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RE: Why is there something rather than nothing?
Dominic wrote: that that question itself is absurd, if there was 'nothing' and there was a 'why' to that 'nothing'; if it had a cause, then there wouldn't be nothing, there would be the cause: something. The question is why is there something, not why is there nothing. The question does not presuppose a why for nothing. Nothing does not require an explanation, whereas something would seem to. Jonathan Colvin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Multiverse concepts in string theory
Hal wrote: I also get the impression that Susskind's attempts to bring disreputable multiverse models into holy string theory is more likely to kill string theory than to rehabilitate multiverses. Perhaps I am getting a biased view by only reading this one blog, which opposes string theory, but it seems that more and more people are saying that the emperor has no clothes. If string theory needs a multiverse then it is even less likely to ever be able to make physical predictions, and its prospects are even worse than had been thought. A lot of people seem to be piling on and saying that it is time for physics to explore alternative ideas. The hostile NY Times book review is just one example. Two words: Continental drift. Ok, continental drift is observable, whereas multiverses aren't, but it is worth remembering the ridicule heaped (up until not so very long ago) on those who dared to suggest what is now known as plate techtonics. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Saibal wrote: The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc. they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the universe we experience seems to be real to us while alternative universes, or past or future states of this universe are not being experienced by us. So, you must think of yourself at any time as being randomly sampled from the set of all possible observer moments. delurk I'm not sure how this works. Suppose I consider my state now at time N as a random sample of all observer moments. Now, after having typed this sentence, I consider my state at time N + 4 seconds. Is this also a random sample on all observer moments? I can do the same at now N+10, and so-on. It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide so closely. So in what sense are these states randomly sampled? Jonathan Colvin
RE: Duplicates Are Selves
Hal Finey wrote: If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies, an objective reality which governs the extent to which two different individuals are the same self, or is it ultimately a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to make the determination? Is this something that reasonable people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they work at it long enough? The former. Remember: There's no arguing about taste. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Duplicates Are Selves
Hal wrote: If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies, an objective reality which governs the extent to which two different individuals are the same self, or is it ultimately a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to make the determination? Is this something that reasonable people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they work at it long enough? The way I see it, Me or my self is a poorly defined concept. It can refer to a number of different things. It could refer to my physical body (now or in the past or future); the mind that is part of *this* physical body (now or in the past or future); any mind or body indentical to this mind or body; any mind or bosy similar to this mind or body; etc. What you attach the descriptor me to is really a matter only of taste or context. One could try to tighten the definition of me to make it non-ambiguous, but then inevitably this will run afoul of one of the various thought experiments this list enjoys entertaining. Jonathan Colvin
RE: How did he get his information?
After about 9 months from the release of the book of Dr. Raj Baldev, Stephen Hawking, one of the noted authorities on Black Hole changed his idea about the Black Hole. Hawking was of the firm opinion that nothing could escape from the Black Hole, not even light and nothing could come out of it. But in July 2004, at 17th International Conference on General Relativity and Gravitation in Dublin, he admitted his mistake that he was wrong for thirty years. Hawking wrong about nothing could escape black holes? Has the writer never heard of Hawking radiation? Hawking began writing about black holes evaporating as far back as the 1970s. I think he's talking about Hawking changing his mind as to whether information can escape from black holes. Hawking always said radiation can escape, but believed all information was destroyed. He changed his mind about that. The above quote is pure bovine excrement. Baldev probably got his doctorate in farming technology. Jonathan Colvin
RE: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)
Stathis wrote: Yet another variation: for 10 million dollars, would you agree to undergo a week of excruciating pain, and then have the memory of the week wiped? What if you remember agreeing to this 100 times in the past; that is, you remember agreeing to it, then a moment later experiencing a slight discontinuity, and being given the ten million dollars (which let's say you gambled all away). You were told every time you would experience pain, but all you experienced was being given the money. Would it be tempting to agree to this again (and this time, I'll put the money in the bank)? I've sometimes wondered whether some anaesthetics might work this way: put you into a state of paralysis, and affect your short term memory. So you actually experience the doctor cutting you open, with all the concommitant pain, but you can't report it at the time and forget about it afterwards. If you knew an anaesthetic worked that way, would you agree to have it used on you for surgery? Jonathan Colvin
RE: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)
Russell Standish wrote: This leads to a speculation that memories are an essential requirement for consciousness... I'm sure they are. Awareness with no memory would be complete confusion (you'd have no idea what any of your sense qualia refer to; or of much else, either). That's why consciousness is *not* a binary phenomenon. As babies grow and gain memories and knowledge, they *gradually* become conscious. This is one reason ethicist Peter Singer ascribes a lower intrinic person-ness to infants and the mentally retarded as compared to competant adults. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Torture yet again
Stathis wrote: When you press the button in the torture room, there is a 50% chance that your next moment will be in the same room and and a 50% chance that it will be somewhere else where you won't be tortured. However, this constraint has been added to the experiment: suppose you end up the copy still in the torture room whenever you press the button. After all, it is certain that there will be a copy still in the room, however many times the button is pressed. Should this unfortunate person choose the coin toss instead? If he shares your beliefs about identity, then if he changes his mind he will be be comitting the gambler's fallacy. However, after having pressed the button 100 times and with nothing to show for it except 100 tortures, his faith that he is a random observer might be shaken :). Jonathan Colvin
RE: Pareto laws and expected income
(JC) My consciousness (or degree of such) is a complicated function of my evolutionary history, but the problem is so multifactorial it is inappropriate to use anthropic reasoning. Nonsense. You are either conscious, in which case you will observe something, or you are not, which case you don't. This is a simple two state logic. That seems a remarkable assertion. As I grow from a fetus to an adult, is there one particular interval of planck time where I go from being an unconscious object to a conscious observer? It is unlikely to be resolvable to the planck scale, but I do expect there to be a first observer moment (ie resolvable on the millisecond scale). It may not be possible to pin down exactly when this occurs with human beings, however, just as it is extraordinarily difficult to draw a dividing line between conscious animals and unconscious ones. Likely because there *is* no dividing line. Why would you think that consciousness / observerness is a two state property? Jonathan Colvin
RE: Torture yet again
Stathis wrote: When you press the button in the torture room, there is a 50% chance that your next moment will be in the same room and and a 50% chance that it will be somewhere else where you won't be tortured. However, this constraint has been added to the experiment: suppose you end up the copy still in the torture room whenever you press the button. After all, it is certain that there will be a copy still in the room, however many times the button is pressed. Should this unfortunate person choose the coin toss instead? If he shares your beliefs about identity, then if he changes his mind he will be be comitting the gambler's fallacy. However, after having pressed the button 100 times and with nothing to show for it except 100 tortures, his faith that he is a random observer might be shaken :). Yes, but do you agree it is the same for any probabilistic experiment in a many worlds cosmology? If you sit down and toss a coin 100 times in a row, there will definitely be one version of you who has obtained 100 heads in a row, just as there will definitely be one version of you (the one still in the torture room) who has nothing to show after pushing the button 100 times. Yes, I agree. There are always going to be an unfortunate few. I think I know where this is going; if manyworlds is correct, there will be 10sup100 copies of me created in the next instant to which nothing bad happens, and a much smaller measure to whom something nasty happens, quite by chance. Presumably if I choose 50% over 10 copies, I should also choose 50% over 10sup100 copies, so if given the option between the status quo (assuming manyworlds) and a seemingly much higher chance of something nasty happening, I should choose the higher chance of nastiness (if I'm being consistent). There's not much answer to that; probably if I was convinced that manyworlds is correct, and something nasty *is* bound to happen to a small number of me in the next instant, I *would* choose the copies. In our thought experiment the subject knows he's getting tortured; unless we can prove manyworlds the nastiness is only conjecture. If that wasn't where you were heading, forgive the presumption... :) Jonathan Colvin
RE: Torture yet again
I (Jonathan Colvin) wrote: When you press the button in the torture room, there is a 50% chance that your next moment will be in the same room and and a 50% chance that it will be somewhere else where you won't be tortured. However, this constraint has been added to the experiment: suppose you end up the copy still in the torture room whenever you press the button. After all, it is certain that there will be a copy still in the room, however many times the button is pressed. Should this unfortunate person choose the coin toss instead? If he shares your beliefs about identity, then if he changes his mind he will be be comitting the gambler's fallacy. However, after having pressed the button 100 times and with nothing to show for it except 100 tortures, his faith that he is a random observer might be shaken :). Yes, but do you agree it is the same for any probabilistic experiment in a many worlds cosmology? If you sit down and toss a coin 100 times in a row, there will definitely be one version of you who has obtained 100 heads in a row, just as there will definitely be one version of you (the one still in the torture room) who has nothing to show after pushing the button 100 times. Yes, I agree. There are always going to be an unfortunate few. I think I know where this is going; if manyworlds is correct, there will be 10sup100 copies of me created in the next instant to which nothing bad happens, and a much smaller measure to whom something nasty happens, quite by chance. Presumably if I choose 50% over 10 copies, I should also choose 50% over 10sup100 copies, so if given the option between the status quo (assuming manyworlds) and a seemingly much higher chance of something nasty happening, I should choose the higher chance of nastiness (if I'm being consistent). There's not much answer to that; probably if I was convinced that manyworlds is correct, and something nasty *is* bound to happen to a small number of me in the next instant, I *would* choose the copies. In our thought experiment the subject knows he's getting tortured; unless we can prove manyworlds the nastiness is only conjecture. If that wasn't where you were heading, forgive the presumption... :) Ok, you've convinced me (or did I convince myself?). I've joined the ranks of the button pushers (with large number of copies anyway). But the probabilities seem to make a difference. For instance if there's a 50% chance of torture vs. 3 copies with one getting tortured for sure, I'll still choose the 50%. Don't ask me at which number of copies I'll start pushing the button; I dunno. Jonathan Colvin
Torture yet again
Sorry, I can't let go of this one. I'm trying to understand it psychologically. Here's another thought experiment which is roughly equivalent to our original scenario. You are sitting in a room, with a not very nice man. He gives you two options. 1) He'll toss a coin. Heads he tortures you, tails he doesn't. 2) He's going to start torturing you a minute from now. In the meantime, he shows you a button. If you press it, you will get scanned, and a copy of you will be created in a distant town. You've got a minute to press that button as often as you can, and then you are getting tortured. What are you going to choose (Stathis and Bruno)? Are you *really* going to choose (2), and start pressing that button frantically? Do you really think it will make any difference? I'm just imagining having pressed that button a hundred times. Each time I press it, nothing seems to happen. Meanwhile, the torturer is making his knife nice and dull, and his smile grows ever wider. Cr^%^p, I'm definitely choosing (1). Ok, sure, each time I press it, I also step out of a booth in Moscow, relieved to be pain-free (shortly to be followed by a second me, then a third, each one successively more relieved.) But I'm still choosing (1). Now, the funny thing is, if you replace torture by getting shot in the head, then I will pick (2). That's interesting, isn't it? Jonathan Colvin
RE: Doomsday and computational irreducibility
Russell Standish wrote: A new (at least I think it is new) objection to the DA just occurred to me (googling computational + irreducibility +doomsday came up blank). This objection (unfortunately) requires a few assumptions: 1) No block universe (ie. the universe is a process). 2) Wolframian computational irreducibility ((2) may be a consequence of (1) under certain other assumptions) Actually, I think that 2) is incompatible with 1). A computational process is deterministic, therefore can be replaced by a block representation. Are you familiar with Wolframian CI systems? The idea of CI is that while the system evolves deterministically, it is impossible (even in principle) to determine or predict the outcome without actually performing the iterations. I'm not at all sure that the idea of block representation works in this case. 3) No backwards causation. The key argument is that by 1) and 2), at time T, the state of the universe at time T+x is in principle un-knowable, even to the universe itself. Thus, at this time T (now), nothing, even the universe itself, can know whether the human race will stop tomorrow, or continue for another billion years. In any case, computational irreducibility does not imply that the the state of the universe at T+x is unknowable. In loose terms, computational irreducibility say that no matter what model of the universe you have that is simpler to compute than the real thing, your predictions will ultimately fail to track the universe's behaviour after a finite amount of time. Of course up until that finite time, the universe is highly predictable :) I'm thinking of Wolframian CI. There seem to be no short-cuts under that assumption (ie. No simpler model possible). The question is, can we patch up this criticism? What if the universe were completely indeterministic, with no causal dependence from one time step to the next? I think this will expose a few hidden assumptions in the DA: 1) I think the DA requires that the population curve is continuous in some sense (given that it is a function from R-N, it cannot be strictly continuous). Perhaps the notion of bounded variation does the trick. My knowledge is bit patchy here, as I never studied Lebesgue integration, but I think bounded variation is sufficient to guarantee existence of the integral of the population curve. 2) The usual DA requires that the integral of the population curve from -\infty to \infty be finite. I believe this can be extended to certain case where the integral is infinite, however I haven't really given this too much thought. But I don't think anyone else has either... 3) I have reason to believe (hinted at in my Why Occam's razor paper) that the measure for the population curve is actually complex when you take the full Multiverse into account. If you thought the DA on unbounded populations was bad - just wait for the complex case. My brain has already short-circuited at the prospect :) In any case, whatever the conditions really turn out to be, there has to be some causal structure linking now with the future. Consequently, this argument would appear to fail. (But interesting argument anyway, if it helps to clarify the assumptions of the DA). I don't see that causal structure is key. My understanding of the standard DA is that the system (universe) itself has knowledge of its future that the observer lacks (sort of bird's eye vs. frog's eye situation), which avoids the reverse -causation problem. Wolframian CI seems like it might be problematic for that account. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Measure, Doomsday argument
Russell Standish wrote: This argument is a variation of the argument for why we find so many observers in our world, rather than being alone in the universe, and is similar to why we expect the universe to be so big and old. Of course this argument contains a whole raft of ill-formed assumptions, so I'm expecting Jonathin Colvin to be warming up his keyboard for a critical response! Ok, if you insist :) I think the above are two disparate arguments. It is simpler by Occam to assume that there should be many observers rather than only one (similar argument to favouring the multiverse over only one big-bang). Once you admit the possibility of one observer, it takes extra argument to say why there should be *only* one. But we expect the universe to be old for cosmological reasons (takes stars a long time to cook up the needed elements, observer take a long time to evolve). Simplicity does not seem to be a factor here. A big universe does not seem much simpler either. Jonathan Colvin
Reference class (was dualism and the DA)
Russell Standish wrote: (JC) If you want to insist that What would it be like to be a bat is equivalent to the question What would the universe be like if I had been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what the answer could be. Suppose you *had* been a bat rather than you (Russell Standish). How would the universe be any different than it is now? If you can answer that question, (which is the key question, to my mind), then I'll grant that the question is meaningful. No different in the 3rd person, very obviously different in the 1st person I don't really know what that means. The only way I can make sense of the question is something like, If I was a bat instead of me (Jonathan Colvin), then the universe would consist of a bat asking the question I'm asking now. That's a counterfactual, a way in which the universe would be objectively different. It wouldn't be counterfactual, because by assumption bats ask this question of themselves anyway. Hence there is no difference in the 3rd person. The 1st person experience is very different though. There are only 1st person counterfactuals. That's quite an assumption. *Do* all conscious things ask this question of themselves? Babies don't. Senile old people don't. I'm not sure that medieval peasants ever thought to ask this question, or pre-literate cavemen. I definitely acknowledge the distinction between 1st and 3rd person. This is not the same as duality, which posits a 3rd person entity (the immaterial soul). This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue with the DA. My (and your) reference class can not be merely conscious observers or all humans, but must be something much closer to someone (or thing) discussing or aware of the DA). I don't think this is a meaningful reference class. I can still ask the question why am I me, and not someone else without being aware of the DA. All it takes is self-awareness IMHO. You *could* certainly. Perhaps it is important as to whether you actually *do* ask that question (and perhaps it should be in the context of the DA). I note that this reference class is certainly appropriate for you and me, and likely for anyone else reading this. This reference class certainly also invalidates the DA (although immaterial souls would rescue it). But at this point, I am, like Nick Bostrom, tempted to throw my hands up and declare the reference class issue pretty much intractable. Jonathan Colvin Incidently, I think I may have an answer to my Why am I not Chinese criticism, and the corresponding correction to Why am I not an ant seems to give the same answer as I originally proposed. I'd be interested to hear it. Here's something else you could look at...calculate the median annual income for all humans alive today (I believe it is around $4,000 /year), compare it to your own, and see if you are anyway near the median. I predict that the answer for you (and for anyone else reading this), is far from the median. This result is obviously related to the why you are not Chinese criticism, and is, I believe, the reason the DA goes astray. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Time travel in multiple universes
Hal wrote: Those are interesting speculations, but I don't think it really makes sense to imagine travelling between the worlds of the Tegmark multiverse. There are no causal connections between them of the type that would be necessary for an information packet to travel in the way we normally think of it happening. I think David Deutsch had some ideas about time travel in the MWI going between parallel worlds, but again I didn't think that could work, physically. Once worlds have decohered, there are no physical mechanisms for them to interact to any measurable degree. However I do think there are connections between time travel and the MWI, different from Deutsch's rather simplistic picture of travel to parallel worlds. The big problem with time travel is not so much the kill-your-father paradox, because as Ben writes this can be easily dealt with by postulating that only consistent time travel works. The bigger puzzle then is the apparent necessity of the universe to be intelligent, for the natural laws to engage in strategic reasoning at least as advanced and sophisticated as the intelligent beings whose free will it is thwarting. When a time traveller tries to do something, there has to be the potential for a sort of back-reaction from the universe which can interfere with his actions if they would lead to a paradox. Let's suppose he goes to do something, make a change in the past which it turns out will be inconsistent with his memories in the future. Something's going to stop him. But how does the universe know that this has to be stopped? It seems that there has to be at least a potential or virtual universe created in which his actions play out, their consequences extend through time into the future where the time traveller departed from, and the inconsistency with his mental state is detected. Nature abhors a paradox. The principle of least (or minimal) action appears to prevent inconsistencies; at least according to Novikov et al. http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/9607063 It's fine for billiard balls going through wormholes, but gets (philosophically at least, if not physically) problematic when applied to objects which like to think they have free will, such as me killing my grandfather. I hate to think that my decisions are reductively determinined by the principle of minimal action (much though my wife might agree). Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA
Russell Standish wrote: On What would it be like to have been born someone else, how does this differ from What is it like to be a bat? Presumably Jonathon Colvin would argue that this latter question is meaningless, unless immaterial souls existed. I still find it hard to understand this argument. The question What is it like to be a bat? still has meaning, but is probably unanswerable (although Dennett, I notice considers it answerable, contra Nagel!) No... What is it like to be (or have been born) a bat? is a *very* different question than Why am I me rather than a bat?. Certainly, assuming immaterial souls or a similar identity dualism, (and that I am my soul, not my body), and that bats have souls like people, it is a meaningful question to ask why am I me rather than a bat, or to state that I could have been a bat, because my soul could have been placed in a bat rather than a human body. The universe would be objectively different under the circumstances I am Jonathan Colvin and I am a bat. If you want to insist that What would it be like to be a bat is equivalent to the question What would the universe be like if I had been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what the answer could be. Suppose you *had* been a bat rather than you (Russell Standish). How would the universe be any different than it is now? If you can answer that question, (which is the key question, to my mind), then I'll grant that the question is meaningful. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA (and torture once more)
Bruno wrote: Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a God could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.). (JC) Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question? Not at all. If you want to insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to figure out). If the material universe is identical under situation (A) (I am copy #1 in washington) and (B) (I am copy#2 in washington), then in what way does it make sense to say that situation A OR situation B might have obtained? Just ask the one in Washington. He will tell you that he feels really be the one in washington. The experience from his personal point of view *has* given a bit of information he feels himself to be the one in washington, and not in Moscow. At this stage he can have only an intellectual (3-person) knowledge that its doppelganger has been reconstituted in Moscow. And he remember correctly by comp his past history in Brussels. snip I'm sure the one in Moscow will also answer that he feels really to be the one in Moscow. But what you haven't answered is in what way the universe is any different under circumstance (A) than (B). This is because there is surely *no* difference at all. This is the reason why it makes no sense (to me) to take the position that if I copy myself, there is a 50% chance of (A) me being observer A, and a 50% chance of (B) me being observer B. There is no difference between (A) and (B). This is also the reason why I choose (A) a 50% chance of torture over (B) being copied ten times, and one copy getting tortured (where it is suggested there is only a 10% chance of me getting tortured). There are clearly two different possible universes under (A) (one where I get tortured, one where I don't). Under (B), there is no way I can make sense of what the 10% probability applies to. The universe is identical under situation (a) I'm person 1 who gets tortured and (b) I'm person 2-10 who doesn't. To insist that there *is* a difference surely requires some new kind of dualism. Perhaps it is a valid dualism; but I think it should be accepted that theories reifying the 1st person are fundamentally dualistic. But I know what your response will be..the dualism comes from reifying the 3rd person independent universe, and if we accept only the 1st person as real, there is no dualism. It is quite a metaphysical leap, though, to discard the 3rd person universe. I'd like to know how to justify such a shift. It does not seem simpler by Occam, because instead of 1 universe containing many observers, we have a multiplicity of universes, each with 1 observer. How does this differ from solipsism? How do we make sense of other observers within *our* universe? If there questions have been addressed before on the list, feel free to point me to the relevant archive section. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA
Russell Standish wrote: Well, actually I'd say the fist *is* identical to the hand. At least, my fist seems to be identical to my hand. Even when the hand is open Define fist. You don't seem to be talking about a thing, but some sort of Platonic form. That's an expressly dualist position. According to the Oxford Concise dictionary: fist: a clenched hand, esp. as used in boxing Another example. You cannot say that a smile is separate from someone's mouth. Yet a smile is not identical to the mouth. Depends whether you are a Platonist (dualist) about smiles. I'd say a smiling mouth *is* identical to a mouth. Even when the mouth is turned down??? As above. Is it your position that you are the same sort of thing as a smile? That's a dualist position. I'd say I'm the same sort of thing as a mouth. ??? You're being incoherent. How can you be the same sort of thing as a smile or a mouth? What do you mean? A mouth is a thing. A smile is not. If I define myself as the body that calls itself Jonathan Colvin, that is the same sort of thing as a mouth (a material object). A smile is a different category entirely. But we are getting side-tracked here. But your response above is ambiguous. I'm not sure if you are agreeing that our appropriate reference class is *not* all humans, but disagreeing as to whether email is important, or disagreeing with the entire statement above (in which case presumably you think our appropriate refererence class for the purposes of the DA is all humans). Can you be more specific about what you disagree with? The reference class is all conscious beings. Since we know of no other conscious beings, then this is often taken to be all humans. The case of extra terrestrial intelligences certainly complicates the DA, however DA-like arguments would also imply that humans dominate to class of conscious beings. This conclusion is not empirically contradicted, but if it ever were, the DA would be refuted. Absent a good definition for conscious, this reference class seems unjustifiable. Could I have been a chimpanzee? If not, why not? Could I have been an infant who died at the age of 5? And why pick on conscious as the reference class. Why couldn't I have been a tree? Constraining the reference to class to subsets of conscious beings immediately leads to contradictions - eg why am I not a Chinese, instead of Australian - Chinese outnumber Australians by a factor of 50 (mind you a factor of 50 is not really enough to base anthropic arguments, but one could easily finesse this). Indeed. This is a further indication that there are problems with the DA. The only way to rescue the DA is to assume that I *could have had* a different birth rank; in other words, that I could have been someone other than me (me as in my body). If the body I'm occupying is contingent (ie. I could have been in any human body, and am in this one by pure chance), then the DA is rescued. Yes. Ok, at least we agree on that. Let's go from there. This seems to require a dualistic account of identity. Why? Explain this particular jump of logic please? I'm not being stubborn here, I seriously do not understand how you draw this conclusion. Read the above again (to which I assume you agree, since you replied yes.) Note particularly the phrase If the body I'm occupying is contingent. How can I occupy a body without a dualistic account of identity? How could I have been in a different body, unless I am somehow separate from my body (ie. Dualism)? I have just finished Daniel Dennett's book Consciousness Explained, and gives rather good account of how this is possible. As our minds develop, first prelingually, and then as language gains hold, our self, the I you refer to, develops out of a web of thoughts, words, introspection constrained by the phylogeny of the body, and also by the environment in which my self awakened (or bootstrapped as it were). Since this must happen in all bodies with the requisite structure (ie humans, and possibly som non-humans), it can easily be otherwise. It can easily be contingent. Yet Daniel Dennett is expressly non-dualist. I'm sure he'd be most interested if you were to label him as a dualist. This is simply an account of how we gain a sense of self. I don't see the relevance to this discussion. I sincerely doubt that Dennett would find the question Why I am I me and not someone else? meaningful in any way. How could *your* self have awakened or been bootstrapped in someone else's body? Dennett expressly *denies* that we occupy our minds. ... You are dodging the question. Assuming for a second that lions and trees are both conscious, you still haven't answered the question as to how a tree could be a lion, without dualism of some sort. I think I have given several examples of such answers. And above I gave yet another answer, this time
RE: Dualism and the DA
Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question? If you want to insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to figure out). If the material universe is identical under situation (A) (I am copy #1 in washington) and (B) (I am copy#2 in washington), then in what way does it make sense to say that situation A OR situation B might have obtained? This seems to be the crux of the objection to any theory which reifies 1st person phenomena. Jonathan Colvin Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is strictly equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and not the one in Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly unanswerable. Even a God could not give an adequate explanation (assuming c.). Bruno Le 16-juin-05, 23:02, Quentin Anciaux a crit : Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 10:02, Jonathan Colvin a crit: Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm conscious (feels like I am, anyway). Hi Jonathan, I think you do not see the real question, which can be formulated (using your analogy) by : Why (me as) Russell Standish is Russell Standish rather Jonathan Colvin ? I (as RS) could have been you (JC)... but it's a fact that I'm not, but the question is why I'm not, why am I me rather than you ? What force decide for me to be me ? :) Quentin http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: Dualism and the DA
Hal Finney wrote: It's an interesting question as to how far we can comfortably or meaningfully take counterfactuals. At some level it is completely mundane to say things like, if I had taken a different route to work today, I wouldn't have gotten caught in that traffic jam. We aren't thrown into a maelstrom of existential confusion as we struggle to understand what it could mean to have different memories than those we do. How could I have not gotten into that traffic jam? What would happen to those memories? Would I still be the same person? We deal with these kinds of counterfactuals all the time. They are one of our main tools for understanding the world and learning which strategies work and which don't. Then there are much more extreme counterfactuals. Apple Computer head Steve Jobs gave a pretty good graduation speech at Stanford last week, http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2005/june15/jobs-061505.html. He explains that he was adopted, and his life was changed in a major way by the circumstances. His biological mother, an unwed grad student, wanted him raised by college graduates, so he was set to be adopted by a lawyer and his wife. At the last minute the lawyer decided he wanted a girl, so Jobs ended up being given to a blue collar couple, neither of whom had gone to college. They were good parents and treated him well, sacrificing so he could go to college, but after six months Jobs dropped out, seeing little value to consuming his family's entire savings. He continued to attend classes on the sly, got into computers and the rest is history. But imagine how different his life would have been if the original plan had gone through and he had been adopted by a successful lawyer, perhaps raised in an upper class household with his every wish met. He would have gone to an Ivy League college and probably done well. But it would have been a totally different life path. Does it make sense for Jobs to say, who would I have been if that had happened? Or would he have been such a totally different person that this stretches the idea of a counterfactual beyond reason? I think his telling the story demonstrates that he does think this way sometimes. Yet none of the memories or experiences that he has would have been present in this other version. At most the two versions might have shared some personality traits, but even those are often strongly influenced by upbringing - his tenacity in the face of adversity, for example, might never have become so strong in a life where everything came easily. Probably there are many people in the world who are at least as similar to Steve Jobs in personality as the person he would have been if his early life had gone that other way. The point is that we can imagine a range of counterfactuals where the difference is a matter of degree, not kind, from trivial matters all the way up to situations where we would have to consider ourselves a different person. There is no bright line to draw that I can see. So yes, if you can imagine what it would have been like to eat something else for breakfast, then you should be able to imagine what it would have been like to be born as someone else. It's the same basic technique, just applied to a greater degree. Those are counterfactuals regarding personal circumstance, and do not seem particularly controversial, even admitting that it is not straightforward to define a single theory of personal identity that covers all the bases. There's a continuous, definable identity that follows a physical/causal/genetic/mental chain all the way from when egg and sperm met up to Jobs' graduation. It does not seem problematic to alter contingent aspects of this identity-chain and yet insist that we retain the same Jobs. It is a great deal harder to see how to make sense of a counterfactual such as Who would I be if my mother and father hadn't had sex?, or who would I be if they'd had sex a day later and a different egg and sperm had met?. I have to disagree with you here, and state that this sort of counterfactual seems to indeed embody a difference of kind, not just degree. We're not talking about imagining_whats_it_likeness. We are talking about me *being* someone different. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA
Hal Finney wrote: Jonathan Colvin writes: In the process of writing this email, I did some googling, and it seems my objection has been independantly discovered (some time ago). See http://hanson.gmu.edu/nodoom.html In particular, I note the following section, which seems to mirror my argument rather precisely: It seems hard to rationalize this state space and prior outside a religious image where souls wait for God to choose their bodies. This last objection may sound trite, but I think it may be the key. The universe doesn't know or care whether we are intelligent or conscious, and I think we risk a hopeless conceptual muddle if we try to describe the state of the universe directly in terms of abstract features humans now care about. If we are going to extend our state desciptions to say where we sit in the universe (and it's not clear to me that we should) it seems best to construct a state space based on the relevant physical states involved, to use priors based on natural physical distributions over such states, and only then to notice features of interest to humans. I've looked for rebuttals of Hanson, and haven't found any. Nick references him, but comments only that Hanson also seems to be comitted to the SIA (not sure why he thinks this). There was an extensive debate between Robin Hanson and Nick Bostrom on the Extropians list in mid 1988. You can pick it up from the point where Robin came up with the rock/monkey/human/posthuman model which he describes in the web page you cite above, at this link: http://forum.javien.com/conv.php?new=trueconvdata=id::vae825qL -Gceu-2ueS-wFbo-Kwj0fIHLv6dh You can also try looking this earlier thread, http://forum.javien.com/conv.php?new=trueconvdata=id::U9mLfRBF -z8ET-BDyq-8Sz1-5UotvKx2iIS2 and focus on the postings by Nick and Robin, which led Robin to produce his formal model. I think if you look at the details however you will find it is Robin Hanson who advocates the you could have been a rock position and Nick Bostrom who insists that you could only have been other people. This seemed to be one of the foundations of their disagreement. I think Robin is assuming (as I do) that the only way counterfactuals such as I could have been someone/something else make sense, absent dualism, is if we adopt a strictly physical identity theory (ie. The atoms in my body could have been a rock rather than a person). Nick then points out that if you were a rock, you wouldn't be you (it looks like he's assuming a pattern identity theory such as Morovacs'). I agree with Nick that if you were a rock, you wouldn't be you. But under pattern identity theory, if you were someone else, you wouldn't be you either. Absent some sort of identity dualism, this is not any improvement on physical identity. The last time I discussed the issue of personal identity with Nick, he agreed with me that the answer to the question why am I me and not someone else? was *not* I am a random observer, and so I'm me by chance, but it's a meaningless question; I could not have been anyone else. But that discussion was not in the context of the DA. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA
Russell Standish wrote: Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body. These two statements are not equivalent. You cannot say that the fist is separate from the hand. Yet the fist is not identical to the hand. Well, actually I'd say the fist *is* identical to the hand. At least, my fist seems to be identical to my hand. Another example. You cannot say that a smile is separate from someone's mouth. Yet a smile is not identical to the mouth. Depends whether you are a Platonist (dualist) about smiles. I'd say a smiling mouth *is* identical to a mouth. But unless I am an immaterial soul or other sort of cartesian entity, this is not possible. I disagree completely. You will need to argue your case hard and fast on this one. See below. Yah - I'm still waiting... Well, to explicate, the DA suffers from the issue of defining an appropriate reference set. Now, we are clearly not both random observers on the class of all observers(what are the chances of two random observers from the class of all observers meeting at this time on the same mailing list? Googleplexianly small). Neither are we both random observers from the class of humans (same argument..what are the chances that both our birth ranks are approximately the same?). For instance, an appropriate reference set for me (or anyone reading this exchange) might be people with access to email debating the DA. But this reference set nullifies the DA, since my birth rank is no longer random; it is constrained by the requirement, for example, that email exists (a pre-literate caveman could not debate the DA). The only way to rescue the DA is to assume that I *could have had* a different birth rank; in other words, that I could have been someone other than me (me as in my body). If the body I'm occupying is contingent (ie. I could have been in any human body, and am in this one by pure chance), then the DA is rescued. This seems to require a dualistic account of identity. All theories that reify the observer are essentially dualistic, IMHO. If I am simply my body, then the statement I could have been someone else is as ludicrous as pointing to a tree and saying Why is that tree, that tree? Why couldn't it have been a different tree? Why couldn't it have been a lion? Jonathan Colvin The tree, if conscious, could ask the question of why it isn't a lion. The only thing absurd about that question is that we know trees aren't conscious. That seems an absurd question to me. How could a tree be a lion? Unless the tree's consciousness is not identical with its body (trunk, I guess), this is a meaningless question. To ask that question *assumes* a dualism. It's a subtle dualism, to be sure. Of course a mind is not _identical_ to a body. What an absurd thing to say. If your definition of dualism is that mind and body are not identical, then this is a poor definition indeed. It is tautologically true. Why do you say of course? I believe that I (my mind) am exactly identical to my body (its brain, to be specific). My definition would be something along the lines of minds and bodies have independent existence - ie positing the existence of disembodied minds is dualism. Such an assumption is not required to apply the Doomsday argument. I may make such assumptions in other areas though - such as wondering why the Anthropic Principle is valid. Not dualism implies the Anthropic Principle. Then how can a tree be a lion without assuming that minds and bodies can have independent existance? Assuming dualism, its easy; simply switch the lion's mind with the tree's. As a little boy once asked, Why are lions, lions? Why aren't lions ants? I have asked this question of myself Why I am not an ant?. The answer (by the Doomsday Argument) is that ants are not conscious. The question, and answer is quite profound. That doesn't seem profound; it seems obvious. Even more obvious is the answer If you were an ant, you wouldn't be Russell Standish. So it is a meaningless question. Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm conscious (feels like I am, anyway). Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA
that minds and bodies can have independent existance? Assuming dualism, its easy; simply switch the lion's mind with the tree's. The question Why am I not a lion? is syntactically similar to Why I am not an ant, or Why I am not Jonathon Colvin?. The treeness (or otherwise) of the questioner is rather irrelevant. In any case, the answers to both the latter questions do not assume minds can be swapped. You are dodging the question. Assuming for a second that lions and trees are both conscious, you still haven't answered the question as to how a tree could be a lion, without dualism of some sort. As a little boy once asked, Why are lions, lions? Why aren't lions ants? I have asked this question of myself Why I am not an ant?. The answer (by the Doomsday Argument) is that ants are not conscious. The question, and answer is quite profound. That doesn't seem profound; it seems obvious. Even more obvious is the answer If you were an ant, you wouldn't be Russell Standish. So it is a meaningless question. I _didn't_ ask the question Assuming I am Russell Standish, why am I not an ant? I asked the question of Why wasn't I an ant?. Its a different question completely. It is a question that *assumes* dualism. The only way those can be different questions is if I is not identical with Russell Standish. Otherwise the question is identical with Why wasn't Russell Standish an ant?. Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm conscious (feels like I am, anyway). This one is also easy to answer also. I'm just as likely to have been born you as born me. But I have to have been born someone. I just so happened to have been born me. This is called symmetry breaking. Again, you are *assuming* dualism in your statement. How could you possibly have been me? If you *had* been me, what would the difference be in the universe? Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA
Quentin wrote: Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm conscious (feels like I am, anyway). I think you do not see the real question, which can be formulated (using your analogy) by : Why (me as) Russell Standish is Russell Standish rather Jonathan Colvin ? I (as RS) could have been you (JC)... but it's a fact that I'm not, but the question is why I'm not, why am I me rather than you ? What force decide for me to be me ? :) My argument is that this is a meaningless question. In what way could you (as RS) have been me (as JC)? Suppose you were. How would the universe be any different than it is right now? This question is analogous to asking Why is 2 not 3?. Why is this tree not that telescope?. Why is my aunt not a wagon?. The only way I can make sense of a question like this is to adopt a dualistic position. In this case, the question makes good sense: me (my soul, consciousness, whatever), might not have been in my body; it might have been in someone else's. It is easy to forget, I think, that the SSA is a *reasoning principle*, not an ontological statement. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we should reason *as if* we are a random sample from the set of all observers in our reference class. This is NOT the same as an ontological statement to the effect that we *are* random observers, which seems hard to justify unless we assume a species of dualism. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
Hal Finney wrote: I presume the answer is that rather than look at physical size/weight of our bodies, one must try to calculate the proportion of the universe's information content devoted to that part of our beings essential to being an observer (probably something to do with the amount of grey matter). Yes, I think that's right. Our bodies don't directly contribute to our conscious experiences. But again, this surely changes as we age. My brain (and consciousness) at age 2 was much smaller than at age 30, and will start to shrink again as I get senile. Does our measure increase with age? I think you meant decrease, at least in terms of becoming elderly. Of course we already know that measure decreases with age due to the continual risk of dying. But yes, I think this argument would suggest that there is a small decrease in measure due to brain shrinkage. It would not be a very large effect, though, I don't think. If we get brain surgery, does our measure diminish? You mean if they cut out a piece of your brain? I guess that would depend on whether it affected your consciousness. If it did you probably have bigger problems than your measure decreasing. Your consciousness would change so much that your previous self might not view you as the same person. And once the transhumanist's dream of mental augmentation is possible, will our measure increase as our consciousness increases? Yes, I think so, assuming the brains actually become bigger. Although there is a counter-effect if the brains instead become faster and smaller, as I wrote earlier. So this raises a paradox, why are we not super-brains? Perhaps this is an argument against the possibility that this will ever happen, a la the Doomsday Argument (why do we not live in the Galactic Empire with its population billions of times greater than today?). There's a simple answer to that one. Presumably, a million years from now in the Galactic Empire, the Doomsday argument is no longer controversial, and it will not be a topic for debate. The fact that we are all debating the Doomsday argument implies we are all part of the reference class: (people debating the doomsday argument), and we perforce can not be part of the Galactic Empire. Although these conclusions may be counter-intuitive, I find it quite exciting to be able to derive any predictions at all from the AUH in the Schmidhuber model. It suggests that uploading your brain to a computer might be tantamount to taking a large chance of dying; unless you could then duplicate your uploaded brain all over the world, which would greatly increase your measure. And all this comes from the very simple assumption that the measure of something is the fraction of multiverse resources devoted to it, a simple restatement of the Schmidhuber multiverse model. I find these conclusions counter-intuitive enough to suggest that deriving measure from a physical fraction of involved reasources is not the correct way to derive measure. It is not unlike trying to derive the importance of a book by weighing it. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA
Russel Standish wrote: Since it is coming from Nick B., over-exhaustive :) I don't think anybody, Nick included, has yet come up with a convincing way to define appropriate reference classes. Absent this, the only way to rescue the DA seems to be a sort of dualism (randomly emplaced souls etc). Nooo! - the DA does not imply dualism. The souls do not need to exist anywhere else before being randomly emplaced. Ambiguous response. Are you saying that the DA requires that souls must be randomly emplaced, but that this does not require dualism, or that the DA does not require souls? It seems to me that to believe we are randomly emplaced souls, whether or not they existed elsewhere beforehand, is to perforce embrace a species of dualism. To rescue the DA (given the problem of defining a reference class), one must assume a particular stance regarding counterfactuals of personal identity; that I could have been someone else (anyone else in the reference class of observers, for example). But unless I am an immaterial soul or other sort of cartesian entity, this is not possible. If I am simply my body, then the statement I could have been someone else is as ludicrous as pointing to a tree and saying Why is that tree, that tree? Why couldn't it have been a different tree? Why couldn't it have been a lion? Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA
Stephen Paul King wrote: Pardon the intrusion, but in your opinion does every form of dualism require that one side of the duality has properties and behaviors that are not constrained by the other side of the duality, as examplified by the idea of randomly emplaced souls? The idea that all dualities, of say mind and body, allow that minds and bodies can have properties and behaviours that are not mutually constrained is, at best, an incoherent straw dog. I don't really uderstand the question the way you've phrased it (I'm not sure what you mean by mutually constrained); I *think* you are asking whether I believe that it is necessary that any duality must have mutually exclusive properties (if not, please elaborate). I think this is implied by the very concept of dualism; if the properties of the dual entities (say mind and body, or particle and wave) are NOT mutually exclusive, then there is no dualism to talk about. If the mind and the body are identical, there is no dualism. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Dualism and the DA
Russel Standish wrote: It seems to me that to believe we are randomly emplaced souls, whether or not they existed elsewhere beforehand, is to perforce embrace a species of dualism. Exactly what species of dualism? Dualism usually means that minds and brains are distinct orthogonal things, interacting at a point - eg pineal gland. What I think of as mind is an emergent property of the interaction of large numbers of neurons coupled together. I do not think of emergent properties as dualism - but if you insist then we simply have a language game. Nope, I'm thinking of dualism as the mind (or consciousness) is separate from the body. Ie. The mind is not identical to the body. To rescue the DA (given the problem of defining a reference class), one must assume a particular stance regarding counterfactuals of personal identity; that I could have been someone else (anyone else in the reference class of observers, for example). True. But unless I am an immaterial soul or other sort of cartesian entity, this is not possible. I disagree completely. You will need to argue your case hard and fast on this one. See below. If I am simply my body, then the statement I could have been someone else is as ludicrous as pointing to a tree and saying Why is that tree, that tree? Why couldn't it have been a different tree? Why couldn't it have been a lion? Jonathan Colvin The tree, if conscious, could ask the question of why it isn't a lion. The only thing absurd about that question is that we know trees aren't conscious. That seems an absurd question to me. How could a tree be a lion? Unless the tree's consciousness is not identical with its body (trunk, I guess), this is a meaningless question. To ask that question *assumes* a dualism. It's a subtle dualism, to be sure. As a little boy once asked, Why are lions, lions? Why aren't lions ants? Jonathan Colvin
RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
You are offered two choices: (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is heads, you will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured. (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the copies will be tortured, and the other 9 will not be tortured. By your reasoning, there is a 50% chance you will be tortured in (a) and a 100% chance you will be tortured in (b), so (a) is better. But I would say the probabilities are (a) 50% and (b) 10%, so (b) is clearly the better choice. H...I'd disagree. Emotionally, (a) feels the better choice to me; in (b) I'm definitely getting tortured, in (a) I may dodge the bullet. On a purely objective basis (attempting to mimimize the amount of torture in the world), (a) is also obviously superior. This would make an interesting poll. Who prefers (a) over (b)? Imagine what would happen if you chose (b). You enter the teleportation sending station, press the green button, and your body is instantly and painlessly destructively analysed. The information is beamed to 10 different receiving stations around the world, where an exact replica of you is created from local raw materials. One of these receiving stations is situated in a torture chambre, and the torture will commence immediately once the victim arrives. Now, what do you think you will actually experience the moment after you press the green button? Do you expect to feel any different because there are now 10 copies of you? Do you expect that the copy being tortured will somehow send signals to the other 9 copies? If not, then how will the 100% chance that one of the copies will be tortured affect you if you happen to be one of the other copies? How will I feel after pressing the button? Your question has a structural issue. You are asking what do you think you will experience the moment after you press the green button?. This question is ill-posed, because post-split, the pre-split you no longer clearly refers to any one person, so the question as posed is unanswerable. Of course, post split there will be ten Jonathan Colvins, each of whom calls themselves me. But there is no longer any one-to-one correspondence with the pre-split me, so it makes no sense to ask what I will experience after pushing the button. From a third person perspective there is no one to one correspondence, but from a first person perspective, there is: each of the ten copies remembers being you pre-split. Perhaps I could ask the question differently. If it turns out that the many worlds interpretation of QM is true, then you will be duplicated multiple times in parallel universes in the next second. When you contemplate how you are going to feel in the next second in the light of this knowledge, do you expect anything different to what you would expect in a single world system? Is there any test you could do to determine whether there is one world or many? No...to both questions. This thought experiment is a good way to demonstrate the myth of continuity of identity. Of course, if you deny that there is such a thing as an observer that persists though time, then the myth does not get off the ground. I believe that the SSA and related assumptions should be taken only as guidelines for reasoning (similar to Sagan's principle of mediocrity), but not as ontologies. In other words, when we are ignorant, we should reason *as if* we are random observers on our reference class; but I do not believe that we *are* random observers. To believe that we *are* random observers requires a species of dualism (albeit a subtle species). It requires believing that *I could have been someone else*. And this is not the case. I could not have been anyone other than me. If my aunt had wheels, she'd be a wagon, and if I had been someone else, I wouln't be me. This is also one of the reasons that the DDA is mistaken,IMHO. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
Stathis wrote: You are offered two choices: (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is heads, you will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured. (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the copies will be tortured, and the other 9 will not be tortured. By your reasoning, there is a 50% chance you will be tortured in (a) and a 100% chance you will be tortured in (b), so (a) is better. But I would say the probabilities are (a) 50% and (b) 10%, so (b) is clearly the better choice. H...I'd disagree. Emotionally, (a) feels the better choice to me; in (b) I'm definitely getting tortured, in (a) I may dodge the bullet. On a purely objective basis (attempting to mimimize the amount of torture in the world), (a) is also obviously superior. This would make an interesting poll. Who prefers (a) over (b)? Imagine what would happen if you chose (b). You enter the teleportation sending station, press the green button, and your body is instantly and painlessly destructively analysed. The information is beamed to 10 different receiving stations around the world, where an exact replica of you is created from local raw materials. One of these receiving stations is situated in a torture chambre, and the torture will commence immediately once the victim arrives. Now, what do you think you will actually experience the moment after you press the green button? Do you expect to feel any different because there are now 10 copies of you? Do you expect that the copy being tortured will somehow send signals to the other 9 copies? If not, then how will the 100% chance that one of the copies will be tortured affect you if you happen to be one of the other copies? How will I feel after pressing the button? Your question has a structural issue. You are asking what do you think you will experience the moment after you press the green button?. This question is ill-posed, because post-split, the pre-split you no longer clearly refers to any one person, so the question as posed is unanswerable. Of course, post split there will be ten Jonathan Colvins, each of whom calls themselves me. But there is no longer any one-to-one correspondence with the pre-split me, so it makes no sense to ask what I will experience after pushing the button. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
Bruno wrote: Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any convincing argument for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after all, *me* (although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we were copied and started diverging. Yes, this is exactly my position, except that I'm not sure I would necessarily care more about what happens to my copy than to a stranger. After all, he knows all my secrets, my bank account details, my passwords... it's not difficult to see how we might become bitter enemies. The situation is different when I am considering my copies in the future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two copies, one of whom will be tortured, I am worried, because that means there is 1/2 chance that I will become the torture victim. When tomorrow comes and I am not the torture victim, I am relieved, because now I can feel sorry for my suffering copy as I might feel sorry for a stranger. You could argue that there is an inconsistency here: today I identify with the tortured copy, tomorrow I don't. But whether it is inconsistent or irrational is beside the point: this is how our minds actually work. Every amputee who experiences phantom limb pain is aware that they are being irrational because there is no limb there in reality, but knowing this does not make the pain go away. This is incorrect, I think. At time A, pre-split, there is a 100% chance that you will *become* the torture victim. The torture victim must have once been you, and thus you must become the torture victim with probability 1. There's no inconsistency here; you are quite right to be worried at time A, because you (at time A) *will* be tortured (at time B). The inconsistency comes with identifying (you at time A, pre-split) with (one of the you's at time B, post-split). There can be no one-to-one correspondence. To sum up I am duplicated, and one of the copy will be tortured, the other will not be tortured. You say that there is 100% chance I will be tortured. If we interview the one who is not tortured he must acknowledge his reasoning was false, and the proba could not have been = to 100% chance. Are you not identifying yourself with the one who will be tortured (in this case you make the error you pretend Stathis is doing. If not, it means you identified yourself with both, but this would mean you do the confusion between 1 and 3 person, given that we cannot *feel* to be two different individuals. There's a third possibility, which is that the I pre-split can not be identified with either of the post-split individuals. As per my reponse to Stathis, the question is ill-posed. You can interview the non-tortured individual post-split, and while it may feel to him that he is me, the same will be true for the other individual. So which is me? The most sensible response is that the question is ill-posed. If I take a loaf of bread, chop it half, put one half in one room and one half in the other, and then ask the question where is the loaf of bread?, we can likely agree that the question is ill-posed. The question what will I feel tomorrow only has an answer assuming that tomorrow there is a unique me. If I have been duplicated, there is no longer a definite answer to the question. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
Bruno wrote: (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is heads, you will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured. (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the copies will be tortured, and the other 9 will not be tortured. By your reasoning, there is a 50% chance you will be tortured in (a) and a 100% chance you will be tortured in (b), so (a) is better. But I would say the probabilities are (a) 50% and (b) 10%, so (b) is clearly the better choice. H...I'd disagree. Emotionally, (a) feels the better choice to me; in (b) I'm definitely getting tortured, in (a) I may dodge the bullet. On a purely objective basis (attempting to mimimize the amount of torture in the world), (a) is also obviously superior. This would make an interesting poll. Who prefers (a) over (b)? With comp, and assuming the copies will never be copied again and are immortal, then b. Ok, but why? Please explain your reasoning. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any convincing argument for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after all, *me* (although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we were copied and started diverging. Yes, this is exactly my position, except that I'm not sure I would necessarily care more about what happens to my copy than to a stranger. After all, he knows all my secrets, my bank account details, my passwords... it's not difficult to see how we might become bitter enemies. The situation is different when I am considering my copies in the future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two copies, one of whom will be tortured, I am worried, because that means there is 1/2 chance that I will become the torture victim. When tomorrow comes and I am not the torture victim, I am relieved, because now I can feel sorry for my suffering copy as I might feel sorry for a stranger. You could argue that there is an inconsistency here: today I identify with the tortured copy, tomorrow I don't. But whether it is inconsistent or irrational is beside the point: this is how our minds actually work. Every amputee who experiences phantom limb pain is aware that they are being irrational because there is no limb there in reality, but knowing this does not make the pain go away. This is incorrect, I think. At time A, pre-split, there is a 100% chance that you will *become* the torture victim. The torture victim must have once been you, and thus you must become the torture victim with probability 1. There's no inconsistency here; you are quite right to be worried at time A, because you (at time A) *will* be tortured (at time B). The inconsistency comes with identifying (you at time A, pre-split) with (one of the you's at time B, post-split). There can be no one-to-one correspondence. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
Hal Finney wrote: Jonathan Colvin writes: There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I suppose, for a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a thing as an essence of an experience? I'd suggest there is no such thing as an observer-moment. I'm happy with using the concept as a tag of sorts when discussing observer selection issues, but I think reifying it is likely a mistake, and goes considerably beyond Strong AI into a full Cartesian dualism. Is it generally accepted here on this list that a substrate-independent thing called an observer moment exists? Here's how I attempted to define observer moment a few years ago: Observer - A subsystem of the multiverse with qualities sufficiently similar to those which are common among human beings that we consider it meaningful that we might have been or might be that subsystem. These qualities include consciousness, perception of a flow of time, and continuity of identity. Observer-moment - An instant of perception by an observer. An observer's sense of the flow of time allows its experience to be divided into units so small that no perceptible change in consciousness is possible in those intervals. Each such unit of time for a particular observer is an observer-moment. So if you don't believe in observer-moments, do you also not believe in observers? Or is it the -moment that causes problems? I don't believe in observers, if by observer one means to assign special ontological status to mental states over any other arrangement of matter. This is similar to the objection to the classic interpretation of QM, whereby an observation is required to collapse the WF (how do you define observer?..a rock?..a chicken?..a person?). But this was in response to a comment that it was time to get serious about observer-moments. An observer is such a poorly defined and nebulous thing that I don't think one can get serious about it. I'd note that your definition is close to being circular..an observer is something sufficiently similar to me that I might think I could have been it. But how do we decide what is sufficient? The qualities you list (consciousness, perception etc) are themselves poorly defined or undefinable. We end up with an observer is an observer if I think it is an observer; which is a bit circular IMHO. Jonathan Colvin
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RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
Lee: Not quite! It turns out that everyone who knows them regards identical twins as different persons. And so regards them, I am pretty certain as different people in a way that they were *NOT* so regard you and your duplicate. You and your duplicate---created yesterday, say---would be SO SIMILAR I claim, that people would regard you as the same person. It seems that identical twins always do have slightly different personalities, and that a lot of the differences they exhibit were created during the nine months before birth. Of course, if you can't affect it, that's a reason for non-concern. But if you could, then, I contend, one intervenes to prevent one's duplicate from suffering for entirely *selfish* reasons. Stathis: It seems that we are just defining the term me differently. My definition is that if you stick a pin in a person and I feel it, then that person is me. If you stick a pin in the guy across the room who looks, talks, behaves etc. like me, *I* don't feel anything. Isn't this a rather basic, scientifically verifiable difference? You may also have something different in mind to me when using the term selfish. In evolutionary biology, animals sometimes engage in apparently self-sacrificing behaviour to help their kin, but in reality the behaviour is selfish, because in so acting the animal is propagating its own genes (which is basically all nature cares about). In this sense, you could argue that we should behave altruistically towards those who share our genes, and call this selfish. I don't accept this, generally, as an argument: just because it is nature's way doesn't mean it is right. But even if i did accept it, it *still* isn't the same when my copy gets stuck with a pin as when I get stuck with a pin. I might feel guilty about it, but I would prefer that he get stuck ten times rather than that I get stuck once. That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on an ethical basis or a purely selfish one) care more about a copy of ourselves getting hurt than a complete stranger? I have little doubt that I *would* rather a stranger get stuck than my copy, but only, I think, because I would have more empathy for my copy than for a stranger, in the same way that I would have more empathy for my mother getting stuck than I would for someone I don't know. Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any convincing argument for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after all, *me* (although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we were copied and started diverging. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
Hal Finney wrote: To apply Wei's method, first we need to get serious about what is an OM. We need a formal model and description of a particular OM. Consider, for example, someone's brain when he is having a particular experience. He is eating chocolate ice cream while listening to Beethoven's 5th symphony, on his 30th birthday. Imagine that we could scan his brain with advanced technology and record his neural activity. Imagine further that with the aid of an advanced brain model we are able to prune out the unnecessary information and distill this to the essence of the experience. We come up with a pattern that represents that observer moment. Any system which instantiates that pattern genuinely creates an experience of that observer moment. This pattern is something that can be specified, recorded and written down in some form. It probably involves a huge volume of data. Sorry for the delay in response, but eskimo started bouncing mail from my other smtp for some unknown reason. There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I suppose, for a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a thing as an essence of an experience? I'd suggest there is no such thing as an observer-moment. I'm happy with using the concept as a tag of sorts when discussing observer selection issues, but I think reifying it is likely a mistake, and goes considerably beyond Strong AI into a full Cartesian dualism. Is it generally accepted here on this list that a substrate-independent thing called an observer moment exists? Jonathan Colvin
RE: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark
Hal: To summarize, logic is not a property of universes. It is a tool that our minds use to understand the world, including possible universes. We may fail to think clearly or consistently or logically about what can and cannot exist, but that doesn't change the world out there. Rather than expressing the AUH as the theory that all logically possible universes exist, I would just say that all universes exist. And of course as we try to understand the nature of such a multiverse, we will attempt to be logically consistent in our reasoning. That's where logic comes in. But all universes exist is merely a tautology. To say anything meaningful, one is then faced with attempting to define what one means by universe, or exist. The concept of logically possible seems to me to be useful in this latter endeavor. Jonathan Colvin
RE: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark
Brent: I doubt that the concept of logically possible has any absolute meaning. It is relative to which axioms and predicates are assumed. That's rather the million-dollar question, isn't it? But isn't the multiverse limited in what axioms or predicates can be assumed? For instance, can't we assume that in no universe in Platonia can (P AND ~P) be an axiom or predicate? Not long ago the quantum weirdness of Bell's theorem, or special relativity would have been declared logically impossible. That declaration would simply have been mistaken. Is it logically possible that Hamlet doesn't kill Polonius? Certainly. I'm sure there are people named Hamlet who have not killed a person named Polonius. Is it logically possible that a surface be both red and green? If you are asking whether it is logically possibly that a surface that can reflect *only* light at a wavelength of 680 nm can reflect a wavelength of 510 nm, the answer would seem to be no. Jonathan Colvin
RE: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark
Stephen: Should we not expect Platonia to be Complete? I'd like to think that it should not be (by Godel?); or that it is not completely self-computable in finite meta-time. Or some such. But that's more of a faith than a theory. Jonathan Colvin Brent: I doubt that the concept of logically possible has any absolute meaning. It is relative to which axioms and predicates are assumed. That's rather the million-dollar question, isn't it? But isn't the multiverse limited in what axioms or predicates can be assumed? For instance, can't we assume that in no universe in Platonia can (P AND ~P) be an axiom or predicate? Not long ago the quantum weirdness of Bell's theorem, or special relativity would have been declared logically impossible. That declaration would simply have been mistaken. Is it logically possible that Hamlet doesn't kill Polonius? Certainly. I'm sure there are people named Hamlet who have not killed a person named Polonius. Is it logically possible that a surface be both red and green? If you are asking whether it is logically possibly that a surface that can reflect *only* light at a wavelength of 680 nm can reflect a wavelength of 510 nm, the answer would seem to be no. Jonathan Colvin
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Stathis: Now, I think you will agree (although Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this excellent understanding of the processes giving rise to human conscious experience, the aliens may still have absolutely no idea what the experience is actually like. Jonathan Colvin: No, I'd agree that they have no idea what the experience is like. But this is no more remarkable than the fact that allthough we may have an excellent understanding of photons, we can not travel at the speed of light, or that although we may have an excellent understanding of trees, yet we can not photosynthesize. Neither of these problems seem particularly hard. Bruno: But we can photosynthesize. And we can understand why we cannot travel at the speed of light. All this by using purely 3-person description of those phenomena in some theory. With consciousness, the range of the debate goes from non-existence to only-existing. The problem is that it seems that an entirely 3-person explanation of the brain-muscles relations evacuates any purpose for consciousness and the 1-person. That's not the case with photosynthesis. You can photosynthesize? I certainly can not (not being a tree). If I had photosynthetic pigments in my skin, I suppose I could; and if I had rubbery wings and sharp teeth I'd be a bat (if my aunt had wheels, she'd be a wagon). I still can not see (intellectually) the problem of consciousness. Consciousness /qualia, 1st person phenomena, etc, IMHO, being very poorly defined, and likely non-existing entities, are a precarious pillar to base any cosmology or metaphysics on. Observer is far superior, and lacks the taint of dualism. To borrow a page from Penrose, I see qualia in much the same light as a shadow. Everyone can agree what a shadow is, point to one, and talk about them. But a shadow is not a thing. The ancients made much ado about shadows, ascribing all sorts of metaphysical significance and whatnot to them. I think it is quite likely that the fuss about consciousness and qualia resurrects this old mistake. Shadows of the mind, indeed. Jonathan Colvin
RE: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark
Stathis: I don't know if you can make a sharp distinction between the really weird universes where observers never evolve and the slightly weird ones where talking white rabbits appear now and then. Consider these two parallel arguments using a version of the anthropic principle: (a) In the multiverse, those worlds which have physical laws and constants very different to what we are used to may greatly predominate. However, it is no surprise that we live in the world we do. For in those other worlds, conditions are such that stars and planets could never form, and so observers who are even remotely like us would never have evolved. The mere fact that we are having this discussion therefore necessitates that we live in a world where the physical laws and constants are very close to their present values, however unlikely such a world may at first seem. This is the anthropic principle at work. (b) In the multiverse, those worlds in which it is a frequent occurence that the laws of physics are temporarily suspended so that, for example, talking white rabbits materialise out of thin air, may greatly predominate. However, it is no surprise that we live in the orderly world that we do. For in those other worlds, although observers very much like us may evolve, they will certainly not spend their time puzzling over the curious absence of white rabbit type phenomena. The mere fact that we are having this discussion therefore necessitates that we live in a world where physical laws are never violated, however unlikely such a world may at first seem. This is the *extreme* anthropic principle at work. If there is something wrong with (b), why isn't there also something wrong with (a)? This is the problem of determining the appropriate class of observer we should count ourselves as being a random selection on. There might indeed be something wrong with (a); replace The mere fact that we are having *this* discussion with, The mere fact that we are having *a* discussion to obtain a dramatically different observer class. Your formulation of (a) (*this* discussion) essentially restricts us to being a random selection on the class of observers with access to internet and email, discoursing on the everything list. Replacing this with a broadens the class to include any intelligent entity capable of (and having) a discussion. The problem of determining the appropriate class seems a rather intractable one. Choosing too broad a class can lead to unpleasant consequences such as the doomsday argument; too narrow a class leads to (b). Mondays, wednesdays and fridays, I believe that my appropriate reference class can be only one; Jonathan Colvin in this particular branch of the MW, since I could not have been anyone else. Weekends, tuesdays and thursdays I believe I'm a random observer on the class of observers. Jonathan Colvin
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
discourse (ie. How are you feeling today? Bit of a pain in the Gulliver.) You appear to be trying to extend qualia into a category relevant to cosmology/science/Platonia, and it is this initial step that I don't follow (mixing together Popper's Worlds I and II). I agree self awareness is important for anthropic observer selection phenomena, but you appear to be positing a much more fundamental role for qualia. Mais je dois admettre que je ne commence pas a comprendre votre theorie. Jonathan Colvin ***
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Stathis: People certainly seem to take their consciousness seriously on this list! I've now managed to alienate both the consciousness doesn't really exist and the it exists and we can explain it factions. I did not mean that there is no explanation possible for consciousness. It is likely that in the course of time the neuronal mechanisms behind the phenomenon will be worked out and it will be possible to build intelligent, conscious machines. Imagine that advanced aliens have already achieved this through surreptitious study of humans over a number of decades. Their models of human brain function are so good that by running an emulation of one or more humans and their environment they can predict their behaviour better than the humans can themselves. Now, I think you will agree (although Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this excellent understanding of the processes giving rise to human conscious experience, the aliens may still have absolutely no idea what the experience is actually like. No, I'd agree that they have no idea what the experience is like. But this is no more remarkable than the fact that allthough we may have an excellent understanding of photons, we can not travel at the speed of light, or that although we may have an excellent understanding of trees, yet we can not photosynthesize. Neither of these problems seem particularly hard. Jonathan Colvin
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
[quoting Stathis] My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I became one with the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to go to such lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume, behaviour, or any other property, and in *this* consists the essential difference between 1st person and 3rd person experience. You can minimise it and say it doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't think you can deny it. I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): *an apple*. I don't think anyone would deny that there is a difference between A and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this essential difference does not seem to have anything in particular to do with qualia or experience. Jonathan Colvin Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing? My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that what it is like to be that thing is identical to being that thing. As Bruno points out, in 3rd person level (ie. the level where I am describing or simulating an apple), a description can not be a thing; but on the 1st person level (where a description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the thing, inside the simulation, as it were), then the description does include what it is like to be that thing. But include is not the correct word to use, since it subtly assumes a dualism (that the qualia exist somehow separate from the mere description of the thing); the description *just is* the thing. Jonathan
RE: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can bruise you?
Lee: No, the important claims that Bruno makes go far beyond. He attempts to derive physics from the theory of computation (i.e., recursive functions, effective computability, incompleteness, and unsolvability). His is also one set of the claims, hypotheses, and conjectures that attempt to reduce physics to a completely timeless abstract world. Julian Barbour, in The End of Time, gave, as you probably know, one of the most brilliant presentations from this perspective. Jonathan: Sure; but I was just addressing the observation by Bruno that a description of a ball can bruise you (if you are also a description). That observation is not unique to Bruno's Comp; it applies to any theory that accepts the premise of Strong AI. I'm astonished to hear this; I thought that strong AI referred merely to the claim that fully human or beyond intelligence might be achieved by automatic machinery even if the programs only push bits around one at a time. In other words, what distinguished the strong AI camp from the weak AI camp was that the latter believed that more is needed somehow or other: perhaps parallel processing; perhaps biological program instantiation; perhaps quantum gravity tubules or... something. No, the conventional meanings of strong vs. weak AI are merely: Weak AI: machines can be made to act *as if* they were intelligent (conscious, etc). Strong AI: machines that act intelligently have real, conscious minds (actually experience the world, qualia etc). A claim that a description of an object (a simulated billiard ball for instance) can bruise me (cause me pain etc) if I am a simulation, requires strong AI, such that my simulation is conscious. Otherwise, under weak AI, my simulation can only act *as if* it were bruised or in pain, since it is not actually conscious. As far as believing that a billiard-ball *machine* or a hydraulic machine might instantiate me (as a running program), I for one *do* believe that. So in my understanding of the terms, as I said above, then it follows that I myself am in the strong AI camp (ontologically). But Strong AI usually presumes substrate independance; so if you don't believe that a mechanical ping pong ball machine for instance could instantiate an intelligence, you would not be classed as in the Strong AI camp. But I (and I know I speak for others) don't think that I'm only a description; we believe that we must be processes running during some time interval on some kind of hardware in some physical reality. So we are as yet unmoved :-) by Bruno's descriptions. The usual reply is that this begs the question as to what a process is. If we accept the block universe, time is a 1st person phenomenon anyway, so how do differentiate between what is a description and what is a process? Jonathan Colvin
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Stathis: OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others) refer to as qualia, you refer to as the difference between a description of a thing and being the thing. I hate the word dualism as much as you do (because of the implication that we may end up philosophically in the 16th century if we yield to it), but haven't you just defined a very fundamental kind of dualism, in aknowledging this difference between a thing and its description? It seems to me, in retrospect, that our whole argument has been one over semantics. Well, that would be a novel application of dualism, I think. A description of a thing, and *a thing* seem to be two very different categories; dualism would usually imply one is talking about dualistic properties of the *same thing*. I'm still inclined to deny that qualia refers to anything. It is a mental fiction. Dennett (whom I greatly respect) goes to great lengths to avoid having impure thoughts about something being beyond empirical science or logic. David Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, 1996) accepts that it is actually simpler to admit that consciousness is just an irreducible part of physical existence. We accept that quarks, or bitstrings, or whatever are irreducible, so why is it any different to accept consciousness or what-it-is-like-to-be-something-as-distinct-from-a-description -of-something (which is more of a mouthful) on the same basis? The argument from Dennet (which I'm inclinced to agree with) would be that we can not accept what-is-it-likeness as an irreducible thing because there is no such thing as what is it likeness. Jonathan Colvin --Stathis Papaioannou [quoting Stathis] My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I became one with the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to go to such lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume, behaviour, or any other property, and in *this* consists the essential difference between 1st person and 3rd person experience. You can minimise it and say it doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't think you can deny it. I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): *an apple*. I don't think anyone would deny that there is a difference between A and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this essential difference does not seem to have anything in particular to do with qualia or experience. Jonathan Colvin Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing? My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that what it is like to be that thing is identical to being that thing. As Bruno points out, in 3rd person level (ie. the level where I am describing or simulating an apple), a description can not be a thing; but on the 1st person level (where a description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the thing, inside the simulation, as it were), then the description does include what it is like to be that thing. But include is not the correct word to use, since it subtly assumes a dualism (that the qualia exist somehow separate from the mere description of the thing); the description *just is* the thing. Jonathan _ MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/
RE: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can bruise you?
Lee writes: Jonathan: Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI; that a simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a real one, and would experience the same qualia. There's no special interface required here; the simulated mind and the simulated billiard ball are in the same world, ie. at the same level of simulation. As far as the simulated person is concerned, the billiard ball is real. Of course, the simulation can also contain a simulation of the billiard ball (2nd level simulation), which will equally be unable to bruise the simulated person, and so on ad infinitum. If we take Bostrom's simulation argument seriously, we all exist in some Nth level simulation, while our simulated billiard ball exists at the (N+1)th level. Now just to keep our bookkeeping accurate, Bruno Marchal's claims far exceed what you have written. snip No, the important claims that Bruno makes go far beyond. He attempts to derive physics from the theory of computation (i.e., recursive functions, effective computability, incompleteness, and unsolvability). His is also one set of the claims, hypotheses, and conjectures that attempt to reduce physics to a completely timeless abstract world. Julian Barbour, in The End of Time, gave, as you probably know, one of the most brilliant presentations from this perspective. Sure; but I was just addressing the observation by Bruno that a description of a ball can bruise you (if you are also a description). That observation is not unique to Bruno's Comp; it applies to any theory that accepts the premise of Strong AI. Jonathan
RE: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
Hi Jonathan, You say that if something and nothing are equivalent, then the big WHY question is rendered meaningless. But isn't the big WHY question equivalent to asking WHY does the integer series -100 to +100 exist? Even though the sum of the integer series is zero, that doesn't render the question meaningless. I don't think that's quite an equivalent question, because the answer is simply because it is necessarily true. I think that's a different observation (and question) than Pearce's free lunch (or observation that the sum of everything is equivalent to nothing). Jonathan Colvin Norman - Original Message - From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 10:20 PM Subject: RE: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST Norman wrote: Thanks for your identification of David Pearce - I see he was co-founder (with Nick Bostrom) of the World Transhumanist Association. I have a lot of respect for Bostrom's views. However, it's Pearce's viewpoint about WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST that I'm interested in. This viewpoint is expressed at http://www.hedweb.com/nihilism/nihilfil.htm His conclusion seems to be that everything in the multiverse adds up to zero, so there are no loose ends that need explaining. Even if true, this doesn't answer the WHY question, however. If you or others have opinions on WHY, I'd like to hear them. I wonder if your opinion will be that no opinion is possible? Pearce is a little tongue-in-cheek here, I think, but surely Pearce does answer the *big* why question (why is there something rather than nothing?). O is nothing, so if everything adds up to zero, something and nothing are equivalent, and the big why question is rendered meaningless. All other why questions (as in, why this rather than that?) are answered by the standard UE (ultimate ensemble), which Pearce seems to assume. Jonathan Colvin
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Stathis: I agree with Lee's and Jonathan's comments, except that I think there is something unusual about first person experience/ qualia/ consciousness in that there is an aspect that cannot be communicated unless you experience it (a blind man cannot know what it is like to see, no matter how much he learns about the process of vision). Let me use the analogy of billiard balls and Newtonian mechanics. Everything that billiard balls do by themselves and with each other can be fully explained by the laws of physics. Moreover, it can all be modelled by a computer program. But in addition, there is the state of being-a-billiard-ball, which is something very strange and cannot be communicated to non-billiard balls, because it makes absolutely no difference to what is observed about them. It is not clear if this aspect of billiard ball experience is duplicated by the computer program, precisely because it makes no observable difference: you have to be the simulated billiard ball to know. But is this state of being a billiard ball any different than simple existence? What in particular is unusual about first person qualia? We might simply say that a *description* of a billiard ball is not the same as *a billiard ball* (a description of a billiard ball can not bruise me like a real one can); in the same way, a description of a mind is not the same as a mind; but what is unusual about that? It is not strange to differentiate between a real object and a description of such, so I don't see that there is anything any more unusual about first person experience. Is it any stranger that a blind man can not see, than that a description of a billiard ball's properties (weight, diameter, colour etc) can not bruise me? Jonathan Colvin You don't need to postulate a special mechanism whereby mind interacts with matter. The laws of physics explain the workings of the brain, and conscious experience is just the strange, irreducible effect of this as seen from the inside. --Stathis Papaioannou Lee corbin wrote: Pratt's disdain follows from the obvious failures of other models. It does not take a logician or mathematician or philosopher of unbelievable IQ to see that the models of monism that have been advanced have a fatal flaw: the inability to prove the necessity of epiphenomena. Maybe Bruno's theory will solve this, I hold out hope that it does; but meanwhile, why can't we consider and debate alternatives that offer a view ranging explanations and unifying threads, such as Pratt's Chu space idea? I just have to say that I have utterly no sense that anything here needs explanation. I have to agree. Perhaps it is because I'm a Denett devotee, brainwashed into a full denial of qualia/dualism, but I've yet to see any coherent argument as to what there is anything about consciousness that needs explaining. The only importance I see for consciousness is its role in self-selection per Bostrom. Jonathan Colvin _ REALESTATE: biggest buy/rent/share listings http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au
RE: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
Norman: You say that Because it is necessarily true is the answer to Why does the integer series -100 to +100 exist? However, you seem to say that this is NOT the answer to Why does anything exist? In this latter case, you seem to say the question is meaningless because the sum of everything is equivalent to nothing. Quentin: I think it is meaningless because the question is Why is there something/anything instead of nothing ?. The answer as given by jonathan is that something/anything and nothing are the same... So if there are the same object, the question is meaningless. Exactly. I should add, I don't agree with Pearce's free lunch theory, because I don't see that it is particularly important or relevant that the sum of everything adds to zero (if indeed it does). Jonathan Colvin
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Stathis: Your post suggests to me a neat way to define what is special about first person experience: it is the gap in information between what can be known from a description of an object and what can be known from being the object itself. But how can being an object provide any extra information? I don't see that information or knowledge has much to do with it. How can being an apple provide any extra information about the apple? Obviously there is a difference between *an apple* and *a description of an apple*, in the same way there is a difference between *a person* and *a description of a person*, but the difference is one of physical existence, not information. Jonathan Colvin
RE: a description of you + a description of billiard ball can bruise you?
Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI; that a simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a real one, and would experience the same qualia. There's no special interface required here; the simulated mind and the simulated billiard ball are in the same world, ie. at the same level of simulation. As far as the simulated person is concerned, the billiard ball is real. Of course, the simulation can also contain a simulation of the billiard ball (2nd level simulation), which will equally be unable to bruise the simulated person, and so on ad infinitum. If we take Bostrom's simulation argument seriously, we all exist in some Nth level simulation, while our simulated billiard ball exists at the (N+1)th level. Jonathan Colvin Stephen: Your claim reminds me of the scene in the movie Matrix: Reloaded where Neo deactivates some Sentinels all the while believing that he is Unplugged. This leads to speculations about matrix in a matrix, etc. http://www.thematrix101.com/reloaded/meaning.php#mwam There is still one question that needs to be answered: what is it that gives rise to the differentiation necessary for one description to bruise (or cause any kind of change) in another description if we disallow for some thing that acts as an interface between the two. What forms the interface in your theory? http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0001/0001064.pdf Stephen - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2005 5:56 AM Subject: Re: What do you lose if you simply accept... Le 17-mai-05, à 09:56, Jonathan Colvin a écrit : Is it any stranger that a blind man can not see, than that a description of a billiard ball's properties (weight, diameter, colour etc) can not bruise me? It is different with comp. because a description of you + a description of billiard ball, done at some right level, can bruise you. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST
Norman wrote: Thanks for your identification of David Pearce - I see he was co-founder (with Nick Bostrom) of the World Transhumanist Association. I have a lot of respect for Bostrom's views. However, it's Pearce's viewpoint about WHY DOES ANYTHING EXIST that I'm interested in. This viewpoint is expressed at http://www.hedweb.com/nihilism/nihilfil.htm His conclusion seems to be that everything in the multiverse adds up to zero, so there are no loose ends that need explaining. Even if true, this doesn't answer the WHY question, however. If you or others have opinions on WHY, I'd like to hear them. I wonder if your opinion will be that no opinion is possible? Pearce is a little tongue-in-cheek here, I think, but surely Pearce does answer the *big* why question (why is there something rather than nothing?). O is nothing, so if everything adds up to zero, something and nothing are equivalent, and the big why question is rendered meaningless. All other why questions (as in, why this rather than that?) are answered by the standard UE (ultimate ensemble), which Pearce seems to assume. Jonathan Colvin
RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Lee corbin wrote: Pratt's disdain follows from the obvious failures of other models. It does not take a logician or mathematician or philosopher of unbelievable IQ to see that the models of monism that have been advanced have a fatal flaw: the inability to prove the necessity of epiphenomena. Maybe Bruno's theory will solve this, I hold out hope that it does; but meanwhile, why can't we consider and debate alternatives that offer a view ranging explanations and unifying threads, such as Pratt's Chu space idea? I just have to say that I have utterly no sense that anything here needs explanation. I have to agree. Perhaps it is because I'm a Denett devotee, brainwashed into a full denial of qualia/dualism, but I've yet to see any coherent argument as to what there is anything about consciousness that needs explaining. The only importance I see for consciousness is its role in self-selection per Bostrom. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes: That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a universe tunnels out of a black hole that just randomly happens to contain your precise brain state at that moment, and for all of future eternity. But the majority of these random universes will be precisely that; random. In most cases you will then find that your immortal experience is of a purely random universe, which is likely a good definition of hell. But it's not all that unlikely that someone in the world, unbeknownst to you, has invented a cure; whereas for a universe with your exact mind in it to be created purely de novo is astronomically unlikely. Look at the number of atoms in your brain, 10^25 or some such, and imagine how many arrangments there are of those atoms that aren't you, compared to the relative few which are you. The odds against that happening by chance are beyond comprehension. Whereas the odds of some lucky accident saving you as you are about to die are more like lottery-winner long, like one in a billion, not astronomically long, like one in a googleplex. I'd say considerably more than one in a billion for a lifespan of even a thousand years. But we are talking *immortality* here (surviving even the heat death of our local universe). At that point the odds must be getting googleplexian... Especially if you accept that it is possible in principle for medicine to give us an unlimited healthy lifespan, then all you really need to do is to live in a universe where that medical technology is discovered, and then avoid accidents. Neither one seems all that improbable from the perspective of people living in our circumstances today. It's harder to see how a cave man could look forward to a long life span. I thought QTI applied to *any* observer, cave men included. I suppose even a cave man can look forward to long life if a UFO lands and gifts him the technology for life extension. I should add that I don't believe in QTI, I don't believe that we are guaranteed to experience such outcomes. I prefer the observer-moment concept in which we are more likely to experience observer-moments where we are young and living within a normal lifespan than ones where we are at a very advanced age due to miraculous luck. Agreed. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Picking up a thread from a little while ago: Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden. Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only illegal according to the rules of chess, but the point of the all logically possible worlds exist idea is not just that all possible worlds consistent with a given set of rules (such as our universe's laws of physics) exist, but that all possible worlds consistent with all logically possible *rules* exist. So the only configurations that would be forbidden would be logically impossible ones like square A4 both does and does not contain a pawn. Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we differentiate between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, and those that are purely random? I think it is suggested that any non-contradictory universe (or world-history) has a finite chance of appearing by chance (randomly tunneling out of a black hole for instance). But can we call a purely random universe rule based? What is the rule? Randomness is non rule-based by definition, so the idea of a rule-based random universe seems a contradiction. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
I think you meant algorithmically *in*compressible. The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where we become immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based universes such as we appear to live in, but a different class of stochastic random ones (which require very unlikely strings of random coincidences to instantiate). The majority of such universes, being essentially random, are probably not very pleasant places to live. Jonathan Colvin Jonathan Colvin writes: Pondering on this, it raises an interesting question. Can we differentiate between worlds that are (or appear to be) rule-based, and those that are purely random? The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has a short program that determines its evolution, or creates its state. A random universe has no program much smaller than itself which can encode its information. Hal Finney
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
The usual approach is that a system which is algorithmically compressible is defined as random. A rule-based universe has a short program that determines its evolution, or creates its state. A random universe has no program much smaller than itself which can encode its information. Hal Finney Jonathan Colvin replies: I think you meant algorithmically *in*compressible. Yes, I did. The relevance was, I was thinking that those universes where we become immortal under MWI are not the conventional rule-based universes such as we appear to live in, but a different class of stochastic random ones (which require very unlikely strings of random coincidences to instantiate). The majority of such universes, being essentially random, are probably not very pleasant places to live. You could look at it from the point of view of observer-moments. Among all observer-moments which remember your present situation and which also remember very long lifetimes, which ones have the greatest measure? It should be those which have the simplest explanations possible. As time goes on, the explanations will presumably have to be more and more complex, but it doesn't necessarily have to be extreme. It could just be, great scientist invents immortality in the year 2006. Then, next year, it will be great scientist invents immortality in the year 2007, etc. Once you're lying on your death bed and each breath could be your last, it starts to get a little more difficult. Maybe it will be like those movies where the condemned man is in the death chamber and they are about to throw the switch, as the lawyer rushes to the prison with news from the governor of a last-minute pardon. You'll be taking your last breath, and someone will rush in with a miraculous cure that was just discovered, or some such. That's putting it mildly. I was thinking that it is more likely that a universe tunnels out of a black hole that just randomly happens to contain your precise brain state at that moment, and for all of future eternity. But the majority of these random universes will be precisely that; random. In most cases you will then find that your immortal experience is of a purely random universe, which is likely a good definition of hell. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Implications of MWI
Mark Fancey writes: Did accepting and understanding the MWI drastically alter your philosophical worldview? If so, how? Hal: I don't know if I would describe it as a drastic alteration, but I do tend to think of my actions as provoking a continuum of results rather than a single result. snip Another way it has influenced my thinking is about future indeterminacy. I now believe, for example, that there is no meaning to certain questions that people ask about future conditions. For example, who will be the next president? I don't think this question is meaningful. Many people will be the next president. My consciousness spans multiple universes where different people will be president. But there are likely many many more universes where Colin Powell is the next president than there are where my 6 year old neice is. So it is a meaningful question. Any question like this which presupposes only one future has a similar problem. Another one we often hear is, are we in a speculative bubble in real estate (or stocks, or whatever). That's a meaningless question. Bubbles can only be defined retrospectively. If prices fall, then we were in a bubble; if they don't, then we weren't. But both futures exist. I live in worlds where we are in a bubble and worlds where we are not in a bubble. The question has no answer. But again we can make a probabilistic argument that there are many more universes where house prices continue climbing than there are where all houses become worthless tomorrow. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Implications of MWI
Norman wrote: If it is true that In infinite time and infinite space, whatever can happen, must happen, not only once but an infinite number of times, then what does probability mean? In your example below, there must be an infinity of worlds where Colin Powell is president and an infinity of worlds where your 6-year old niece is president. Are you saying that the Colin Powell infinity is bigger than the 6-year old niece infinity? Yes. Or; It takes an infinite amount time for everything to happen an infinite number of times. Therefore there is no time T where anything has happened an infinite number of times (I'm assuming T= infinity has no real meaning in any world). At any *particular* time T (at which we or anyone exists), nothing will have happened an infinite number of times; thus at any time T there will be far more universes where Colin Powell is president than my six year old neice. Jonathan Colvin Mark Fancey writes: Did accepting and understanding the MWI drastically alter your philosophical worldview? If so, how? Hal: I don't know if I would describe it as a drastic alteration, but I do tend to think of my actions as provoking a continuum of results rather than a single result. snip Another way it has influenced my thinking is about future indeterminacy. I now believe, for example, that there is no meaning to certain questions that people ask about future conditions. For example, who will be the next president? I don't think this question is meaningful. Many people will be the next president. My consciousness spans multiple universes where different people will be president. But there are likely many many more universes where Colin Powell is the next president than there are where my 6 year old neice is. So it is a meaningful question. Any question like this which presupposes only one future has a similar problem. Another one we often hear is, are we in a speculative bubble in real estate (or stocks, or whatever). That's a meaningless question. Bubbles can only be defined retrospectively. If prices fall, then we were in a bubble; if they don't, then we weren't. But both futures exist. I live in worlds where we are in a bubble and worlds where we are not in a bubble. The question has no answer. But again we can make a probabilistic argument that there are many more universes where house prices continue climbing than there are where all houses become worthless tomorrow.
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin wrote: Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds (maximal consistent set of propositions) of a FS are not computable; that even given infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a complete world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the case that given infinite time, eveything that can happen must happen. I must admit this is not my area of expertise; but it seems to me that the only other option of defining a world (identifying it with the FS itself) will, by Godel's incompleteness theorem, necessitate that there exist unprovable true propositions of world; the world will be incomplete, so again, not everything that can happen will happen. Jesse: Godel's incompleteness theorem only applies in cases where the statements have a meaning in terms of our mathematical model of arithmetic (see my comments at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4584.html ). If your statements are something like descriptions of the state of a cellular automaton, then I don't see them having any kind of external meaning in terms of describing arithmetical truths, so there's no sense in which there would be unprovable but true statements. I was asking the question in the context of Tegmark's UE (by which all and only structures that exist mathematically exist physically), and whether it has relevance to the existence of all possible things. Frankly I'm not sure that Godel is relevant in that context; but then I'm not sure that it's irrelevant either. In this context statements like the descriptions of the states of cellular automata *can* be seen as describing arithmetical truths. No? Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Hal wrote: Consider a 2-D cellular automaton world like Conway's Life. Every cell is either occupied or unoccupied. It has one of two states. Now let us consider such a world in which one cell holds much more than one bit of information. Suppose it holds a million bits. This one cell is tiny like an electron; yet it holds a great deal of information, like an omniscient entity. This description is logically contradictory. A system with only two states cannot hold a million bits of information. That is an elementary theorem of mathematical information theory. The problem is not specific to a world. The problem is with the concept that a two state system can hold a million bits. That concept is inherently contradictory. That makes it meaningless. Trying to apply it to a world or to anything else is going to produce meaningless results. Rather than say that such a world cannot exist because it is logically contradictory, it makes more sense to say that logically contradictory descriptions fail to describe worlds, because they fail to describe anything in a meaningful way. In what way are those two statements not equivalent? They both seem to make the same point, which is that logically contradictory descriptions do not refer. Jonathan
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Bruno:In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world. JC: Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how can they be said to be instantiated? If we extend this to Tegmark, this implies that even given infinite time, a world can never be complete (fully generated). Which implies that even given infinite time, not everything that *can* happen *will* happen; which was my argument to begin with. Jonathan, I have seen it stated that, given infinite time, everything that CAN happen MUST happen, not only once but uncountable times. You argue that this is incorrect. Can you show why it is incorrect? Thanks, Norman Samish Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds (maximal consistent set of propositions) of a FS are not computable; that even given infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a complete world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the case that given infinite time, eveything that can happen must happen. I must admit this is not my area of expertise; but it seems to me that the only other option of defining a world (identifying it with the FS itself) will, by Godel's incompleteness theorem, necessitate that there exist unprovable true propositions of world; the world will be incomplete, so again, not everything that can happen will happen. Bruno? Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
JC: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden. Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only illegal according to the rules of chess, but the point of the all logically possible worlds exist idea is not just that all possible worlds consistent with a given set of rules (such as our universe's laws of physics) exist, but that all possible worlds consistent with all logically possible *rules* exist. So the only configurations that would be forbidden would be logically impossible ones like square A4 both does and does not contain a pawn. Sure. But chess was just an analogy using one particular FS (part of set theory). But suppose I posit a world that consists of an arbitrary sequence of propositions XYZ. Is it necessarily the case that for *any* arbitrary set of propositions, we can identify a FS that these propositions of theories of? When does a formal system stop being formal, and become simply arbitrary? Here I am out of my depth. Anyone? Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Hal Ruhl wrote: I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run concurrently. If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in that branch. Stathis: I don't see why this should be so. Your consciousness should be able to jump between branches, between physical locations and across long periods of time. I have not made up my mind whether it can also jump backwards in time, i.e. if a moment can be experienced as being in your future when in the real world it is actually implemented in the past. That is, presumably, assuming that the Principle of Indifference is correct. I've got an issue with the PofI though; the problem of identity, or, how do we decide whether a consciousness in a different branch or time is mine? Is all that is required is that an identical brain-state exist elsewhere or elsewhen? Then, as you've noted, there is an issue of sequencing. Why assume a jump must always be forward in time? With no physical continuity between brain-states, our consciousness might get stuck in an endless loop: ..WXYZXYZXYZ... etc. I suppose that would be an immortality of sorts, albeit rather a hellish one; but I suppose we wouldn't realize we were stuck. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible (inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have property X and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent for there to exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I consist of a single elctron. Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible). Such a world may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all instantiated programs. Omniscience is a problematic concept; one can argue that a single electron does indeed have all possible knowledge encoded in one bit. But leaving that aside, why do you say that it is logically impossible for an electron to be intelligent? To show that it is *logically* impossible you would have to show that it entails a logical or mathematical contradiction, such as 2+2=5. My point is not that it *is* logically impossible, but that it *may be*. It is obvious that 2+2=5 is a mathematical contradiction. But if we take Tegmark's radical platonism seriously, then such contradictions must scale up into the categories of things and worlds. All possible things exist; and all impossible things do not. How do we decide whether an omniscient electron is a possible thing? It certainly does not appear to be; and the point is that it may *in fact* be an impossible thing. It is straightforward to show that 2+2=5 is contradictory under number theory. It is obviously not so straightforward to show that an omniscient electron is equally a-priori contradictory. It is not even obvious that an omniscient electron is in the same category of propositions as 2+2=5. But I'd argue that if we take Tegmark seriously, then it should be. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't there a problem? If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal systems (as in Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie. worlds that are never instantiated). This seems in direct contradiction to the actual existence of everything conveivable, does it not? Bruno: Are you sure Tegmark identify worlds with propositions of FS? Perhaps I should have said, to be precise, If we consider worlds to consist of the sets of consistent propositions of formal systems. Just being lazy. I'm not aware that anyone else has yet identified worlds with the propositions of FS, but I am identifying them as such. It seems reasonable, since the Ultimate Ensemble is simply the set of all formal systems. Anyway, what logicians (and modal logicians in particular) are used to do is to identify worlds with maximal consistent sets of propositions (or sentences). Then you can extract from Godel that any FS can be instantiated in alternative worlds. For example if you take a typical FS like Peano Arithmetic, the proposition that PA is consistent is undecidable. This means that there is at least two maximal consistent sets of propositions extending the set of theorems of PA: one with the proposition that PA is consistent and one with the proposition that PA is inconsistent. In that sense the non provable propositions are instantiated in worlds. In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world. Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how can they be said to be instantiated? If we extend this to Tegmark, this implies that even given infinite time, a world can never be complete (fully generated). Which implies that even given infinite time, not everything that *can* happen *will* happen; which was my argument to begin with. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin wrote: Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible (inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have property X and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent for there to exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I consist of a single elctron. Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible). Such a world may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all instantiated programs. Omniscience is a problematic concept; one can argue that a single electron does indeed have all possible knowledge encoded in one bit. But leaving that aside, why do you say that it is logically impossible for an electron to be intelligent? To show that it is *logically* impossible you would have to show that it entails a logical or mathematical contradiction, such as 2+2=5. My point is not that it *is* logically impossible, but that it *may be*. It is obvious that 2+2=5 is a mathematical contradiction. But if we take Tegmark's radical platonism seriously, then such contradictions must scale up into the categories of things and worlds. All possible things exist; and all impossible things do not. How do we decide whether an omniscient electron is a possible thing? It certainly does not appear to be; and the point is that it may *in fact* be an impossible thing. It is straightforward to show that 2+2=5 is contradictory under number theory. It is obviously not so straightforward to show that an omniscient electron is equally a-priori contradictory. It is not even obvious that an omniscient electron is in the same category of propositions as 2+2=5. But I'd argue that if we take Tegmark seriously, then it should be. Jonathan Colvin Stathis: OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a priori contradictory? That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden. That's why I can't consistently predict what tomorrow's lottery numbers will be. So if I could answer your question, I'd probably be out buying lottery tickets right now :). Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis: OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a priori contradictory? Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden. That's why I can't consistently predict what tomorrow's lottery numbers will be. So if I could answer your question, I'd probably be out buying lottery tickets right now :). To elaborate, even something as simple as chess rapidly becomes too complex to answer your question. I can show you a mid-game chess position, and in general it will be unfeasible (even with all the computers in the world) for you to answer the question is this position a-priori contradictory with the theorem of chess. This is because there at are 10sup120 possible chess games. If it is that hard to answer the question about a system as simple as chess, it becomes easier to see why it is so hard to answer such a question about our world. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. Everything that can happen does happen is not synonymous with everything we can imagine happening does happen. Worlds where we live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. Jonathan Colvin Stathis: I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5) Isn't that a contradictory statement? It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5 AND there are lots of worlds where in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5. , but how is it logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more common than the ones where Hell freezes over. I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically possible. Here's a (limited) analogy. If I show you are particular mid-game chess position, with a certain arrangement of pieces on the board, it is generally not possible to tell whether the position is a logically possible chess game (ie. corresponds to a legal chess position) without knowing the entire history of the game up to that point. There are certainly particular arrangements of pieces that it is impossible to reach given the axiomatic starting positions and the rules of chess. It is equally possible, I would suggest, that there *might* be certain arrangements of matter that will not be reachable in *any* formal system; universally undecidable propositions, to use a Godelian term. My pink buny suit universe might be one such. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin wrote: While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. Everything that can happen does happen is not synonymous with everything we can imagine happening does happen. Worlds where we live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. Jonathan Colvin Stathis: I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5) Isn't that a contradictory statement? It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5 AND there are lots of worlds where in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5. Yes, it is contradictory as written. What I should have said was that 2+2= (whatever it actually is) independently of time and space, but while it is not logically possible for this sum to amount to anything else in any world, it is possible that one or more sentient beings in some world are systematically deluded about the value of the sum. , but how is it logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more common than the ones where Hell freezes over. I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically possible. Here's a (limited) analogy. If I show you are particular mid-game chess position, with a certain arrangement of pieces on the board, it is generally not possible to tell whether the position is a logically possible chess game (ie. corresponds to a legal chess position) without knowing the entire history of the game up to that point. There are certainly particular arrangements of pieces that it is impossible to reach given the axiomatic starting positions and the rules of chess. It is equally possible, I would suggest, that there *might* be certain arrangements of matter that will not be reachable in *any* formal system; universally undecidable propositions, to use a Godelian term. My pink buny suit universe might be one such. Jonathan Colvin OK, I agree with this in principle. However, I can't think of any such logically impossible worlds. With quantum tunneling, matter popping into existence from the vacuum, and so on, it really does look like everything conceivable is possible. At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't there a problem? If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal systems (as in Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie. worlds that are never instantiated). This seems in direct contradiction to the actual existence of everything conveivable, does it not? Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes: While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. Everything that can happen does happen is not synonymous with everything we can imagine happening does happen. Worlds where we live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. Jonathan Colvin I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5), but how is it logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more common than the ones where Hell freezes over. --Stathis Papaioannou Brent: But what does logically possible mean? Logic is just some rules to prevent us from contradicting ourselves. Is it logically possible that, Quadruplicity preens cantatas.? Is it logically possible that the same object be both red and green? Once you get beyond direct contradiction (e.g. Quadruplicity does *not* preen cantatas) you have to invoke semantics and some kind of nomologically possible. Then, so far as anyone knows, we're back to physically possible and even that is ill defined. The whole concept of possible, beyond narrowly defined circumstances, is so ambiguous as to be worthless. I think we're assuming Tegmark's UI here, so physically possible and logically possible means the same thing. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
snip Stathias: Yes, everything that can happen, does happen, somewhere in the multiverse. There will certainly be a world where you get smarter and smarter, and ultimately you know everything. But at any point in the development of the multiverse, you are (1) certain to find yourself alive, and (2) most likely to find yourself alive in branches with higher measure. In the near future, this means you will not experience life-threatening illnesses or accidents. In the intermediate future, it probably means you will be living in times when anti-ageing technology or mind uploading becomes available. In the far future, you may survive as the result of some very bizarre coincidences, but these will still be the least unlikely of the possible bizarre coincidences. If you can think of a way in which becoming smarter and smarter is the most likely / least unlikely method for your long term survival, then perhaps this is something you can look forward to. While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. Everything that can happen does happen is not synonymous with everything we can imagine happening does happen. Worlds where we live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Free Will Theorem
Norman Samish wrote: I have somewhat arbitrarily defined free will as voluntary actions that are both self-determined by a Self-Aware Object, and are not predictable. My reasoning is that if something is completely predictable, then there is no option for change, hence no free will. But this illustrates the problem. Randomness is not an option, or will. Randomness is simply randomness. What is doing the opting? To preserve an option for change, you must appeal to a ghost in the machine (dualism); otherwise you have preserved the freedom, but at the cost of loosing the will. We are then merely dice making random actions, with the *illusion* of will. How is this superior to determinism? On this issue, Jonathan Colvin apparently disagrees, since he states that There is no contradiction between determinism / predictability and free will, so long as free will is viewed as self-determinism. But free will would be a meaningless concept in a deterministic universe. If the future were completely predictable then how could there be free will? Everything would be pre-ordained. Everything would indeed be pre-ordained. But why would this make our will not free? What does free mean, in this context? I don't think free in this sense means simply non-deterministic, or random. I consider myself a free man, as opposed to a prisoner. But the definition of a free man is not someone who acts randomly; it is someone free from *external coercion* or imprisonment. Likewise, our will is free if it is free from *external* coercion. It is a fallacy to believe that *internal* (self) determinism is contrary to free will, for it makes no sense that one could coerce one's self. Equating freedom with non-determinism is, IMHO, committing a category error. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Free Will Theorem
Norman Samish wrote: If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He says, the only relevant question as to whether our will is free is whether our conscious minds (our selves) determine our actions. But what about the sufferers of schizophrenia who Stathis Papaioannou referred to? They exercise self-determination, and their mental state is such that their actions, at least in some cases, are completely predictable. Do they have free will? I don't see that the actions of schizophrenia patients are any more predicatable than yours or mine. In fact, people suffering from this disease are often *less* predictable (which is why schizophrenia can sometimes be dangerous). To the extent that their actions are controlled by their conscious minds, they have free will. If they feel they are being forced to act contrary to their will (speculatively, perhaps by *random* excitation of parts of their brain) I would suggest that they do *not* have free will in such cases, because their actions are not willed by their conscious minds. In this case randomness is contrary to free will, illustrating why basing free will on unpredictability is a fallacy. Another example might be a self-aware computer of the future that would be programmed to have predictable actions as well as self-determination. Would it have free will? Yes. Although what do you mean by predictable? Its actions might be predictable only insofar as an identical program subjected to identical stimulus would give identical actions (its actions might be predictable but computationally irreducible). In both cases, the actions of the Self-Aware Organism are predictable, hence their will is not free. They are bound by their destiny. I don't see how mere predictability is incompatible with free will. Your actions too are predictable. If I set you in the middle of a highway with a large bus heading for you, I predict you will move out of the way, unless you are suicidal. Does that mean *you* do not have free will? To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely predictable. Why not? Jonathan Colvin
Re: Free Will Theorem
Norman Samish wrote: If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He says, the only relevant question as to whether our will is free is whether our conscious minds (our selves) determine our actions. But what about the sufferers of schizophrenia who Stathis Papaioannou referred to? They exercise self-determination, and their mental state is such that their actions, at least in some cases, are completely predictable. Do they have free will? I don't see that the actions of schizophrenia patients are any more predicatable than yours or mine. In fact, people suffering from this disease are often *less* predictable (which is why schizophrenia can sometimes be dangerous). To the extent that their actions are controlled by their conscious minds, they have free will. If they feel they are being forced to act contrary to their will (speculatively, perhaps by *random* excitation of parts of their brain), I would suggest that they do *not* have free will in such cases, because their actions are not willed by their conscious minds. In this case randomness is contrary to free will, illustrating why basing free will on unpredictability is a fallacy. Another example might be a self-aware computer of the future that would be programmed to have predictable actions as well as self-determination. Would it have free will? Yes. Although what do you mean by predictable? Its actions might be predictable only insofar as an identical program subjected to identical stimulus would give identical actions (its actions might be predictable / deterministic but computationally irreducible). In both cases, the actions of the Self-Aware Organism are predictable, hence their will is not free. They are bound by their destiny. I don't see how mere predictability is incompatible with free will. Your actions too are predictable. If I set you in the middle of a highway with a large bus heading for you, I predict you will move out of the way, unless you are suicidal. Does that mean *you* do not have free will? To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely predictable. Why not? There is no contradiction between determinism / predictability and free will, so long as free will is viewed as self-determinism. Jonathan Colvin
RE: Free Will Theorem
Apologies for double-posting. My dial-up account is rather unreliable. Jonathan Colvin Norman Samish wrote: If free will simply means self-determination then Jonathan is right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He says, the only relevant question as to whether our will is free is whether our conscious minds (our selves) determine our actions. But what about the sufferers of schizophrenia who Stathis Papaioannou referred to? They exercise self-determination, and their mental state is such that their actions, at least in some cases, are completely predictable. Do they have free will? JC: I don't see that the actions of schizophrenia patients are any more predicatable than yours or mine. In fact, people suffering from this disease are often *less* predictable (which is why schizophrenia can sometimes be dangerous). To snip
RE: Free Will Theorem
This discussion is exhibiting the usual confusion about what free will means. The concept itself is incoherent as generally used (taken as meaning my actions are not determined). But then in this case they must be merely random (which is hardly an improvement), or we require recourse to a Descartian immaterial dualism, which merely pushes the problem back one level. The only sensible meaning of free will is *self-determination*. Once looked at in this manner, quantum indeterminacy is irrelevant. Our actions are determined by the state of our minds. Whether these states are random, chaotically deterministic, or predictably deterministic is irrelevant; the only relevant question as to whether our will is free is whether our conscious minds (our selves) determine our actions. In most circumstances, the answer is surely yes, and so we have self-determination and hence free will. Sleepwalking, reflexes, etc. are examples of actions that are not consciously self-determined, and so are not examples of free will. Jonathan Colvin ** Norman Samish writes: The answer to Stat[h]is' question seems straightforward. Given quantum indeterminacy, thought processes cannot be predictable. Therefore, genuine free will exists. ...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly I have no control over? Norman Samish
Joining post: Jonathan Colvin
Hello... I am subscribing to this list, and as requested by the list-creator, here is a brief introduction of moi-meme. I found this list while Google x-referencing doomsday argument x reference class. I am interested in metaphysika such as the DDA, MWI, Simulation Argument, Anthropic Principle, and most other interesting philosci issues (Barrow/Tipler, Bostrom, Dennet, Everett, Wolfram etc.) My background is Physics and Philosophy bachelors (U of Toronto), followed by a stint as a technical writer for Atomic Energy of Canada, then for various Internet/Tech entities, finally out of the tech field completely and driving a sailboat for a living in Galiano Island, British Columbia. Current bugbears include N.B.'s Simulation Argument and, as noted above, the DDA. Cheers, Jonathan Colvin
