guide in such a
field," and that "when continua of higher dimensionality than 3 are
considered ... we begin to have systems of relations between the different
dimensions."  This is followed by a paragraph that Jeff quoted previously.

CSP:  A continuum may have any discrete multitude of dimensions whatsoever.
If the multitude of dimensions surpasses all discrete multitudes there
cease to be any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet obtained any
logically distinct conception of such a continuum. Provisionally, I
identify it with the *uralt *vague generality of the most abstract
potentiality. (RLT 253-254)

A continuum of "the multitude of dimensions that surpasses all discrete
multitudes" would be the ultimate potential aggregate, and thus the
ultimate super-order.  What does Peirce later say that "the clean
blackboard" (CP 6.203, RLT:261) represents?  "The original vague
potentiality ... a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions
..."  I am guessing that Gary R. characterized the blackboard as
"*ur*-continuity"
precisely because Peirce here referred to "the *uralt* vague generality of
the most abstract potentiality."  He was talking about the same thing in
both passages, as well as in CP 6.490 when he discussed super-order.

CSP:  Now continuity is shown by the logic of relatives to be nothing but a
higher type of that which we know as generality. It is relational
generality ... we must suppose that as a rule the continuum has been
derived from a more general continuum, a continuum of higher generality.
(CP 6.190, RLT:258)

The source of *all *other continua is the continuum of the *highest
*generality,
a generality that exceeds all multitudes of discrete levels of relational
generality, a generalization of generality--in a word, a super-order.

Before we move on to "the questions of theological metaphysics" ... does
all of this seem to be on the right track?  Again, great suggestion.

Thanks,

Jon

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 4:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jeff, List:
>
> Thank you for this very interesting suggestion.  In order to facilitate
> such a discussion (hopefully), here is the passage about "Super-order" from
> CP 6.490.
>
> CSP:  Order is simply thought embodied in arrangement; and thought
> embodied in any other way appears objectively as a character that is a
> generalization of order, and that, in the lack of any word for it, we may
> call for the nonce, "Super-order." It is something like uniformity. The
> idea may be caught if it is described as that of which order and uniformity
> are particular varieties ... A state in which there should be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Mike Bergman


  
  
I suppose if everyone comments on these constant arguments as
  being "tiresome" maybe we are approaching a community consensus of
  what constitutes the sign for "tiresome" in a Peircean sense. I
  find it interesting that Peirce held the ethics of all of this as
  separate from the semiotic process.
If you would, and this is directed specifically to Jon, please
  cease from my perspective this practice:

On 11/4/2016 9:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

  Edwina, List:


I frankly find it amusing that you think I am "upset and angry"
about any of this.  I am quite comfortable with my assessment
here, and once again leave it to the good judgment of the List
community to separate the wheat from the chaff.


These are arguments that you and Edwina choose to pursue ad
  infinitum. Please cease in asking readers of this list to
either be on your side or not. My "good judgment" is to wish not to
hear fruitless arguments pursued to exhaustion, looking for the last
word, and certainly not be asked to weigh in (even in my own mind)
on which tiresome argument holds sway.

Mike


  


Regards,


Jon

  
  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:09 PM,
Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

  
Jon, Gary R- I wrote this
before - 
 
Peirce was quite explicit
about the 'Zero, the Nothing'..see 1.412, 6.217.  I
do not read this as a set of Platonic worlds, which,
after all, have some identity. I read this state as
'absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility"
6.217.
 
As I've said, i see the
blackboard as POST Big Bang, with sudden flashes of
chalkmarks on it...unrelated to each other"the
mark is a mere accident, and as such may be erased.
It will not interfere with another mark drawn in
quite another way. There need be no consistency
between the two. But no further progress beyond this
can be made, until a mark will stay for a
little while; that is, until some beginning of a 
  habit has been established by virtue of which
the accident acquires some incipient staying
quality, some tendency toward consistency" 6.204.
 
I read the above as Peirce
outlining a POST BigBang number of 'possibles',
which could be viewed as those Platonic
ideas...but...'no progress beyond this can be
made...until ONE mark will stay for a
while; i.e., takes on Thirdness..and this
establishes our particular physico-chemical
universe.
 
So- my reading of this is that
many 'marks' [possible world modes] can emerge but
have no staying power...until one such
mark DOES develop this power..and as such..its
consistency makes it dominant as our universe's
typology of matter/mind.
 
I am not referring to any
'merged' set of chalkmarks - I am simply reading the
texts as they are. 
And again - I don't see that
the development of 'staying power', which develops
within Thirdness can be defined as 'the Big Bang'.
The 'Big Bang' is not Thirdness! Therefore, I don't
see that these chalkmarks are Pre-Big Bang, but I
read them as POST Big Bang. 
 
And Jon - don't you have YOUR
set of biases within which you read the texts? Of
course, others are aware that we interpret the texts
differently. I suppose I'm trying to say that I
really wonder why you are so upset and angry about
the fact that others don't always accept your view
and your analysis. 
 
I repeat - others may read
these texts in a different interpretation, but,
there is no need for anger at such differences. And
- I don't think that we can come to a definitive
answer among the few on this list who actually
comment...

 
Edwina

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

Your analysis completely ignores CP 6.206-208.  You claim that none of the
marks *ever *interact, and only *one *mark has staying power.  But Peirce
very clearly stated that *multiple *lines appear, persist, and together
form "a *new *line, the envelope of those others," such that they
"gradually tend to lose their individuality ...  Many such reacting systems
may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself act
as a first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in
turn will merge its individuality."  These larger systems are the many
"Platonic worlds," and it is not until *this *point in the story that out
of one of them "is differentiated the particular actual universe of
existence in which we happen to be."  *This *is where I place the Big
Bang--not "the development of 'staying power'" much earlier in the
narrative.

Peirce never confines the habit of persistence to one mark, or even one set
of marks.  He never says or implies that the many reacting systems or the
many Platonic worlds "dissipate" after they have developed the habit of
persistence--not even once our particular existing universe appears on the
scene.  Hence your "reading" is quite simply *not consistent with the text
itself*, which means that it is not a *reading *at all--it is your
imposition of a predetermined conceptual framework.  Do I have my own
biases?  Sure, but I readily acknowledge them, and I am making a good-faith
effort to understand *what Peirce meant* based on *what he actually wrote*.

I frankly find it amusing that you think I am "upset and angry" about any
of this.  I am quite comfortable with my assessment here, and once again
leave it to the good judgment of the List community to separate the wheat
from the chaff.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, Gary R- I wrote this before -
>
> Peirce was quite explicit about the 'Zero, the Nothing'..see 1.412,
> 6.217.  I do not read this as a set of Platonic worlds, which, after all,
> have some identity. I read this state as 'absolutely undefined and
> unlimited possibility" 6.217.
>
> As I've said, i see the blackboard as POST Big Bang, with sudden flashes
> of chalkmarks on it...unrelated to each other"the mark is a mere
> accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another
> mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the
> two. But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark will
> *stay* for a little while; that is, until some beginning of a*  habit*
> has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires some
> incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency" 6.204.
>
> I read the above as Peirce outlining a POST BigBang number of 'possibles',
> which could be viewed as those Platonic ideas...but...'no progress beyond
> this can be made...until ONE mark will *stay* for a while; i.e., takes on
> Thirdness..and this establishes our particular physico-chemical universe.
>
> So- my reading of this is that many 'marks' [possible world modes] can
> emerge but have no *staying* power...until one such mark DOES develop
> this power..and as such..its consistency makes it dominant as our
> universe's typology of matter/mind.
>
> I am not referring to any 'merged' set of chalkmarks - I am simply reading
> the texts as they are.
> And again - I don't see that the development of 'staying power', which
> develops within Thirdness can be defined as 'the Big Bang'. The 'Big Bang'
> is not Thirdness! Therefore, I don't see that these chalkmarks are Pre-Big
> Bang, but I read them as POST Big Bang.
>
> And Jon - don't you have YOUR set of biases within which you read the
> texts? Of course, others are aware that we interpret the texts differently.
> I suppose I'm trying to say that I really wonder why you are so upset and
> angry about the fact that others don't always accept your view and your
> analysis.
>
> I repeat - others may read these texts in a different interpretation, but,
> there is no need for anger at such differences. And - I don't think that we
> can come to a definitive answer among the few on this list who actually
> comment...
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond  ; Peirce-L
>  ; Helmut Raulien 
> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 8:44 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big Bang?
>
>
> I guess that depends how one understands the Big Bang.  You take it to be
> the beginning of *everything*; before the Big Bang, there was *nothing*.
> The real question is, what would *Peirce *have taken it to be?  I think
> that the much more likely answer is when

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, list:

"I do not understand you," is the phrase of an angry man.

*http://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html
*

Hth,
Jerry R

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 9:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, Gary R- I wrote this before -
>
> Peirce was quite explicit about the 'Zero, the Nothing'..see 1.412,
> 6.217.  I do not read this as a set of Platonic worlds, which, after all,
> have some identity. I read this state as 'absolutely undefined and
> unlimited possibility" 6.217.
>
> As I've said, i see the blackboard as POST Big Bang, with sudden flashes
> of chalkmarks on it...unrelated to each other"the mark is a mere
> accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another
> mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the
> two. But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark will
> *stay* for a little while; that is, until some beginning of a*  habit*
> has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires some
> incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency" 6.204.
>
> I read the above as Peirce outlining a POST BigBang number of 'possibles',
> which could be viewed as those Platonic ideas...but...'no progress beyond
> this can be made...until ONE mark will *stay* for a while; i.e., takes on
> Thirdness..and this establishes our particular physico-chemical universe.
>
> So- my reading of this is that many 'marks' [possible world modes] can
> emerge but have no *staying* power...until one such mark DOES develop
> this power..and as such..its consistency makes it dominant as our
> universe's typology of matter/mind.
>
> I am not referring to any 'merged' set of chalkmarks - I am simply reading
> the texts as they are.
> And again - I don't see that the development of 'staying power', which
> develops within Thirdness can be defined as 'the Big Bang'. The 'Big Bang'
> is not Thirdness! Therefore, I don't see that these chalkmarks are Pre-Big
> Bang, but I read them as POST Big Bang.
>
> And Jon - don't you have YOUR set of biases within which you read the
> texts? Of course, others are aware that we interpret the texts differently.
> I suppose I'm trying to say that I really wonder why you are so upset and
> angry about the fact that others don't always accept your view and your
> analysis.
>
> I repeat - others may read these texts in a different interpretation, but,
> there is no need for anger at such differences. And - I don't think that we
> can come to a definitive answer among the few on this list who actually
> comment...
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky 
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond  ; Peirce-L
>  ; Helmut Raulien 
> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 8:44 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big Bang?
>
>
> I guess that depends how one understands the Big Bang.  You take it to be
> the beginning of *everything*; before the Big Bang, there was *nothing*.
> The real question is, what would *Peirce *have taken it to be?  I think
> that the much more likely answer is when "this Universe of Actual
> Existence" emerged from "the whole universe of true and real possibilities"
> as "a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the
> blackboard" (NEM 4:345, RLT 162).  So the Platonic worlds must have been 
> *before
> *the Big Bang, because they come *before *the existence of our *particular
> *universe, and all of them but one have *no connection* with the latter
> whatsoever.
>
> ET:  But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began
> to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.
>
>
> Where do you find this in CP 6.203-208?  Where in that passage does it say
> that only *one *set of chalk marks began to take habits?  On the
> contrary, it states quite plainly, "Many such reacting systems may spring
> up," and that we are "to conceive that there are many" Platonic worlds.
> Where does it say that one of these "became dominant" over the others?
> Where does it suggest that *any *merged aggregation of chalk marks,
> having developed the habit of persistence, would have--or even could
> have--"dissipated"?  This is not a legitimate *reading *of the text, it
> is the imposition of a predetermined conceptual framework on it.
>
> ET:  I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read
> the texts differently ...
>
>
> We should not block the way of inquiry by assuming that, just because we
> read the texts differently, there is no correct (or incorrect) way to read
> the texts.
>
> ET:  ... but I do think that we on the list should be aware that there are
> different views on this issue
>
>
> Do you really

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon, Gary R- I wrote this before - 

Peirce was quite explicit about the 'Zero, the Nothing'..see 1.412, 6.217.  I 
do not read this as a set of Platonic worlds, which, after all, have some 
identity. I read this state as 'absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility" 
6.217.

As I've said, i see the blackboard as POST Big Bang, with sudden flashes of 
chalkmarks on it...unrelated to each other"the mark is a mere accident, and 
as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another mark drawn in quite 
another way. There need be no consistency between the two. But no further 
progress beyond this can be made, until a mark will stay for a little while; 
that is, until some beginning of a  habit has been established by virtue of 
which the accident acquires some incipient staying quality, some tendency 
toward consistency" 6.204.

I read the above as Peirce outlining a POST BigBang number of 'possibles', 
which could be viewed as those Platonic ideas...but...'no progress beyond this 
can be made...until ONE mark will stay for a while; i.e., takes on 
Thirdness..and this establishes our particular physico-chemical universe.

So- my reading of this is that many 'marks' [possible world modes] can emerge 
but have no staying power...until one such mark DOES develop this power..and as 
such..its consistency makes it dominant as our universe's typology of 
matter/mind.

I am not referring to any 'merged' set of chalkmarks - I am simply reading the 
texts as they are. 
And again - I don't see that the development of 'staying power', which develops 
within Thirdness can be defined as 'the Big Bang'. The 'Big Bang' is not 
Thirdness! Therefore, I don't see that these chalkmarks are Pre-Big Bang, but I 
read them as POST Big Bang. 

And Jon - don't you have YOUR set of biases within which you read the texts? Of 
course, others are aware that we interpret the texts differently. I suppose I'm 
trying to say that I really wonder why you are so upset and angry about the 
fact that others don't always accept your view and your analysis. 

I repeat - others may read these texts in a different interpretation, but, 
there is no need for anger at such differences. And - I don't think that we can 
come to a definitive answer among the few on this list who actually comment...

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L ; Helmut Raulien 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 8:44 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, List:


ET:  Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big Bang?


  I guess that depends how one understands the Big Bang.  You take it to be the 
beginning of everything; before the Big Bang, there was nothing.  The real 
question is, what would Peirce have taken it to be?  I think that the much more 
likely answer is when "this Universe of Actual Existence" emerged from "the 
whole universe of true and real possibilities" as "a discontinuous mark--like a 
line figure drawn on the area of the blackboard" (NEM 4:345, RLT 162).  So the 
Platonic worlds must have been before the Big Bang, because they come before 
the existence of our particular universe, and all of them but one have no 
connection with the latter whatsoever.


ET:  But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began 
to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.


  Where do you find this in CP 6.203-208?  Where in that passage does it say 
that only one set of chalk marks began to take habits?  On the contrary, it 
states quite plainly, "Many such reacting systems may spring up," and that we 
are "to conceive that there are many" Platonic worlds.  Where does it say that 
one of these "became dominant" over the others?  Where does it suggest that any 
merged aggregation of chalk marks, having developed the habit of persistence, 
would have--or even could have--"dissipated"?  This is not a legitimate reading 
of the text, it is the imposition of a predetermined conceptual framework on it.


ET:  I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read 
the texts differently ...


  We should not block the way of inquiry by assuming that, just because we read 
the texts differently, there is no correct (or incorrect) way to read the texts.


ET:  ... but I do think that we on the list should be aware that there are 
different views on this issue


  Do you really think that anyone on the List is not aware of this by now?


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Gary R, Helmut:

The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big 
Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S read them as

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

ET:  Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big Bang?

I guess that depends how one understands the Big Bang.  You take it to be
the beginning of *everything*; before the Big Bang, there was *nothing*.
The real question is, what would *Peirce *have taken it to be?  I think
that the much more likely answer is when "this Universe of Actual
Existence" emerged from "the whole universe of true and real possibilities"
as "a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the
blackboard" (NEM 4:345, RLT 162).  So the Platonic worlds must have
been *before
*the Big Bang, because they come *before *the existence of our
*particular *universe,
and all of them but one have *no connection* with the latter whatsoever.

ET:  But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began
to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.

Where do you find this in CP 6.203-208?  Where in that passage does it say
that only *one *set of chalk marks began to take habits?  On the contrary,
it states quite plainly, "Many such reacting systems may spring up," and
that we are "to conceive that there are many" Platonic worlds.  Where does
it say that one of these "became dominant" over the others?  Where does it
suggest that *any *merged aggregation of chalk marks, having developed the
habit of persistence, would have--or even could have--"dissipated"?  This
is not a legitimate *reading *of the text, it is the imposition of a
predetermined conceptual framework on it.

ET:  I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read
the texts differently ...

We should not block the way of inquiry by assuming that, just because we
read the texts differently, there is no correct (or incorrect) way to read
the texts.

ET:  ... but I do think that we on the list should be aware that there are
different views on this issue

Do you really think that anyone on the List is *not *aware of this by now?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, Helmut:
>
> The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big
> Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S read them as BEFORE. In
> my reading, before the BigBang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic
> worlds. But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set
> began to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.
>
> I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read the
> texts differently, but I do think that we on the list should be aware that
> there are different views on this issue.
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, Helmut, Jon S, Jeff, John, Clark, List,

In a passage preceding the one I recently quoted twice, Peirce writes:

[A]s a rule the continuum has been derived from a more general continuum, a
continnum of higher generality.

>From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe with all
its arbitrary secondness is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary
determination, of a world of ideas, a Platonic world [. . .] [Note: *not* an
existential world but "a world of ideas, a Platonic world."]

If that is correct, we cannot suppose the process of derivation, a process
which extends from before time and from before logic, we cannot suppose
that it began elsewhere than in the utter vagueness of completely
undetermined and dimensionless potentiality. [Note: "before time" in "utter
vagueness" not of nothing but of "completely undetermined and
dimensionsless potentiality."]

The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the *existing
universe*, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves
have become or are becoming developed. [Note: the topic here is of an
evolutionary process *not *merely "of the *existing universe,*" emphasis in
the original.]

We shall naturally suppose, of course, that existence is a stage of
evolution. *This existence* is presumably but a special *existence*. We
need not suppose that every form needs for its evolution to emerge into
this world, but only that it needs to enter into *some* theater of
reactions of which it is one. [Note:
*This existence* is presumably but a special *existence;"* further*, *consider
the language he uses of the possibility of emerging *not* into this
world--our Universe--but merely "*some* theater of reactions"--I have
commented elsewhere that this suggests a possibly multi-universe theory. GR]

The evolution of forms begins, or at any rate, has for an early stage of
it, a vague potentiaility, and that either is or is followed by a continuum
of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the individual
dimensions to be distinct. It must be a contraction of the vagueness of
that potentiality of *everything in general and of nothing in particular* that
the world of forms comes forth. [emphasis added, RLT, 259]

So, as I read this, it is not here a matter of 'nothing at all' as Edwina
claims, but the "potentiality of everything in general and nothing in
paritcular" that is still but merely the ground from which, *not* this
*existential
world*, but "the world of forms" can emerge. I'd call that *way *pre-Big
Bang.

One can, I suppose, try to position these comments within the procrustean
bed of *our* special, existential, post-Big Bang  world in which Edwina
would try to fit it, but to me such a reading flies in the face of this
passage, the one I was earlier quoting, the whole of this lecture, and much
else that Peirce wrote (including, the N.A.)

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, Helmut:
>
> The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big
> Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S read them as BEFORE. In
> my reading, before the BigBang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic
> worlds. But after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set
> began to take habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.
>
> I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read the
> texts differently, but I do think that we on the list should be aware that
> there are different views on this issue.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 4:04 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's
> Cosmology)
>
> Helmut, List,
>
> Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may
> prove to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt),
> Peirce wrote *this* (embedded in an argument which makes his position--
> that there is a Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian
> one issues--quite clear).
>
> Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the
> existing universe,* but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are,
> therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and
> subordinated to one another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds
> is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we
> happen to be*." (RLT, 263, emphasis added).
>
>
> The immediate question as I see it is: How did Peirce conceive of this
> matter? I would highly recommend that anyone looking into that question
> read carefully RLT, esp. 261-264.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Gary R, Helmut:

The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big 
Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S read them as BEFORE. In my 
reading, before the BigBang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic worlds. But 
after, there were multiple 'chalk marks' - but only ONE set began to take 
habits and became dominant, while the others dissipated.

I don't think that this dispute can be 'settled' because we do read the texts 
differently, but I do think that we on the list should be aware that there are 
different views on this issue.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 4:04 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Helmut, List,


  Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may 
prove to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt), Peirce 
wrote this (embedded in an argument which makes his position-- that there is a 
Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian one issues--quite 
clear).


Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing 
universe, but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to 
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another 
until finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular 
actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." (RLT, 263, emphasis 
added).


  The immediate question as I see it is: How did Peirce conceive of this 
matter? I would highly recommend that anyone looking into that question read 
carefully RLT, esp. 261-264.



  Best,


  Gary R








  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

Edwina, list,
I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with 
Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I guess, 
that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of everything, such as 
philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of metaphors, whatever. So 
there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big bang is said to be not only 
the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you suggest a meta-time, in a 
meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning is merely postponed to that: 
Did the meta-universe come from a meta-big-bang? I only have two possible 
explanations for this problem of origin/beginning: Either there was no 
beginning/creation, and no big bang (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe 
some weeks ago) , or there is a circle of creation, like: A creates B, B 
creates C, C creates A. But this would mean, that creation is atemporal, 
otherwise it would not work. But I like it, and maybe it is good for some quite 
funny science-fiction story. But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is 
everywhere, is "God", and it forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! 
This is getting weird, I have to think some more about it first.
Best,
Helmut
  
 04. November 2016 um 19:44 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 
Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing 
Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - but 
I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on theistic 
issues as well]. 

That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the pre BigBang world, as 
a set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would not be nothing 
but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead,  it is nothing, 'pure 
zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which after all, establish 
different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility' 
...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217]. 

Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague 
potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds 
within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' were 
without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their potentiality; 
it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared. "Many such reacting systems 
may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself acts as a 
first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in turn will 
merge its individuality" 6.207.  This is POST BigBang.

With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of 
those 'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could have 
stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and these habits 
established our particular world rather than one of the other 'Platonic 
worlds'. By chance [tychasm],  habits developed within ONE TYPE of

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, list,

Yes, that is what I suspect too: It is not about chronologic: Creation, God, necessity, causality. Due to our limited human experience we cannot see these things other than in time flow, chronologically, so likely with a beginning. But maybe causation and time flow are not so strictly connected with each other as we think! Maybe they are two different things, that merely happen to occur parallelly just for us, but not necessarily for, like, God, or whoever.

Best,

Helmut

Freitag, 04. November 2016 um 21:42 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

The Big Bang is called a "singularity" because it is the point in the past when the mathematical equations that scientists currently take as governing our existing universe break down; i.e., the event when those laws of nature came into being, assuming that they have remained essentially unchanged since then. (Peirce, of course, held that they have evolved, and are still subject to minute spontaneous variations.) Consequently, as Gary R. has been highlighting by quoting CP 6.208, if the Big Bang has a place in Peirce's cosmology at all, it can only correspond to the beginning of our existing universe. Everything that comes before that in Peirce's blackboard narrative--the blackboard itself, the initial chalk mark, the aggregation of multiple marks into reacting systems, and the merging of those systems into larger Platonic worlds--must precede the Big Bang. Now, granted, since the Big Bang corresponds to the beginning of time, "precede" has to be taken in some way other than strictly chronologically; but as Clark Goble has affirmed, this problem of language arises no matter what words we use when trying to discuss things "before" time began. The only way to avoid the kind of circularity that you describe below is to recognize the necessity of necessary Being--Ens necessarium--which Peirce explicitly identified as God in "A Neglected Argument."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 2:52 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Edwina, list,

I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I guess, that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of everything, such as philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of metaphors, whatever. So there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big bang is said to be not only the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you suggest a meta-time, in a meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning is merely postponed to that: Did the meta-universe come from a meta-big-bang? I only have two possible explanations for this problem of origin/beginning: Either there was no beginning/creation, and no big bang (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe some weeks ago) , or there is a circle of creation, like: A creates B, B creates C, C creates A. But this would mean, that creation is atemporal, otherwise it would not work. But I like it, and maybe it is good for some quite funny science-fiction story. But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is everywhere, is "God", and it forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! This is getting weird, I have to think some more about it first.

Best,

Helmut

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[PEIRCE-L] Super-order and continuity, was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jeff, Jon S, List,

Jeff, I agree that indeed this entire final lecture ("The Logic of
Continuity" in RLT) is challenging. I also at first glance tend to agree
with your suggestions as to what Peirce is up to in the several sections of
that lecture. For example, concerning Peirce's "mathematical survey" and
"phenomenological experiment" involving the cave odors you wrote:

JD: It looks to me like the mathematical survey of the relationships he
notes between topology, projective geometry and metrical geometries are
being used to set up the arguments. Likewise, the phenomenological thought
experiment involving the cave of odors is also doing some work.

JD: [. . .] One goal of [the mathematical] discussion, I assume, is to
analyze these examples in order to see how those mathematical methods might
be applied to the logical difficulties involved in working with the
conception.
[. . .] The goal of the [phenomenological experiment, the odor caves] is to
provide us with some exercises of the imagination in which we are being
asked to explore arrangements of odors in spaces that are markedly
different from our typical experience of how things that are spatially
arranged. One of the key ideas, I believe, is that this imaginative
exploration does not involve any kind of optical ray of light or any
physical straight bar that might be used to apply projective or metrical
standards to the spatial arrangements.

And, as you point out, what he concludes from the survey and experiment is
"logical in character."

 "A continuum may have any discrete multitude of dimensions whatsoever. If
the multiude of dimensions surpasses all discrete multitudes there cease to
be any distinct dimensions. I have not as yet obtained any logically
distinct conception of such a continuum. Provisionally, I identify it with
the uralt vague generality of the most abstract potentiality." (253-4)

He then, as you noted, transitions to the metaphysical questions involving
the blackboard diagram. You suggested that before considering further "the
questions of theological metaphysics" that it might be helpful to reflect
on Peirce's conception of super-order in the N.A. as being perhaps an aid
in interpreting the blackboard diagram; or, vice versa, that the RLT
diagram might help us get a firmer grasp of super-order.

I think that that's an excellent idea. If Jon agrees, I recall his posting
a nice summary of what he drew from Peirce's discussion of super-order a
short while back, so that if he were to cut and paste that here, it might
be a good way to get the discussion going. Hoping that this will happen,
I've changed the Subject of the thread.

Best,

Gary R

*cation Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 5:39 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> 
> Gary R, Jon S, List,
>
> The pages you and Jon are examining (RLT 261-4) are quite challenging. The
> guiding aims of the lecture, he tells us on the first page, are (1) to work
> out the logical difficulties involved in the conception of continuity, and
> then (2) to address the metaphysical difficulties associated with the
> conception. What is needed, he says, is a better method of reasoning about
> continuity in philosophy generally.
>
> It looks to me like the mathematical survey of the relationships he notes
> between topology, projective geometry and metrical geometries are being
> used to set up the arguments. Likewise, the phenomenological thought
> experiment involving the cave of odors is also doing some work.
>
> The mathematical examples he offers are meant, I am supposing, to offer us
> with some nice case studies that we can use to study the methods that have
> been taking shape in the 19th century in order to handle mathematical
> questions about continuity in topology and projective geometry. One goal of
> this discussion, I assume, is to analyze these examples in order to see how
> those mathematical methods might be applied to the logical difficulties
> involved in working with the conception.
>
> Then, the phenomenological experiment is designed as an exercise that
> helps to limber us up for the challenges we face. The goal is to provide us
> with some exercises of the imagination in which we are being asked to
> explore arrangements of odors in spaces that are markedly different from
> our typical experience of how things that are spatially arranged. One of
> the key ideas, I believe, is that this imaginative exploration does not
> involve any kind of optical ray of light or any physical straight bar that
> might be used to apply projective or metrical standards to the spatial
> arrangements.
>
> The big conclusion he draws from both the mathematical and
> phenomenological investigations is logical in character: "A continuum may
> have any discrete multitude of dimensions whatsoever. If the multiude of
> dimensions surpasses all discrete multitudes there cease

[PEIRCE-L] Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

Jeff, List:

Thank you for this very interesting suggestion.  In order to facilitate
such a discussion (hopefully), here is the passage about "Super-order" from
CP 6.490.

CSP:  Order is simply thought embodied in arrangement; and thought embodied
in any other way appears objectively as a character that is a
generalization of order, and that, in the lack of any word for it, we may
call for the nonce, "Super-order." It is something like uniformity. The
idea may be caught if it is described as that of which order and uniformity
are particular varieties ... A state in which there should be absolutely no
super-order whatsoever would be such a state of nility. For all Being
involves some kind of super-order. For example, to suppose a thing to have
any particular character is to suppose a conditional proposition to be true
of it, which proposition would express some kind of super-order, as any
formulation of a general fact does. To suppose it to have elasticity of
volume is to suppose that if it were subjected to pressure its volume would
diminish until at a certain point the full pressure was attained within and
without its periphery. This is a super-order, a law expressible by a
differential equation. Any such super-order would be a super-habit. Any
general state of things whatsoever would be a super-order and a super-habit.

Obviously I have been focusing on the blackboard diagram recently, so I
will need to review the earlier portions of the lecture in RLT with this in
mind.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 4:39 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R, Jon S, List,
>
> The pages you and Jon are examining (RLT 261-4) are quite challenging. The
> guiding aims of the lecture, he tells us on the first page, are (1) to work
> out the logical difficulties involved in the conception of continuity, and
> then (2) to address the metaphysical difficulties associated with the
> conception. What is needed, he says, is a better method of reasoning about
> continuity in philosophy generally.
>
> It looks to me like the mathematical survey of the relationships he notes
> between topology, projective geometry and metrical geometries are being
> used to set up the arguments. Likewise, the phenomenological thought
> experiment involving the cave of odors is also doing some work.
>
> The mathematical examples he offers are meant, I am supposing, to offer us
> with some nice case studies that we can use to study the methods that have
> been taking shape in the 19th century in order to handle mathematical
> questions about continuity in topology and projective geometry. One goal of
> this discussion, I assume, is to analyze these examples in order to see how
> those mathematical methods might be applied to the logical difficulties
> involved in working with the conception.
>
> Then, the phenomenological experiment is designed as an exercise that
> helps to limber us up for the challenges we face. The goal is to provide us
> with some exercises of the imagination in which we are being asked to
> explore arrangements of odors in spaces that are markedly different from
> our typical experience of how things that are spatially arranged. One of
> the key ideas, I believe, is that this imaginative exploration does not
> involve any kind of optical ray of light or any physical straight bar that
> might be used to apply projective or metrical standards to the spatial
> arrangements.
>
> The big conclusion he draws from both the mathematical and
> phenomenological investigations is logical in character: "A continuum may
> have any discrete multitude of dimensions whatsoever. If the multiude of
> dimensions surpasses all discrete multitudes there cease to be any distinct
> dimensions. I have not as yet obtained any logically distinct conception of
> such a continuum. Provisionally, I identify it with the uralt vague
> generality of the most abstract potentiality." (253-4) On page 257, he
> makes the transition from the attempt to draw on mathematics and
> phenomenology for the sake of addressing the logical difficulties
> associated with the concept of continuity, and the then takes up the
> metaphysical difficulties.
>
> Before turning to the questions of theological metaphysics that he takes
> up on 258-9 or the example of the diagrams on the blackboard shortly
> thereafter, let me ask a question. In the Additament to the Neglected
> Argument, he makes use of the conception of Super-order. I am wondering if
> there is anything in his discussion of mathematics and phenomenology in the
> first part of this last lecture in RLT that might help us to clarify this
> conception of Super-order? What I'd like to do is to work towards a more
> adequate understanding of that conception and then see if it could be used
> to shed some light on the points

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Gary R, Jon S, List,

The pages you and Jon are examining (RLT 261-4) are quite challenging. The 
guiding aims of the lecture, he tells us on the first page, are (1) to work out 
the logical difficulties involved in the conception of continuity, and then (2) 
to address the metaphysical difficulties associated with the conception. What 
is needed, he says, is a better method of reasoning about continuity in 
philosophy generally.

It looks to me like the mathematical survey of the relationships he notes 
between topology, projective geometry and metrical geometries are being used to 
set up the arguments. Likewise, the phenomenological thought experiment 
involving the cave of odors is also doing some work.

The mathematical examples he offers are meant, I am supposing, to offer us with 
some nice case studies that we can use to study the methods that have been 
taking shape in the 19th century in order to handle mathematical questions 
about continuity in topology and projective geometry. One goal of this 
discussion, I assume, is to analyze these examples in order to see how those 
mathematical methods might be applied to the logical difficulties involved in 
working with the conception.

Then, the phenomenological experiment is designed as an exercise that helps to 
limber us up for the challenges we face. The goal is to provide us with some 
exercises of the imagination in which we are being asked to explore 
arrangements of odors in spaces that are markedly different from our typical 
experience of how things that are spatially arranged. One of the key ideas, I 
believe, is that this imaginative exploration does not involve any kind of 
optical ray of light or any physical straight bar that might be used to apply 
projective or metrical standards to the spatial arrangements.

The big conclusion he draws from both the mathematical and phenomenological 
investigations is logical in character: "A continuum may have any discrete 
multitude of dimensions whatsoever. If the multiude of dimensions surpasses all 
discrete multitudes there cease to be any distinct dimensions. I have not as 
yet obtained any logically distinct conception of such a continuum. 
Provisionally, I identify it with the uralt vague generality of the most 
abstract potentiality." (253-4) On page 257, he makes the transition from the 
attempt to draw on mathematics and phenomenology for the sake of addressing the 
logical difficulties associated with the concept of continuity, and the then 
takes up the metaphysical difficulties.

Before turning to the questions of theological metaphysics that he takes up on 
258-9 or the example of the diagrams on the blackboard shortly thereafter, let 
me ask a question. In the Additament to the Neglected Argument, he makes use of 
the conception of Super-order. I am wondering if there is anything in his 
discussion of mathematics and phenomenology in the first part of this last 
lecture in RLT that might help us to clarify this conception of Super-order? 
What I'd like to do is to work towards a more adequate understanding of that 
conception and then see if it could be used to shed some light on the points he 
is making on pages 258-64--or vice versa.

--Jeff









Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, November 4, 2016 1:04 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Helmut, List,

Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may prove 
to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt), Peirce wrote 
this (embedded in an argument which makes his position-- that there is a 
Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian one issues--quite 
clear).

Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing 
universe, but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to 
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another 
until finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular 
actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." (RLT, 263, emphasis 
added).

The immediate question as I see it is: How did Peirce conceive of this matter? 
I would highly recommend that anyone looking into that question read carefully 
RLT, esp. 261-264.

Best,

Gary R


[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien 
> wrote:
Edwina, list,
I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with 
Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I guess, 
that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of everything, such as 
philosophy,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread John F Sowa


On 11/4/2016 12:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

JFS:  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter,
there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret
that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic
pre-semiosis.


ET: I don't know that analytic perception/interpretation is necessary
for Thirdness. As Mike Bergman just pointed out, 'Mind' operates in
physico-chemical matter. Therefore, I'd claim that Thirdness, which I'll
define as the process of generating and using habits, i.e., habits of
morphology - emerges at the same time as Firstness and Secondness.


The potential for Thirdness would emerge at the instant of the
Big Bang.  But nothing could interpret that potential Thirdness
as Thirdness until some mind or quasi-mind came into existence.

For a collection of articles on "protosemiosis" and related issues,
http://www.uni-kassel.de/upress/online/frei/978-3-933146-63-2.volltext.frei.pdf

General consensus:  It's debatable -- and they debated it.


JFS: [The line called supertime] exists only in our 100-D hypothesis.



ET: Interesting - and I wish we could get into the analysis of
time in more detail.


Peirce understood the notion of spaces of arbitrarily many dimensions,
since he had edited his father's book on linear algebra -- and he had
discovered and added new theorems about them in the new edition.

He also understood the issues of relating different coordinate systems,
and he considered it likely that our universe is not Euclidean.

Does anyone know if he had written anything about embedding our
universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension?

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Clark Goble

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:46 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos pre-the Big Bang 
> (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't really 
> bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I used the 
> modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language do we have 
> to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last lecture of the 
> 1898 Reasoning and the Logic of Things from this, our, existential one?) 
> contra a more Aristotelian cosmos once there exists a, shall we say, 
> particular three category semiosic universe might be helpful in  moving this 
> discussion forward. So, my question: Are these two different? If so, how so? 
> If not, why not?

For Peirce the platonic forms clearly are potentialities. Much as in the 
Platonists you have forms becoming more differentiated or limited. To the 
Platonists this is emanation. While I’ll confess I don’t quite grasp the 
absolute transitions between the three worlds of Plotinus and related 
neoPlatonists it seems likely Peirce is following something similar. So for the 
Platonist the world of soul or spirit involves time and mediation and is 
roughly Peirce’s thirdness. Souls as moving essences generate the material and 
phenomenal world. 

It’s worth noting that there isn’t a single platonic view here. Rather there’s 
lots of related views of how to deal with the emanations. I’m quite sure Peirce 
had read Proclus, Plotinus and possibly Iamblicus and Pseudo-Dionysius. Yet as 
Soren mentioned Schelling also can’t be neglected here. Again his commentary on 
the Timaeus probably is relevant particularly for RLT.

The simple view is that Peirce just recognizes the difference between 
possibility (treated as real in his mature thought) and actuality. Aristotle’s 
own universe is a tad more complex than you suggest since prime matter plays 
such an important role. And it’s this reconciling Aristotle and Plato with 
prime matter as pure differentiation that I confess I find interesting in 
Peirce. This is a matter (forgive the pun) Peirce doesn’t address much in his 
mature thought. It’s mainly in his earlier more Kantian period that it pops up. 
While I recognize people here don’t like him too much, I think that Derrida’s 
notion of différance is something he picks up out of Peirce’s conception of the 
symbol and ends up being this neoPlatonic/Aristotilean prime matter. In turn 
this becomes quite important for understanding type-token repetition which was 
such a concern in Continental Philosophy in the 50’s and 60’s. (Not just 
Derrida but also Deleuze and others)

I bring this up because if we’re going to talk about the logical pre-material 
order we’re getting into places Peirce isn’t necessarily explicit (or at least 
clear). It’s also places where I think people have extended Peirce following 
his logic. In particular in thirdness within his mature phase we have to ask 
what differentiates the triadic parts enabling a triad? That sounds obvious and 
not important until one stops to think about it long. When the sign indicates 
its object by a hint that implies a space of some sort. Within temporal 
situated signs that’s partially due to time but there must a logical gap too or 
a spacing. So Peirce’s weather vane example functions because there’s a logical 
gap between the material vane and the wind. That difference always must precede 
the sign.

This difference isn’t the nothing that Jon and Edwina are disputing. That’s a 
kind of positively acting potential of potentiality. (Roughly akin to the 
Platonic One) This difference is a logically previous ‘substance’ that must be 
there for signs to be signs. It’s prime matter or if we return again to the 
Timaeus it is pure logical space or receptical. (Khora)

So before the big bang in its physical sense there must be possibility with the 
big bang in one interpretation merely being the event of actualization. 
(Especially if we consider it in a General Relativity conception as the 
emergence of a four dimensions block universe — of course things are trickier 
in quantum mechanics but then so too is the existence of a big bang) But this 
possibility must come from something so too must the place for the possibility 
to become actual. Again if we think of the big bang as the emergence of a four 
dimensional space ‘all at once’ then what is the place where this is able to 
appear? The possibility of possibility and the possibility of place must 
pre-‘exist’ the big bang. 

Which again is just the traditional Platonic story of the Timaeus by way of 
Aristotle. And again I’m not saying I agree with any of this. Although it is 
nice to know all that platonism I read back in the 90’s that had seemed 
pointless for so long is finally being worth something.

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Helmut, List:

The Big Bang is called a "singularity" because it is the point in the past
when the mathematical equations that scientists currently take as governing
our existing universe break down; i.e., the event when those laws of nature
came into being, *assuming *that they have remained essentially unchanged
since then.  (Peirce, of course, held that they have *evolved*, and are
still subject to minute spontaneous variations.)  Consequently, as Gary R.
has been highlighting by quoting CP 6.208, if the Big Bang has a place in
Peirce's cosmology *at all*, it can *only *correspond to the beginning of
our *existing *universe.  Everything that comes *before *that in Peirce's
blackboard narrative--the blackboard itself, the initial chalk mark, the
aggregation of multiple marks into reacting systems, and the merging of
those systems into larger Platonic worlds--must *precede *the Big Bang.
Now, granted, since the Big Bang corresponds to the *beginning *of time,
"precede" has to be taken in some way other than strictly chronologically;
but as Clark Goble has affirmed, this problem of language arises no matter
what words we use when trying to discuss things "before" time began.  The
only way to avoid the kind of circularity that you describe below is to
recognize the necessity of necessary Being--*Ens necessarium*--which Peirce
explicitly identified as God in "A Neglected Argument."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 2:52 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina, list,
> I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with
> Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I
> guess, that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of
> everything, such as philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of
> metaphors, whatever. So there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big
> bang is said to be not only the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you
> suggest a meta-time, in a meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning
> is merely postponed to that: Did the meta-universe come from a
> meta-big-bang? I only have two possible explanations for this problem of
> origin/beginning: Either there was no beginning/creation, and no big bang
> (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe some weeks ago) , or there is a
> circle of creation, like: A creates B, B creates C, C creates A. But this
> would mean, that creation is atemporal, otherwise it would not work. But I
> like it, and maybe it is good for some quite funny science-fiction story.
> But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is everywhere, is "God", and it
> forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! This is getting weird, I
> have to think some more about it first.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

Jon, other Jon, Gary, list:

Thank you for your support of other Jon.  This would mean that you think CP
5.189 is not a pragmatic maxim also, because it belongs to what you both
classify as "logical critic”, the definition of which I suspect is clear to
you both.   For in that definition, “logical critic” would somehow exclude
pragmatic maxim by way of law of non-contradiction.  They cannot both be
one thing because each are exclusionary things.

Peirce said many things and I’ve noticed that we are just as free to pick
and choose the different things he said to support our arguments, as if we
believers are the only existing persons.  For instance, he said that “logic
is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad.”  And of course,
you consider my reasoning as bad for a reason; CP 5.189 is not *even* a
pragmatic maxim because “logical critic”.

Yet again, we are free to pick and choose what we like from the vast bed of
Peirce’s writings.  Here is another:

“Man is essentially a social animal: but to be social is one thing, to be
gregarious is another: I decline to serve as bellwether.

My book is meant for people who *want to find out; *and people who want
philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere.  There are philosophical
soup shops at every corner, thank God!”

__

I would ask you, social animal, to find out the depths of CP 5.189 and why
it is that I say understanding this object over any other is the best.

For “*whatever is fittingly related to its proper operation is said to be
virtuous and good**… And that which is most perfect in this operation is
the ultimate end, particularly in the case of operations that are not
ordered to any products, such as the acts of understanding and sensing.
Now, since operations of this type are specified by their objects, through
which they are known also, any one of these operations must be more perfect
when its object is more perfect.*”~Aquinas

CP 5.189 is the only pragmatic maxim that is fittingly related to its
proper operation; one that claims to be perfect like no other because it
even contributes to the *uberty* of reasoning, which far more calls for
solicitous care.

With best wishes,
Jerry Rhee

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 2:45 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, Jerry, List,
>
> Jon, I concur with your assessment.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
>
>> Jerry R.:
>>
>> You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not.  You offer it as a
>> candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not.  You want us
>> to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
>> and CP 5.189 is your creed.  I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
>> at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> The Other Jon
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought
>>> to look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
>>> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
>>> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
>>> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
>>> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
>>> accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
>>> decided by the rights of the question.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
>>> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
>>> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
>>> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
>>> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
>>> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
>>> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
>>> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
>>> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
>>> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
>>> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
>>> is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
>>> lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
>>> valued by Peirce?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
>>> practically

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Helmut, List,

Whatever you or Edwina may think, whatever the 'truth' of the matter may
prove to be (if any such proof were possible, which I greatly doubt),
Peirce wrote *this* (embedded in an argument which makes his position--
that there is a Platonic cosmos from which this, shall we say, Aristotelian
one issues--quite clear).

Peirce: "[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the existing
universe,* but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one
another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the
particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be*." (RLT,
263, emphasis added).


The immediate question as I see it is: How did Peirce conceive of this
matter? I would highly recommend that anyone looking into that question
read carefully RLT, esp. 261-264.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:52 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina, list,
> I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with
> Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I
> guess, that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of
> everything, such as philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of
> metaphors, whatever. So there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big
> bang is said to be not only the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you
> suggest a meta-time, in a meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning
> is merely postponed to that: Did the meta-universe come from a
> meta-big-bang? I only have two possible explanations for this problem of
> origin/beginning: Either there was no beginning/creation, and no big bang
> (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe some weeks ago) , or there is a
> circle of creation, like: A creates B, B creates C, C creates A. But this
> would mean, that creation is atemporal, otherwise it would not work. But I
> like it, and maybe it is good for some quite funny science-fiction story.
> But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is everywhere, is "God", and it
> forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! This is getting weird, I
> have to think some more about it first.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  04. November 2016 um 19:44 Uhr
>  "Edwina Taborsky" 
>
> Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing
> Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all -
> but I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on
> theistic issues as well].
>
> That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the *pre* BigBang
> world, as a set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would
> not be nothing but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead,  it is
> nothing, 'pure zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which
> after all, establish different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined
> and unlimited possibility' ...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217].
>
> Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague
> potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds
> within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits'
> were without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their
> potentiality; it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared. "Many such
> reacting systems may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these
> may itself acts as a first line from which a larger system may be built, in
> which it in turn will merge its individuality" 6.207.  *This is POST *
> BigBang.
>
> With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of
> those 'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could
> have stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and
> these habits established our particular world rather than one of the other
> 'Platonic worlds'. *By chance* [tychasm],  habits developed within ONE
> TYPE of 'Platonic world'...and the others, I presume, dissolved, as our
> particular universe took over.
>
> The multiple Platonic worlds are not pre BigBang, in my reading, but post.
> And Thirdness quickly isolated and privileged one 'Set' - which then became
> our particular universe.
>
> Therefore, I equally don't read Peirce as having the three categories
> 'existential' in the pre BigBang phase; my reading is that these three
> categories, which are fundamental laws of matter/mind...emerged WITH the
> emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it.
>
> Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of
> Peirce, just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the
> stage where we can definitely say that only ONE

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Helmut Raulien


Edwina, list,

I my humble (being a layman about all these things) opinion, I agree with Edwina, because the big bang is said to have been a singularity, and I guess, that "singularity" is not only a matter of physics, but of everything, such as philosophy, black boards, metaphysical meanings of metaphors, whatever. So there can not be a "pre" of it, the less as the big bang is said to be not only the origin of space, but of time too. Lest you suggest a meta-time, in a meta-universe, but then the problem of beginning is merely postponed to that: Did the meta-universe come from a meta-big-bang? I only have two possible explanations for this problem of origin/beginning: Either there was no beginning/creation, and no big bang (I had supposed a multi-bubble-universe some weeks ago) , or there is a circle of creation, like: A creates B, B creates C, C creates A. But this would mean, that creation is atemporal, otherwise it would not work. But I like it, and maybe it is good for some quite funny science-fiction story. But perhaps it is not far fetched: Creation is everywhere, is "God", and it forms circular attractors of recreation. Stop! This is getting weird, I have to think some more about it first.

Best,

Helmut

 

 04. November 2016 um 19:44 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 



Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - but I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on theistic issues as well]. 

 

That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the pre BigBang world, as a set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would not be nothing but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead,  it is nothing, 'pure zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which after all, establish different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility' ...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217]. 

 

Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' were without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their potentiality; it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared. "Many such reacting systems may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself acts as a first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in turn will merge its individuality" 6.207.  This is POST BigBang.

 

With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of those 'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could have stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and these habits established our particular world rather than one of the other 'Platonic worlds'. By chance [tychasm],  habits developed within ONE TYPE of 'Platonic world'...and the others, I presume, dissolved, as our particular universe took over. 

 

The multiple Platonic worlds are not pre BigBang, in my reading, but post. And Thirdness quickly isolated and privileged one 'Set' - which then became our particular universe. 

 

Therefore, I equally don't read Peirce as having the three categories 'existential' in the pre BigBang phase; my reading is that these three categories, which are fundamental laws of matter/mind...emerged WITH the emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it.

 

Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of Peirce, just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the stage where we can definitely say that only ONE reading is The Accurate One. I offer my reading; some on the list may agree; some may not. That is as far as a scholarly list can go, I think.

 

Edwina

 

 

 

 

 

 


- Original Message -

From: Gary Richmond

To: Peirce-L

Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 1:55 PM

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

 


Edwina, Jon S, List,

 

I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have been rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however, that I do not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair minded' at all, but rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual framework on Peirce's very different one. 

 

For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments (and I've pointed to this passage before):

 


"[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

Jon, Jerry, List,

Jon, I concur with your assessment.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jerry R.:
>
> You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not.  You offer it as a
> candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not.  You want us
> to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
> and CP 5.189 is your creed.  I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
> at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
>
> Thanks,
>
> The Other Jon
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Jon, list:
>>
>>
>>
>> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>>
>>
>>
>> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
>> look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
>> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
>> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
>> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
>> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
>> accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
>> decided by the rights of the question.
>>
>>
>>
>> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
>> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
>> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
>> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
>> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
>> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>>
>>
>>
>> What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
>> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
>> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
>> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
>> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
>> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
>> is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
>> lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
>> valued by Peirce?
>>
>>
>>
>> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
>> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
>> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
>> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
>> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
>> shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
>> characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
>> manifestations*.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is,
>>
>> What is C?
>>
>> What is A?
>>
>> What is B?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry, List,
>>>
>>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>>
>>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>>> which they point.
>>>
>>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>>> A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
>>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>>> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
>>> (4) Inference Rules.
>>>
>>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>>> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
>>> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
>>> in question come into play.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>>
 Jon, list:

 Thank you for that earnest answer.
 Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
 That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
 possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
 based on our valuation for likeness between terms?

 And if we were not to attempt

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

Jon, other Jon, list:

Thank you for that sobering thought.

"But that is an accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims
that must be decided by the rights of the question.

 In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
What I list are reasons to suspect..."


So, what are the rules that are to be adopted at the outset?  CP 5.189.

If not this, *which*?  What is the strongest argument?

What will help us prevent the constant generation and destruction, and
instead promote best movement to our stated purpose?


"This mind may be called the *commens*. It consists of all that is, and
must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in
order that the sign in question should fulfill its function. This I proceed
to explain." ~Peirce


Hth,

Jerry Rhee

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jerry R.:
>
> You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not.  You offer it as a
> candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not.  You want us
> to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
> and CP 5.189 is your creed.  I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
> at the very bottom of this e-mail string.
>
> Thanks,
>
> The Other Jon
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
>
>> Jon, list:
>>
>>
>>
>> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>>
>>
>>
>> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
>> look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
>> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
>> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
>> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
>> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
>> accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
>> decided by the rights of the question.
>>
>>
>>
>> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
>> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
>> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
>> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
>> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
>> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>>
>>
>>
>> What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
>> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
>> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
>> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
>> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
>> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
>> is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
>> lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
>> valued by Peirce?
>>
>>
>>
>> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
>> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
>> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
>> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
>> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
>> shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
>> characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
>> manifestations*.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is,
>>
>> What is C?
>>
>> What is A?
>>
>> What is B?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry, List,
>>>
>>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>>
>>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>>> which they point.
>>>
>>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>>> A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
>>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>>> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
>>> (4) Inference Rules.
>>>
>>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>>> that go toward sustaining any

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

Jerry R.:

You make CP 5.189 sound mystical, which it is not.  You offer it as a
candidate for "the [best] pragmatic maxim," which it is not.  You want us
to treat you as a "co-inquirer," which you are not--you are a *dogmatist*,
and CP 5.189 is your creed.  I already gave my reasons; please re-read them
at the very bottom of this e-mail string.

Thanks,

The Other Jon

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:35 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Jon, list:
>
>
>
> You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.
>
>
>
> What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
> look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
> For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
> pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
> apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
> that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
> accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
> decided by the rights of the question.
>
>
>
> In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.
> What I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For
> example, this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that
> acquire meaning from their place in the whole system rather than from
> explicit definitions"), definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones
> that we can utter out loud, etc…
>
>
>
> What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
> more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
> the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
> reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
> anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
> of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
> is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
> lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
> valued by Peirce?
>
>
>
> I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
> practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
> indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
> while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
> [we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
> shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
> characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
> manifestations*.
>
>
>
> That is,
>
> What is C?
>
> What is A?
>
> What is B?
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry R
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
>> Jerry, List,
>>
>> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
>> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
>> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
>> to Compute Better Answers.
>>
>> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
>> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
>> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
>> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
>> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
>> which they point.
>>
>> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
>> A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
>> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
>> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
>> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
>> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
>> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
>> (4) Inference Rules.
>>
>> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
>> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
>> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
>> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
>> in question come into play.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>
>>> Jon, list:
>>>
>>> Thank you for that earnest answer.
>>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
>>> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
>>> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
>>> based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
>>>
>>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
>>> vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
>>> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods
>>> at
>>> our disposal.
>>>
>>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
>>> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
>>>
>>> Thank you for your comments,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Gary R - again, it is my strong sense that I am accurately representing 
Peirce's views on this issue. I don't see that I disagree with him at all - but 
I do disagree with you and Jon on this issue [and, obviously, on theistic 
issues as well]. 

That is - I don't see a Nothing, which is to say, the pre BigBang world, as a 
set of Platonic worlds. If this were the case, then, it would not be nothing 
but would be sets of ideal potentialities. Instead,  it is nothing, 'pure 
zero', pure freedom, no variety of Platonic worlds which after all, establish 
different perspectives, it is "absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility' 
...not a SET of Platonic worlds. [1.412, 6.217]. 

Then, with the BigBang, this set up the Blackboard 'the original vague 
potentiality' and moved into that set of multiple possible Platonic worlds 
within the phase of Firstness and Secondness. At this time, these 'bits' were 
without habits [Thirdness] - that's what provides them with their potentiality; 
it is possible that many chalkmarks appeared. "Many such reacting systems 
may spring up in the original continuum; and each of these may itself acts as a 
first line from which a larger system may be built, in which it in turn will 
merge its individuality" 6.207.  This is POST BigBang.

With these multiple sets - the universe could have gone anywhere; some of those 
'bits' could have dissipated; others could have emerged; some could have 
stayed. But THEN - came the development of habits, Thirdness - and these habits 
established our particular world rather than one of the other 'Platonic 
worlds'. By chance [tychasm],  habits developed within ONE TYPE of 'Platonic 
world'...and the others, I presume, dissolved, as our particular universe took 
over. 

The multiple Platonic worlds are not pre BigBang, in my reading, but post. And 
Thirdness quickly isolated and privileged one 'Set' - which then became our 
particular universe. 

Therefore, I equally don't read Peirce as having the three categories 
'existential' in the pre BigBang phase; my reading is that these three 
categories, which are fundamental laws of matter/mind...emerged WITH the 
emergence of matter/mind...and are not separate from it.

Therefore - you and Jon, and others, may certainly reject my reading of Peirce, 
just as I reject yours and Jon's - but, I don't think we are at the stage where 
we can definitely say that only ONE reading is The Accurate One. I offer my 
reading; some on the list may agree; some may not. That is as far as a 
scholarly list can go, I think.

Edwina






  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 1:55 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Edwina, Jon S, List,


  I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion 
with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have been 
rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however, that I do 
not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair minded' at all, but 
rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual framework on Peirce's very 
different one. 


  For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard 
discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a sort of 
Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments (and I've 
pointed to this passage before):


"[A]ll this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing 
universe, but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to 
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another 
until finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular 
actual universe of existence in which we happen to be." (RLT, 263, emphasis 
added).


  Now you may disagree with Peirce in this matter, but this is what he 
wrote--the blackboard diagram would seem to represent what he no doubt believed 
to be the character of the cosmos before "one of these Platonic worlds is 
differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen 
to be," that is, before what corresponds to the Big Bang.


  It is my strong sense that Jon has consistently accurately presented Peirce's 
views as they appear in the 1898 lecture, and that your remarks contra his do 
not represent Peirce's clearly articulated views (as, for example, given in the 
quotation above), but rather your own. They seem to me less an interpretation 
than a misreading of Peirce, one which your conceptual framework apparently 
requires.


  Best,


  Gary R








  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Gary R, list:

Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

Jon, list:

You make pragmaticism sound mystical, which it is not.

What is plainer than to say that CP 5.189 is the one to which we ought to
look; the one to read again and again before you move on to the others?
For if the purpose is to select one over the lessers in order to spread
pragmaticism in a way that prevents it from being kidnapped, then it is
apparent to me that attending to these lessers too closely is one reason
that keeps us from taking in the sense of plain advice. But that is an
accusation that applies to both of us.  These are claims that must be
decided by the rights of the question.

In order to move forward, we must make the rules clear at the outset.  What
I list are reasons to suspect that CP 5.189 is the best one. For example,
this one has a C A B to triangulate, ("undefined terms that acquire meaning
from their place in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions"),
definitions that are outside of ourselves, ones that we can utter out loud,
etc…

What do you offer as reasons?  If you refuse to give reasons but simply
more advice, you don’t treat me as a co-inquirer.  You are not agreeing to
the expectations of an inquiry at the outset.  For if you give your
reasons, then we can compare and make determinations together.  I
anticipate that whatever reasons you give, it will be fitting for the case
of CP 5.189 because it wholly captures the essence of pragmaticism for it
is nothing but the logic of abduction.  Can you make such claims for the
lessers?  For example, why did you not list this following maxim that was
valued by Peirce?

I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it is
practically certain that we cannot directly, nor with much accuracy even
indirectly, observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person,
while it is far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what
[we] can even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what
shoots through our own minds, it is *much safer to define all mental
characters* as far as possible *in* *terms* of their *outward
manifestations*.

That is,

What is C?

What is A?

What is B?

Best,

Jerry R

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 8:51 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Jerry, List,
>
> Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
> to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
> to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
> to Compute Better Answers.
>
> For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
> of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
> taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
> recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
> again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
> which they point.
>
> For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
> A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
> the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
> in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
> (2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
> (3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
> the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
> (4) Inference Rules.
>
> But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
> of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
> that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
> use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
> in question come into play.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
>
> On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>
>> Jon, list:
>>
>> Thank you for that earnest answer.
>> Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
>> That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
>> possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
>> based on our valuation for likeness between terms?
>>
>> And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
>> vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
>> interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods
>> at
>> our disposal.
>>
>> So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
>> investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?
>>
>> Thank you for your comments,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>
>> Jerry, List,
>>>
>>> I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
>>> so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
>>> of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
>>> But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
>>> we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
>>> principles can be improved almost indefinitely.
>>>
>>> I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
>>> to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, Jon S, List,

I certainly do not intend to get into a long (or even a short) discussion
with you, Edwina, on this as both your position and Jon's (and mine) have
been rather thoroughly and repeatedly articulated. I must say, however,
that I do not see your "reading" of the blackboard passages as 'fair
minded' at all, but rather it seems to me to impose your own conceptual
framework on Peirce's very different one.

For example, at RLT, 263, in the midst of the long and complex blackboard
discussion, RLT, 261-4, which blackboard Peirce himself refers to as "a
sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality," RLT, 261), he comments
(and I've pointed to this passage before):

"[A]ll this, be it remembered, *is not of the order of the existing
universe,* but is merely a Platonic world  of which we are, therefore, to
conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one
another until *finally one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the
particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be*." (RLT,
263, emphasis added).

Now you may disagree with Peirce in this matter, but this is what he
wrote--the blackboard diagram would seem to represent what he no doubt
believed to be the character of the cosmos *before* "one of these Platonic
worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
which we happen to be," that is, before what corresponds to the Big Bang.

It is my strong sense that Jon has consistently accurately presented
Peirce's views as they appear in the 1898 lecture, and that your remarks
*contra* his do not represent Peirce's clearly articulated views (as, for
example, given in the quotation above), but rather your own. They seem to
me less an interpretation than a misreading of Peirce, one which your
conceptual framework apparently requires.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 1:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list:
>
> Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I certainly
> don't agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and that
> the three Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial.
>
> Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but that
> diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague
> potentiality or at any rate of some early stage of its determination'.
> 6.203. As I said in my earlier post today, my reading is that this
> blackboard is POST Big Bang, which is why it is a 'continuum of some
> indefinite multitude of dimensions'. 6.203. This is NOT the same as the
> pre  Big Bang Zeroness - which is NOTHING.
>
> And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for Thirdness
> is a continuum of *some particular habits*, not just a 'continuum and
> certainly not of 'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The very nature of
> Thirdness is its function to constrain novelty and insert morphological
> habits.
>
> As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line -
> that's irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is
> differentiated from what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface
> and the white surface} 6.203].  It's the differentiation from
> 'what-it-is-not' that is important, for this is obviously Secondness.
>
> The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and
> Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit
> Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they
> develop common habits of formation. As Peirce notes 'However, the mark is a
> mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with
> another mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency
> between the two. But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a
> mark with *stay* for a little while; that is, until some beginning of a
> *habit* has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires
> some incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency. This
> habit is a generalizing tendency" 6.204.
>
> The three categories are fundamental laws of nature; their origin is with
> nature - which includes the physico-chemical as well as biological realms.
> Therefore - I disagree that they are pre-BigBang. I read Peirce that they
> originate, as natural laws, with the BigBang's potentiality.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Friday, November 04, 2016 12:27 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
> Jon S, Edwina, List,
>
> Jon wrote:
>
>
>- The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being
>   differentiated out of one of these

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Gary R, list:

Well, I consider myself a 'fair-minded reader of Peirce' and I certainly don't 
agree with Jon S's view that the blackboard is pre-Big Bang and that the three 
Categories are pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial.

Of course the blackboard is a metaphor - set out as a diagram...but that 
diagram is a metaphor of what we assume is that 'original vague potentiality or 
at any rate of some early stage of its determination'. 6.203. As I said in my 
earlier post today, my reading is that this blackboard is POST Big Bang, which 
is why it is a 'continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions'. 6.203. 
This is NOT the same as the pre  Big Bang Zeroness - which is NOTHING. 

And by 'continuum', I certainly don't see this as Thirdness, for Thirdness is a 
continuum of some particular habits, not just a 'continuum and certainly not of 
'indefinite multitude of dimensions. The very nature of Thirdness is its 
function to constrain novelty and insert morphological habits. 

As for quibbling about whether the chalk mark is a point or a line - that's 
irrelevant. It is a unique 'bit' of matter/mind - that is differentiated from 
what-it-is-not ["the limit between the black surface and the white surface} 
6.203].  It's the differentiation from 'what-it-is-not' that is important, for 
this is obviously Secondness.

The first chalkmark exhibits only Firstness [its novel appearance] and 
Secondness [its differentiation from the blackness] but would only exhibit 
Thirdness if it stayed 'as it is' and if other chalkmarks appear and they 
develop common habits of formation. As Peirce notes 'However, the mark is a 
mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another 
mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the two. 
But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark with stay for a 
little while; that is, until some beginning of a habit has been established by 
virtue of which the accident acquires some incipient staying quality, some 
tendency toward consistency. This habit is a generalizing tendency" 6.204. 

The three categories are fundamental laws of nature; their origin is with 
nature - which includes the physico-chemical as well as biological realms. 
Therefore - I disagree that they are pre-BigBang. I read Peirce that they 
originate, as natural laws, with the BigBang's potentiality. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 12:27 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  Jon S, Edwina, List, 


  Jon wrote:


  a.. The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being 
differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a 
discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the 
source of its continuity--cannot be post-Big Bang; and the three Categories 
must be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.


  Minus your addition of the notion of a whiteboard--which additon I think is 
quite helpful in representing the "Aggregations of merged chalk marks 
represent[ing] "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" 
(CP 6.206-208"--this is certainly the way I have always seen Peirce's 
blackboard discussion and, I believe, a fair minded reader must see it (whether 
or not they agree with Peirce here). As I wrote just yesterday, in the 
blackboard diagram--not a metaphor (I stand corrected)--"Peirce seems not at 
all to be considering the semiosic universe we inhabit, but the conditions for 
any, perhaps many, possible universe(s) to arise."


  Thanks especially for succinctly putting the argumentation into bullet points 
(including pointers to the exact passages in CP 6.203-208), this constituting 
an excellent summary of Peirce's 1898 argument.


  Best,


  Gary R








  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:

Edwina, List:


I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat what I 
have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the others 
associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone (including myself) 
the dissertation.  I will simply reiterate a few quick points about the 
blackboard illustration.
  a.. The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor; 
this means that it embodies the significant relations among the parts of 
whatever it represents.

  b.. The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents "a 
continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); and a 
continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness.
  c.. The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line;

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)


John, List: Excellent comments. See mine below:




On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

1) >> my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three category semiosic

universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only emerge
within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe.



JFS:  Yes.  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter,

there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret
that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic
pre-semiosis.


ET: I don't know that analytic perception/interpretation is necessary for 
Thirdness. As Mike Bergman just pointed out, 'Mind' operates in 
physico-chemical matter. Therefore, I'd claim that Thirdness, which I'll 
define as the process of generating and using habits, i.e., habits of 
morphology - emerges at the same time as Firstness and Secondness.  So, what 
first emerged as let's say, a hydrogen atom could continue on its typology 
within the habits of Thirdness.

---



2) JFS:> As soon as life of any kind (even some kind of pre-life) began

to form, there was the beginning of a non-degenerate Thirdness.

As soon as there were animals with sight (any alien animals on
any early planets), they could look up at more ancient stars and
interpret (full Thirdness) patterns that had never previously
been the objects of semiosis.


ET: Again, I don't see Thirdness as operative only within life/pre-life; it 
exists in the physico-chemical realms as well. As for objective 
interpretation -  I'm not sure that all that is required is sight. I  think 
that the development and use of symbols is necessary for objective analysis. 
And I don't see symbolic use outside of our species.

--



3) >> my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce

notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless
freedom 6.219..." is not, in my view, the same as the logic of
freedom or possibility [which is Firstness].



JFS: I agree.  But we have to distinguish the universe (whatever it is)

from any mathematical coordinate system we impose upon it, around it,
or outside of it.

For the moment, let's ignore string theory, multiverses, and other
such hypotheses.  Just consider an Einsteinian 4-D universe.

Mathematically, we can postulate a 100-dimensional coordinate system
in which that 4-D universe is "embedded".  But that system is just
pure mathematics.  Nothing exists that has that shape.

We could name one of those dimensions "supertime" and imagine
that coordinate line running through the middle of the 4D universe.
Then we could call the line segment running to minus infinity
"pre-time" and the segment running to plus infinity "post-time".

But whatever we call it is irrelevant.  It exists only in our
100-D hypothesis.  For the actual universe, that line called
supertime is meaningless.

As Peirce would say, supertime has no implications whatsoever
for anything that any intelligent being in the universe could
ever perceive or act upon.  It's just pure mathematics with
no observable effects or meaningful applications.



ET: Interesting - and I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more 
detail.>

John









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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon S, Edwina, List,

Jon wrote:


   - The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being differentiated
  out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
discontinuous mark"
  (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.

Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the
source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three
Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.

Minus your addition of the notion of a whiteboard--which additon I think is
quite helpful in representing the "Aggregations of merged chalk marks
represent[ing] "reacting systems" that aggregate further into "Platonic
worlds" (CP 6.206-208"--this is certainly the way I have always seen
Peirce's blackboard discussion and, I believe, a fair minded reader must
see it (whether or not they agree with Peirce here). As I wrote just
yesterday, in the blackboard *diagram*--*not* a metaphor (I stand
corrected)--"Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic
universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, possible
universe(s) to arise*."

Thanks especially for succinctly putting the argumentation into bullet
points (including pointers to the exact passages in CP 6.203-208), this
constituting an excellent summary of Peirce's 1898 argument.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, List:
>
> I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat what I
> have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the others
> associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone (including
> myself) the dissertation.  I will simply reiterate a few quick points about
> the blackboard illustration.
>
>- The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor;
>this means that it *embodies *the significant *relations *among the
>parts of whatever it represents.
>- The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents "a
>continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); and a
>continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness.
>- The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line; it is a *surface*,
>and its continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the
>underlying blackboard (CP 6.203).
>- The chalk mark exhibits all three Categories (CP
>6.203&205)--Firstness (whiteness), Secondness (boundary between black and
>white), and Thirdness (continuity).
>- Aggregations of merged chalk marks represent "reacting systems" that
>aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.206-208), each of which I
>call a "whiteboard."
>- The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being
>differentiated out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a
>discontinuous mark" (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.
>
> Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the
> source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three
> Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting
>> tiresome, to say the least.
>>
>> I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the
>> 'early cosmos' from 'this our existential one' *contra* an Aristotelian
>> one 'once there exists a particular three category semiosic universe'.
>>
>> 1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a
>> three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three
>> categories only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind
>> universe. There are no categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began
>> our universe.
>>
>> That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure
>> zero'This pure zero is the nothing of not having been
>> born..boundless freedom".  6.217.  My reading of this is that this pure
>> zero is NOT the same as Firstness, because, my reading of Firstness is that
>> it is an embedded state of feeling, which means, that its nature is to
>> express a quality of some form of matter/mind.  Redness; heat; coldness
>> Therefore, my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce
>> notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless freedom
>> 6.219..."is not, in my view,  the same as the logic of freedom or
>> possibility [which is Firstness].
>>
>> "What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became
>> potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some *quality*' 6.220.
>> Now - my reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy

2016-11-04 Thread Anny Ballardini

I think this is a wonderful bouquet. Hopefully also the others will appreciate 
it.

Sent from my iPhone

> On Nov 4, 2016, at 2:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
> 
> This is the intro to an attempt to articulate what I have been working on. It 
> is clearly not germane but Gary kindly offered me a nest in this forum where 
> what I did would a place to be.
> 
> BOUQUET
> 
> My Philosophy
> 
> INTRODUCTION
> 
> This bouquet is just a cluster among many. Most of those who have life have 
> good will. We all make our bouquets. I offer this to you as my philosophy, by 
> which I mean the sharing of a discipline you might like. I style it as 
> growing things. We are all meant to grow. From free but callow to free and 
> wise. From lost in self to found in Abba. Yes, Abba’s my companion. Just as 
> Jesus had him also as a friend. Someone to talk to day by day. You can as 
> well. It’s in the Prayer that Jesus taught. I give you this bouquet. Be 
> gentle with its flowers. They’re alive.
> 
> +
> 
> If a philosophy that seeks to be universal does not include the terms below, 
> I deem it incomplete. The hard truth underlying these contents:
> 
> One FORGIVENESS Daisies. Two LOGIC Wheat.  Three Triadic Snowdrop. Four Will 
> Sweet Violet. Five Reason Five Spot. Six Conscience Celandine. Seven Values 
> Sage. Eight Consciousness Wild Rose. Nine Heart Golden Yarrow. Ten Mind 
> Gorse. 11 Thought   Ground Ivy. 12 Reality Rose Angel.  13 Ethics Witch 
> Hazel. 14 Tolerance Foxglove. 15 Helpfulness Elm.   16 Democracy Hazel 
> Catkins. 17 Non-idolatry Bluebells. 18 Aesthetics Jacob’s Ladder. 19 TRUTH 
> Drummond Phlox. 20 BEAUTY Coltsfoot. 21 Evil Clasping Cone. 22 Action Morning 
> Glory. 23 Expression Corn Flowers.  24 JUSTICE Baby Blue Eyes. 25 LOVE 
> Butterbur. 26 FREEDOM Iceland Poppy. 27 GOOD Alder.   
> 
> CAPS = Ontological U = Triad (Also Ontological) The rest are essential terms 
> and utilities. 
>  
> 
> -
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> 
> 
> 
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Mike, list - I totally, fully agree.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Mike Bergman 
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 11:11 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

  On 11/4/2016 9:19 AM, John F Sowa wrote:

On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 

  my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three category semiosic 
  universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only emerge 
  within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe. 

Yes.  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter, 
there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret 
that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic 
pre-semiosis. 

  I do not see where life or minds are a prerequisite for Thirdness. My 
interpretation of Peirce is that the natural physical laws governing matter 
that emerged after the Big Bang provide the generalities or "habits" sufficient 
to qualify as Thirdness. Did he not also point to crystals and the purely 
physical world?

Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and 
one can
no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, 
etc., of objects
are really there. CP 4.551

  Mike 

--

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List:

I could post a lengthy rebuttal, but it would basically just repeat what I
have already laid out in considerable detail in this thread and the others
associated with Peirce's Cosmology, so I will spare everyone (including
myself) the dissertation.  I will simply reiterate a few quick points about
the blackboard illustration.

   - The blackboard is "a sort of diagram" (CP 6.203), not a metaphor; this
   means that it *embodies *the significant *relations *among the parts of
   whatever it represents.
   - The blackboard "is a continuum of two dimensions" that represents "a
   continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (CP 6.203); and a
   continuum is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness.
   - The chalk mark is not a point, or even a line; it is a *surface*, and
   its continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the
   underlying blackboard (CP 6.203).
   - The chalk mark exhibits all three Categories (CP 6.203&205)--Firstness
   (whiteness), Secondness (boundary between black and white), and Thirdness
   (continuity).
   - Aggregations of merged chalk marks represent "reacting systems" that
   aggregate further into "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.206-208), each of which I
   call a "whiteboard."
   - The Big Bang corresponds to our existing universe being differentiated
   out of one of these "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.208) as "a discontinuous mark"
   (NEM 4:345, RLT:162) on the whiteboard.

Consequently, the blackboard--which precedes the whiteboard, and is the
source of its continuity--*cannot *be post-Big Bang; and the three
Categories *must *be pre-Big Bang, with Thirdness primordial among them.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary, list - yes, I think that both tone and repetition are getting
> tiresome, to say the least.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by your suggestion of differentiating the
> 'early cosmos' from 'this our existential one' *contra* an Aristotelian
> one 'once there exists a particular three category semiosic universe'.
>
> 1) My confusion comes from my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a
> three category semiosic universe. That is, my view is that the three
> categories only emerge within the existentiality of the matter/mind
> universe. There are no categories before this 'Big Bang' or whatever began
> our universe.
>
> That is, in the pre-universe, "We start, then, with nothing, pure
> zero'This pure zero is the nothing of not having been
> born..boundless freedom".  6.217.  My reading of this is that this pure
> zero is NOT the same as Firstness, because, my reading of Firstness is that
> it is an embedded state of feeling, which means, that its nature is to
> express a quality of some form of matter/mind.  Redness; heat; coldness
> Therefore, my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce
> notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless freedom
> 6.219..."is not, in my view,  the same as the logic of freedom or
> possibility [which is Firstness].
>
> "What immediately resulted was that unbounded potentiality became
> potentiality of this or that sort - that is ,of some *quality*' 6.220.
> Now - my reading is that the unbounded Nothing [which again, is NOT
> Firstness or Thirdness]...suddenly moved into Firstness.
>
> Again, 'the zero of bare possibility, by evolutionary logic, leapt into
> the *unit* of some quality" 6.220.  So again, the zero of nothing moved
> into Firstness, where 'something is possible/Red is something; therefore
> Red is possible'. 6.220.  Again - the zero of bare possibility is NOT
> Firstness or Thirdness. It is Nothing. Then..it moved into being 'embedded'
> within matter - as Firstnesswhere *something* is possible. Not
> unbounded possibility but *something* is possible. This is already
> constrained possibility, very different from the 'zero of boundless
> possibility'.
>
> 2) His next phase seems to be, following the basic 'vague to the definite'
> 6.191, from a 'vague potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a
> continuum of forms having a multitude of dimensions too great for the
> individuals dimensions to be distinct" 6.196.  These would be
> differentiated units in Secondness [and Firstness]. Then, habits of
> relations or Thirdness begin...and this vast multitude is 'contracted'.
> "The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous"
> 6.199.
>
> 3) With regard to the blackboard metaphor, my reading of it is that the
> blackboard refers to 'the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of
> some stage of its determination' 6.203. My reading is that this
> blackboard is POST Big Bang. The blackboard is NOT the 'zero of bare
> possibility'. Instead, it is POST Big Bang - and suddenly, a singular point
> appears - that chalk line. [I'll leave out Peirce-as-God having drawn it].
> As a point, it has *identity*,  that continuity-of-being that Peirce
> refers to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread Mike Bergman


  
  
On 11/4/2016 9:19 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
  
  my own view that our 'existential cosmos'
IS a three category semiosic

universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only
emerge

within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe.

  
  
  Yes.  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time
  thereafter,
  
  there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and
  interpret
  
  that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and
  dyadic
  
  pre-semiosis.
  


I do not see where life or minds are a prerequisite for Thirdness.
My interpretation of Peirce is that the natural physical laws
governing matter that emerged after the Big Bang provide the
generalities or "habits" sufficient to qualify as Thirdness. Did he
not also point to crystals and the purely physical world?

Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It
  appears in the
  work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
  world; and one can
  no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the
  shapes, etc., of objects
  are really there. CP 4.551


Mike 


  


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[PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy

2016-11-04 Thread Stephen C. Rose

*This is the intro to an attempt to articulate what I have been working on.
It is clearly not germane but Gary kindly offered me a nest in this forum
where what I did would a place to be.*

*BOUQUET*

*My Philosophy*

*INTRODUCTION*

*This bouquet is just a cluster among many. Most of those who have life
have good will. We all make our bouquets. I offer this to you as my
philosophy, by which I mean the sharing of a discipline you might like. I
style it as growing things. We are all meant to grow. From free but callow
to free and wise. From lost in self to found in Abba. Yes, Abba’s my
companion. Just as Jesus had him also as a friend. Someone to talk to day
by day. You can as well. It’s in the Prayer that Jesus taught. I give you
this bouquet. Be gentle with its flowers. They’re alive.*

*+*

*If a philosophy that seeks to be universal does not include the terms
below, I deem it incomplete. The hard truth underlying these contents:*

*One FORGIVENESS Daisies. Two LOGIC Wheat.  Three Triadic Snowdrop. Four
Will Sweet Violet. Five Reason Five Spot. Six Conscience Celandine. Seven
Values Sage. Eight Consciousness Wild Rose. Nine Heart Golden Yarrow. Ten
Mind Gorse. 11 Thought   Ground Ivy. 12 Reality Rose Angel.  13 Ethics
Witch Hazel. 14 Tolerance Foxglove. 15 Helpfulness Elm.   16 Democracy
Hazel Catkins. 17 Non-idolatry Bluebells. 18 Aesthetics Jacob’s Ladder. 19
TRUTH Drummond Phlox. 20 BEAUTY Coltsfoot. 21 Evil Clasping Cone. 22 Action
Morning Glory. 23 Expression Corn Flowers.  24 JUSTICE Baby Blue Eyes. 25
LOVE Butterbur. 26 FREEDOM Iceland Poppy. 27 GOOD Alder.   *
*CAPS = Ontological U = Triad (Also Ontological) The rest are essential
terms and utilities. *

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

2016-11-04 Thread John F Sowa


On 11/4/2016 8:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

my own view that our 'existential cosmos' IS a three category semiosic
universe. That is, my view is that the three categories only emerge
within the existentiality of the matter/mind universe.


Yes.  But at the instant of the Big Bang and for some time thereafter,
there were no minds or quasi-minds that could perceive and interpret
that existence.  But there was a physical kind of monadic and dyadic
pre-semiosis.

As soon as life of any kind (even some kind of pre-life) began
to form, there was the beginning of a non-degenerate Thirdness.

As soon as there were animals with sight (any alien animals on
any early planets), they could look up at more ancient stars and
interpret (full Thirdness) patterns that had never previously
been the objects of semiosis.


my reading of this pre-universe state is that it was, as Peirce
notes "unbounded potentiality'. This "Nothingness of boundless
freedom 6.219..." is not, in my view, the same as the logic of
freedom or possibility [which is Firstness].


I agree.  But we have to distinguish the universe (whatever it is)
from any mathematical coordinate system we impose upon it, around it,
or outside of it.

For the moment, let's ignore string theory, multiverses, and other
such hypotheses.  Just consider an Einsteinian 4-D universe.

Mathematically, we can postulate a 100-dimensional coordinate system
in which that 4-D universe is "embedded".  But that system is just
pure mathematics.  Nothing exists that has that shape.

We could name one of those dimensions "supertime" and imagine
that coordinate line running through the middle of the 4D universe.
Then we could call the line segment running to minus infinity
"pre-time" and the segment running to plus infinity "post-time".

But whatever we call it is irrelevant.  It exists only in our
100-D hypothesis.  For the actual universe, that line called
supertime is meaningless.

As Peirce would say, supertime has no implications whatsoever
for anything that any intelligent being in the universe could
ever perceive or act upon.  It's just pure mathematics with
no observable effects or meaningful applications.

John

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Maxims

2016-11-04 Thread Jon Awbrey


Jerry, List,

Inquiry begins in Doubt and aims for Belief but the rush
to get from D to B and achieve mental peace can cause us
to short the integrated circuits of inquiry that we need
to Compute Better Answers.

For one thing, we sometimes operate under the influence
of fixed ideas and hidden assumptions that keep us from
taking in the sense of fairly plain advice, so I'd just
recommend reading those versions of the Pragmatic Maxim
again and again and trying to triangulate the points to
which they point.

For another thing, not everything in logic is an argument.
A well-developed formal system will have:  (1) Primitives,
the undefined terms that acquire meaning from their place
in the whole system rather than from explicit definitions,
(2) Definitions, that connect derived terms to primitives,
(3) Axioms, propositions taken to be true for the sake of
the theorems can be derived from them by means of certain
(4) Inference Rules.

But that's just the formal underpinnings -- there's all sorts
of informal heuristics, regulative principles, rules of thumb
that go toward sustaining any system of significant practical
use, and that's where bits of practical advice like the Maxim
in question come into play.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/3/2016 5:28 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:

Jon, list:

Thank you for that earnest answer.
Still, can there not be a strongest argument?
That is, an argument that is the best given the number of existing
possibilities that are presented explicitly; a choice among them that is
based on our valuation for likeness between terms?

And if we were not to attempt to speak on it, does that not make us
vegetables?  For that would be to deny that it is at least in our best
interest to view clearly on what we place our valuations and the methods at
our disposal.

So, what is that best pragmatic maxim for us, the community of
investigators who are devoured by a desire to find things out?

Thank you for your comments,
Jerry R

On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Jerry, List,

I tend to think more in relative terms than absolute terms,
so I would not expect to find an absolute best formulation
of any core principle in philosophy, science, or even math.
But taken relative to specific interpreters and objectives
we frequently find that symbolic expressions of meaningful
principles can be improved almost indefinitely.

I had hoped to have more time to elaborate, but I will have
to beg off at this point and try to get back to it later on.

Regards,

Jon

On 11/1/2016 2:05 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:

Jon, list:

How do you assess whether a pragmatic maxim is good or bad?

| "For logic is, in the main, criticism of reasoning as good or bad."

| "There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief



| that the believer is the only existing person.  Were anybody to adopt
| such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it.  But when
| a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of
| their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical
| theory that they are all hypostatically the same ego."
| ~ Peirce

Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Peircers,

Here is a set of variations on the Pragmatic Maxim
that I collected a number of years ago, along with
some commentary of my own as I last left it.  As I
understand them, they all say essentially the same
thing, merely differing in emphasis, point of view,
or rhetorical style as befit the moment's audience
or occasion.

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2008/08/07/pragmatic-maxim/

Regards,

Jon

On 10/15/2016 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:


List:

Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion
to a new thread topic.  I would appreciate it if others
would do likewise when extending any of the other ongoing
conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects
besides Peirce's cosmology.

There seems to be a confusion here between "*the* pragmatic maxim,"
which is a very specific principle of *methodeutic* with multiple
formulations in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim,"
which is not something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.
In particular, CP 5.189 is not *the* pragmatic maxim, nor even *a*
pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best*
pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established recently in another
thread, it is the form of inference for abduction *only*, and thus
falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently
serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to
deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
those that are not.

In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which*
pragmatic maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...

| That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which,
| if sound, must render needless any further rule as to
| the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses,
|

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)