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To
not presuppose a why for nothing.
Nothing does not require an explanation, whereas something would seem
to.
Jonathan Colvin
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) on
those who dared to suggest what is now known as plate techtonics.
Jonathan Colvin
, and so-on.
It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide so closely. So
in what sense are these states randomly sampled?
Jonathan Colvin
for the individuals involved to
make the determination? Is this something that reasonable
people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about
it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they
work at it long enough?
The former. Remember: There's no arguing about taste.
Jonathan
the
descriptor me to is really a matter only of taste or context. One could
try to tighten the definition of me to make it non-ambiguous, but then
inevitably this will run afoul of one of the various thought experiments
this list enjoys entertaining.
Jonathan Colvin
mind
about that. The above quote is pure bovine excrement. Baldev probably got
his doctorate in farming technology.
Jonathan Colvin
it afterwards. If
you knew an anaesthetic worked that way, would you agree to have it used on
you for surgery?
Jonathan Colvin
consciousness is *not* a binary phenomenon. As babies
grow and gain memories and knowledge, they *gradually* become conscious.
This is one reason ethicist Peter Singer ascribes a lower intrinic
person-ness to infants and the mentally retarded as compared to competant
adults.
Jonathan Colvin
changes his mind he
will be be comitting the gambler's fallacy.
However, after having pressed the button 100 times and with nothing to show
for it except 100 tortures, his faith that he is a random observer might be
shaken :).
Jonathan Colvin
and unconscious ones.
Likely because there *is* no dividing line. Why would you think that
consciousness / observerness is a two state property?
Jonathan Colvin
he's getting tortured; unless we can prove manyworlds the
nastiness is only conjecture.
If that wasn't where you were heading, forgive the presumption... :)
Jonathan Colvin
I (Jonathan Colvin) wrote:
When you press the button in the torture room, there is a
50% chance
that your next moment will be in the same room and and a
50% chance
that it will be somewhere else where you won't be
tortured. However,
this constraint has been added
more relieved.) But I'm still choosing (1).
Now, the funny thing is, if you replace torture by getting shot in the
head, then I will pick (2). That's interesting, isn't it?
Jonathan Colvin
be
problematic for that account.
Jonathan Colvin
). Simplicity does not seem to be a factor here. A big universe does
not seem much simpler either.
Jonathan Colvin
in the 1st
person
I don't really know what that means. The only way I can
make sense of
the question is something like, If I was a bat instead of me
(Jonathan Colvin), then the universe would consist of a bat
asking the
question I'm asking now. That's a counterfactual, a way
of minimal action (much though my wife might agree).
Jonathan Colvin
rather than a human body. The universe would be objectively different
under the circumstances I am Jonathan Colvin and I am a bat.
If you want to insist that What would it be like to be a bat is equivalent
to the question What would the universe be like if I had been a bat rather
than me?, it is very
?
If there questions have been addressed before on the list, feel free to
point me to the relevant archive section.
Jonathan Colvin
can you be the same sort of
thing as a smile or a mouth? What do you mean?
A mouth is a thing. A smile is not. If I define myself as the body that
calls itself Jonathan Colvin, that is the same sort of thing as a mouth (a
material object). A smile is a different category entirely. But we
am copy #1 in
washington) and (B) (I am copy#2 in washington), then in what way does it
make sense to say that situation A OR situation B might have obtained?
This seems to be the crux of the objection to any theory which reifies 1st
person phenomena.
Jonathan Colvin
Note that the question why am
about imagining_whats_it_likeness. We are talking about me *being*
someone different.
Jonathan Colvin
Hal Finney wrote:
Jonathan Colvin writes:
In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it
seems my objection has been independantly discovered (some
time ago).
See http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html
In particular, I note the following section, which seems to
mirror my
Colvin)? I'm conscious
(feels like I am, anyway).
Jonathan Colvin
is if I is not identical with Russell Standish. Otherwise the
question is identical with Why wasn't Russell Standish an ant?.
Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm
conscious (feels like I am, anyway).
This one is also easy to answer also. I'm just as likely to
have been
Quentin wrote:
Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm
conscious (feels like I am, anyway).
I think you do not see the real question, which can be
formulated (using your
analogy) by :
Why (me as) Russell Standish is Russell Standish rather
Jonathan Colvin ? I (as RS
that deriving
measure from a physical fraction of involved reasources is not the correct
way to derive measure. It is not unlike trying to derive the importance of a
book by weighing it.
Jonathan Colvin
as pointing to a
tree and saying Why is that tree, that tree? Why couldn't it have been a
different tree? Why couldn't it have been a lion?
Jonathan Colvin
exclusive, then there is no dualism to talk about. If the mind and the body
are identical, there is no dualism.
Jonathan Colvin
, then the
statement I could have been someone else is as ludicrous
as pointing
to a tree and saying Why is that tree, that tree? Why couldn't it
have been a different tree? Why couldn't it have been a lion?
Jonathan Colvin
The tree, if conscious, could ask the question of why it isn't
a lion
not have been anyone other than me. If my aunt had wheels, she'd
be a wagon, and if I had been someone else, I wouln't be me. This is also
one of the reasons that the DDA is mistaken,IMHO.
Jonathan Colvin
as posed is unanswerable.
Of course, post split there will be ten Jonathan Colvins, each of whom
calls themselves me. But there is no longer any one-to-one correspondence
with the pre-split me, so it makes no sense to ask what I will experience
after pushing the button.
Jonathan Colvin
Bruno wrote:
Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any
convincing argument
for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after
all, *me*
(although it once was). We ceased being the same person
the moment
we were copied and started diverging
will never be copied again
and are immortal, then b.
Ok, but why? Please explain your reasoning.
Jonathan Colvin
Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any
convincing argument
for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after
all, *me*
(although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we
were copied and started diverging.
Yes, this is exactly my
Hal Finney wrote:
Jonathan Colvin writes:
There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I
suppose, for a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think
there is such a thing as an essence of an experience? I'd suggest
there is no such thing as an observer-moment. I'm
test
the empathetic rationale, I don't see any convincing argument for
favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after all, *me*
(although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we were
copied and started diverging.
Jonathan Colvin
here on this list that a
substrate-independent thing called an observer moment exists?
Jonathan Colvin
in.
But all universes exist is merely a tautology. To say anything meaningful,
one is then faced with attempting to define what one means by universe, or
exist. The concept of logically possible seems to me to be useful in
this latter endeavor.
Jonathan Colvin
at a wavelength of 680 nm can reflect a wavelength of
510 nm, the answer would seem to be no.
Jonathan Colvin
Stephen: Should we not expect Platonia to be Complete?
I'd like to think that it should not be (by Godel?); or that it is not
completely self-computable in finite meta-time. Or some such. But that's
more of a faith than a theory.
Jonathan Colvin
Brent: I doubt that the concept
Stathis: Now, I think you
will agree (although Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this
excellent understanding of the processes giving rise to human
conscious experience, the aliens may still have absolutely no idea
what the experience is actually like.
Jonathan Colvin: No, I'd
class can be only one;
Jonathan Colvin in this particular branch of the MW, since I could not
have been anyone else. Weekends, tuesdays and thursdays I believe I'm a
random observer on the class of observers.
Jonathan Colvin
for
qualia. Mais je dois admettre que je ne commence pas a comprendre votre
theorie.
Jonathan Colvin
***
. Their models of human brain function are so good
that by running an emulation of one or more humans and their
environment they can predict their behaviour better than the
humans can themselves. Now, I think you will agree (although
Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this excellent
in particular to do with
qualia or experience.
Jonathan Colvin
Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever
meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing?
My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that what it is like to be that
thing is identical to being that thing
as to what a process is. If
we accept the block universe, time is a 1st person phenomenon anyway, so how
do differentiate between what is a description and what is a process?
Jonathan Colvin
with) would be that
we can not accept what-is-it-likeness as an irreducible thing because
there is no such thing as what is it likeness.
Jonathan Colvin
--Stathis Papaioannou
[quoting Stathis]
My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
duplicated
system myself
Lee writes:
Jonathan: Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI;
that a
simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a real one, and
would experience the same qualia. There's no special interface
required here; the simulated mind and the simulated billiard
ball are
).
Jonathan Colvin
Norman
- Original Message -
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 10:20 PM
Subject: RE: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
Norman wrote: Thanks for your identification of David
object and a description of such, so I don't see that there
is anything any more unusual about first person experience. Is it any
stranger that a blind man can not see, than that a description of a billiard
ball's properties (weight, diameter, colour etc) can not bruise me?
Jonathan Colvin
You don't
is
meaningless.
Exactly. I should add, I don't agree with Pearce's free lunch theory,
because I don't see that it is particularly important or relevant that the
sum of everything adds to zero (if indeed it does).
Jonathan Colvin
* and *a description of a
person*, but the difference is one of physical existence, not information.
Jonathan Colvin
Bostrom's simulation argument seriously, we all exist in some Nth
level simulation, while our simulated billiard ball exists at the (N+1)th
level.
Jonathan Colvin
Stephen: Your claim reminds me of the scene in the movie Matrix:
Reloaded where Neo deactivates some Sentinels all the while
, something and
nothing are equivalent, and the big why question is rendered meaningless.
All other why questions (as in, why this rather than that?) are answered
by the standard UE (ultimate ensemble), which Pearce seems to assume.
Jonathan Colvin
for consciousness is its role in
self-selection per Bostrom.
Jonathan Colvin
Jonathan Colvin writes:
That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more
likely that a
universe tunnels out of a black hole that just randomly happens to
contain your precise brain state at that moment, and for all
of future
eternity. But the majority of these random universes
Picking up a thread from a little while ago:
Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position
that is
a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far
from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden.
Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess position
strings of random coincidences to instantiate). The
majority of such universes, being essentially random, are probably not very
pleasant places to live.
Jonathan Colvin
Jonathan Colvin writes:
Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we
differentiate between worlds
Finney
Jonathan Colvin replies:
I think you meant algorithmically *in*compressible.
Yes, I did.
The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where
we become
immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based
universes such
as we appear to live in, but a different class
all
houses become worthless tomorrow.
Jonathan Colvin
six
year old neice.
Jonathan Colvin
Mark Fancey writes:
Did accepting and understanding the MWI drastically alter your
philosophical worldview? If so, how?
Hal: I don't know if I would describe it as a drastic alteration,
but I do tend to think of my actions as provoking a continuum
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds (maximal
consistent set of propositions) of a FS are not computable;
that even
given infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to
generate a complete world. This suggests to me
Hal wrote:
Consider a 2-D cellular automaton world like Conway's Life.
Every cell is either occupied or unoccupied. It has one of
two states. Now let us consider such a world in which one
cell holds much more than one bit of information. Suppose it
holds a million bits. This one cell is
?
Jonathan Colvin
. Is it necessarily the case that for *any* arbitrary
set of propositions, we can identify a FS that these propositions of
theories of? When does a formal system stop being formal, and become simply
arbitrary? Here I am out of my depth. Anyone?
Jonathan Colvin
be an immortality of
sorts, albeit rather a hellish one; but I suppose we wouldn't realize we
were stuck.
Jonathan Colvin
Tegmark seriously, then it should be.
Jonathan Colvin
Jonathan Colvin At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't
there a
problem?
If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal
systems (as in
Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie.
worlds
that are never instantiated). This seems in direct
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically
impossible
(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk
about) a world
where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be
logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously
Stathis: OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you
think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a priori
contradictory?
Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position
that
is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex
2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse
where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a
pink rabbit suit.
Jonathan Colvin
Stathis: I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that
there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of
worlds where everyone shares
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think
it is by
no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life
Jonathan Colvin writes:
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I
think it is by
no means clear that just because everything that can happen does
happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes
omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life
dressed
possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse
where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever
or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit.
Jonathan Colvin
are then merely dice making random actions, with the *illusion* of
will. How is this superior to determinism?
On this issue, Jonathan Colvin apparently disagrees, since he
states that There is no contradiction between determinism /
predictability and free will, so long as free will is viewed
not have free will?
To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely
predictable.
Why not?
Jonathan Colvin
*you* do not have free will?
To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely
predictable.
Why not? There is no contradiction between determinism / predictability and
free will, so long as free will is viewed as self-determinism.
Jonathan Colvin
Apologies for double-posting. My dial-up account is rather unreliable.
Jonathan Colvin
Norman Samish wrote:
If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is
right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have
free will. He
says, the only relevant question
will. Sleepwalking, reflexes, etc. are examples of actions that are not
consciously self-determined, and so are not examples of free will.
Jonathan Colvin
**
Norman Samish writes:
The answer to Stat[h]is' question seems
straightforward. Given
of the tech field completely and
driving a sailboat for a living in Galiano Island, British Columbia.
Current bugbears include N.B.'s Simulation Argument and, as noted above, the
DDA.
Cheers,
Jonathan Colvin
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