RE: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[gnox]

ET: I think that this is becoming absurd –

 

GF: On that point we agree!

I will henceforth cease to comment on your interpretations of Peirce, no matter 
how far they may wander from what Peirce actually wrote. You have your own 
style of interpretation and you are welcome to it. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 09:17
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

 

Gary F, list

I think that this is becoming absurd - Words do NOT have a singular meaning. 

When you wrote 'to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign - I 
understand the term 'acquainted' in this sentence to mean what Peirce means 
when he writes 'tell about it'.  I don't mean what I think you mean [and I may 
be wrong] as any kind of direct or even indirect contact.

And 'telling about' or knowledge-of, is via the practice of semiosis which is 
an action of mediated interpretation. 

Edwina

 

On Wed 25/08/21 9:04 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

“The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish 
acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is what is meant in 
this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it presupposes an 
acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it.” — 
Peirce, CP2.231 (1910) 

 

ET: Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 'percept' is out of 
context'?

 

No, because that use is not out of context, as I explained.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: 25-Aug-21 08:50

Gary F, list

I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to my use of 
the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 
'percept' is out of context'?

And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the 
sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"

My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign' 
is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of mediated interpretation.

Edwina



 

On Wed 25/08/21 8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca 
  sent:

Edwina, List,

 

Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does not need to 
define the word “percept” for William James, who was well acquainted with both 
the word and its object. It is part of his explanation of the difference 
between psychology and phenomenology.

 

The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of “the 
business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not yet acquainted with 
it. There are several definitions to suit different occasions. In order to 
become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign (the actual practice of 
phenomenology), we have to approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming 
that Peirce’s definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same 
thing, the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This is 
necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their objects, nor can 
one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent vagueness of words. That’s 
why it is a trap to take any definition of a science or practice as 
fundamental. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Cc: Jon Awbrey 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré

 

List 

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just lifted from 
a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with James, the difference 
between psychology and his phenomenology. Therefore, the definition of 
'percept' given below is out of context. 

Edwina

 

 

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] SlideShowAndré

[gnox]

“The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish 
acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is what is meant in 
this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it presupposes an 
acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it.” — 
Peirce, CP2.231 (1910)

 

ET: Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 'percept' is out of 
context'?

 

No, because that use is not out of context, as I explained.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky  
Sent: 25-Aug-21 08:50



Gary F, list

I'm not sure of the point of your comment, other than to object to my use of 
the word 'definition'. Should I perhaps have said that 'the USE of the term of 
'percept' is out of context'?

And you write: "In order to become acquainted with the dynamic object of the 
sign (the actual practice of phenomenology),"

My understanding of 'becoming acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign' 
is by the practice of semiosis; ie, by a process of mediated interpretation.

Edwina



 

On Wed 25/08/21 8:40 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca   sent:

Edwina, List,

 

Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does not need to 
define the word “percept” for William James, who was well acquainted with both 
the word and its object. It is part of his explanation of the difference 
between psychology and phenomenology.

 

The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of “the 
business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not yet acquainted with 
it. There are several definitions to suit different occasions. In order to 
become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign (the actual practice of 
phenomenology), we have to approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming 
that Peirce’s definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same 
thing, the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This is 
necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their objects, nor can 
one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent vagueness of words. That’s 
why it is a trap to take any definition of a science or practice as fundamental.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
On Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Cc: Jon Awbrey 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré

 

List 

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just lifted from 
a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with James, the difference 
between psychology and his phenomenology. Therefore, the definition of 
'percept' given below is out of context.

Edwina

 

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré

[gnox]

Edwina, List,

 

Peirce’s tatement about percepts is not a definition. Peirce does not need to 
define the word “percept” for William James, who was well acquainted with both 
the word and its object. It is part of his explanation of the difference 
between psychology and phenomenology.

 

The quotations in slide 33, on the other hand, are definitions (of “the 
business of phenomenology,” intended for those who are not yet acquainted with 
it. There are several definitions to suit different occasions. In order to 
become acquainted with the dynamic object of the sign (the actual practice of 
phenomenology), we have to approach it by a kind of triangulation, assuming 
that Peirce’s definitions and descriptions of it are all views of the same 
thing, the same phenomenon, viewed from different angles, as it were. This is 
necessary because words cannot furnish acquaintance with their objects, nor can 
one verbal definition suffice, due to the inherent vagueness of words. That’s 
why it is a trap to take any definition of a science or practice as fundamental.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 25-Aug-21 07:57
To: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
Cc: Jon Awbrey 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Slide ShowAndré

 

List

I think that this is a confusing exchange, since the quote is just lifted from 
a much larger section where Peirce is discussing with James, the difference 
between psychology and his phenomenology. Therefore, the definition of 
'percept' given below is out of context.

Edwina

 

On Tue 24/08/21 10:31 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com 
  sent:

JA, JC, List,

 

JA: . . .I do remember having

long discussions on the List about what used to be
a fairly standard Peircean idea that percepts,
the very data of the senses, are signs.

 

CSP: Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so for phenomenology. 
CP 8.300 1904-10-03  Letters to William James  

 

Best.

 

Gary R

 


 


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke


 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York







 

 

On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 10:03 PM Jon Awbrey  > wrote:

Dear Jerry,

Not sure about all of that, but I do remember having
long discussions on the List about what used to be
a fairly standard Peircean idea that percepts,
the very data of the senses, are signs.

Regards,

Jon

On 8/24/2021 7:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
> List:
> 
>> On Aug 24, 2021, at 11:39 AM,
>>
>> On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not semeiotic.
> 
> This sentence is a remarkable example of how emotional rhetorical thrusts 
> generate the thoughts  that make no sense in the language of CSP.
> 
> Units of thoughts have units of meaning.   These two concepts are inseparable.
> 
> In the engineering sciences, especially the epistemology and ontology of 
> pragmatic necessities, the connections between phaneroscopy and semiotics are 
> essential to ethical actions.
> 
> The graphic diagrams that illustrate the iconic forms of engineering work 
> connect, necessarily, the semeiotic with the phaneroscopy. Indeed, the 
> connections of symbols with the indices of the diagrams derived from semiotic 
> and phaneroscopy could be a central thesis of engineering sciences.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

[gnox]

Jon A.S., John S., list,

Perhaps we are making some progress in this reading of ADT’s talk, if John is 
ready to admit that Peirce’s phenomenology is a separate science from 
mathematics, that it occupies a place in the hierarchy below mathematics but 
above all other sciences, and that its focus on experience makes it different 
from any other science. (I think you must be ready to admit this, John, since 
you took it as an insult when I said that you haven’t admitted it before!) 

GF (previously): Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear 
that the key word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he 
renamed it “phaneroscopy”) is experience.

JAS: Nevertheless, as André finally acknowledges, "this understanding of 
experience is not equivalent to what will become the phaneron." For Peirce, 
experience is strictly cognitive (i.e., semiosic) and involuntary, constraints 
that do not apply to the phaneron as a whole.

GF: Yes, the time has come for examining the relation between experience and 
the phaneron. André mentions in slide 32 (already posted) that “the term 
phaneron was coined in late October 1904 after an exchange with William James.” 
To provide more context for this discussion, I’ll post here some excerpts from 
that “exchange,” quoting those parts of the letter to James (CP 8.286-301) 
where Peirce writes explicitly about phenomenology. 

 

CSP: … As I understand you, then, the proposition which you are arguing is a 
proposition in what I have called phenomenology, that is, just the analysis of 
what kind of constituents there are in our thoughts and lives, (whether these 
be valid or invalid being quite aside from the question). It is a branch of 
philosophy I am most deeply interested in and which I have worked upon almost 
as much as I have upon logic. It has nothing to do with psychology. …

Perhaps the most important aspect of the series of papers of which the one you 
send me is the first, will prove to be that it shows so clearly that 
phenomenology is one science and psychology a very different one. I know that 
you are not inclined to see much value in distinguishing between one science 
and another. But my opinion is that it is absolutely necessary to any progress. 
The standards of certainty must be different in different sciences, the 
principles to which one science appeals altogether different from those of the 
other. From the point of view of logic and methodical development the 
distinctions are of the greatest concern. Phenomenology has no right to appeal 
to logic, except to deductive logic. On the contrary, logic must be founded on 
phenomenology. Psychology, you may say, observes the same facts as 
phenomenology does. No. It does not observe the same facts. It looks upon the 
same world; — the same world that the astronomer looks at. But what it observes 
in that world is different. Psychology of all sciences stands most in need of 
the discoveries of the logician, which he makes by the aid of the 
phenomenologist.

I am not sure that it will do to call this science phenomenology owing to 
Hegel's Phänomenologie being somewhat different. But I am not sure that Hegel 
ought not to have it named after his attempt. …

My “phenomenon” for which I must invent a new word is very near your “pure 
experience” but not quite since I do not exclude time and also speak of only 
one “phenomenon.”

 

GF: The “new word” he invented was, of course, “phaneron.” To contrast it with 
Peirce’s usage of “experience,” the first thing I’d say is that “phaneron” 
refers to the collective total of whatever is or (can be) experienced, rather 
than the experience itself (considered as something that happens or occurs to a 
“subject of experience”). But Peirce also says that the practice of 
phenomenology/ phaneroscopy itself does not assume a distinction between 
experience and what is experienced, or between “subjective” and “objective” 
experience — or, as he put it elsewhere, between consciousness and the 
“contents of consciousness.” 

Anyway, we’ll have to sort this out in more detail later, with direct 
quotations if necessary. We will no doubt continue to get alternative 
interpretations posted by others, who are welcome to post them, but unless they 
are based directly on something Peirce actually wrote about the subject, I 
don’t see much point in arguing for or against them.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 24-Aug-21 13:00
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

 

Gary F., List:

GF: Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear that the key 
word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he renamed it 
“phaneroscopy”) is experience.

Nevertheless, as André finally acknowledges, "this understanding of experience 
is not equivalent to what will become the phaneron." For Peirce, experience is 
strictly cognitive (i.e., semiosic) and involuntary,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] possibility WAS Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

John, Helmut,

"Qualitative possibility" is the term Peirce used in the Lowell Lectures of
1903  :

CSP: My view is that there are three modes of being. I hold that we can
directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time before the mind
in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative possibility, the
being of actual fact, and the being of law that will govern facts in the
future. (CP 1.23)

In CP 1.25 he calls it "positive qualitative possibility." I also quoted it
from CP 1.533 in an earlier post. Since "Quality" is Peirce's first choice
for a word representing Firstness, it's a natural choice in a context where
he needs to distinguish it from other kinds of "possibility."

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 22-Aug-21 22:30
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: h.raul...@gmx.de; g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L'

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] possibility WAS Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Helmut, 

Technical terms are important when a completely new concept has been
invented for which there is no convenient term in the common vocabulary.
If a new term is necessary, it's important to choose some combination of
common words that is not likely to create ambiguities or confusions.

There was some discussion about confusing implications of the word
'possibility'.  That is why somebody suggested the adjective 'qualitative'
in front of 'possibility'.

I was not involved in the original discussion, but I agree that the term
'qualitative possibility' is a bad choice, for several reasons:  (1) It's an
unusual combination, whose intended meaning cannot be derived from the
dictionary definitions of the two words, considered separately.  (2) It was
suggested as a term for an issue about Peirce's philosophy, but Peirce
himself never used that combination. (3) Even for somebody who has studied
Peirce's writings, the intended meaning of the combination is not clear. 

Finally, I suggested the word 'diagram', one of Peirce's favorite terms,
which could be used in discussions of the issues that were raised.  The word
diagram does *not* mean 'qualitative possibility' (whatever that may mean).
But that is a huge advantage.  The word 'diagram' steers the discussion into
clear, precise issues instead of some vague talk about qualitative
possibilities.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30

[gnox]

Edwina, I think we should note that De Tienne follows chronological order in 
his presentation of Peirce quotes in this part of his talk, but the chapter of 
CP 7 that you are quoting from strings together a number of texts from widely 
separated periods in Peirce’s life, and in complete disregard of chronology. CP 
7.581 (near the end of your post) is from Lecture XI of Peirce’s Lowell 
Lectures (W1:493) dated November 1866, so it is even earlier than his “New List 
of Categories” (1867). Peirce’s ideas (and of course his terminology) changed 
considerably over the following 30-odd years, and we can’t ignore this if we 
want to properly interpret what he wrote about phenomenology and phaneroscopy 
from 1902 onward. As always, context matters.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Edwina Taborsky
Sent: 22-Aug-21 10:19
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 30

 

List

To my understanding, what De Tienne seems to be  talking about in this and 
subsequent slides [and I don't think one can separate them],  with his 
reference to Experience is what Peirce refers to as Consciousness. He also 
writes that 'consciousness is also used to denote what I call feeling" 7.586 
and 'man's feelings are perceptions, he is affected by objects' 7.587, and 
"Perception is the possibility of acquiring information, of meaning more". That 
is, of learning. 

What is learning?

 Peirce writes "all learning is  virtually reasoning; we have only to reflect 
that the mere experience of a sense-reaction is not learning. That is only 
something from which something can be learned, by interpreting it. The 
interpretation is the learning" 7.536

Peirce provides us with three elements of consciousness, Feeling, Altersense 
and Medisense [akin to the Three Categories] 7.551, but these are not acts of 
learning. Consciousness can classify, by grouping perceptions within the 
element of  Medisense, but can it Interpret?

Instead, my understanding is that, as Peirce writes,  we must discriminate 
"between an inductive and a hypothetic explanation of the facts of human life. 
We have seen that every fact requires two kinds of explanation; the one 
proceeds by induction to replace its subject by a wider one, the other proceeds 
by hypothesis to replace its predicate by a deeper one. We have seen that these 
two explanations never coincide that both are indispensable….7.581

I interpret or misinterpret this to mean that Consciousness is the action 
within the phaneroscopy and operates within the three modes as outlined in 
7.551 et al, which is that of primarily acknowledging the 'percepts', and 
associating or classifying them,  and Mathematics provides the hypothetical 
explanations, which makes them 'teleological or purposive.7.570.

I don't see this outline within De Tienne - but - perhaps I am 
'misinterpreting' him. 

Edwina



 

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 29

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. This slide
continues his narrative of the gradual development of Peirce’s thinking
toward the concept which eventually became “Phaneroscopy.” The next slide
will follow shortly.

Gary f.

 



 

Text: 

In CP 7.526, he has High Philosophy precede the two main branches of
Philosophy (Logic and Metaphysics): 

Still more general than these [two] is High Philosophy which brings to light
certain truths applicable alike to logic and to metaphysics. It is with this
high philosophy that we have at first to deal. 

So Peirce feels “prescissively” that one cannot transition directly from
mathematics to logic or metaphysics. Some fundamental step is missing,
something that must ground both logic and metaphysics.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

John, in the clear light of morning, it appears to me that your revision of
ADT's slide 25 is all about theoretical models. (I prefer "model" over
"diagram", generally speaking, because we tend to think of a "diagram" as
two-dimensional, while the dimensionality of a "model" is not thus limited.)
Instead of elucidating the practice of phaneroscopy, you have virtually
eliminated it from the scope of science. I say "virtually" because it's not
clear whether, by not mentioning it, you are denying it or simply taking it
for granted. Peirce refused to do either, and that is why he had to include
it in his classification as "the primal positive science."

The first step in your account is a "mathematical interpretation." You don't
say what it is an interpretation of. But every interpretant, mathematical or
otherwise, must be triadically related to a sign and its object. If we
regard cognition as semiosis, we are already making a theoretical model.
Peirce on the other hand says that cognition must begin with direct
experience  . Sometimes he says it
begins with the percept, which is another way of saying the same thing. The
first step is attention to what appears, to the phenomenon, to what is
"before the mind in any way." Only after attending to it do we begin to sort
out the different "ways" of being "before the mind" (as an object, as a
sign, as an interpretant, as a specific kind of object or sign or
interpretant, etc. etc. ad infinitum.)

There are philosophers who deny that "direct experience of things in
themselves" is possible, but most take it for granted. Peirce, instead of
taking either of those options, made it into a science by analyzing it (i.e.
analyzing the phaneron) into its "indecomposable elements." As ADT explains
in the slides I'm about to post, he called this science "high philosophy,"
and then "phenomenology," and then "phaneroscopy," coining a term whose
reference couldn't be confused with anything else because nobody else was
using the term. But in order to define it, he had to use terms that
everybody uses, such as "mind" and "experience." It took me an entire
chapter of my book   to explain what
people mean by "experience", so I won't try to do that here; but it is a key
word in the current part of ADT's talk, so we can discuss it later if need
be.

Gary f.

 

From: John F. Sowa  
Sent: 22-Aug-21 00:26
To: s...@bestweb.net
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Helmut Raulien ;
g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

My only excuse is that it's after midnight.

Helmut, List,

JFS:  I agree with Gary that "there are no perfect choices when it
comes to naming such things" and we should "weed out the choices most
likely to cause confusion."

HR:  But if we weed out too many terms, we may not be able to talk
anymore!  Can we not instead "count on mathematicians" to tell us, how
we should define and use "possibility" and "relation"?

The objection to the word 'possibility' was that it suggests a kind of
Secondnesss, since it would involve a dyadic relation to something
else.

My proposed revision to ADT's slide is to bring back Peirce's word
'diagram', which is one of his favorite terms.  Since every diagram is
an icon, it belongs to the first member of (icon, index, symbol).

It's true that a diagram may also be considered as a possibility, but
by itself, it's a first.  The aspect of Secondness only occurs after
somebody deliberately chooses it as a description of something else.

Instead of the new terms that ADT proposed, I said that his slide 25
could be stated more clearly and simply by bringing back the word
'diagram'.  See below for ADT's original slide 25.  After that is my
revised version of slide 25.  And just now, I thought of an even
simpler version of ADT's last sentence.  See my new version at the
bottom.

John



The original slide 25 by ADT:

. Given mathematics' unbounded search for formal necessities, we
cannot count on mathematicians to help figure out what goes on in
experience.

. Yet we cannot ignore the natural urge that pushes the rest of us to
figure out the all-too-real world that holds us under its bondage.  We
want to sort out its laws, its structures, its composition, its guises
and disguises.

. As a point of method, however, given that mathematics is the "first"
stage of research in the heuristic schema, how do we transition out of
it into a concern no longer detached from but attached to the
conditions sustaining the cosmos, the world, nature,



A revised version of slide 25 suggested by JFS in the previous note:

. Given mathematics' unbounded search for formal necessities, the
phenomenologist must map any mathematical interpretation to a diagram
that can help us figure out what goes on in experience.

. Yet we cannot ignore the natural urge that pushes the rest of us to
figure out the all-too-rea

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

John, we agree that De Tienne’s reference to a “transition out of mathematics” 
in slide 25 can be confusing, and you say that we can avoid the confusion “by 
adopting the word 'diagram' for ADT's slide 25.” It’s not clear to me how this 
“adopting” would work. Do you mean substituting the word “diagram” for some 
part of slide 25? Here’s the original text of it:

 

ADT: • Given mathematics' unbounded search for formal necessities, we cannot 
count on mathematicians to help figure out what goes on in experience.

• Yet we cannot ignore the natural urge that pushes the rest of us to figure 
out the all-too-real world that holds us under its bondage. We want to sort out 
its laws, its structures, its composition, its guises and disguises.

• As a point of method, however, given that mathematics is the “first” stage of 
research in the heuristic schema, how do we transition out of it into a concern 
no longer detached from but attached to the conditions sustaining the cosmos, 
the world, nature, life in general, our life?

 

Can you demonstrate how you would “adopt the word 'diagram'” for that slide?

 

JFS: The word 'diagram' is an English word whose common meaning includes 
Peirce's mathematical sense.  Since Peirce defined a diagram as a kind of icon, 
it is the first in the trichotomy of icon, index, symbol.

 

GF: I see much potential for confusion here. In the first place, “diagram” is 
clearly not a synonym for “icon.” An existential graph, for instance, is more 
iconic than its equivalent in algebraic notation or in a verbal sentence, but 
it certainly isn’t a “pure” icon, as its symbolic aspects have to be taken into 
account in the interpretation of it. Nobody can read an existential graph 
without first learning the conventions of the system. Besides, these graphs 
usually include words as names of the “spots,” and visual “icons” used as 
substitutes for those names are no less symbolic. The “icons” we use in 
everyday life, such as those on men’s and women’s washrooms, are also 
conventional despite their independence of any particular verbal language. The 
fact that a diagram is a kind of icon does not imply that the words “icon” and 
“diagram” are interchangeable.

 

In short, I don’t see how your use of the term “diagram” clarifies the practice 
of phaneroscopy. Maybe you can explain by drawing me a diagram.  (insert smile 
icon here.)

 

Gary f.

 

 

}  {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 20-Aug-21 23:30
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Gary F, Helmut, List,

I agree with Gary that "there are no perfect choices when it comes to
naming such things" and we should "weed out the choices most likely to
cause confusion."

HR:  In mathematical language, the sentence "possibility implies a
relation to what exists" is false.  Maybe in ordinary English usage it
is true, I dont know

That uncertainty is a good reason for not adopting it as a technical
term, except in the context of modal logic.

GF:  In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English
usage, “possibility implies a relation to what exists.” Since
existence involves Secondness, that renders tthe word “possibility”
unfit for rendering the concept named “Firstness.” In order to
consistently use “qualitative possibility” in reference to Firstness,
it is necessary to explicitly set aside the ordinary implication which
connects the word to Secondness.  This is what Peirce does in the
bolded words quoted from EP2:479:

More reason for avoiding it, except in the context of modal logic.

This discussion started with slide 25, in which ADT wanted a
"transition" out of mathematics to something that "the rest of us" can
understand.  The word 'diagram' is an English word whose common
meaning includes Peirce's mathematical sense.  Since Peirce defined a
diagram as a kind of icon, it is the first in the trichotomy of icon,
index, symbol.

By adopting the word 'diagram' for ADT's slide 25, we resolve the
issues without introducing new jargon.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

Thanks Jon, this does clarify the matter, especially the definitions of 
Firstness where Peirce uses phrases such as “positive suchness” and “positive 
possibility.” It’s yet another reminder of the importance of context in 
determining the meaning of a word. I think it was Comte who first used the term 
“positive science,” and I think Peirce was just following his lead in opposing 
it to hypothetical science; but his other uses of “positive” do not refer to 
actuality as opposed to possibility, or to Secondness as opposed to Firstness. 
Anyway there’s no perfect choices when it comes to naming such things. As long 
as a word is used to denote anything real, its inherent vagueness is 
incorrigible; only a nonverbal index can make a real connection to the dynamic 
object. Nevertheless we try (Peirce certainly tried) to weed out the choices 
most likely to cause confusion, and trust the interpreter to pay close 
attention to the context.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 20-Aug-21 14:21
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English usage, 
“possibility implies a relation to what exists.”

 

I previously highlighted another usage by Peirce in which "possibility implies 
a relation to what exists," namely, in accordance with his pragmaticism 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00228.html). I went on to 
suggest in that post that only possibilities that can become actual are 
relevant to practitioners of the positive sciences, a limitation that does not 
apply to the hypothetical science of pure mathematics. This seems to be 
consistent with how Peirce spells out what he means by "positive" vs. 
"hypothetical" in his classification of the sciences, where he affirms again 
the dependence of phaneroscopy on pure mathematics for principles.

 

CSP: This science of Phenomenology is in my view the most primal of all the 
positive sciences. That is, it is not based, as to its principles, upon any 
other positive science. By a positive science I mean an inquiry which seeks for 
positive knowledge; that is, for such knowledge as may conveniently be 
expressed in a categorical proposition. Logic and the other normative sciences, 
although they ask, not what is but what ought to be, nevertheless are positive 
sciences since it is by asserting positive, categorical truth that they are 
able to show that what they call good really is so; and the right reason, right 
effort, and right being, of which they treat, derive that character from 
positive categorical fact.

Perhaps you will ask me whether it is possible to conceive of a science which 
should not aim to declare that something is positively or categorically true. I 
reply that it is not only possible to conceive of such a science, but that such 
science exists and flourishes, and Phenomenology, which does not depend upon 
any other positive science, nevertheless must, if it is to be properly 
grounded, be made to depend upon the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of 
Pure Mathematics, whose only aim is to discover not how things actually are, 
but how they might be supposed to be, if not in our universe, then in some 
other. A Phenomenology which does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science 
hardly come to years of discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful 
club-footed affair that Hegel produced. (CP 5.39-40, EP 2:144, 1903)

 

The knowledge discovered in the positive sciences is properly expressed in 
categorical propositions, while the knowledge discovered in pure mathematics as 
a hypothetical science are properly expressed in conditional propositions. Note 
also that since Peirce considers the normative sciences to be positive 
sciences, he explicitly rejects the modern "is-ought" problem.

 

GF: Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of vagueness in 
order to show that in the language of exact logic (as opposed to ordinary 
English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability of actualization.

 

Indeed, Peirce's first universe encompasses whatever is "capable of being so 
present [to one consciousness] in its entire Being" (EP 2:479, 1908); or as he 
puts it elsewhere, "anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for 
getting fully represented," i.e., "their Being consists in mere capability of 
getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them" (CP 6.452&455, EP 
2:434&435, 1908).

 

GF: I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of positivity with actuality and 
Secondness is more problematic, though.

 

I agree, since phaneroscopy is a positive science and yet is not confined to 
the study of actuality and 2ns. In fact, it is not concerned at all with 
distinguishing actuality from possibility and necessity, and it is where 2ns is 
discovered by prescission from 3ns.

 

GF: ... Firstness has its own kind 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

Getting back to the substantive issue raised in my previous post …

 

In his third Lowell Lecture (1903), Peirce says that the Firstness of Firstness 
can be called “qualitative possibility.” But earlier in the same lecture, he 
says this:

 

CSP: That wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very 
being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility 
implies a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of 
being of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, 
“possibility” would have answered the purpose.

 

GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English usage, 
“possibility implies a relation to what exists.” Since existence involves 
Secondness, that renders the word “possibility” unfit for rendering the concept 
named “Firstness.” In order to consistently use “qualitative possibility” in 
reference to Firstness, it is necessary to explicitly set aside the ordinary 
implication which connects the word to Secondness. This is what Peirce does in 
the bolded words quoted from EP2:479:

 

CSP: One of these [three] Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself 
alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one 
consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It 
follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even 
to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this Universe 
Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability 
of actualization. 

 

GF: The quote is continued below by Robert (who omitted the first two sentences 
given above).

Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of vagueness in 
order to show that in the language of exact logic (as opposed to ordinary 
English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability of actualization. This 
effectively cancels, in the logical context, the objection which prevented him 
(in the Lowell Lecture) from using “possibility” as another name for 
“Firstness,” justifies Peirce’s use of “qualitative possibility” in reference 
to Firstness, and gives us De Tienne (and the rest of us) license to use 
“possibility” in that way. 

 

I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of positivity with actuality and 
Secondness is more problematic, though. Peirce’s statement in a 1904 letter to 
Welby that “Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
positively and without reference to anything else” (CP 8.328) suggests that 
Firstness has its own kind of positivity, just as it has its own kind of 
reality. But I haven’t found any firm evidence for this in Peirce’s text, so I 
don’t intend to argue the point.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 19-Aug-21 09:51
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I 
meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to 
your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) 
practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something 
about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism” 
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the way, I 
regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem with your 
crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what is (to any 
dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what ADT’s text. Your own 
posts have made that motivation pretty clear, so I won’t comment on it here. 

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your 
highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other 
tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in 
Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if 
we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like to 
add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is from one of 
Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the third Lowell 
Lecture of 1903, is online here: https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The 
question about “possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:

 

CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which 
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it 
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you 
have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I 
meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to 
your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) 
practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something 
about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism” 
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the way, I 
regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem with your 
crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what is (to any 
dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what ADT’s text. Your own 
posts have made that motivation pretty clear, so I won’t comment on it here. 

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your 
highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other 
tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in 
Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if 
we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like to 
add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is from one of 
Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the third Lowell 
Lecture of 1903, is online here: https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The 
question about “possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:

 

CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which 
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it 
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you 
have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of 
Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of 
pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you 
can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (thinking of quality, reaction, and 
mediation), what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness 
of Secondness — that is what Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of 
Thirdness. …

A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is perfectly 
simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the tragedy of 
King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such 
qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word 
possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, 
while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new 
word was required for it. Otherwise, “possibility” would have answered the 
purpose. …

To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of 
mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as any, 
poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, 
qualitative possibility, existence, mentality, resulting from applying 
Firstness to the three categories. We might strike new words for them: primity, 
secundity, tertiality. [end CSP quote]

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 19-Aug-21 05:03



 

List,

No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from ADT supporters.

 

 ADT >

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the actualization 
of a special form, which can be rendered into the term positiveness, an 
abstraction resulting from positivization.

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the 
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will explore that 
resulting positiveness (or secondization).

 CSP >

 "I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles,although the 
latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary 
as a general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect 
actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For 
that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially 
vague. For example, geometrical figures belong to this Universe; now since 
every such figure involves lines which can only be supposed to exist as 
boundaries where three bodies come together, or to be the place common to three 
bodies, and since the boundary of a solid or liquid is merely the place at 
which its forces of cohesion are neither very great nor very small, which is 
essentially vague, it is plain that the idea is essentially vague or 
indefinite. Moreover, suppose the three bodies that come together at a line are 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[gnox]

Jerry,

 

No problem. My assertions belong to the department of pragmatism that Peirce 
called critical common-sensism.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler  
Sent: 17-Aug-21 17:18
To: Peirce List 
Cc: Gary Fuhrman 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
Semiotics.(Part A)

 

List, Gary

 

CSP professed to be a pragmatist and a realist.

 

As such, he based his epistemology and ontology on semiosis and the meaning of 
signs.

 

Can you clarify how the assertions of your message are related to CSP’s 
philosophies?

 

Observation of a cedar tree is nice. 

 

 

Cheers

 

Jerry 

 

 

 





On Aug 17, 2021, at 3:35 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca   
wrote:

 

Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be that what is or 
is not true of the world of existences can be scientifically stated without the 
help of mathematical reasoning.

You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that.

Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window next to me as I write this. 
This is true of the world of existences, and I have stated it without the help 
of mathematical reasoning. One example should suffice — unless you define 
“scientifically stated” in such a way as to exclude reports of direct 
observation, or else define “mathematical reasoning” in a way that includes 
direct observation. So which of those equally far-fetched definitions are you 
going to resort to, in order to prove your point?

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 17-Aug-21 14:35
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
Semiotics.(Part A)

 

List,

The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical 
reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not true 
of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.

But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ? 

That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be 
scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?

My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne 
explicitely claim: Yes. 

Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple inventories 
of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a kind of study 
which has been known under the label of comparativism in Human Sciences before 
the arrival of Structuralism)

B. Morand

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[gnox]

Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be that what is or 
is not true of the world of existences can be scientifically stated without the 
help of mathematical reasoning.

You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that.

Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window next to me as I write this. 
This is true of the world of existences, and I have stated it without the help 
of mathematical reasoning. One example should suffice — unless you define 
“scientifically stated” in such a way as to exclude reports of direct 
observation, or else define “mathematical reasoning” in a way that includes 
direct observation. So which of those equally far-fetched definitions are you 
going to resort to, in order to prove your point?

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 17-Aug-21 14:35
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
Semiotics.(Part A)

 

List,

The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical 
reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not true 
of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.

But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ? 

That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be 
scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?

My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne 
explicitely claim: Yes. 

Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple inventories 
of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a kind of study 
which has been known under the label of comparativism in Human Sciences before 
the arrival of Structuralism)

B. Morand

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Tribalism (was André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25)

[gnox]

Jon, yes, that’s pretty much the sociological phenomenon I refer to as 
“tribalism.” I might add that in the present case, those who indulge in it 
typically interpret criticism of their expressed opinions as criticism of 
themselves, and often claim they are defending themselves, their personal 
reputations or their specialties against the kind of attacks that they are 
themselves perpetrating. 

 

I’m sure you know what I mean because you’ve been the target of many such 
attacks in recent years on the list, while your appeals to reason and evidence 
have been pointedly ignored. If others want to see examples of the tribalist 
“debating” technique, they can look into the archives and read almost any 
recent post by Robert Marty. I mention him specifically because he has openly 
declared his favored style of ‘scholarly’ discourse to be a “blood sport” and 
has acted accordingly, making no attempt to conceal the personal basis of his 
animosities (unlike those who spread their slanders offlist). At least he’s 
honest enough about it that the evidence is there on the list for anyone who 
cares to look.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 17-Aug-21 10:23
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Tribalism (was André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25)

 

Edwina, List:

 

I cannot speak for Gary F., but my understanding of tribalism as a sociological 
phenomenon is that Person X affirms what Person Y says, not so much because X 
agrees with the content of what Y says, but simply because X considers Y to be 
a member of the same tribe. Likewise, Person X denies what Person Z says, not 
so much because X disagrees with the content of what Z says, but simply because 
X considers Z to be a member of a different tribe. In other words, responses 
are not based primarily on the substance of a given post, but on the identity 
of the person who wrote it.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

 

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 8:24 AM Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote:

Gary F, list

It is commendable that you have removed Bernard Morand as a tribal member - and 
are willing to engage with him as an individual  - but this still leaves the 
problem of the existence, as you outline, of others " who have demonstrated the 
tribalistic tendencies ". 

That is, your post still asserts the existence of tribes on the list.

 I'd like to know: what are the attributes, according to you, of 'tribalistic 
tendencies'? 

Surely you can't be saying that IF X person agrees with Y person, then, the two 
are members of the same tribe. 

Or is it, IF X person disagrees with Z person - then, the two are members of 
different tribes?

Edwina

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[gnox]

List, before even looking at what’s been posted since my own post below, I feel 
I should apologize to Bernard Morand for saying that “the concept of a “dynamic 
object” plays no part in your philosophy of language,” based solely on the 
two-sentence statement that I quoted from his previous post. I should have 
asked him to clarify that statement instead of jumping to such a general 
conclusion from it. Even worse, my post could have been uncharitably read as 
lumping him in with those who have demonstrated the tribalistic tendencies I 
described (which would thus be taken as evidence of my own descent into 
tribalism). Of course that was not my intention, but my unwarranted remark 
about Bernard’s “philosophy of language” was totally irresponsible, and I do 
apologize for that.

 

Now I’ll get caught up on yesterday’s list activity and see whether there’s a 
need for further comment on slides 25-6.

 

Gary f.

 

}  {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 16-Aug-21 11:10
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

 

Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about the 
“dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong. Indeed you’ve 
shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your philosophy 
of language.

BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any language 
except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in formal 
languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in scientific 
exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the usual necessary 
reference to its inventor as well as definitions and references to their 
authors.

GF: What’s missing from this account is the denotation of the word, as opposed 
(by Peirce) to its signification. I think this approach to language use is very 
concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of dialogue from Lewis Carroll:

‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’

‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.’

‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's all.’

GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters on 
this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an “arena” (his 
word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are typecast as either 
allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends not on what has been said 
but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have been assigned to. Indeed this 
pattern seems to be taking over most public discourse these days, so the Peirce 
list is not unusual in this respect.

The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol which is 
all signification and no denotation is a symbol devoid of information, as the 
“logical product” defined by the formula Breadth × Depth = Information (Peirce, 
W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth) of a term is zero, the product 
(information) is also zero. In other words, you can’t get information from a 
symbol that lacks indexicality. Of course, as Peirce pointed out, words in 
themselves (other than proper names and pronouns) are quite poor in 
indexicality (Turning Signs 7: Experience and Experiment (gnusystems.ca) 
 ). And as you say, any attempt to 
convey experientially what Peirce meant in his reference to a “process of 
thought” by which the elements of experience “must be picked out of the 
fragments that necessary reasonings scatter” is doomed to failure.

But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay any 
more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy) than to 
anyone else’s?

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 16-Aug-21 05:53
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

 

Gary F., list

Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca   a écrit :

Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French, but 
unfortunately I don’t have that ability.

BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching to 
definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father. Surely 
we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas on what he 
called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.

GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the dynamic object 
of that sign — is what it is independently of anything Peirce said about it. 
Would you

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[gnox]

Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about the 
“dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong. Indeed you’ve 
shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your philosophy 
of language.

BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard term , a word (in any language 
except those that some have called "ortho-languages" and also in formal 
languages) doesn't bear any constraint about its use even in scientific 
exchanges. What counts is its intended signification, then the usual necessary 
reference to its inventor as well as definitions and references to their 
authors.

GF: What’s missing from this account is the denotation of the word, as opposed 
(by Peirce) to its signification. I think this approach to language use is very 
concisely summed up by Humpty Dumpty in this bit of dialogue from Lewis Carroll:

‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’

‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.’

‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that's all.’

GF: I can see the appeal of this approach to many of the regular posters on 
this list, especially those (like Robert Marty) who treat it as an “arena” (his 
word) of interpersonal conflict, where other posters are typecast as either 
allies or enemies, and the response to a post depends not on what has been said 
but on who said it, i.e. which tribe they have been assigned to. Indeed this 
pattern seems to be taking over most public discourse these days, so the Peirce 
list is not unusual in this respect.

The problem with this, from a Peircean point of view, is that a symbol which is 
all signification and no denotation is a symbol devoid of information, as the 
“logical product” defined by the formula Breadth × Depth = Information (Peirce, 
W2:83). If the denotation (extension, breadth) of a term is zero, the product 
(information) is also zero. In other words, you can’t get information from a 
symbol that lacks indexicality. Of course, as Peirce pointed out, words in 
themselves (other than proper names and pronouns) are quite poor in 
indexicality (Turning Signs 7: Experience and Experiment (gnusystems.ca) 
 ). And as you say, any attempt to 
convey experientially what Peirce meant in his reference to a “process of 
thought” by which the elements of experience “must be picked out of the 
fragments that necessary reasonings scatter” is doomed to failure.

But as you also say, Peirce is not God the Father, so why should we pay any 
more attention to his view of language or semiosis (or phaneroscopy) than to 
anyone else’s?

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 16-Aug-21 05:53
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

 

Gary F., list

Le 15/08/2021 à 14:35, g...@gnusystems.ca   a écrit :

Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French, but 
unfortunately I don’t have that ability.

BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching to 
definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father. Surely 
we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas on what he 
called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.

GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the dynamic object 
of that sign — is what it is independently of anything Peirce said about it. 
Would you also say that about “pragmaticism,” or “synechism”? I find this a 
very odd way of using technical terms, especially those invented by an expert 
lexicographer like Peirce. 

After studying what he called “high philosophy,” and then “phenomenology,” and 
finally “phaneroscopy,” including his explicit reasons for the latter name 
change, I decided to venture forth on my own practice of that type of 
investigation, and it didn’t seem right to call it “phaneroscopy” because that 
would claim its exact identity with what Peirce called by that name. So I chose 
a different name, “cenoscopy,” citing the Century Dictionary definition of it 
(Turning Signs 0: Phenoscopy (gnusystems.ca) 
 ). There is in fact no definition of 
“phaneroscopy” in either the Century Dictionary or the current Oxford English 
Dictionary, which indicates to me that it is indeed a technical term of 
philosophy, defined by its inventor, rather than a standard English term. Maybe 
in French you treat such terms differently, but in English I think we are bound 
to use it, if at all, as a technical term that is not independent of Peirce’s 
usage of it. We are of course free to disagree with Peirce’s “ethics of 
terminology” on this point, I’m just giving my own reasons for agreeing with it.

To my s

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[gnox]

Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French, but 
unfortunately I don’t have that ability.

BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching to 
definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father. Surely 
we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas on what he 
called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.

GF: You are asserting that “what he called phaneroscopy” — the dynamic object 
of that sign — is what it is independently of anything Peirce said about it. 
Would you also say that about “pragmaticism,” or “synechism”? I find this a 
very odd way of using technical terms, especially those invented by an expert 
lexicographer like Peirce. 

After studying what he called “high philosophy,” and then “phenomenology,” and 
finally “phaneroscopy,” including his explicit reasons for the latter name 
change, I decided to venture forth on my own practice of that type of 
investigation, and it didn’t seem right to call it “phaneroscopy” because that 
would claim its exact identity with what Peirce called by that name. So I chose 
a different name, “cenoscopy,” citing the Century Dictionary definition of it 
(Turning Signs 0: Phenoscopy (gnusystems.ca) 
 ). There is in fact no definition of 
“phaneroscopy” in either the Century Dictionary or the current Oxford English 
Dictionary, which indicates to me that it is indeed a technical term of 
philosophy, defined by its inventor, rather than a standard English term. Maybe 
in French you treat such terms differently, but in English I think we are bound 
to use it, if at all, as a technical term that is not independent of Peirce’s 
usage of it. We are of course free to disagree with Peirce’s “ethics of 
terminology” on this point, I’m just giving my own reasons for agreeing with it.

I notice you didn’t comment on the “Macbeth” scenario I offered as a possible 
example of what Peirce meant in his reference to a “process of thought” by 
which the elements of experience “must be picked out of the fragments that 
necessary reasonings scatter.” Since you are, as you said, primarily interested 
in the practice of phaneroscopy, I’d like to know (in more concrete terms) how 
you interpret Peirce’s statement about that.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 14-Aug-21 09:35
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

 

Gary F, list

Le 13/08/2021 à 15:41, g...@gnusystems.ca   a écrit :

Bernard, list,

BM: I have no definitive opinion on the validy of this later arrangement but I 
note that 1) hierarchical structures emblematic of the gender / species 
distinction can be superseded by network structures …

GF: I assume you mean genera/species distinction, and yes, we do need to pay 
more attention to network structures than Peirce did. I have no personal 
interest in the Comtean classification of sciences, but it is so deeply 
intertwined with Peirce’s definition of phaneroscopy that we can’t ignore it 
when we focus on that subject. And if we’re going to develop our practice of 
phaneroscopy, it’s Peirce’s phaneroscopy that we have to focus on, because it 
was Peirce who originated and named this “science” (which is not the case with 
mathematics). So it’s his verbal definitions and his descriptions of the 
practice of it that we have to take as “given,” not our own ideas (or even 
Peirce’s ideas) about mathematics or logic.

Apologies for the confusion about gender, a trap installed by French language 
which has in this case one unique word "genre" heavily polysemic

But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching to 
definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father. Surely 
we have to refer to his rights as first inventor but then, our ideas on what he 
called phaneroscopy can / have to be freely expressed and spread.

BM: I noticed the quote given by John Sowa of which I was unaware before:

CSP:  Phaneroscopy... is the science of the different elementary
constituents of all ideas.  Its material is, of course, universal
experience, -- experience I mean of the fanciful and the abstract, as
well as of the concrete and real.  Yet to suppose that in such
experience the elements were to be found already separate would be to
suppose the unimaginable and self-contradictory.  They must be
separated by a process of thought that cannot be summoned up
Hegel-wise on demand.  They must be picked out of the fragments that
necessary reasonings scatter; and therefore it is that phaneroscopic
research requires a previous study of mathematics.  (R602, after 1903
but before 1908) 

GF: Yes, that last sentence is very interesting. If we take “the fragments that 
necessary reasonings scatter” as general (rather than vague), so that it “turns 
over to the interpreter the right to compl

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[gnox]

Bernard, list,

 

I just noticed that the point I was trying to make below (about “experience”) 
is more fully explained by Peirce in this 1893 text:

 

Experiencing (TS ·7) (gnusystems.ca) 
 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 11-Aug-21 10:40



 

Bernard, list,

Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a 
non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of his 
peculiar sense of humor.

As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can indeed 
call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary to 
Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the internal 
and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between a “world of 
imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is virtually 
identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to the 
metaphysical idea of reality. Peirce usually refers to “experience” as 
something forced upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to it. In 
these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar is it is 
purely hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm of “degenerate 
Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow 
involves a focus on pure mathematics and a corresponding neglect of 
mathematical applications. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer 
to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.

Gary f.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[gnox]

Bernard, list,

Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a 
non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of his 
peculiar sense of humor.

As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can indeed 
call it “experience,” but only in a peculiar sense which is contrary to 
Peirce’s regular usage. Usually in Peirce, the distinction between the internal 
and external worlds corresponds directly to the difference between a “world of 
imagination” and “the actual world.” The idea of externality is virtually 
identical with the idea of Secondness and is closely related to the 
metaphysical idea of reality. Peirce usually refers to “experience” as 
something forced upon us, indicating that Secondness is essential to it. In 
these Peircean terms, the “everyday work” of mathematicians, insofar is it is 
purely hypothetical, takes place in an internal world, a realm of “degenerate 
Secondness” (EP1:280, W6:211).

As JAS has been reminding us, the context of De Tienne’s talk/slideshow 
involves a focus on pure mathematics and a corresponding neglect of 
mathematical applications. This is one reason why he (and Peirce) do not refer 
to pure mathematics as “experiential” in the sense that phaneroscopy is.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Bernard Morand
Sent: 11-Aug-21 09:18
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

 

Gary f. , list

De Tienne slide 23  starts with: "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is not 
concerned with anything but itself. The world could stop existing, but to pure 
mathematicians that would at most be an inconvenience."

This is clearly a blunder since if the world stopped existing, there would no 
more exist mathematicians at all, neither pure nor applied.

It is repeated in slide 24 that you published today: "The significance and 
truth-value of such constructs [those of mathematicians] depends only on their 
internal inferential coherence, not on the world of experience."

Writing such a definitive judgment is just ignoring the every day work of 
mathematicians who pass their time in diverses experiments with forms, 
abstracts figures, models, constructs, etc., not to speak of the value of their 
underlying hypotheses.

The slide 23 blunder that you minimize as "a choice of language" is certainly a 
good rhetorical trick to get the laughs on one's side. But this is not a valid 
scientific argument. And since it will be repeated in the following slide, it 
has an intended purpose: to show that pure mathematics are internally coherent 
wild dreams cut off the world.

In fact I think that the human ancestors of mathematics were those prehistoric 
people who managed to figure out on the walls of their caves the drawings of 
savage animals.

I wish that at the end of this slow reading you will undertake the 
phaneroscopic observations of mathematicians at work, without any prejudice as 
Peirce suggested it.

Bernard Morand

Le 10/08/2021 à 16:09, g...@gnusystems.ca   a écrit :

Bernard, thank you for a thoughtful post (and thanks to Jon S for an equally 
thoughtful reply to it). I especially appreciate your tacit acknowledgement of 
the emotional basis of your own response to De Tienne’s choice of language at 
“the starting point in slide 23.” But my own response will be limited to this 
part of your post:

BM: By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De Tienne is 
repeating the well known duality between abstract and concrete, imaginary and 
existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as excluding mathematics out of a 
scientific realm that will end confined into the experimental sciences.  I 
don't think that such a project can be qualified as peircian.

GF: Of course Marty is entitled to carry on his crusade against a putative 
attempt (by De Tienne and other scholars) to “exclude mathematics” from science 
and from a Peircean understanding of it. He is also “entitled” to attribute 
malicious intent to anyone who does not sign on to his crusade, even to those 
who simply ignore it. But in my opinion, the rest of us are no less entitled to 
ignore it as simply irrelevant to what De Tienne is saying about phaneroscopy, 
and to maintain a focus on the actual content of his slides. 

After a few attempts to communicate with Robert on a reasonable basis, which I 
soon realized were futile, I have simply turned my limited attention elsewhere. 
Frankly, given a choice to spend my time reading Marty or reading Peirce, I 
will choose Peirce every time. Robert is entitled to carry on his crusade as 
long as he likes, and others are entitled to give it the attention they think 
it deserves. As for me, I have nothing to say about it that hasn’t been said 
already.

Turning back to the “slow read,” I might point out that it is about 
phaneroscopy, including its non-reciprocal dependence on mathematics for 
abstract

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 24

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

*   What mathematicians observe (and construct and manipulate) are pure
hypotheses, possibilia that get represented in diagrams.
*   The significance and truth-value of such constructs depends only on
their internal inferential coherence, not on the world of experience.
*   Mathematics seeks to derive consequences that are true in every
possible configuration, and not merely what is true of the actual world.
*   In that regard, pure mathematics plays freely with forms,
unconcerned with whether they play any part in experience.

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► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[gnox]

Bernard, thank you for a thoughtful post (and thanks to Jon S for an equally 
thoughtful reply to it). I especially appreciate your tacit acknowledgement of 
the emotional basis of your own response to De Tienne’s choice of language at 
“the starting point in slide 23.” But my own response will be limited to this 
part of your post:

BM: By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De Tienne is 
repeating the well known duality between abstract and concrete, imaginary and 
existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as excluding mathematics out of a 
scientific realm that will end confined into the experimental sciences.  I 
don't think that such a project can be qualified as peircian.

GF: Of course Marty is entitled to carry on his crusade against a putative 
attempt (by De Tienne and other scholars) to “exclude mathematics” from science 
and from a Peircean understanding of it. He is also “entitled” to attribute 
malicious intent to anyone who does not sign on to his crusade, even to those 
who simply ignore it. But in my opinion, the rest of us are no less entitled to 
ignore it as simply irrelevant to what De Tienne is saying about phaneroscopy, 
and to maintain a focus on the actual content of his slides. 

After a few attempts to communicate with Robert on a reasonable basis, which I 
soon realized were futile, I have simply turned my limited attention elsewhere. 
Frankly, given a choice to spend my time reading Marty or reading Peirce, I 
will choose Peirce every time. Robert is entitled to carry on his crusade as 
long as he likes, and others are entitled to give it the attention they think 
it deserves. As for me, I have nothing to say about it that hasn’t been said 
already.

Turning back to the “slow read,” I might point out that it is about 
phaneroscopy, including its non-reciprocal dependence on mathematics for 
abstract principles. The fact that nearly all sciences call upon mathematics 
for principles under which to organize their observations is taken for granted 
in De Tienne’s talk, as it is too obvious to be made a focal point in a 
discussion of phaneroscopy. Robert and his fellow crusaders naturally interpret 
this taking-for-granted as a denial of the importance of mathematics, and 
insist on reading this denial into De Tienne’s explicit text, regardless of 
what it actually says in its context. As we have seen, questioning this style 
of interpretation only leads to more unfounded accusations of malicious intent 
and various intellectual sins. Consequently I feel entitled to say nothing 
further about the whole crusade, which I consider a distraction from more 
relevant issues. In fact I’m already regretting giving so much time and thought 
to it in this post. Enough already.

Gary f.

 

 

From: Bernard Morand  
Sent: 9-Aug-21 12:02

Gary f., list

I think that the matter is much less simple than your way of stating it. In my 
opinion the discussion would gain in clarity by distinguishing 3 subjects.

First, the nature of mathematics qua science (as distinct from men who make it 
), the definition of which by Robert Marty seems to me correct : " the exact 
study of idealized forms"

Second, the methods and reasonings in use in this discipline : "drawing 
necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things" (being understood 
that "hypothetical" doesn't mean "not existing" nor irreal. Can we say that the 
number theory is just an hypothetical construct ?)

Third, the place and role of mathematics in some given classification of 
sciences. In the actual dicussion, it is the question of the relationship 
between mathematics and phaneroscopy, a relationship that can be seen as a 
dependance from the one to the other, but it counts only for the classification 
aspect. If phaneroscopy seems to depend logically from mathematics for its 
principles, it does not entail that mathematics cannot be feeded by the 
findings of phaneroscopy.

This last point makes me refuse since the beginning the starting point in slide 
23 ; "BECAUSE mathematics, in principle, is not concerned with anything but 
itself. The world could stop existing, but to pure mathematicians that would at 
most be an inconvenience."

By pointing at the opposition egocentrism / world existence, De Tienne is 
repeating the well known duality between abstract and concrete, imaginary and 
existence. BTW Marty is entitled to see it as excluding mathematics out of a 
scientific realm that will end confined into the experimental sciences.  I 
don't think that such a project can be qualified as peircian. 

We have to hold together three elements : the Real, the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary. It is a much more difficult task but it permits to ask the question 
: how does a purely abstract science can partake its own form discoveries with 
the experimental sciences ? It seems to me that the concept of isomorphism that 
does not claim a community of contents but a resemblance of forms is a good 
candidate by focusin

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

[gnox]

Jon S, list,

Slide 23 does indeed contain a careless error in citation, but the words 
“inserted” are in fact Peirce’s, not André’s. They come from CP 1.247 (part of 
the “Minute Logic”): “Mathematics is engaged solely in tracing out the 
consequences of hypotheses. As such, she never at all considers whether or not 
anything be existentially true, or not.” There is no incompatibility between CP 
1.53 and CP 1.247 as far as the nature of mathematics is concerned. Anyway, 
Robert’s continuing polemic against André De Tienne need not distract us from 
the point of slides 22-3, which is that phaneroscopy does not and cannot 
provide mathematics with any fundamental principle.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 8-Aug-21 20:54
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

 

Robert, List:

 

I sincerely appreciate the correction of the excerpt from CP 1.53 (c. 1896). It 
is surprising and indeed troubling that André would insert his own words where 
he is purportedly quoting Peirce. My first thought was that perhaps the 
additional phrase was in the original manuscript and omitted (inadvertently or 
otherwise) by the CP editors, which has happened in some other places, but 
inspection of R 1288:7 confirms that it is not the case here. As any 
examination of the List archives would amply demonstrate, I am always eager to 
understand and convey Peirce's ideas accurately by carefully citing and 
reproducing his actual texts.

 

For that very reason, I am also surprised that anyone would suggest that when I 
provided a link to the Commens Dictionary entry for "mathematics," I somehow 
"didn't read it well" and thus would find it problematic that Peirce included 
the formulation of mathematical hypotheses within the scope of a 
mathematician's practice. On the contrary, I have never disputed this, I have 
merely insisted with Peirce that mathematics is the science which draws 
necessary conclusions about those hypothetical states of things. Moreover, as I 
pointed out in an off-List exchange several months ago, CP 3.559 is the central 
passage of an entire series of articles that I wrote for my fellow structural 
engineers on "The Logic of Ingenuity" (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10490). 
Its last sentence provides an excellent summary of the whole lengthy paragraph.

 

CSP: Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he first 
frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not concern the 
drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without inquiring or caring 
whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and, secondly, he proceeds to 
draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis. (CP 3.559, 1898)

 

Returning to the subject at hand, the mathematician's hypothesis is different 
from the phaneroscopist's hypothesis. Because the mathematician's method is 
strictly deductive, it can only be applied to an idealization that has been 
"stripped of all features which do not concern the drawing of [necessary] 
consequences from it." That is precisely why the mathematician must proceed 
"without inquiring or caring whether it [the idealization] agrees with the 
actual facts or not." By contrast, the phaneroscopist is inquiring about the 
phaneron and thus cares very much whether a given hypothesis agrees with what 
is being observed there. Consequently, although mathematics is an indispensable 
aid to phaneroscopy, phaneroscopy is by no means reducible to mathematics--just 
as mathematics is an indispensable aid to every other science, but none of them 
is reducible to mathematics.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Sun, Aug 8, 2021 at 4:29 PM robert marty mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com> > wrote:

1-I have already pointed out in the  

 Podium, Section 3:  Peirce, an architectonic philosopher (p. 8), how much 
André De Tienne tried to minimize the role of mathematics in scientific 
discovery and particularly in phaneroscopy. Here are two significant extracts:

 

1.1 "…after having acclaimed mathematics as "queen of all sciences," he 
immediately sends mathematicians (and with them mathematics) back to 
confinement in their own field: 'But the moment inquiry turns the barest of 
attention to the conditions that give experience its earthly flavor; the moment 
inquiry acquires a vested interest in a realm of being purely detached 
mathematicians are not concerned with, that of positive experience.'" (De 
Tienne. 2004: 1)[emphasize mine]

 

1.2 "Both [Mathematics and phaneroscopy] are acritical since both refrain from 
making assertions about the object of thei

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 22

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. As this
slide ends with a question, I will post the next slide (giving De Tienne’s
answer) within a day, so as not to prolong the suspense.

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

Shocking news!

Mathematicians are phaneroscopists, too! 

They must be, somehow. 

After all, before they come up with fundamental theorems of all sorts, they
have to conduct a ton of observations based on diagrams and imaginative
constructions. They contemplate ideal forms. They are looking for patterns
and patterns of patterns, which they need to manifest one way or another –
but artificially (though not arbitrarily). 

Yet, phaneroscopy as such does not and cannot provide mathematics with any
fundamental principle. 

WHY?

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Mathematical phaneroscopy (was slow read...

[gnox]

JFS: Phenomenology/phaneroscopy analyzes experiences in the phaneron in
order to classify and determine the elements of experience.  But as Peirce
said, the same kinds of experiences may comefrom external sensation, from
imagination, or from memories.

GF: The phrase "kinds of experiences" is ambiguous. My specific answer to
the question I posed would be that the distinction between the actual world
and a world of imagination arises from awareness of the difference between
Secondness and Firstness, together with the recognition that these distinct
elements of experience are equally elementary.

JFS: The distinctions necessary for science or for any action in and on the
world would come from normative logic:  speculative grammar or stechiology;
critic; and methodeutic.

GF: The question is not about distinctions in general, but about a specific
distinction which normative science cannot rely on mathematics to supply.
Your general statement glosses over the fact that according to Peirce's
classification of sciences, normative logic depends for its principles on
phenomenology/phaneroscopy (as well as on mathematics, from which it cannot
inherit this distinction in principle).

Gary f. 



 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 7-Aug-21 00:13
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu



Jon AS, Edwina, Jack, Gary F, List,

JFS:  The simplest and clearest definition [of the adjective
'mathematica'l':  "Anything that can be completely specified by a
definition stated in any branch of mathematics."

JAS:  That is not a definition, it is a tautology.

No.  Jack asked "what is meant by 'mathematical' here?"  For
phaneroscopy, the adjective must allow any branch of mathematics that
may be useful for analyzing any kind of experience.  It's important to
state that.

JAS:  For Peirce [mathematics] is the science which draws necessary
conclusions...

That is Benjamin P's definition.  It's an excellent characterization
of the subject, but it doesn't provide guidance for a phenomenologist.
Immediately before Peirce discussed phenomenology in 1903, he defined
mathematics by its three main branches:  formal logic; discrete math;
continuous math.

Edwina:  My comparison to "grammar" follows from a similar
understanding of this as a "process of setting up relations and
interactions between units".  I.e., what is an abstract logical
process?  The closest I can get to something which fits that
description is "grammar"

Grammar would be a good way to characterize the combinations of
elements in a linear language.  But Peirce said that diagrams are
closer to the original patterns in the experience.

Jack:  Therefore- my interpretation of the above is that mathematics
is essentially an abstract logical process; not an actual measurement
process.  But a process of setting up relations and interactions
between units.

Yes.  And Peirce went beyond linear grammars to diagrams in two or
more dimensions.  Existential graphs are the most common diagrams he
used, but he also mentioned his wish for the technology for
stereoscopic patterns in three dimensions plus motion.  He would have
loved today's systems for virtual reality.

Gary:  According to Peirce, "The actual world cannot be distinguished
from a world of imagination by any description" (EP1:227, W5:164, CP
3.363, 1885).  As we have all repeated many times, mathematics itself
does not and cannot distinguish between the actual world and a world
of imagination.  If this distinction is necessary for science,
including logic, and it cannot come from mathematical principles,
where does it come from?

Phenomenology / phaneroscopy analyzes experiences in the phaneron in
order to classify and determine the elements of experience.  But as
Peirce said, the same kinds of experiences may comefrom external
sensation, from imagination, or from memories.

The distinctions necessary for science or for any action in and on the
world would come from normative logic:  speculative grammar or
stechiology; critic; and methodeutic.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Mathematical phaneroscopy (was slow read...

[gnox]

John, list,

According to Peirce, "The actual world cannot be distinguished from a world
of imagination by any description" (EP1:227, W5:164, CP 3.363, 1885).

As we have all repeated many times, mathematics itself does not and cannot
distinguish between the actual world and a world of imagination.

If this distinction is necessary for science, including logic, and it cannot
come from mathematical principles, where does it come from?

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 6-Aug-21 18:13
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Cc: tabor...@primus.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Mathematical phaneroscopy (was slow
read...

 

Jack KRC> At the risk of being pedantic, what is meant by "mathematical"
here?

That question is important for understanding what Peirce meant in saying
that Phaneroscopy depends on mathematics. 

The simplest and clearest definition:  "Anything that can be completely
specified by a definition stated in any branch of mathematics."  This
definition is consistent with everything Peirce wrote.  There are many
statements by Peirce that say something very similar to this, and nobody has
found any statement by Peirce that is inconsistent with it.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 21

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. This is
the beginning of part 4, “From Mathematics to Phaneroscopy.”

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

Significant light can be thrown onto phaneroscopy by contrasting it with
mathematics. 

Indeed, the schema's structure tells us that 

(1) mathematics comes up with fundamental principles essential
to phaneroscopy; 

(2) phaneroscopy may help mathematicians through corrective
suggestions, observational clues, theoretical validation; 

(3) unlike phaneroscopy, mathematics is not part of cenoscopy:
its object is not part of  “common, familiar experience” – still, it is part
of the experience common to mathematicians, hence their specialized gift for
a certain kind of phaneroscopy ...

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 20

[gnox]

Jon S,

Perhaps it was misleading of André to label it a “paradox” that scholars might 
be doing phaneroscopy without being aware of it — after all, if bats and other 
beasts can “do calculations” without being aware that they are doing so, maybe 
it’s no paradox at all. Still, the brevity of slide 20 makes it almost as 
cryptic as Jon A’s response, so maybe we should move right along to the next 
slide.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 5-Aug-21 14:20



 

Gary F., List:

 

As I posted several months ago upon first encountering André's slides 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-04/msg00089.html), this one 
reminds me of some familiar remarks by Peirce.

 

CSP: Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be 
proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that this 
satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to that 
of other men. (CP 3.358, EP 1:109, 1878)

 

CSP: Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics 
... and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude 
and uncriticized metaphysics with which they are packed. ... Every man of us 
has a metaphysics, and has to have one; and it will influence his life greatly. 
Far better, then, that that metaphysics should be criticized and not be allowed 
to run loose. (CP 1.129, c. 1905)


Likewise, everyone practices phaneroscopy--most without realizing it, and few 
care to study it or criticize their default ways of going about it. However, 
attending to it and refining our skill in it can only enhance our inquiries in 
the other positive sciences, all of which depend on it in accordance with 
Peirce's classification. I am still learning that lesson myself, since I 
continue to have a strong tendency to focus primarily on mathematics, logic as 
semeiotic, and metaphysics when contemplating and discussing his thought--often 
skipping right over phenomenology, as well as the normative sciences of 
esthetics and ethics.

 

Unfortunately, I sense a similar inclination on the part of those who keep 
referencing Peirce's earlier outline classification of the sciences--which 
omits phaneroscopy, esthetics, and ethics altogether, instead going straight 
from mathematics to logic as the first branch of empirics--or who keep claiming 
in various other ways that "it's mathematics all the way down."

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 9:17 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. 

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text: Paradox

Few scholars are aware that they ought to study, or even practice phaneroscopy 
in order to conduct their specialized observations. 

The likelihood is that they do practice it, but not knowingly, and therefore 
not with sufficiently appropriate skill. 

The time has come to seize and order the clouds – without dissipating them!

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 20

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. 

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text: Paradox

Few scholars are aware that they ought to study, or even practice
phaneroscopy in order to conduct their specialized observations. 

The likelihood is that they do practice it, but not knowingly, and therefore
not with sufficiently appropriate skill. 

The time has come to seize and order the clouds – without dissipating them!

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 19

[gnox]

Gary R, Jon S, list,

Thanks for the welcome back, though as you suggest, Gary, my bodymind is still 
not ‘up to speed.’ For this and other reasons I don’t have much to say about 
previous posts in this thread. I can see why André’s choice of the word 
“drives” in this sentence could be problematic:

ADT: as far as Peirce is concerned, phaneroscopy is, after mathematics, the 
activity that drives not only every other subfield of theoretical philosophy, 
but also any number of the more special idioscopic sciences, those that have 
recourse to phaneroscopic findings, knowingly or unknowingly.

GF: However, I think the word “drives” follows naturally upon the observation 
that “phaneroscopy is a fundamental activity” in the sciences, as André’s 
previous sentence says. To me this implies a distinct kind of directed energy 
which is not only mental but experiential. Obviously one must have developed 
some prior acquaintance with this “activity” in order to glean any information 
from such an assertion. I’ve developed my own acquaintance with it over the 
years by simply following Peirce’s many and detailed accounts of the activity, 
while adjusting my own practice of it so that it plausibly corresponds to what 
Peirce was talking about. 

Based on this experience, I am skeptical of the attempts to deny that such an 
activity is “fundamental” to Peirce’s concept of cenoscopic science. I am 
equally skeptical of attempts to prove mathematically that what Peirce calls 
“phaneroscopy” is nothing but a mathematical category theory. For one thing, 
it’s hard to see why Peirce would insert such a science at such a high level in 
his classification at all, if it is really nothing but mathematics. Peirce 
explains, in the 1903 Syllabus and elsewhere, why such a science must be 
distinguished from mathematics and must be fundamental to cenoscopic sciences 
such as semiotic. But this has been pointed out earlier in the slow read, and 
has been met only with uncomprehending hostility by those who deny the 
fundamental status which Peirce assigned to phaneroscopy. Personally I have no 
interest in recycling such a futile discourse, so I’ll leave that to others who 
are so inclined. Meanwhile I’d like to get back to the main track of the slow 
read by posting the next slide, which continues the discussion of phaneroscopic 
practice. 

Gary f.

} What a thing means is simply what habits it involves. [Peirce] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 3-Aug-21 17:05



Jon S, List,

I too am very glad to see Gary F back on the List as I know from off List 
communication that this has been -- and indeed continues to be -- a challenging 
time for him in consideration of his physical health. Indeed, I have encouraged 
him to go slow in returning to posting De Tienne's slides on the List, but he 
has plunged ahead anyhow, and so I would like to take that as a sign of his 
improving health.  

 

JAS: [De Tienne] then explicitly acknowledges that phaneroscopy is, after 
mathematics, the activity that drives every other subfield of theoretical 
philosophy and all the special sciences. No one is disputing that phaneroscopy 
depends for its principles upon mathematics, broadly defined by Peirce as the 
science which draws necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things. 

 

As you noted, Jon, the relationship between mathematics and phaneroscopy will 
soon be taken up in the slow read. But even at this juncture I would like to 
suggest that the idea that phaneroscopy "depends" for its principles on 
mathematics represents a special kind of dependency. Certainly the 
practitioners of any science placed lower in Peirce's Classification of 
Sciences would be foolish not to look for fundamental principles in those above 
it. But that mathematics and philosophy "drive" the other theoretical and all 
the special sciences seems to me to, perhaps, overstate the case. 

 

While Peirce argues along Comtean lines that sciences lower in the 
classification ought look to those higher in the classification for principles 
(and to those lower for examples), as theoretical sciences they are also in the 
process of themselves discovering principles. In my view, if they are 'driven' 
by anything, it is by the spirit of pure theoretical research (which includes 
looking for principles in more abstract sciences). In my view it is for the 
sciences lower in the classification to look for principles from those higher 
which may aid in furthering their own studies. Finally, does Peirce employ the 
word 'drives' in discussing the Comtean dependency? A keyword search in the CP 
doesn't show that he does.

 

At present I think that this terminological matter is especially important in 
seeing phenomenology, as the prime example at hand, as involving much more than 
the categories conceived as merely, shall we say, mathematically valental

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 18

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. (Please
excuse the two-week delay since the previous slide was posted. A bout of
viral pneumonia has made it difficult for me to post or to follow the
discussion on the list.)

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

From Peirce's “Perennial” Classification of Sciences: 

Sciences of Discovery

1. Mathematics

2. Philosophy/Cenoscopy

2.1 Phaneroscopy 

2.2 Normative Sciences 

2.2.1 Esthetics 

2.2.2 Ethics 

2.2.3 Logic

2.3 Metaphysics 

Idioscopy (Special Sciences)

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 17

[gnox]

Thanks, Jon, for transcribing that part of R 284, which I didn’t have time to 
search out yesterday. It’s similar to his detailed procedural and pragmatic 
‘definition’ of lithium in the “Syllabus” (EP2:286):

CSP: “The peculiarity of this definition,— or rather this precept that is more 
serviceable than a definition,— is that it tells you what the word lithium 
denotes by prescribing what you are to do in order to gain a perceptual 
acquaintance with the object of the word.”

His use of the word “precept” in this context is very apt because the 
prescription precedes the perception of the object. This reinforces the 
contrast between the two principles identified by André De Tienne as guiding 
the classification of sciences, and the difference between preceding in 
principle and preceding in procedure. It’s interesting that Peirce describes 
the application of such a precept as “more logical” than the textbook 
definition of lithium as “that element whose atomic weight is 7 very nearly.” 

I think you’re quite right to correct the (rather lame) final sentence of my 
post as you did. Bellucci’s paper on phaneroscopic analysis brings out the 
complexity of the relations among the sciences of mathematics, logic and 
phaneroscopy, where the hierarchical order is clear enough but the practice of 
each of these sciences involves the others procedurally. The special difficulty 
in phaneroscopy is in gaining “perceptual acquaintance” with the phaneron, 
because (as Peirce says) it’s right in front of you all the time, and that 
makes it very hard to see! The procedure he prescribes (for the “subtilizing 
logician” is to try to think of anything that is not phaneral (according to the 
verbal definition of the phaneron), because the impossibility of doing that is 
immediately obvious. This again shows the circularity of scientific method, 
because the concept of the phaneron must precede the procedure (and so on).

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 15-Jul-21 20:46
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 17

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: This leaves open the question of how to classify the science--if it is a 
science--which enables us to “settle” what the phaneron is.

 

Perhaps we can find the answer to that question by consulting what Peirce wrote 
right before claiming to have just "settled what the phaneron is" as quoted 
below.

 

CSP: But, come, let us survey the whole field, the broad expanse of all that is 
before the mind in any way whatever, and see what forms of undecomposable 
elements, can be detected there. Perhaps somebody may inquire whether I mean 
the ideas themselves, or the objects they present. Such an inquirer is 
altogether off the track. The objects that are presented are before the mind, 
are they not? If the ideas are not the objects presented, then since you speak 
of them, they are in some sense before your mind too, even if instead of 
observing, you make the hypothesis that ideas different from the objects are 
before the mind, although it may be that nothing is really before your mind but 
the objects. Even then, these ideas are supposed, and as such are before the 
mind. Suppose there be a mere tinge of melancholy, of annoyance, or of joy, 
which brings no additional object but only colors the objects that are before 
the mind independently of the color. Still, in some sense this color is before 
the mind. All that is imagined, felt, thought, desired, or that either colors 
or governs what we feel or think is in some sense, before the mind. The sum 
total of it all I will name the phaneron. If I am asked whether I limit myself 
to what actually is at this indivisible instant before the mind or include all 
that ever was or will be before any mind or whether I mean something 
intermediate, or if I am asked whether I admit anything absolutely 
inconceivable, or am asked any such hard questions, the answer is that I have 
made my meaning plain enough to the eye of common-sense. The phaneron embraces 
all that is present to the mind. This same subtilizing logician who asks these 
questions, to which I as a logician myself can make no sort of objection and 
stand ready to follow him in his subtilizing, I give the answer: First exercize 
every care not to include in the phaneron anything that never enters your head 
at all and after exercizing the utmost scrupulosity in this respect, if there 
is any question whether a given thing belongs to the phaneron or not, carefully 
state the question in writing & set down after it the answer, Yes. Thus, "Is a 
self-contradictory object included in the phaneron? Yes." (R 284:40-41[37-38], 
c. 1905)

 

This strikes me as more of a stipulated definition than a result of scientific 
inquiry. Our mere ability to ask whether X is included in the phaneron is 
sufficient to entail that X is included in the phaneron.

 

GF: Bellucci appears to argue that it i

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 17

[gnox]

André De Tienne: “a science that happens to make use of a principle
formulated in a more abstract science … may provide that prior science with
corrective feedback, reasons to revise generalizations, and reasons to
redesign formal possibilities. Thus, a science may also be said to precede
another science if the latter provides such a critical and validating
feedback in return.” (slide 17)

GF: Apparently a science may precede another not only in this hierarchical
sense but also in a procedural sense:

CSP: “Having thus settled what the phaneron is, we have to undertake the
examination [of] its indecomposable constituents. But before undertaking the
actual work of observation, it is indispensable that we should begin by
considering what is possible for otherwise we would be exploring without any
definite field to explore. We should idly wonder without accomplishing
anything.” (MS 284, p. 39, c. 1905, as quoted by Francesco Bellucci — the
emphasis is his — in
https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis).

GF: The procedural order here is:

1.  settling “what the phaneron is”
2.  “considering what is possible” [by means of a formal or mathematical
logic?]
3.  “undertaking the actual work of observation” [i.e. phaneroscpic
observation]

This leaves open the question of how to classify the science — if it is a
science — which enables us to “settle” what the phaneron is. Bellucci
appears to argue that it is the logic of relatives, taking a cue (as it
were) from the idea of valency generalized from the science of chemistry.

Gary f.

 

Text of slide 17:

2. The principle of critical inductive validation and correction 

The order of logical dependency implies that a science that happens to make
use of a principle formulated in a more abstract science, 

either by manifesting instantiations of such principles,

or by putting the clouds of possibilities, freely played with in the more
abstract sciences, “through their exercises,” thus through the test of
real-world actualizations, 

may provide that prior science with corrective feedback, reasons to revise
generalizations, and reasons to redesign formal possibilities. 

Thus, a science may also be said to precede another science if the latter
provides such a critical and validating feedback in return.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

[gnox]

List,

 

CSP: ... every man inhabits two worlds. These are directly distinguishable by 
their different appearances. But the greatest difference between them, by far, 
is that one of these two worlds, the Inner World, exerts a comparatively slight 
compulsion upon us, though we can by direct efforts so slight as to be hardly 
noticeable, change it greatly, creating and destroying existent objects in it; 
while the other world, the Outer World, is full of irresistible compulsions for 
us, and we cannot modify it in the least, except by one peculiar kind of 
effort, muscular effort, and but very slightly even in that way. (CP 5.474)

 

RM: The objects of Phaneroscopy are in the inner world.

 

GF: We have already seen several of Peirce's definitions of phaneroscopy and of 
the phaneron. None of them say that phaneroscopy ignores objects in the outer 
world; on the contrary, the phaneron includes anything that appears or can 
appear in any way. Robert's statement above would be true enough if we changed 
the word “Phaneroscopy” to “Mathematics”; but as it stands, it is nonsense. 
(Just pointing this out to those who are trying to follow the thread, because 
it may not be obvious to everyone.)

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 14-Jul-21 05:46



 

Gary F., John Alan, Gary R., List,

 

What you describe is right for the experimental sciences of nature, i.e. the 
knowledge of objects in the outer world. The objects of Phaneroscopy are in the 
inner world. It so happens that in this world, the relations between A 
preliminary mathematical result govern mathematics and Phaneroscopy …

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 16

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. Comments,
questions and counter-arguments are welcome. (Personal attacks are not. This
is peirce-l, not Facebook.)

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

1. The principle of principle-dependency

Any heuristic science discovers and expresses a number of general
fundamental principles that find applications not only across its whole
range but also in other sciences or fields of research. 

Any science that would make use of general principles originating in another
science is said to depend on that other science and thus to follow it as a
matter of prescissive classification. 

This order of subsequence therefore moves from the more abstract or
theoretical science to the more concrete or applied science in phylogenetic
fashion.

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 15

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. Here
begins Part 3 of the presentation. The next two slides will follow shortly.

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

This is not the place to discuss the long history of the development of
Peirces classification of the sciences. Be it known, however, that in its
mature form it was subtended by two major principles.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

[gnox]

Well, I guess I underestimated how eager we are to focus on the classification 
of sciences! A couple of brief questions before I post the slides on that:

Robert, thanks for attaching the Tommi Vehkavaara diagram. In it mathematics is 
labelled “negative science.” This is a new term for me, and I haven’t found it 
in any of Peirce’s texts, so it would be helpful if you explain what it means, 
or else point us to the paper where Tommi does so. (Maybe he just invented it 
to distinguish it from “positive science.”)

Jon, you wrote that “what mainly distinguishes it [phaneroscopy] from 
mathematics is observation vs. imagination; or rather, observation as including 
but not limited to products of the imagination” — but for the very reason you 
give after the semicolon, I wouldn’t want to frame the distinction as 
“observation vs. imagination.” Peirce says that even mathematics is 
observational, in a quote that Robert posted earlier:

CSP: The first [ science ] is mathematics, which does not undertake to 
ascertain any matter of fact whatever, but merely posits hypotheses and traces 
out their consequences. It is observational, in so far as it makes 
constructions in the imagination according to abstract precepts, and then 
observes these imaginary objects, finding in them relations of parts not 
specified in the precept of construction. This is truly observation, yet 
certainly in a very peculiar sense; and no other kind of observation would at 
all answer the purpose of mathematics. (CP 1.239)

GF: So the “very peculiar” kind of observation in mathematics is observation of 
imaginary objects, while phaneroscopic observation is of any objects that can 
be “before the mind” regardless of whether they are imaginary or not. (What we 
usually call the “empirical” sciences generally observe objects that are not 
imaginary in the sense that mathematical constructions are.)

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 13-Jul-21 12:33



 

Gary F., List:


At the risk of jumping the gun ...

 

GF: For example, Peirce says that the practice of phanerocopy consists of 
“observation and generalization.”

 

As Daniel Campos discusses in a 2009 paper 
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236711950_Imagination_Concentration_and_Generalization_Peirce_on_the_Reasoning_Abilities_of_the_Mathematician),
 Peirce also says that mathematical reasoning requires the "intellectual 
abilities" of imagination, concentration, and generalization. It seems to me 
that concentration likewise plays an important role in phaneroscopy--"the power 
of concentration of attention, so as to hold before the mind a highly complex 
image, and keep it steady enough to be observed” (CP 2.81, 1902)--so what 
mainly distinguishes it from mathematics is observation vs. imagination; or 
rather, observation as including but not limited to products of the 
imagination, such that phaneroscopy is indeed a positive science (in the sense 
described below) while mathematics is a strictly hypothetical science.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 10:20 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote:

List,

Slide 14 is the last in Part 2 of the slideshow, and I’m sure many of us are 
eager to start on Part 3, which is about “the place of phaneroscopy in Peirce’s 
mature classification of the sciences.” So unless questions arise today about 
the specific content of this slide, I’d like to post the next slide tomorrow, 
along with slides 16 and 17 (as a sort of triptych). They outline the two 
principles which guide Peirce’s classification of sciences, which I think need 
to be considered together. Here’s why:

Peirce’s classification is mostly inherited from Auguste Comte, including the 
hierarchical order which places the most abstract sciences at the top, with the 
idea that they supply principles to the lower sciences. Comte also introduced 
the concept of positive science, which (for Peirce at least) means experiential 
science. (This usage of “positive” has nothing to do with “positive logic” (as 
opposed to “negative logic.”) Where Peirce differs from today’s common usage is 
that he considered the normative sciences (esthetics, ethics and critical 
logic) to be positive sciences. He also argued, from 1902 on, that the 
normative sciences — and especially logic — depend for their principles on 
mathematics and phenomenology/phaneroscopy. We can’t hope to understand the 
relationship in practice between mathematics and phaneroscopy by reducing 
either one to the other. That is Peirce’s point in asserting that phaneroscopy 
is a positive science while mathematics is not.

The classification hierarchy in which order is determined by dependence for 
principles of t

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

[gnox]

List,

Slide 14 is the last in Part 2 of the slideshow, and I’m sure many of us are
eager to start on Part 3, which is about “the place of phaneroscopy in
Peirce’s mature classification of the sciences.” So unless questions arise
today about the specific content of this slide, I’d like to post the next
slide tomorrow, along with slides 16 and 17 (as a sort of triptych). They
outline the two principles which guide Peirce’s classification of sciences,
which I think need to be considered together. Here’s why:

Peirce’s classification is mostly inherited from Auguste Comte, including
the hierarchical order which places the most abstract sciences at the top,
with the idea that they supply principles to the lower sciences. Comte also
introduced the concept of positive science, which (for Peirce at least)
means experiential science. (This usage of “positive” has nothing to do with
“positive logic” (as opposed to “negative logic.”) Where Peirce differs from
today’s common usage is that he considered the normative sciences
(esthetics, ethics and critical logic) to be positive sciences. He also
argued, from 1902 on, that the normative sciences — and especially logic —
depend for their principles on mathematics and phenomenology/phaneroscopy.
We can’t hope to understand the relationship in practice between mathematics
and phaneroscopy by reducing either one to the other. That is Peirce’s point
in asserting that phaneroscopy is a positive science while mathematics is
not.

The classification hierarchy in which order is determined by dependence for
principles of the lower upon the higher does not reflect the procedural
order in the practice of heuristic sciences. For example, Peirce says that
the practice of phanerocopy consists of “observation and generalization.”
Naturally we tend to assume that observation comes first and generalization
later. But if we are practicing this science for the purpose of discovering
the categories as elements of a phaneron which includes possibilities and
actualities, we are quite likely to start with possibilities and then do a
‘reality check’ to see whether our hypothetical schema applies as well to
actualities; and the reality check must be a kind of observation,
experiential like the surprising events that prompt us to come up with a
hypothesis in the first place. Indeed all theoretical sciences, to the
extent that their theories are testable, go through cycles of observation
and generalization and testing and modification, or conjecture and
refutation (Popper). In practice, then, sciences can precede each other so
that there is no pragmatic significance in debates over which comes first.

This is all a sort of prolegomena to André’s outline of the two principles
which, he says, guide the classification of sciences. I suppose those who
consider themselves experts in that department (which I don’t!) might want
to skip Part 3 of the slideshow and jump ahead to Part 4, which is entitled
“From mathematics to phaneroscopy”; but I think that would violate a
cardinal principle which I just invented: Thou shalt not rush a slow read.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 13-Jul-21 08:55



 

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. Now that
we have definitions of the three universal categories, the next step in
chronological order is Peirce’s application of them to various aspects of
logic.

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

From the 1890s on: 

Peirce will be developing his mature theory of the three categories (and
their “degeneracies”) extensively throughout numerous writings, from many
standpoints, including the logic of relations, the logic of evolution, the
logic of inferences, the logic of semiotics, metaphysics, and even the
classification of sciences. 

One cannot discuss Peirce’s phaneroscopy without looking briefly at his
classification of the sciences.

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. Now that
we have definitions of the three universal categories, the next step in
chronological order is Peirce’s application of them to various aspects of
logic.

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

From the 1890s on: 

Peirce will be developing his mature theory of the three categories (and
their “degeneracies”) extensively throughout numerous writings, from many
standpoints, including the logic of relations, the logic of evolution, the
logic of inferences, the logic of semiotics, metaphysics, and even the
classification of sciences. 

One cannot discuss Peirce’s phaneroscopy without looking briefly at his
classification of the sciences.

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 13

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. Below the
text of the slide, I have also included Peirce’s definition of Thirdness
from the Century Dictionary Supplement.

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

Thirdness is the mode of being which consists in something being a Third, or
Medium, between a Second and its First. It is Representation as an element
of the Phenomenon. It is the fact that future facts of Secondness will take
on a determinate general character. 

It is fundamentally a synechistic and teleological agency that combines or
pairs things together (com-pares) to fulfill an intelligible purpose or
realize a general rule. 

__

Appendix: Peirce’s definition of “thirdness” from the Century Dictionary
Supplement (1909):

thirdness, n. —2. The mode of being of that which is such as it is by virtue
of a triadic relation which is incapable of being defined in terms of dyadic
relations. (CD Supplement, p. 1344)

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[gnox]

Robert, you wrote yesterday:

RM: here is section 5 of my preprint in which I point out that Peirce proposes 
a name to designate each category and a derived name to designate the elements 
(phanerons) belonging to each of these categories.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 11-Jul-21 09:56



Gary F. ... now it's you who goes faster than the music 

GF : "Peirce never refers to phanerons as “elements,” or to elements as 
“phanerons.” (sic). I have never written such nonsense. For more than 40 years 
I have been talking about the elements of phenomena; I have even built a 
"trichotomic machine 

 " ( Marty,Robert, "The trichotomic machine", Semiotica, vol. 2019, no 228,‎ 
mai 2019, p. 173-192)  which breaks down a phaneron into elements like a 
crystal breaks down light and better like X-rays make a skeleton appear on a 
screen (corresponding at the "skeletonisation" of Peirce..

Here is a quote from my preprint "The Podium " :
"In the main text, "The basis of Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy" (EP2 360), Peirce 
invites his reader to accompany him in his discovery: 
"I invite the reader to join me in a little survey of the Phaneron(which will 
be sufficiently identical for him and for me) in order to discover what 
different forms of indecomposable elements it contains."  (Marty 6.3 from EP2 
360)

"Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally present 
in the phenomenon; meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is present at any time 
to the mind in any way" (CP 1.186)

GF : "Peirce’s phaneroscopy is a positive science, not a purely hypothetical 
one like mathematics"

"Perhaps you will ask me whether it is possible to conceive of a science which 
should not aim to declare that something is positively or categorically true. I 
reply that it is not only possible to conceive of such a science, but that such 
science exists and flourishes, and Phenomenology, which does not depend upon 
any other positive science, nevertheless must, if it is to be properly 
grounded, be made to depend upon the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of 
Pure Mathematics, whose only aim is to discover not how things actually are, 
but how they might be supposed to be, if not in our universe, then in some 
other. A Phenomenology which does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science 
hardly come to years of discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful 
club-footed affair that Hegel produced. (CP 5.40)

 

GF : " Also, we’ve seen in Robert’s previous posts that he regards the 
categories as produced by deduction from mathematical principles ..."

 

This is wrong, completely wrong! The word "deduction" does not even appear in 
my article "Podium"! Gary F. presents me as he would like me to be! 

 

Here is what I do, it is very simple:

1- I construct a mathematical object diagrammatized as follows: 3 → 2 →1 (C) 
which is a Poset in 
wich les graphismes 3,2,1 sont reliés par des flèches qui représentent des  
homogenous binary relations entre eux qui vérifient les axiomes requis pour 
être un Poset. 

2-On the other hand, I find that Peirce's 3 universal categories constitute an 
object (D) diagrammatized as follows: Thirdness → Secondness → Firsness (D) 
where the arrows represent homogenous binary relations between the categories; 
they result from their respective definitions that Peirce obtains by 
abstractive observation. These relations also verify the three axioms required 
by Poset's definition. The three universal categories are thus also in a Poset 
relational structure. De Tienne has almost captured this structure as 
"Quasi-Ordinal" (sic).

3- I establish that the two posets (C) and (D) are 
  isomorphic, which is child's play. 
As a result, "In mathematical jargon, one says that two objects are the same up 
to an isomorphism.There is nothing deductive in this identification of 
structures; however, ignoring it has consequences. I will explain them when the 
time comes.

 

This isomorphism captures with the greatest accuracy the identification of 
forms explicitly mentioned in MS 1345 in the sentence "-empirics , the study of 
phenomena with the purpose of identifying their forms with those mathematics 
has studied"; it also covers the relations of dependence between mathematics 
and any positive science mentioned in any other classification of sciences. ( 
see Tommi Vehkavaara's compilation 

  ).

 

To assert unceasingly that Phaneroscopy is only a positive science by rejecting 
mathematics, is to refuse to recognize the role they play in the Sciences of 
Discovery; it is to amputate Peirce's work from its mathematical part ...

 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[gnox]

Jack, list,

I should point out (to avoid further confusion) that Robert’s brand of category 
theory is a post-Peircean development and does not adhere strictly to Peirce’s 
phaneroscopic terminology. Peirce never refers to phanerons as “elements,” or 
to elements as “phanerons.” He refers to the universal categories as “elements 
of the phaneron,” or “elements of experience,” or “elements of consciousness”; 
he even refers to “categories of phanerons” once, in CP 1.286 (below); but not 
to phanerons as “elements.” (Use of that term in phaneroscopy comes from an 
analogy with chemistry, as we’ll see later.)

Also, we’ve seen in Robert’s previous posts that he regards the categories as 
produced by deduction from mathematical principles, while Peirce says they are 
generalized from observation of the phaneron (“inductively,” as André put it in 
an earlier slide). Peirce’s phaneroscopy is a positive science, not a purely 
hypothetical one like mathematics. (The positivity of phaneroscopy will be 
examined in later slides of this slow read.) 

CSP [continuing CP 1.286 from my previous post]: What I term phaneroscopy is 
that study which, supported by the direct observation of phanerons and 
generalizing its observations, signalizes several very broad classes of 
phanerons; describes the features of each; shows that although they are so 
inextricably mixed together that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest 
that their characters are quite disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a 
certain very short list comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons 
there are; and finally proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of 
enumerating the principal subdivisions of those categories.

It will be plain from what has been said that phaneroscopy has nothing at all 
to do with the question of how far the phanerons it studies correspond to any 
realities. It religiously abstains from all speculation as to any relations 
between its categories and physiological facts, cerebral or other. It does not 
undertake, but sedulously avoids, hypothetical explanations of any sort. It 
simply scrutinizes the direct appearances, and endeavors to combine minute 
accuracy with the broadest possible generalization. The student's great effort 
is not to be influenced by any tradition, any authority, any reasons for 
supposing that such and such ought to be the facts, or any fancies of any kind, 
and to confine himself to honest, single-minded observation of the appearances. 
The reader, upon his side, must repeat the author's observations for himself, 
and decide from his own observations whether the author's account of the 
appearances is correct or not. (CP 1.286-7, c. 1904)

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Robert Marty
Sent: 10-Jul-21 12:59



 

JACK, List

 

For clarification, here is section 5 of my preprint in which I point out that 
Peirce proposes a name to designate each category and a derived name to 
designate the elements (phanerons) belonging to each of these categories. By 
adopting these distinctions one avoids many confusions.

 

"5. Some preliminary and necessary clarifications about terminology.

Universal Categories are "categories of elements of phenomena." Therefore, it 
is necessary to 

distinguish clearly, in any statement, whether one is referring to a particular 
category or an element 

(phaneron) belonging to this category. Very frequently, Peirce, when he 
designates elements, calls 

"Priman" any element belonging to the Firstness (CP 1.295, 1.320), "Secundan" 
any element 

belonging to the Secondness (CP 1.296, 1.319, 1.320), "Tertian" any element 
belonging to the 

Thirdness (1.297, 1.351). In "The basis of the pragmaticism in phaneroscopy" 
(EP2 360- 370) of 

1903, Peirce makes systematic use of it (EP2: 364). A distinction rarely found 
in the literature. Peirce 

also uses other equivalent terms, notably "a Firstness" or "a Possible" instead 
of "a Priman, "a 

Secondness, "an Existent" or "a Fact" instead of "a Secundan" and "a Thirdness, 
"a Necessitant"

instead of "a Tertian." (EP2, 479). This is the reason why it must be well 
established, from this 

moment on, that we will have a name to designate each of the three categories 
and a well 

differentiated name to designate the corresponding elements that belong to each 
category. This is 

necessary because Peirce often leaves the distinction to the reader. For 
example, he often refers to the 

correlates of relations as "First," "Second," "Third" (CP 2.274), and it 
frequently happens that these 

terms are interpreted as "a Firstness," "a Secondness," or "a Thirdness," 
respectively. Consequently, 

we will proceed to systematic rewriting, which will be very useful in the 
definitions in particular. "

 

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352641475_The_Podium_of_Universal_Categories_and_their_degenerate_cases

 

Best,

Robert Marty

 

Le sam. 10 juil. 2021 à 15:05, mailto:g

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[gnox]

Helmut, list,

A memory of a past event is present to the mind in a way that the past event 
itself is NOT present to the mind. The quality of that memory is its Firstness, 
but as a qualisign it does NOT represent the quality of the event, because the 
object and interpretant of a qualisign can only be a quality, and a quality 
which does not differ from that of the qualisign itself. 

If you read the memory as representing the event iconically, then according to 
Peirce’s 1903 classification of signs, it must be an Iconic Sinsign whose 
quality makes it determine the idea of an object (the past event, presumably). 
“Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, 
it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a 
Qualisign” (EP2:294). But now we are talking semiotics, not phaneroscopy; and 
we must bear in mind that it is “the principles and analogies of Phenomenology” 
which enable us to classify signs in the first place (EP2:289, CP 2.233). When 
we talk semiotics, we are treating of phenomena in their Thirdness. Only 
phenomenology/phaneroscopy “treats of Phenomena in their Firstness” (EP2:197). 
Which does not mean that all phenomena are Firsts.

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 9-Jul-21 12:38
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

 

Gary F.,

 

The idea, that a phenomenon is a first, I have got during the recent thread 
about phaneroscopy, aka phenomenology, in which it was more or less agreed, 
that that subject is about phenomena as firstnesses, or as a science itself 
being a firstness, in contrast to semiotics. Or something like that. So I was 
taking this firstness-talk seriously.

"Present to the mind": Meaning, some things have appeared from the past, but 
are now present: All together in the infetisimally small window of time, that 
we call the present. This cannot be made of parts, because parts can only be 
perceived sequentially, one after the other, during a range of time. Therefore 
a phenomenon must be holistic, and a quale. Wholeness means all at the same 
time. No sequence, no reaction, no mediation. Just a (specific) quality, but 
this quality, without implying it, is a result of its temporal history. How 
well it can re-evoke its precursor, and keep the process up, is a matter of 
brain capacity and intelligence, I think. I guess, the more specific a quale 
is, the more neurons are taking part, and that means more consciousness.

 

Best

Helmut

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[gnox]

Jack, list,

First, I should clarify that it is only the universal categories that are
“ubiquitous,” to use Peirce’s term. He mentions several times that there are
other sets of categories, or elements, that the practice of
phenomenology/phaneroscopy could bring to light; but he preferred to focus
on the formal elements of the phaneron (as opposed to the material elements)
precisely because they are universal, and because the set is very small.

Second, Peirce does give examples of a phenomenon with only one (of the
three) elements. His favorite is a disembodied “red patch” — but you have to
imagine it as eternal, unchanging, and being the entire content of
consciousness, i.e. the whole universe. It does not stand out from a
background, and it’s not the predicate of a subject, because the
subject/predicate distinction brings in the element of Secondness, just as
the subject/object distinction does in commonsense psychology. You can’t
even experience it as “a phenomenon” because that would assume that multiple
phenomena are at least possible, and so you have Secondness again, plus
Thirdness as soon as you classify it as a phenomenon. That, I think, is why
Peirce wrote to James that he spoke of  “only one ‘phenomenon’” (CP 8.301)
and needed to invent a new word for it, which turned out to be “phaneron”.

But once he had defined phaneroscopy as a procedure that could be practiced
by any number of investigators, then he could (and did, although rarely)
speak of phanerons in the plural:

CSP: There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons;
and since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the
like of which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control
the accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually
repeat my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more
utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of
chromatic decoration to a man congenitally blind. (CP 1.286)

So yes, if someone wants to define “elements of the phenomenon” in some
other way than Peirce’s, he’s free to do so, but according to Peirce’s
ethics of scientific terminology he cannot call what he is doing
“phaneroscopy,” because he is not following the procedure defined by Peirce
as phaneroscopy, and thus not repeating Peirce’s observations and
experiments.

JC: To what extent, if at all, is Peirce's system constrained by the weight
of its own emphasis upon the interpretative?

GF: There is no “emphasis upon the interpretative” in phaneroscopy as Peirce
defined it; on the contrary, the emphasis is on direct experience and
unfiltered observation (which is not easy, as Peirce said repeatedly). The
emphasis in semeiotic is a different story, but as I’ve said before, you
have no chance of actually practicing phaneroscopy if you treat it as a mere
branch of semiotics (or of any other science). That’s why Peirce called it
“the most primal of all the positive sciences” (CP 5.39).

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
Sent: 9-Jul-21 11:52



The phaneron, or any phenomenon, always has three elements, Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness.

 

Gary, List,

 

When you say that the phaneron (or any phenomenon) always has three
elements, I was wondering (rhetorically), "Yes, but as defined by who?"  I
know this is Peirce's definition but, to play devil's advocate, if one is
convinced that whatever phenomenon has only one element, then does it not
really seem as if this is so (and does not that seeming - the appearance -
thus make it so?). The distinction I'm making here is between "emic" and
"etic" - for the person who believes the phaneron has, say, one element
only, that belief must surely translate into reality? Whereas the observer
who may be well-versed in Peirce sees that person's belief as an error of
judgement. 

 

Or: To what extent, if at all, is Peirce's system constrained by the weight
of its own emphasis upon the interpretative? 

 

best

 

Jack

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[gnox]

Helmut,

A phenomenon is anything that appears, or is present to the mind. The phaneron 
is the collective total of whatever appears or could appear or be present to 
the mind generically (not to a particular mind).

The phaneron, or any phenomenon, always has three elements, Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness. In an existing thing, Secondness is predominant, but 
the possibility of it, its quality, is its Firstness. Its meaning, if it has 
any, is its Thirdness, its function as a Sinsign, which has both existence and 
quality; obviously, if it exists, it must also be possible.

I’m not sure where you got the idea that a phenomenon is a first. Every 
phenomenon has its Firstness, but we only call it a First if we prescind its 
Firstness from whatever Secondness or Thirdness it may have. Of course, as soon 
as we call it a First, it has become “objectified,” so that it is the object of 
a sign, meaning that it is now in triadic relation with a sign and an 
interpretant, and thus has taken on Thirdness. But that doesn’t change its 
quality.

I don’t know if this helps, I’m improvising instead of quoting Peirce because I 
don’t know which definitions you’ve already seen. But I think a careful reading 
of the definitions provided in the slides should suffice, if you drop 
assumptions and habits such as treating every phenomenon as if it were a 
perceived object or a sign. (Signs are phenomena but not all phenomena are 
signs, only those in which Thirdness is predominant in our consciousness of 
them. Semiotics depends on phaneroscopy, not the other way round) Questions 
about specific terms used in the definitions might help, though, if you’re 
still confused.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 9-Jul-21 09:48



 

Gary, List

 

Now I am confused about the definition of phenomenon, and accordingly 
phenomenology / phaneroscopy. If secondness, reaction, is a part of its, a 
phenomenon is not a first. I had thought it was. But firsts don´t have parts 
(see previous slide), so there cannot be a second of a first. In the opinion I 
have had until now, a phenomenon is an appearance by the primisense. It may be 
a re-entry from altersense or medisense, but turned into a firstness without 
parts. That means, the complexity of reaction or thought is transformed into or 
replaced by specificness of a quale, which is the phenomenon. To say it is an 
icon would be wrong, because icons have parts. So a phenomenon (in my previous 
opinion) is a more or less specific quale. Like the intuitive feeling you may 
have e.g about the color red, the american history, or existential graphs, 
before this intuition again causes reactions (altersense) and reflections 
(medisense).

 

Best

Helmut

  

  

Freitag, 09. Juli 2021 um 13:10 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca  
wrote:

 

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow 
posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. Below the 
text of the slide, I have also included Peirce’s definition of Secondness from 
the Century Dictionary Supplement.

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

Secondness is the mode of being which consists in something being Second to 
some First, regardless of anything else, and in particular regardless of any 
Law, although if may conform to a law. It is Reaction as an element of the 
Phenomenon. It is the mark of whatever exists or “obsists” in its actuality.

__

Appendix: Peirce’s definition of “secondness” from the Century Dictionary 
Supplement (1909):

secondness, n. —2. (a) The mode of being of an object which is such as it is by 
virtue of being connected with or related to another object or objects, 
regardless of any triadic relation. (b) The mode of connection or relation of 
such an object, with such other. (c) In a looser sense, the secundal, or 
relative, character which belongs to an individual object, as having such a 
mode of being. (CD Supplement, p. 1189)

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. Below the
text of the slide, I have also included Peirce’s definition of Secondness
from the Century Dictionary Supplement.

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

Secondness is the mode of being which consists in something being Second to
some First, regardless of anything else, and in particular regardless of any
Law, although if may conform to a law. It is Reaction as an element of the
Phenomenon. It is the mark of whatever exists or “obsists” in its actuality.

__

Appendix: Peirce’s definition of “secondness” from the Century Dictionary
Supplement (1909):

secondness, n. —2. (a) The mode of being of an object which is such as it is
by virtue of being connected with or related to another object or objects,
regardless of any triadic relation. (b) The mode of connection or relation
of such an object, with such other. (c) In a looser sense, the secundal, or
relative, character which belongs to an individual object, as having such a
mode of being. (CD Supplement, p. 1189)

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 10

[gnox]

Helmut, John, Robert, list,

Yes, Helmut, there is a metaphysical aspect to Peirce’s 1867 “New List” essay; 
there is even a psychological aspect, even though Peirce insisted that logic 
has nothing to learn from psychology. But for Peirce, even at this early date, 
metaphysics is dependent on logic, not the other way round. Many years later he 
asserted the dependence of logic on ethics, and the dependence of both on 
phenomenology. In 1867 he wasn’t even discriminating between logic and 
phenomenology. And it’s not clear in what sense (if any) metaphysics is “behind 
nature.” But we’ll get to metaphysics soon in the slow read. To the other 
questions in your post I have no ready answers.

John, I fail to see any “debate” between Robert and me about the relations 
between mathematics and the positive sciences (including semiotics). I think 
the Peirce quotes we both shared are pretty clear on that subject. If you think 
the internal divisions of mathematics are relevant to the relations between 
mathematics and phaneroscopy, you can explain that when we get to that question 
later on in the slow read, and we will see how consistent that theory is with 
Peirce’s explicit statements about the involvement of mathematics in 
phaneroscopy.

Robert, I don’t see that your assertion about “the elimination of mathematics 
in the secondary literature on Peirce” is relevant to the subject of 
phaneroscopy, and so far you have avoided saying anything about its status as a 
positive science or its relationship to other positive sciences. So I think 
it’s time we proceeded to the next series of slides in the slow read, which 
provide definitions of the three phaneroscopic categories or “elements of the 
phaneron.” After that we’ll get to the classification of sciences and where 
phaneroscopy fits in that schema.

Gary f.  

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 6-Jul-21 12:22



 

Gary F., List

 

To me it had seemed, that in the "New List of Categories" the poles "Being" and 
"Substance", and the category-steps between them, would sound quite 
metaphysical (about what is behind nature).

Is it a rational progress to at last combine human ratio with nature, or is it 
rather a fallacy to first having supposed a classifying, opposing distinction 
between both? Are humans not animals, or are they animals plus something else? 
Like "animals 2.0."? Is "artificial" the contradiction to "natural", or natural 
too?

 

Best

Helmut

  

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[gnox]

Thank you, Robert, for providing two more Peirce quotes in confirmation of the 
three in my post, all clarifying the role of formal, mathematical, deductive 
logic in philosophy. Here is one more that might clarify it still further:

CSP: If the whole business of mathematics consists in deducing the properties 
of hypothetical constructions, mathematics is the one science to which a 
science of logic is not pertinent. For nothing can be more evident than its own 
unaided reasonings. On the contrary logic is an experiential, or positive, 
science. Not that it needs to make any special observations, but it does rest 
upon a part of our experience that is common to all men. Pure deductive logic, 
insofar as it is restricted to mathematical hypotheses, is, indeed, mere 
mathematics. But when logic tells us that we can reason about the real world in 
the same way with security, it tells us a positive fact about the universe. (CP 
7.524)

As I quoted the other day in reference to slide 9, Peirce says that “Normative 
science rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics” (CP 1.186, 1902). 
The text that we are slow-reading is about phaneroscopy, including its 
relations with other positive sciences. If you have an opinion about that, we’d 
like to hear it; for one thing, we’d like to know how experience fits into the 
picture as you see it. That might help to explain why normative science rests 
largely on phenomenology as well as on mathematics.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 6-Jul-21 12:13
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

 

Gary F, List

 

My opinion is that Mathematics and Philosophy are best placed where Peirce 
himself put them :

 

Extract from  

 (26) (DOC) The "Podium" of Universal Categories and their degenerate cases | 
robert marty - Academia.edu

 

Section  1 Prolegomena on the role of mathematics in the classifications of 
sciences.

 

Carolyn Eisele, the editor of "The New Elements of Mathematics" of Peirce 
(1982), quoting Peirce, emphasized the importance of these principles for a 
proper understanding of Peirce's philosophy:

 

The doctrine of exact philosophy . . . is that all danger of error in 
philosophy will be reduced to a minimum by treating in philosophy will be 
reduced to a minimum by treating the problem as mathematically as possible, 
that is, by constructing some sort of a diagram representing that which is 
supposed to be open to the observation of every scientific intelligence, and 
thereupon mathematically . . . deducing the consequences of that hypothesis. 
(Peirce, NEM IV, x). 

It is no wonder that in every classification of the sciences, mathematics heads 
every list, while philosophy, to be exact "must rest on mathematical 
principles. (Peirce, NEM IV, 273) [emphasize mine]

 

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty  

https://martyrobert.academia.edu/

 

 

 

Le mar. 6 juil. 2021 à 15:45, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > 
a écrit :

Point of clarification:

CSP: Formal logic, however developed, is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is 
by no means the whole of logic, or even its principal part. It is hardly to be 
reckoned as a part of logic proper. Logic has to define its aim; and in doing 
so is even more dependent upon ethics, or the philosophy of aims, by far, than 
it is, in the methodeutic branch, upon mathematics. We shall soon come to 
understand how a student of ethics might well be tempted to make his science a 
branch of logic; as, indeed, it pretty nearly was in the mind of Socrates. But 
this would be no truer a view than the other. Logic depends upon mathematics; 
still more intimately upon ethics; but its proper concern is with truths beyond 
the purview of either. (CP 4.240, 1902)

CSP: 526. Logic is a branch of philosophy. That is to say it is an 
experiential, or positive science, but a science which rests on no special 
observations, made by special observational means, but on phenomena which lie 
open to the observation of every man, every day and hour. There are two main 
branches of philosophy, Logic, or the philosophy of thought, and Metaphysics, 
or the philosophy of being. Still more general than these is High Philosophy 
which brings to light certain truths applicable alike to logic and to 
metaphysics. It is with this high philosophy that we have at first to deal. (CP 
7.526, undated)

GF: In my opinion this “High Philosophy,” or first of the positive sciences, is 
essentially the same science that Peirce called “phenomenology” in 1902, and 
later “phaneroscopy”. It makes observations by direct experience and 
generalizes from them with the help of some kind of logica utens. After the 
categories have been prescinded, named

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[gnox]

Point of clarification:

CSP: Formal logic, however developed, is mathematics. Formal logic, however,
is by no means the whole of logic, or even its principal part. It is hardly
to be reckoned as a part of logic proper. Logic has to define its aim; and
in doing so is even more dependent upon ethics, or the philosophy of aims,
by far, than it is, in the methodeutic branch, upon mathematics. We shall
soon come to understand how a student of ethics might well be tempted to
make his science a branch of logic; as, indeed, it pretty nearly was in the
mind of Socrates. But this would be no truer a view than the other. Logic
depends upon mathematics; still more intimately upon ethics; but its proper
concern is with truths beyond the purview of either. (CP 4.240, 1902)

CSP: 526. Logic is a branch of philosophy. That is to say it is an
experiential, or positive science, but a science which rests on no special
observations, made by special observational means, but on phenomena which
lie open to the observation of every man, every day and hour. There are two
main branches of philosophy, Logic, or the philosophy of thought, and
Metaphysics, or the philosophy of being. Still more general than these is
High Philosophy which brings to light certain truths applicable alike to
logic and to metaphysics. It is with this high philosophy that we have at
first to deal. (CP 7.526, undated)

GF: In my opinion this “High Philosophy,” or first of the positive sciences,
is essentially the same science that Peirce called “phenomenology” in 1902,
and later “phaneroscopy”. It makes observations by direct experience and
generalizes from them with the help of some kind of logica utens. After the
categories have been prescinded, named and conceptualized as a trichotomy,
then we can use formal logic to apply them in other branches of philosophy.

CSP: I have followed out this trichotomy into many other ramifications, and
have uniformly found it to be a most useful polestar in my explorations into
the different branches of philosophy. There is no fallacy in it; for it
asserts nothing, but only offers suggestions…. My trichotomy is plainly of
the family stock of Hegel’s three stages of thought,—an idea that goes back
to Kant, and I know not how much further. But the arbitrariness of Hegel’s
procedure, utterly unavoidable at the time he lived,—and presumably, in less
degree, unavoidable now, or at any future date,—is in great measure avoided
by my taking care never to miss the solid support of mathematically exact
formal logic beneath my feet. (EP2:428, 1907)

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 5-Jul-21 23:22
Robert, List,

I strongly agree with you:

RM> My criticism is precisely about the fact that De Tienne starts with
phaneroscopy and forgets that the formal structures he believes in
discovering are inherited from mathematics on which they depend. 

At the end of this note is the opening section of my previous note on the
elements of phaneroscopy.  These points are the prerequisites for
understanding what Peirce wrote about phenomeology or phaneroscopy.  It's
impossible to evaluate what anybody wrote about phaneroscopy without a solid
understanding of Peirce's assumptions.

John

--

The categories and
hypoicons, the foundation for semeiotic, are derived
from the phaneron by applying the
three branches of pure mathematics:
formal logic; discrete mathematics
(arithmetic, graphs, and discrete sets); 
and continuous mathematics (geometry,
topology, and uncountable sets).  
See the diagram of Peirce’s
classification of the sciences (attached in the 
file CSPscience.jpg).
 
We must also distinguish the term
formal logic, which occurs 119 times
in CP, from logic proper, which
occurs just 7 times in CP.   DeMorgan
coined the term formal
logic, and Peirce adopted it for every logic
notation developed by himself or
others.  Note its importance:
 
CSP:  The little that I have
contributed to pragmatism (or, for that
matter, to any other department of
philosophy), has been entirely the
fruit of this outgrowth from
formal logic, and is worth much more than
the small sum total of the rest of my
work, as time will show.
(CP 5.469, R318, 1907)
 
CSP:  My trichotomy is plainly of the
family stock of Hegel’s three
stages of thought, — an idea that goes back to Kant, and I know
not how
much further.  But the arbitrariness
of Hegel’s procedure, utterly
unavoidable at the time he lived,
— and presumably, in less
degree,
unavoidable now, or at any future
date, — is in great measure
avoided
by my taking care never to miss the
solid support of mathematically
exact formal logic beneath my feet  (EP 2:428,
R318, 1907)
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 9

[gnox]

Jack, list,

I’ll start with a few general comments on Peircean epistimology and
semiotics before I insert my comments into your post below.

First, all knowledge is fallible, relative and incomplete. We can directly
experience things that we have no prior knowledge of; but we can’t know
anything about something we have no experience of. “Normative science
[including logic] rests largely on phenomenology and on mathematics;
metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science” (CP 1.186, 1902).  

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
Sent: 2-Jul-21 08:54



Gary, List, 

 

GF: Peirce’s objection to Kantian metaphysics and epistemology was that for
Peirce the thing-in-itself is cognizable if it makes any sense to talk about
it at all. The notion of an incognizable thing-in-itself was, for Peirce,
absurd. 

 

JC: Yes, but surely there are things (and things about things) that we
cannot know;

 

GF: How do we know that? Surely there are experiences that surprise us,
which implies that there is something we don’t know about the “things”
experienced. But that doesn’t imply that we cannot know more about them than
we do now. And as for things we have no experience of, not even an inkling
of their possibility, we can say (and know) nothing about them, not even
fallibly.

 

JC: … or our knowledge of such things extends only so far as to permit us a
glimpse of fallibility. 

 

CSP: :Direct experience is neither certain nor uncertain, because it affirms
nothing -- it just is. There are delusions, hallucinations, dreams. But
there is no mistake that such things really do appear, and direct experience
means simply the appearance. It involves no error, because it testifies to
nothing but its own appearance. For the same reason, it affords no
certainty. It is not exact, because it leaves much vague; though it is not
inexact either; that is, it has no false exactitude. (CP 1.148)

 

JC: In the fashion of Bertrand Russell, we might consider a tumble glass (or
any such object). We know the glass as object through experience; only
insofar as we have held/seen/otherwise sensed such glasses before, or
insofar as we can imagine what such an object must/might be like based on
our experience of other objects which suggest a kind of iconic affinity. We
can even imagine the glass's atomic and subatomic structure. But, surely, we
cannot know the actual relation of this atomic-subatomic structure "in
itself" - that is, we cannot know what is happening at atomic/subatomic
levels as they exist beyond the scope of our perceptive faculties. We can,
with the aid of science, make good attempts at imagining/inferring such
processes, but does our image of these processes correspond to their actual
being (every atom as it exists relative to every other atom at a given
moment in time?)? 

 

GF: Here you are making a metaphysical assumption that atomic and subatomic
particles have an “actual being.” But we have no direct experience of them —
only a theoretical model of the processes they are involved in — so our
knowledge is not directly based on unmediated experience, or on
phaneroscopic observation, which does not admit metaphysical assumptions.
But it is still knowledge — fallible, relative and incomplete like all
knowledge.

JC: I can understand how our idea/image of such processes are very real (as
Peirce says, such ideas/images "really do appear" to us) in a
representational sense as our conception/experience of such things (whether
fancy or fact) is "real" if/when it simply "is" or "appears" in any
representational state before the mind. But is there not a divide between
our experience of an object at its "surface level" (touch, taste, and so
on), the inference we draw of its internal structure (its atomic/subatomic
composition), and then that internal structure as it actually is -- atom to
atom -- which contributes to the surface (forms it, in fact) but cannot be
reduced to that surface alone, being of a different order/degree of
substance? 

 

Or, put differently, can we really equate our talk about the thing-in-itself
(which is entirely experiential) with the internal structuring of that thing
-- tumble glass in this instance -- of which we have no means of direct
experience? Or, if we can somehow experience it directly, we have no means
of comprehending this experience in a way which isn't then contaminated by
time (by memory)?

 

GF: Knowledge is based on experience. In psychology and psychobiology,
cognition is partially based on knowledge because we are anticipatory
systems whose brains implement feedforward loops (for more on this, see
Turning Signs 9: Model and Meaning (gnusystems.ca)
 .) But this too is a theoretical
model, an explanation of what we experience. In phaneroscopy, on the other
hand, experience is not based on knowledge. Making knowledge out of the raw
material of experience is the task of semiotic/logic, which is grounded i

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

[gnox]

Welcome to the conversation on the Peirce list, Jack! I hope your post will 
inspire some of the other “novices” to join in as well.

You may get a reply from Jon when he has the time, but for now I’ll just offer 
my own response to one key point in your post:

JC: Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of 
consciousness?

GF: Thirdness is the predominant mode of cognition and of semiosis, but not of 
consciousness according to Peirce’s usual employment of the term: 
“Consciousness may mean any one of the three categories” (CP 8.256, 1902). 
Secondness is felt or sensed as “dyadic consciousness” (R 300, 38) before it is 
abstracted and named as a category. As for Firstness,

CSP: Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the 
day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had 
become conscious of his own existence — that is first, present, immediate, 
fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and 
evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. 
(W6:171, CP 1.357, 1887-8)

GF: Description, being semiosic, is ‘contaminated’ with Thirdness; but the pure 
“first” is conscious even for Adam before he had become conscious of his own 
existence. This is a broader usage of “consciousness” than we usually find in 
cognitive science or psychology, where many virtually identify it with 
self-consciousness. But it’s the appropriate usage for phaneroscopy, where 
direct “observation” of the phaneron has to come before “generalization.” In 
the latter stage, where a “doctrine of categories” emerges, there does seem to 
be a kind of “feedback loop” where the investigator has to go back and forth 
between theory and observation in order to “test” the theory, as in any 
positive science. But preconceptions are not supposed to interfere with 
phaneroscopic “observation” proper.

We should also address the questions you raise about time and about the Kantian 
thing-in-itself, but since André addresses that one directly in the next slide 
(9), I think I’ll wait until that’s been posted.

Gary f.

} This sentence contradicts itself—or rather—well, no, actually it doesn't! 
[Hofstadter] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
Sent: 29-Jun-21 17:21
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

 

Gary, list, 

 

GF: That’s why we can prescind Firstness from Secondness (or Thirdness), but we 
can’t prescind Secondness from Firstness, because Secondness is not logically 
possible without Firstness. And that’s why there must be more to the phaneron 
than what we call reality, even though phaneroscopy (unlike mathematics) is a 
positive science, and indeed the first of the positive sciences.

 

Isn't it a fact, though, that thirdness is the irreducible mode of 
consciousness? That we can metaphorically arrive at ideas of firstness, 
Secondness, and so on, but always from the vantage point of thirdness? I might 
have this wrong, but if not it would seem to suggest a kind of feedback loop in 
attempts to prescind Secondness from Thirdness or Firstness from Secondness. 

 

Reading Jon Alan Schmidt's article, Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy 
of Time, I was wondering whether it is possible to prescind "time" from 
"thought"? I'm thinking of this in synechist terms (i.e., "Time is no 
exception; in fact, it is 'the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles 
of which we envisage every other continuum' 

(Peirce in JAS 2020: 12). The problem being that surely "time" is, in 
phenomenological terms, "thought"? Kant makes time the precondition for the 
possibility of existence (or something along those lines) which seems to merely 
reify its a priori status (along with space). And whilst we can take time and 
space as a priori categories, it doesn't seem to me that we can "literally" do 
this - that is, time and space are a priori for no one even though we suppose 
they must, logically, be a priori for everyone. We know it/each only through 
experience so that whilst we can suppose that time/space exist prior to our 
experience of it as such, such judgement must still be made from within that 
experiential prism. 

 

So, in essence, how can we usefully prescind one from the other when the two 
are either mutually constitutive (dialectical) or a kind of monadic firstness 
to which we have no real access (except through consciousness which is always 
at the level of mediation - of Thirdness)? Also, if we say there is "more to 
the phaneron than what we call reality", are we also not moving in the 
direction of Kant's "thing as such" or thing in and of itself? Again, absolute 
novice here but I do know that Peirce in general seems opposed to traditional 
"metaphysics" and "metaphysicians" which an at

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

[gnox]

Helmut, list,

HR: So, in short: Dissociation, prescission, discrimination is imagining, 
supposing, representing one thing without the other.

GF: That’s a bit too short, in the case of prescission, which Peirce says is 
supposing *a state of things* in which one element is present without the 
other, *the one being logically possible without the other*. That’s not the 
same as just supposing one thing without the other. When we suppose the 
existence of apples without oranges, we’re not supposing a whole state of 
things, a whole universe, which is what we’re doing when we prescind Firstness 
from the other elements.

If we’re considering an ingredient of the phaneron, we can prescind its 
Firstness from the rest of it, or from the rest of the whole phaneron, because 
it is logically possible that this quale (First) is all there is, that there is 
nothing else for it to be other than. That is not possible in reality because 
Secondness and Thirdness are there too, in any real phenomenon. That’s why we 
can prescind Firstness from Secondness (or Thirdness), but we can’t prescind 
Secondness from Firstness, because Secondness is not logically possible without 
Firstness. And that’s why there must be more to the phaneron than what we call 
reality, even though phaneroscopy (unlike mathematics) is a positive science, 
and indeed the first of the positive sciences.

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 29-Jun-21 13:13
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

 

Gary F., List

 

So, in short: Dissociation, prescission, discrimination is imagining, 
supposing, representing one thing without the other. But how were these two 
things originally combined? I guess, as we are talking about phaneroscopy / 
phenomenology, that the only required combination is, that the two things 
appear together as one phenomenon (?).

 

Best, Helmut 

  

 29. Juni 2021 um 14:39 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca  
wrote:

 

Helmut, list,

I think it’s important to discriminate between logical processes, or kinds of 
argument (deduction, induction, abduction), and “kinds of separation” 
(dissociation, prescission, discrimination), which are pre-logical in the sense 
that no reasoning is involved, just a kind of imagination/perception of 
possibilities. A couple of paragraphs from Peirce’s 1903 “Syllabus” might be 
helpful here. Both are from EP2:270 (but I’m skipping one paragraph between 
them).

CSP: [[ In order to understand logic, it is necessary to get as clear notions 
as possible of these three categories and to gain the ability to recognize them 
in the different conceptions with which logic deals. Although all three are 
ubiquitous, yet certain kinds of separations may be effected upon them. There 
are three distinct kinds of separation in thought. They correspond to the three 
categories. Separation of Firstness, or Primal Separation, called Dissociation, 
consists in imagining one of the two separands without the other. It may be 
complete or incomplete. Separation of Secondness, or Secundal Separation, 
called Precission, consists in supposing a state of things in which one element 
is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the 
other. Thus, we cannot imagine a sensuous quality without some degree of 
vividness. But we usually suppose that redness, as it is in red things, has no 
vividness; and it would certainly be impossible to demonstrate that everything 
red must have a degree of vividness. Separation of Thirdness, or Tertial 
Separation, called discrimination, consists in representing one of the two 
separands without representing the other. If A can be prescinded from, i.e. 
supposed without, B, then B can, at least, be discriminated from A. ]] 

[[ It is possible to prescind Firstness from Secondness. We can suppose a being 
whose whole life consists in one unvarying feeling of redness. But it is 
impossible to prescind Secondness from Firstness. For to suppose two things is 
to suppose two units; and however colorless and indefinite an object may be, it 
is something, and therein has Firstness, even if it has nothing recognizable as 
a quality. Everything must have some non-relative element; and this is its 
Firstness. So likewise it is possible to prescind Secondness from Thirdness. 
But Thirdness without Secondness would be absurd. ]]

As for involution and evolution, I would say they are neither kinds of argument 
nor kinds of separation, but kinds of logical relation.

Gary f.

From: Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> >
Sent: 28-Jun-21 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca  
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

 

Gary F., List

 

Prescission is not reciprocal. Is the reciprocal process of prescission 
dissociation, and vice versa? Dissociation to me seems like involvement 
(inv

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

[gnox]

Helmut, list,

I think it’s important to discriminate between logical processes, or kinds of 
argument (deduction, induction, abduction), and “kinds of separation” 
(dissociation, prescission, discrimination), which are pre-logical in the sense 
that no reasoning is involved, just a kind of imagination/perception of 
possibilities. A couple of paragraphs from Peirce’s 1903 “Syllabus” might be 
helpful here. Both are from EP2:270 (but I’m skipping one paragraph between 
them).

CSP: [[ In order to understand logic, it is necessary to get as clear notions 
as possible of these three categories and to gain the ability to recognize them 
in the different conceptions with which logic deals. Although all three are 
ubiquitous, yet certain kinds of separations may be effected upon them. There 
are three distinct kinds of separation in thought. They correspond to the three 
categories. Separation of Firstness, or Primal Separation, called Dissociation, 
consists in imagining one of the two separands without the other. It may be 
complete or incomplete. Separation of Secondness, or Secundal Separation, 
called Precission, consists in supposing a state of things in which one element 
is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the 
other. Thus, we cannot imagine a sensuous quality without some degree of 
vividness. But we usually suppose that redness, as it is in red things, has no 
vividness; and it would certainly be impossible to demonstrate that everything 
red must have a degree of vividness. Separation of Thirdness, or Tertial 
Separation, called discrimination, consists in representing one of the two 
separands without representing the other. If A can be prescinded from, i.e. 
supposed without, B, then B can, at least, be discriminated from A. ]] 

[[ It is possible to prescind Firstness from Secondness. We can suppose a being 
whose whole life consists in one unvarying feeling of redness. But it is 
impossible to prescind Secondness from Firstness. For to suppose two things is 
to suppose two units; and however colorless and indefinite an object may be, it 
is something, and therein has Firstness, even if it has nothing recognizable as 
a quality. Everything must have some non-relative element; and this is its 
Firstness. So likewise it is possible to prescind Secondness from Thirdness. 
But Thirdness without Secondness would be absurd. ]]

As for involution and evolution, I would say they are neither kinds of argument 
nor kinds of separation, but kinds of logical relation.

Gary f.

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 28-Jun-21 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

 

Gary F., List

 

Prescission is not reciprocal. Is the reciprocal process of prescission 
dissociation, and vice versa? Dissociation to me seems like involvement 
(involution?), and prescission like evolvement (evolution?). In other words, 
dissociation seems like deductively focussing on an aspect: There is a color, 
color requires a space for it, so there is a space. There is a melody, melodies 
are made of sounds, so there is sound. Prescission then would be a by 
determination necessary evolution: There is space, space is there for something 
filling it, I can only see something if it has a color, so there should be 
color. There is a sound, a sound alone is obsolete, has no meaning. So there 
should be other sound(s), a melody. So dissociation is analytical, and 
prescission is creative. But not creative in the sense of arbitrary abduction 
(guessing), but determinated, necessary abduction. But from what comes the 
determination and necessity? De Tienne says, it comes from the predecessor. The 
predecessor contains a meaning, which anticipates its own unfolding, its own 
elaboration. That means, the intentionality of abstraction originates not in 
the person that does it, but in the object itself. Though this object may 
require a person (or another source of mind) to do the abstraction / 
prescission.

 

Best

Helmut

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 7

[gnox]

Robert, I can see how your Categorical Theoretic Structuralism is a way of
establishing the credentials of phaneroscopy as a science. But it doesn’t
explain why Peirce’s classification places it first among all positive
sciences, prior to logic and semiotic. Almost any positive science can call
on a mathematical theory and apply it to theorize about its observations;
but phaneroscopy is unique in this respect because it is supposed to
“dispense with preconceptions” and consider phenomena in their Firstness.
I’m hoping that the second part of André’s presentation on prescission will
help to show how phaneroscopy can be “pre-truth.” But I think we should wait
and see if there are any other comments or questions on slide 7 before we go
on to the next one.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 26-Jun-21 17:34

 

List,

My aim is not to differ from André's approach to discovering categories. I
do not want to engage in an endless philosophical debate about the reality
of mathematical objects and their complex relationship with experience. The
disagreements will come later because I assume a Categorical Theoretic
Structuralism position in mathematics. I extend it to phaneroscopy using an
isomorphism between an abstract mathematical object (Poset or Functor) and
the set of relations between Peirce's universal categories as he defines
them. It seems to me that this consolidates the scientific status of
phaneroscopy. Then - note that this is my conclusion - I point out all the
interest in considering these structures because they agree with Peirce's
objective idealism if we need a philosophical reference. 

Your quotation from Peirce introducing the question of truth is
enlightening in this respect: "And this truth like every truth must come to
us by the way of experience. No apriorist ever denied that.". Indeed,
whether you consider me as an apriorist or not, it will not destroy this
isomorphism. All means are good to reach the truth; let us not waste time in
vain quarrels. 

Sincerely,

Robert Marty

 

Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy 

 
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty

  https://martyrobert.academia.edu/

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 7

[gnox]

List,

Robert, except for a few inaccuracies (like the misspelling of prescission), 
your account of the discovery of the categories is very much in line with 
André’s, although the terminology is different. If I may focus on one sentence 
of your summary, I have a question about your usage of the term a priori here: 
“the act of precession is a simple observation that we can discover an 
organization a priori in the phaneron.” In most philosophical discourse (since 
Kant anyway), a priori means “prior to experience” (usually meaning sense 
experience). If you mean that we can discover this “organization” without 
relying on any particular sense experience, this is certainly true of 
phaneroscopic observation, because the phaneron includes that “organization” as 
well as sense experience. But obviously the discovery cannot be prior to 
observation of the phaneron. Once it has been formulated, mathematically or 
otherwise, the organization has been generalized from the observation, not the 
other way round. If you agree with that, your account is in agreement with 
André’s, as far as I can see.

As for Peirce, one relevant comment on the issue is this one:

CSP (CP 1.417,): [[ The questions which are here to be examined are, what are 
the different systems of hypotheses from which mathematical deduction can set 
out, what are their general characters, why are not other hypotheses possible, 
and the like. These are not problems which, like those of mathematics, repose 
upon clear and definite assumptions recognized at the outset; and yet, like 
mathematical problems, they are questions of possibility and necessity. What 
the nature of this necessity can be is one of the very matters to be 
discovered. This much, however, is indisputable: if there are really any such 
necessary characteristics of mathematical hypotheses as I have just declared in 
advance that we shall find that there [are], this necessity must spring from 
some truth so broad as to hold not only for the universe we know but for every 
world that poet could create. And this truth like every truth must come to us 
by the way of experience. No apriorist ever denied that. The first matters 
which it is pertinent to examine are the most universal categories of elements 
of all experience, natural or poetical. ]]

Gary f.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 26-Jun-21 04:08



List,

Since it is a slow read, we have the convenience of dealing with the questions 
one after the other.

I observe that it is admitted in the previous slide that the reader is familiar 
with the categories.  They have a logical role, form a small set gradually 
ordered, participate in a step-by-step process that incorporates them. Each 
category is found inductively (in the phaneron, I suppose); finally, they are 
tested by precession.

 I notice that no formal definition of the categories have been presented (like 
CP 8.328), nor any justification of their reduction to three (Reduction 
Thesis), and that the terms "mode of being" have not been mentioned so far. 

 

Slide 7 provides more details on testing.

- it is an act of abstractive analysis (it is thus an operation of the mind on 
what is in front of it, i.e., a phaneron).

- This operation seeks to identify (used as an intransitive verb) in this 
phaneron logically (sic) distinct components. The latter has the particularity 
of having non-reciprocal* dependency relations between them. This is how sets 
of three components connected by these relations are formed, that an act of 
analysis has abstracted from the phaneron. 

The next two points introduce "active determinations" and particular rules (to 
be discussed later).

 

At this point, I summarize: the act of precession is a simple observation that 
we can discover an organization a priori in the phaneron. An organization that 
is already there. Now, in the mathematical repository, we find a very simple 
axiomatized structure (Partially Ordered Set, Poset) devoid of any empirical 
contamination which gathers in a single diagram (3-->2-->1) the totality of the 
information brought by De Tienne.  Why not extract this structure from the 
"cloudy manifold"? Everything would become so much simpler! Especially 
considering that Peirce advocates it in his Classification of Sciences (MS 
1345, CP 2.119):

 

 "[ … ]- mathematics, the study of ideal constructions without reference to 
their real existence,  

 - empirics, the study of phenomena with the purpose of identifying their forms 
with those mathematics has studied,

 - pragmatics, the study of how we ought to behave in the light of the truths 
of empirics."

(Peirce, MS 1345, undated, transcription 1976: NEM, III.2, 1122) [bold emphasis 
is mine]

 

*(i.e. whenever there is a relation of dependence between two components A and 
B, there is no relation of dependence between B and A)

 

Sincerely,

Robert Marty

 

Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy 

f

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[gnox]

Robert, that’s good, I’ll post slide 7 shortly so everyone knows what we’re 
talking about. I haven’t heard back from André about your previous post.

 

One more comment on slide 6. Jon has suggested that “Perhaps André is merely 
attempting to preclude the misconception that Peirce's three categories are 
sequentially ordered, as if 1ns comes first, 2ns comes second, and 3ns comes 
third in some sense.” That could well be, but there’s a complication concerning 
the “New List of Categories” because the process he is analyzing there sounds 
very much like a sequence that could be temporal as well as logical. For 
instance, he says that “Quality, therefore, in its very widest sense, is the 
first conception in order in passing from being to substance.” So I don’t think 
we can entirely separate the order of relative complexity from sequential 
order. (After all, even consequence is a kind of sequence.) We just have to be 
careful to distinguish among the logical, psychological, and phaneroscopic 
points of view, especially when they are all looking at such a complex 
phenomenon as semiosis.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: robert marty  
Sent: 25-Jun-21 05:29



Gary F, It will be possible to debate these questions from the following slide 
in which André De Tienne writes about "a non-reciprocal logical order of 
dependence". ... I am ready ...

 Robert Marty


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty  

https://martyrobert.academia.edu/

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[gnox]

List,

I think my previous post on this slide may have overemphasized the
difference between Peirce’s 1867 view of the categories and his later
“phaneroscopic” view of them, and I’d like to correct that before we leave
slide 6, which refers to Peirce’s early discovery that the “set of genuinely
universal categories is small and gradually ordered.” 

It may not be clear what “genuinely universal categories” are — i.e. how
they differ from other sets of categories — nor is it clear what André means
by “gradually ordered.” The next few slides (dealing with prescission) will
probably clarify this; but before we get to them, I’d like to provide some
relevant text from a letter Peirce wrote c. 1905 to a “Signor Calderoni”:

[[ … on May 14, 1867, after three years of almost insanely concentrated
thought, hardly interrupted even by sleep, I produced my one contribution to
philosophy in the “New List of Categories” in the Proceedings of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. VII, pp. 287-298. Tell your
friend Julian that this is, if possible, even less original than my maxim of
pragmatism; and that I take pride in the entire absence of originality in
all that I have ever sought to bring to the attention of logicians and
metaphysicians. My three categories are nothing but Hegel's three grades of
thinking. I know very well that there are other categories, those which
Hegel calls by that name. But I never succeeded in satisfying myself with
any list of them. We may classify objects according to their matter; as
wooden things, iron things, silver things, ivory things, etc. But
classification according to structure is generally more important. And it is
the same with ideas. Much as I would like to see Hegel's list of categories
reformed, I hold that a classification of the elements of thought and
consciousness according to their formal structure is more important. I
believe in inventing new philosophical words in order to avoid the
ambiguities of the familiar words. I use the word phaneron to mean all that
is present to the mind in any sense or in any way whatsoever, regardless of
whether it be fact or figment. I examine the phaneron and I endeavor to sort
out its elements according to the complexity of their structure. I thus
reach my three categories. ]] (CP 8.213, c. 1905).

Peirce’s assertion that his “three categories are nothing but Hegel's three
grades of thinking” might be misleading in some ways, but it confirms
André’s statement that they are “gradually ordered.” It also shows that
Peirce’s method of “reaching” his three categories did not undergo a
complete change when he renamed it “phaneroscopy” in 1904.

Gary f.

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca  
Sent: 23-Jun-21 13:48
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

 

List,

Part 2 of the slide presentation introduces Peirce’s “universal categories”
with an outline of the 1867 paper in which he first presented his “New List
of Categories.” This was decades before he started referring to them as
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, and 35 years before he started
referring to his method of discerning them as “phenomenology.” Personally I
find the “New List” paper to be one of the most difficult Peirce ever wrote,
and I think André does a good job of reducing its argument to one slide. But
I must point out that Peirce’s categorial theory, and his phenomenological
method, went through several changes between 1867 and the 1903-4 writings
which contain his most clear and cogent statements about them and about his
method. For now I’ll just mention one of those changes.

The “New List” paper was explicitly “based upon the theory already
established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of
sensuous impressions to unity and that the validity of a conception consists
in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity
without the introduction of it.” This was a Kantian theory of cognition
which Peirce no longer accepted in 1886, when he wrote the following:

[[ Kant talks inaccurately of the manifold of sense; in fact the first
impression has no parts, any more than it has unity or wholeness; yet it may
be allowed to be potentially a manifold, if we say that all that the
intellect evolves from it lies involved within it. The pure First is
essentially vivid, present, and conscious; for that which is dead or remote
is as it is only for him who may perceive it. What the world was to Adam on
the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or
had become conscious of his own existence,—that is first. ]] (W5:299)

Peirce’s three Categories are recognizable in his 1867 paper, but there is a
big difference between “the manifold of sense” and the phaneron, and we
can’t comprehend phaneroscopy without seeing the difference. I hope the slow
read will lead us toward that goal.

Gary f. 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[gnox]

List,

Part 2 of the slide presentation introduces Peirce’s “universal categories”
with an outline of the 1867 paper in which he first presented his “New List
of Categories.” This was decades before he started referring to them as
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, and 35 years before he started
referring to his method of discerning them as “phenomenology.” Personally I
find the “New List” paper to be one of the most difficult Peirce ever wrote,
and I think André does a good job of reducing its argument to one slide. But
I must point out that Peirce’s categorial theory, and his phenomenological
method, went through several changes between 1867 and the 1903-4 writings
which contain his most clear and cogent statements about them and about his
method. For now I’ll just mention one of those changes.

The “New List” paper was explicitly “based upon the theory already
established, that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of
sensuous impressions to unity and that the validity of a conception consists
in the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity
without the introduction of it.” This was a Kantian theory of cognition
which Peirce no longer accepted in 1886, when he wrote the following:

[[ Kant talks inaccurately of the manifold of sense; in fact the first
impression has no parts, any more than it has unity or wholeness; yet it may
be allowed to be potentially a manifold, if we say that all that the
intellect evolves from it lies involved within it. The pure First is
essentially vivid, present, and conscious; for that which is dead or remote
is as it is only for him who may perceive it. What the world was to Adam on
the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or
had become conscious of his own existence,—that is first. ]] (W5:299)

Peirce’s three Categories are recognizable in his 1867 paper, but there is a
big difference between “the manifold of sense” and the phaneron, and we
can’t comprehend phaneroscopy without seeing the difference. I hope the slow
read will lead us toward that goal.

Gary f. 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 21-Jun-21 17:34



Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. 

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

Necessary assumption for the purposes of this talk: 

You are already minimally familiar with Peirce's three categories of
firstness, secondness, and thirdness. 

• 1864-1867: Initial search for a new conception of the logical role a set
of genuinely universal categories should fulfill

- Discovery that this set is small and gradually ordered.

- Each category is a distinct and indispensable stage in the process of
turning a cloudy manifold into a clarified unifying intellection.

- Each category is found inductively and confirmed through the test of
PRESCISSION, a powerful kind of heuristic abstraction.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[gnox]

Robert, your criticism is duly noted and has been forwarded to André De Tienne. 
Whether he responds to you or to the list is of course up to him.

Since no one (including you) has expressed an interest in having Peirce’s texts 
on the issue (other than the one you quoted) posted to the list, I’ll wait 
until we reach the stage of the slow read that deals with it before posting 
them. 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 23-Jun-21 10:47
To: Gary Fuhrman ; Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

 

I will not follow you on this polemical tone because to criticize, in 
scientific matters, is precise to respect, since one makes the first effort to 
consider the thought of the other and then a second effort by building 
arguments to contest it if need be. My criticism is precisely about the fact 
that De Tienne starts with phaneroscopy and forgets that the formal structures 
he believes in discovering are inherited from mathematics on which they depend. 
 You have done very well to warn him, and I hope that he will have the 
opportunity to put forward his own justifications. 

I do not doubt that you can bring forward a large number of quotations from 
Peirce, but it will be difficult for you to escape the sense of dependence 
without finding yourself in contradiction with Peirce himself:  

 

"It is, however, not a heresy but a doctrine very widely entertained, since 
Auguste Comte wrote, that the sciences form a sort of ladder descending into 
the well of truth, each one leading on to another, those which are more 
concrete and special drawing their principles from those which are more 
abstract and general". (CP 2.119) [emphasize mine]

 

RM

Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy 

  fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty

  https://martyrobert.academia.edu/

 

 

 

Le mer. 23 juin 2021 à 15:08, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > 
a écrit :

Robert, your prescription of “mutual respect” apparently doesn’t oblige you to 
extend respect to André De Tienne. The subject of mathematics and its relation 
to phaneroscopy has not come up yet in the slow read; it doesn’t come up until 
slide 18, with Peirce’s classification of the sciences. But you have apparently 
jumped to the conclusion that De Tienne ignores mathematics entirely because he 
does not start with it. I’ll copy this to him in case he wants to respond.

I’ll be happy to post here what Peirce said about the reliance of phaneroscopy 
on mathematics, it you really want to discuss it in a mutually respectful 
manner, rather than turning it into a combative “debate.”

Gary f.

}  {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From:   peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
<  peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 23-Jun-21 08:16
To: Gary Fuhrman <  g...@gnusystems.ca>; Peirce-L < 
 PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

 

List,

 

I followed without intervening in the debates on André de Tienne's slides. The 
initiative is interesting because one spends a long time in a frame, breaking 
with the only particular reactions of the present. Taking the time to discuss 
step by step on a constructed presentation can be eminently profitable to the 
collective progress. Each one can bring his stone or his nuance in a climate of 
mutual respect. Observation shows that this is not the case.

 

The cause of this is, in my opinion, that from the beginning, the first slide 
introduces a characterized bias. Indeed, the discussion is biased by the 
proposal to choose André de Tienne's idiosyncratic approach as a framework. It 
has not really been discussed. It imposes the entry into the Peircean system of 
thought through phaneroscopy presented as a science of observation without any 
prior foundation. It would be made possible by the capacity granted to any mind 
to prescind universal categories in any phaneron, i.e., in everything that is 
in front of the mind. We can immediately observe that if the mind can prescind 
universal categories in any phaneron, they are already there (CP 1.353). 
Indeed, "The categories are mostly combined in the observables; to separate 
them, the human mind operates by "dissociation," "prescission," and 
"distinction." It is a process that works like chemical analysis, a kind of 
"cracking" that dissociates the molecules to highlight the atoms that 
constitute it and then distinguish the constituents" (auto citation, see the 
links below). If there is a mystification to be mentioned, it may be here!

 

De Tienne's idiosyncrasy consists of recognizing the pre-eminent place of 
mathematics in Peirce's thought to better exclude it by c

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[gnox]

Robert, your prescription of “mutual respect” apparently doesn’t oblige you to 
extend respect to André De Tienne. The subject of mathematics and its relation 
to phaneroscopy has not come up yet in the slow read; it doesn’t come up until 
slide 18, with Peirce’s classification of the sciences. But you have apparently 
jumped to the conclusion that De Tienne ignores mathematics entirely because he 
does not start with it. I’ll copy this to him in case he wants to respond.

I’ll be happy to post here what Peirce said about the reliance of phaneroscopy 
on mathematics, it you really want to discuss it in a mutually respectful 
manner, rather than turning it into a combative “debate.”

Gary f.

}  {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 23-Jun-21 08:16
To: Gary Fuhrman ; Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

 

List,

 

I followed without intervening in the debates on André de Tienne's slides. The 
initiative is interesting because one spends a long time in a frame, breaking 
with the only particular reactions of the present. Taking the time to discuss 
step by step on a constructed presentation can be eminently profitable to the 
collective progress. Each one can bring his stone or his nuance in a climate of 
mutual respect. Observation shows that this is not the case.

 

The cause of this is, in my opinion, that from the beginning, the first slide 
introduces a characterized bias. Indeed, the discussion is biased by the 
proposal to choose André de Tienne's idiosyncratic approach as a framework. It 
has not really been discussed. It imposes the entry into the Peircean system of 
thought through phaneroscopy presented as a science of observation without any 
prior foundation. It would be made possible by the capacity granted to any mind 
to prescind universal categories in any phaneron, i.e., in everything that is 
in front of the mind. We can immediately observe that if the mind can prescind 
universal categories in any phaneron, they are already there (CP 1.353). 
Indeed, "The categories are mostly combined in the observables; to separate 
them, the human mind operates by "dissociation," "prescission," and 
"distinction." It is a process that works like chemical analysis, a kind of 
"cracking" that dissociates the molecules to highlight the atoms that 
constitute it and then distinguish the constituents" (auto citation, see the 
links below). If there is a mystification to be mentioned, it may be here!

 

De Tienne's idiosyncrasy consists of recognizing the pre-eminent place of 
mathematics in Peirce's thought to better exclude it by confining it, along 
with mathematicians, to their field.  I  support this judgment in the preprint 
that I have just put online. I extract just this quote (among others):

 

Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of the 
sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of steps, 
each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may adapt our 
phraseology to the image of the well of truth with flights of stairs leading 
down into it:

We divide the whole into three great parts:

 - mathematics, the study of ideal constructions without reference to their 
real existence,
  
 - empirics, the study of phenomena with the purpose of identifying their forms 
with those mathematics has studied,

 - pragmatics, the study of how we ought to behave in the light of the truths 
of empirics.

(Peirce, MS 1345, undated, transcription 1976: NEM, III.2, 1122) [emphasize 
mine]

 

In short, to confer on phaneroscopy, without mystification, the status of 
science, we must be collectively capable of identifying mathematical forms with 
forms resulting from the abstractive observation of phanerons and, for that, it 
is necessary of course that these forms are already there in the mind of the 
observers. Not to make mathematics "the unseen character"(in french 
"L'arlésienne") is a prerequisite for any healthy discussion. Otherwise, one 
will open the way to a war of extermination between clans in the depths of the 
"well of truth." In such battles, "the reason of the stronger is always the 
best."

 

 

 (PDF) The "Podium" of Universal Categories and their degenerate cases 
(researchgate.net)

https://www.academia.edu/49325877/The_Podium_of_Universal_Categories_and_their_degenerate_cases

 

Sincerely,

 

Robert Marty

 

 

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty  

https://martyrobert.academia.edu/

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[gnox]

Auke, posting of the next slide does not cut off discussion of the previous 
slide. Gary can still answer your question “Why consciousness and not awareness 
or apperception?” if that’s what you are referring to as “unsettled.” Maybe you 
can clarify: are you asking why Gary chose the word “consciousness,” or why 
Peirce chose it in that context? If the latter, it would be a difficult 
question to settle!

 

When you wrote “method of tenacity,” did you mean “method of velocity”? That 
would seem more appropriate to the situation.

 

gf

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. 

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

Necessary assumption for the purposes of this talk: 

You are already minimally familiar with Peirce's three categories of
firstness, secondness, and thirdness. 

• 1864-1867: Initial search for a new conception of the logical role a set
of genuinely universal categories should fulfill

- Discovery that this set is small and gradually ordered.

- Each category is a distinct and indispensable stage in the process of
turning a cloudy manifold into a clarified unifying intellection.

- Each category is found inductively and confirmed through the test of
PRESCISSION, a powerful kind of heuristic abstraction.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

[gnox]

Jon, Gary R, list,

As you said, Gary, this post of Jon’s is a very rich one, and after reading it 
through three times I’m still learning from it. I don’t have much to add, or 
any particular objections to it, and don’t have strong feelings on the 
terminological issue. But something about your exchange reminds me of the last 
sentence I quoted from CP 1.280: “Original work in this department, if it is to 
be real and hitherto unformulated truth, is — not to speak of whether it is 
difficult or not — one of those functions of growth which every man, perhaps, 
in some fashion exercises once, some even twice, but which it would be next to 
a miracle to perform a third time.” What kind of work can be done by almost 
everybody once but three times by almost nobody?

The “department” is of course phenomenology, and formulation of a truth is 
certainly part of it. But the hard part, apparently, is the originality. The 
reason is that Firstness is predominant in originality, while Thirdness is 
predominant in formulation. Once you’ve learned to recognize the elementarity 
or indecomposability of a category, and given it a name, no amount of 
reformulation or renaming can restore the originality of the insight. Your 
cognition of it will continue to be re-cognition. Unless you lose your memory 
altogether, your prior formulation is going to influence your perceptual 
judgment about every percept that you recognize. You can prescind its 
Firstness, if you are good at prescission, but the originality of the 
perception is lost as soon as you formulate it in any way. But if you are 
lucky, the work of formulation may bear fruit for somebody else by directing 
their attention to elements of the phenomena that they had not already seen as 
elementary.  

When I first read that sentence of Peirce’s, I found it puzzling, and I don’t 
claim to have seen the full truth of it yet, which is why I keep coming back to 
it. But I’m going to stop here for today and hope that others can pick out some 
of the pieces of the puzzle from what I’ve said above, in spite of its 
awkwardness.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 20-Jun-21 16:40
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

 

Gary R., Gary F., List:

 

GR: My reservations for now: (1) again, I do not see the use of quali-, sin-, 
and legisense in phenomenology as conflating aspects of it with quali-, sin-, 
and legisign in logic as semeiotic, but as revealing the underlying influence 
(which is not a conflation, as 'sense' and 'sign' are two very different 
concepts) of the ideas and terminology found in phenomenology on those which 
appear logic as semeiotic;

 

I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense" 
conflates phaneroscopy with semeiotic, I said that it runs the risk of 
fostering such conflation.

 

GR: (2) primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add to 
the already problematic neologistist terminology employed by Peirce.

 

True, but "sinsense" and "legisense" are even more novel (and arguably even 
more problematic) as terms that Peirce himself never used. With that in mind, 
consider this passage from his text on the ethics of terminology.

 

CSP: [W]hen a man has introduced a conception into science, it naturally 
becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that conception suitable 
scientific expressions, and that when a name has been conferred upon a 
conception by him to whose labors science is indebted for that conception, it 
becomes the duty of all,--a duty to the discoverer, and a duty to science,--to 
accept his name, unless it should be of such a nature that the adoption of it 
would be unwholesome for science; that should the discoverer fail in his duty 
either by giving no name or an utterly unsuitable one, then, after a reasonable 
interval, whoever first has occasion to employ a name for that conception must 
invent a suitable one; and others ought to follow him; but that whoever 
deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was 
conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense 
against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty 
of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 
2:265, 1903)

 

In short, we should not invent new names for conceptions that he (or anyone 
else) has already introduced into science under other names, unless those 
original names are "utterly unsuitable." Accordingly, if we wish to preserve 
"qualisense" from 1909, it should be accompanied by "molition" and 
"habit-consciousness" as in that same passage, rather than the neologisms 
"sinsense" and "legisense." On the other hand, if we wish to preserve "-sense" 
as the consistent root word for all three categories, then we should stick with 
"primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" from c

RE: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Helmut, yes, that’s exactly why I didn’t use the word “type”, and only used the 
word “token” because I couldn’t think of a better word to get the idea across.

 

Gary f.

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 20-Jun-21 02:26
To: gary.richm...@gmail.com
Cc: Peirce-L ; Gary Fuhrman 
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, Gary, List

 

Of course I agree, that Peirce´s own explanation and your interpretation are 
much better than my attempt. Still though I feel a little unwell about the 
token-type relation between "the phaneron" and "a phaneron": Usually the type 
is a class between other classes on the same level of classification. But the 
phaneron, I´d say, is alone on its level. But I see, you did not mention the 
term "type", you just wrote, that a single phaneron is a token of the generic 
phaneron.

 

Best

Helmut

  

  

19. Juni 2021 um 18:40 Uhr
"Gary Richmond" mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> >
wrote:

 

 

I like your answers better too, Gary, much better; but your quoted text arrived 
on the List as blank spaces, likely because of your reverse type color (white 
on black) in your book, Turning Sings.  Here's the text as I darkened it. 

 

Cheers,

 

Not-G-man

  

-- Forwarded message -
From: mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> >
Date: Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 9:00 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
To: mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >

  

Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. 
Here’s mine:

In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of 
phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends 
on multiple observations. He therefore refers to a plurality of 
phaneroscopists, each of whom has to make his or her own direct observations of 
the phaneron. Thus we must refer to a plurality of “phanerons” when we consider 
what they are doing. We might say that each of these phanerons is a token of 
the generic phaneron, and each observer a token of the mind that the phaneron 
is present to. Here is the quotation again:

[[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and 
since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of 
which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the 
accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat 
my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail 
to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic 
decoration to a man congenitally blind. What I term phaneroscopy is that study 
which, supported by the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its 
observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the 
features of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together 
that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite 
disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list 
comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally 
proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal 
subdivisions of those categories. ]]

 

The reason that Peirce usually insists on the oneness of the phaneron (or 
phenomenon) is explained (in his typical convoluted fashion) in EP2:472, 1913:

[[ … what I am aware of, or, to use a different expression for the same fact, 
what I am conscious of, or, as the psychologists strangely talk, the ‘contents 
of my consciousness’ (just as if what I am conscious of and the fact that I am 
conscious were two different facts, and as if the one were inside the other), 
this same fact, I say, however it be worded, is evidently the entire universe, 
so far as I am concerned.]]

 


If that doesn’t help, there’s a much longer explanation in  
 Turning Signs 5: Inside Out (gnusystems.ca).


 


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke


 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York





 

  

On Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 9:00 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. 
Here’s mine:

In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of 
phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends 
on multiple observations. He therefore refers to a plurality of 
phaneroscopists, each of whom has to make his or her own direct observations of 
the phaneron. Thus we must refer to a plurality of “phanerons” when we consider 
what they are doing. We might say that each of these phanerons is a token of 
the generic phaneron, and each observer a token of the mind that the phaneron 
is present to. Here is the quotation again:

[[ There is n

RE: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Thanks for fixing that up, Gary. I’m still baffled by this white-text thing, 
because it never comes back to me from the list that way, and in this case the 
quotes were not copied from TS but from another file that is not formatted 
white-on-black. Strange. I hope this post doesn’t come out reversed!

 

Gary f.

From: Gary Richmond  
Sent: 19-Jun-21 12:40
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Gary Fuhrman 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary f, List,

 

I like your answers better too, Gary, much better; but your quoted text arrived 
on the List as blank spaces, likely because of your reverse type color (white 
on black) in your book, Turning Sings.  Here's the text as I darkened it. 

 

Cheers,

 

Not-G-man

 

-- Forwarded message -
From: mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> >
Date: Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 9:00 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
To: mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >

 

Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. 
Here’s mine:

In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of 
phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends 
on multiple observations. He therefore refers to a plurality of 
phaneroscopists, each of whom has to make his or her own direct observations of 
the phaneron. Thus we must refer to a plurality of “phanerons” when we consider 
what they are doing. We might say that each of these phanerons is a token of 
the generic phaneron, and each observer a token of the mind that the phaneron 
is present to. Here is the quotation again:

[[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and 
since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of 
which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the 
accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat 
my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail 
to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic 
decoration to a man congenitally blind. What I term phaneroscopy is that study 
which, supported by the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its 
observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the 
features of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together 
that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite 
disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list 
comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally 
proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal 
subdivisions of those categories. ]]

 

The reason that Peirce usually insists on the oneness of the phaneron (or 
phenomenon) is explained (in his typical convoluted fashion) in EP2:472, 1913:

[[ … what I am aware of, or, to use a different expression for the same fact, 
what I am conscious of, or, as the psychologists strangely talk, the ‘contents 
of my consciousness’ (just as if what I am conscious of and the fact that I am 
conscious were two different facts, and as if the one were inside the other), 
this same fact, I say, however it be worded, is evidently the entire universe, 
so far as I am concerned.]]

 


If that doesn’t help, there’s a much longer explanation in  
 Turning Signs 5: Inside Out (gnusystems.ca).


 


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke


 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York







 

 

On Sat, Jun 19, 2021 at 9:00 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. 
Here’s mine:

In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of 
phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends 
on multiple observations. He therefore refers to a plurality of 
phaneroscopists, each of whom has to make his or her own direct observations of 
the phaneron. Thus we must refer to a plurality of “phanerons” when we consider 
what they are doing. We might say that each of these phanerons is a token of 
the generic phaneron, and each observer a token of the mind that the phaneron 
is present to. Here is the quotation again:

[[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and 
since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of 
which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the 
accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat 
my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail 
to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic 
decoration to a man congenitally bl

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Auke, I’m not suggesting anything different from what Peirce said about 
phaneroscopy. The trouble is that in order to grasp what it is, you have to 
take Peirce at his word rather than translating his ideas into habitual 
categories such as “Cartesian thought experiment,” “absolute doubt” and “the 
unreal.”

I know that you have access to a large sampling of Peirce’s texts and can 
search through it for “phenomenology” and “phanero.” If you’re not willing to 
wait for some of those texts to turn up in this slow read, I recommend that you 
find and read them yourself while setting aside your preconceptions. (which is 
in itself a crucial and challenging aspect of phaneroscopic practice.) Then 
you’ll be in a position to judge whether anything I’ve said is in conflict with 
anything Peirce said on the subject.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 19-Jun-21 09:18
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F.

Are you suggesting that doing phaneroscopy is like doing a cartesian thought 
experiment? Eliminating everything, and building things up from absolute doubt, 
or, in your case, the unreal?

Auke

Op 19 juni 2021 om 14:33 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca  
: 

AVB: I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?

GF: I guess that’s right! I naively trusted that your question related to the 
nature of phaneroscopy as Peirce defines it, and not to some metaphysical issue 
which does not exist for phaneroscopy. 

  

Gary f. 

  

  

From: Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl> > 
Sent: 19-Jun-21 04:06
To: g...@gnusystems.ca  ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?

 

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca  
:

Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by 
stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver 
its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have 
missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the 
dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it would 
be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the 
semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if 
it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall. 

I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal categories 
“do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality.” 
Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, not the other 
way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I 
could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in connection with 
phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your 
question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that. 

Gary f. 

  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca  
:

Auke, Gary R, list, 

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the 
mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Lo

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. 
Here’s mine:

In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of 
phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends 
on multiple observations. He therefore refers to a plurality of 
phaneroscopists, each of whom has to make his or her own direct observations of 
the phaneron. Thus we must refer to a plurality of “phanerons” when we consider 
what they are doing. We might say that each of these phanerons is a token of 
the generic phaneron, and each observer a token of the mind that the phaneron 
is present to. Here is the quotation again:

[[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and 
since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of 
which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the 
accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat 
my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail 
to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic 
decoration to a man congenitally blind. What I term phaneroscopy is that study 
which, supported by the direct observation of phanerons and generalizing its 
observations, signalizes several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the 
features of each; shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together 
that no one can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite 
disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list 
comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally 
proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal 
subdivisions of those categories. ]]

 

The reason that Peirce usually insists on the oneness of the phaneron (or 
phenomenon) is explained (in his typical convoluted fashion) in EP2:472, 1913:

[[ … what I am aware of, or, to use a different expression for the same fact, 
what I am conscious of, or, as the psychologists strangely talk, the ‘contents 
of my consciousness’ (just as if what I am conscious of and the fact that I am 
conscious were two different facts, and as if the one were inside the other), 
this same fact, I say, however it be worded, is evidently the entire universe, 
so far as I am concerned.]]

 

If that doesn’t help, there’s a much longer explanation in Turning Signs 5: 
Inside Out (gnusystems.ca)  .

 

Gary f

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 19-Jun-21 07:32
To: a.bree...@upcmail.nl
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

List

 

Here again the maybe most frequently used quote about "phaneron", from the 
Commens Dictionary:

"

1905 | Adirondack Summer School Lectures | CP 1.284

Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the 
collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, 
quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask 
present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions 
unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the 
phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all 
minds. So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied 
with the formal elements of the phaneron.

"

Due to this quote I was wondering, why Peirce in other places speaks of 
multiple "phanerons", or of "a phaneron". To me there are two possible 
explanations:

1. "Never having entertained a doubt" is two weak negations, that make a merely 
weak definition, i.e. a possibility. So he did not exclude the other 
possibility, that there may be distinct phanerons.

2. The phaneron is spatially total, but temporally separable, though, due to 
the continuity-claim, blurredly separable.

I like number 1 better.

Another question by me is, that "quite regardless of whether it corresponds to 
any real thing or not" does not exclude the possibility, that it does 
correspond to a real thing, i.e. include a dynamic object, i.e. be semiotic. 
Claiming regardlessness to me sounds rather like a scientific method to better 
focus on the phaneron alone, than like a completely distinct science. But I 
dont know the exact definition of "science", so ok, I guess, phaneroscopy may 
be called a science. Setting closer borders of "regard" helps to not miss 
something.

Did I get everything ok?

Best

Helmut

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

AVB: I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?

GF: I guess that’s right! I naively trusted that your question related to the 
nature of phaneroscopy as Peirce defines it, and not to some metaphysical issue 
which does not exist for phaneroscopy.

 

Gary f. 

 

 

From: Auke van Breemen  
Sent: 19-Jun-21 04:06
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?

 

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca  
: 

Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by 
stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver 
its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have 
missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the 
dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it would 
be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the 
semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if 
it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall. 

I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal categories 
“do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality.” 
Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, not the other 
way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I 
could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in connection with 
phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your 
question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that. 

Gary f. 

  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca  
:

Auke, Gary R, list, 

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the 
mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to develop their 
senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing that 
does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or 
phaneroscopy. 

By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses of 
the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as 
phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may 
develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as 
semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological 
decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them “branches” 
of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to 
do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science 
is that Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. 

I hope this helps … 

  

Gary f. 

  

  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
To: 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excerc

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

John, everything you say here was taken for granted in my post (and is one
of the central ideas in my book): that most communication has to rely on
trusting one’s dialogue partner to be speaking from experience. Auke’s
question was about the word veracity in comparison with honesty and other
terms for specific aspects of truthfulness. So that was the question I
answered.

 

Your last sentence, though, shows that you’re confusing phaneroscopy with
psychology. Phaneroscopy is a cenoscopic science and does not need any
special equipment to make its observations. Peirce contrasts it with
psychology in a 1909 letter to William James:

[[ I mean to begin by drawing a distinction between what I call “Psychology
Proper,” meaning an account of how the mind functions, developes, and
decays, together with the explanation of all this by motions and changes of
the brain, or, in default of this kind of explanation, by generalizations of
psychical phenomena, so as to account for all the workings of the soul in
the sense of reducing them to combinations of a few typical workings,— in
short a sort of physiology of the mind, on the one hand,— and what I call
“Phaneroscopy” on the other, or a description of what is before the mind or
in consciousness, as it appears, in the different kinds of consciousness,
which I rank under … three headings …. First, “Qualisense,” which means that
element of Feeling which consists in consciousness of the Quality of the
Feeling, but omitting the element of Vividness, which does not alter the
Quality (thus a faint memory of a highly luminous, and chromatic vermillion
does not appear less luminous or less high colored, for all its dimness) and
omitting all other concomitants of present feeling that are absent from a
correct recollection of the same Quality. (CP 8.300) ]]

 

I include the last part of that to throw some specifically phaneroscopic
light on qualia. This term, introduced by Peirce, has been widely used in
cognitive science, but usually without a Peircean understanding of it; hence
what David Chalmers called “the hard problem of consciousness.” Marc
Champagne has shown in his recent book Consciousness and the Philosophy of
Signs how such philosophical problems could be untangled by paying more
attention to Peirce’s semiotic analysis — especially the concept of the
qualisign — and its basis in phaneroscopy.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 18-Jun-21 23:36
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions
that are publicly verifiable.  

But a huge amount of information that we get every day is reported by people
whose observations cannot be  verified by any other sources.  When your
friends or family discuss their experiences, they rarely have photographic
evidence or other confirming sources about what they did or saw.

Over time, we learn that some people are more reliable or truthful than
others.  We also learn that people whose reports are usually truthful may
hide or distort some issues that may be painful or embarrassing.

For dreams and feelings, the subject's introspective reports are the only
sources for the details.  But neuroscientists have found those reports to be
extremely valuable for interpreting the data they receive from brain scans.

Modern technology can provide important resources for enhancing the science
of phaneroscopy.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by 
stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver 
its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have 
missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the 
dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it would 
be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the 
semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if 
it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall. 

I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal categories 
“do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality.” 
Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, not the other 
way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I 
could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in connection with 
phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your 
question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca  
: 

Auke, Gary R, list, 

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the 
mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to develop their 
senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing that 
does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or 
phaneroscopy. 

By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses of 
the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as 
phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may 
develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as 
semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological 
decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them “branches” 
of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to 
do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science 
is that Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. 

I hope this helps … 

  

Gary f. 

  

  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
To: 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

--

You wrote:

“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.

--

In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or 
single minded would have been a better choice. 

But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I 
did apply it to the excercize.   

 

The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
categories.”

--

yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in 
reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what 
your conception is of reality. 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Auke, Gary R, list,

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the 
mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to develop their 
senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing that 
does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or 
phaneroscopy.

By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses of 
the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as 
phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may 
develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as 
semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological 
decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them “branches” 
of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to 
do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science 
is that Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.

I hope this helps …

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
To: 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

--

You wrote:

“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.

--

In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or 
single minded would have been a better choice. 

But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I 
did apply it to the excercize.   

 

The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
categories.”

--

yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in 
reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what 
your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in 
(trutfunctional) propositions?

best,

Auke

Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca  
: 

Helmut, Auke, list, 

I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): it’s 
very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently to a 
word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on the 
object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t think 
either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the discussion; 
neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word “embodied” would 
have such an effect on her. 

Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, 
because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete: 

[[ Jon, 

CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves 
upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than 
the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as 
it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905)

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.

In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is 
because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the 
truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]

GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It is the 
predominance of Secondness that

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Helmut, Auke, list,

I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): it’s 
very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently to a 
word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on the 
object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t think 
either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the discussion; 
neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word “embodied” would 
have such an effect on her.

Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, 
because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete:

[[ Jon,

CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves 
upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than 
the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as 
it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905)

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.

In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is 
because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the 
truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]

GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It is the 
predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a normative science from 
phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive but not normative science. 
“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness. 

CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their 
immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of 
Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, 1903).

GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic consciousness.” 
But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is independent of individual 
thought,” because the existence of individual thinkers does not appear in the 
direct consciousness of the phaneroscopist. That is why Peircean phaneroscopy 
pointedly ignores the differences between individual minds and treats all 
possible minds as one mind.

CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I 
mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to 
the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. 
If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these 
questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of 
the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all 
minds. (CP 1.284, 1905)

CSP: I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total 
content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any other), the 
sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive 
value. (EP2:362, 1905)

GF: If you say this is unrealistic, you are exactly right. Reality is not an 
issue in phenomenology/phaneroscopy. The issue is the elements of the phaneron, 
also known as the “universal categories.”

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 17-Jun-21 02:57
To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com  

List,

 

the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I suspect 
people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in 
tribalistically separating the discussers in one group of the good ones, and 
one of the bad ones, identifying the bad ones due to their use of the wrong 
codes. I said "I suspect", to try to avoid the paradoxon of doing the same now. 
Though I know it sounds as if I am. That is because if once this sort of 
manichaeism is started, it is hard to stop.

I am not completely against identity politics, but against essentialism. It 
originally is a rightist domain. Sadly, some leftists too do not pay enough 
attention that the defence of discriminated identity groups does not switch 
into essentialism.

 

Best

Helmut

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Jon AS, list,

I’m looking forward to the part of our slow read that delves into Peirce’s 
classification of sciences, as I think that will explain what André means by 
saying that phaneroscopists are “pre-truthists.” But you’re right, some of the 
ideas floated in the other thread show what happens when people try to fit 
phaneroscopy (or the universal categories) into a preconceived framework such 
as a semiotic theory. For instance, one result is a confusion of Firstness with 
iconicity.

The pragmatic relationships among phaneroscopy, mathematics, logic and 
semeiotic are actually quite complex and sometimes recursive, as I hope will 
become clear as we take a closer look at Peirce’s texts on the subject. For 
today I’d just like to share a paragraph from André De Tienne’s 1993 paper on 
“Peirce’s Definitions of the Phaneron”:

[[ Our awareness of a phaneron is always total and puts it into our “Immediate 
and Complete possession” (MS 645:3, 1909). The most important feature is the 
immediacy, the directness, with which one is aware of the phaneron. The 
appearance and the mind are conflated, which means that there is nothing to 
mediate between the two: there is no intervening sign. We are put facie ad 
faciem before the very phaneron itself, Peirce says (MS 645:5). Direct 
awareness is a face-to-face encounter, which is the same as saying that that 
which appears to a mind is not represented. A seeming is not a representation, 
at least not in the first place, and thus a phaneron never conveys any 
cognitive information. Direct awareness is therefore not to be confounded with 
cognitive intuition, which is a faculty whose existence Peirce denies. It 
follows, then, that the mode of manifestation of a phaneron must be in some 
essential respect quite different from that of a sign.] (De Tienne 1993, 282) ]

The “direct awareness” at the heart of phaneroscopy requires its observations 
to be pre-theoretical and pre-logical (and a fortiori, pre-truth!). But as 
Peirce said, it takes a ““great effort not to be influenced” by one’s habitual 
preconceptions (especially if one believes that all awareness is semiotic, i.e. 
mediated). This is exactly the kind of opinion that one has to set aside in 
order to develop a well-grounded conception of semiosis is in the first place.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 15-Jun-21 12:17



Gary F., List:

I agree that the last line on this slide is especially important, but several 
recent posts have exhibited evidence of the mistake described in the one right 
above it. In fact, at times I myself have surely been guilty of jumping too 
quickly from phaneroscopy into semeiotic. The problem is that if we focus 
exclusively on representation and mediation, which are paradigmatic 
manifestations of 3ns, then we effectively skip right over 1ns as quality and 
2ns as reaction. Moreover, Peirce makes it very clear that phaneroscopy is an 
activity in which every inquirer must engage.

CSP: Understand me well. My appeal is to observation,--observation that each of 
you must make for himself. (CP 5.52, EP 2:154, 1903)

CSP: There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and 
since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of 
which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the 
accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat 
my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail 
to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic 
decoration to a man congenitally blind. ...

The reader, upon his side, must repeat the author's observations for himself, 
and decide from his own observations whether the author's account of the 
appearances is correct or not. (CP 1.286-287, 1904)

 

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 6:10 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

 Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s 
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. (You will 
notice André’s characteristic sense of humor here, but the last line should be 
taken quite seriously.)

 Text:

“Phaneroscopy”? What a strange word! Can it possibly mean anything? 

Is it really a science? How come I have never heard of it before?

Can I get a Ph.D. in phaneroscopy? In what university?

Are phaneroscopists well paid? Is their job useful and interesting? Does it 
help save lives? 

Some say that Peirce did everything that needed to be done in phaneroscopy, and 
that everything else is semiotics. Is that right? 

Is it true that phaneroscopists never 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 3

[gnox]

Cathy, I’m impressed with your awareness of phaneroscopy as an activity, a 
practice which informs our way of “continuing on with the business of life.” As 
slide 3 observes, this aspect of it seems to escape notice because of its 
association with Peirce’s theory of categories. Part of the problem is that 
Peirce didn’t refer to this activity as “phenomenology” until 1902, and then 
renamed it “phaneroscopy” in 1904. But when we grasp the nature of the activity 
from his definitions and examples given at that time and later, it becomes 
clear that he was already practicing it in 1867 when he wrote his famous “New 
List of Categories,” and continued to practice it all his life.

In a 1903 letter to William James, Peirce described phenomenology as “just the 
analysis of what kind of constituents there are in our thoughts and lives, 
(whether these be valid or invalid being quite aside from the question). It is 
a branch of philosophy I am most deeply interested in and which I have worked 
upon almost as much as I have upon logic” (CP 8.295). His later definitions of 
this “analysis” reflect his interest in what he called the formal elements of 
the phaneron (as opposed to the material elements). 

One essential component of phenomenological work is the practice of 
prescinding, or prescision (variously spelled), which Peirce introduced in his 
“New List” paper as a “kind of separation … which arises from attention to one 
element and neglect of the other” (CP 1.549, W2:50, EP1:2). This is essential 
for arriving at an understanding of the formal elements, because they are what 
all phenomena have in common, as well as all “minds” that the phaneron can be 
present to. I hope this will become clearer as we consider more of Peirce’s 
definitions of phaneroscopy and examples of its practice. But you and Gary R 
have got us off to a great start. I’ll be posting the next slide tomorrow. (I’m 
trying to limit myself to one post a day here.)

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 13-Jun-21 19:26
To: Peirce-L 
Cc: Gary Fuhrman ; Jon Alan Schmidt 
; Benjamin Udell 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 3

 

[note: I have moved this discussion from the second slide thread to the third 
one which Gary F posted today as I believe that Cathy's post and my response be 
to it begin to address some of the questions adumbrated in De Tienne's 3nd 
slide]

Cathy, List,

You wrote:

 

CT: From my perspective and understanding, Phaneroscopy would seek to determine 
elements of the phaneron as in how we as humans cognitively go about 'mapping' 
our 'medium' as experience takes each of us on single-minded, unique journeys. 
That mapping necessarily fills in cognitive gaps for each of us, which would 
include imagination etc., and investigating how we each do that so that we can 
continue on with the business of life and our next experience is an exciting 
research field indeed! . . . Studying how this [filling in] takes place 
throughout our experience of the Phaneron is so much more in depth than what I 
have studied of other systems of phenomenology.

 

GR: I tend to strongly agree. For many years, sensing the field's potential 
importance, I studied as many "systems of phenomenology" as I could find. Yet I 
too was generally not at all satisfied with their 'depth', as you put it, until 
I discovered Peirce's work. I should note, however, that I did find 
Merleau-Ponty's mid-20th century inquiries, initiated in his Phenomenology of 
Perception, of considerable interest (as I believe does Ben Udell, the 
co-manager with me of Peirce-L and the Arisbe website). Perhaps of the greatest 
value to me, and to this day, is Merleau-Ponty's book, not completed at his 
death (including many pages of associated notes) posthumously published as The 
Visible and the Invisible. Some have even found in that late work the roots of 
a nascent 'ecophenomenology', vitally important because, and as you wrote: 

CT: As higher order life forms, we may have the most advantageous 'view' of the 
phaneron. I believe that the ability to understand how we interact with it, and 
how it affects humanity and our biosphere, is crucial to our future.


GR: I completely agree as I am fairly certain that Gary Furhman does as well, 
for example, as suggested by his initial response to you. 

 

You quoted Peirce in a 1905 letter to William James in which he finds James' 
expression 'pure experience' as somewhat misleading for what they apparently 
both have in mind: 

 

CSP: "For me experience is what life has forced upon us [. . .] But my phaneron 
is not limited to what is forced upon us; it also embraces all that we most 
capriciously conjure up, not objects only but all modes of contents of 
cognitional consciousness."

 


CT: I think that Peirce's words to William James on this matter are helpful in 
deciphering what Peirce meant by phaneron and phaneroscopy.


GR: I agree. It is sometimes 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 3

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of Andre De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. (The first
one I posted was actually slide 2 because I skipped the title slide.)

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

Phaneroscopy is a sort of white elephant in Peirce studies. 

 

Most scholars are familiar with Peirce's seminal theory of categories and
its association with multiple research areas in his philosophy, logic,
semiotics, and evolutionary metaphysics. 

 

They are also familiar with that theory's association with what Peirce ended
up calling “phaneroscopy.” But as to what phaneroscopy is, the kind of
activity it consists in, its status as a “science,” its practice, its
purpose, its usefulness: all of it raises a cloud of questions.

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

[gnox]

Welcome Cathy, and thank you for placing the renewed interest in Peircean 
phaneroscopy into its current social context. Also for providing the quotation 
from CP 1.286-287, which is an important one for developing the practice of 
phaneroscopy. We need to distinguish this practice from that of applying its 
categories (of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness) to other sciences, 
including social sciences and normative sciences such as ethics. Phaneroscopy, 
in the context of Andre De Tienne’s slideshow at least, is the science (or 
science-egg) which generates those “universal” concepts from single-minded 
observation of the appearances, or as he put it later, from the phaneron.

 

I think Andre’s talk assumed some familiarity with Peirce’s writings on the 
subject, and his slides will quote some of them, but we’ll probably need to 
quote more in order to address the questions raised in Andre’s slides. Here is 
one from Peirce's “Adirondack Lectures” of 1905:

 

[[ Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean 
the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the 
mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If 
you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions 
unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the 
phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all 
minds. So far as I have developed this science of phaneroscopy, it is occupied 
with the formal elements of the phaneron.]] (CP 1.284)

 

For those who aren’t familiar with Peirce’s writings on the subject, it might 
be best to start with his lectures devoted to phenomenology, such as the second 
Harvard Lecture of 1903 (EP2:145), or his “Syllabus” introduction to it 
(EP2:267-72).

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Synechism Center
Sent: 12-Jun-21 09:35



Edwina, list,

 

1904 | Logic viewed as Semeiotics. Introduction Number 2. Phaneroscopy | CP 
1.286-287

What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the direct 
observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations, signalizes several 
very broad classes of phanerons; describes the features of each; shows that 
although they are so inextricably mixed together that no one can be isolated, 
yet it is manifest that their characters are quite disparate; then proves, 
beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of these broadest 
categories of phanerons there are; and finally proceeds to the laborious and 
difficult task of enumerating the principal subdivisions of those categories.

It will be plain from what has been said that phaneroscopy has nothing at all 
to do with the question of how far the phanerons it studies correspond to any 
realities. It religiously abstains from all speculation as to any relations 
between its categories and physiological facts, cerebral or other. It does not 
undertake, but sedulously avoids, hypothetical explanations of any sort. It 
simply scrutinizes the direct appearances, and endeavors to combine minute 
accuracy with the broadest possible generalization. The student’s great effort 
is not to be influenced by any tradition, any authority, any reasons for 
supposing that such and such ought to be the facts, or any fancies of any kind, 
and to confine himself to honest, single-minded observation of the appearances. 
The reader, upon his side, must repeat the author’s observations for himself, 
and decide from his own observations whether the author’s account of the 
appearances is correct or not.

 

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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

[gnox]

As Gary R announced, we’re starting a slow read of Andre De Tienne’s
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. Here’s the
first slide (a table of contents, actually). I’ll probably post the next
slide here this weekend. If you have any questions or comments about this
one, jump right in!

 

Gary f.

 



 

Text:

• 1. Phaneroscopy may be mystifying but is no mystery

• 2. Reminders about Peirce's theory of three categories

• 3. The place of phaneroscopy in Peirce's mature classification of sciences

• 4. From mathematics to phaneroscopy

• 5. Phaneroscopy as Inquiry into the positiveness of experience

• 6. The Phaneron and its ingredients

• 7. How to scope the phaneron and why

• 8. Phaneroscopy's role and relevance for any inquiry

• Conclusion: Phaneroscopy as a science-egg

 

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

[gnox]

Helmut, my book has a lot to say about relations between time and logic, but 
probably the most relevant to your question is here: Objecting and Realizing 
(TS ·12) (gnusystems.ca)   . 
Actually there’s more of Peirce than of me in it, but I hope there’s no 
objection to that.

 

Gary f.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 23-May-21 11:50



Gary F., List

 

Yes, but I don´t know if I am right. It would mean, that temporality is 
something more than causality: Mere causality in the present would be 
symbolized with another implication: "If A then (if A then B)". But this term 
reduces to "if A Then B", when you write it with Boolean "not"s  or an EG. But 
only if you separate the past (the premiss) from the present, you get the 
contradiction "A and not A" in it (in the past). So yes, it is a disagreement 
with 

‘the form of the relation of two instants of time, or what is the same thing as 
the relation between a logical antecedent and consequent.’

because it is the hypothesis, that it is not the same thing. But I don´t feel 
competent of disagreeing, so it is not my well-fermented opinion, but rather a 
question: Might it be like that, and what do you think?

Best

 

Helmut

  

  

23. Mai 2021 um 13:06 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca  
wrote:

Helmut, on this point you seem to disagree with Peirce about logical relations. 
Peirce in 1880 (W4:170) identified illation as the basic or ‘primitive’ logical 
relation, and in his 1906 ‘PAP’ (MS 293) he identified it with ‘the form of the 
relation of two instants of time, or what is the same thing as the relation 
between a logical antecedent and consequent.’

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 22-May-21 18:13
  

Supplement: The logical connection between premiss and rule cannot be 
symbolized with logical notation including EGs. It is a temporal connection, a 
relation between past and present. Logic notation merely notes the status of 
the present. Implication implies this temporal relation, and "not (A and not 
B)" doesn´t. So both are different, but this difference doesn´t show in logical 
notation.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

[gnox]

Helmut, on this point you seem to disagree with Peirce about logical relations. 
Peirce in 1880 (W4:170) identified illation as the basic or ‘primitive’ logical 
relation, and in his 1906 ‘PAP’ (MS 293) he identified it with ‘the form of the 
relation of two instants of time, or what is the same thing as the relation 
between a logical antecedent and consequent.’

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 22-May-21 18:13
  

Supplement: The logical connection between premiss and rule cannot be 
symbolized with logical notation including EGs. It is a temporal connection, a 
relation between past and present. Logic notation merely notes the status of 
the present. Implication implies this temporal relation, and "not (A and not 
B)" doesn´t. So both are different, but this difference doesn´t show in logical 
notation.

 

Jon, Jon, List

 

Wikipedia says there are two kinds of "ex falso quod libet": First the 
contradiction "A and not A", and secondly the counterfactual material 
implication "If A then B" with A being false. From "every unicorn is pink" 
follows, that this is true, and anything else also is. These two kinds of 
quodlibet seem different, but I think they can be connected, by which a 
hypothesis about implication in general occurs:

 

Maybe "If A then B" is not only a rule, but also a case, meaning, it includes a 
premiss: A exists. So "If A then B" does not mean "A exists and if A then B", 
but it means "If A then B, on the premiss that A is true". Now, if A is false, 
unicorns donot exist, this falsity also is part of the premiss. The case-part 
of implication, that part that is not part of the rule, now has a 
backwards-effect on the premiss. The complete premiss now is: "A exists, and A 
does not exist", or "A is both true and false". This is the contradictional "ex 
falso quodlibet", which makes the rule-part´s, the implication´s result true, 
like anything else as well.

 

I think, this quibbly argument has the benefit, that one can understand the 
counterfactual-material-implication-qoudlibet ("Every unicorn is pink" being 
true), which intuitively is not as easy to understand as the 
contradiction-quodlibet ("if one nonsense is true, all sense is lost anyway, 
then say what you want, all is true.": Easy to understand.).

 

The hypothesis about implication is, that though it is only one term, it adds 
something to the premiss of itself. Maybe that is what distinguishes "if A then 
B" from "not (A and not B)".

 

Best

Helmut

  

  

20. Mai 2021 um 01:39 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
>
wrote:

Jon A., List: 

 

Technically, yes, at least in classical logic. Nevertheless, according to 
Peirce, "it can no longer be granted that every conditional proposition whose 
antecedent does not happen to be realized is true" (CP 4.580, 1906).

 

Regards,

  

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 6:13 PM Jon Awbrey mailto:jawb...@att.net> > wrote:

FYI — 

 

“Every unicorn 🦄 is pink” is true.

 

Jon
  

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Objective Idealism

[gnox]

Gary R, list,

Apparently the list guidelines do not forbid posting an “interpretation” that 
flatly contradicts the text it claims to be interpreting.

Nor is there any objection to pointing out the fact that said “interpretation” 
does contradict the text it claims to be interpreting.

But when the poster of the “interpretation” objects to anyone pointing out said 
fact, on the ground that all interpretations are opinions, and are therefore 
all of equal value and incorrigible, and thus any attempt to correct them 
constitutes a personal attack, I think that should be the end of the discussion.

The idea that all interpretations are equally valid reminds me of Peirce’s 
remark in the second Lowell lecture   (where 
he is deriving the concept of negation from the scroll): “Let us invent a sign 
which shall assert that everything is true. Nothing could be more illogical 
than that statement, inasmuch as it would render logic false as well as 
needless.”

The statement (expressed or implied) that all interpretations are of equal 
value is similar to the assertion that everything is true, except that it 
dispenses altogether with the notion of truth. It has the effect of rendering 
all “interpretations” and “opinions” needless; and of course defending an 
“interpretation” against disagreement with it is equally needless.

It follows, I think, that once the relevant facts about an “interpretation” 
have been posted, any further discussion of the issue is also needless and 
unworthy of the list’s attention. That’s why I don’t discuss the issue in this 
post, and perhaps why John S. also declines to discuss it.

This is only my opinion, of course, but I take the trouble to express it 
because I believe that some opinions do have more truth-value than others 
because they are more consistent with the facts of the matter.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 21-May-21 01:11
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Objective Idealism

 

Edwina,

 

You have read a lot of personal judgment into my post which is not there. I am 
merely doing what JFS has just said in a different context, that the "evidence 
makes it very hard for anyone to claim the contrary opinion."

 

Here the evidence is again in short. Peirce writes:

 

". . .the physical law [is] derived and special, the psychical law alone [is] 
primordial."

 

The psychical law alone is primordial. How else is anyone to legitimately 
interpret that than JFS and I have? I read your counter-argument which I found 
strained and unconvincing.

 

". . . matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." 

 

"Matter is effete mind." Again, Peirce's words are as clear as day. Indeed:

 

". . .matter is nothing but effete mind."  And further that:

 

". . .matter [is] mere specialized and partially deadened mind."

 

You can protest as much as you wish, but as you noted, John Sowa "pointed out, 
the term 'opinion' should not be understood as ungrounded, subjective and 
therefore belittled - but as a conclusion based on evidence."

I don't see that I've "belittled" you at all. I simply completely disagree with 
you, pointing out that your opinion is NOT "a conclusion based on evidence." 

 

And I didn't "put you down" all. On what do you base that claim? To show how an 
opinion is a conclusion NOT based on evidence is not a put down and it is not 
"unprofessional." Your saying that is closer to being "unprofessional," but I 
won't make that judgment. But one should be careful, I think, of name-calling, 
especially in public. And I actually thought you knew me better than that. 
What? I can't strongly disagree with you without being called "unprofessional"? 
 

 

You keep saying that you disagree with "Jon's interpretation"--well, take that 
'opinion' out of consideration and look only at Peirce's texts, something JFS 
has frequently claimed of late ought to be the final arbiter of his meaning. It 
is not you and Jon (or me) who disagree (as you claim), but you and Peirce if 
we are to take him at his word. Your 'interpretation' does not take him at his 
word.

 

And I do not "support Jon's view"--you will perhaps notice that my "support" 
has been solely Peirce's texts. I support Peirce's view as expressed in his 
texts. Jon seems to do precisely the same, not expressing an opinion, perhaps 
at most at times paraphrasing a text (to introduce it) which he then quotes.

 

As for scholars affirming Pierce's view of "objective idealism," well, I can't 
do it this evening, but I could point to many scholars who simply quote (as I 
have) Peirce and reaffirm that this is in fact his view. 

 

Now if you want to disagree with his view, then that's a very different matter 
which would require some argumentation on your behalf. 

 

You write that your "interpretation of this is: matter-is-mind; and 
-mind-is-matter. The two are interactive, entwined correlates an

RE: [PEIRCE-L] EG Introduction (was Intuitionistic logic)

[gnox]

Thanks for that response, Jon. After tweaking my draft a bit and inserting a 
link to a list of the sources you mentioned, I’ve now put up the whole chapter 
which includes the section on EGs (Turning Signs 13: Meaning Spaces 
(gnusystems.ca)   and taken down the 
draft.

I found your introduction both concise and readable, but then I’m familiar with 
the material you’ve posted to the list on the subject, so maybe mine is not an 
“innocent eye.” It’s good to see that it will be part of a “Handbook of 
Cognitive Mathematics” (a field I hadn’t heard of before). It gives a more 
complete sketch of EGs than mine does, but then mine is embedded in a book that 
deals more with the positive cognitive sciences (as Peirce would call 
them)(philosophy, semiotic/logic, biology, psychology, linguistics etc.) than 
with mathematics, so it’s adapted to that purpose.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 19-May-21 12:24



Gary F., List:

Thanks for the link to your current draft, which I think is an excellent 
overview. My only suggestion, besides the obvious one of finishing and posting 
it, is to add links at the very end to the 1973 book by Roberts 
(https://www.felsemiotica.com/descargas/Roberts-Don-D.-The-Existential-Graphs-of-Charles-S.-Peirce.pdf)
 that you reference, as well as his 1992 paper that provides a nice summary 
(https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/82124291.pdf) and perhaps also Zeman's 1964 
dissertation that remains the most comprehensive treatment of Gamma with broken 
cuts for modal logic (https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481).

Personally, I have found it challenging to present Peirce's ideas in a way that 
is digestible for the novice, because I have to overcome the "curse of 
knowledge" that results in assuming too much of the reader; i.e., taking more 
for granted than is warranted. With that in mind, what follows is my own 
attempt at a brief introduction to EG, which also happens to touch on the 
previous thread topic. It will appear in a chapter, "Peirce on Abduction and 
Diagrams in Mathematical Reasoning," on which Gary R. and I recently 
collaborated with mathematical historian and Peirce scholar Joseph Dauben for 
the forthcoming Springer book, Handbook of Cognitive Mathematics. As always, I 
would likewise welcome any feedback.

 

Peirce ultimately considered his most important contribution to logic to be the 
development of a "diagrammatic syntax" for propositions and a set of 
transformation rules for carrying out deductive inferences from them, a system 
that he dubbed "Existential Graphs." He had three objectives in mind for it: 
"to afford a method (1) as simple as possible (that is to say, with as small a 
number of arbitrary conventions as possible), for representing propositions (2) 
as iconically, or diagrammatically and (3) as analytically as possible" (CP 
4.561n, 1908).

 

A blank sheet stands for the continuum of all true propositions, any of which 
may be explicitly "scribed" on it as a graph-instance consisting of a single 
letter in the "Alpha" version for propositional logic, or of names denoting 
abstract general concepts and heavy lines denoting concrete indefinite 
individuals ("something") in the "Beta" version for first-order predicate 
logic. Each name has one, two, or three "pegs" where a heavy line may be 
attached, signifying the attribution of the concept to that individual. The 
number of pegs associated with the name corresponds to the "valency" of the 
concept as monadic ("redness"), dyadic ("killing"), or triadic ("giving").

 

Existential graphs for "some apple is red," "Cain killed Abel," and "Bob gives 
a ball to Larry":



 

There is no limitation on the number of graph-instances that may be scribed on 
the sheet, which signifies the primitive relation of coexistence such that 
juxtaposing multiple graph-instances expresses the conjunction of the 
propositions that they represent. There is also no limitation on the number of 
branches that may be added to a heavy line, which corresponds to the primitive 
relation of identity such that each branch attached to a name attributes 
another concept to the same individual. Coexistence and identity are thus 
continuous relations, and they are also symmetrical: "A and B" is logically 
equivalent to "B and A," while "some S is P" is logically equivalent to "some P 
is S."

 

A third primitive relation is required, and for Peirce it is the most 
fundamental of all: "The first relation of logic, that of antecedent and 
consequent, is unsymmetrical. Now an unsymmetrical relation cannot result from 
any combination of symmetrical relations alone" (NEM 3:821, 1905). This is what 
he usually called "consequence," now typically referred to as "implication." It 
is represented in Existential Graphs by a "scroll," which is "a curved line 
without contrary flexure and returning into itself after once crossing itself, 
and thus f

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

[gnox]

Jon A, according to Peirce it’s true for Philonians but not for Diodorans. See 
text inserted into Lowell Lecture 2 (gnusystems.ca) 
  .

 

Gary f

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: 19-May-21 19:13
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: s...@bestweb.net; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

 

FYI —

 

“Every unicorn 🦄 is pink” is true.

 

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com


On May 19, 2021, at 5:52 PM, Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> > wrote:

List,

 

Does anybody know an example which justifies intuitionistic logic, so in which 
classical logic fails? I think Jon, A.S., you once gave me the following 
example:

 

"Every unicorn is pink" is false, but "There is no unicorn that is not pink" is 
true.

 

"Every unicorn is pink" is false, because it means "If it is a unicorn, then it 
is pink", and "If it is a unicorn" implies, that unicorns exist. So it is equal 
with "Unicorns exist, and if it is a unicorn, it is pink". Because unicorns 
donot exist, the proposition is false.

 

"There is no unicorn that is not pink" sounds true, because there are no 
unicorns at all, so there are no non-pink unicorns too. But if it would be so, 
that this form of proposition too implied the existence-claim, it would be 
false as well. Is that so? Is in classical logic "There is no unicorn that is 
not pink" equal with "Unicorns exist, and there is no unicorn that is not pink"?

 

This might be so e.g. due to the fact alone, that the term "Unicorn" has been 
mentioned. For EGs, it would mean, that every term written in any place is a 
possible too in the blank sheet. Meaning, that it generally exists. Otherwise 
it would not signify anything, it would e.g. be like "NOT &/(", senseless. But 
this would mean, that the term "existential" in "Existential Graphs" means, 
that only existing things are allowed in them.

 

Another way to classically synchronize the two propositions might be to say, 
that if a term signifies a nonexistent thing, it automatically signifies its 
phantasy-concept instead. Then "Every unicorn is pink" is false, because in 
some animated movie by Disney occurs a white unicorn. "There is no unicorn that 
is not pink" then is false for the same reason. This explanation is somewhat 
smoother than the first, but requires this said automatism: If A does not 
physically exist, then A is the existing concept of A.

 

Best

Helmut

  

  

19. Mai 2021 um 06:58 Uhr
 "John F. Sowa" mailto:s...@bestweb.net> >
wrote:

Gary R,

I'm glad you asked.

GR> Please explain how this "blocks the way of inquiry" for folk like me who 
are apparently radically deficient in mathematics and logic so simply can't see 
it as such.  


Intuitionistic logic is a restriction on the permissible rules of inference. 
That makes it impossible to use many widely accepted theories of mathematics -- 
among them, the theory that there are hierarchies of infinities. 

 

Peirce was one of the mathematicians who discovered a proof of that point 
independently of Georg Cantor.  And it's the foundation for his theory of 
continuity -- which Abraham Robinson proved was consistent in 1960.

In applications to science and engineering, especially computer science, nobody 
uses intuitionistic logic. The reason why is that it "blocks the way" of using 
the most convenient, efficient, and flexible methods of reasoning. 

The mainstream mathematicians don't stop intuitionists from developing their 
own pet theories.  They just ignore them.

John

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

[gnox]

Gary R and list, 

Being a non-mathematician myself, I’ve been drafting an introduction to 
Peirce’s EGs for the likes of us. I have the current draft online now here: EG 
introduction (gnusystems.ca)   It 
includes many links both to Peirce’s own introduction to EGs (Lowell Lecture 2 
of 1903) and to other (later) Peirce quotations.

 

Of course I’d welcome comments and suggestions (even from mathematicians!).

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 18-May-21 23:58



John, Jon, List,

JAS: Peirce anticipates aspects of the formal system that is now known as 
intuitionistic logic--e.g., defining negation as the implication of falsity...

JFS: Nobody knows what Peirce would have said about the less dogmatic treatment 
of intuitionistic logic by Heyting and others, including Oostra.  But it's 
doubtful that he would have approved of the drastic reduction in acceptable 
mathematical theories.  He was always highly suspicious of any attempt to block 
the way of inquiry.

"Dogmatic treatment of intuitionistic logic, etc."?? How in the world is 
"intuitionistic logic--e.g., defining negation as the implication of 
falsity..." (emphasis added) a "drastic reduction in acceptable mathematical 
theories"? Acceptable to whom? You? Who else?

And, really, it seems fairly over the top to describe it as "an attempt to 
block the way of inquiry?" Certainly your saying so does not make it so. Please 
explain how this "blocks the way of inquiry" for folk like me who are 
apparently radically deficient in mathematics and logic so simply can't see it 
as such. 

As JAS wrote:

JAS: . . . Peirce seeks to account for objective or ontological 
indeterminacy--there are some propositions that are neither true nor false 
because reality is indeterminate. Years later, he briefly explores the logical 
implications of this in his "Logic Notebook."

CSP: Triadic Logic is that logic which, though not rejecting entirely the 
Principle of Excluded Middle, nevertheless recognizes that every proposition, S 
is P, is either true, or false, or else S has a lower mode of being such that 
it can neither be determinately P, nor determinately not-P, but is at the limit 
between P and not P. (R 339:515[344r], 1909)

 

JAS: Intuitionistic logic also recognizes this limit but does not assign a 
third truth value to it, which is what Peirce goes on to propose. Accordingly, 
in today's terminology, what he [Peirce] is primarily rejecting in these 
passages is not the (so-called) law of excluded middle ("either a proposition 
or its negation is true"), but rather the principle of bivalence ("every 
proposition is either true or false") [emphasis added]. 

 

In a word: Who is actually being 'dogmatic' here?

 

Best,

 

Gary R


 


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke


 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York







 

 

On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 10:59 PM John F. Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net> > wrote:

Jon AS,

I'm writing an article about Peirce's writings on logic in 1911, which I'll 
post to P-list soon.  And I'm glad that we can agree on that point.

JFS> However, Peirce and Brouwer were on opposite sides of fundamental issues 
about the nature of mathematics.  ...  In general, Brouwer's assumptions were 
diametrically opposed to Peirce's fundamental assumptions.

JAS> I wholeheartedly agree.

But in R670. Peirce definitively rejected the idea of defining negation in 
terms of implication and falsity.  I show that in my article.

JAS> Peirce anticipates aspects of the formal system that is now known as 
intuitionistic logic--e.g., defining negation as the implication of falsity...

Nobody knows what Peirce would have said about the less dogmatic treatment of 
intuitionistic logic by Heyting and others, including Oostra.  But it's 
doubtful that he would have approved of the drastic reduction in acceptable 
mathematical theories.  He was always highly suspicious of any attempt to block 
the way of inquiry.

John_ _ _ _ _ _ _

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

[gnox]

John, I appreciate the clarification in your post: when you wrote that
intuitionist logic "blocks the way of inquiry", what you really meant was
that it "blocks the way" of using the most convenient, efficient, and
flexible methods of reasoning. Peirce's idea of inquiry, and specifically of
the inquiry he was developing by means of Existential Graphs, was very
different from that, especially in his one presentation of EGs to a mixed
audience (meaning an audience not composed entirely of mathematicians). He
made this clear at the very beginning of his second Lowell lecture
  of 1903: 

[[ Before beginning, let us distinctly recognize the purpose which this
system of expression is designed to fulfil. It is intended to enable us to
separate reasoning into its smallest steps so that each one may be examined
by itself. Observe, then, that it is not the purpose of this system of
expression to facilitate reasoning and to enable one to reach his
conclusions in the speediest manner. Were that our object, we should seek a
system of expression which should reduce many steps to one; while our object
is to subdivide one step into as many as possible. Our system is intended to
facilitate the study of reasoning but not to facilitate reasoning itself.
Its character is quite contrary to that purpose.]]

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 19-May-21 00:59
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

 

Gary R,

I'm glad you asked.

GR> Please explain how this "blocks the way of inquiry" for folk like me who
are apparently radically deficient in mathematics and logic so simply can't
see it as such. 


Intuitionistic logic is a restriction on the permissible rules of inference.
That makes it impossible to use many widely accepted theories of mathematics
-- among them, the theory that there are hierarchies of infinities.  

Peirce was one of the mathematicians who discovered a proof of that point
independently of Georg Cantor.  And it's the foundation for his theory of
continuity -- which Abraham Robinson proved was consistent in 1960.

In applications to science and engineering, especially computer science,
nobody uses intuitionistic logic. The reason why is that it "blocks the way"
of using the most convenient, efficient, and flexible methods of reasoning.


The mainstream mathematicians don't stop intuitionists from developing their
own pet theories.  They just ignore them.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Scroll vs Nested Ovals (was Existential Graphs in 1911)

[gnox]

Jon, I think your posts in this thread and its predecessors are the most 
valuable contributions to the list that we’ve seen in the past year or so. 
You’ve illuminated one of Peirce’s most philosophically important contributions 
to logic, one that I must admit I had previously overlooked, and reawakened my 
interest in Peirce’s graphs. I think we owe thanks to you, Pietarinen, 
Bellucci, and Shafiei for doing the spadework on this. I’m particularly 
interested in the phenomenological aspects of the work you cited previously, 
Peirce and Husserl: Mutual Insights on Logic, Mathematics and Cognition 
(https://books.google.com/books?id=xjK0DwAAQBAJ). But even the logical aspects 
alone seem to me one of Peirce’s major contributions.

 

It’s clear that Peirce himself never repudiated that contribution, or John Sowa 
would have given evidence of that by now. What puzzles me is why John wants to 
repudiate these Peircean insights, when his argument is based solely on his 
claim to absolute authority “in mathematics and logic”.

 

Gary f.

 

} It is a characteristic of wisdom not to do desperate things. [Thoreau] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 8-Feb-21 20:39
To: s...@bestweb.net; Peirce List 
Cc: ahti-veikko.pietari...@taltech.ee; francesco.belluc...@unibo.it; 
cdw...@iupui.edu; martin.irv...@georgetown.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Scroll vs Nested Ovals (was Existential Graphs in 1911)

 

John, List, All:

 

JFS: Thank you for emphasizing the fact that Peirce's only comments in favor of 
the scroll came before June 1911.

 

Indeed, his "only" comments in favor of the scroll are in numerous passages 
from his extensive writings about EGs between late 1896 and June 1911. 
Nevertheless, as far as I know--please provide a citation if I am 
mistaken--there is no passage whatsoever in his entire vast corpus where he 
repudiates those favorable comments, nor his underlying analysis of inference. 
As I keep pointing out, omission is not rejection.

 

JFS: In Peirce's writings after that date, the scroll is "equivalent" to a nest 
of two negations.

 

Actually, he never uses the word "scroll" in any of those writings, and he 
states that a figure showing nested ovals "is equivalent to" one showing a 
scroll (without calling it that) exactly once. It is in a draft manuscript for 
a lecture that would have introduced EGs to an audience not previously familiar 
with them, where it occurs in the context of explaining why shading is a much 
better alternative to thin lines for distinguishing oddly and evenly enclosed 
areas. Again, as far as I know--please provide a citation if I am 
mistaken--there is no passage whatsoever in his entire vast corpus where he 
repudiates the philosophical basis for taking consequence (scroll) as a 
primitive, such that negation (cut/oval) is derived from it.

 

Moreover, even in June and December 1911, he remains consistently adamant about 
his primary objective in developing and promoting EGs.

 

CSP: I wish to draw your attention, in the most emphatic way possible, to the 
purpose this Syntax is intended to subserve; since anybody who did not pay 
attention to that statement would be all but sure, not merely to mistake the 
intention of this syntax, but to think that intention as CONTRARY to what it 
really is as well he could. Namely he would suppose the object was to reach the 
conclusion from given premisses with the utmost facility and speed, while the 
real purpose is to dissect the reasoning into the greatest possible number of 
distinct steps and so to force attention to every requisite of the reasoning. 
The supposed purpose would be of little consequence, and it is the business of 
the mathematicians to furnish inventions to attain it; but the real purpose is 
to supply a real and crying need, although logicians are so stupid as not to 
recognize it and to put obstacles in the way of meeting it. (RL 231, NEM 3:168, 
1911 Jun 22)

 

CSP: The ultimate purpose of contriving this diagrammatic syntax, is to enable 
one with facility to divide any necessary, or mathematical, reasoning into its 
ultimate logical steps. (RL 376, R 500:3, 1911 Dec 6)

 

As I discussed previously ( 
 
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-02/msg00019.html), Shafiei's 
example of ex falso quodlibet conclusively demonstrates the vast superiority of 
scrolls over cuts/ovals for fulfilling the real and ultimate purpose of EGs, 
even when employed in accordance with classical logic.

 

Regards,

 

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Mon, Feb 8, 2021 at 9:21 AM John F. Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net> > wrote:

Jon AS,

Thank you for 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[gnox]

Jon Alan, list,

GF: a relation of negation can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. I wonder 
which case applies to this early (1868) remark of Peirce’s: “The individual 
man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so 
far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to 
be, is only a negation” (EP1:55, CP 5.317). Either? Both? Neither?

JAS: I suggest that we interpret that particular statement in light of what 
comes right before it.

GF: I think that goes without saying, but I don’t think your interpretation 
(copied below) answers the question. If the context involves “the ideal state 
of complete information”, then the contrast is between an ideal “individual” 
and an ideal “community” — not between real people and real communities. That 
might justify saying that the individual is absolutely and dyadically not the 
community, which (as I understand it) would make the negation symmetrical.

On the other hand, if we interpret Peirce’s reference as being to the actual 
cognition of a real “individual man” rather than a logically strict individual, 
that would point to the asymmetry of the relation, if only because cognition 
takes time, and in real time the relation between past and future is 
asymmetrical. Even in more spatial terms, the relation between a community and 
a member of the community is obviously asymmetrical.

As a quasi-corollary, I would say that mathematical logic which formalizes 
patterns in actual reasoning by omitting the time factor also eliminates the 
asymmetry of the antecedent-consequent relation. Whether this is true of 
Existential Graphs depends on how we interpret them; and how we interpret them 
depends (in reality) on what purpose we are using them for.

By the way, my question was not intended as a terminological one, so John’s 
reply didn’t strike me as relevant. To me, the asymmetries of both logic and 
time are issues of positive science, even cenoscopy, not mathematics. As for 
Peirce’s proposition “Triadic Logic is universally true”, I’m still wondering 
what that could mean! (That there’s no such thing as falsity in Triadic Logic?)

Also by the way, I corrected above the typo in my previous text (“(18)” for 
“(1868)”); sorry about that.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 20-Dec-20 15:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued 
logic)

 

Gary F., List:

 

I suggest that we interpret that particular statement in light of what comes 
right before it.

 

CSP: Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be 
known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends 
on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by 
virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought 
identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought 
now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential 
existence, dependent on the future thought of the community. (CP 5.316, EP 
1:54-55, 1868)

 

Note that Peirce wrote the article in which these quotes appear ("Some 
Consequences of Four Incapacities") at age 28, not 18. He is contrasting the 
individual human, "apart from his fellows," with "the community" whose 
collective thought would "be in the ideal state of complete information" after 
infinite inquiry and thus would know "what anything really is." This is the 
telos of the ongoing process of semiosis that Richard Kenneth Atkins calls 
"cognitive welding" in his 2016 book, Peirce and the Conduct of Life: Sentiment 
and Instinct in Ethics and Religion.

 

To the extent that each of us suffers from "ignorance and error," we have a 
"separate existence" from the continuum of Truth that is represented in 
existential graphs by the sheet of assertion. Again, whether this "negation" is 
"symmetrical by composition" or unsymmetrical depends on whether excluded 
middle holds, such that every proposition is either true or false; and Peirce 
states plainly, "This assumption ... I consider utterly unwarranted, and do not 
believe it" (NEM 3:758, 1893). That is why "Triadic Logic does not conflict 
with Dyadic Logic; only, it recognizes, what the latter does not" such that 
"Triadic Logic is universally true" (R 339:515[344r], 1909).

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[gnox]

Thanks, Jon Alan, I think I’m aboard this train of thought, although it’s 
taking me into unfamiliar territory.

I hadn’t really considered that a relation of negation can be either 
symmetrical or asymmetrical. I wonder which case applies to this early (18) 
remark of Peirce’s: “The individual man, since his separate existence is 
manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his 
fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation” (EP1:55, CP 
5.317). Either? Both? Neither?

Gary f.

} Judge not, that ye be not judged. [Matthew 7:1] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 19-Dec-20 18:58



 

Gary F., List:

Returning after a few days of vacation ...

GF: Consequence comes before negation.

Indeed, I have been pointing this out for a while now. The fundamental 
asymmetry of logic is why in existential graphs, besides the symmetrical 
relations of coexistence (blank sheet) and individual identity (heavy line), 
the unsymmetrical relation of consequence (scroll) is a logical primitive as 
Peirce himself affirms.

CSP: We have seen that there are three relations which subsist between the 
parts of graphs. The first is the relation expressed by the scroll. This is the 
most important of all, since this is the relation of premiss and conclusion; 
that is, if it be true that if A is true B is true, then should A occur as a 
premiss we have a right to conclude B. The second relation is that expressed by 
writing two graphs side by side AB, that is to say, the relation of 
coexistence, and the third is the relation of individual identity expressed by 
the heavy line. (R 466:18-19, 1903)

In fact, he implies on multiple occasions that there must be at least one 
unsymmetrical relation that is a logical primitive, because although a 
symmetrical relation can be derived from unsymmetrical relations, it is 
impossible to derive an unsymmetrical relation from symmetrical relations.

CSP: But we are bound to carry our logical analysis to the furthest point, when 
the analysis of thought is the very business we have in hand. Hence, if one 
sign can be expressed as a complication or special determination of another, we 
are bound so to express it in logical analysis. Now an unsymmetrical relation 
can never be expressed as a complex or special case of a symmetrical relation; 
but a symmetrical relation may be expressible by means of an unsymmetrical 
relation. (R 482:12, 1896-7)

CSP:  It is, however, important to state that the relations of identity and of 
coexistence ... are the only simple dyadic relations which are symmetrical, 
that is, which imply each its own converse. All other symmetrical relations are 
compounded and involve asymmetric elements. (R 284:88[83], 1905)

CSP: In my own system of existential graphs, the only formal signs are the 
sheet, the cut or enclosing line, and the line of identity, each of which 
expresses a dyadic symmetrical relation. But that does not amount to developing 
the principles of logic from symmetrical relations alone. The first relation of 
logic that of antecedent and consequent is unsymmetrical. Now an unsymmetrical 
relation cannot result from any combination of symmetrical relations alone ... 
(NEM 3:821, 1905)

Peirce even explains elsewhere that reasoning of any kind requires the 
unsymmetrical relation of consequence but is possible without the "notion of 
falsity."

CSP: [T]here must have been a time when men used language with some syntax, and 
yet were not fully conscious of it; and as long as they were in that condition, 
they could hardly have had much notion of falsity, although they might very 
well have drawn simple inferences, such as the Scroll of Fig. 5 represents; but 
these would have furnished them no notion of falsity or even of contradiction. 
(RS 30:20-21[Copy T:14-15], c. 1906)

CSP: It was forced upon the logician’s attention that a certain development of 
reasoning was possible before, or as if before, the concept of falsity had ever 
been framed, or any recognition of such a thing as a false assertion had ever 
taken place. Probably every human being passes through such a grade of 
intellectual life, which may be called the state of paradisaical logic, when 
reasoning takes place but when the idea of falsity, whether in assertion or in 
inference, has never been recognized. (R 669:18-19[16-17], 1911)

CSP: [T]he denial implies recognition of the affirmation, while the affirmation 
is so far from implying recognition of the denial, that one might imagine a 
paradisaic state of innocence in which men never had the idea of falsity, and 
yet might reason ... (RL 376, R 500:12, 1911)

As I have suggested before, presumably a child (or even a pet) first learns the 
meaning of the word "no" by drawing simple inferences from experience. For 
example, if an adult human says "no" and I do it anyway, then something 
unpleasant happens to me.

G

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[gnox]

Jerry, the following paragraph from Harvard Lecture 6 (1903, EP2:218, CP5.176) 
might help to explain Peirce’s usage of ampliative (his translation of Kant’s 
erweiternde):

 

[[ I may presume that you are all familiar with Kant's reiterated insistence 
that necessary reasoning does nothing but explicate the meaning of its 
premisses. Now Kant's conception of the nature of necessary reasoning is 
clearly shown by the logic of relations to be utterly mistaken, and his 
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, which he otherwise and 
better terms explicatory (erläuternde)  and ampliative (erweiternde) judgments, 
which is based on that conception, is so utterly confused that it is difficult 
or impossible to do anything with it. But, nevertheless, I think we shall do 
very well to accept Kant's dictum that necessary reasoning is merely 
explicatory of the meaning of the terms of the premisses, only reversing the 
use to be made of it. Namely instead of adopting the conception of meaning from 
the Wolffian logicians, as he does, and making use of this dictum to express 
what necessary reasoning can do, about which he was utterly mistaken, we shall 
do well to understand necessary reasoning as mathematics and the logic of 
relations compels us to understand it, and to use the dictum, that necessary 
reasoning only explicates the meanings of the terms of the premisses, to fix 
our ideas as to what we shall understand by the meaning of a term. ]]

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jerry LR Chandler  
Sent: 14-Dec-20 23:08
To: Peirce List 
Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued 
logic)

 

List:  

 

Following Jon's assertion, an internet search reveal fresh information on the 
usage of “ampliative”, starting with the  citation in the Comment Dictionary.

 

The Commens dictionary states:

News | Posted 12/03/2017
  
Workshop: Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences

Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the 
conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its 
premises (Collected Papers 2.623).

 

The citation at 2.623 concerns the bean counting examples wrt Induction and 
Hypothesis. 

Ampliative does not occur in 2.623

 

Apparently, the citation was picked by the sponsors of the subsequent 
conference where Commens provides the following statement:

 

Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the 
conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its 
premises (Collected Papers 2.623). This is how the term is still standardly 
used in contemporary logic and philosophy of science, and how it is to be 
understood in the title of this workshop.

 

(The purpose of the workshop was to explore possible meanings of the term.)

 

Analytically, the citation lacks logical coherence.  After all, even a simple 
deduction goes beyond what is already contained in the premises!  

 

BTW, 2.630 uses the term, “amplifiative”, perhaps in a different sense. 

 

The Oxford  dictionary cites “amplicative reasoning”.  (But reasoning is a 
general term with many meanings

Term used by Peirce to denote arguments whose conclusions go beyond their 
premises (and hence amplify the scope of our beliefs). Inductive arguments and 
arguments to the best explanation are not deductively valid, but may yield 
credible conclusions. Most reasoning takes us to conclusions that go beyond our 
data, in ways that interest us.

 

Historically, apparently the term did not originate with CSP:

 

"1653, Hugh Binning (1627–1653), “Sermon VI.”, in  The Works of the Rev. Hugh 
Binning‎  [1], page 579:

Therefore I take it to be rather declarative, or ampliative, or both."

 

In summary, this evidence appears to support the ablative usage of the term 
“ampliative” as an adjective that modifies the perception of the scale of the 
scope of a logic in order to be consistent with the meaning of the Latin root.

 

Jon wrote:

 That being the case, necessary reasoning is by definition not ampliative but 
merely explicative.

 

I continue to maintain that this is problematic.  Necessary reasoning in often 
ampliative.

 

Cheers

 

Jerry 

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[gnox]

Jon Alan, list,

Three years ago when I posted my transcription of Lowell Lecture 2 on my 
website (https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm) I was quite baffled by Peirce’s 
derivation of the negating signification of the cut from the signification of 
the scroll with a blackened inner close or “pseudograph”. I even posted to the 
Peirce list expressing my bafflement. I wish I could have read (and understood) 
this post of yours back then, because it would have cleared things up for me. 
But then I probably couldn’t have understood it because I was still a beginner 
in the study of Existential Graphs. Your post explains succinctly much of what 
I’ve learned about them since. 

In logical terms, the key is that excluded middle is a principle only of 
deductive reasoning, not of ampliative reasoning, which always comes first in 
any inquiry; and the concept of negation is in a sense derived from the 
principle of excluded middle. Consequence comes before negation. At least 
that’s my understanding now, thanks to your explanation.

Gary f.

 

} Seeking enlightenment apart from the world is like looking for horns on a 
hare. [Hui-neng] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 13-Dec-20 18:47
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

 

List:

 

I have been thinking about existential graphs again lately and wondering how 
they might be employed to represent abduction, rather than deduction. Peirce 
describes the form of abductive inference as follows.

 

CSP: The surprising fact, C, is observed;

But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.

Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2:341, 1903)

 

He elaborates on this a few years later.

 

CSP: Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation, in one or 
another of the three Universes, of some surprising phenomenon, some experience 
which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of 
expectation ... . The inquiry begins with pondering these phenomena in all 
their aspects, in the search of some point of view whence the wonder shall be 
resolved. At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible 
Explanation,--by which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as 
necessarily consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with 
the truth of the credible conjecture, as premisses. On account of this 
Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with 
favor. As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible" ... (CP 
6.469, EP 2:441, 1908) 

 

Hence abduction is "reasoning from consequent to antecedent" (ibid) or 
reasoning from conclusion to premisses--i.e., reasoning backwards, which is why 
Peirce ultimately prefers to call it retroduction. Accordingly, in EGs we can 
scribe any true proposition on the sheet of assertion--such as a surprising 
fact (C)--and "scroll" it so that it becomes the consequent of a conditional 
(in the inner close), then insert any proposition whatsoever (A) as the 
hypothetical antecedent (in the outer close). Since C is true and we have 
complied with the transformation rules, the resulting consequence (if A then C) 
cannot be false no matter what we choose for A. But does this entail that it is 
true?

 

On the contrary, as with intuitionistic logic, excluded middle does not hold in 
such a case. Given that C is true, we only have reason to suspect that A is 
true if C follows from A as a matter of course. In other words, the 
plausibility of A as an explanation of C relies on there being a rational 
sequence from A to C. This requirement is obscured in classical deductive 
logic, "completely hidden behind the superfluous machinery which is introduced 
in order to give an appearance of symmetry to logical law" (R 490:29, CP 4.581, 
1906), by treating "if A then C" as equivalent to "not-(A and not-C)" or "not-A 
or C"--i.e., a scroll as equivalent to nested cuts or a shaded area enclosing 
an unshaded area--because the latter formulations are always true as long as C 
is true.

 

CSP: The second failure of Selectives to be as analytical as possible lies in 
their encouraging the idea that negation, or denial, is a relatively simple 
concept, and that the concept of Consequence, is a special composite of two 
negations, so that to say, “If in the actual state of things A is true, then B 
is true,” is correctly analyzed as the assertion, “It is false to say that A is 
true while B is false.” I fully acknowledge that, for most purposes and in a 
preliminary explanation, the error of this analysis is altogether 
insignificant. But when we come to the first analysis the inaccuracy must not 
be passed over. (R 300:48-49[47-48], 1908)

 

Even in deductive reasoning, there is "a real movement of thought" from 
antecedent to consequent, from premisses to conclusion. The continuou

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Kindle editions of Writings

[gnox]

Ben, no, you can’t search through multiple Kindle books, as you can through 
multiple PDFs. And yes, Jerry, the search facility is limited to keywords and 
simple strings.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Ben Udell  
Sent: 30-Nov-20 18:17
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Kindle editions of Writings

 

List, 
Also can one search all the available volumes at once with a single search? 
- Best, Ben

On 11/30/2020 11:16 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

List, Jon
 
To me, the value of these editions would be fantastically enhanced if the 
indexing is complete and if searching by multiple terms is possible.
 
Any comments from purchasers?
 
Cheers 
JLRC 
 
Sent from my iPad
 

On Nov 30, 2020, at 9:32 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
  wrote:
 
Gary F., List:
 
At Amazon.com, the current Kindle edition prices are as follows.
Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition -  $7.99 each for 
Volumes 1, 2, 6, and 8; $10.83 for Volume 3, $11.16 for Volume 4, and $11.24 
for Volume 5 ($65.19 for all seven).
The Essential Peirce - $7.99 for Volume 1, $14.74 for Volume 2 ($22.73 for 
both).
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - 

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Kindle editions of Writings

[gnox]

And thanks for mentioning that, Gary R!

 

I don’t have a Kindle either, I read Kindle books using the free app on my 
laptop. This has several advantages over printed books (and manuscripts): 
e-books (either Kindle or PDF) are searchable, you can copy text from them for 
pasting into other texts, and you control the text size as well as the contrast 
between text and background (I prefer white text on black background). Kindle 
books also use clickable links to go from text to footnote and back.

 

Disclaimer: I do not represent Amazon and I get no compensation for posting 
this.

 

Gary f

} Opposition always enflames the enthusiast, never converts him. [Schiller] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time

 

From: Gary Richmond  
Sent: 29-Nov-20 08:00



Thanks, Gary f. 

For those of you who don't own a Kindle (I don't), while several models are 
also on sale at Amazon, you can read Kindle books on many devices by 
downloading the Kindle app. See this article for an overview:

https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/reviewedcom/2020/04/01/how-read-kindle-books-without-kindle/5103202002/

Best,

Gary R

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[PEIRCE-L] Kindle editions of Writings

[gnox]

Aloha Peirceans,

 

I just noticed that Kindle editions of all 7 volumes of the Writings 
Chronological Edition are selling for $9.99 each. (At least they are on 
Amazon.ca, I haven’t checked Amazon.com.) I bought and downloaded one of them 
at it appears to be all there (compared to the hardcover edition) … quite a 
bargain if you don’t already have them. Essential Peirce Vol. 1 is also $9.99 
on Kindle.

 

Gary f.

 

} All messages are coded. [G. Bateson] {

  https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time



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[PEIRCE-L] Mathematical evolution

[gnox]

This newly revised patch from Turning Signs may be of interest concerning
relations between mathematics and experience, in a biosemiotic context. It
contains a 3-paragraph Peirce quote plus a number of links to other quotes:
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/xrp.htm#x23 .

Gary F.

 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[gnox]

John S,

Nobody here is disputing that “eg1911, as specified in L231, is complete” for 
the pedagogical purpose of teaching classical first-order logic. Do you really 
think that was Peirce’s purpose in developing EGs? Or that eg1911 completely 
accomplishes the purposes which Peirce explicitly stated for EGs?

For instance, Peirce explicitly intended to incorporate modal logic into his 
system of EGs. Does the 1911 system complete that project?

One more specific question: you have mentioned several times that Peirce 
considered a three-valued logic, one that does not strictly adhere to the 
principle of excluded middle, but I don’t recall any further explanation of 
this. Can you show how it can be done with eg1911?

Gary f.

 

From: John F. Sowa  
Sent: 9-Aug-20 23:30
To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Cc: Peirce-L ; Gary Richmond 
; ahti-veikko.pietari...@ttu.ee; 
francesco.belluc...@unibo.it; Cornelis de Waal ; 
martin.irv...@georgetown.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best 
and final version of EGs)

 

Jon AS,

In NEM 3:140, Peirce made a clear distinction between the vague words of 
ordinary language, and the precise terminology of science:

CSP>  The language and symbols of ordinary life are short, defective and 
figurative.  As little as possible is spoken, as much as possible is left to 
implication, imagination and belief.  But scientific symbols and methods should 
be complete.  As little as possible should be left to implication, imagination 
and belief. 

By these criteria, eg1911, as specified in L231, is complete.  It is logically 
equivalent to every version of classical first-order logic from Frege (1879) 
and Peirce (1885) to the present.  Nothing is left to implication, imagination, 
or belief.

As Peirce showed in R670, a scroll is logically equivalent to a nest of two 
ovals.  AS Peirce said in NEM 3:140, a scientific notation should leave as 
little as possible to implication, imagination, or belief.  That implies that 
there is no room for any residual meaning for a scroll that is in any way 
different from the meaning of a nest of two ovals.

If you have any further questions, please study the progression from R669 to 
R670, L231, L378, and L376 and my commentary about them.  Unless any MSS later 
than December 1911 are found which say anything to the contrary, the version in 
L231 must  be considered definitive.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

[gnox]

D’accord!   ☺

gf

From: robert marty  
Sent: 9-Aug-20 14:31



Gary, I'm 9 years older than you!  So I have more excuses? 😉


Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty  

 

 de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty

 

 

 

Le ven. 7 août 2020 à 17:00, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > 
a écrit :

Robert, your apology is accepted, and I don’t blame you for defending 
mathematics when you thought it was being disrespected by a non-mathematician. 
We agree, I think, that both mathematics and experience of the external world 
are essential to scientific reasoning, and the semiotic explanation you posted 
of your lattice diagram makes good sense to me. I hope I wasn’t too hard on you 
in that last post of mine. Maybe I’m getting a bit cranky in my old age.

 

Gary f.

 

From: robert marty mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com> 
> 
Sent: 6-Aug-20 18:39
To: Gary Fuhrman mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> >; Peirce-L 
mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

 

Gary, I admit that I saw in your post an attempt to lower the role of 
mathematics on the path of research in Peirce's semiotics. My apology is that 
this has been an issue close to my heart for almost 40 years. So it was a straw 
man argument as you say  and I apologize for that. It was therefore only for 
you to take advantage of John's quotation (I also apologize to him for having 
involved him in this dubious fight) to remind those who might have doubted it 
"that mathematics is not a positive science".  
I clumsily hoped that you would be led, on this occasion, to say something 
positive about the role of mathematics - although it is not a positive science, 
it is important to remember this - and especially about mathematical objects 
that did not exist in Peirce's time and about which he had a strong intuition. 
But it was a waste of time; only the beginning of my posts caught your 
attention ... so I won't do it again and I'll stop spreading terror with a 
humorous signature that you took perhaps a bit too seriously.
There won't be blood on the walls! 

Best regards,

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty  

 

 de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

[gnox]

Jon AS, you quoted me at the end of your post, but now I’d like to qualify what 
I said there by quoting Peirce: “we cannot make ourselves understood if we 
merely say what we mean.” Here’s the context:

 

[[ The acquiring [of] a habit is nothing but an objective generalization taking 
place in time. It is the fundamental logical law in course of realization. When 
I call it objective, I do not mean to say that there really is any difference 
between the objective and the subjective, except that the subjective is less 
developed and as yet less generalized. It is only a false word which I insert 
because after all we cannot make ourselves understood if we merely say what we 
mean. ] ‘Abstract of 8 lectures’ (NEM IV, 140)]

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt  
Sent: 8-Aug-20 16:36
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and 
final version of EGs)

 

Jeff, List:

 

JD:  Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction 
between principles and laws.

 

I specifically asked for references where Peirce supposedly endorses your claim 
that "a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the 
premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our 
representation of such a law."

 

JD:  Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of the term "principle" is 
instructive on this point.

 

Quoting those definitions would have been appreciated, rather than expecting 
everyone on the List to look them up for ourselves, although Ben Udell kindly 
provided a link to the ones for "principle" (another is below).

 

JD:  See the 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, 
Hamilton, etc.

 

CSP:  4. A truth which is evident and general; a truth comprehending many 
subordinate truths; a law on which others are founded, or from which others are 
derived: as, the principles of morality, of equity, of government, etc. In 
mathematical physics a principle commonly means a very widely useful theorem. 
...

5. That which is professed or accepted as a law of action or a rule of conduct; 
one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of a system: as, the principles of 
the Stoics or the Epicureans; hence, a right rule of conduct; in general, 
equity; uprightness: as, a man of principle. 
(http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=06 

 &page=294&query=principle)

 

There are no accompanying examples of uses by Aristotle, and the only one from 
Hamilton--which mentions Aristotle--is for the 2nd sense, not the 4th or 5th.

 

CSP:  2. Cause, in the widest sense; that by which anything is in any way 
ultimately determined or regulated. ...

"Without entering into the various meanings of the term Principle, which 
Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence anything exists, is produced, 
or is known, it is sufficient to say that it is always used for that on which 
something else depends; and thus both for an original law and for an original 
element. In the former case it is a regulative, in the latter a constitutive, 
principle." Sir W. Hamilton, Reid, Note A, §5, Supplementary Dissertations

 

Aristotle and Hamilton evidently define "principle" as "that on which something 
else depends," such as "an original law."  The 4th sense similarly defines it 
as "a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived."  The 
5th sense seems consistent with my interpretation, rather than yours--excluded 
middle "is professed or accepted as a law" within classical logic, such that it 
is "one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of [that] system."  In any case, 
Peirce never defines a principle as our representation of a law; on the 
contrary ...

 

JD:  Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term.

 

CSP:  3. A proposition which expresses the constant or regular order of certain 
phenomena, or the constant mode of action of a force; a general formula or rule 
to which all things, or all things or phenomena within the limits of a certain 
class or group, conform, precisely and without exception; a rule to which 
events really tend to conform. 
(http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=04 

 &page=705&query=law)

 

It is a law, not a principle, that he defines as a proposition--i.e.,. a 
representation.  He goes on to call it "a general formula or rule to which all 
things ... conform, precisely and without exception."  As I said before, 
excluded middle is not a law, because it is not exceptionless.

 

JD:  Here is a famous passage [CP 1.405-406, c. 1896] where Peirce explicitly 
employs the Kantian distinction.

 

Where do you see such a distinction in that passage?  The only mention of the 
wo

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

[gnox]

Robert, your apology is accepted, and I don’t blame you for defending 
mathematics when you thought it was being disrespected by a non-mathematician. 
We agree, I think, that both mathematics and experience of the external world 
are essential to scientific reasoning, and the semiotic explanation you posted 
of your lattice diagram makes good sense to me. I hope I wasn’t too hard on you 
in that last post of mine. Maybe I’m getting a bit cranky in my old age.

 

Gary f.

 

From: robert marty  
Sent: 6-Aug-20 18:39
To: Gary Fuhrman ; Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

 

Gary, I admit that I saw in your post an attempt to lower the role of 
mathematics on the path of research in Peirce's semiotics. My apology is that 
this has been an issue close to my heart for almost 40 years. So it was a straw 
man argument as you say  and I apologize for that. It was therefore only for 
you to take advantage of John's quotation (I also apologize to him for having 
involved him in this dubious fight) to remind those who might have doubted it 
"that mathematics is not a positive science".  
I clumsily hoped that you would be led, on this occasion, to say something 
positive about the role of mathematics - although it is not a positive science, 
it is important to remember this - and especially about mathematical objects 
that did not exist in Peirce's time and about which he had a strong intuition. 
But it was a waste of time; only the beginning of my posts caught your 
attention ... so I won't do it again and I'll stop spreading terror with a 
humorous signature that you took perhaps a bit too seriously.
There won't be blood on the walls! 

Best regards,

Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty  

 

 de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

[gnox]

Robert, you've certainly shown that semiotics is a blood sport for you, but 
you've also shown how that kind of methodology can twist a scholar's thinking.

 

John's post about the Eisele article omitted any mention of the role of actual 
experience in scientific reasoning. I did not attack John (or Eisele) for 
attacking experience; I simply commented that “if theorematic reasoning is only 
a mathematical procedure, it leaves out the experiential element of Peirce's 
methodology and his pragmatism.”

Yesterday you distorted my comment by leaving out my key word IF, and built 
that into a straw man that you could accuse of attacking mathematics. Today you 
accuse me of ignoring my own word “if” and of uttering a “truism” in my comment 
– the same comment that you misquoted and attacked yesterday! Apparently you 
will do anything, even reverse yourself, to keep that straw man alive so you 
can keep on flailing away at it. But it won't work, because you just can't make 
a straw man bleed with your own semiotic truisms. The whole history is below 
for all to read. 

 

It was Peirce who said that “Mathematics is not a positive science” (CP 3.428). 
If you care at all about Peirce's scientific terminology, I'd suggest searching 
through his works for “positive science”, and for his contrast between a “real 
relation” and a “relation of reason” (terms he adopted from the Scholastic 
logicians, in accordance with his ethics of terminology). But if you prefer to 
carry on with your “blood sport,” count me out.

 

Gary f.

 

From: robert marty  
Sent: 6-Aug-20 05:29
To: Gary Fuhrman ; Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

 

Gary F., List

 

It's not a response and my post was not an attack but a counterattack to your 
exploitation of the quote from John's post, in conjunction with your insistence 
on the term "imaginary" : "The relevance to John's original post, as i see it, 
is this: if theorematic reasoning is only a mathematical procedure, it leaves 
out the experiential element of Peirce's methodology and his pragmatism". Who 
can disagree with that? But what about the ability of mathematics to grasp 
"real relations" by means of "relations of reason"? Not a word ... You seem to 
ignore the important word "if" ... By editorializing a truism you undermine by 
omission the role of mathematics in the construction of theories. And then you 
triumph by trumpeting that mathematics is not a positive science, which nobody 
supports. If you want to go beyond CP 1.240 to 1.245 you will read this:

 

Beginning with Class I, mathematics meddles with every other science without 
exception. There is no science whatever to which is not attached an application 
of mathematics. This is not true of any other science, since pure mathematics 
has not, as a part of it, any application of any other science, inasmuch as 
every other science is limited to finding out what is positively true, either 
as an individual fact, as a class, or as a law; while pure mathematics has no 
interest in whether a proposition is existentially true or not. In particular, 
mathematics has such a close intimacy with one of the classes of philosophy, 
that is, with logic, that no small acumen is required to find the joint between 
them." (CP 1.245)

 

Some additional remarks: 

 " Diagrammatic signs are not so good at that" ... another truism: they are 
Iconic Sinsigns so they are not indexical signs, but they play a capital role 
in the abductive phase of formal constructions because they bring the first 
information about the dynamic object.

On the other hand, "genuine indexes" are Dicent Sinsigns (they point to the 
dynamic object and provide information about it) and "degenerate indexes" are 
Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns which also point to the dynamic object without 
providing information. There is a relation of presupposition between them. See :

 

"Second: An Iconic Sinsign [e.g., an individual diagram] is any object of 
experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an 
object. Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may 
be like, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will 
embody a Qualisign."(CP 2.255)

 

"Third: A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign [e.g., a spontaneous cry] is any object of 
direct experience so far as it directs attention to an Object by which its 
presence is caused. It necessarily involves an Iconic Sinsign of a peculiar 
kind, yet is quite different since it brings the attention of the interpreter 
to the very Object denoted." (CP 2.256)

 

"Fourth: A Dicent Sinsign [e.g., a weathercock] is any object of direct 
experience, in so far as it is a sign, and, as such, affords information 
concerning its Object. This it can only do by being really affected by its 
Object; so that it is necessarily an Index. The only information it can afford 
is of actual fact. Such a Sign must involve an Iconic Sinsign to embody the 
informati

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

[gnox]

Robert, answering your attack on a straw man would hardly be worthwhile, as it 
is apparently based on a misquotation of my post and your own hostile reaction 
to the word “imaginary.” Rather than unleash a barrage of quotes, i will just 
give one example where Peirce uses that word as i did in my paraphrase. This is 
from his classification of the “theoretical sciences,” CP 1.240 (1902):

 

[[ The first is mathematics, which does not undertake to ascertain any matter 
of fact whatever, but merely posits hypotheses, and traces out their 
consequences. It is observational, in so far as it makes constructions in the 
imagination according to abstract precepts, and then observes these imaginary 
objects, finding in them relations of parts not specified in the precept of 
construction. This is truly observation, yet certainly in a very peculiar 
sense; and no other kind of observation would at all answer the purpose of 
mathematics. ]]

 

Gary f.

 

From: robert marty  
Sent: 5-Aug-20 04:49



 

Gary F., Edwina, John, Auke, List

So you're sending mathematics back into the field of the imaginary. Peirce 
isn't as radical as you. He begins a simple and clear classification of science 
with:

- the mathematical sciences: "the study of ideal constructions without 
reference to their real existence",  

If we stopped reading it here, we wouldn't be so preoccupied with mathematics, 
as you seem to want us to be.

But as he goes on he writes:

-Empirical sciences: "the study of phenomena with the purpose of identifying 
their forms with those mathematics has studied"

which puts them back at the center of scientific thought and creates an 
obligation of scientific morality. In other words, what will you do with your 
"genuine indexes" if you do not have universal forms to support them. Will you 
prefer doctrines that have remained in an unformed state rather than having 
formalized theories that can be applied in the real world? By the way, Peirce 
ends his classification with :

- the pragmatic sciences, "the study of how we ought to behave in the ligth of 
the truths of empirics." (C.S. Peirce, 1976: NEM , vol III.2 1122, MS 1345)

which shows without question that pragmatism cannot do without even "imaginary" 
mathematics and even that they are the cornerstone of its pragmatism. 

To claim as you do that "theoretical reasoning is only a mathematical 
procedure, it leaves aside the experiential element of Peirce's methodology and 
his pragmatism" is an insult to Peirce himself and is in fact a certain 
negationism. I am not going to go into a recollection of the innumerable texts 
in which Peirce asserts the role he attributes to mathematics. I believe that 
the one I am quoting above is more than sufficient.

On the other hand, if you were not blinded by this kind of a priori rejection 
of mathematics you could have benefited from the lattice of the classes of 
signs, as noted by Edwina, which would have shown you that the dicent and 
rhematic indexical legisigns encapsulate the corresponding dicent and rhematic 
indexical sinsigns and furthermore that the legisigns themselves are 
encapsulated in dicent and rhematic symbols which combined using deductive or 
inductive arguments produce theories.

But as they say in French "il n'est pire sourd qui ne veut entendre"! (he's the 
worst deaf person who doesn't want to hear!)

Best regards

Robert Marty

Semiotics is a fighting sport

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 

fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty  

 

 de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty

 

 

 

Le lun. 3 août 2020 à 18:18, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > 
a écrit :

Jon et al.,

The basic point of my post was that the interpreter of a sign can keep its 
dynamic object “in view” only by means of the indexical function of the sign, 
which connects it to actual experience. Diagrammatic signs are not so good at 
that.

The relevance to John's original post, as i see it, is this: if theorematic 
reasoning is only a mathematical procedure, it leaves out the experiential 
element of Peirce's methodology and his pragmatism. 

Mathematics is not a positive science, meaning that it involves no actual 
experience (other than the experience of doing mathematics, in which the 
universe of discourse is entirely imaginary). All positive sciences (including 
phaneroscopy, logic and semiotic) deal with what Peirce calls real relations as 
opposed to relations of reason (CP 1.365, for instance). A proposition in a 
positive science thus must employ a genuine Index 
 , as opposed to a degenerate index such 
as ‘the letters attached to a geometrical or other diagram’ (EP2:172).

Gary f.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

[gnox]

Jon et al.,

The basic point of my post was that the interpreter of a sign can keep its 
dynamic object “in view” only by means of the indexical function of the sign, 
which connects it to actual experience. Diagrammatic signs are not so good at 
that.

The relevance to John's original post, as i see it, is this: if theorematic 
reasoning is only a mathematical procedure, it leaves out the experiential 
element of Peirce's methodology and his pragmatism. 

Mathematics is not a positive science, meaning that it involves no actual 
experience (other than the experience of doing mathematics, in which the 
universe of discourse is entirely imaginary). All positive sciences (including 
phaneroscopy, logic and semiotic) deal with what Peirce calls real relations as 
opposed to relations of reason (CP 1.365, for instance). A proposition in a 
positive science thus must employ a genuine Index 
 , as opposed to a degenerate index such 
as ‘the letters attached to a geometrical or other diagram’ (EP2:172).

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey  
Sent: 3-Aug-20 11:35
To: Peirce List 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragma, Pragmata, Pragmatitude!

 

Dear Gary, All ...

 

I was obviously having a lot more fun with words in those days ...

sigh, good times ... the point of it all being I always see the whole complex 
of meanings associated with the Greek root "pragma, pragmata" through the more 
threadbare veil of the Latin "object".

That complex contains all the senses of aims, concerns, ends, goals, 
intentional objects, and purposes we tend to express more obliquely through the 
use of "object" to mean "objective".  Still, the latter use does have some 
currency in cybernetics, operations research, and systems theory, so it's a 
handy sense to keep in mind.

 

Cf: Liddell & Scott

 

 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dpra%3Dgma

 

Regards,

 

Jon

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