Tom Caylor wrote:
Stathis wrote:
> If you wander into the middle of one of our discussions, it might seem
that we've all forsaken common sense. As a general rule, bizarre-sounding
physical scenarios are proposed as "thought experiments", to explain,
explore or clarify a theory by applying it
>Hal wrote: > >I actually think this is a philosphically defensible position. Why should > >one OM care about another, merely because they happen to be linked by > >a body? There's no a priori reason why an OM should sacrifice, it doesn't > >get any benefit by doing so. > >But I'll tell you why we
Tom Caylor wrote:
Hal wrote:
>I actually think this is a philosphically defensible position. Why should
>one OM care about another, merely because they happen to be linked by
>a body? There's no a priori reason why an OM should sacrifice, it doesn't
>get any benefit by doing so.
>But I'll tell y
Hal wrote:
>I actually think this is a philosphically defensible position. Why should >one OM care about another, merely because they happen to be linked by >a body? There's no a priori reason why an OM should sacrifice, it doesn't >get any benefit by doing so.
>But I'll tell you why we don't work
Tom wrote:
> Now if continuous consciousness is not necessarily required for immortality, then why are you > waiting around for copying? Won't cloning come far sooner? What is it about > copying that is better than cloning.
Stathis wrote:
> Why do you say that continuous consciousness is not ne
Le 14-juin-05, à 03:15, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Mon, Jun 13, 2005 at 11:45:52AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
To Russell: I don't understand what you mean by a "conscious
description". Even the expression "conscious" machine can be
misleading
at some point in the reasoning.
A descri
On Mon, Jun 13, 2005 at 11:45:52AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> To Russell: I don't understand what you mean by a "conscious
> description". Even the expression "conscious" machine can be misleading
> at some point in the reasoning.
A description could be conscious in the same way that with
Oops sorry. I did misunderstood you. Thanks for the clarification. I
agree with your preceding post to Hal now.
Bruno
Le 13-juin-05, à 16:23, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal:
To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x
and x' from the simi
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal:
To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x and x'
from the similarity of x and x'.
I am not sure that makes sense for me.
In particular how could x and x' be similar, if x', but not x, involves a
'white rabbit events'.
It's not c
Le 13-juin-05, à 15:39, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Bruno Marchal:
To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x and
x' from the similarity of x and x'.
I am not sure that makes sense for me.
In particular how could x and x' be similar, if x', but not x,
involves a 'white rab
Bruno Marchal:
To Jesse: You apparently completely separate the probability of x and x'
from the similarity of x and x'.
I am not sure that makes sense for me.
In particular how could x and x' be similar, if x', but not x, involves a
'white rabbit events'.
It's not completely separable, but
Le 12-juin-05, à 14:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
But the basic idea is simple perhaps: Suppose I must choose between
a) I am 3-multiplied in ten exemplars. One will get an orange juice
and 9 will be tortured.
b) I am 3-multiplied in ten exemplars. One will be
Le 12-juin-05, à 06:30, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
My speculation is that p(y -> x) would depend on a combination of some
function that depends only on intrinsic features of the description of
x and y--how "similar" x is to y, basically, the details to be
determined by some formal "theory of consc
This is *exactly* the way it is! Each moment is ephemeral; once the next
moment comes along, the previous one could not be any more thoroughly dead
and gone from the universe if it had sat on top of a detonating nuclear
bomb. Of course, the difference if you sit on a nuclear bomb is that, QTI
a
Bruno Marchal writes:
But the basic idea is simple perhaps: Suppose I must choose between
a) I am 3-multiplied in ten exemplars. One will get an orange juice and 9
will be tortured.
b) I am 3-multiplied in ten exemplars. One will be tortured, and 9 will
get a glass of orange juice instead
Daddycaylor writes:
I'm new to this so I haven't read about all your people's different
theories. I've read quite a bit on transhumanist stuff, Aubrey DeGrey,
Freeman
Dyson, ... it seems people are trying anything they can imagine, and
expanding
into what they can't imagine, to look for
On Sat, Jun 11, 2005 at 07:43:30PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> Jesse Mazer writes:
> > But I explained in my last post how the ASSA could also apply to an
> > arbitrary "next" observer-moment as opposed to an arbitrary "current"
> > one--if you impose the condition I mentioned about the relation
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
> But I explained in my last post how the ASSA could also apply to an
> arbitrary "next" observer-moment as opposed to an arbitrary "current"
> one--if you impose the condition I mentioned about the relation between
> conditional probability and absolute pro
Jesse Mazer writes:
> But I explained in my last post how the ASSA could also apply to an
> arbitrary "next" observer-moment as opposed to an arbitrary "current"
> one--if you impose the condition I mentioned about the relation between
> conditional probability and absolute probability, which is
Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Jun 10, 2005 at 08:15:25AM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> OK, is that why you're saying the ASSA and RSSA are incompatible? But my
> point is that I think this incompatibility is removed if you always take
> the ASSA as applying to your current observer-moment, and
On Fri, Jun 10, 2005 at 08:15:25AM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> OK, is that why you're saying the ASSA and RSSA are incompatible? But my
> point is that I think this incompatibility is removed if you always take
> the ASSA as applying to your current observer-moment, and the RSSA as
> applying to
At 12:43 PM 6/11/2005, Hal Finney wrote:
Here's a little tongue-in-cheek rant...
(snip)
Yet how many philosophers are willing to seriously consider abandoning
this arbitrary conditioning in deciding what is right and wrong? How many
of us here are willing to take the logical path to its ultimat
Here's a little tongue-in-cheek rant...
>From an Unhappy Observer-Moment to its Future Observer-Moments
Dear Observer-Moments of my future:
Philosophical musing has forced me to reconsider my relationship to
you, the observer moments which follow my own in the existence of the
"observer" who tie
Hal Finney writes, in his usual eloquent and enlightening way:
I was working on an essay on the nature of thought experiments about
copying, but it got bogged down, so I will make this short. I am trying
to analyze it based on evolutionary considerations. Copying is much like
biological reprod
I attempted something like your water tank model of the multiverse with the
game I describe here: http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m6608.html. My
conclusion was that the relative measure is important in determining the
successor OM (I think this is what you call the RSSA, although I prefer
Le 09-juin-05, à 23:12, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
With comp, and assuming the copies will never be copied again
and are immortal, then "b". [the experiment is redescribed below]
Ok, but why? Please explain your reasoning.
It is not simple to explain, although it is a consequence of the
U
Le 09-juin-05, à 23:10, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Bruno wrote:
There's a third possibility, which is that the "I" pre-split can not be
identified with either of the post-split individuals. As per my
reponse to
Stathis, the question is ill-posed. You can interview the non-tortured
individu
On Thu, Jun 09, 2005 at 02:10:51PM -0700, Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> If I take a loaf of bread, chop it half, put one half in one room and one
> half in the other, and then ask the question "where is the loaf of bread?",
> we can likely agree that the question is ill-posed.
>
> The question "what w
On Thu, Jun 09, 2005 at 02:04:00PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> I was working on an essay on the nature of thought experiments about
> copying, but it got bogged down, so I will make this short. I am trying
> to analyze it based on evolutionary considerations. Copying is much like
> biological r
Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Jun 10, 2005 at 12:22:24AM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> Hal didn't say anything about only sampling the birth moment randomly
> according to the absolute measure, or imply it as far as I understood
him.
>
The RSSA is applied to the "next" OM, so can only predi
Le 10-juin-05, à 06:47, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I'm new to this so I haven't read about all your people's different theories. I've read quite a bit on transhumanist stuff, Aubrey DeGrey, Freeman Dyson, ... it seems people are trying anything they can imagine, and expanding into what they c
> > > > > You are offered two choices:
> > > > >
> > > > > (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is
> heads, you
> > > > > will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured.
> > > > >
> > > > > (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the
> > > copies will be
> > > > > to
I'm new to this so I haven't read about all your people's different
theories. I've read quite a bit on transhumanist stuff, Aubrey DeGrey,
Freeman Dyson, ... it seems people are trying anything they can imagine,
and expanding into what they can't imagine, to look for immortality. Now
if c
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Jun 09, 2005 at 07:35:42PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >
> >You are arguing that it is possible to have an absolute measure for
> >each observer moment, as well as a relative measure on the transitions
> >between observer moments. Of c
On Thu, Jun 09, 2005 at 07:35:42PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >
> >You are arguing that it is possible to have an absolute measure for
> >each observer moment, as well as a relative measure on the transitions
> >between observer moments. Of course this is correct.
> >
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> > > You are offered two choices:
> > >
> > > (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is heads, you
> > > will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured.
> > >
> > > (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the
> copies will be
> > > tortured, an
Russell Standish wrote:
You are arguing that it is possible to have an absolute measure for
each observer moment, as well as a relative measure on the transitions
between observer moments. Of course this is correct.
However, the ASSA and the RSSA are more than that. The SS stands for
self samp
Brent Meeker wrote (accidentally offlist):
> >From: "Hal Finney" [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >Copying is such a bonus that it swamps consideration of quality of life.
> >In a world where people have adapted to copying, they would work as
> >hard to make a copy as they would in our world to avoid dy
You are arguing that it is possible to have an absolute measure for
each observer moment, as well as a relative measure on the transitions
between observer moments. Of course this is correct.
However, the ASSA and the RSSA are more than that. The SS stands for
self sampling, ie the principle that
Bruno wrote:
> >> (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is
> heads, you will
> >> be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured.
> >>
> >> (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the
> copies will be
> >> tortured, and the other 9 will not be tortured.
> >>
> >> By your
I was working on an essay on the nature of thought experiments about
copying, but it got bogged down, so I will make this short. I am trying
to analyze it based on evolutionary considerations. Copying is much like
biological reproduction and we can expect many of the same effects in
a society in
Bruno wrote:
> >>> Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any
> > convincing argument
> >>> for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after
> >> all, *me*
> >>> (although it once was). We ceased being the same person
> the moment
> >>> we were copied and star
Stathis wrote:
> > > You are offered two choices:
> > >
> > > (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is heads, you
> > > will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured.
> > >
> > > (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the
> copies will be
> > > tortured, and the oth
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> You are offered two choices:
>
> (a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is heads,
> you will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured.
>
> (b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the copies
> will be tortured, and the other 9 will not be tort
"Stathis Papaioannou" wrote:
Subjectively, there is *always* a one to one correspondence between an
earlier and a later version, even though from a third person perspective
the relationship may appear to be one to many, many to many, or many to
one. This is in part why reasoning as if observ
Le 08-juin-05, à 21:54, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any
convincing argument
for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after
all, *me*
(although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we
were copied
Le 09-juin-05, à 08:55, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
(a) A coin will be flipped tomorrow. If the result is heads,
you will be tortured; if tails, you will not be tortured.
(b) You will be copied 10 times tomorrow. One of the copies
will be tortured, and the other 9 will not be tortured.
By your
> -Original Message-
> From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 5:16 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
> Subject: RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
>
> Jonathan Colvin writes:
>
> [
Jonathan Colvin writes:
[quoting Stathis Papaioannou]:
>The situation is different when I am considering my copies in
>the future. If I know that tomorrow I will split into two
>copies, one of whom will be tortured, I am worried, because
>that means there is 1/2 chance that I will "become" the
>
>>Jonathan Colvin: Beyond the empathetic rationale, I don't see any
convincing argument
>>for favoring the copy over a stranger. The copy is not, after
>all, *me*
>>(although it once was). We ceased being the same person the moment we
>>were copied and started diverging.
>
>Yes, this is exactl
Le 08-juin-05, à 14:18, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Jonathan Colvin writes:
That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on
an
ethical basis or a purely selfish one) care more about a copy of
ourselves
getting hurt than a complete stranger?
I have little doubt that
Jonathan Colvin writes:
That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on an
ethical basis or a purely selfish one) care more about a copy of ourselves
getting hurt than a complete stranger?
I have little doubt that I *would* rather a stranger get stuck than my
copy,
but o
Jonathan Colvin writes:
> That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on an
> ethical basis or a purely selfish one) care more about a copy of ourselves
> getting hurt than a complete stranger?
>
> I have little doubt that I *would* rather a stranger get stuck than my copy,
>-Original Message-
>From: Jonathan Colvin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 5:20 AM
>To: everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
...
>That raises an interesting question. *Should* we (whether reasoned on an
&
Lee:
>>Not quite! It turns out that everyone who knows them regards
>identical
>>twins as different persons. And so regards them, I am pretty
>certain as
>>different people in a way that they were *NOT* so regard you and your
>>duplicate. You and your duplicate---created yesterday,
>say---w
Lee Corbin wrote:
[quoting Stathis]
> > I got here this way: to be consistent,
> > I must use all my knowledge
> > to arrive at a class of events and
> > processes that I approve of, and
> > classes that I disapprove of. I
> > decided that it was bad for me to
> > suffer. Then since by physics
Stathis wrote
> > I got here this way: to be consistent,
> > I must use all my knowledge
> > to arrive at a class of events and
> > processes that I approve of, and
> > classes that I disapprove of. I
> > decided that it was bad for me to
> > suffer. Then since by physics, I
> > seem to be any s
Lee Corbin writes (quoting Stathis):
> I believe that tomorrow I will become one of the people in the
multiverse
> who believe they are me and share my memories.
What if you have just taken Midazolam, and so won't remember
any of this tomorrow? (I contend that you'll be them anyway.)
[Good s
Stathis writes
> I believe that tomorrow I will become one of the people in the multiverse
> who believe they are me and share my memories.
What if you have just taken Midazolam, and so won't remember
any of this tomorrow? (I contend that you'll be them anyway.)
> When I think about this, I
>
Lee Corbin writes:
Stathis writes
> ...I think we may basically agree, but there are some differences. If
you
> look at it from a third person perspective, continuity of personal
identity
> over time is not only a delusion but a rather strange and inconsistent
> delusion.
I'm not quite sure
Saibal Mitra writes:
> Stephen Paul King writes:
> > I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we
base
> > the idea that "copies" could exist upon? What if "I", or any one
else's
1st
> > person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is
impossible,
> >
Saibal Mitra writes:
> This is actualy another argument against QTI. There are only a finite number
> of different versions of observers. Suppose a 'subjective' time evolution on
> the set of all possible observers exists that is always well defined.
> Suppose we start with observer O1, and under t
Dear Stathis,
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Thursday, June 02, 2005 11:55 PM
Subject: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
snip
It is true that nature is quantum mechanical rather than cl
- Original Message -
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 05:00 AM
Subject: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
> Stephen Paul King writes:
> > I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what d
Stephen Paul King writes:
Dear Lee and Stathis,
I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base
the idea that "copies" could exist upon? What if "I", or any one else's 1st
person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is
impossible, what is the stat
Stephen Paul King writes:
> I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we base
> the idea that "copies" could exist upon? What if "I", or any one else's 1st
> person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is impossible,
> what is the status of all of thes
st in this state of denial?"
>
> Stephen
>
> - Original Message -----
> From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "EverythingList"
> Sent: Thursday, June 02, 2005 10:32 PM
> Subject: RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
>
> snip
--
*P
Lee Corbin writes:
The problem is actually one of *anticipation*. As naturally evolved
creatures, we are fashioned to anticipate the next moments. I have no
time now to get into it, but I don't think that this feeling of
anticipation really can be rigorously used; it's (unfortunately)
riddled w
Original Message -
From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "EverythingList"
Sent: Thursday, June 02, 2005 10:32 PM
Subject: RE: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
snip
Stathis writes
> ...I think we may basically agree, but there are some differences. If you
> look at it from a third person perspective, continuity of personal identity
> over time is not only a delusion but a rather strange and inconsistent
> delusion.
I'm not quite sure I understand why you
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> I don't see how this follows. I can't even imagine what it might mean to
get
> "higher benefit" from higher measure days. What I assumed Hal meant was
that
> on even days his total measure was higher, so that double the usual
number
> of versio
Lee,
Your comments touch on important issues. Having read the article on your web
page I think we may basically agree but there are some differences. If you
look at it from a third person perspective, continuity of personal identity
over time is not only a delusion but a rather strange and inc
Bruno writes
> Le 02-juin-05, à 15:23, Lee Corbin a écrit :
> > [Stathis wrote]
> >> So if I am told that tomorrow I will be copied ten times and
> >> one of these copies will be tortured, I am worried, because
> >> that means there is a 1/10 chance I will be tortured.
> >
> > Good example, but I
Quentin Anciaux writes:
> What I understand from that is as if you could influence probabilty, as if
> knowing something or acting in some way will change your "future" Hal by
> having him "good moments"... But if at every choice, every results exists
> (whatever the measures of each one).. Some
Hi Hal,
I don't follow you very well, and I tried to ask you two times a question
which does not seems to be of interrest to respond (or maybe my english is so
bad, that it doesn't mean anything ?). But I'll try once more.
What I understand from that is as if you could influence probabilty, as
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> I don't see how this follows. I can't even imagine what it might mean to get
> "higher benefit" from higher measure days. What I assumed Hal meant was that
> on even days his total measure was higher, so that double the usual number
> of versions of Hal were generat
Lee Corbin writes:
Stathis writes
> I understand [Saibal's] point, but I think you are making an invalid
assumption
> about the relationship between a random sampling of all the OM's
available
> to an individual and that individual's experience of living his life.
> Suppose a trillion trilli
Le 02-juin-05, à 15:23, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Stathis: So if I am told that tomorrow I will be copied ten times and
one of these copies will be tortured, I am worried, because
that means there is a 1/10 chance I will be tortured.
Good example, but I would say that you will be tortured with
1
Le 02-juin-05, à 08:48, Lee Corbin a écrit :
What? And I thought that I had understood how the term "Observer
Moment" is used on this list! :-(
You are optimist :)
According to Nick Bostrom who introduced the term, "observer-moments are pieces of subjective time" (http://www.escribe.com/scien
I continue to describe a different way of talking than that
used by Stathis, who writes
> [Saibal writes]
>
> > The same is true here. It must follow from the laws of physics (which
> > include the effects of simulations) that there are indeed many more copies
> > of you at t2.
Yes, we can say th
Stathis writes
> I understand [Saibal's] point, but I think you are making an invalid
> assumption
> about the relationship between a random sampling of all the OM's available
> to an individual and that individual's experience of living his life.
> Suppose a trillion trillion copies of my min
Saibal Mitra wrote:
[quoting Stathis]
> I understand your point, but I think you are making an invalid
assumption
> about the relationship between a random sampling of all the OM's
available
> to an individual and that individual's experience of living his life.
> Suppose a trillion trillion c
Le 28-mai-05, à 14:32, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
I'm actually still with the ASSA. I agree that if there is no
cul-de-sac,
you can always redefine an observer moment by including the
information that
he has survived a suicide experiment. But I would consider that
observer
moment to have a low
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC:
Verzonden: Saturday, May 28, 2005 07:26 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >You have to consider the hug
Hi Bruno
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Verzonden: Friday, May 27, 2005 04:08 PM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not ac
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> More generally, if a person has N OM's available to him at time t1 and
kN at
> time t2, does this mean he is k times as likely to find himself
experiencing
> t2 as t1? I suggest that this is not the right way to look at it. A
person
> only ex
Le Samedi 28 Mai 2005 07:21, "Hal Finney" a écrit :
> It is the same with all the examples. Causing more experiences of
> joy is better than causing more experiences of sadness. Even with
> the one person who lives from day to day, it still applies. He is not
> subjectively aware of his measure
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> More generally, if a person has N OM's available to him at time t1 and kN at
> time t2, does this mean he is k times as likely to find himself experiencing
> t2 as t1? I suggest that this is not the right way to look at it. A person
> only experiences one OM at a ti
Saibal Mitra wrote:
You have to consider the huge number of alternative states you could be in.
1) Consider an observer moment that has experienced a lot of things. These
experiences are encoded by n bits. Suppose that these experiences were more
or less random. Then we can conclude that there
Excuse me, has anyone seen a ball around here? It's got an infinity symbol on it. Oh, here it is. OK, just playing through...Fore! Original Message - From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Subject: Re: Many Pa
Hi Saibal,
Le 27-mai-05, à 14:29, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Verzonden: Friday, May 27, 2005 01:44 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Verzonden: Friday, May 27, 2005 01:44 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >Quoting Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> >
> > > On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > >
> > > >One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that
it
> > > >solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start w
Saibal Mitra wrote:
Quoting Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that it
> >solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of
all
> >possible observer moments on
at and the Schroedinger's Cat example.- Original Message - From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>Subject: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM... Date: Thu, 26 May 2005 19:02:19 +0200 > > The original posting about this
s.
Saibal
Quoting "aet.radal ssg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> For some reason I didn't get the original post about the suicide paradox,
> so if someone could resend it, sans any "everything" computer lingo, I
> would appreciate it.
> The subject of the thread
Quoting Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> >One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that it
> >solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of all
> >possible observer moments on which a measure is defin
For some reason I didn't get the original post about the suicide paradox, so if someone could resend it, sans any "everything" computer lingo, I would appreciate it.
The subject of the thread - "Many Pasts? - Not according to QM" taken on its face seems false, at least fr
On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that it
solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of all
possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can be
calculated in principle using the laws of ph
- Oorspronkelijk bericht -
Van: "Patrick Leahy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Aan:
Verzonden: Wednesday, May 18, 2005 05:57 PM
Onderwerp: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
> Of course, many of you (maybe all) may be defining pasts from an
> information-theoretic
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