date:20121023

On 10/23/2012 6:33 PM, Max Gron wrote:

On Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:19:08 AM UTC+10:30, Rex Allen wrote:

On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch > wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen > wrote:
>>
>> But I also deny that mechanism can account for consciousness (except
>> by fiat declaration that it does).
>>
>
> Rex,
> I am interested in your reasoning against mechanism.  Assume there is were
> an] mechanical brain composed of mechanical neurons, that contained the 
same
> information as a human brain, and processed it in the same way.

I started out as a functionalist/computationalist/mechanist but
abandoned it - mainly because I don't think that "representation" will
do all that you're asking it to do.

For example, with mechanical or biological brains - while it seems
entirely reasonable to me that the contents of my conscious experience
can be represented by quarks and electrons arranged in particular
ways, and that by changing the structure of this arrangement over time
in the right way one could also represent how the contents of my
experience changes over time.

However, there is nothing in my conception of quarks or electrons (in
particle or wave form) nor in my conception of arrangements and
representation that would lead me to predict beforehand that such
arrangements would give rise to anything like experiences of pain or
anger or what it's like to see red.

I think that's a failure of imagination.  From what I know about quarks and electrons I 
can infer that they will form atoms and in certain circumstances on the surface of the 
Earth they will form molecules and some of these can be molecules that replicate and 
evolution will produce complex reproducing organisms these will evolve ways of interacting 
with the environment which we will call 'seeing red' and 'feeling pain' and some of them 
will be social and evolve language and symbolism and will experience emotions like anger.

The same goes for more abstract substrates, like bits of information.
What matters is not the bits, nor even the arrangements of bits per
se, but rather what is represented by the bits.

"Information" is just a catch-all term for "what is being
represented".  But, as you say, the same information can be
represented in *many* different ways, and by many different
bit-patterns.

And, of course, any set of bits can be interpreted as representing any
information.  You just need the right "one-time pad" to XOR with the
bits, and viola!  The magic is all in the interpretation.  None of it
is in the bits.  And interpretation requires an interpreter.

SO...given that the bits are merely representations, it seems silly to
me to say that just because you have the bits, you *also* have the
thing they represent.

Just because you have the bits that represent my conscious experience,
doesn't mean that you have my conscious experience.  Just because you
manipulate the bits in a way as to represent "me seeing a pink
elephant" doesn't mean that you've actually caused me, or any version
of me, to experience seeing a pink elephant.

All you've really done is had the experience of tweaking some bits and
then had the experience of thinking to yourself:  "hee hee hee, I just
caused Rex to see a pink elephant..."

Even if you have used some physical system (like a computer) that can
be interpreted as executing an algorithm that manipulates bits that
can be interpreted as representing me reacting to seeing a pink
elephant ("Boy does he look surprised!"), this interpretation all
happens within your conscious experience and has nothing to do with my
conscious experience.

Thinking that the "bit representation" captures my conscious
experience is like thinking that a photograph captures my soul.

That's right.  The meaning, the what is represented, is given by interaction (including 
speech) with the environment (including others).  So only a computer with the ability to 
interact can seem intelligent and therefore conscious and only one that interacts 
intelligently with people (a robot) can have human-like intelligence that we can infer 
from behavior.

Brent

Though, obviously this is as true of biological brains as of
computers.  But so be it.

This is the line of thought that brought me to the idea that conscious
experience is fundamental and uncaused.

> The
> behavior between these two brains is in all respects identical, since the
> mechanical neurons react identically to their biological counterparts.
>  However for some unknown reason the computer has no inner life or 
conscious
> experience.

I agree that if you assume that representation "invokes" conscious
experience, then the brain and the computer would both have to be
equally con

Re: Interactions between mind and brain


On 10/23/2012 7:16 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/23/2012 3:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/23/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/23/2012 3:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:


snip


But you wrote, "Both require the prior existence of a solution to a 
NP-Hard problem."  An existence that is guaranteed by the definition.


Hi Brent,

OH! Well, I thank you for helping me clean up my language! Let me 
try again. ;--) First I need to address the word "existence". I have 
tried to argue that "to exists" is to be "necessarily possible" but 
that attempt has fallen on deaf ears, well, it has until now for you 
are using it exactly how I am arguing that it should be used, as in 
"An existence that is guaranteed by the definition." DO you see that 
existence does nothing for the issue of properties? The existence of 
a pink unicorn and the existence of the 1234345465475766th prime 
number are the same kind of existence, 


I don't see that they are even similar.  Existence of the aforesaid 
prime number just means it satisfies a certain formula within an axiom 
system.  The pink unicorn fails existence of a quite different kind, 
namely an ability to locate it in spacetime.  It may still satisfy 
some propositions, such as, "The animal that is pink, has one horn, 
and loses it's power in the presence of a virgin is obviously 
metaphorical."; just not ones we think of as axiomatic.


 Hi Brent,

Why are they so different in your thinking? If the aforesaid prime 
number is such that there does not exist a physical symbol to represent 
it, how is it different from the pink unicorn? Why the insistence on a 
Pink Unicorn being a "real' creature?
I am using the case of the unicorn to force discussion of an 
important issue. We seem to have no problem believing that some 
mathematical object that cannot be physically constructed and yet balk 
at the idea of some cartoon creature. As I see it, the physical paper 
with a drawing of a pink horse with a horn protruding from its forehead 
or the brain activity of the little girl that is busy dreaming of riding 
a pink unicorn is just as physical as the mathematician crawling out an 
elaborate abstract proof on her chalkboard. A physical process is 
involved. So why the prejudice against the Unicorn? Both exists in our 
minds and, if my thesis is correct, then there is a physical process 
involved somewhere. No minds without bodies and no bodies without minds, 
or so the expression goes...




once we drop the pretense that existence is dependent or contingent 
on physicality.


It's not a pretense; it's a rejection of Platonism, or at least a 
distinction between different meanings of 'exists'.


Right, I am questioning Platonism and trying to clear up the 
ambiguity in the word 'exists'.




Is it possible to define Physicality can be considered solely in 
terms of bundles of particular properties, kinda like Bruno's bundles 
of computations that define any given 1p. My thinking is that what is 
physical is exactly what some quantity of separable 1p have as 
mutually consistent 


But do the 1p have to exist?  Can they be Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson?


1p is the one thing that we cannot doubt, at least about our own 
1p. Descartes did a good job discussing that in his /Meditations/... 
That something other than ourselves  has a 1p, well, that is part of the 
hard problem! BTW, my definition of physicality is not so different from 
Bruno's, neither of us assumes that it is ontologically primitive and 
both of us, AFAIK, consider it as emergent or something from that which 
is sharable between a plurality of 1p. Do you have a problem with his 
concept of it?




(or representable as a Boolean Algebra) but this consideration seems 
to run independent of anything physical. What could reasonably 
constrain the computations so that there is some thing "real" to a 
physical universe? 


That's already assuming the universe is just computation, which I 
think is begging the question.  It's the same as saying, "Why this and 
not that."


No, I am trying to nail down whether the universe is computable or 
not. If it is computable, then it is natural to ask if something is 
computing it. If it is not computable, well.. that's a different can of 
worms! I am testing a hypothesis that requires the universe (at least 
the part that we can observe and talk about) to be representable as a 
particular kind of topological space that is dual to a Boolean algebra; 
therefore it must be computable in some sense.




There has to be something that cannot be changed merely by changing 
one's point of view.


So long as you think other 1p viewpoints exist then intersubjective 
agreement defines the 'real' 3p world.


My thinking is that it exists as a necessary possibility in some a 
priori sense and it actually existing in a 'real 3p' sense are not the 
same thing. Is this a problem? The latter implies that it is accessible 
in some way. The former, well, there is

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-10-23 Thread Max Gron



On Sunday, November 28, 2010 5:19:08 AM UTC+10:30, Rex Allen wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 7:40 PM, Jason Resch 
> > 
> wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 3:38 PM, Rex Allen 
> > > 
> wrote:
> >>
> >> But I also deny that mechanism can account for consciousness (except
> >> by fiat declaration that it does).
> >>
> >
> > Rex,
> > I am interested in your reasoning against mechanism.  Assume there is 
> were
> > an] mechanical brain composed of mechanical neurons, that contained the 
> same
> > information as a human brain, and processed it in the same way.
>
> I started out as a functionalist/computationalist/mechanist but
> abandoned it - mainly because I don't think that "representation" will
> do all that you're asking it to do.
>
> For example, with mechanical or biological brains - while it seems
> entirely reasonable to me that the contents of my conscious experience
> can be represented by quarks and electrons arranged in particular
> ways, and that by changing the structure of this arrangement over time
> in the right way one could also represent how the contents of my
> experience changes over time.
>
> However, there is nothing in my conception of quarks or electrons (in
> particle or wave form) nor in my conception of arrangements and
> representation that would lead me to predict beforehand that such
> arrangements would give rise to anything like experiences of pain or
> anger or what it's like to see red.
>
> The same goes for more abstract substrates, like bits of information.
> What matters is not the bits, nor even the arrangements of bits per
> se, but rather what is represented by the bits.
>
> "Information" is just a catch-all term for "what is being
> represented".  But, as you say, the same information can be
> represented in *many* different ways, and by many different
> bit-patterns.
>
> And, of course, any set of bits can be interpreted as representing any
> information.  You just need the right "one-time pad" to XOR with the
> bits, and viola!  The magic is all in the interpretation.  None of it
> is in the bits.  And interpretation requires an interpreter.
>
> SO...given that the bits are merely representations, it seems silly to
> me to say that just because you have the bits, you *also* have the
> thing they represent.
>
> Just because you have the bits that represent my conscious experience,
> doesn't mean that you have my conscious experience.  Just because you
> manipulate the bits in a way as to represent "me seeing a pink
> elephant" doesn't mean that you've actually caused me, or any version
> of me, to experience seeing a pink elephant.
>
> All you've really done is had the experience of tweaking some bits and
> then had the experience of thinking to yourself:  "hee hee hee, I just
> caused Rex to see a pink elephant..."
>
> Even if you have used some physical system (like a computer) that can
> be interpreted as executing an algorithm that manipulates bits that
> can be interpreted as representing me reacting to seeing a pink
> elephant ("Boy does he look surprised!"), this interpretation all
> happens within your conscious experience and has nothing to do with my
> conscious experience.
>
> Thinking that the "bit representation" captures my conscious
> experience is like thinking that a photograph captures my soul.
>
> Though, obviously this is as true of biological brains as of
> computers.  But so be it.
>
> This is the line of thought that brought me to the idea that conscious
> experience is fundamental and uncaused.
>
> > The
> > behavior between these two brains is in all respects identical, since the
> > mechanical neurons react identically to their biological counterparts.
> >  However for some unknown reason the computer has no inner life or 
> conscious
> > experience.
>
> I agree that if you assume that representation "invokes" conscious
> experience, then the brain and the computer would both have to be
> equally conscious.
>
> But I don't make that assumption.
>
> So the problem becomes that once you open the door to the "multiple
> realizability" of representations then we can never know anything
> about our substrate.
>
> You *think* that your brain is the cause of your conscious
> experience...but as you say, a computer representation of you would
> think the same thing, but would be wrong.
>
> Given that there are an infinite number of ways that your information
> could be represented, how likely is it that your experience really is
> caused by a biological brain?  Or even by a representation of a
> biological brain?  Why not some alternate algorithm that results in
> the same *conscious* experiences, but with entirely different
> *unconscious* elements?  How could you notice the difference?
>
> > Information can take many physical forms.
>
> Information requires interpretation.  The magic isn't in the bits.
> The magic is in the interpreter.
>
> Rex 
>

The brain might be (it's impossible, I assume it's probable) wired in a 
lab, and there are e

Re: wave function collapse


On 10/23/2012 5:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi meekerdb

There are a number of theories to explain the collapse of the quantum wave 
function
(see below).
1) In subjective theories, the collapse is attributed
to consciousness (presumably of the intent or decision to make
a measurement).


There are also 'subjective' epistemological interpretations in which the 'collapse' is 
just taking account of the change in information provided by a measurement (c.f. Asher 
Peres or Chris Fuchs arXiv:1207.2141  ).



2) In objective or decoherence theories, some physical
event (such as using a probe to make a measurement)
in itself causes decoherence of the wave function. To me,
this is the simplest and most sensible answer (Occam's Razor).


Decoherence has gone part way in explaining the apparent collapse of the wave function, 
but it still depends on the existence of a preferred (einselected) basis in which the 
density matrix is diagonalized by environmental interactions.  Tracing over the 
environmental degrees of freedom is our mathematical operation - it's not part of system 
physics.



3) There is also the many-worlds interpretation, in which collapse
of the wave is avoided by creating an entire universe.
This sounds like overkill to me.
So I vote for decoherence of the wave by a probe.


It's not true that disturbance by the measurement device causes the (apparent) collapse; 
it's the interaction with an environment, and ultimately it may require assumption of 
retarded wave propagation. I highly recommend the review article on decoherence by 
Schlosshauer arXiv:quant-ph/0312059 .


Brent

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Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism


On 10/23/2012 5:47 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed.

On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:

Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is 
the thesis that we cannot
prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from 
Descartes' proposition

that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism).

If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot 
prove that objects outside
us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we 
cannot observe the
passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there 
is some fixed inextended substrate
on which to observe the change in time.  Thus there must exist a 
fixed (only necessarily over a small
duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality.  A similar 
conclusion can be made regarding

space.

Here is an alternate account of that argument:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde

"Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's 
argument (Dicker 2004, 2008):


 1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am 
aware, and can be aware,
 that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal 
order. (premise)



OK

 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific 
temporal order only if I perceive

  something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
  temporal order. (premise)

What motivates this premise?


I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in 
their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine 
computation.  I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between 
successive experiences.  This is consistent with the idea that an 
experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of 
states that constitute the same stream of consciousness.


Brent

I agree.

--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Interactions between mind and brain


On 10/23/2012 4:53 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Hi, Stephen,
you wrote some points in accordance with my thinking (whatever that is 
worth) with one point I disagree with:
if you want to argue a point, do not accept it as a base for your 
argument (even negatively not). You do that all the time. (SPK? etc.) -


Hi John,

My English is pathetic and my rhetoric is even worse, I know 
this... I don't have an internal narrative in English, its all 
proprioceptive sensations that I have to translate into English as best 
I can... Dyslexia sucks! What I try to do is lay down a claim and then 
argue for its validity; my language often is muddled... but the point 
gets across sometimes. I have to accept that limitation...




My fundamental question: what do you (all) call *_'mind_*'?


Actually, mind - for me- is a concept, an abstraction, it isn't a 
thing at all...



(Sub: does the *_brain_* do/learn mind functions? HOW?)


The same way that we learn to communicate with each other. How 
exactly? /hypothesis non fingo///.


(('experimentally observed' is restricted to our present level of 
understanding/technology(instrumentation)/theories.
Besides: "miraculous" is subject to oncoming explanatory novel info, 
when it changes into merely 'functonal'.))


I agree.


To fish out some of my agreeing statements:
/*"Well, I don't follow the crowd"*/
Science is no voting matter. 90+% believed the Flat Earth.


I wish more ppl understood that fact!


*//*
/*"...* Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same mind..."
/(Meaning: the 'invasion(?)' called 'altering a neuron' MAY change the 
functionalist's complexity /IN THE MIND!-/ which is certainly beyond 
our knowable domain. That makes the 'hard' hard. We 'like' to explain 
DOWN everything in today's knowable terms. (Beware my agnostic views!)


Agnostisism is a good stance to take. I am a bit too bold and lean 
into my beliefs. Sometimes too far...


"Computation" of course I consider a lot more than that (Platonistic?) 
algorithmic calculation on our existing (and so knowable?) embryonic 
device. I go for the Latin orig.: to THINK together - mathematically, 
or beyond. That mat be a deficiency from my (Non-Indo-European) mother 
tongue where the (improper?) translatable equivalent closes to the 
term "expectable". "I am counting on your visit tomorrow".


That is similar to my notion of "faith" as "expectation of future 
truth"...


/"I strongly believe that computational complexity plays a huge role 
in many aspects of the hard problem of consciousness and that the 
Platonic approach to computer science is obscuring solutions as it is 
blind to questions of resource availability and distribution."/

(and a lot more, do we 'know' about them, or not (yet).


yep, unknown unknowns!


/"Is the brain strictly a classical system? - No,..."
/The *"BRAIN"* may be - as a 'Physical-World' figment of our 
bio-physio conventional science image, but its mind-related 
 function(?) (especially the hard one) is much more than a 'system': 
ALL 'parts' inventoried in explained functionality).
And: I keep away from the beloved "thought-experiments" invented to 
make uncanny ideas practically(?) feasible.


Ah, I love thought experiments, the are the laboratory of 
philosophy. ;-)


/"...As I see it, there is no brain change without a mind change and 
vice versa. The mind and brain are dual,..." /
Thanks, Stephen, originally I thought there may be some 
(tissue-related) minor brain-changes not affecting the mind of which 
the 'brains' serves as a (material) tool in our "sci"? explanations.
Reading your post(s) I realized that it is a complexity and ANY change 
in one part has consequences in the others.


Right. I have to account for the degradation effects. 
Psycho-physical parallelism is either exact or not at all.



So whatever 'part' we landscape as the /'neuronal brain'/ it is
still part of the wider complexity unknowable.


Indeed!


Have a good trip onward


Thanks. ;-)


John M
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:43 PM, Stephen P. King 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:


On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:

If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms
then there we
would expect some scientific evidence of this.
Evidence would
constitute, for example, neurons firing when
measurements of
transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc.
suggest that they
should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of
neurons and
other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it
has never been
experimentally observed. Why?


Hi Stathis,

 How would you set up the experiment? How

Re: Interactions between mind and brain

On 10/23/2012 3:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/23/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/23/2012 3:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/23/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard problems
are
solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you (I'm surely
misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve NP-hard
problems... it's
not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the problem may be
bigger
than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard
problems for
most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in theories
(you have
the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem.

Quentin

Hi Quentin,

Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus on the
requirement of resources for computations to be said to be solvable. This is my
criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it completely ignores
these
considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) has a
related
problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established
Harmony of

Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard
problem. We cannot consider the solution to be "accessible" prior to its actual
computation!

Why not? NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of their
defintion.

"Having a solution" in the abstract sense, is different from actual access to the
solution. You cannot do any work with the abstract fact that a NP-Hard problem has a
solution, you must actually compute a solution! The truth that there exists a minimum
path for a traveling salesman to follow given N cities does not guide her anywhere.
This should not be so unobvious!

But you wrote, "Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem."
An existence that is guaranteed by the definition.

Hi Brent,

OH! Well, I thank you for helping me clean up my language! Let me try again. ;--)
First I need to address the word "existence". I have tried to argue that "to exists" is
to be "necessarily possible" but that attempt has fallen on deaf ears, well, it has
until now for you are using it exactly how I am arguing that it should be used, as in
"An existence that is guaranteed by the definition." DO you see that existence does
nothing for the issue of properties? The existence of a pink unicorn and the existence
of the 1234345465475766th prime number are the same kind of existence,

I don't see that they are even similar. Existence of the aforesaid prime number just
means it satisfies a certain formula within an axiom system. The pink unicorn fails
existence of a quite different kind, namely an ability to locate it in spacetime. It may
still satisfy some propositions, such as, "The animal that is pink, has one horn, and
loses it's power in the presence of a virgin is obviously metaphorical."; just not ones we
think of as axiomatic.

once we drop the pretense that existence is dependent or contingent on
physicality.

It's not a pretense; it's a rejection of Platonism, or at least a distinction between
different meanings of 'exists'.

Is it possible to define Physicality can be considered solely in terms of bundles of
particular properties, kinda like Bruno's bundles of computations that define any given
1p. My thinking is that what is physical is exactly what some quantity of separable 1p
have as mutually consistent

But do the 1p have to exist? Can they be Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson?

(or representable as a Boolean Algebra) but this consideration seems to run independent
of anything physical. What could reasonably constrain the computations so that there is
some thing "real" to a physical universe?

That's already assuming the universe is just computation, which I think is begging the
question. It's the same as saying, "Why this and not that."

There has to be something that cannot be changed merely by changing one's point
of view.

So long as you thing other 1p viewpoints exist then intersubjective agreement defines the
'real' 3p world.

When you refer to the universe computing itself as an NP-hard problem, you are assuming
that "computing the universe" is member of a class of problems.

Yes. It can be shown that computing a universe that contains something consistent
with Einstein's GR is NP-Hard, as the problem of deciding whether or not there exists a
smooth diffeomorphism between a pair of 3,1 manifolds has been proven (by Markov) to be
so. This tells me that if we are going to consider the evolution of the universe to be
something that can be a simulation running on some powerful computer (or an abstract
computation in Platonia) then that simulation has to at least the equivalent to solving
an N

Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

On 10/23/2012 3:20 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal
order only if I perceive
something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
temporal order. (premise)

What motivates this premise?

I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in
their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine
computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between
successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an
experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of
states that constitute the same stream of consciousness.

Brent

Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing
one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory
of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in
contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of
the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists),

Because otherwise you would only be aware of the passage of time when you consciously
remembered and compared two states?

I certainly agree that subconscious thought/information-processing must exist. Conscious
thought can only account for a small part of our thinking/awareness. It seems to roughly
correspond to what we can put into words or otherwise communicate. That's why I think its
appearance was associated with the (cultural) evolution of language.

Brent

but
does not entail the existence of an external world.

As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a
difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process
information at all).

Cheers

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Re: Interactions between mind and brain


On 10/23/2012 1:29 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/23/2012 3:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/23/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... 
NP-hard problems are
solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I read you 
(I'm surely
misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you can't solve 
NP-hard problems... it's
not the case,... but as your input grows, the time to solve the 
problem may be bigger
than the time ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the 
NP-hard problems for
most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in 
theories (you have

the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the halting problem.

Quentin

Hi Quentin,

Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some 
focus on the
requirement of resources for computations to be said to be 
solvable. This is my
criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer theory, it 
completely ignores these
considerations. The Big Bang theory (considered in classical terms) 
has a related
problem in its stipulation of initial conditions, just as the 
Pre-Established Harmony of
Leibniz' Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution 
to a NP-Hard
problem. We cannot consider the solution to be "accessible" prior 
to its actual

computation!


Why not?  NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of 
their defintion.


"Having a solution" in the abstract sense, is different from 
actual access to the solution. You cannot do any work with the 
abstract fact that a NP-Hard problem has a solution, you must 
actually compute a solution! The truth that there exists a minimum 
path for a traveling salesman to follow given N cities does not guide 
her anywhere. This should not be so unobvious!


But you wrote, "Both require the prior existence of a solution to a 
NP-Hard problem."  An existence that is guaranteed by the definition.


Hi Brent,

OH! Well, I thank you for helping me clean up my language! Let me 
try again. ;--) First I need to address the word "existence". I have 
tried to argue that "to exists" is to be "necessarily possible" but that 
attempt has fallen on deaf ears, well, it has until now for you are 
using it exactly how I am arguing that it should be used, as in "An 
existence that is guaranteed by the definition." DO you see that 
existence does nothing for the issue of properties? The existence of a 
pink unicorn and the existence of the 1234345465475766th prime number 
are the same kind of existence, once we drop the pretense that existence 
is dependent or contingent on physicality.
Is it possible to define Physicality can be considered solely in 
terms of bundles of particular properties, kinda like Bruno's bundles of 
computations that define any given 1p. My thinking is that what is 
physical is exactly what some quantity of separable 1p have as mutually 
consistent (or representable as a Boolean Algebra) but this 
consideration seems to run independent of anything physical. What could 
reasonably constrain the computations so that there is some thing "real" 
to a physical universe? There has to be something that cannot be changed 
merely by changing one's point of view.



When you refer to the universe computing itself as an NP-hard problem, 
you are assuming that "computing the universe" is member of a class of 
problems.


Yes. It can be shown that computing a universe that contains 
something consistent with Einstein's GR is NP-Hard, as the problem of 
deciding whether or not there exists a smooth diffeomorphism between a 
pair of 3,1 manifolds has been proven (by Markov) to be so. This tells 
me that if we are going to consider the evolution of the universe to be 
something that can be a simulation running on some powerful computer (or 
an abstract computation in Platonia) then that simulation has to at 
least the equivalent to solving an NP-Hard problem. The prior existence, 
per se, of a solution is no different than the non-constructable proof 
that Diffeo_3,1 /subset NP-Hard that Markov found.


It actually doesn't make any sense to refer to a single problem as 
NP-hard, since the "hard" refers to how the difficulty scales with 
different problems of increasing size.


These terms, "Scale" and "Size", do they refer to some thing 
abstract or something physical or, perhaps, both in some sense?



I'm not clear on what this class is.


It is an equivalence class of computationally soluble problems. 
http://cs.joensuu.fi/pages/whamalai/daa/npsession.pdf There are many of 
them.


Are you thinking of something like computing Feynman path integrals 
for the universe?


Not exactly, but that is one example of a computational problem.






What would a "prior" computation mean?


Where did you get that cluster of words?
From you, below, in the next to last paragraph (just because I

Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

2012-10-23 Thread Russell Standish

On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >> 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific 
> >> temporal order only if I perceive
> >>  something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
> >>  temporal order. (premise)
> >What motivates this premise?
> 
> I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in
> their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine
> computation.  I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between
> successive experiences.  This is consistent with the idea that an
> experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of
> states that constitute the same stream of consciousness.
> 
> Brent
> 

Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing
one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory
of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in
contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of
the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists), but
does not entail the existence of an external world.

As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a
difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process
information at all). 

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

2012-10-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 11:04 PM, Roger Clough  wrote:
> Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
>
> Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the
> thesis that we cannot
> prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes'
> proposition
> that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism).
>
> If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove
> that objects outside
> us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot
> observe the
> passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some
> fixed inextended substrate
> on which to observe the change in time.  Thus there must exist a fixed (only
> necessarily over a small
> duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality.  A similar conclusion
> can be made regarding
> space.

I cannot doubt that I exist *at this moment*, but I can doubt that I
existed before, or that any other moments have or will exist.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed.

On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:

Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis
that we cannot
prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes'
proposition
that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism).

If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that
objects outside
us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot
observe the
passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some
fixed inextended substrate
on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only
necessarily over a small
duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can
be made regarding
space.

Here is an alternate account of that argument:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde

"Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker
2004, 2008):

1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and
can be aware,
that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. (premise)

2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal
order only if I perceive
something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
temporal order. (premise)

What motivates this premise?

I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in their duration, they
are discrete like states of a Turing machine computation. I'd say we perceive temporal
order by overlap between successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an
experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of states that constitute
the same stream of consciousness.

Brent

3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by
reference to which
I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)

Even assuming 2), what motivates this premise?

4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to which
I can
determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)

Well, I don't accept an objective concept of time anyway, so I have
no problem with this, although I don't see why this should hold,
assuming an objective (eg Newtonian) concept of time is valid.

(5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having
experiences that occur in a
specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space
outside me by reference
to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)

Yes, I can see this follows.

(6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by
reference to which
I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5)"

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/23/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

2012-10-23 Thread Russell Standish

I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed.

On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:
> Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
> 
> Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis 
> that we cannot
> prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' 
> proposition 
> that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). 
> 
> If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that 
> objects outside 
> us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot 
> observe the 
> passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some 
> fixed inextended substrate 
> on which to observe the change in time.  Thus there must exist a fixed (only 
> necessarily over a small
> duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality.  A similar conclusion can 
> be made regarding
> space.  
> 
> Here is an alternate account of that argument:
> 
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde
>   
> "Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument 
> (Dicker 2004, 2008): 
> 
> 1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and 
> can be aware, 
> that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. 
> (premise) 
>

OK
 
> 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal 
> order only if I perceive
>  something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
>  temporal order. (premise) 

What motivates this premise?

> 
> 3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by 
> reference to which 
> I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) 
> 

Even assuming 2), what motivates this premise?

> 4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to 
> which I can 
> determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
> 

Well, I don't accept an objective concept of time anyway, so I have
no problem with this, although I don't see why this should hold,
assuming an objective (eg Newtonian) concept of time is valid.

>  (5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having 
> experiences that occur in a 
> specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space 
> outside me by reference 
> to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) 
> 

Yes, I can see this follows.

> (6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by 
> reference to which 
> I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5)"
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/23/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> 
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Interactions between mind and brain

2012-10-23 Thread John Mikes

Hi, Stephen,
you wrote some points in accordance with my thinking (whatever that is
worth) with one point I disagree with:
if you want to argue a point, do not accept it as a base for your argument
(even negatively not). You do that all the time. (SPK? etc.) -
My fundamental question: what do you (all) call *'mind*'?
(Sub: does the *brain* do/learn mind functions? HOW?)
(('experimentally observed' is restricted to our present level of
understanding/technology(instrumentation)/theories.
Besides: "miraculous" is subject to oncoming explanatory novel info, when
it changes into merely 'functonal'.))

To fish out some of my agreeing statements:
*"Well, I don't follow the crowd"*
Science is no voting matter. 90+% believed the Flat Earth.
**
*"... Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same mind..."
*(Meaning: the 'invasion(?)' called 'altering a neuron' MAY change the
functionalist's complexity *IN THE MIND!-* which is certainly beyond our
knowable domain. That makes the 'hard' hard. We 'like' to explain DOWN
everything in today's knowable terms. (Beware my agnostic views!)

"Computation" of course I consider a lot more than that (Platonistic?)
algorithmic calculation on our existing (and so knowable?) embryonic
device. I go for the Latin orig.: to THINK together - mathematically, or
beyond. That mat be a deficiency from my (Non-Indo-European) mother tongue
where the (improper?) translatable equivalent closes to the term
"expectable". "I am counting on your visit tomorrow".

* "I strongly believe that computational complexity plays a huge role in
many aspects of the hard problem of consciousness and that the Platonic
approach to computer science is obscuring solutions as it is blind to
questions of resource availability and distribution."*
(and a lot more, do we 'know' about them, or not (yet).

*"Is the brain strictly a classical system? - No,..."
*The *"BRAIN"* may be - as a 'Physical-World' figment of our bio-physio
conventional science image, but its mind-related  function(?) (especially
the hard one) is much more than a 'system': ALL 'parts' inventoried in
explained functionality).
And: I keep away from the beloved "thought-experiments" invented to make
uncanny ideas practically(?) feasible.

*"...As I see it, there is no brain change without a mind change and vice
versa. The mind and brain are dual,..." *
Thanks, Stephen, originally I thought there may be some (tissue-related)
minor brain-changes not affecting the mind of which the 'brains' serves as
a (material) tool in our "sci"? explanations.
Reading your post(s) I realized that it is a complexity and ANY change in
one part has consequences in the others.
So whatever 'part' we landscape as the *'neuronal brain'* it is
still part of the wider complexity unknowable.

Have a good trip onward

John M

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:43 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

> On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King 
>> wrote:
>>
>>  If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we
 would expect some scientific evidence of this. Evidence would
 constitute, for example, neurons firing when measurements of
 transmembrane potentials, ion concentrations etc. suggest that they
 should not. You claim that such anomalous behaviour of neurons and
 other cells due to consciousness is widespread, yet it has never been
 experimentally observed. Why?

>>>
>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>
>>>  How would you set up the experiment? How do you control for an
>>> effect
>>> that may well be ubiquitous? Did you somehow miss the point that
>>> consciousness can only be observed in 1p? Why are you so insistent on a
>>> 3p
>>> of it?
>>>
>> A top-down effect of consciousness on matter could be inferred if
>> miraculous events were observed in neurophysiology research. The
>> consciousness itself cannot be directly observed.
>>
>
> Hi Stathis,
>
> This would be true only if consciousness is separate from matter, such
> as in Descartes failed theory of substance dualism. In the dual aspect
> theory that I am arguing for, there would never be any "miracles" that
> would contradict physical law. At most there would be statistical
> deviations from classical predictions. Check out
> http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/**ratmech.pdffor
>  details. My support for this theory and not materialism follows from
> materialism demonstrated inability to account for 1p. Dual aspect monism
> has 1p built in from first principles. BTW, I don't use the term "dualism"
> any more as what I am advocating seems to be too easily confused with the
> failed version.
>
>
>>  I don't mean putting an extra module into the brain, I mean putting
 the brain directly into the same configuration it is put into by
 learning the language in the normal way.

>>>
>>>  How might we do that? Alter 1 neuron and you might not have the same
>>> mind.
>>>
>> When you learn

Re: Solipsism = 1p

2012-10-23 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Tuesday, October 23, 2012 2:21:30 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>  On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>  
>
>  On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>
>>
>> But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of   
>> view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some   
>> theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. 
>>
>>  
> This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for 
> granted. How can experience itself be simulated? 
>
>
>  The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, 
> neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of 
> thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. 
>
>   
> Hi Craig and Bruno,
>
> If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* 
> the experience. 
>

That's what I am saying. Nothing is being simulated, there is only a direct 
experience (even if that experience is a dream, which is only a simulation 
when compared to what the dream is not). Bruno said that the brain 
simulates experience, but it isn't clear what it is that can be more 
authentic than our own experience.
 

> I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model that 
> Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion.
>
>  
>  I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, 
>
>
>  Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much 
> literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant "simulate the 
> context making the experience of the person, "really living in Platonia" 
> possible to manifest itself locally.
>  
>
> We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within 
> another? 
>

Right.
 

>
>  
>  but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience 
> itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead 
> be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, 
> on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If 
> the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those 
> neurotransmitters and cells? 
>
>
>  It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its 
> most probable computation.
>  
>
> There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of 
> computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological 
> space) aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a 
> "separate substance".
>
>
>  
>  Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business 
> producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it 
> isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible.
>  
>
>  The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost 
> the complementary of computations.
>  
>
> Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate.
>

I don't think computations can generate anything. Only things can generate 
other things, and computations aren't things, they are sensorimotive 
narratives about things. I say no to enumeration without presentation.
 

>
>   That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that 
> "anti-computation" and compare to physics. 
>  
>
> But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. What 
> we get is an infinite "landscape" of possible physics theories.
>

This makes me think... if Comp were true, shouldn't we see Escher like 
anomalies of persons whose computations have evolved their own personal 
exceptions to physics? Shouldn't most of the multi-worlds be filled with 
people walking on walls or swimming through the crust of the Earth?

Craig
 

>
>  
>  Bruno
>
>  
> -- 
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>  

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Re: Solipsism = 1p


On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the
point of
view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some
theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false.


This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience 
for granted. How can experience itself be simulated?


The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, 
neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of 
thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations.




Hi Craig and Bruno,

If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation 
*is* the experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that 
that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of 
abstraction in my opinion.





I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated,


Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much 
literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant "simulate 
the context making the experience of the person, "really living in 
Platonia" possible to manifest itself locally.


We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within 
another?




but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience 
itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but 
instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is 
happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to 
actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it 
doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells?


It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its 
most probable computation.


There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of 
computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological 
space) aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not 
a "separate substance".




Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no 
business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, 
why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible.


The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost 
the complementary of computations.


Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate.

That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that 
"anti-computation" and compare to physics.


But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. 
What we get is an infinite "landscape" of possible physics theories.




Bruno



--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Interactions between mind and brain


On 10/23/2012 9:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

I saw a paper once on the possibility of the universe
inventing itself as it goes along. I forget the result
or why, but it had to do with the amount of information
in the universe, the amount needed to do such a calc,
etc. Is some limnit exceeded ?

Hi Roger,

The currently accepted theoretical upper bound on computation is 
the Bekenstein bound. 
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bekenstein_bound But this bound is 
based on the assumption that the radius of a sphere that can enclose a 
given system is equivalent to what is required to effectively isolate 
that system, if an event horizon where to exist at the surface. It 
ignores the implications of quantum entanglement, but for the sake of 
0-th order approximations of it, it works.





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/23/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-22, 14:35:15
Subject: Re: Interactions between mind and brain


On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard
problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I
read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you
can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your
input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time
ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems
for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in
theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the
halting problem.

Quentin

Hi Quentin,

  Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus
on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be
solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer
theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory
(considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation
of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz'
Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard
problem. We cannot consider the solution to be "accessible" prior to its
actual computation!
  The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe
such that there is a universe that we observe now is in the state that
it is and such is consistent with our existence in it must be explained
either as being the result of some fortuitous accident or, as some
claim, some "intelligent design" or some process working in some
super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior
computation idea is true.
  I am trying to find an alternative that does not require
computations to occur prior to the universe's existence! Several people,
such as Lee Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann and David Deutsch have advanced the
idea that the universe is, literally, computing its next state in an
ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is computing
solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense.

--
Onward!

Stephen





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Stephen


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Re: Interactions between mind and brain

On 10/23/2012 3:40 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/23/2012 2:03 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/22/2012 11:35 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Quentin

Hi Quentin,

Why not? NP-hard problems have solutions ex hypothesi; it's part of their
defintion.

But you wrote, "Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard problem." An
existence that is guaranteed by the definition. When you refer to the universe computing
itself as an NP-hard problem, you are assuming that "computing the universe" is member of
a class of problems. It actually doesn't make any sense to refer to a single problem as
NP-hard, since the "hard" refers to how the difficulty scales with different problems of
increasing size. I'm not clear on what this class is. Are you thinking of something like
computing Feynman path integrals for the universe?

What would a "prior" computation mean?

Where did you get that cluster of words?
From you, below, in the next to last paragraph (just because I quit writing doesn't mean
I quit reading at the same point).

Are you supposing that there is a computation and *then* there is an implementation (in
matter) that somehow realizes the computation that was formerly abstract. That would
seem muddled.

Right! It would be, at least, muddled. That is my point!

But no one but you has ever suggested the universe is computed and then implemented to a
two-step process. So it seems to be a muddle of your invention.

Brent

If the universe is to be explained as a computation then it must be realized by the
computation - not by some later (in what time measure?) events.

Exactly. The computation cannot occur before the universe! Did you stop reading at
this point?

Brent

The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe such
that there
is a universe that we observe now is in the state that it is and such is
consistent with
our existence in it must be explained either as being the result of some
fortuitous
accident or, as some claim, some "intelligent design" or some process working
in some
super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior
computation idea is
true.
I am trying to find an alternative that does not require computations to
occur prior
to the universe's existence! Several people, such as Lee Smolin, Stuart
Kaufmann and
David Deutsch have advanced the idea that the universe is, literally, computing
its next
state in an ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is
computing
solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense.

Re: Solipsism = 1p

2012-10-23 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Tuesday, October 23, 2012 10:15:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of   
>> view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some   
>> theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. 
>>
>>
> This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for 
> granted. How can experience itself be simulated? 
>
>
> The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, 
> neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of 
> thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. 
>

That's what I'm saying, experience can't be simulated.
 

>
>
>
> I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, 
>
>
> Never. It does not make sense. 
>

Why not? I am sitting here at my desk while I am imagining I am in a coffee 
shop instead - or a talking bowling ball is eating a coffee shop, or 
whatever. I can simulate practically any experience I like by imagining it.
 

> You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted 
> to be short. I meant "simulate the context making the experience of the 
> person, "really living in Platonia" possible to manifest itself locally.
>

Oh, ok.
 

>
>
>
> but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience 
> itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead 
> be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, 
> on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If 
> the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those 
> neurotransmitters and cells? 
>
>
> It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most 
> probable computation.
>

Why would that result in an experience?
 

>
>
>
>
> Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business 
> producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it 
> isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible.
>
>
> The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the 
> complementary of computations. That is why we can test comp by doing the 
> math of that "anti-computation" and compare to physics. 
>

If they are not computation then how can computation refer to them?

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> It's a fun theory, but it's really not a viable explanation for the 
> universe where we actually live.
>
> Craig
>
>
>
> -- 
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>
>
>
>

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Re: Code length = probability distribution

On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:50, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2012/10/22 Stephen P. King
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2012/10/22 Russell Standish
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Hi Rusell,
>
> How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen

No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is
that

the Great Programmer has finite (or perhaps bounded resources), which
gives an additional boost to algorithms that run efficiently.

that´s the problem that I insist, has a natural solution
considering the computational needs of living beings under natural
selection, without resorting to a everithing-theory of reality
based of a UD algorithm, like the Schmidhuber one.

Dear Alberto,

My suspicion is that there does not exist a single global
computation of the behavior of living (or other) beings and that
"natural selection" is a local computation between each being and
its environment. We end up with a model where there are many
computations occurring concurrently and there is no single
computation that can dovetail all of them together such that a
picture of the universe can be considered as a single simulation
running on a single computer except for a very trivial case (where
the total universe is in a bound state and at maximum equilibrium).

Yes, that'`s also what I think. These computations are material, in
the sense that they are subject to limitation of resources (nervous
signal speeds, chemical equilibrion, diffusion of hormones etc. So
the bias toward a low kolmogorov complexity of an habitable universe
can be naturally deduced from that.

Natural selection is the mechanism for making discoveries,
individual life incorporate these discoveries, called adaptations. A
cat that jump to catch a fish has not discovered the laws of newton,
Instead, the evolution has found a way to modulate the force exerted
by the muscles according with how long the jump must be, and
depending on the weight of the cat (that is calibrated by playing at
at the early age).

But this technique depends on the lineality and continuity of the
law of newton for short distances. If the law of newton were more
complicated, that would not be possible. So a low complexity of the
macroscopical laws permit a low complexity and a low use of
resources of the living computers that deal with them, and a faster
dsicovery of adaptations by natural selection. But that complexity
has a upper limit; Lineality seems to be a requirement for the
operation of natural selection in the search for adaptations.

http://ilevolucionista.blogspot.com.es/2008/06/ockham-razor-and-genetic-algoritms-life.html

I kind of agree with all what you say here, and on the basic
philosophy. But I think that what you describe admits a more general
description, in which the laws of physics are themselves selected by a
process similar but more general than evolution. It makes me think
that life (and brains at some different level) is what happen when a
universal system mirrors itself. A universal machine is a dynamical
mirror, and life can develop once you put the dynamical mirror in
front of itself (again a case of diagonalization). I think I follow
your philosophy, but apply it in arithmetic and/or computer science.

Now I am just afraid, to talk frankly, that it looks like you have a
reductionist conception of numbers and machines, which does not take
into account the discovery of the universal machine (by the Post-
Church-Kleene-Turing thesis) which makes you miss that your philosophy
might be the natural philosophy of all universal numbers. (I probably
exaggerate my point for attempt to be short).

We can already talk with the "Löbian numbers". I already recognize
myself. I already don't take them as zombie. It does not matter that
the talk admits a local atemporal description. Arithmetic is full of
life and dreams.

And if we limit ourselves, non constructively (it is the price) to the
*arithmetically sound* Löbian numbers, we get an arithmetical
interpretation of a platonist conception of reality. Decidable on its
propositional parts.

In that conception physics is the border of the universal mind, which
by assuming comp, might be the mind of the universal machine.

Can that philosophy helps to solve the 1p measure problems, or guide
us in the "human" interpretation of the arithmetical interpretation?
Hard to say. Plausible. There will be different methods, and insight.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Can you think of an experiment to verify comp ?

2012-10-23 Thread smitra


Bruno was born 100 years too late, he would have predicted quantum mechanics.

Saibal


Citeren Roger Clough :


Hi Bruno Marchal

Nothing is true, even comp, until it is proven by experiment.
Can you think of an experiment to verify comp ?


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/23/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-22, 13:18:13
Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life


Hi Roger,

You just describe the non-comp conviction. You don't give any
argument. With comp, you are the owner of an infinity of machine, it
does not matter if it is in silicon or carbon, as long as the
components do the right relative things in the most probable history.

You are just insulting many creatures just by referring to their 3p
shapes. You are not cautious. You might insult God in the process.
Certainly so in case they are conscious, imo.

Any way, strong AI is the hypothesis that machine can be conscious.
Comp is the assumption that your body behave locally like a machine,
so that you might change it in some futures.


Bruno



On 21 Oct 2012, at 22:35, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

1p is to know by acquaintance (only possible to humans).
I conjecture that any statement pertaining to humans containing
1p is TRUE.

3p is to know by description (works for both humans and computers).
I believe that any statement pertaining to computers containing
1p is FALSE.

Consciousness would be to know that you are conscious, or

for a real person, 1p(1p) = TRUE
and saying that he is conscious to others would be 3p(1p) = TRUE
or even (3p(1p(1p))) = TRUE


But a computer cannot experience anything (is blocked from 1p), or

for a computer, 3p (1p) = FALSE (or any statement containing 1p)
but 3p(3p) = TRUE (or any proposition not containing 1p = TRUE)


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/21/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-21, 09:56:39
Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life


Hi John,


On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno,
especially in my identification as "responding to relations".
Now the "Self"? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level of
thinking, more so than the average (animalic?) mind. - OR: we have
no idea. What WE call 'Self-Ccness' is definitely a human attribute
because WE identify it that way. I never talked to a cauliflower to
clarify whether she feels like having a self? (In cauliflowerese, of
course).


My feeling was first that all homeotherm animals have self-
consciousness, as they have the ability to dream, easily realted to
the ability to build a representation of one self. Then I have
enlarged the spectrum up to some spiders and the octopi, just by
reading a lot about them, looking video.


But this is just a personal appreciation. For the plant, let us say
I know nothing, although I supect possible consciousness, related to
different scalings.


The following theory seems to have consciousness, for different
reason (the main one is that it is Turing Universal):


x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)


x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x


But once you add the very powerful induction axioms: which say that
if a property F is true for zero, and preserved by the successor
operation, then it is true for all natural numbers. That is the
infinity of axioms:


(F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x))) -> AxF(x),


with F(x) being any formula in the arithmetical language (and thus
defined with "0, s, +, *),


Then you get L?ianity, and this makes it as much conscious as you
and me. Indeed, they got a rich theology about which they can
develop maximal awareness, and even test it by comparing the physics
retrievable by that theology, and the observation and inference on
their most probable neighborhoods.


L?ianity is the treshold at which any new axiom added will create
and enlarge the machine ignorance. It is the utimate modesty treshold.




Bruno











On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:19, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

IMHO all life must have some degree of consciousness
or it cannot perceive its environment.


Are you sure?

Would you say that the plants are conscious? I do think so, but I am
not sure they have self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness accelerates the information treatment, and might
come from the need of this for the self-movie living creature having
some important mass.

"all life" is a very fuzzy notion.

Bruno









Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/17/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-17, 10:13:37
Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life




On 16 Oct 2012, at 18:37, John Clark wrote:


On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 2:40 PM, meekerdb

Re: A test for solipsism

On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not?

If you assume non-comp, or just non-strong AI.

Bruno

2012/10/22 Stephen P. King
On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno and Roger,

What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie
from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything
other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact?

--
Onward!

Stephen

Hi Stephan,

That sounds like autism to me.

Roger

Hi Roger,

I was trying to demonstrate that the closest real example of a p-
zombie is an autistic person, but they almost never act "normally".
I think that the p-zombie idea is nonsensical.

--
Onward!

Stephen

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computers, materialism and subjective/objective dyslexia

Computers, materialism and subjective/objective dyslexia

In materialism there is no self, it is implied.
This works in most cases, except if the case involves the 
self or subjectivity. The problem with that situation is that, 
without a self to be subjective, there can be no subjectivity. 
Hence what we know to be subjective (lived experience, 
for example) has to be considered as objective. This is 
somewhat understandable, because subjective/objective 
dyslexia and its issues are hard to understand.  

Thus comp, or computer output, which is objective, can easily
be confused with subjective phenomena.  

Now life, thought, consciousness, and intelligence are all
subjective (non-physical, non-objective) activities. 
But because of subjective/objective dyslexia, and the
fact that it is difficult to conceive of the nonphysical, 
they are almost always often considered to be objective
(physical) phenomena.  In other words, life, consciousness and 
thought are thought to be properties of or associated with, 
material objects.

  


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/23/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Re: One more nail in comp's coffin.

2012-10-23 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 8:50 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:

> Hi Bruno,
>
> My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can
> have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have
> consciousness as well.
>
> Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p
>
> But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p'
> -- because, let's say, it's less intelligent than I am.
> Or it's not travelled around the world as I have.
> Or it is only 3 years old. I've only used it for 3 years.
> Or it is Christian while I am a pagan.
> Or it is a materialist while I follow Leibniz.
> Or I am drunk and it is sober.
>
> Then the meaning of the 3p to me = 1p(3p).
> The meaning of the 3p to the computer = 1p'(3p).
>
> These obviously aren't  going to be the same.
> So comp can't work or work with any reliability.
>


You could use this same argument to "disprove" the consciousness of every
other person on earth.

Jason

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Re: Solipsism = 1p

On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of
view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some
theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false.

This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes
experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated?

The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated,
neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of
thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations.

I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated,

Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much
literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant "simulate
the context making the experience of the person, "really living in
Platonia" possible to manifest itself locally.

but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience
itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but
instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is
happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to
actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it
doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells?

It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its
most probable computation.

Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no
business producing such things at all. If the world is computation,
why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible.

The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost
the complementary of computations. That is why we can test comp by
doing the math of that "anti-computation" and compare to physics.

Bruno

It's a fun theory, but it's really not a viable explanation for the
universe where we actually live.

Craig

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Re: Continuous Game of Life

On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:26, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/22/2012 12:51 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/10/22 Jason Resch 

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark   
wrote:

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

 >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new  
type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in  
error, so there was no point in reading about things built on top  
of that

> From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM  
duplication, you will live both at W and at W

Yes.

yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place

Yes.

> so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first  
person and third person.

Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if  
we are identical then my first person experience of looking at you  
is identical to your first person experience of looking at me, and  
both our actions are identical for a third person looking at both  
of us. As long as we're identical it's meaningless to talk about 2  
conscious beings regardless of how many bodies or brains have been  
duplicated.

Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but  
then not thinking about what that really means, you haven't  
realized that a noun (like a brain) has been duplicated but a  
adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has not been as long as they are  
identical; you are treating adjectives as if they were nouns and  
that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused by the fact  
that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as by  
forming different memories, then they are no longer identical. And  
finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not  
each other any more afterthose changes both  
still have a equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal. After  
reading these multiple confusions in one step of your proof I saw  
no point in reading more, and I still don't.

John,

I think you are missing something.  It is a problem that I noticed  
after watching the movie "The Prestige" and it eventually led me to  
join this list.

Unless you consider yourself to be only a single momentary atom of  
thought, you probably believe there is some stream of thoughts/ 
consciousness that you identify with.  You further believe that  
these thoughts and consciousness are produced by some activity of  
your brain.  Unlike Craig, you believe that whatever horrible  
injury you suffered, even if every atom in your body were separated  
from every other atom, in principle you could be put back together,  
and if the atoms are put back just right, you will be removed and  
alive and well, and conscious again.

Further, you probably believe it doesn't matter if we even re-use  
the same atoms or not, since atoms of the same elements and  
isotopes are functionally equivalent.  We could take apart your  
current atoms, then put you back together with atoms from a  
different pile and your consciousness would continue right where it  
left off (from before you were obliterated).  It would be as if a  
simulation of your brain were running on a VM, we paused the VM,  
moved it to a different physical computer and then resumed it.   
From your perspective inside, there was no interruption, yet your  
physical incarnation and location has changed.

Assuming you are with me so far, an interesting question emerges:  
what happens to your consciousness when duplicated?  Either an atom  
for atom replica of yourself is created in two places or your VM  
image which contains your brain emulation is copied to two  
different computers while paused, and then both are resumed.   
Initially, the sensory input to the two duplicates could be the  
same, and in a sense they are still the same mind, just with two  
instances, but then something interesting happens once   
different input is fed to the two instances: they split.  You could  
say they split in the same sense as when  someone opens  
the steel box to see whether the cat is alive or dead.  All the  
splitting in quantum mechanics may be the result of our infinite  
instances discovering/learning different things about our infinite  
environments.

I would add that what's interresting in the duplication is the what  
happens next probability (when the "two" copies diverge). If you're  
about to do an experience (for exemple opening a door and looking  
what is behind) and that just before opening the door, your are  
duplicated, the copy is put in the same position in front of an  
identical door, the fact that you were originally (just before  
duplication) in front of a door that opens on new york city, what  
is the probability that when you open it *it is* new york city...  
in case of a single universe (limited) where not duplications of  
state could appear the answer is straighforward, it is 100%, but in  
case of comp or MWI, the probability is no

Re: Re: Interactions between mind and brain

Hi Stephen P. King  

I saw a paper once on the possibility of the universe
inventing itself as it goes along. I forget the result
or why, but it had to do with the amount of information
in the universe, the amount needed to do such a calc,
etc. Is some limnit exceeded ?

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/23/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-22, 14:35:15 
Subject: Re: Interactions between mind and brain 

On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 
> I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard  
> problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I  
> read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you  
> can't solve NP-hard problems... it's not the case,... but as your  
> input grows, the time to solve the problem may be bigger than the time  
> ellapsed since the bigbang. You could say that the NP-hard problems  
> for most input are not technically/practically sovable but they are in  
> theories (you have the algorithm) unlike undecidable problems like the  
> halting problem. 
> 
> Quentin 
Hi Quentin, 

 Yes, they are solved algorithmically. I am trying to get some focus  
on the requirement of resources for computations to be said to be  
solvable. This is my criticism of the Platonic treatment of computer  
theory, it completely ignores these considerations. The Big Bang theory  
(considered in classical terms) has a related problem in its stipulation  
of initial conditions, just as the Pre-Established Harmony of Leibniz'  
Monadology. Both require the prior existence of a solution to a NP-Hard  
problem. We cannot consider the solution to be "accessible" prior to its  
actual computation! 
 The calculation of the minimum action configuration of the universe  
such that there is a universe that we observe now is in the state that  
it is and such is consistent with our existence in it must be explained  
either as being the result of some fortuitous accident or, as some  
claim, some "intelligent design" or some process working in some  
super-universe where our universe was somehow selected, if the prior  
computation idea is true. 
 I am trying to find an alternative that does not require  
computations to occur prior to the universe's existence! Several people,  
such as Lee Smolin, Stuart Kaufmann and David Deutsch have advanced the  
idea that the universe is, literally, computing its next state in an  
ongoing fashion, so my conjecture is not new. The universe is computing  
solutions to NP-Hard problems, but not in any Platonic sense. 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen 

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Can you think of an experiment to verify comp ?

Hi Bruno Marchal  

Nothing is true, even comp, until it is proven by experiment.
Can you think of an experiment to verify comp ?


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/23/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-22, 13:18:13 
Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life 


Hi Roger, 

You just describe the non-comp conviction. You don't give any  
argument. With comp, you are the owner of an infinity of machine, it  
does not matter if it is in silicon or carbon, as long as the  
components do the right relative things in the most probable history. 

You are just insulting many creatures just by referring to their 3p  
shapes. You are not cautious. You might insult God in the process.  
Certainly so in case they are conscious, imo. 

Any way, strong AI is the hypothesis that machine can be conscious.  
Comp is the assumption that your body behave locally like a machine,  
so that you might change it in some futures. 


Bruno 



On 21 Oct 2012, at 22:35, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> 1p is to know by acquaintance (only possible to humans). 
> I conjecture that any statement pertaining to humans containing  
> 1p is TRUE. 
> 
> 3p is to know by description (works for both humans and computers). 
> I believe that any statement pertaining to computers containing  
> 1p is FALSE. 
> 
> Consciousness would be to know that you are conscious, or 
> 
> for a real person, 1p(1p) = TRUE 
> and saying that he is conscious to others would be 3p(1p) = TRUE 
> or even (3p(1p(1p))) = TRUE 
> 
> 
> But a computer cannot experience anything (is blocked from 1p), or 
> 
> for a computer, 3p (1p) = FALSE (or any statement containing 1p) 
> but 3p(3p) = TRUE (or any proposition not containing 1p = TRUE) 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/21/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-21, 09:56:39 
> Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life 
> 
> 
> Hi John, 
> 
> 
> On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote: 
> 
> 
> Bruno, 
> especially in my identification as "responding to relations". 
> Now the "Self"? IT certainly refers to a more sophisticated level of  
> thinking, more so than the average (animalic?) mind. - OR: we have  
> no idea. What WE call 'Self-Ccness' is definitely a human attribute  
> because WE identify it that way. I never talked to a cauliflower to  
> clarify whether she feels like having a self? (In cauliflowerese, of  
> course). 
> 
> 
> My feeling was first that all homeotherm animals have self-  
> consciousness, as they have the ability to dream, easily realted to  
> the ability to build a representation of one self. Then I have  
> enlarged the spectrum up to some spiders and the octopi, just by  
> reading a lot about them, looking video. 
> 
> 
> But this is just a personal appreciation. For the plant, let us say  
> I know nothing, although I supect possible consciousness, related to  
> different scalings. 
> 
> 
> The following theory seems to have consciousness, for different  
> reason (the main one is that it is Turing Universal): 
> 
> 
> x + 0 = x 
> x + s(y) = s(x + y) 
> 
> 
> x *0 = 0 
> x*s(y) = x*y + x 
> 
> 
> But once you add the very powerful induction axioms: which say that  
> if a property F is true for zero, and preserved by the successor  
> operation, then it is true for all natural numbers. That is the  
> infinity of axioms: 
> 
> 
> (F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x))) -> AxF(x), 
> 
> 
> with F(x) being any formula in the arithmetical language (and thus  
> defined with "0, s, +, *), 
> 
> 
> Then you get L?ianity, and this makes it as much conscious as you  
> and me. Indeed, they got a rich theology about which they can  
> develop maximal awareness, and even test it by comparing the physics  
> retrievable by that theology, and the observation and inference on  
> their most probable neighborhoods. 
> 
> 
> L?ianity is the treshold at which any new axiom added will create  
> and enlarge the machine ignorance. It is the utimate modesty treshold. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:19, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 
> 
> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> IMHO all life must have some degree of consciousness 
> or it cannot perceive its environment. 
> 
> 
> Are you sure? 
> 
> Would you say that the plants are conscious? I do think so, but I am  
> not sure they have self-consciousness. 
> 
> Self-consciousness accelerates the information treatment, and might  
> come from the need of this for the self-movie living creature having  
> some important mass. 
> 
> "all life" is a very fuzzy notion. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/17/2

Re: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists

Hi Bruno Marchal  

Numbers and calculations are not subjective,
for they are mindless.
Which means they can't experience anything.
They're dead in the water.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/23/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-22, 12:49:30 
Subject: Re: The circular logic of Dennett and other materialists 

On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:51, Roger Clough wrote: 

On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote:  

> Hi Bruno Marchal  
>  
> This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie  
> definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind  
> but it can still behave just as a real person would.  
>  
> But that assumes, as the materialists do, that the mind  
> has no necessary function. Which is nonsense, at least  
> to a realist.  
>  
> Thus Dennett claims that a real candidate person  
> does not need to have a mind. But that's in his  
> definition of what a real person is. That's circular logic.  

BRUNO: I agree with you on this.  
Dennett is always on the verge of eliminativism. That is deeply wrong.  

Now, if you want eliminate the zombie, and keep comp, you have to  
eventually associate the mind to the logico-arithmetical relations  
defining a computation relative to a universal number, and then a  
reasoning explains where the laws of physics comes from (the number's  
dream statistics).  

This leads also to the arithmetical understanding of Plotinus, and of  
all those rare people aware of both the importance of staying rational  
on those issue, *and* open minded on, if not aware of, the existence  
of consciousness and altered consciousness states.  

ROGER: OK. As long as the computer stays 3p, then anything is possible. 

You can't. Machines have 1p, personal memory, and personal relative incarnation 
and relation with some truth. 

1p = experiencing (only humans can do this). 

What? 
Are you saying that dogs and cats have no 1p? 

3p(1p) = a way of saying that a human can publicly describe his experience. 

He cannot really do that, but he can communicate something,  and then the 
others, by using their own experience can, or cannot relate. 

1p(3p) = a way of saying that a human can experience any description  
or proposition (by himself, by a computer, by others) 

OK. 

3p = a description or proposition given by a human, or by a machine. 

OK. 

3p(3p) = computer "knowledge" of a proposition or description 
I really don't know what it means to say that a computer knows something. 

With comp you know perfectly well what it means, as comp is the hypothesis that 
you are a computer. So a particular case of what  "a computer knows something" 
is what it means for you know something. 

Ah! A computer can only know things by description, but not by 
acquaintance. 

Forget the current man-made computer. We talk about a special sort of machine. 
There is nothing in the brain that a computer cannot imitate, at some fine 
grained level. So if you believe that brain can do something that acomputer can 
do, you will have to give a 3p description of the brain which is not Turing 
emulable. Then, first you are still stuck with a pre 3-things, so it will not 
help you for the mind-body problem, and second, well, nobody find in Nature (as 
opposed in math) non Turing emulable things in our neighborhood, except, 
importantly, for the souls of machines and humans, and for their detailed 
material reality.  
The soul of the machine, is not a machine, from the point of view of the 
machine. Machine's naturally believe that their are not machine, especially 
when growing ego. 

Only humans can know things by either route. 

Looks like a dogma. frankly, a very sad dogma. The Bp and Bp & p arithmetical 
modalities already exemplifies why and how the machines (actually, not the 
universal computer, but the L?ian believer) is sensible to the two routes. 

Humans can be cute, and terrible, but for human and non human, it is always a 
sort of error of declaring oneself superior, especially in feeling and 
subjective matter. You don't know that.  

Bruno 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p

Hi Bruno Marchal  




> 
> ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything, 
> it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available. 


But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of  
view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some  
theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. 

ROGER: Simulated experience would be  objective, such
as is given by the text of a novel (knowledge by description). True 
experience is the subjective experience of the mind --knowledge 
by aquaintance. These are obviously substantially different.

BRUNO: You are right, it is not the material computer who thinks, nor the  
physical brains who thinks, it is the owner (temporarily) of the  
brain, or of the computers which does the thinking (and that can  
include a computer itself, if you let it develop beliefs). 

ROGER: I don't think so. 

The owner of the brain is the self.

But although the owner of a computer will have a 
self, so would anybody else involved in creating
the computer or software also have one.

Are trying to say that I or anybody else can cause
the computer to be conscious ? If wave collapse causes
consciousness, there are objective theories of wave collapse 
called decoherence theories which seem more realistic to me. 

But I can't seem to see how these could work on a computer. 

Roger

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wave function collapse

Hi meekerdb 

There are a number of theories to explain the collapse of the quantum wave 
function
(see below). 

1) In subjective theories, the collapse is attributed
to consciousness (presumably of the intent or decision to make
a measurement). 

2) In objective or decoherence theories, some physical
event (such as using a probe to make a measurement) 
in itself causes decoherence of the wave function. To me,
this is the simplest and most sensible answer (Occam's Razor). 

3) There is also the many-worlds interpretation, in which collapse
of the wave is avoided by creating an entire universe.
This sounds like overkill to me.

So I vote for decoherence of the wave by a probe.

Roger Clough

Wave function collapse.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave_function_collapse

"The cluster of phenomena described by the expression wave function collapse 
is a fundamental problem in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and is 
known
 as the measurement problem. The problem is not really confronted by the 
Copenhagen 
Interpretation, which postulates that this is a special characteristic of the 
"measurement" process.

 The Many-Worlds Interpretation deals with it by discarding the 
collapse-process, 
thus reformulating the relation between measurement apparatus and system in 
such a way that the linear laws of quantum mechanics are universally valid; 
that is, the only process according to which a quantum system evolves is 
governed 
by the Schr?inger equation or some relativistic equivalent. Often tied in with 
the Many-Worlds 
Interpretation, but not limited to it, is the physical process of decoherence, 
which 
causes an apparent collapse. Decoherence is also important for the 
interpretation
 based on Consistent Histories. 

A general description of the evolution of quantum mechanical systems is 
possible by 
using density operators and quantum operations. In this formalism (which is 
closely 
related to the C*-algebraic formalism) the collapse of the wave function 
corresponds 
to a non-unitary quantum operation. 

The significance ascribed to the wave function varies from interpretation to 
interpretation, 
and varies even within an interpretation (such as the Copenhagen 
Interpretation). 
If the wave function merely encodes an observer's knowledge of the universe 
then 
the wave function collapse corresponds to the receipt of new information. 
This is somewhat analogous to the situation in classical physics, except that 
the classical "wave function" does not necessarily obey a wave equation. 
If the wave function is physically real, in some sense and to some extent, 
then the collapse of the wave function is also seen as a real process, to the 
same extent."

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/23/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content - 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-10-22, 12:26:39 
Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life 

On 10/22/2012 12:51 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 

2012/10/22 Jason Resch 

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark wrote: 

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: 

 >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of 
 >> indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there 
 >> was no point in reading about things built on top of that 

> From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM duplication, 
> you will live both at W and at W 

Yes. 

yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place 

Yes. 

> so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person and 
> third person. 

Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we are 
identical then my first person experience of looking at you is identical to 
your first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are 
identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're identical 
it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of how many bodies 
or brains have been duplicated. 

Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but then not 
thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun (like a 
brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has not been as 
long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if they were nouns 
and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused by the fact that if 
2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as by forming different 
memories, then they are no longer identical. And finally you are confused by 
the fact that although they are not each other any more after those changes 
both still have a equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading 
these multiple confusions in one step of your proof I saw no point in reading 
more, and I still don't. 

John, 

I think you

Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism

Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis 
that we cannot
prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' 
proposition 
that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). 

If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that 
objects outside 
us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot 
observe the 
passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some 
fixed inextended substrate 
on which to observe the change in time.  Thus there must exist a fixed (only 
necessarily over a small
duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality.  A similar conclusion can 
be made regarding
space.  

Here is an alternate account of that argument:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde
  
"Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker 
2004, 2008): 

1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and can 
be aware, 
that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. (premise) 

2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal 
order only if I perceive
 something permanent by reference to which I can determine their temporal 
order. (premise) 

3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by 
reference to which 
I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) 

4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to which 
I can 
determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)

 (5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having 
experiences that occur in a 
specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space 
outside me by reference 
to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) 

(6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by 
reference to which 
I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5)"


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/23/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Re: Interactions between mind and brain