Re: length-extension and Merkle-Damgard hashes

Travis H. wrote: So I was reading this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merkle-Damgard It seems to me the length-extension attack (given one collision, it's easy to create others) is not the only one, though it's obviously a big concern to those who rely on it. This attack thanks to Schneier: If

Paper summarizing new directions in protecting web users

resent) in Columbia univ. this Friday and in IBM Watson on next Tuesday - so if any of you are around, I'll love to see you. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com Try TrustBar - improved browser security U

New version (0.9.97) of TrustBar - first from the new developer team

stBar/index.html#download Feedback will be most welcome! -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com Try TrustBar - improved browser security UI: http://AmirHerzberg.com/TrustBar Visit my Hall Of Shame of Unprotected Login

DoS attack on The Million Dollar Homepage

x27;m currently working closely with my hosting company, Sitelutions, to bring the site back online as soon as possible. More news soon. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com Try TrustBar - improved browser securi

`Identified by` technique of TrustBar adopted by IE, other browsers...

, Opera, KDE) where they agreed to adopt these ideas http://AmirHerzberg.com/TrustBar - my page for info and downloads of TrustBar... TrustBar is a public domain, open source project. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http

Re: US Banks: Training the next generation of phishing victims

warning of their unprotected login and the fact I'm going to add them to `hall of shame`) by legal threats. Typical case of `pay lawyers a lot, to avoid doing things right`. 4. One company sent me coupons for free trades. Rare example, I'm afraid... -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg

Re: An overview of cryptographic protocols to prevent spam

email. And Ross Anderson once had to resort to asking Adi to call me on the phone to deliver a message, since a crazy mail filter here (Bar Ilan Univ.) blocked his messages for weeks... And more incidents. So believe me I'm well aware of this problem. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg

Re: PKI too confusing to prevent phishing, part 28

problems are worse. I think our community should try to be constructive. I definitely try myself, hence TrustBar. Please help me: try it and give me feedback, if you are a good programmer, lend a hand improving it; or find other ideas and implement them. Best, Amir Herzberg Paul Hoffman wrote

An overview of cryptographic protocols to prevent spam

- I hope you won't consider me a spammer... -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com Try TrustBar - improved browser security UI: http://AmirHerzberg.com/TrustBar Visit my Hall Of Shame of Unprotected

Re: Defending users of unprotected login pages with TrustBar 0.4.9.93

then http for web mailer. However if you edit the URL after login to https, it appears to work ok over SSL also. cool, this may also be something we can do for users (essentially requires us extending the auto-redirection features with wildcard functionality). -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associat

Re: Defending users of unprotected login pages with TrustBar 0.4.9.93

David Wagner wrote: Amir Herzberg writes: However, quite a few of these sites invoke SSL/TLS only _after_ user has typed in her user name and pw, and clicked `submit`. This allows a MITM adversary to send a modified login page to the user, which sends the pw to the attacker (rather than

Re: Defending users of unprotected login pages with TrustBar 0.4.9.93

or this attack, Mozilla would be a much better target... In fact, since `everybody` uses Windows, any stupid program can redirect users to fake sites - and do much worse... Anyway - thanks for the feedback. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Scie

Defending users of unprotected login pages with TrustBar 0.4.9.93

n our research on secure usability. Thanks! BTW, TrustBar is an open-source project, so if some of you want to provide it to your customers, possibly customized (branded) etc., there is no licensing required. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar

Re: simple (&secure??) PW-based web login (was Re: Another entryin theinternet security hall of shame....)

glosses over dealing with failures, but this is not difficult; I also don't discuss how to support users of `public` PCs and changing PCs, solutions are possible. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com T

Amazon's

. Nice oracle to find last 5 digits... making it quite easy to find the full number. Not that anybody would bother. Still, I find it funny. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com Try TrustBar - improved

Re: [Anti-fraud] simple (&secure??) PW-based web login (was Re:Anotherentry in theinternet security hall of shame....)

Ian G wrote: Amir Herzberg wrote: For a stationary user, the extension compares _Iterations_ and confirm it is at most one less than previous value of _Iterations_ used with this site. (Minor point - if relying on incrementing Iterations, this may impact password sharing scenarios. Whether

simple (&secure??) PW-based web login (was Re: Another entry in theinternet security hall of shame....)

ion on these machines... so I like the previous solution better. Ok, enough for now; now tell me what's wrong, etc It is definitely too simple to be any good. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com Try

Please try TrustBar 0.4 beta 9.3 with Hey! ...

#x27;ll be happy to cooperate in testing with other bars (e.g. petname, of course). It is quite easy. I will really appreciate if you test it - yourselves, of course, but also if you try to find one non-expert e-banking user and have him try it for two weeks... -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

like the other proposals. I may be wrong about the CyberCash role, though, it was a while, and I don't think it matters so much... -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com Try TrustBar - improved brows

Re: the limits of crypto and authentication

en to such attacks. But... crypto and authentication, imho, are the best tools to prevent such malware from being installed. Yes, I know, this is far from the current situation, with corrupted PCs (Zombies) being a very large fraction (around a third?)... -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate

Re: Feature or Flaw?

Lance James wrote: Amir Herzberg wrote: Lance James wrote: ... > https://slam.securescience.com/threats/mixed.html This site is set so that there is a frame of https://www.bankone.com inside my https://slam.securescience.com/threats/mixed.html site. The imaginative part is that you

Re: Feature or Flaw?

mailman/listinfo/anti-fraud -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com Try TrustBar - improved browser security UI: http://AmirHerzberg.com/TrustBar Visit my Hall Of Shame of Unprotected Login pages: http://A

Re: Menezes on HQMV

Eric Rescorla wrote: There's an interesting paper up on eprint now: http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/205 Another look at HMQV Alfred Menezes ... In this paper we demonstrate that HMQV is insecure by presenting realistic attacks in the Canetti-Krawczyk model that reco

Rephrased: Should login pages be protected by SSL - although it won'thelp most users?

Ole Kasper Olsen wrote: ... Amir Herzberg asked the question of "should login pages be SSL encrypted". The flurry of discussion can be summerized as "Yes"... ... 2. Most people believe that a login page *should* be encrypted for web sites carrying important data. (e.g., f

Exploiting AES cache timing attack

(somehow!) eavesdrop on the (encrypted) communication on the Net but _not_ on the (plaintext) communication on the intranet, to decipher the communication of a pair of honest employees, Alice in A and Bob in B? If so, what's the best defense? -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Prof

Re: AmEx unprotected login site

above, can protect reasonably well even naive or unsuspecting users. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com New: see my Hall Of Shame of Unprotected Login pages: http://AmirHerzberg.com/shame

Re: AmEx unprotected login site

this does not prevent you from also blocking in a proxy any CAs you don't trust. Let the user decide among these you can't rule out. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com New: see my Hall O

Re: AmEx unprotected login site

better to make the CA visible to the user (but in a way users can understand - I believe we have that with TrustBar). -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com New: see my Hall Of Shame of Unprotected Log

Re: AmEx [add: and other] unprotected login site

eal with, and I'd love not to have to pay my mortgage on time, and I'd love a pony and a mountain of gold. I'm an adult, though, so I accept that I can't have everything I want and I need to fulfill my obligations. Are we to expect less of AMERICAN EXPRESS? Of VERIZON? That'

Re: AmEx unprotected login site (was encrypted tapes, was Re: Papersabout"Algorithm hiding" ?)

is so clueless as to send you corrupted scripts, it may as well publish your password directly... Best, Amir Herzberg Ken Ballou wrote: > Unless I misunderstand, the problem is that I can not determine where my login information will go without examining the source of the login page. Sure,

AmEx unprotected login site (was encrypted tapes, was Re: Papersabout "Algorithm hiding" ?)

do with "ease of use" or tools that default "safe". The problem is that they don't know there is anything to fix at a level of the firm that is capable of taking the decision to fix it. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar I

Hall of Shame of Unprotected Login Sites, and Phishing/Spoofing FAQ

phishing and spoofing, at http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/shame/FAQ.htm -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com New: see my Hall Of Shame of Unprotected Login pages: http://AmirHerzberg.com/shame.html

Re: Trojan horse attack involving many major Israeli companies, executives

eli IT managers and developers, and hence improve the security of their systems. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University http://AmirHerzberg.com New: see my Hall Of Shame of Unprotected Login pages: http://AmirHer

Re: Citibank discloses private information to improve security

that even naive users understand quite the TrustBar UI for SSL protected sites. We display something like identified by . I'll appreciate your thoughts/feedback, try it at http://TrustBar.MozDev.org. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar

Re: Trojan horse attack involving many major Israeli companies, executives

05.30 15:34 +0200 ) Amir Herzberg: See more info e.g. at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/581790.html an excellent tale [still unfolding]- no doubt coming to a bookstore or movie theatre near you real soon. of course, it was never mentioned in the article, but they *had* to be running wi

Trojan horse attack involving many major Israeli companies, executives

problems. This couple were apparently targeted by the Trojan for personal reasons; the programmer is their ex-son-in-law... See more info e.g. at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/581790.html -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor Department of Computer Science Bar Ilan University

Re: how email encryption should work (and how to get it used...)

-aware mail agents (MTA-MTA, MTA-MUA)); so that's what we are developing in SICS. I believe these efforts are complementary to providing encryption services. Best, Amir Herzberg - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscri

Re: how email encryption should work (and how to get it used...)

ling to provide feedback...] Best, Amir Herzberg James A. Donald wrote: -- In my blog http://blog.jim.com/ I post "how email encryption should work" I would appreciate some analysis of this proposal, which I think summarizes a great deal of discussion that I have read. * The

Re: $90 for high assurance _versus_ $349 for low assurance

sufficiently to identify sites, and to _know_ which CA is identifying the (protected) site they use. This is easy to do, and of course you can add this to your Mozilla/FireFox browser by installing our TrustBar (from http://TrustBar.mozdev.org). Best, Amir Herzberg John Levine wrote: Does

Re: PK -> OTP?

's wrong with sending the device encryption of a random number (using the public key of the device), and the device sending back the number as proof of possession of the corresponding secret key? Best, Amir Herzberg -

Re: A cool demo of how to spoof sites (also shows how TrustBar preventsthis...)

y posting on this list I am exactly encouraging people to review the code (it is all script so you can just download TrustBar and read it), write their own better code, etc... Best, Amir Herzberg - The Cryptography Mailing List

Re: A cool demo of how to spoof sites (also shows how TrustBar preventsthis...)

arm. Best, Amir Herzberg - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: A cool demo of how to spoof sites (also shows how TrustBar preventsthis...)

Taral wrote: On Wed, Feb 09, 2005 at 07:41:36PM +0200, Amir Herzberg wrote: Want to protect your Mozilla/FireFox from such attacks? Install our TrustBar: http://TrustBar.Mozdev.org (this was the first time that I had a real reason to click the `I don't trust this authority` button...) Opi

Re: A cool demo of how to spoof sites (also shows how TrustBar preventsthis...)

Adam Shostack wrote: On Wed, Feb 09, 2005 at 07:41:36PM +0200, Amir Herzberg wrote: | Want to see a simple, working method to spoof sites, fooling | Mozilla/FireFox/... , even with an SSL certificate and `lock`? | | http://www.shmoo.com/idn/ | | See also: | | http://cgi.ebay.com/ws

A cool demo of how to spoof sites (also shows how TrustBar preventsthis...)

our TrustBar: http://TrustBar.Mozdev.org (this was the first time that I had a real reason to click the `I don't trust this authority` button...) Opinions? Best, Amir Herzberg - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe b

TrustBar: an open-source crypto anti-spoofing/phishing toolbar forFireFox

n - as other info displayed by browsers - can be spoofed in different ways, as explained in our paper and in some of the previous works we cite. Best, Amir Herzberg - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Can you help develop crypto anti-spoofing/phishing tool ?

y URL` which is too complex for naive users). Thanks (also for the URL)! Amir Herzberg - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Re: Can you help develop crypto anti-spoofing/phishing tool ?

- which, imho, is a good thing. I find it almost a professional insult, that people go for non-crypto identification mechanisms to prevent spoofing and phishing. I mean, if we can't sell crypto for this purpose, this - imho - is a real

Can you help develop crypto anti-spoofing/phishing tool ?

fact, I wouldn't object if some serious open-code developer assumed responsibility... If people are interested, and want to discuss face to face, I'll be in RSA on 15-18/February... Best, Amir Herzberg - The Cryptograph

Re: HMAC?

finding many collisions easily, including to messages with random prefixes, this could be more worrying... -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept., Bar Ilan University http://amirherzberg.com (information and lectures in cryptography & security) Mirror site:

Re: Websites, Passwords, and Consumers (Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, August 15,2004)

... -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept., Bar Ilan University http://amirherzberg.com (information and lectures in cryptography & security) Mirror site: http://www.mfn.org/~herzbea/ begin:vcard fn:Amir Herzberg n:Herzberg;Amir org:Bar Ilan University;Comp

Re: dual-use digital signature vulnerability

public key signatures) that the signed documents are structured with a random field before and after the `actual contract`, as long as the fields are well defined. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept., Bar Ilan University http://amirherzberg.com (information an

On SSL, SET, `real PKI` and real code against Phishing/Spoofing

t approach? Should we change something before releasing (hoping in a week or two) or longer term? Can you do it for IE or other browser? (for the paper, see my homepage as below...) -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept., Bar Ilan University http://amirherzberg.com

Re: Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

n't have any illusions that I'll convince you and I have no desire to get involved in an endless debate. Accordingly, I'll end my half of the conversation here. Feel free to have the last word. Eric, I think this was rude, and quite unlike you. Nobody forces you to communicate. A

On `SSL considered harmful`, correct use of condoms and SSL abuse

. Or if your partner promised to use it, but forgot. So while `SSL is harmful` sounds sexy, I think it is misleading. Maybe `Stop SSL-Abuse!` -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept., Bar Ilan University http://amirherzberg.com (information and lectur

Re: dual-use digital signature vulnerability

ne the digital signature in a (`regular`) contract between the parties. The contract defines what the parties agree to be considered as equivalent to their (physical) signature, with well defined interpretation and restrictions. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor, Computer

Re: Can crypto help against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

e briefly to a guy from the FDIC at last year's antiphishing meeting who said they'd been thinking of something like that. Agree! We call this a credential, see in paper or just this screen shot http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/Papers/ecommerce/spoofing_files/image006.gif -- Best regards,

Re: Question on the state of the security industry

homepage or directly at http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/Papers/ecommerce/spoofing.htm), I'll love to hear their feedback.. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept., Bar Ilan University http://amirherzberg.com (information and lectures in cryptography & s

Re: Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

, you simply have to validate the (regular) certificate on the first time you get a public key from the server... -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept., Bar Ilan University http://amirherzberg.com (information and lectures in cryptography & security)

Re: Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

've seen, claim very high actual damages. -- Best regards, Amir Herzberg Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept., Bar Ilan University http://amirherzberg.com (information and lectures in cryptography & security) begin:vcard fn:Amir Herzberg n:Herzberg;Amir org:Bar Ilan Univers

Re: EZ Pass and the fast lane ....

down (and they definitely _don't_ slow down...). So I think this observation about EZ Pass is probably true, but for some time ago; with current technology, reading license plates is possible (which, I guess, has some alarming privacy implications...). Best regards, Amir Herzberg Asso

Can crypto help against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

Web Sites, at http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/155/ and http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/Papers/ecommerce/Spam.htm # Controlling Spam by Secure Internet Content Selection, at http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/154/ and http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/Papers/ecommerce/Spam.htm -- Best regards, Ami

Re: Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

Florian Weimer wrote: * Amir Herzberg: # Protecting (even) Naïve Web Users, or: Preventing Spoofing and Establishing Credentials of Web Sites, at http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/Papers/ecommerce/trusted%20credentials%20area.PDF The trusted credentials area is an interesting concept. Thanks

Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

tials area) we developed for Mozilla, and it works great; I hope we'll feel soon confident enough with the code so we'll be able to put it in the public domain. Experienced Mozilla developers who will be willing to help test and evaluate the code are invited to contact me. -- Best re

recommendations/evaluations of free / low-cost crypto libraries

d send to the list. Important aspects include reliability, functionality, performance, documentation, cost (for development system - no `per seat` cost!), and licensing terms (in particular can it be used for commercial products, and any restrictions). Thanks a lot... -- Best regards, Ami

Looking for mirror (or: better) sites to host my crypto/security lectures

nably reliable and persistent. In the meanwhile, if you find you cannot download the files, I guess I'll have to send by e-mail... Unfortunately these are pretty large files. Needless to say, technical comments and corrections are also (or: especially) welcome. Best regards, Amir Herzberg

Re: why "penny black" etc. are not very useful (could crypto stop spam??)

make it a bit more difficult for e-mail viruses to propagate. What's the bug in this simple solution? If anybody wants to implement I'm willing to assist in developing/validating the protocols. Best regards, Amir Herzberg Computer Science Department, Bar Ilan University Home

Re: example: secure computing kernel needed

At 04:20 30/12/2003, David Wagner wrote: Ed Reed wrote: >There are many business uses for such things, like checking to see >if locked down kiosk computers have been modified (either hardware >or software), I'm a bit puzzled why you'd settle for detecting changes when you can prevent them. Any cha

Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)

At 18:02 29/12/2003, Ben Laurie wrote: Amir Herzberg wrote: ... specifications, I use `non-repudiation` terms for some of the requirements. For example, the intuitive phrasing of the Non-Repudiation of Origin (NRO) requirement is: if any party outputs an evidence evid s.t. valid(agreement, evid

RE: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)

ormal specifications. > Best regards, > > Amir Herzberg > Computer Science Department, Bar Ilan University > Lectures: http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/book.html > Homepage: http://amir.herzberg.name > > - &g

Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)

at: do you really object and if so why? What of applications/scenarios that seem to require non-repudiation, e.g. certified mail, payments, contract signing,...? Best regards, Amir Herzberg Computer Science Department, Bar Ilan University Lectures: http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/book.html Home

Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)

pudiation of origin, i.e. the ability of recipient to convince a third party that a message was sent (to him) by a particular sender (at certain time)? Or - do you think this is not an important requirement? Or what? Best regards, Amir Herzberg Computer Science Department, Bar Ilan University

Re: Super-Encryption

again as I wrote before...) that you don't achieve your stated goal of identifying the intended receiver. This is also solved if you sign the ciphertext and the receiver's public key, or simply sign the identity of the receiver. Anyway, I am repeating myself, so... Best regards,

Re: Super-Encryption

st regards, Amir Herzberg Computer Science Department, Bar Ilan University Lectures: http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/book.html Homepage: http://amir.herzberg.name At 16:25 15/12/2003, Matt wrote: Quoting Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > I don't see any value added by cipher1 - what&#

Re: Super-Encryption

er, in his MSc thesis which he completed these days. I can provide details (or paper/thesis) but first I wonder if this is what you wanted to achieve at all. Best, Amir Herzberg Computer Science Dept, Bar Ilan University Lectures: http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/book.html At 16:42 12/12/2003, wr

RE: Are there...one-way encryption algorithms

k-ins. BTW I've updated my foils on encryption and hashing which cover much of this topic (see in site if interested). Best, Amir Herzberg http://amir.herzberg.name - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by send

Re: Digital cash and campaign finance reform

en without knowing for sure they got the money - kind of `risk management` - I'm not sure what we want is to allow big contributors to gain favors while not really making as big a contribution as they promised... Best, Amir Herzberg At 10:11 08/09/2003 -0700, Steve Schear wrote: Everyone knows th

Re: Fwd: [IP] A Simpler, More Personal Key to Protect Online Messages

e time to explain so nicely why this kind of systems, while cute, are not really helping applied cryptography (IMHO). Best regards... Amir Herzberg http://amir.herzberg.name - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by

DIMACS Tutorial on Applied Cryptography and Network Security: NJ, Aug 4-7

as of applied cryptography and secure communication and commerce. So please consider joining us, and forward to forums or individuals that may be interested. Amir Her

Re: grumpf: PODC (and security in distributed computing) announcement

he teaser, the topic of the conference (it's about podcs?), the dates, and the location. Topic: Distributed computing, and this year special focus on distributed security and crypto Dates: July 13-17 Location: Boston, MA URL: http://www.podc.org/podc2003/ Best, a very

PODC early registration and hotel deadlines (June 18/19)

may receive. I look forward to seeing many of you at PODC in July! Victor Luchangco PODC 2003 Publicity Chair Amir Herzberg http://amir.herzberg.name - The

Applied crypto site - lectures, notes, etc...

, time-stamping,... Secure Payments and Banking ---- Amir Herzberg http://amir.herzberg.name - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe

PODC'03 & Security in Distributed Computing: register and reserve hotel (till Thursday June 12)

ay also discuss crypto/privacy issues...). General PODC Information === See below `call for participation`. I hope you will join us for a great conference in July! Amir Herzberg PODC 2003 Security Track Chair CALL FOR PARTI

Re: An attack on paypal --> secure UI for browsers

m, ICICS, LNCS 2513, 2002. This issue is also covered somewhat by my article in CACM (May 2002). Best, Amir Herzberg http://amir.herzberg.name - Combine the two to allow sites to provide a user-trustable UI to enter a password which cannot be sucked down. - Evangelize to users that this is be

Re: Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down

to key length requirements); in particular public key systems are always `only` computationally secure. This is not really a problem and certainly not a motivation to design new systems, without a proof of security... Best, Amir Herzberg http://amir.herzberg.name