Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

PS "Fire breathing dragoons " indeed! Tres amusant. On 21 August 2014 13:24, LizR wrote: > On 21 August 2014 11:57, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark wrote: >> >>> >>> There is nothing log

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 21 August 2014 11:57, meekerdb wrote: > On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark wrote: > >> >> There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon >> powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such >> an anima

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

(I don't see why comp is equivalent to the CI, mind you. Or what the "requirement for observers in my mind" means...) On 21 August 2014 13:16, LizR wrote: > Is IIUC "If I Understand Correctly" ? (IIUC?) > > > > On 21 August 2014 13:06, Russell Standish wrote: > >> On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 09:42

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

Is IIUC "If I Understand Correctly" ? (IIUC?) On 21 August 2014 13:06, Russell Standish wrote: > On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 09:42:22AM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the > > Copenhagen Interpretation CI > > in the need for c

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 09:42:22AM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the > Copenhagen Interpretation CI > in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI for that > reason. > Richard > I don't see this. 1p pheno

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 08:30:56AM -0700, meekerdb wrote: > On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > 2) invariant for all choice of TOE rich enough to define a universal > > machine > > I'm not sure what is meant by "choice of TOE". Who is doing the > choosing? Under comp we've already as

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 8/20/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote: On 21 August 2014 03:13, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: On 18 Aug 2014, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote: On 8/18/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote: Yes, I still haven't had a satisfactory answer on what that would mean for a computation - i.e.

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote: On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote: There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such an animal actually exists.

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 8/20/2014 3:49 PM, LizR wrote: On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote: Chambers believes that if philosophers can conceive of something then it must be logically possible, and Chambers can conceive of a smart zombie, but young children can conce

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 8/20/2014 2:20 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent: why should "spiders" (etc.) be 'not conscious'? I think they are, in a way. But if I were pitching the idea of uploading someone's mother into a virtual reality and warranting that said virtual mother would be conscious, I don't think I'd mentio

Re: Neuromorphic ‘atomic-switch’ networks function like synapses in the brain

On 21 August 2014 02:44, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 20 Aug 2014, at 01:05, meekerdb wrote: > > On 8/19/2014 3:57 PM, LizR wrote: > > Why can't you make a copy? (Is that "in practice, until the next > breakthrough comes along", or is it impossible even in principle, like > non-clonable quantum syst

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 21 August 2014 03:13, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 18 Aug 2014, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote: > > On 8/18/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote: > > Yes, I still haven't had a satisfactory answer on what that would mean for > a computation - i.e. what physically differentiates identical computations > with differ

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark wrote: > > There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon > powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such > an animal actually exists. > Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a multiverse, in which

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark wrote: > Chambers believes that if philosophers can conceive of something then it > must be logically possible, and Chambers can conceive of a smart zombie, > but young children can conceive that 2+2 = 5. > > And that objects cease to exist when hidden. There c

Re: MGA revisited paper

Brent: why should "spiders" (etc.) be 'not conscious'? BTW what is your take on "conscious"? I have no idea myself, because I consider "everything" an 'observer' that tackles info about anything - and the brainfunction(?) invoked by many for conscious processes lacks the connection in our present

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 8/20/2014 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Aug 2014, at 21:49, John Mikes wrote: Stathis: you wrote Aug.19: /"What we know is that the brain can generate consciousness. The brain is not a digital computer running a program, but if it can be simulated by one, and if the simulation is

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 20 Aug 2014, at 02:27, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2014 4:44 PM, LizR wrote: On 20 August 2014 04:16, meekerdb wrote: If your altered state of consciousness has no self-awareness, is it still "consciousness"? And there's self-consciousness, i.e. being aware you are thinking. So it's no

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 19 Aug 2014, at 21:49, John Mikes wrote: Stathis: you wrote Aug.19: "What we know is that the brain can generate consciousness. The brain is not a digital computer running a program, but if it can be simulated by one, and if the simulation is conscious, and if the program can be "run"

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 19 Aug 2014, at 21:04, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 6:16 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2014 8:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Aug 2014, at 09:56, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 August 2014 15:20, meekerdb wrote: On 8/17/2014 8:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 19 Aug 2014, at 18:16, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2014 8:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Aug 2014, at 09:56, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 August 2014 15:20, meekerdb wrote: On 8/17/2014 8:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Both consciousness and physics supervene on the computation

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 11:34 PM, Pierz wrote: > In "The Conscious Mind", Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has > failed to provide an explanation for consciousness > It's not just materialism, a philosopher like Chambers would not be satisfied with any explanation of the form "X causes c

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 19 Aug 2014, at 17:59, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2014 3:10 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 19 August 2014 01:53, meekerdb wrote: So the idea is that comp necessarily entails epistemological logics (the "dreams of the machines") Except that it seems to be an epistemology very different from on

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 19 Aug 2014, at 12:10, David Nyman wrote: On 19 August 2014 01:53, meekerdb wrote: So the idea is that comp necessarily entails epistemological logics (the "dreams of the machines") Except that it seems to be an epistemology very different from ones we usually practice. What's the l

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 8/20/2014 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote: On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state we might live some

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 19 Aug 2014, at 08:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, August 19, 2014, David Nyman wrote: On 18 August 2014 23:27, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The way I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what i

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 19 Aug 2014, at 02:53, meekerdb wrote: On 8/18/2014 4:23 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 18 August 2014 23:27, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The way I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what is being simulate

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote: On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote: On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote: > Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd sa

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 19 Aug 2014, at 00:27, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 August 2014 18:35, LizR wrote: On 18 August 2014 20:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 August 2014 14:24, LizR wrote: On 18 August 2014 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think that a sustained stream of consciousness wil

Re: MGA revisited paper

On 18 Aug 2014, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote: On 8/18/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote: On 18 August 2014 20:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18 August 2014 14:24, LizR wrote: > On 18 August 2014 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probabl

Re: Neuromorphic ‘atomic-switch’ networks function like synapses in the brain

On 20 Aug 2014, at 01:05, meekerdb wrote: On 8/19/2014 3:57 PM, LizR wrote: Why can't you make a copy? (Is that "in practice, until the next breakthrough comes along", or is it impossible even in principle, like non-clonable quantum systems?) Not in principle. But as I read it the networ

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 20 Aug 2014, at 07:08, Kim Jones wrote: On 18 Aug 2014, at 5:33 am, meekerdb wrote: Is there a kind of soul that is independent of memory but is a "person"? Well, you'd want to hope so by now, surely. After all, if there isn't, then "What's It All (been) About, Alfie?" No cu

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 20 Aug 2014, at 02:53, David Nyman wrote: On 19 August 2014 21:35, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can agree. But it is not entirely, as I suspect you might prefer, a reversal between 3p reality and 1p reality, as we continue to have a big 3p reality: the arithmetical reality which contains co

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

Bruno, Could you explain again why a measure is needed in Everettian Many World Theories? Your 1p observer requirement for measure suggests that the physical came from life. I have asked you this before and your response is that the universe would still evolve but "weakly", whatever that means, in

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote: On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote: Ah no, I'm not mistaking the map for the territory. I don't know why you say that. I'm saying the territory is infinite in all directions (according to my guess), but our maps are finite and so have to have f

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 19 Aug 2014, at 03:37, John Mikes wrote: On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between different

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote: On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between different p

Re: Comp and "logical supervenience"

On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote: On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote: On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote: On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote: > Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes to the doctor. > It's cowardly of me, but I t