Re: Simulated Brains

Brent wrote: *"No, but some neuron excites some other neuron is all that happens later in your brain too. So where does it become pain? Is it when those neurons in your brain connect the afferent signal with the language modes for "pain" or with memories of injuries or with a vocal cry?"* We a

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 8, 2:10 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > Craig, > > Now I agree that my example was not good. I have searched some more. > What about phantom pain, that is, pain in a limb that has been removed > by amputation? What your theory says about such a thing? I think that phantom limb pain is about th

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 8, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > You mean some neuron are me? That is worst that the "grandmother   > neuron" idea. All of your neurons are you, but the only some groups are aware that they are you at any given time. If you're drunk, for instance, some parts of you are not online and w

Re: Simulated Brains

On 08.08.2011 00:03 meekerdb said the following: On 8/7/2011 11:07 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 07.08.2011 19:58 meekerdb said the following: On 8/6/2011 11:44 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Please note that according to experimental results (see the book mentioned in my previous message), p

Re: Simulated Brains

Craig, Now I agree that my example was not good. I have searched some more. What about phantom pain, that is, pain in a limb that has been removed by amputation? What your theory says about such a thing? Evgenii On 07.08.2011 22:28 Evgenii Rudnyi said the following: On 07.08.2011 21:26 Cr

Re: Simulated Brains

On 08 Aug 2011, at 03:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: Interesting article: Residents of the brain: Scientists turn up startling diversity among nerve cells http://www.sciencenews.org/view/feature/id/332400/title/Residents_of_the_brain_ "No two cells are the same. Zoom in, and the brain’s wrinkly, p

Re: Simulated Brains

Interesting article: Residents of the brain: Scientists turn up startling diversity among nerve cells http://www.sciencenews.org/view/feature/id/332400/title/Residents_of_the_brain_ "No two cells are the same. Zoom in, and the brain’s wrinkly, pinkish- gray exterior becomes a motley collection of

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/7/2011 11:07 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 07.08.2011 19:58 meekerdb said the following: On 8/6/2011 11:44 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Please note that according to experimental results (see the book mentioned in my previous message), pain comes after the event. For example when you t

Re: Simulated Brains

On 07.08.2011 21:26 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 7, 11:47 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 07.08.2011 17:12 Craig Weinberg said the following: It seems that pain is some brain function, see for example http://www.thenakedscientists.com/HTML/content/interviews/interview/651/ I h

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 7, 11:47 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > On 07.08.2011 17:12 Craig Weinberg said the following: > It seems that pain is some brain function, see for example > > http://www.thenakedscientists.com/HTML/content/interviews/interview/651/ > > I have just searched in Google > > people that do not ex

Re: Simulated Brains

Brent, Sorry, I have not understood your question correctly - I thought it was something like "what was before pain". My unconsciousness has answered your question faster as it has interpreted it correctly for my consciousness. The answer to your question in my view that without consciousnes

Re: Simulated Brains

On 07.08.2011 19:58 meekerdb said the following: On 8/6/2011 11:44 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... Please note that according to experimental results (see the book mentioned in my previous message), pain comes after the event. For example when you touch a hotplate, you take your hand back not

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/6/2011 11:44 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 07.08.2011 05:12 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 6, 9:35 pm, meekerdb wrote: On 8/6/2011 4:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: The language doesn't matter. You can see that a person is in pain by their response to being burned, even if they h

Re: Simulated Brains

On 07 Aug 2011, at 16:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 07.08.2011 14:51 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 7, 2:44 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 07.08.2011 05:12 Craig Weinberg said the following: We can always infer qualia. It doesn't mean our inference is correct. In this case I'm poi

Re: Simulated Brains

On 07.08.2011 17:12 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 7, 10:31 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 07.08.2011 14:51 Craig Weinberg said the following: The pain comes to 'us' after the event. That's not to say that the cells of your burned finger are not in pain already. Cellular pain may no

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 7, 10:31 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > On 07.08.2011 14:51 Craig Weinberg said the following: > > The pain comes to 'us' after the event. That's not to say that the > > cells of your burned finger are not in pain already. Cellular pain > > may not be the same experience of course as a trilli

Re: Simulated Brains

On 07.08.2011 14:51 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 7, 2:44 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 07.08.2011 05:12 Craig Weinberg said the following: We can always infer qualia. It doesn't mean our inference is correct. In this case I'm pointing out that the inference doesn't require a lear

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 7, 2:44 am, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: > On 07.08.2011 05:12 Craig Weinberg said the following: > > We can always infer qualia. It doesn't mean our inference is > > correct. In this case I'm pointing out that the inference doesn't > > require a learned language. My point is that math is not nat

Re: Simulated Brains

On 06 Aug 2011, at 22:00, Stephen P. King wrote to Craig Weinberg: Craig: Natural numbers are an invention of an entity that thinks, Bruno: The existence of numbers, with the laws of addition and multiplication, entails the existence of universal numbers. They can introspect themselves and d

Re: Simulated Brains

On 07.08.2011 05:12 Craig Weinberg said the following: On Aug 6, 9:35 pm, meekerdb wrote: On 8/6/2011 4:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: The language doesn't matter. You can see that a person is in pain by their response to being burned, even if they have not developed language yet. Interesting

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 6, 9:35 pm, meekerdb wrote: > On 8/6/2011 4:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > The language doesn't matter. You can see that a person is in pain by > > their response to being burned, even if they have not developed > > language yet. > > Interesting.  Now Craig *can* infer qualia from behav

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/6/2011 4:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: The language doesn't matter. You can see that a person is in pain by their response to being burned, even if they have not developed language yet. Interesting. Now Craig *can* infer qualia from behavior. Brent -- You received this message because yo

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 6, 4:00 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: > Hi Craig and Bruno, . > > But it's not intersubjective if we don't agree. You need to understand > > math in the exact way that it is intended in order to agree. Certainly > > as math becomes more complex, it can become less objective than simple > > l

Re: Simulated Brains

Hi Craig and Bruno, I think you two are 'talking past each other' in that you are thinking of completely different things in your comments. On 8/6/2011 2:12 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 6, 12:46 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Aug 2011, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: If we 'need t

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 6, 12:46 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 06 Aug 2011, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > If we 'need to agree on elementary principles' doesn't that mean it's > > intersubjective? > > If we agree on principles, it means it is intersubjective, but this > does not mean it is necessarily not ob

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 6, 11:38 am, John Mikes wrote: > Dear Steohen and Craig: > I would apply my response to Stathis to your 'simulation': you can simulate > whatever you )already) know about the substrate. Our knowledge is sporadic > and skewed - fitted to the so far absorbed and adjusted knowledge we > assu

Re: Simulated Brains

On 06 Aug 2011, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 6, 6:16 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2011, at 20:26, Craig Weinberg wrote: That is my point exactly: inter-subjective agreement is as close to objectivity that we can get. Of course this is debatable. I would say that elemen

Re: Simulated Brains

Dear Steohen and Craig: I would apply my response to Stathis to your 'simulation': you can simulate whatever you )already) know about the substrate. Our knowledge is sporadic and skewed - fitted to the so far absorbed and adjusted knowledge we assumed, so we can 'simulate' incompletely. Best regard

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 6, 6:16 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 05 Aug 2011, at 20:26, Craig Weinberg wrote: > >>> That is my point exactly: inter-subjective agreement is as close to > >>> objectivity that we can get. > > >> Of course this is debatable. I would say that elementary arithmetic   > >> is > >> objectiv

Re: Simulated Brains

On 05 Aug 2011, at 20:26, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 5, 1:00 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Aug 2011, at 01:37, Craig Weinberg wrote: That is my point exactly: inter-subjective agreement is as close to objectivity that we can get. Of course this is debatable. I would say that elementary

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 10:52 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: The very act of first person-ness (1^st person frame) in X might be performing the same function ... removing the decoherence apparent to an external observer of X, while remaining decohered in the frame of reference of the 3^rd person observer.

RE: Simulated Brains

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jesse Mazer Sent: Wednesday, 3 August 2011 3:26 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Simulated Brains On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 1:14 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 10:03 PM, Stephen

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 5, 1:00 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 05 Aug 2011, at 01:37, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > That is my point exactly: inter-subjective agreement is as close to > > objectivity that we can get. > > Of course this is debatable. I would say that elementary arithmetic is   > objective per se. But

Re: Simulated Brains

On 05 Aug 2011, at 01:37, Craig Weinberg wrote: That is my point exactly: inter-subjective agreement is as close to objectivity that we can get. Of course this is debatable. I would say that elementary arithmetic is objective per se. But physical realities can indeed be shown, or argued t

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 4, 5:07 pm, meekerdb wrote: > On 8/4/2011 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is > > a property of the subject. The subject's perception determines the > > degree to which one complex of phenomena can be distin

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/4/2011 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 4, 1:08 pm, 1Z wrote: On Aug 3, 9:14 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 3, 1:35 pm, 1Z wrote: On Aug 3, 1:54 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, wh

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 4, 1:08 pm, 1Z wrote: > On Aug 3, 9:14 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Aug 3, 1:35 pm, 1Z wrote: > > > > On Aug 3, 1:54 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is > > > > a property of the subject. The subject's perceptio

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 3, 9:14 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Aug 3, 1:35 pm, 1Z wrote: > > > On Aug 3, 1:54 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is > > > a property of the subject. The subject's perception determines the > > > degree to which o

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 3, 1:35 pm, 1Z wrote: > On Aug 3, 1:54 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is > > a property of the subject. The subject's perception determines the > > degree to which one complex of phenomena can be distinguished from > > an

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 3, 10:45 am, Jason Resch wrote: > On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 7:54 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> > > Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is > > a property of the subject. The subject's perception determines the > > degree to which one complex of phenomena can be di

Re: Simulated Brains

On 03 Aug 2011, at 05:54, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 8:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King > wrote: No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a who

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 3, 1:54 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote: > Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is > a property of the subject. The subject's perception determines the > degree to which one complex of phenomena can be distinguished from > another. Ontologically, objectively, it m

Re: Simulated Brains

On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 7:54 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Aug 3, 1:37 am, Jason Resch wrote: > > What is your theory of identity? > > > > Would you agree that if a certain object has identical properties, > > roles, and relations that it is the same? > > Sameness is part of the phenomenology of

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 3, 1:37 am, Jason Resch wrote: > What is your theory of identity? > > Would you agree that if a certain object has identical properties,   > roles, and relations that it is the same? Sameness is part of the phenomenology of pattern recognition, which is a property of the subject. The subje

Re: Simulated Brains

gnition. We don't want a simulation of the thing. We want an instance of the thing. -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, 3 August 2011 2:19 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com

Re: Simulated Brains

On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 1:14 AM, meekerdb wrote: > On 8/2/2011 10:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > >> I'm just interested in how we would decide who won? If there is some test >>> you can suggest or some theoretical development you anticipate it would be >>> very relevant to the question of the ph

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 10:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: I'm just interested in how we would decide who won? If there is some test you can suggest or some theoretical development you anticipate it would be very relevant to the question of the philosophical zombie. Whatever, this conversation is going nowhe

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/3/2011 12:18 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:00 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/201

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 2, 2011, at 10:54 PM, "Stephen P. King" wrote: On 8/2/2011 8:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King > wrote: No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated

RE: Simulated Brains

ehalf Of meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, 3 August 2011 2:19 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Simulated Brains On 8/2/2011 4:00 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote: >> On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: >>> On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, me

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 5:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King > wrote: No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. This lead

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 4:00 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On A

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 8:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King > wrote: No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. This lead

Re: Simulated Brains

On Tue, Aug 2, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: > >No, my thought is that quantum coherence accounts for, among other > things, the way that sense data is continuously integrated into a whole. > This leads to a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the "Cartesian > Theater". Dennett's

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 6:08 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote:

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 2:58 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: I've been repeating this over and over but nobody seems to recognize it. Whether or not something is deemed to be 'acting like a conscious being' just means that something resembles yourself in it's physical appearance and behavior enough that you infer

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 2:44 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: The point is that there is a point

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 2, 5:26 pm, meekerdb wrote: > Craig's position seems to be more a blur than a point.  He has said that > only biological neurons can instantiate consciousness Consciousness is a qualitative estimation, all but useless for discussing the distinction between biological and non-biological in

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 5:26 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computation

Re: Simulated Brains

On Aug 2, 5:08 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: > On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: >      As to your post here. Craig's point is that the simulated brain, > even if simulated down to the molecular level, will only be a simulation > and 'think simulate thoughts'. If said simulated brain has a > co

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 2:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the syste

Re: Simulated Brains

On 8/2/2011 4:04 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 12:43 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Aug 2, 2:06 pm, "Stephen P. King" wrote: The point is that there is a point where the best possible model or computational simulation of a system is the system itself. The fact that it is impossible to