Le 13-août-06, à 12:57, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
>
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer
is
running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the
UDA
shows why. The answer is:
the co
Bruno Marchal writes:
> >> I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is
> >> running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the
> >> UDA
> >> shows why. The answer is:
> >> the computer which is running are the relative universal number which
> >> e
Russell Standish writes:
> Precisely my point!
>
> On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
> > > difference, or only a
> > > small amount of difference to the mea
Russell Standish writes:
> Precisely my point!
>
> On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > > By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
> > > difference, or only a
> > > small amount of difference to the mea
Le 10-août-06, à 14:16, Stathis Papaioannou wrote :
>> Bruno: I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for
>> example, and it
>> is the reason why we can put a measure on it. All computations exist
>> (this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at
>> least
>> cou
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
> >>> ...a controlled
> >>> experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
> >>> everything else
> >>> the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in
> >>> perfect
> >>> lockstep.
> >>
> >>
> >> I think that the idea that a lower
WC writes:
> >Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level,
> >but rather involves making a "close enough" copy. It is obvious, I think,
> >that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how
> >good the copy of a person would have to be (what
Le 08-août-06, à 15:54, W. C. a écrit :
>
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>>
>> ...
>> I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I
>> find it
>> somehow ambiguous.
>> Let me comment anyway.
>> Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will
>> not be
>> possibl
Precisely my point!
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
> > difference, or only a
> > small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
>
> You can't "make
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
> difference, or only a
> small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
You can't "make a difference" in Platonia. There is no time there,
no change, and no causality.
--~--~---
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >
> > Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
> >
> >>> ...a controlled
> >>> experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
> >>> everything else
> >>> the same, such as having an AI running on several com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have
> empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that "physical reality" is the
> result of interfering computable waves.
Quantum weirdness is entirely compatible with
materialism-contingency-empiricism.
Schrodi
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >>
> >> Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like
> >> observing
> >> your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an
> >> electron.
> >
> > Could you say more about this? If y
W. C. wrote:
> Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level exists.
> If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my life),
> I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? the
> origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.)
Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>> Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like
>> observing
>> your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an
>> electron.
>
> Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more
>
>From: Bruno Marchal
>
>...
>I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I find it
>somehow ambiguous.
>Let me comment anyway.
>Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will not be
>possible in our life time (except for those who will succeed in some lu
Russell Standish writes:
> > Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical
> > computers (that is, what
> > we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be)
> > has almost twice
> > the measure as it would have if it were running on one comput
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 01:11:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical
> computers (that is, what
> we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be)
> has almost twice
> the measure as it would h
Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
>
>>> ...a controlled
>>> experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
>>> everything else
>>> the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in
>>> perfect
>>> lockstep.
>
Le 08-août-06, à 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
> But I still can't see that ""matter" is the result of a sum on an
> infinity
> of interfering computations".
> Can you tell me why?
My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have
empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that "physi
Le 08-août-06, à 05:49, W. C. a écrit :
>
>> From: Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>> ...
>> Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum
>> level,
>> but rather involves making a "close enough" copy. It is obvious, I
>> think,
>> that this is theoretically possible, but it is not
Le 08-août-06, à 10:10, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
>
> Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
>> Can you tell me why?
>
> Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell
> you.
>
> If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go
> continue polluti
Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
> Can you tell me why?
Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell you.
If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go
continue polluting the mailing list.
Quentin
--~--~-~--~~
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 07-août-06, à 15:52, W. C. a écrit :
>
> >
> >> From: Bruno Marchal
> >> ...
> >> Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that
> >> you
> >> survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will
> >> simulate
> >> not only that leve
>From: W. C.
>
> >From: Bruno Marchal
> >...
> >Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing
> >your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an
> >electron.
> >...
>
>Any microscope (optical or electron type)? What's the min. magnification &
>resol
>From: Stathis Papaioannou
>
>...
>Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level,
>but rather involves making a "close enough" copy. It is obvious, I think,
>that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how
>good the copy of a person would ha
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
> > ...a controlled
> > experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
> > everything else
> > the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect
> > lockstep.
>
>
> I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appe
Russell Standish:
> On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in
> > parallel,
> > you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective
> > time
> > period, so maybe this
>From: Bruno Marchal
>...
>Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing
>your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the "path" of an
>electron.
>...
Any microscope (optical or electron type)? What's the min. magnification &
resolution to see it?
I need to fin
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Of course those physicist would believe in the wave collapse will have
> more reason than Everett followers to swallow what I say.
Not much more. Physical MWI is a materialist-contingent-empiricst
theory
and therefore just as much opposed to your
idealist-necessitarian-ra
Le 07-août-06, à 15:52, W. C. a écrit :
>
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>> ...
>> Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that
>> you
>> survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will
>> simulate
>> not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the
>From: Bruno Marchal
>...
>Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that you
>survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will simulate
>not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the following
>prediction: if you look at yourself or at you ne
Le 07-août-06, à 01:44, W. C. a écrit :
>
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>> ...
>> But it is easy to explain that this is already a "simple" consequence
>> of
>> comp. Any piece of "matter" is the result of a sum on an infinity of
>> interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be
>>
> would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries
>>> and millenia
>>> would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age
>>> and our
>>> measure continuously drops.
>>>
>>> I actually believe that a psychologica
>From: Bruno Marchal
>...
>But it is easy to explain that this is already a "simple" consequence of
>comp. Any piece of "matter" is the result of a sum on an infinity of
>interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be
>"clonable" without cloning the whole UD, but this woul
On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in
> parallel,
> you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective
> time
> period, so maybe this "stretches out" the time perio
ical explanation for this phenomenon is
> > more
> > likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you are a
> > young child)
> > but it's an interesting idea.
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> >
> > --
> Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 19:17:21 +1000
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
>
>
> This is one of those truly cracked ideas that
ur life if you are a
> young child)
> but it's an interesting idea.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
> > Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> >
Hi Stathis,
I agree with what you say. Note that quantum information is very
different from classical information. Quantum information in general
cannot be copied or cloned, so that there is no relative local back-up
possible. That is why in quantum teleportation, the annihilation of the
CW writes:
> It's like teleportation. Maybe you can demonstrate with 1 or 2 particles in
> QM.
> But it's another very different thing when we are talking about human beings
> (or simple animals).
> Maybe other very knowledgeable prof. (like "scerir"???) in this list can
> provide useful ref.
proportion of your life if you are a young
child)
but it's an interesting idea.
Stathis Papaioannou
> Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Interested in th
Le 04-août-06, à 15:18, W. C. a écrit :
> I remember other people mentioned before. *Normal* people can't accept
> that
> there is no physical universe.
> Even Buddhists won't say that.
Sorry. I was short. All what I say is that IF we take the comp hyp
seriously enough THEN we can see that
>From: Stathis Papaioannou
>
>Not at all. There is a *huge* difference between what is possible in theory
>and what is possible practically. A person wearing down a mountain with his
>fingers is a practical impossibility, but there is nothing in the laws of
>physics making it a theoretical impo
CW writes:
> >c) Accepting "a)" and "b)" you assume "physical laws" making time travel
> >possible (which is of course controversial; this could be in principle
> >possible with very special assumption, which could also be false in
> >principle with other assumption).
>
> Time travel is as p
Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
will at some point have a total measure
>From: Bruno Marchal
>Are you sure that this is possible, even just in principle? Actually, just
>to show me that it could be possible in principle you have to give me your
>fundamental assumptions. Actually it looks like you are assuming the
>following:
>a) there is a physical universe (well,
Le 04-août-06, à 08:03, W. C. a écrit :
>
>> From: Bruno Marchal
>> All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such
>> substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in
>> many >
>> fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is
>> base
CW writes:
> >From: Stathis Papaioannou
> >Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you created at
> >point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to the same
> >extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If you
> >answer "no" then y
>From: Bruno Marchal
>All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such
>substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in many >
>fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is based on
>the notion of generalized brain: you could say that
CW writes:
> Hi, Bruno,
>
> Sorry for my na鴳e question.
> Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use the
> teleportation
> example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction.
> Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists and teleportat
Le 02-août-06, à 10:20, C. W. a écrit :
Hi, Bruno,
Sorry for my na鴳e question.
Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use the
teleportation
example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction.
Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists a
bject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 26-juil.-06, ?13:34, Russell Standish wrote :
>
> Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees,
> and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment
> on theologi
Russell Standish writes, regarding http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227 :
> Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
> was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
> not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
>
> My comment on the observer
Le 26-juil.-06, à 13:34, Russell Standish wrote :
>
> Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees,
> and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment
> on theologians of course, I don't really know any all that well.
>
> Not to say your perception i
Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
measure of older observer moments is less
Saibal Mitra writes:
> From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
> > it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
> > The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
> > systematic explor
- Original Message -
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2006 08:28 AM
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
> The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
> it
Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees,
and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment
on theologians of course, I don't really know any all that well.
Not to say your perception is wrong, but it will take a Herculean
effort to get other to th
Le 26-juil.-06, à 06:29, Danny Mayes quoted Rees:
So I favor peaceful coexistence rather than constructive dialogue between science and theology
With comp (or just with deep enough introspection) you can understand that science is just modesty, and that it is not domain dependent. I favor colla
Danny Mayes writes:
> Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
> Which approximates my ideas on the nature of reality and the possible role
> of intelligence.
Well, no offense to Martin or you, but that's pretty ordinary stuff which
we have been discussing on this list since 1998.
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