z rejected Descartes claim that material bodies are
extensive while mind is intensive -- which would be a dualism --
in favor of an Idealistic monism. Otherwise, being a dualism, they
cannot logically interact.
This also amounts to a rejection of pure materalism, a third
path, namely that everythin
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 11/5/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> *From:* Craig Weinberg
> *Receiver:* everything-list
> *Time:* 2012-11-05, 09:01:1
Hi Richard Ruquist
Indeed, dualism is -- has to be-- science fiction.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Richard Ruquist
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 09:22:15
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem
On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have come to a
conclusion.
Craig
On Monday, November 5, 2012 8
r the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 09:01:10
Subject: Re: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it see
On 11/5/2012 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't know that I'm a philosopher, but it seems to me that I have
come to a conclusion.
Craig
On Monday, November 5, 2012 8:13:38 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
What they say about economists is also
appropriate to say abo
- Receiving the following content -
> From: Craig Weinberg
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04
> Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem
>
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5, rc
ecially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-05, 08:04:04
Subject: Re: Dualism as a cover-up "solution" to the mind-body problem
On Monday, November 5, 2012 6:45:50 AM UTC-5
lid.
> Instead, they are phoney attempts to get around the unresolveable
> issue that mind and body are completely contrary substances,
> and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem.
>
> Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith
> bod
Roger says "that mind and body are completely contrary substances"
Richard replies "what is dualism if not that?"
On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 6:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Craig Weinberg
>
> The dualisms will work as fictions as long as you don't take
> the
etely contrary substances,
and calling them a dualism is just a handy cover-up of the problem.
Only Leibniz can claim philosophical verity by treating boith
body and mind as mind (idealism). Materialist monists
hold that mind is physical, which is nonsense,
and the dualist coverup doesn't solve that
On May 12, 8:00 pm, Richard Ruquist wrote:
> On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> > On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir wrote:
>
> >> >A
On 5/15/2012 5:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Stephen,
On 14 May 2012, at 19:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
Do you mean that when all chemists accept the multiverse
interpretation, they will start work
On 14 May 2012, at 22:41, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 14.05.2012 10:29 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Yet, I guess that even not all physicists believe in multiverse.
When
you convince all physicists that multivers exists, I will start
Hi Stephen,
On 14 May 2012, at 19:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno March
On 14.05.2012 10:29 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
...
Yet, I guess that even not all physicists believe in multiverse. When
you convince all physicists that multivers exists, I will start
thinking about it.
On reality, usually all humans
On 5/14/2012 4:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhag
On 13 May 2012, at 23:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe"
theory
ar
On 13.05.2012 15:09 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimon
ollapse) have no problems
in that respect, and line up well with the everything-like use of
Occam.
Bruno
On 12 May 2012, at 13:03, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/quantum-dualist-interactionism.html
In Chapter 2, C
On 12 May 2012, at 22:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/12/2012 6:20 AM, scerir wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990)
reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actu
On 12 May 2012, at 15:20, scerir wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990)
reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called
On 12 May 2012, at 14:59, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe"
theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse th
On 13.05.2012 04:38 meekerdb said the following:
On 5/12/2012 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
Not all of them, at least not in the sense of dualist you mean. Adrian
Kent ha
On 5/12/2012 11:21 PM, scerir wrote:
H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of waves packet).
Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes th
H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of waves packet).
Dirac said that it is 'Nature' that makes the choice (of measurement
outcome). B
oblems: 'collapse' is just a change in our information.
Brent
Computationalism and Everett (QM without collapse) have no problems in that respect, and
line up well with the everything-like use of Occam.
Bruno
On 12 May 2012, at 13:03, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
A few quotes belo
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir wrote:
>
>> >A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
>> >Evgenii
>>
>> H. Kragh ("
On 5/12/2012 10:19 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir <mailto:sce...@libero.it>> wrote:
>A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
>Evgenii
H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990)
repo
On 5/12/2012 6:20 AM, scerir wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called "collapse
On Sat, May 12, 2012 at 9:20 AM, scerir wrote:
> >A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
> >Evgenii
>
> H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
> a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
> ac
>A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
>Evgenii
H. Kragh ("Dirac: a Scientific Biography", Cambridge U.P., 1990) reports
a 1927 discussion between Dirac, Heisenberg and Born, about what
actually gives rise to the so called "collapse" (reduction of waves packe
On 12.05.2012 13:33 Bruno Marchal said the following:
Evgenii,
All this is well known. Copenhagen theory, or "unique-universe" theory
are non computationalist dualist theories.
But as Shimony has shown, the idea that consciousness collapse the wave
leads to many difficulties, like non local hidd
012, at 13:03, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/quantum-dualist-interactionism.html
In Chapter 2, Conscious Souls, Brains and Quantum Mechanics there is
a nice section Quantum Dualist Interactionism (p. 17 – 21) w
A few quotes below to dualism from Max Velmans.
Evgenii
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/05/quantum-dualist-interactionism.html
In Chapter 2, Conscious Souls, Brains and Quantum Mechanics there is a
nice section Quantum Dualist Interactionism (p. 17 – 21) where Max
Velmans describes works that
artes 'invented' and 'advertised' his "*
dualism"* to keep the soul figment of the faithful in his theory - in order
to escape the Inquisition. Spinozza was in a better position: he risked only
a 'shunning' from the Jewish community, what he got indeed.
On 8/29/2011 6:05 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Stephen and Jason,
interesting discours, but you use concepts that beg for my questioning.
Dualism may be an observation based on phenomena we misunderstand and
explain to the level of "present" theories. A violation of the laws of
physics
life form from existing?
Also are you saying you are a substance dualist?
Hi,
Is 'substance dualism' the only form of dualism?
I suppose there is idealism (only mind) which would be a theory of no
substances. Also nothing precludes someone from postulating 3 types
of substances,
Stephen and Jason,
interesting discours, but you use concepts that beg for my questioning.
Dualism may be an observation based on phenomena we misunderstand and
explain to the level of "present" theories. A violation of the laws of
physics asks: are those "laws' reall
list?
Hi,
Is 'substance dualism' the only form of dualism?
I suppose there is idealism (only mind) which would be a theory of no
substances. Also nothing precludes someone from postulating 3 types
of substances, but this is uncommon because usually the second
substance invoked is
On 8/28/2011 11:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Capillary action is not a violation of the laws of physics. What
about substance monism precludes any life form from existing?
Also are you saying you are a substance dualist?
Hi,
Is 'substance dualism' the only form of dualism?
ly physical statements? Are you
> familiar with the ideas of philosopher David Chalmers, who
> takes the latter position? He doesn't advocate
> interactive dualism, where there's some kind of
> soul-stuff that can influence matter--he assumes that the
> physical world is &
Le 24-juin-05, à 22:43, Pete Carlton a écrit :
(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I
have had meetings to attend etc..)
On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno wrote
There are two *physical* issues here.
1) The simplest one is that if you
(Sorry for the delay; I like to spend several hours writing here but I have had meetings to attend etc..)On Jun 22, 2005, at 4:19 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:There are two *physical* issues here.1) The simplest one is that if you agree with the comp indeterminacy(or similar) you get an explanation of th
Le 22-juin-05, à 21:26, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Actually, it occurred to me lately that saying "everything happens" may be the same as the paradox of the "set of all sets".
That is indeed close to may critics of Tegmark. But as you know logician have made progress in set theories, and today
Le 22-juin-05, à 13:19, Brent Meeker a écrit :
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM
To: Pete Carlton
Cc: EverythingList
Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
Now, if you
Can anyone explain http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech to me. Stephen
seems to think Pratt has solved the "Caspar" problem of dualism. It also
involves
http://www.meta-religion.com/Philosophy/Articles/Philosophy_of_the_mind/mind-bo
dy.htm by someone whose nom-de-internet is
Brent Meeker:
>The fact that all these metaphysical problems and bizarre results are predictedby assuming *everything happens* implies to me that *everything happens* islikely false. I'm not sure what the best alternative is, but I like RolandOmnes view point that QM is a probabilistic theory and
>-Original Message-
>From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 8:16 AM
>To: Pete Carlton
>Cc: EverythingList
>Subject: Re: Dualism and the DA
>
>
>
>Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
>
>> I think the
Le 21-juin-05, à 21:21, Pete Carlton a écrit :
I think the practical differences are large, as you say, but I
disagree that it points to a fundamental metaphysical difference. I
think what appears to be a metaphysical difference is just the
breakdown of our folk concept of "I". Imagine a pr
On Jun 20, 2005, at 10:44 AM, Hal Finney wrote:Pete Carlton writes: -- we don't need to posit any kind of dualism to paper over it, we just have to revise our concept of "I". Hal Finney wrote:Copies seem a little more problematic. We're pretty cavalier aboutcreating and de
Russell Standish wrote:
> > I'd be interested to hear it. Here's something else you could look
> > at...calculate the median annual income for all humans
> alive today (I
> > believe it is around $4,000 /year), compare it to your own,
> and see if
> > you are anyway near the median. I predict
On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 12:52:23PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>
> That's quite an assumption. *Do* all conscious things ask this question of
> themselves? Babies don't. Senile old people don't. I'm not sure that
> medieval peasants ever thought to ask this question, or pre-literate
> cavemen.
Almost the right answer. In fact, if you download the population of
countries from the US Census bureau, throw them into a histogram, you
will find that the distribution is best fit with a power law, with
exponent -1 (my best fit was actually -1.05, but it was -1 within
error). This implies that th
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Russell Standish'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "'EverythingList'"
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 09:52 PM
Subject: Reference class (was dualism and the DA)
Russell Standish wrote:
> > > >(JC) If you want to insist that "What would it be like
> to be a bat"
> > > >is equivalent to the question "What would the universe be like
> > > if I had
> > > > been a bat rather than me?", it is very hard to see what the
> > > > answer could be. Suppose you
>
which pushes the folk
> concept of "I" past its breaking point; we don't need to posit any
> kind of dualism to paper over it, we just have to revise our concept
> of "I".
I agree that this view makes sense. We come up with all these mind
bending and para
les made of you in two different places, and both doubles wil be psychologically identical at the time of their creation such that each will say they are you - then you know everything there is to know. There is no further question of "which one will >I< be"? This is simply a situati
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue with the DA. My (and
> your) reference class can not be merely "conscious observers" or "all
> humans", but must be something much closer to "someone (or thing) discussing
> or aware of the DA). I note that this refer
I am with you here. and if you agree with the 50% I made my point. The 10% was introduced only for treating a case where the copies did not diverge (or the comp histories going through the states of those copies.
To insist that there *is* a difference surely requires some new kind of
dualism. Pe
On Mon, Jun 20, 2005 at 12:01:48AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> > >(JC) If you want to insist that "What would it be like to be a bat" is
> > > equivalent to the question "What would the universe be like
> > if I had
> > > been a bat rather than me?", it is very h
Russell Standish wrote:
> >(JC) If you want to insist that "What would it be like to be a bat" is
> > equivalent to the question "What would the universe be like
> if I had
> > been a bat rather than me?", it is very hard to see what the answer
> > could be. Suppose you
> > *had* been a bat ra
I have just waved my magic wand, and lo! Jonathan Colvin has been changed
body and mind into Russell Standish and placed in Sydney, while Russell
Standish has been changed into Jonathan Colvin and placed somewhere on the
coastal US. If anyone else covets a particular person's wealth or position,
Le Dimanche 19 Juin 2005 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
> the dualism comes from reifying the 3rd
> person independent universe, and if we accept only the 1st person as
> "real", there is no dualism. It is quite a metaphysical leap, though, to
> discard the 3rd person univ
not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.).
>
>> (JC) Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question?
>
>Not at all.
>
>> If you want to
>> insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is
>> possible without assuming a dualism
en born) a bat?" is a *very* different
question than "Why am I me rather than a bat?".
Certainly, assuming immaterial souls or a similar identity dualism, (and
that "I" am my soul, not my body), and that bats have souls like people, it
is a meaningful question to ask "wh
adequate
explanation (assuming c.).
Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question?
Not at all.
If you want to
insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is
possible
without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying
to
figure out
erstanding, design and conditions. Our own
mind-limited artifact.
#2: Over the millennia faith-strategists invented dualism to imply something
that 'survives' us and can be praised or punished just to secure the grip of
'faith' (organizations?) on the 'faithful, ao
On "What would it be like to have been born someone else", how does
this differ from "What is it like to be a bat?"
Presumably Jonathon Colvin would argue that this latter question is
meaningless, unless immaterial souls existed.
I still find it hard to understand this argument. The question "Wha
On Jun 17, 2005, at 10:24 AM, Hal Finney wrote:
Does it make sense for Jobs to say, who would I have been if that had
happened?
Yes, it makes sense, but only because we know that the phrase "Who
would I have been", uttered by Steve Jobs, is just a convenient way
for expressing a third-per
who insists that you could only have
>been other people. This seemed to be one of the foundations
>of their disagreement.
I think Robin is assuming (as I do) that the only way counterfactuals such
as "I could have been someone/something else" make sense, absent dualism, is
if w
Hal Finney wrote:
>It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably
>or meaningfully take counterfactuals. At some level it is
>completely mundane to say things like, if I had taken a
>different route to work today, I wouldn't have gotten caught
>in that traffic jam. We aren't th
It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably or
meaningfully take counterfactuals. At some level it is completely
mundane to say things like, if I had taken a different route to work
today, I wouldn't have gotten caught in that traffic jam. We aren't
thrown into a maelstrom of ex
Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question? If you want to
insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible
without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to
figure out).
If the material universe is identical under situat
Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly
equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in
Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a God
could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.).
Bruno
Le 16-juin-05, à 23:02, Quent
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it seems my
> objection has been independantly discovered (some time ago). See
> http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html
>
> In particular, I note the following section, which seems to mirror my
> argument rather pre
ody I'm
>> >occupying is contingent (ie.
>> >> I could have been in any human body, and am in this one by pure
>> >> chance), then the DA is rescued.
>> >
>> >Yes.
>>
>> Ok, at least we agree on that. Let's go from there.
>&g
Dear Jonathan,
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2005 9:15 PM
Subject: RE: Dualism
snip
[SPK]
The same kind of mutual constraint that
Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>>Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form of
>>>dualism require that one side of the duality has properties and
>>>behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of the duality,
>>>as examplified by
a *reasoning principle*, not
an ontological statement. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we
should reason *as if* we are a random sample from the set of all observers
in our reference class. This is NOT the same as an ontological statement to
the effect that we *are* random observers, which seems hard to justify
unless we assume a species of dualism.
Jonathan Colvin
Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 10:02, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
> Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm conscious
> (feels like I am, anyway).
Hi Jonathan,
I think you do not see the real question, which can be formulated (using your
analogy) by :
Why (me as) Russell Standish is
>> Russell Standish wrote:
>> >> Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as "the mind (or consciousness) is
>> >> separate from the body". Ie. The mind is not identical to
>the body.
>> >>
>> >
>> >These two statements are
Dear Joanthan,
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Stephen Paul King'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2005 1:14 AM
Subject: RE: Dualism and the DA
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Pardon the
On Thu, Jun 16, 2005 at 01:02:11AM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
> >> Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as "the mind (or consciousness) is
> >> separate from the body". Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
> >>
> &
Russell Standish wrote:
>> Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as "the mind (or consciousness) is
>> separate from the body". Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
>>
>
>These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that
>the fist is s
On Wed, Jun 15, 2005 at 10:30:11PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>
> Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as "the mind (or consciousness) is separate
> from the body". Ie. The mind is not identical to the body.
>
These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say tha
Russel Standish wrote:
>> It seems to me that to believe we are randomly emplaced
>souls, whether
>> or not they existed elsewhere beforehand, is to perforce embrace a
>> species of dualism.
>
>Exactly what species of dualism? Dualism usually means that
>
Stephen Paul King wrote:
>Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form
>of dualism require that one side of the duality has properties
>and behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of
>the duality, as examplified by the idea of "randomly emplaced
Russel Standish wrote:
>> Since it is coming from Nick B., over-exhaustive :) I don't think
>> anybody, Nick included, has yet come up with a convincing way to
>> define appropriate reference classes. Absent this, the only way to
>> rescue the DA seems to b
Dear Jonathan,
Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form of dualism
require that one side of the duality has properties and behaviors that are
not constrained by the other side of the duality, as examplified by the idea
of "randomly emplaced souls"?
The ide
> the DA seems to be a sort of dualism (randomly emplaced souls etc).
>
Nooo! - the DA does not imply dualism. The souls do not need to exist
anywhere else before being randomly emplaced.
Cheers
--
*PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
is of type &qu
I am not sure that the Aristotelic term applied
to this. I see hylemorphism as the position that
matter beggets form (rather the other way
around which is the more platonic position).
I think it applies fully to the group of attempts
to build Relational (Classical and Quantum)
Theories of space-
From: "Joao Leao"
> Our access to mathematical archetypes is in
> this sense a "map" to help us "make our way back
> to the garden", as Joni Mitchell (that great
> Platonist) would put it!
If I remember well - but I studied all that 35
years ago - Aristotle called all that 'hylomorphism',
from
thing-list@eskimo.com
; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, May 20, 2005 1:13 PM
Subject: Re: In defense of Dualism
(typos corrected)
Dear Stephen,
I think I catch your point. As it happens the distinction Being/Becoming
(as Form/Substance) are very Aristotelian, both in origin and in the way
r Joao,
Your point is well taken! My failure was to point out that my 'rant' was
against those that would claim that dualism can never be a viable alternative,
especially to a Numbers-are-all-that-exists-monism. Thank you for pointing
out that such is called Pythagorianism.
OTOH
Dear Joao,
Your point is well taken! My failure was to
point out that my 'rant' was against those that would claim that dualism can
never be a viable alternative, especially to a
Numbers-are-all-that-exists-monism. Thank you for pointing out that
such is called Pyth
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Jonathan,
Non-separateness and identity are not the same thing!
Your argument
against dualism assumes that the duals are somehow separable and
non-mutually dependent and thus lacking a linking mechanism dualism
fails as
a viable theory. On the other hand, once
Dear Jonathan,
Non-separateness and identity are not the same thing! Your argument
against dualism assumes that the duals are somehow separable and
non-mutually dependent and thus lacking a linking mechanism dualism fails as
a viable theory. On the other hand, once we see the flaw in the
percieving at this moment. So just as
in Chalmers' system, there is a difference between the "objective"
mathematical description of an observer-moment and the subjective
"what-it-is-like-to-be" of the observer-moment corresponding to that
description. There's a case for
Dear Stathis,
For an alternative approach to dualism see:
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/pratt95rational.html
Kindest regards,
Stephen
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent
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