subject:"Energy conservation in many\-worlds"


> On 5 Dec 2019, at 02:12, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 10:44 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
 consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
 response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness, 
>>> It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
>>> what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but 
>>> crazy?
>> Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.
> 
> Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog died I'd 
> get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact then is that my 
> dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I get another dog.  The 
> same thing eventuates tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me to the 
> authorites and when I explain this to the judge he mandates psychiatric care.
> 
> Hence Mechanism is false.
> 
> I think the point Bruno is making is that consciousness requires 
> "counterfactual correctness”,


Not just “consciousness”, also the simpler notion of computation requires or 
even define a notion of counterfactual correctness. It is not much more than a 
semantic for the “if A then B else C”. 



> by which he appears to mean that consciousness must be such that if the 
> inputs are changed (counterfactually), then the output must also change.

… must also change (counterfactually). OK.


> This hypothesis -- that consciousness requires this "counterfactuall 
> correctness" -- was introduced ad hoc in order to protect the movie graph 
> argument. If we take the sequence of states through which a computation 
> proceeds to give a particular conscious experience and reproduce exactly 
> those states on a film or something similar, then running through those 
> states will reproduce the same conscious experience. They want to avoid this 
> conclusion, so they impose the restriction that the sequence of state must be 
> "counterfactually correct", i.e., it must respond differently to different 
> input -- which the movie graph, being fixed, clearly cannot.

Who they? Not me, and Maudlin makes that move to get a reductio ad absurdum of 
having both mechanism and materialism. Then at the end he choses materialism, 
where I keep Mechanism, but both Maudlin and me showed that indeed it is absurd 
to believe in both mechanism and the idea that consciousness is related 
exclusively to some material events.


> 
> That this ad hoc manoeuvre does not prove anything about consciousness was 
> shown by Maudlin in his "Olympia" argument.

That is weird. Maudlin, and men  did prove something about consciousness, 
mechanism and materialism.

We show that materialism -> non mechanism, or equivalently that mechanism -> 
non materialism. You can’t have them both. 


> One can restore counterfactual correctness by additional ad hoc additions to 
> the graph, without altering the fact that the movie record still reproduces 
> the conscious experience.

But the added piece have no role in the actual computation, and so that would 
endow the movie with consciousnes, but also the movies with the holes, and all 
consciousness will supervene on anything, making the theory inconsistent. 

It is much simpler to study what is a computation, and understand that 
consciousness is in the computation, not in this or that implementation of the 
computation, except statistically below our substitution level.




> The "competition" is irrelevant to consciousness in this case.


?

Bruno




> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

> On 5 Dec 2019, at 01:22, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 9:33 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 3 Dec 2019, at 23:06, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 8:03 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> My brain currently has only one state.
>> How do you know that? How could you know that.
>> 
>> It is a pretty good hypothesis.
>>> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these 
>>> do not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states 
>>> consistent with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you 
>>> ever prove such a thing?
>> We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume 
>> mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the 
>> infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness.
>> 
>> The answer is simple. Do not assume mechanism. Then the physical universe is 
>> what it is,
> 
> In which theory of mind? Once you assume non-mechanism, you need to give your 
> theory of mind, and explain how it allows a unique universe.
> 
> No I don't. It is only in your mind that such a thing is necessary.

That is not true. To predict a physical events, and to be able to confirm it, 
if you look in detail, you need an identity brain-mind, which is OK FAPP, but 
when we assume Mechanism, it does no more work. And if you don’t assume 
Mechanism, you still need a theory of mind (if you want a theory of everything, 
which is the subject matter of this forum).

> Science does not need to explain everything before it gets started.

It can always make simplifying assumption, but it has to be always aware that 
those are assumption, and must be able to see the incompatibility between some 
assumption. Mechanism is my working hypothesis in the philosophy of mind (aka 
cognitive science, theology, metaphysics, …).

> A theory of mind can develop in the normal course of science -- it is not an 
> a priori requirement.

Of course. The mind like matter develops well before theories of mind or 
theories of matter, but when we search a theory of everything, we have to get 
them all, and they have to be compatible and related in a coherent manner.

> 
> In fact, quantum mechanics has moved resolutely in the direction of 
> eliminating any requirement of mind, measurement, or observers as 
> fundamentals for the theory.

Quantum mechanics is mainly an extraordinary tools to predict and anticipate 
the result of number-measurement, interpreted in some ways by us, but there is 
simply no unanimity of what it means or represents, or even how to use it with 
gravitation.

You confuse physics and metaphysics here. You give that impression.

The advantage of the mechanist hypothesis is that it gives a reasonably easy 
theory of mind and consciousness, and it reduces the mind-body problem into a 
body problem, and the math explains why there is no explosion of white rabbits 
at it seems in first sight in arithmetic, etc.

> Consequently mechanism, postulating that the physical universe arises out of 
> the statistics over all consistent extensions of the computations underlying 
> consciousness, is going in completely the wrong direction.

Why?

Proving this would refute Mechanism, and would be very interesting.

> By making consciousness central to your theory,

I don’t make consciousness central. It is a consequence of the theory, which is 
not mine, but the one in which many materialist believe (where actually I 
explain why it is incompatible with materialism).

> you are destroying all possibility of an objective science.

Of course not. Are you sure you have understood what I did? I show that 
mechanism and materialism are incompatible, and I show that physics is in the 
head of the machine, and how to derive it, so that we can compare. Then the 
result obtained so far fits with the observation, so mechanism is not yet 
refuted. Claiming that you believe in an ontological physical universe, 
irreducible to anything else is not an argument then we do science.

> Putting the observer as a central element of the theory is what went wrong 
> with the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. The elimination of 
> the personal, the mind, and the observer is central to modern physics.

Yes, in arithmetic too. The universal machine have to grasp what is independent 
on any particular universal machine relative representation, and physics 
becomes invariant for the ontological theories. It looks we share the same 
motivation to be skeptical of the Copenhagen interpretation. Now, you still 
need an observer, to predict what we can feel when we look around. It is not 
central indeed, but eventually the whole physical reality might not be central 
either. With mechanism the physical becomes a subbranch of the theological,

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds


> On 5 Dec 2019, at 00:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
 consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
 response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness, 
>>> It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
>>> what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but 
>>> crazy?
>> Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.
> 
> Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog died I'd 
> get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact then is that my 
> dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I get another dog. 

In the counter situation, yes (relatively real or not, that is not relevant 
here, but it has to make sense)


> The same thing eventuates tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me to the 
> authorites and when I explain this to the judge he mandates psychiatric care.

You will need to elaborate this part. You lost me here.



> 
> Hence Mechanism is false.

?

Bruno




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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds


> On 4 Dec 2019, at 21:04, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review
>  
> 
>  
> 
> we do, after all, know something about the intrinsic nature of matter, over 
> and above everything we know in knowing the equations of physics. Why? 
> Because we know the intrinsic nature of consciousness and consciousness is a 
> form of matter.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> I don't think mind (intelligence + consciousness) is a form of matter anymore 
> than fast is a form of racing car,


Very good point!


> mind is what a form of matter does when it is organized in certain ways.  


OK; if you want to implement that mind relatively to you. 

And mind is not much what it does, as what it feels, although here we could 
decide to distinguish or not a first person mind (the one which feels) and a 
third person mind (which acts relatively to us, or to some machine).


More generally, mind is what any universal or particular machine do (and could 
feel to do) when given to any universal machinery or machine. “Matter is then 
explained as a first person plural stable and sharable realities” (usually very 
deep in Bennett sense).

If not, you need to explain more on what is matter, and how it makes some 
computations more real than some others. 

Bruno





> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

> On 4 Dec 2019, at 18:59, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/4/2019 2:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I am a scientist, and I like Mechanism, not because I would think it is 
>> true, but because the mind-body problem becomes a mathematical problem 
>> (extracting physics from intensional arithmetic/computer science), and we 
>> can already test the proposition physics (and it fits rather well).
> 
> But nothing has been extracted. 

?

That is simply wrong. The propositional logic of all modes of self-reference, 
including the material one, have been extracted, either under the form of an 
axiomatic theory, or through their theorem prover.

> It's like saying you like the God theory because it explains everything, we 
> just have to figure out why God did things the way He did.

But here God is given by something in between very elementary arithmetic and 
the standard model of arithmetic, and we get the explanation of where all 
computations comes from, and we can already ask the (Löbian) universal machine 
where the physical reality comes from, etc. that’s how I got the quantum logics.

You need to study Gödel’s 1931 paper. Despite he missed CT and the universal 
machine, he proved implicitly the Turing universality of his beweisbar 
predicate, and announce the fact that the machine itself (the system of 
Principia Mathematica in Gödel’s pet Löbian machine) can justify its own 
incompleteness conditionally to its consistency. Gôdel illustrate the embedding 
of the “theory of arithmetic” in the arithmetical reality, and more generally 
forever what Post already saw (during some period) which is the embedding of 
the universal machine in (any) universal machineries. That enforces an internal 
many-histories interpretation of arithmetic, in arithmetic. 

So here the God is very simple, everyone already believe in it, assuming they 
believe in what is taught in primary school. And the explanation of how the 
rest emerges, with its psychological and physical modes, is easy once we do 
enough math to understand, let us say, Martin Davis’ chapter four of his Dover 
book “Computability and Unsolvability”, but of course the book of Boolos and 
others can show the progress made since.

You talk like you forget the second part of the SANE04 paper, that is the 
mathematical work, modest compared to the work already done by Gödel, Löb, 
Grzegorczyk, Boolos, Goldblatt, (and Kusnetsov and Muravitskii independently of 
them), up to Solovay G and G* theory.

Anyway, the main thing accessible even by non-expert in logic is that if we 
assume Digital Mechanism, that program is not a matter of choice, iphysics has 
to be reduce to machine’s psychology/theology if wa want to solve the mind-body 
problem. If this does not work, we get evidence that Digital Mechanism is false 
(and John Clark has to revise its contract and ask for some analog machine (and 
good luck to know which one).

Physics is a wonderful and very important science, but physicalism seems to me 
wrong, and is proved wrong when we assume YD + CT.

Bruno

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

> On 4 Dec 2019, at 12:03, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 9:06:07 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/3/2019 6:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> The opposite of experiential realism.
>> 
>> • A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take 
>> 
>>Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms 
>> 
> One wonders what Klein thinks including subjectivity would look like.  Every 
> example he gives is based on someone report subjective feelings...but reports 
> are objective.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> The subjective/objective distinction is a big rabbit hole to fall into a 
> mind/matter dualism. There is only matter; experiences are material entities:
> 
> One thing we do know about matter is that when you put some very 
> common-or-garden elements (carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, sodium, potassium, etc) 
> together in the way in which they're put together in brains, you get 
> consciousness like ours – a wholly physical phenomenon. (It's happening to 
> you right now.) And this means that we do, after all, know something about 
> the intrinsic nature of matter, over and above everything we know in knowing 
> the equations of physics. Why? Because we know the intrinsic nature of 
> consciousness and consciousness is a form of matter.

I have no idea how consciousness, a knowledge oneself, would be a priori 
physical.

Assuming mechanism, the physical is an aspect of consciousness, and 
consciousness is an aspect of the self-referential abilities of the numbers and 
(importantly) their relation with truth.

I don’t claim this is true, but this is enforced by the YD + CT. In particular 
CT makes sense of a constructive version of everything, like the universal 
dovetailer, which is a “splashed” version of a universal machine.

And it is testable, and it predicts a many-histories with a quantum topology of 
a sort. It provides some different physical reality possible according to which 
of the quantum logics provided by the self-reference get closer to what we 
observe. In physics too, there is a debate about the relation between quantum 
logic and quantum computation, quantum dynamics, etc.

You need to understand that the mathematical reality kicks back. If CT is 
correct, all theories about digital machines are incomplete and 
incomplete-able, The arithmetical reality explores itself from inside through 
the number relations implementing variate sorts of universal machine and 
relations between those machines. Consciousness is the indubitable experiential 
knowledge of an indubitable but unprovable truth. The Robinsonian machine get 
it already in a sort of innocent way, but the Löbian machine, like Peano 
arithmetic or ZF, have all the means to understand the abyssal nature of their 
ignorance, and even to study its structure and build the tools to explore the 
thing.

The metaphysical/theological notion of primary matter is not something that we 
could see, and seeing is also not an evidence for an ontology. I say this 
because some people talk like if the ontological existence of a physical 
universe could not be doubted. 

Bruno

> 
> https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review
>  
> 
>  
> 
> @philipthrift
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 10:44 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
> consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
> response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness,
>
> It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
> what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but 
> crazy?
>
> Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.
>
>
> Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog died I'd
> get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact then is that my
> dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I get another dog.  The
> same thing eventuates tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me to the
> authorites and when I explain this to the judge he mandates psychiatric
> care.
>
> Hence Mechanism is false.
>

I think the point Bruno is making is that consciousness requires
"counterfactual correctness", by which he appears to mean that
consciousness must be such that if the inputs are changed
(counterfactually), then the output must also change. This hypothesis --
that consciousness requires this "counterfactuall correctness" -- was
introduced ad hoc in order to protect the movie graph argument. If we take
the sequence of states through which a computation proceeds to give a
particular conscious experience and reproduce exactly those states on a
film or something similar, then running through those states will reproduce
the same conscious experience. They want to avoid this conclusion, so they
impose the restriction that the sequence of state must be "counterfactually
correct", i.e., it must respond differently to different input -- which the
movie graph, being fixed, clearly cannot.

That this ad hoc manoeuvre does not prove anything about consciousness was
shown by Maudlin in his "Olympia" argument. One can restore counterfactual
correctness by additional ad hoc additions to the graph, without altering
the fact that the movie record still reproduces the conscious experience.
The "competition" is irrelevant to consciousness in this case.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 9:33 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 23:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 8:03 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> My brain currently has only one state.
>>
>> How do you know that? How could you know that.
>>
>
> It is a pretty good hypothesis.
>
>> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these
>> do not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states
>> consistent with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you
>> ever prove such a thing?
>>
>> We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume
>> mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the
>> infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness.
>>
>
> The answer is simple. Do not assume mechanism. Then the physical universe
> is what it is,
>
>
> In which theory of mind? Once you assume non-mechanism, you need to give
> your theory of mind, and explain how it allows a unique universe.
>

No I don't. It is only in your mind that such a thing is necessary. Science
does not need to explain everything before it gets started. A theory of
mind can develop in the normal course of science -- it is not an a priori
requirement.

In fact, quantum mechanics has moved resolutely in the direction of
eliminating any requirement of mind, measurement, or observers as
fundamentals for the theory. Consequently mechanism, postulating that the
physical universe arises out of the statistics over all consistent
extensions of the computations underlying consciousness, is going in
completely the wrong direction. By making consciousness central to your
theory, you are destroying all possibility of an objective science. Putting
the observer as a central element of the theory is what went wrong with the
Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. The elimination of the
personal, the mind, and the observer is central to modern physics.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 12/3/2019 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption, it's a 
consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals. Clearly actions as a 
response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for consciousness,

It's not clear to me.  How can there be a response to an input ("input" to 
what) that doesn't occur?  And why would such a response be anything but crazy?

Why necessarily crazy? If you can prove this, you refute Mechanism.


Wow, I didn't expect it to be so easy.  I have a dog.   If my dog died 
I'd get another dog.  My dog didn't die today.  The counterfact then is 
that my dog did die today.  So responding the counterfact I get another 
dog.  The same thing eventuates tomorrow.  Soon my neighbors report me 
to the authorites and when I explain this to the judge he mandates 
psychiatric care.


Hence Mechanism is false.

Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift



On Wednesday, December 4, 2019 at 2:05:21 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
>> https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review
>>  
>>
>
>> *we do, after all, know something about the intrinsic nature of matter, 
>> over and above everything we know in knowing the equations of physics. Why? 
>> Because we know the intrinsic nature of consciousness and consciousness is 
>> a form of matter.*
>
>
>
>


> I don't think mind (intelligence + consciousness) is a form of matter 
> anymore than fast is a form of racing car, mind is what a form of matter 
> does when it is organized in certain ways. 
>


The form that a racing car takes when it's going 120 m,p.h.: We say that 
form is fast. 

In any case, the contrary to what he said before this is mind-matter 
dualism.

@philipthrift

>
>  

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread John Clark

>
> https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review
>
>

> *we do, after all, know something about the intrinsic nature of matter,
> over and above everything we know in knowing the equations of physics. Why?
> Because we know the intrinsic nature of consciousness and consciousness is
> a form of matter.*


John K Clark

I don't think mind (intelligence + consciousness) is a form of matter
anymore than fast is a form of racing car, mind is what a form of matter
does when it is organized in certain ways.













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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 12/4/2019 2:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am a scientist, and I like Mechanism, not because I would think it 
is true, but because the mind-body problem becomes a mathematical 
problem (extracting physics from intensional arithmetic/computer 
science), and we can already test the proposition physics (and it fits 
rather well).


But nothing has been extracted.  It's like saying you like the God 
theory because it explains everything, we just have to figure out why 
God did things the way He did.


Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Philip Thrift

On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 9:06:07 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/3/2019 6:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> The opposite of experiential realism.
>
> • A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take 
> 
>Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms 
> 
>
>
> One wonders what Klein thinks including subjectivity would look like.  
> Every example he gives is based on someone report subjective feelings...but 
> reports are objective.
>
> Brent
>

The subjective/objective distinction is a big rabbit hole to fall into a 
mind/matter dualism. There is only matter; experiences are material 
entities:

One thing we do know about matter is that when you put some very 
common-or-garden elements (carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, sodium, potassium, 
etc) together in the way in which they're put together in brains, you get 
consciousness like ours – a wholly physical phenomenon. (It's happening to 
you right now.) And this means that we do, after all, know something about 
the intrinsic nature of matter, over and above everything we know in 
knowing the equations of physics. Why? Because we know the intrinsic nature 
of consciousness and consciousness is a form of matter.

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review

@philipthrift

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 23:06, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 8:03 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> My brain currently has only one state.
> How do you know that? How could you know that.
> 
> It is a pretty good hypothesis.
>> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these do 
>> not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states consistent 
>> with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you ever prove 
>> such a thing?
> We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume 
> mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the 
> infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness.
> 
> The answer is simple. Do not assume mechanism. Then the physical universe is 
> what it is,

In which theory of mind? Once you assume non-mechanism, you need to give your 
theory of mind, and explain how it allows a unique universe.

> and your brain, being part of it, is what it is. No need to choose anything.

You need to choose a non-mechanist theory of mind. You are back to complete 
ignorance. Note that Mechanism can be weakened a lot (like with Oracular Turing 
machine) without changing the nature of the problem. Indeed, once you assume 
some infinities, the complexity of the problem grows, even just its formulation.
I am a scientist, and I like Mechanism, not because I would think it is true, 
but because the mind-body problem becomes a mathematical problem (extracting 
physics from intensional arithmetic/computer science), and we can already test 
the proposition physics (and it fits rather well).

> 
>  
>  Of course, this should not be a problem for a non-mechanist, except that he 
> has to provide its non-mechanist theory of mind, and still explain the role 
> of the (not finitely descriptible) substrate in generating its consciousness.
> 
> So why should that be a problem? My non-mechanist theory of mind is that mind 
> is what brains do.

That is not a theory. How do you explain the qualia and their non rational 
communicability. To use the ontological (metaphysical) assumption of a primary 
physical universe to explain mind is not better than to assume a god. It 
explains nothing. You need a *testable*(refutable)  theory of mind. 

> Why should I need to explain the role of the substrate in generating 
> consciousness? I simply have to do normal science and explore the 
> relationship between my physical brain and my conscious experience. Maybe 
> difficult, but no 
> insurmountable conceptual issues. Your problems here are all of your own 
> making.

The Mechanist hypothesis is the older hypothesis in science and metaphysics. 
Darwinism use it. Molecular biology confirms it. To assume non-mechanism is 
usually done by religious literalist and their explanation is purely magical. I 
am not sure you are aware of the difficulties of the mind-body problem. At 
least you don’t use Mechanism to hide it, like many materialist. I will wait 
for your theory of mind.
And then I will wait for your explanation of why there is a physical universe, 
something that mechanism explains entirely (and I don’t know any theory 
succeeding in that task). It explains also why the laws of physics have a 
mathematical shape.

Bruno

> Bruce
> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 3 Dec 2019, at 09:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 2:39:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Nov 2019, at 22:59, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 2:49:17 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:33:26 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> In any case, in the case of MWI, in the types of examples Sean Carroll talks 
>> about, here's a concrete case:
>> 
>> In one branch, Sean Carroll goes out for a jog around the park.
>> 
>> In another branch, Sean Carroll; stays home and takes a nap. 
>> 
>> I don't see how the two Seans (running, napping) are in "superposition", or 
>> how Sean's energy is distributed to and within these two worlds.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> It really is not so much that a person is in a superposition than the 
>> quantum particles and states that compose them are.
>> 
>> LC 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In the MWI branch world Jog where Sean is jogging and in the branch world 
>> Nap where Sean is napping, the jogging-Sean particles in Jog and the 
>> napping-Sean particles in Nap are in superposition. 
>> 
>> Then there is another branching of Jog where Sean is hit by a car 
>> Jog-HitByCar and one where he isn't Jog-NotHitByCar. Particles in 
>> superpositions: Nap, Jog, Jog-HitByCar, Jog-NotHitByCar, ...
>> 
>> This seems like it should make no sense.
> 
> Yet, that happens in the arithmetical reality. So it certainly makes sense, 
> up to verify this regularly (the theory might be false). It is 
> counter-intuitive, but there is no contradiction, and it is the simpler way 
> to reconcile mind and matter, and the observations.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> This proves my point that Many Worlds can only work in a pure informational 
> (or arithmetical) reality.
> 
> The Many Worlders are (like Sean Carroll) anti-materialists - in the sense 
> that they think everything is information (or quantum information).


Quantum information is, or should be, digital information seen from the 
“material modes of self-reference”, and this is confirmed so far. It is a 
typical physical thing, and as such it emerges from the first person view in 
arithmetic (which are typically NOT arithmetical). Sean Carroll miss the point 
that the Wave itself must be explained by Mechanism (a classical notion).

Bruno


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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 09:51, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 10:21:53 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
>  The reason is that many different 
> quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that thought...not 
> only different quantum superpositions. 
> 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> 
> 
> Doesn't Penrose think that there cannot be thoughts (no such things as real 
> non-zombie thoughts like we experience in our brains) without quantum 
> mechanical stuff going on? :)

Penrose assumes explicitly the negation of Mechanism (and implicitly the 
existence of a primary physical universe). 
He argues against Mechanism by using a notoriously invalid argument based on a 
misunderstanding of Gödel theorem. 
In his second book, Penrose corrected his use of Gödel (going from the invalid 
"Gödel’s incompleteness shows that we are not machine", to the valid (and “well 
known”) Gödel’s incompleteness shows that we cannot know which machine we could 
be, assuming we (our body) are machines (which provides the technic to define 
the first person using incompleteness). Emil Post foresaw all this already in 
the 1920s.

Penrose has unfortunately enlarged the gap between logicians and physicists.

Bruno

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-03 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 12/3/2019 6:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


The opposite of experiential realism.

• A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take 

Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms 





One wonders what Klein thinks including subjectivity would look like.  
Every example he gives is based on someone report subjective 
feelings...but reports are objective.


Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift



On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 1:58:20 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/3/2019 12:51 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 10:21:53 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>>  The reason is that many different 
>> quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that thought...not 
>> only different quantum superpositions. 
>>
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>>
>
> Doesn't Penrose think that there cannot be thoughts (no such things as 
> real non-zombie thoughts like we experience in our brains) without quantum 
> mechanical stuff going on? :)
>
>
> He also thinks Goedel's theorem doesn't apply to the community of 
> mathematicians.  
>
> I don't find philosophical zombies at all plausible.  I think 
> consciousness is a necessary component of human level intelligence; it's 
> implicit in the ability to imagine plans in which you are an actor.
>
> Brent
>


The opposite of experiential realism.

• A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take 

   Phenomenological Reality on its own Terms 

 

@philipthrift 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-03 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 8:03 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> My brain currently has only one state.
>
> How do you know that? How could you know that.
>

It is a pretty good hypothesis.

> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these
> do not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states
> consistent with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you
> ever prove such a thing?
>
> We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume
> mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the
> infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness.
>

The answer is simple. Do not assume mechanism. Then the physical universe
is what it is, and your brain, being part of it, is what it is. No need to
choose anything.

>  Of course, this should not be a problem for a non-mechanist, except that
> he has to provide its non-mechanist theory of mind, and still explain the
> role of the (not finitely descriptible) substrate in generating its
> consciousness.
>

So why should that be a problem? My non-mechanist theory of mind is that
mind is what brains do. Why should I need to explain the role of the
substrate in generating consciousness? I simply have to do normal science
and explore the relationship between my physical brain and my conscious
experience. Maybe difficult, but no
insurmountable conceptual issues. Your problems here are all of your own
making.
Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-03 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 12/3/2019 12:51 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 10:21:53 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



 The reason is that many different
quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that
thought...not
only different quantum superpositions.


Brent



Doesn't Penrose think that there cannot be thoughts (no such things as 
real non-zombie thoughts like we experience in our brains) without 
quantum mechanical stuff going on? :)


He also thinks Goedel's theorem doesn't apply to the community of 
mathematicians.


I don't find philosophical zombies at all plausible.  I think 
consciousness is a necessary component of human level intelligence; it's 
implicit in the ability to imagine plans in which you are an actor.


Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds



> On 3 Dec 2019, at 05:21, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2019 5:39 PM, smitra wrote:
>> On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
 On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
 
 On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
  wrote:
 
 On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
 
 Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
 screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
 Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
 the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:
 
 |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
 
 We can then analyse the system in some basis:
 
 |system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
 
 where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
 vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
 
 It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
 acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
 convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have
 
 |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
 
 Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
 equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
 original state.
 ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
 space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
 basis vector.
>>> 
>>> The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
>>> becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result
>>> of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
>>> anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
>>> whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
>>> to avoid the "M" word.)
>>> 
 The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
 anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
 because initial conditions may make it zero.
>>> 
>>> Irrelevant to the main point.
>>> 
> The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
> quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
> this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
> state.
> 
> If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
> self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
> conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
> depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
> it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
> so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
> treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
> are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
> stochastic single-world model.
 
 Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
 interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
 after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
 interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
 the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.
>>> 
>>> Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
>>> either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
>>> everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
>>> single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
>>> end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
>>> no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
>>> about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
>>> out life insurance..
>>> 
>>> Bruce
>>> 
>>> "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
>>> 
>>> Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
>>> probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
>>> tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
>>> 
>>> We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
>>> than one branch of the multiverse?
>>> 
>>> Bruce
>> 
>> Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
>> doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number of 
>> distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that your mindset 
>> and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be consistent with 
>> only one physical brain state. This means that given your subjective state, 
>> the physical state of your MWI sector should be described as a very complex 
>> superposition involving a large number of brain states that are entangled 
>> with the environment.
> 
>

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds


> On 3 Dec 2019, at 03:18, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 12:39 PM smitra  > wrote:
> On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift  > >
> > wrote:
> > 
> > "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
> > 
> > Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
> > probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
> > tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
> > 
> > We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
> > than one branch of the multiverse?
> > 
> > Bruce
> 
> Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
> doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number 
> of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that your 
> mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be 
> consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that given 
> your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector should be 
> described as a very complex superposition involving a large number of 
> brain states that are entangled with the environment.
> 
> My brain currently has only one state.

How do you know that? How could you know that.


> Other states may be consistent with my current conscious state, but these do 
> not exist. The idea that I am a superposition of all brain states consistent 
> with my consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you ever prove such 
> a thing?

We cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, and if we assume 
mechanism, we cannot see how a universe could choose one state against the 
infinitely many others which lead to the same consciousness. 

Of course, this should not be a problem for a non-mechanist, except that he has 
to provide its non-mechanist theory of mind, and still explain the role of the 
(not finitely descriptible) substrate in generating its consciousness. 





> If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate 
> ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following 
> paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At 
> all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just 
> transitioning from one particular state to another state. Since 
> consciousness is related to the actual physical state of the computer, 
> replacing the computer by a dumb device that doesn't compute anything, 
> which simply cycles through physical states that the computer would move 
> through given some particular set of inputs, will render exactly the 
> same consciousness.
> 
> Yes, and so what? If my consciousness is a sequence of brain states, anything 
> that produces that same sequence of brain states will produce my 
> consciousness. Substrate independence, after all.
> This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption,
> 
> It is not absurd in the least. Argument ad absurdum is not a logical 
> argument. What is absurd to you may be perfectly reasonable to someone else.
> it's a consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals.

Which will need to assume actual infinities, and very big one.



> 
> How can a counterfactual exist? By definition, it is counter to the facts, 
> hence, non-existent.
>  
> Clearly actions 
> as a response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for 
> consciousness,
> 
> But there cannot be any such thing as a counterfactual input. You might 
> consider "What if" scenarios. But they are not relevant for my current 
> brain state. It will do what it will do, whatever the input.
> but there is no room to do that within classical single 
> World physics. But as I pointed out above the generic state of a 
> conscious involves being located not in a single branch, but being 
> distributed over an astronomically large number of different branches.
> 
> Different branches are, by definition, non-interacting, so different branches 
> correspond to different persons. Anyway, I choose not to accept this load of 
> speculative rubbish.

Because you speculate on a physical universe which would be ontologically 
primary. With mechanism, we need not to assume more than 2+2=4, or Kxy = x, …

There is no problem with the MWI once we stop assuming physicalism, which seems 
to me to be the bg speculation here.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
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>

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift



On Tuesday, December 3, 2019 at 2:39:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 29 Nov 2019, at 22:59, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 2:49:17 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:33:26 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In any case, in the case of MWI, in the types of examples Sean Carroll 
>>> talks about, here's a concrete case:
>>>
>>> *In one branch, Sean Carroll goes out for a jog around the park.*
>>>
>>> *In another branch, Sean Carroll; stays home and takes a nap.* 
>>>
>>> I don't see how the two Seans (running, napping) are in "superposition", 
>>> or how Sean's energy is distributed to and within these two worlds.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> It really is not so much that a person is in a superposition than the 
>> quantum particles and states that compose them are.
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
>
>
> In the MWI branch world Jog where Sean is jogging and in the branch world 
> Nap where Sean is napping, the jogging-Sean particles in Jog and the 
> napping-Sean particles in Nap are in superposition. 
>
> Then there is another branching of Jog where Sean is hit by a car 
> Jog-HitByCar and one where he isn't Jog-NotHitByCar. Particles in 
> superpositions: Nap, Jog, Jog-HitByCar, Jog-NotHitByCar, ...
>
> This seems like it should make no sense.
>
>
> Yet, that happens in the arithmetical reality. So it certainly makes 
> sense, up to verify this regularly (the theory might be false). It is 
> counter-intuitive, but there is no contradiction, and it is the simpler way 
> to reconcile mind and matter, and the observations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
This proves my point that Many Worlds can only work in a pure informational 
(or arithmetical) reality.

The Many Worlders are (like Sean Carroll) anti-materialists - in the sense 
that they think everything is information (or quantum information).

@philipthrift
 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds



> On 3 Dec 2019, at 02:39, smitra  wrote:
> 
> On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>> On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
>>>  wrote:
>>> On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
>>> screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
>>> Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
>>> the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:
>>> |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
>>> We can then analyse the system in some basis:
>>> |system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
>>> where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
>>> vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
>>> It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
>>> acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
>>> convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have
>>> |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
>>> Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
>>> equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
>>> original state.
>>> ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
>>> space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
>>> basis vector.
>> The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
>> becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result
>> of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
>> anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
>> whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
>> to avoid the "M" word.)
>>> The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
>>> anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
>>> because initial conditions may make it zero.
>> Irrelevant to the main point.
 The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
 quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
 this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
 state.
 If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
 self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
 conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
 depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
 it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
 so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
 treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
 are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
 stochastic single-world model.
>>> Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
>>> interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
>>> after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
>>> interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
>>> the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.
>> Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
>> either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
>> everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
>> single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
>> end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
>> no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
>> about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
>> out life insurance..
>> Bruce
>> "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
>> Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
>> probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
>> tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
>> We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
>> than one branch of the multiverse?
>> Bruce
> 
> Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), doesn't 
> fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number of distinct 
> physical brain states is so astronomically large that your mindset and how 
> you are feeling about everything isn't going to be consistent with only one 
> physical brain state. This means that given your subjective state, the 
> physical state of your MWI sector should be described as a very complex 
> superposition involving a large number of brain states that are entangled 
> with the environment.
> 
> If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate ourselves 
> in one single branch, then this leads to the following paradox. Consider 
> simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At all moments in time, the 
> physical state of the computer is just

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift



On Monday, December 2, 2019 at 10:21:53 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
>  The reason is that many different 
> quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that thought...not 
> only different quantum superpositions. 
>
>
> Brent 
>
>

Doesn't Penrose think that there cannot be thoughts (no such things as real 
non-zombie thoughts like we experience in our brains) without quantum 
mechanical stuff going on? :)

@philipthrift 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds


> On 30 Nov 2019, at 02:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 5:12 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> On 11/27/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book 
>>> came out.
>>> 
>>> There has never been an answer.
>> 
>> If you think in terms of the wf of the multiverse, it's just a ray in 
>> Hilbert space and moves around.  It doesn't split.  What "splits" is the 
>> subspace we're on.  So when we measure a spin as UP or DOWN, our subspace 
>> splits into two orthogonal subspaces on which the ray projects.  But they 
>> are only orthogonal on that one dimension (the spin of that particle), so 
>> any other variable encoded in the ray gets projected with the same value as 
>> before, e.g. the energy or the particle.
>> 
>> Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a screen or 
>> through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full Hilbert space. We can 
>> take the tensor product of this subspace with the rest of the universe to 
>> recover the full Hilbert space:
>> 
>>   |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
>> 
>> We can then analyse the system in some basis:
>> 
>>|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
>> 
>> where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis vectors for 
>> (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
>> 
>> It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra acts over 
>> the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets convoluted with the same 
>> 'environment' in each case, we have
>> 
>> |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
>> 
>> Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger equation, so it 
>> carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the original state.
> 
> ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert space.  It 
> doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a basis vector.  The c_i 
> can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry anything.  No 
> every Schrodinger equation solution is realized because initial conditions 
> may make it zero.
> 
>> The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum 
>> quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in this sum 
>> has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original state.
>> 
>> If we take each component of the above sum to represent a self-contained 
>> separate world, then all quantum numbers are conserved in each world. 
>> Whether there is global conservation depends on how we treat the 
>> coefficients c_i. But, on the face of it, there are N copies of the 
>> basis+environment in the above sum, so everything is copied in each 
>> individual world. Exactly how you treat the weights in this situation is not 
>> clear to me -- if they are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just 
>> have a stochastic single-world model.
> 
> Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic 
> interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize after the 
> measurement.  And one problem with the ontic interpretation is saying what 
> probability means.  But it seems that the epistemic interpretation leaves the 
> wf to be a personal belief.


It is a first person plural belief, sharable by vast collection of interacting 
universal entities whose existence can be proved in weak theory of arithmetic. 
It is a view from inside any model of arithmetic, but unprovable in any theory 
of arithmetic.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds


> On 29 Nov 2019, at 22:59, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 2:49:17 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:33:26 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> In any case, in the case of MWI, in the types of examples Sean Carroll talks 
> about, here's a concrete case:
> 
> In one branch, Sean Carroll goes out for a jog around the park.
> 
> In another branch, Sean Carroll; stays home and takes a nap. 
> 
> I don't see how the two Seans (running, napping) are in "superposition", or 
> how Sean's energy is distributed to and within these two worlds.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> It really is not so much that a person is in a superposition than the quantum 
> particles and states that compose them are.
> 
> LC 
> 
> 
> 
> In the MWI branch world Jog where Sean is jogging and in the branch world Nap 
> where Sean is napping, the jogging-Sean particles in Jog and the napping-Sean 
> particles in Nap are in superposition. 
> 
> Then there is another branching of Jog where Sean is hit by a car 
> Jog-HitByCar and one where he isn't Jog-NotHitByCar. Particles in 
> superpositions: Nap, Jog, Jog-HitByCar, Jog-NotHitByCar, ...
> 
> This seems like it should make no sense.

Yet, that happens in the arithmetical reality. So it certainly makes sense, up 
to verify this regularly (the theory might be false). It is counter-intuitive, 
but there is no contradiction, and it is the simpler way to reconcile mind and 
matter, and the observations.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds


> On 28 Nov 2019, at 19:38, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 12:12:22 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 11/27/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 5:39:09 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 4:51:55 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark > wrote:
>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett > wrote:
>> 
>> > I think your [Brent Meeker] point about other conservation laws is 
>> > interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a 
>> > state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and get 
>> > charge conservation in every branch?
>> 
>> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems likely all 
>> of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem like much of 
>> a problem.
>> 
>> 
>> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number of 
>> sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can land. 
>> There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very large 
>> number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> The electric charge in one branch is the same electric charge in all other 
>> branches.
>> 
>> LC 
>> 
>> 
>> So the number of coulombs  in a branching Many Worlds grows exponentially .
>> 
>> Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units 
>> , 
>> which took effect on 20 May 2019,[2] 
>>  the elementary 
>> charge  (the charge of the 
>> proton ) is exactly 1.602176634×10−19 
>> coulombs. Thus the coulomb is exactly the charge of 1/(1.602176634×10−19) 
>> protons, which is approximately 6.2415090744×1018 protons (1.036×10−5 mol 
>> ). The same number of electrons 
>>  has the same magnitude but opposite 
>> sign of charge, that is, a charge of −1 C.
>> 
>> 
>> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book came 
>> out.
>> 
>> There has never been an answer.
> 
> If you think in terms of the wf of the multiverse, it's just a ray in Hilbert 
> space and moves around.  It doesn't split.  What "splits" is the subspace 
> we're on.  So when we measure a spin as UP or DOWN, our subspace splits into 
> two orthogonal subspaces on which the ray projects.  But they are only 
> orthogonal on that one dimension (the spin of that particle), so any other 
> variable encoded in the ray gets projected with the same value as before, 
> e.g. the energy or the particle.
> 
> Brent
> 
> That is more in line with what is going on. The charge of an electron, along 
> with all other quantum numbers of the electron or any elementary particle, is 
> not duplicated. It only appears in any sort of branch and with the 
> renormalization of probability there is this mistaken idea of duplication. 
> Nothing is duplicated any more than a superposition of basis states implies 
> duplication.  That ray in Hilbert space is projected onto a tangent vector in 
> projective Hilbert space along a geodesic. The observer is just forced into 
> observing that evolution with the vector projected once again onto a certain 
> basis element. 
> 
> Now how that happens with the measurement being ultimately nonlocal, with it 
> might be added an ambiguity as to the probability at the measurement, is an 
> open question. In MWI there is no fundamental localization of a wave 
> function, so assigning that projectivization is ambiguous. However, we may 
> "cheat" and say the phenomenological appearance of a localization by the 
> observer acts as this projectivization that appears as a collapse. 
> 
> Nothing is fundamentally duplicated.

OK. Like with Mechanism in arithmetic, there is only first person 
self-differentiation, which appears as self-projection in consistent histories, 
which all exists in an atemporal static embedded in the (structured) collection 
of all computations.

Bruno



> 
> LC
> 
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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-03 Thread smitra


On 03-12-2019 05:21, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:

On 12/2/2019 5:39 PM, smitra wrote:

On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:


On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:

|universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>

We can then analyse the system in some basis:

|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,

where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.

It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have

|universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).

Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
original state.
??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
basis vector.


The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis 
vector
becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the 
result

of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
to avoid the "M" word.)


The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
because initial conditions may make it zero.


Irrelevant to the main point.


The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
state.

If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
stochastic single-world model.


Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.


Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
out life insurance..

Bruce

"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"

Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.

We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
than one branch of the multiverse?

Bruce


Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The 
number of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large 
that your mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going 
to be consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that 
given your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector 
should be described as a very complex superposition involving a large 
number of brain states that are entangled with the environment.


That's true.  But it waaay under estimating the number of brain states
consistent with a thought.  The reason is that many different
quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that
thought...not only different quantum superpositions.



If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate 
ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following 
paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At 
all moments in time, the

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-02 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 12/2/2019 5:39 PM, smitra wrote:

On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:


On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:

|universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>

We can then analyse the system in some basis:

|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,

where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.

It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have

|universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).

Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
original state.
??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
basis vector.


The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result
of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
to avoid the "M" word.)


The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
because initial conditions may make it zero.


Irrelevant to the main point.


The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
state.

If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
stochastic single-world model.


Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.


Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
out life insurance..

Bruce

"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"

Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.

We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
than one branch of the multiverse?

Bruce


Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The 
number of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large 
that your mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going 
to be consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that 
given your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector 
should be described as a very complex superposition involving a large 
number of brain states that are entangled with the environment.


That's true.  But it waaay under estimating the number of brain states 
consistent with a thought.  The reason is that many different 
quasi-classical brain states will be consistent with that thought...not 
only different quantum superpositions.




If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate 
ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following 
paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At 
all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just 
transitioning from one

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-02 Thread smitra

On 03-12-2019 03:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 12:39 PM smitra wrote:

On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift

wrote:

"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch

(stochastically)"

Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds -

theory.

We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
than one branch of the multiverse?

Bruce

Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some
instant),
doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The
number
of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that
your
mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be
consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that given

your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector should
be
described as a very complex superposition involving a large number
of
brain states that are entangled with the environment.

My brain currently has only one state. Other states may be consistent
with my current conscious state, but these do not exist. The idea that
I am a superposition of all brain states consistent with my
consciousness is just idle speculation. How would you ever prove such
a thing?

Using the argument below

If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate
ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following
paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer.
At
all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just
transitioning from one particular state to another state. Since
consciousness is related to the actual physical state of the
computer,
replacing the computer by a dumb device that doesn't compute
anything,
which simply cycles through physical states that the computer would
move
through given some particular set of inputs, will render exactly the

same consciousness.

Yes, and so what? If my consciousness is a sequence of brain states,
anything that produces that same sequence of brain states will produce
my consciousness. Substrate independence, after all.

It cannot be due to a sequence of events given that you are conscious at
every instant.

This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption,

It is not absurd in the least. Argument ad absurdum is not a logical
argument. What is absurd to you may be perfectly reasonable to someone
else.

Substrate independence implies that you can map any sequence of states
to those of any other system, for example a clock.

it's a consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals.

How can a counterfactual exist? By definition, it is counter to the
facts, hence, non-existent.

It requires a multiverse.

Clearly actions
as a response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for
consciousness,

But there cannot be any such thing as a counterfactual input. You
might consider "What if" scenarios. But they are not relevant for
my current brain state. It will do what it will do, whatever the
input.

If your brain is executing an algorithm and the execution of that
algorithm is causing consciousness, then your brain doing something else
if the input where different is relevant.

but there is no room to do that within classical single
World physics. But as I pointed out above the generic state of a
conscious involves being located not in a single branch, but being
distributed over an astronomically large number of different
branches.

Different branches are, by definition, non-interacting, so different
branches correspond to different persons. Anyway, I choose not to
accept this load of speculative rubbish.

A set of "close" branches can define both the approximate output
resulting from the input and also the algorithm that defines the
relationship between the two. A strict single world picture falls prey
to the movie graph argument. At any moment in time your neurons are
processing information in some way, but because consciousness depends
only on the physical state, a fake brain that would always do whatever
your brain is doing regardless of the input would render your
consciousness of that moment.

Bruce

Saibal

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-02 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Tue, Dec 3, 2019 at 12:39 PM smitra  wrote:

> On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
> > wrote:
> >
> > "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
> >
> > Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
> > probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
> > tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
> >
> > We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
> > than one branch of the multiverse?
> >
> > Bruce
>
> Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant),
> doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number
> of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that your
> mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be
> consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that given
> your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector should be
> described as a very complex superposition involving a large number of
> brain states that are entangled with the environment.
>

My brain currently has only one state. Other states may be consistent with
my current conscious state, but these do not exist. The idea that I am a
superposition of all brain states consistent with my consciousness is just
idle speculation. How would you ever prove such a thing?

> If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate
> ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following
> paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At
> all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just
> transitioning from one particular state to another state. Since
> consciousness is related to the actual physical state of the computer,
> replacing the computer by a dumb device that doesn't compute anything,
> which simply cycles through physical states that the computer would move
> through given some particular set of inputs, will render exactly the
> same consciousness.
>

Yes, and so what? If my consciousness is a sequence of brain states,
anything that produces that same sequence of brain states will produce my
consciousness. Substrate independence, after all.

> This absurd conclusion depends only on the single world assumption,


It is not absurd in the least. Argument ad absurdum is not a logical
argument. What is absurd to you may be perfectly reasonable to someone else.

> it's a consequence of the non-existence of counterfactuals.


How can a counterfactual exist? By definition, it is counter to the facts,
hence, non-existent.


> Clearly actions
> as a response to counterfactual inputs must be relevant for
> consciousness,


But there cannot be any such thing as a counterfactual input. You might
consider "What if" scenarios. But they are not relevant for my current
brain state. It will do what it will do, whatever the input.

> but there is no room to do that within classical single
> World physics. But as I pointed out above the generic state of a
> conscious involves being located not in a single branch, but being
> distributed over an astronomically large number of different branches.
>

Different branches are, by definition, non-interacting, so different
branches correspond to different persons. Anyway, I choose not to accept
this load of speculative rubbish.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-02 Thread smitra


On 02-12-2019 09:39, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:


On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a
screen or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full
Hilbert space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with
the rest of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:

|universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>

We can then analyse the system in some basis:

|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,

where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.

It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra
acts over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets
convoluted with the same 'environment' in each case, we have

|universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).

Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger
equation, so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the
original state.
??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert
space.  It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a
basis vector.


The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result
of the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with
anything. So the schematic above must represent the particle or
whatever that is being measured (considered of interest, if you wish
to avoid the "M" word.)


The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized
because initial conditions may make it zero.


Irrelevant to the main point.


The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original
state.

If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are
conserved in each world. Whether there is global conservation
depends on how we treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of
it, there are N copies of the basis+environment in the above sum,
so everything is copied in each individual world. Exactly how you
treat the weights in this situation is not clear to me -- if they
are treated as probabilities, it seems that you just have a
stochastic single-world model.


Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize
after the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic
interpretation is saying what probability means.  But it seems that
the epistemic interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.


Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a
single-world. In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you
end up on only one branch (stochastically). So the other branches do
no work, and might as well be discarded. If you are really worried
about the possibility of fully decohered branches recombining, take
out life insurance..

Bruce

"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"

Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let
probabilities (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the
tent - you might as well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.

We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more
than one branch of the multiverse?

Bruce


Your subjective state (everything that you're aware at some instant), 
doesn't fully specify the exact physical state of your brain. The number 
of distinct physical brain states is so astronomically large that your 
mindset and how you are feeling about everything isn't going to be 
consistent with only one physical brain state. This means that given 
your subjective state, the physical state of your MWI sector should be 
described as a very complex superposition involving a large number of 
brain states that are entangled with the environment.


If we assume that we can bypass this problem and that we can locate 
ourselves in one single branch, then this leads to the following 
paradox. Consider simulating such a conscious entity on a computer. At 
all moments in time, the physical state of the computer is just 
transitioning from one particular state to another state. Since 
consciousness is related to the actual physical state of the computer, 
replacing the computer by a dumb device that doesn't compute anything, 
which simply cycles through physical states that the computer would move 
through given some particular

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-02 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 7:19 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a screen
>>> or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full Hilbert space. We
>>> can take the tensor product of this subspace with the rest of the universe
>>> to recover the full Hilbert space:
>>>
>>>   |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
>>>
>>> We can then analyse the system in some basis:
>>>
>>>|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
>>>
>>> where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis vectors
>>> for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
>>>
>>> It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra acts
>>> over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets convoluted with the
>>> same 'environment' in each case, we have
>>>
>>> |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
>>>
>>> Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger equation, so
>>> it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the original state.
>>>
>>>
>>> ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert space.
>>> It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a basis vector.
>>>
>>
>> The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
>> becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result of
>> the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with anything.
>> So the schematic above must represent the particle or whatever that is
>> being measured (considered of interest, if you wish to avoid the "M" word.)
>>
>>
>>
>>>   The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
>>> anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized because
>>> initial conditions may make it zero.
>>>
>>
>> Irrelevant to the main point.
>>
>>> The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
>>> quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in this sum
>>> has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original state.
>>>
>>> If we take each component of the above sum to represent a self-contained
>>> separate world, then all quantum numbers are conserved in each world.
>>> Whether there is global conservation depends on how we treat the
>>> coefficients c_i. But, on the face of it, there are N copies of the
>>> basis+environment in the above sum, so everything is copied in each
>>> individual world. Exactly how you treat the weights in this situation is
>>> not clear to me -- if they are treated as probabilities, it seems that you
>>> just have a stochastic single-world model.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
>>> interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize after
>>> the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic interpretation is saying
>>> what probability means.  But it seems that the epistemic interpretation
>>> leaves the wf to be a personal belief.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
>> either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
>> everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a single-world.
>> In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you end up on only one
>> branch (stochastically). So the other branches do no work, and might as
>> well be discarded. If you are really worried about the possibility of fully
>> decohered branches recombining, take out life insurance..
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
>
> "even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)"
>
>
> Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let probabilities
> (stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the tent - you might as
> well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.
>

We do have only one world. Do you know of anyone who lives in more than one
branch of the multiverse?

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-02 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, December 1, 2019 at 6:24:08 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>> On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>
>> Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a screen or 
>> through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full Hilbert space. We can 
>> take the tensor product of this subspace with the rest of the universe to 
>> recover the full Hilbert space:
>>
>>   |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
>>
>> We can then analyse the system in some basis:
>>
>>|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
>>
>> where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis vectors 
>> for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
>>
>> It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra acts 
>> over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets convoluted with the 
>> same 'environment' in each case, we have
>>
>> |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
>>
>> Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger equation, so 
>> it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the original state. 
>>
>>
>> ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert space.  It 
>> doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a basis vector.
>>
>
> The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector 
> becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result of 
> the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with anything. 
> So the schematic above must represent the particle or whatever that is 
> being measured (considered of interest, if you wish to avoid the "M" word.)
>
>  
>
>>   The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry 
>> anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized because 
>> initial conditions may make it zero.
>>
>
> Irrelevant to the main point.
>
>> The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum 
>> quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in this sum 
>> has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original state.
>>
>> If we take each component of the above sum to represent a self-contained 
>> separate world, then all quantum numbers are conserved in each world. 
>> Whether there is global conservation depends on how we treat the 
>> coefficients c_i. But, on the face of it, there are N copies of the 
>> basis+environment in the above sum, so everything is copied in each 
>> individual world. Exactly how you treat the weights in this situation is 
>> not clear to me -- if they are treated as probabilities, it seems that you 
>> just have a stochastic single-world model.
>>
>>
>> Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic 
>> interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize after 
>> the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic interpretation is saying 
>> what probability means.  But it seems that the epistemic interpretation 
>> leaves the wf to be a personal belief.
>>
>
> Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In 
> either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and 
> everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a single-world. 
> In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you end up on only one 
> branch (stochastically). So the other branches do no work, and might as 
> well be discarded. If you are really worried about the possibility of fully 
> decohered branches recombining, take out life insurance..
>
> Bruce
>



"even in many-worlds you end up on only one branch (stochastically)" 



Sean Carroll himself has said (in a tweet) that if you let probabilities 
(stochasticity) in - like the camel's nose under the tent - you might as 
well have a one world - not many worlds - theory.



@philipthrift

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-12-01 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sat, Nov 30, 2019 at 12:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a screen or
> through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full Hilbert space. We can
> take the tensor product of this subspace with the rest of the universe to
> recover the full Hilbert space:
>
>   |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>
>
> We can then analyse the system in some basis:
>
>|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,
>
> where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis vectors
> for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.
>
> It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra acts over
> the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets convoluted with the same
> 'environment' in each case, we have
>
> |universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).
>
> Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger equation, so
> it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the original state.
>
>
> ??  The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert space.  It
> doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a basis vector.
>

The formalism supposes that the state represented by each basis vector
becomes entangled with the environment to leave a record of the result of
the measurement. Coordinate systems do not become entangled with anything.
So the schematic above must represent the particle or whatever that is
being measured (considered of interest, if you wish to avoid the "M" word.)



>   The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
> anything.  No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized because
> initial conditions may make it zero.
>

Irrelevant to the main point.

> The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
> quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in this sum
> has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original state.
>
> If we take each component of the above sum to represent a self-contained
> separate world, then all quantum numbers are conserved in each world.
> Whether there is global conservation depends on how we treat the
> coefficients c_i. But, on the face of it, there are N copies of the
> basis+environment in the above sum, so everything is copied in each
> individual world. Exactly how you treat the weights in this situation is
> not clear to me -- if they are treated as probabilities, it seems that you
> just have a stochastic single-world model.
>
>
> Yes, I think that's right.  Which is the attraction of the epistemic
> interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize after
> the measurement.  And one problem with the ontic interpretation is saying
> what probability means.  But it seems that the epistemic interpretation
> leaves the wf to be a personal belief.
>

Yes, I find this easier to understand in a single-world situation. In
either case, you have to renormalise the state -- energy, charge and
everything -- for each branch in many-worlds as much as in a single-world.
In fact, as Zurek points out, even in many-worlds you end up on only one
branch (stochastically). So the other branches do no work, and might as
well be discarded. If you are really worried about the possibility of fully
decohered branches recombining, take out life insurance..

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-29 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/28/2019 4:17 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 5:12 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 11/27/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean
Carroll's book came out.

There has never been an answer.

If you think in terms of the wf of the multiverse, it's just a ray
in Hilbert space and moves around. It doesn't split. What
"splits" is the subspace we're on. So when we measure a spin as
UP or DOWN, our subspace splits into two orthogonal subspaces on
which the ray projects. But they are only orthogonal on that one
dimension (the spin of that particle), so any other variable
encoded in the ray gets projected with the same value as before,
e.g. the energy or the particle.

Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a screen
or through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full Hilbert
space. We can take the tensor product of this subspace with the rest
of the universe to recover the full Hilbert space:

|universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>

We can then analyse the system in some basis:

|system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,

where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis
vectors for (i = 1, ..,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.

It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra acts
over the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets convoluted
with the same 'environment' in each case, we have

|universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).

Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger equation,
so it carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the original state.

?? The basis just defines a coordinate system for the Hilbert space.
It doesn't mean that the wf ray has any component along a basis vector.
The c_i can be zero; in which case that basis vector doesn't carry
anything. No every Schrodinger equation solution is realized because
initial conditions may make it zero.

The environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum
quantities associated with the system of interest. So each term in
this sum has the full energy, charge, and so on of the original state.

If we take each component of the above sum to represent a
self-contained separate world, then all quantum numbers are conserved
in each world. Whether there is global conservation depends on how we
treat the coefficients c_i. But, on the face of it, there are N copies
of the basis+environment in the above sum, so everything is copied in
each individual world. Exactly how you treat the weights in this
situation is not clear to me -- if they are treated as probabilities,
it seems that you just have a stochastic single-world model.

Yes, I think that's right. Which is the attraction of the epistemic
interpretation: you treat them as probabilities so you renormalize after
the measurement. And one problem with the ontic interpretation is
saying what probability means. But it seems that the epistemic
interpretation leaves the wf to be a personal belief.

Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-29 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 2:49:17 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:33:26 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> In any case, in the case of MWI, in the types of examples Sean Carroll 
>> talks about, here's a concrete case:
>>
>> *In one branch, Sean Carroll goes out for a jog around the park.*
>>
>> *In another branch, Sean Carroll; stays home and takes a nap.* 
>>
>> I don't see how the two Seans (running, napping) are in "superposition", 
>> or how Sean's energy is distributed to and within these two worlds.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> It really is not so much that a person is in a superposition than the 
> quantum particles and states that compose them are.
>
> LC 
>



In the MWI branch world Jog where Sean is jogging and in the branch world 
Nap where Sean is napping, the jogging-Sean particles in Jog and the 
napping-Sean particles in Nap are in superposition. 

Then there is another branching of Jog where Sean is hit by a car 
Jog-HitByCar and one where he isn't Jog-NotHitByCar. Particles in 
superpositions: Nap, Jog, Jog-HitByCar, Jog-NotHitByCar, ...

This seems like it should make no sense.

@philipthrift

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-29 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 12:33:26 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 7:30:57 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 11:56:57 PM UTC-6, smitra wrote:
>>>
>>> On 29-11-2019 01:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: 
>>> > On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:45 AM Lawrence Crowell 
>>> >  wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> >> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:55:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift 
>>> >> wrote: 
>>> >> 
>>> >>> But Sean Carroll says there are multiple Sean Carrolls that come 
>>> >>> into being as the MWI branches, so whatever charge Sean Carroll 
>>> >>> now has is "replicated" in World x and World y, and then the 
>>> >>> multiple Sean Carrolls go do their own things independently. 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> That's exactly what he says happens. 
>>> >>> 
>>> >>> @philipthrift 
>>> >> 
>>> >> Really there are no duplicate Carroll's or Crowell's or anyone else. 
>>> >> There are amplitudes for such with a distribution given by a 
>>> >> decoherent set, and phenomenologically any of these in such a branch 
>>> >> "renormalize" the probabilities to one. It is not so much that I 
>>> >> branch and am duplicated, but that I am also existent in other 
>>> >> branches. 
>>> > 
>>> > That is sheer sophistry. If energy, charge, and other conserved 
>>> > quantities, are conserved in each branch, and the number of branches 
>>> > increases exponentially as it does in MWI, then the total amount of 
>>> > these quantities also increases, and  you, and everything else, is 
>>> > duplicated in every branch. If you treat branch weights as 
>>> > probabilities, and then calculate an expectation value over branches, 
>>> > then that expectation value is constant. But that is just a 
>>> > single-world theory. 
>>> > 
>>> > Bruce 
>>>
>>> That total amount has no physical meaning. Different branches are 
>>> analogous to different moments in time in a single universe setting in 
>>> the block universe view. All that happens in the MWI is that instead of 
>>> one successor universe you have multiple ones. But it's not that God is 
>>> continuously destroying universes and creating new universes using the 
>>> energy of the old universe. If it were like that then God would not be 
>>> able to implement the MWI, but this is not how it works. All the future 
>>> and past states are equally real and time evolution is just an 
>>> information conserving mapping. 
>>>
>>> Saibal 
>>>
>>
>> A summation of energy or any other quantum number can make sense in a 
>> local frame. In particular if this local frame can be considered, at least 
>> to some reasonable degree of approximation, as a closed system then it is 
>> reasonable to be concerned over this sum. The thing people are concerned 
>> about is the resetting of probability for a particular branch, which is a 
>> ψ-ontological procedure similar to such a resetting of probability in 
>> the ψ-epistemological method of the collapse. 
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>
>
> In any case, in the case of MWI, in the types of examples Sean Carroll 
> talks about, here's a concrete case:
>
> *In one branch, Sean Carroll goes out for a jog around the park.*
>
> *In another branch, Sean Carroll; stays home and takes a nap.* 
>
> I don't see how the two Seans (running, napping) are in "superposition", 
> or how Sean's energy is distributed to and within these two worlds.
>
> @philipthrift
>

It really is not so much that a person is in a superposition than the 
quantum particles and states that compose them are.

LC 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-29 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, November 29, 2019 at 7:30:57 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 11:56:57 PM UTC-6, smitra wrote:
>>
>> On 29-11-2019 01:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: 
>> > On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:45 AM Lawrence Crowell 
>> >  wrote: 
>> > 
>> >> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:55:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift 
>> >> wrote: 
>> >> 
>> >>> But Sean Carroll says there are multiple Sean Carrolls that come 
>> >>> into being as the MWI branches, so whatever charge Sean Carroll 
>> >>> now has is "replicated" in World x and World y, and then the 
>> >>> multiple Sean Carrolls go do their own things independently. 
>> >>> 
>> >>> That's exactly what he says happens. 
>> >>> 
>> >>> @philipthrift 
>> >> 
>> >> Really there are no duplicate Carroll's or Crowell's or anyone else. 
>> >> There are amplitudes for such with a distribution given by a 
>> >> decoherent set, and phenomenologically any of these in such a branch 
>> >> "renormalize" the probabilities to one. It is not so much that I 
>> >> branch and am duplicated, but that I am also existent in other 
>> >> branches. 
>> > 
>> > That is sheer sophistry. If energy, charge, and other conserved 
>> > quantities, are conserved in each branch, and the number of branches 
>> > increases exponentially as it does in MWI, then the total amount of 
>> > these quantities also increases, and  you, and everything else, is 
>> > duplicated in every branch. If you treat branch weights as 
>> > probabilities, and then calculate an expectation value over branches, 
>> > then that expectation value is constant. But that is just a 
>> > single-world theory. 
>> > 
>> > Bruce 
>>
>> That total amount has no physical meaning. Different branches are 
>> analogous to different moments in time in a single universe setting in 
>> the block universe view. All that happens in the MWI is that instead of 
>> one successor universe you have multiple ones. But it's not that God is 
>> continuously destroying universes and creating new universes using the 
>> energy of the old universe. If it were like that then God would not be 
>> able to implement the MWI, but this is not how it works. All the future 
>> and past states are equally real and time evolution is just an 
>> information conserving mapping. 
>>
>> Saibal 
>>
>
> A summation of energy or any other quantum number can make sense in a 
> local frame. In particular if this local frame can be considered, at least 
> to some reasonable degree of approximation, as a closed system then it is 
> reasonable to be concerned over this sum. The thing people are concerned 
> about is the resetting of probability for a particular branch, which is a 
> ψ-ontological procedure similar to such a resetting of probability in 
> the ψ-epistemological method of the collapse. 
>
> LC
>



In any case, in the case of MWI, in the types of examples Sean Carroll 
talks about, here's a concrete case:

*In one branch, Sean Carroll goes out for a jog around the park.*

*In another branch, Sean Carroll; stays home and takes a nap.* 

I don't see how the two Seans (running, napping) are in "superposition", or 
how Sean's energy is distributed to and within these two worlds.

@philipthrift

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-29 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 11:56:57 PM UTC-6, smitra wrote:
>
> On 29-11-2019 01:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: 
> > On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:45 AM Lawrence Crowell 
> > > wrote: 
> > 
> >> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:55:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift 
> >> wrote: 
> >> 
> >>> But Sean Carroll says there are multiple Sean Carrolls that come 
> >>> into being as the MWI branches, so whatever charge Sean Carroll 
> >>> now has is "replicated" in World x and World y, and then the 
> >>> multiple Sean Carrolls go do their own things independently. 
> >>> 
> >>> That's exactly what he says happens. 
> >>> 
> >>> @philipthrift 
> >> 
> >> Really there are no duplicate Carroll's or Crowell's or anyone else. 
> >> There are amplitudes for such with a distribution given by a 
> >> decoherent set, and phenomenologically any of these in such a branch 
> >> "renormalize" the probabilities to one. It is not so much that I 
> >> branch and am duplicated, but that I am also existent in other 
> >> branches. 
> > 
> > That is sheer sophistry. If energy, charge, and other conserved 
> > quantities, are conserved in each branch, and the number of branches 
> > increases exponentially as it does in MWI, then the total amount of 
> > these quantities also increases, and  you, and everything else, is 
> > duplicated in every branch. If you treat branch weights as 
> > probabilities, and then calculate an expectation value over branches, 
> > then that expectation value is constant. But that is just a 
> > single-world theory. 
> > 
> > Bruce 
>
> That total amount has no physical meaning. Different branches are 
> analogous to different moments in time in a single universe setting in 
> the block universe view. All that happens in the MWI is that instead of 
> one successor universe you have multiple ones. But it's not that God is 
> continuously destroying universes and creating new universes using the 
> energy of the old universe. If it were like that then God would not be 
> able to implement the MWI, but this is not how it works. All the future 
> and past states are equally real and time evolution is just an 
> information conserving mapping. 
>
> Saibal 
>

A summation of energy or any other quantum number can make sense in a local 
frame. In particular if this local frame can be considered, at least to 
some reasonable degree of approximation, as a closed system then it is 
reasonable to be concerned over this sum. The thing people are concerned 
about is the resetting of probability for a particular branch, which is a 
ψ-ontological procedure similar to such a resetting of probability in 
the ψ-epistemological method of the collapse. 

LC

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread smitra

On 29-11-2019 01:00, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:45 AM Lawrence Crowell
wrote:

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:55:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift
wrote:

But Sean Carroll says there are multiple Sean Carrolls that come
into being as the MWI branches, so whatever charge Sean Carroll
now has is "replicated" in World x and World y, and then the
multiple Sean Carrolls go do their own things independently.

That's exactly what he says happens.

@philipthrift

Really there are no duplicate Carroll's or Crowell's or anyone else.
There are amplitudes for such with a distribution given by a
decoherent set, and phenomenologically any of these in such a branch
"renormalize" the probabilities to one. It is not so much that I
branch and am duplicated, but that I am also existent in other
branches.

That is sheer sophistry. If energy, charge, and other conserved
quantities, are conserved in each branch, and the number of branches
increases exponentially as it does in MWI, then the total amount of
these quantities also increases, and you, and everything else, is
duplicated in every branch. If you treat branch weights as
probabilities, and then calculate an expectation value over branches,
then that expectation value is constant. But that is just a
single-world theory.

Bruce

That total amount has no physical meaning. Different branches are
analogous to different moments in time in a single universe setting in
the block universe view. All that happens in the MWI is that instead of
one successor universe you have multiple ones. But it's not that God is
continuously destroying universes and creating new universes using the
energy of the old universe. If it were like that then God would not be
able to implement the MWI, but this is not how it works. All the future
and past states are equally real and time evolution is just an
information conserving mapping.

Saibal

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 1:37 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> That electron existed in a electrically neutral universe, if you
>> multiply that by "a very large number" you've got a very large number of 
>> electrically
>> neutral universes and charge conservation is preserved in each branch and
>> of course in the entire multiverse.
>
>
>
> * > And you could apply the same reasoning to energy.  Almost all ways of
> assigning a total energy to the universe find it to be zero.*
>

As Sean Carroll points out, if you insist you could say that, you
could say there’s
energy in the gravitational field but it’s negative so it exactly cancels
the energy you think is being gained in the matter fields; but what would
be the point? Saying that will not increase anybody's understanding of what is
going on, and unlike other forms of energy there is no such thing as the
density of gravitational energy so you can only use it while talking about
the universe as a whole, you can't use it to solve local problems unless
they are isolated from the rest of the universe which rarely happens even
approximately. Why not just admit it and say energy conservation stops
being useful when things get very big?

John K Clark

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 6:00:22 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:45 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:55:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> But Sean Carroll says there are multiple Sean Carrolls that come into 
>>> being as the MWI branches, so whatever charge Sean Carroll now has is 
>>> "replicated" in World x and World y, and then the multiple Sean Carrolls go 
>>> do their own things independently.
>>>
>>> That's exactly what he says happens.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> Really there are no duplicate Carroll's or Crowell's or anyone else. 
>> There are amplitudes for such with a distribution given by a decoherent 
>> set, and phenomenologically any of these in such a branch "renormalize" the 
>> probabilities to one. It is not so much that I branch and am duplicated, 
>> but that I am also existent in other branches.  
>>
>
> That is sheer sophistry. If energy, charge, and other conserved 
> quantities, are conserved in each branch, and the number of branches 
> increases exponentially as it does in MWI, then the total amount of these 
> quantities also increases, and  you, and everything else, is duplicated in 
> every branch. If you treat branch weights as probabilities, and then 
> calculate an expectation value over branches, then that expectation value 
> is constant. But that is just a single-world theory.
>
> Bruce
>

The reason quantum numbers can be conserved in a particular branch and also 
within the global wave function is that on the branch the probability has 
been set to unity. On the global wave these observables are majorized by 
the probabilities that on each branch are set to unity. It is a bit strange 
to think about, but I think if you give it some reflection you will see 
this.

LC

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 5:12 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 11/27/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book
> came out.
>
> There has never been an answer.
>
>
> If you think in terms of the wf of the multiverse, it's just a ray in
> Hilbert space and moves around.  It doesn't split.  What "splits" is the
> subspace we're on.  So when we measure a spin as UP or DOWN, our subspace
> splits into two orthogonal subspaces on which the ray projects.  But they
> are only orthogonal on that one dimension (the spin of that particle), so
> any other variable encoded in the ray gets projected with the same value as
> before, e.g. the energy or the particle.
>

Right. The subsystem we are considering (an electron fired at a screen or
through an S-G magnet) is just a subspace of the full Hilbert space. We can
take the tensor product of this subspace with the rest of the universe to
recover the full Hilbert space:

  |universe> = |system>{\otimes}|environment>

We can then analyse the system in some basis:

   |system> = Sum_i c_i |basis_i>,

where c_i are complex coefficients, and |basis_i> are the basis vectors for
(i = 1, ...,, N), N being the dimension of the subspace.

It is assumed that the normal distributive law of vector algebra acts over
the tensor product, so each basis vector then gets convoluted with the same
'environment' in each case, we have

|universe> = Sum_i c_i (|basis_i>|environment>).

Each basis vector is a solution of the original Schrodinger equation, so it
carries the full energy, moment, change etc, of the original state. The
environment is just the rest of the universe minus the quantum quantities
associated with the system of interest. So each term in this sum has the
full energy, charge, and so on of the original state.

If we take each component of the above sum to represent a self-contained
separate world, then all quantum numbers are conserved in each world.
Whether there is global conservation depends on how we treat the
coefficients c_i. But, on the face of it, there are N copies of the
basis+environment in the above sum, so everything is copied in each
individual world. Exactly how you treat the weights in this situation is
not clear to me -- if they are treated as probabilities, it seems that you
just have a stochastic single-world model.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 1:45 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:55:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> But Sean Carroll says there are multiple Sean Carrolls that come into
>> being as the MWI branches, so whatever charge Sean Carroll now has is
>> "replicated" in World x and World y, and then the multiple Sean Carrolls go
>> do their own things independently.
>>
>> That's exactly what he says happens.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> Really there are no duplicate Carroll's or Crowell's or anyone else. There
> are amplitudes for such with a distribution given by a decoherent set, and
> phenomenologically any of these in such a branch "renormalize" the
> probabilities to one. It is not so much that I branch and am duplicated,
> but that I am also existent in other branches.
>

That is sheer sophistry. If energy, charge, and other conserved quantities,
are conserved in each branch, and the number of branches increases
exponentially as it does in MWI, then the total amount of these quantities
also increases, and  you, and everything else, is duplicated in every
branch. If you treat branch weights as probabilities, and then calculate an
expectation value over branches, then that expectation value is constant.
But that is just a single-world theory.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread Philip Thrift

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 8:45:50 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
>
> Really there are no duplicate Carroll's or Crowell's or anyone else. There 
> are amplitudes for such with a distribution given by a decoherent set, and 
> phenomenologically any of these in such a branch "renormalize" the 
> probabilities to one. It is not so much that I branch and am duplicated, 
> but that I am also existent in other branches.  
>
> LC
>

This sounds like an interpretation of quantum mechanics, but it doesn't 
sound like Many Worlds as presented by Sean Carroll. It sounds more like

The concept of *multiple histories 
* is closely related to 
the many-worlds interpretation 
 of quantum 
mechanics . In the same 
way that the many-worlds interpretation regards possible futures as having 
a real existence of their own, the theory of multiple histories reverses 
this in time to regard the many possible past histories of a given event as 
having real existence.

Suppose Sean had written a book on this vs. what he wrote about.

@philipthrift

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 12:12:22 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/27/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 5:39:09 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote: 
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 4:51:55 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: 
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

 *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws 
> is interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a 
> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and 
> get 
> charge conservation in every branch?*

 Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems 
 likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem 
 like much of a problem.

>>>
>>>
>>> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number 
>>> of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can 
>>> land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very 
>>> large number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> The electric charge in one branch is the same electric charge in all 
>> other branches.
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
>
> So the number of *coulombs*  in a branching Many Worlds grows 
> exponentially .
>
> Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units 
> , 
> which took effect on 20 May 2019,[2] 
>  the elementary 
> charge  (the charge of 
> the proton ) is exactly 1.602176634×
> 10−19 coulombs. Thus the coulomb is exactly the charge of 1/(1.602176634×
> 10−19) protons, which is approximately 6.2415090744×1018 protons (1.036×10
> −5 mol ). The same number of 
> electrons  has the same magnitude 
> but opposite sign of charge, that is, a charge of −1 C.
>
>
> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book 
> came out.
>
> There has never been an answer.
>
>
> If you think in terms of the wf of the multiverse, it's just a ray in 
> Hilbert space and moves around.  It doesn't split.  What "splits" is the 
> subspace we're on.  So when we measure a spin as UP or DOWN, our subspace 
> splits into two orthogonal subspaces on which the ray projects.  But they 
> are only orthogonal on that one dimension (the spin of that particle), so 
> any other variable encoded in the ray gets projected with the same value as 
> before, e.g. the energy or the particle.
>
> Brent
>

That is more in line with what is going on. The charge of an electron, 
along with all other quantum numbers of the electron or any elementary 
particle, is not duplicated. It only appears in any sort of branch and with 
the renormalization of probability there is this mistaken idea of 
duplication. Nothing is duplicated any more than a superposition of basis 
states implies duplication.  That ray in Hilbert space is projected onto a 
tangent vector in projective Hilbert space along a geodesic. The observer 
is just forced into observing that evolution with the vector projected once 
again onto a certain basis element. 

Now how that happens with the measurement being ultimately nonlocal, with 
it might be added an ambiguity as to the probability at the measurement, is 
an open question. In MWI there is no fundamental localization of a wave 
function, so assigning that projectivization is ambiguous. However, we may 
"cheat" and say the phenomenological appearance of a localization by the 
observer acts as this projectivization that appears as a collapse. 

Nothing is fundamentally duplicated.

LC

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/28/2019 2:36 AM, John Clark wrote:



On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:51 PM Bruce Kellett > wrote:




Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it
seems likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of
charge doesn't seem like much of a problem.



/> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large
number of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the
electron can land. There was only one negative charge originally
-- now there are a very large number. Where did the extra charges
come from?/


What extra charges? That electron existed in a electrically neutral 
universe, if you multiply that by "a very large number" you've got 
a very large number of electrically neutral universes and charge 
conservation is preserved in each branch and of course in the entire 
multiverse.


And you could apply the same reasoning to energy.  Almost all ways of 
assigning a total energy to the universe find it to be zero.


Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/27/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 5:39:09 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell
wrote:

On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 4:51:55 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark
wrote:

On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

/> I think your/[Brent Meeker] /point about other
conservation laws is interesting -- especially charge.
How would you divide the charge of a state among the
superposed basis states according to the Born rule and
get charge conservation in every branch?/

Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and
it seems likely all of them are, so preserving
conservation of charge doesn't seem like much of a problem.

Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very
large number of sub-branches created -- one for every position
that the electron can land. There was only one negative charge
originally -- now there are a very large number. Where did the
extra charges come from?

Bruce

The electric charge in one branch is the same electric charge in
all other branches.

So the number of *coulombs* in a branching Many Worlds grows
exponentially .

Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units
,
which took effect on 20 May 2019,^[2]
the
elementary charge
(the charge of the
proton ) is exactly
1.602176634×10^−19 coulombs. Thus the coulomb is exactly the charge
of 1/(1.602176634×10^−19 ) protons, which is approximately
6.2415090744×10^18 protons (1.036×10^−5 mol
). The same number of
electrons has the same
magnitude but opposite sign of charge, that is, a charge of −1 C.

This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's
book came out.

There has never been an answer.

If you think in terms of the wf of the multiverse, it's just a ray in
Hilbert space and moves around. It doesn't split. What "splits" is the
subspace we're on. So when we measure a spin as UP or DOWN, our
subspace splits into two orthogonal subspaces on which the ray
projects. But they are only orthogonal on that one dimension (the spin
of that particle), so any other variable encoded in the ray gets
projected with the same value as before, e.g. the energy or the particle.

Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/27/2019 10:21 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 5:19 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:


On 11/27/2019 6:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 11:49 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 11/27/2019 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:47 AM Pierz mailto:pier...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 9:51:55 AM UTC+11,
Bruce wrote:

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark
 wrote:

On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

/> I think your/[Brent Meeker] /point about
other conservation laws is interesting --
especially charge. How would you divide the
charge of a state among the superposed basis
states according to the Born rule and get
charge conservation in every branch?/


Our branch of the multiverse is electrically
neutral and it seems likely all of them are, so
preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem
like much of a problem.



Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a
very large number of sub-branches created -- one for
every position that the electron can land. There was
only one negative charge originally -- now there are
a very large number. Where did the extra charges
come from?

I think it's a misapplication of rules that empirically
apply (locally, as JC points out) within branches, which
is the only world we ever directly know. "Where did the
extra charges come from?" is the same question as "where
did the extra matter come from?", yet that is simply
what happens /ex hypothesi /in//MWI. We observe that
time evolution is unitary - and that observation is
naturally always within the context of individual
branches. Therefore it seems to me to be over-extending
the principle to even try to apply that rule across
branches as well. Perhaps there is some
"renormalization" we can do to make a preserved
quantity, but why bother - just so that we can say, hey,
look at that, we preserved it!? I tried to explain MWI
to a physics-naive friend once and she said, "but then
you'd see the other copies!" (or something like that).
Well of course that is silly, but fundamentally it's the
same mistake - thinking that principles that apply
across individual branches must also apply between them.


Fair enough. That sounds reasonable. The trouble is that
conservation in the wave function comes from unitary
evolution. And unitary evolution applies only to the
universal wave function -- time development on individual
branches is not unitary.


Although it's not in the way contemplated for MWI, it has
been known since Wigner that some measurements will not
conserve energy (even locally) it was proven in general for
conserved quantities in the WAY theorem:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.04607.pdf


Does not the Wigner result (and the WAY theorem) depend on the
dubious assumption that since measurements are represent by
hermitian operators, all hermitian operators correspond to
measurements? Clearly, not all hermitian matrices commute with
 the Hamiltonian.


As I understand it the theorem says that any exact measurement
must commute with the Hamiltonian in order that energy be
conserved.  But the catch is "exact".  It means putting the system
measured into the eigenstate corresponding to the measured value. 
But if a very small deviation is allowed, so that the measured
state includes a very small admixture of orthogonal states then
the energy conservation can be satisfied even for operators that
don't commute with the Hamiltonian...but then the measurement is
not "exact" in von Neumann's sense of leaving the system in an
exact eigenstate.


So it is not really relevant to the issue at hand.


Right.  It's not relevant to the duplication/division of MWI.

Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:53 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> *Much the same would happen if the cosmos has a net angular momentum,
> where that spacetime would have features of the G**ödel universe.*

And if the universe rotated then it would be possible to build a time
machine where you could go into the past and kill your great grandfather,
so you never existed so you never killed your great grandfather, so you did
exist and you did build a time machine where you killed your great
grandfather, so ...

 John K Clark

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:57:11 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 4:52:26 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 2:51 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>> *> So the number of coulombs  in a branching Many Worlds grows 
>>> exponentially .*
>>>
>>
>> There are both positive coulombs and negative coulombs, when you add them 
>> all up in each branch you get exactly zero, and zero times a number, even a 
>> very large number, is zero. And 0,0,0,0 is not an example of 
>> exponential growth. 
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>  
>>
>
> The electrically charged universe
> Michael Düren 
> 
> (Submitted on 31 Jan 2012)
>
> The paper discusses the possibility of a universe that is not electrically 
> neutral but has a net positive charge. It is claimed that such a universe 
> contains a homogeneous distribution of protons that are not bound to 
> galaxies and fill up the intergalactic space. This proton `gas' charges 
> macroscopic objects like stars and planets, but it does not generate 
> electrostatic or magnetic fields that affect the motion of these bodies 
> significantly. However, the proton gas may contribute significantly to the 
> total dark matter of the universe and its electrostatic potential may 
> contribute to the dark energy and to the expansion of the universe.
>
> Subjects: General Physics (physics.gen-ph)
> MSC classes: 83F05
> Cite as: arXiv:1201.6585 
>  [physics.gen-ph]
>
>
> @philipthrift 
>

The problem with the idea of a cosmos that is electrically charged is 
electric field lines do not terminate at charges. There would then be 
electric charges that either wrap around a finite volume space and drive 
the electrical energy into some divergence, or for a flat or R^3 Euclidean 
spatial topology there is some electric field reaching out "to infinity" 
that defines some topological index out there that would violate 
Hawking-Penrose energy conditions. Much the same would happen if the cosmos 
has a net angular momentum, where that spacetime would have features of the 
Gödel universe.

LC

LC 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:55:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:26:39 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 1:51:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 5:39:09 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>>> wrote:

 On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 4:51:55 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett  
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws 
>>> is interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of 
>>> a 
>>> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and 
>>> get 
>>> charge conservation in every branch?*
>>
>>
>> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems 
>> likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't 
>> seem 
>> like much of a problem.
>>
>
>
> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number 
> of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can 
> land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a 
> very 
> large number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>
> Bruce
>

 The electric charge in one branch is the same electric charge in all 
 other branches.

 LC 

>>>
>>>
>>> So the number of *coulombs*  in a branching Many Worlds grows 
>>> exponentially .
>>>
>>> Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units 
>>> , 
>>> which took effect on 20 May 2019,[2] 
>>>  the elementary 
>>> charge  (the charge of 
>>> the proton ) is exactly 1.602176
>>> 634×10−19 coulombs. Thus the coulomb is exactly the charge of 1/(1.602
>>> 176634×10−19) protons, which is approximately 6.2415090744×1018 protons 
>>> (1.036×10−5 mol ). The same 
>>> number of electrons  has the 
>>> same magnitude but opposite sign of charge, that is, a charge of −1 C.
>>>
>>>
>>> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book 
>>> came out.
>>>
>>> There has never been an answer.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> No, no, no! This happens no more than does the number of coulombs 
>> multiply when an electron is in some superposition of states. In MWI, and I 
>> am not trying to be a panegyric for MWI,  there is still a superposition of 
>> states. The trajectory or geodesic is in the Fubini-Study metric, a line 
>> bundle space of  π:H → PH on Hilbert space and its projectivization on the 
>> line bundle. The observer is restricted to a sort of "frame dragging" along 
>> one basis direction. This does not mean the charge is duplicated in any 
>> global sense, but more that the observer simply observes the electron and 
>> its associated charge with respect to one measurement outcome. This really 
>> is not that different from the CI construct with projector operators. The 
>> observer along other paths similarly observes the same electron and charge, 
>> but just carried along another basis direction.
>>
>> THE CHARGE IS NOT DUPLICATED! I don't know how to more emphatically state 
>> this!
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>
>
> But Sean Carroll says there are multiple Sean Carrolls that come into 
> being as the MWI branches, so whatever charge Sean Carroll now has is 
> "replicated" in World x and World y, and then the multiple Sean Carrolls go 
> do their own things independently.
>
> That's exactly what he says happens.
>
> @philipthrift
>

Really there are no duplicate Carroll's or Crowell's or anyone else. There 
are amplitudes for such with a distribution given by a decoherent set, and 
phenomenologically any of these in such a branch "renormalize" the 
probabilities to one. It is not so much that I branch and am duplicated, 
but that I am also existent in other branches.  

LC

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread Philip Thrift

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 4:52:26 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 2:51 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
> *> So the number of coulombs  in a branching Many Worlds grows 
>> exponentially .*
>>
>
> There are both positive coulombs and negative coulombs, when you add them 
> all up in each branch you get exactly zero, and zero times a number, even a 
> very large number, is zero. And 0,0,0,0 is not an example of 
> exponential growth. 
>
> John K Clark
>
>  
>

The electrically charged universe
Michael Düren 

(Submitted on 31 Jan 2012)

The paper discusses the possibility of a universe that is not electrically 
neutral but has a net positive charge. It is claimed that such a universe 
contains a homogeneous distribution of protons that are not bound to 
galaxies and fill up the intergalactic space. This proton `gas' charges 
macroscopic objects like stars and planets, but it does not generate 
electrostatic or magnetic fields that affect the motion of these bodies 
significantly. However, the proton gas may contribute significantly to the 
total dark matter of the universe and its electrostatic potential may 
contribute to the dark energy and to the expansion of the universe.

Subjects: General Physics (physics.gen-ph)
MSC classes: 83F05
Cite as: arXiv:1201.6585  [physics.gen-ph]

@philipthrift 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread Philip Thrift



On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 7:26:39 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 1:51:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 5:39:09 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 4:51:55 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

 On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett  
> wrote:
>
> *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws 
>> is interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of 
>> a 
>> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and 
>> get 
>> charge conservation in every branch?*
>
>
> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems 
> likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem 
> like much of a problem.
>


 Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number 
 of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can 
 land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a 
 very 
 large number. Where did the extra charges come from?

 Bruce

>>>
>>> The electric charge in one branch is the same electric charge in all 
>>> other branches.
>>>
>>> LC 
>>>
>>
>>
>> So the number of *coulombs*  in a branching Many Worlds grows 
>> exponentially .
>>
>> Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units 
>> , 
>> which took effect on 20 May 2019,[2] 
>>  the elementary 
>> charge  (the charge of 
>> the proton ) is exactly 1.602176634
>> ×10−19 coulombs. Thus the coulomb is exactly the charge of 1/(1.602176634
>> ×10−19) protons, which is approximately 6.2415090744×1018 protons (1.036×
>> 10−5 mol ). The same number 
>> of electrons  has the same 
>> magnitude but opposite sign of charge, that is, a charge of −1 C.
>>
>>
>> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book 
>> came out.
>>
>> There has never been an answer.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> No, no, no! This happens no more than does the number of coulombs multiply 
> when an electron is in some superposition of states. In MWI, and I am not 
> trying to be a panegyric for MWI,  there is still a superposition of 
> states. The trajectory or geodesic is in the Fubini-Study metric, a line 
> bundle space of  π:H → PH on Hilbert space and its projectivization on the 
> line bundle. The observer is restricted to a sort of "frame dragging" along 
> one basis direction. This does not mean the charge is duplicated in any 
> global sense, but more that the observer simply observes the electron and 
> its associated charge with respect to one measurement outcome. This really 
> is not that different from the CI construct with projector operators. The 
> observer along other paths similarly observes the same electron and charge, 
> but just carried along another basis direction.
>
> THE CHARGE IS NOT DUPLICATED! I don't know how to more emphatically state 
> this!
>
> LC
>



But Sean Carroll says there are multiple Sean Carrolls that come into being 
as the MWI branches, so whatever charge Sean Carroll now has is 
"replicated" in World x and World y, and then the multiple Sean Carrolls go 
do their own things independently.

That's exactly what he says happens.

@philipthrift

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 1:51:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 5:39:09 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 4:51:55 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

 *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws 
> is interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a 
> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and 
> get 
> charge conservation in every branch?*

 Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems 
 likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem 
 like much of a problem.

>>>
>>>
>>> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number 
>>> of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can 
>>> land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very 
>>> large number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> The electric charge in one branch is the same electric charge in all 
>> other branches.
>>
>> LC 
>>
>
>
> So the number of *coulombs*  in a branching Many Worlds grows 
> exponentially .
>
> Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units 
> , 
> which took effect on 20 May 2019,[2] 
>  the elementary 
> charge  (the charge of 
> the proton ) is exactly 1.602176634×
> 10−19 coulombs. Thus the coulomb is exactly the charge of 1/(1.602176634×
> 10−19) protons, which is approximately 6.2415090744×1018 protons (1.036×10
> −5 mol ). The same number of 
> electrons  has the same magnitude 
> but opposite sign of charge, that is, a charge of −1 C.
>
>
> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book 
> came out.
>
> There has never been an answer.
>
> @philipthrift
>

No, no, no! This happens no more than does the number of coulombs multiply 
when an electron is in some superposition of states. In MWI, and I am not 
trying to be a panegyric for MWI,  there is still a superposition of 
states. The trajectory or geodesic is in the Fubini-Study metric, a line 
bundle space of  π:H → PH on Hilbert space and its projectivization on the 
line bundle. The observer is restricted to a sort of "frame dragging" along 
one basis direction. This does not mean the charge is duplicated in any 
global sense, but more that the observer simply observes the electron and 
its associated charge with respect to one measurement outcome. This really 
is not that different from the CI construct with projector operators. The 
observer along other paths similarly observes the same electron and charge, 
but just carried along another basis direction.

THE CHARGE IS NOT DUPLICATED! I don't know how to more emphatically state 
this!

LC

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 7:07 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> The trouble seems to be that this account is different from the account
> given in the energy case, where we were supposed to weight the sub-branches
> by their corresponding Born weights.

That's because the charge conservation explanation is shorter and simpler;
I don't have to talk about the square of the absolute value of the wave
function, all I have to say is that any number multiplied by zero is zero.
Charge conservation seems to be more fundamental than matter/energy
conservation, a virtual electron can just pop into existence in the vacuum
for a very short time, but even for that very short time charge
conservation is preserved because when that negatively charged virtual
electron pops into existence a positively charged virtual anti-electron
always pops into existence too.

John K Clark

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-28 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:37 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:51 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems
>>> likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem
>>> like much of a problem.
>>>
>>
>>
>> *> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number
>> of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can
>> land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very
>> large number. Where did the extra charges come from?*
>>
>
> What extra charges? That electron existed in a electrically neutral
> universe, if you multiply that by "a very large number" you've got a very
> large number of electrically neutral universes and charge conservation is
> preserved in each branch and of course in the entire multiverse.
>

That seems to be nearly an explanation. When you single the electron out
and consider its wave function as representing a large number of possible
positions on the screen, the rest of the universe must have a net positive
charge, since it starts off electrically neutral. So as the rest of the
universe is split, the electron always arrives in a universe that is
lacking one negative charge, so that the result is always a universe that
is electrically neutral on every branch.

The trouble seems to be that this account is different from the account
given in the energy case, where we were supposed to weight the sub-branches
by their corresponding Born weights. With the result that the original
energy was split among the branches according to the Born weights, and the
total energy of the global wave function was not increased. In the charge
case, the original charge is not split according to any weight at all --
that would not make sense. So a corresponding number of positively charged
universes have to be created so that each branch can end up electrically
neutral. In the global wave function, therefore, the total number of
electrons (and cancelling positive charges) must have increased by the
number of possible positions that the original electron could have landed.

This all seems a bit ad hoc and odd. Why should the Born weights play a
role for energy, but not for charge? Or is it the case that the Born
weights play no role at all, and in the energy case, the rest of the
universe in which the particle lands is always one lacking the energy of
just that particle. Energy being then conserved in every branch separately,
but not in the global wave function? Odd, to say the least.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 2:51 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
*> So the number of coulombs  in a branching Many Worlds grows
> exponentially .*
>

There are both positive coulombs and negative coulombs, when you add them
all up in each branch you get exactly zero, and zero times a number, even a
very large number, is zero. And 0,0,0,0 is not an example of
exponential growth.

John K Clark

 John K Clark






>
> Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units
> ,
> which took effect on 20 May 2019,[2]
>  the elementary
> charge  (the charge of
> the proton ) is exactly 1.602176634×
> 10−19 coulombs. Thus the coulomb is exactly the charge of 1/(1.602176634×
> 10−19) protons, which is approximately 6.2415090744×1018 protons (1.036×10
> −5 mol ). The same number of
> electrons  has the same magnitude
> but opposite sign of charge, that is, a charge of −1 C.
>
>
> This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book
> came out.
>
> There has never been an answer.
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
> --
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> 
> .
>

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:51 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:


>
>> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems
>> likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem
>> like much of a problem.
>>
>
>
> *> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number
> of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can
> land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very
> large number. Where did the extra charges come from?*
>

What extra charges? That electron existed in a electrically neutral
universe, if you multiply that by "a very large number" you've got a very
large number of electrically neutral universes and charge conservation is
preserved in each branch and of course in the entire multiverse.

 John K Clark

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-27 Thread Philip Thrift



On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 5:39:09 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 4:51:55 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws is 
 interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a 
 state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and get 
 charge conservation in every branch?*
>>>
>>>
>>> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems 
>>> likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem 
>>> like much of a problem.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number of 
>> sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can land. 
>> There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very large 
>> number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> The electric charge in one branch is the same electric charge in all other 
> branches.
>
> LC 
>


So the number of *coulombs*  in a branching Many Worlds grows exponentially 
.

Under the 2019 redefinition of the SI base units 
, 
which took effect on 20 May 2019,[2] 
 the elementary 
charge  (the charge of the 
proton ) is exactly 1.602176634×10−19 
coulombs. 
Thus the coulomb is exactly the charge of 1/(1.602176634×10−19) protons, 
which is approximately 6.2415090744×1018 protons (1.036×10−5 mol 
). The same number of electrons 
 has the same magnitude but 
opposite sign of charge, that is, a charge of −1 C.


This was the issue about mass raised weeks ago when Sean Carroll's book 
came out.

There has never been an answer.

@philipthrift


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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 5:19 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 11/27/2019 6:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 11:49 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 11/27/2019 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:47 AM Pierz  wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 9:51:55 AM UTC+11, Bruce wrote:

 On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws
>> is interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a
>> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and 
>> get
>> charge conservation in every branch?*
>
>
> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems
> likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem
> like much of a problem.
>


 Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number
 of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can
 land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very
 large number. Where did the extra charges come from?

 I think it's a misapplication of rules that empirically apply (locally,
>>> as JC points out) within branches, which is the only world we ever directly
>>> know. "Where did the extra charges come from?" is the same question as
>>> "where did the extra matter come from?", yet that is simply what happens 
>>> *ex hypothesi
>>> *in MWI. We observe that time evolution is unitary - and that
>>> observation is naturally always within the context of individual branches.
>>> Therefore it seems to me to be over-extending the principle to even try to
>>> apply that rule across branches as well. Perhaps there is some
>>> "renormalization" we can do to make a preserved quantity, but why bother -
>>> just so that we can say, hey, look at that, we preserved it!? I tried to
>>> explain MWI to a physics-naive friend once and she said, "but then you'd
>>> see the other copies!" (or something like that). Well of course that is
>>> silly, but fundamentally it's the same mistake - thinking that principles
>>> that apply across individual branches must also apply between them.
>>>
>>
>> Fair enough. That sounds reasonable. The trouble is that conservation in
>> the wave function comes from unitary evolution. And unitary evolution
>> applies only to the universal wave function -- time development on
>> individual branches is not unitary.
>>
>>
>> Although it's not in the way contemplated for MWI, it has been known
>> since Wigner that some measurements will not conserve energy (even locally)
>> it was proven in general for conserved quantities in the WAY theorem:
>> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.04607.pdf
>>
>
> Does not the Wigner result (and the WAY theorem) depend on the dubious
> assumption that since measurements are represent by hermitian operators,
> all hermitian operators correspond to measurements? Clearly, not all
> hermitian matrices commute with  the Hamiltonian.
>
>
> As I understand it the theorem says that any exact measurement must
> commute with the Hamiltonian in order that energy be conserved.  But the
> catch is "exact".  It means putting the system measured into the eigenstate
> corresponding to the measured value.  But if a very small deviation is
> allowed, so that the measured state includes a very small admixture of
> orthogonal states then the energy conservation can be satisfied even for
> operators that don't commute with the Hamiltonian...but then the
> measurement is not "exact" in von Neumann's sense of leaving the system in
> an exact eigenstate.
>

So it is not really relevant to the issue at hand.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-27 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/27/2019 6:11 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 11:49 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 11/27/2019 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:47 AM Pierz mailto:pier...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 9:51:55 AM UTC+11, Bruce
wrote:

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark
wrote:

On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

/> I think your/[Brent Meeker] /point about other
conservation laws is interesting -- especially
charge. How would you divide the charge of a
state among the superposed basis states according
to the Born rule and get charge conservation in
every branch?/

Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral
and it seems likely all of them are, so preserving
conservation of charge doesn't seem like much of a
problem.

Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very
large number of sub-branches created -- one for every
position that the electron can land. There was only one
negative charge originally -- now there are a very large
number. Where did the extra charges come from?

I think it's a misapplication of rules that empirically apply
(locally, as JC points out) within branches, which is the
only world we ever directly know. "Where did the extra
charges come from?" is the same question as "where did the
extra matter come from?", yet that is simply what happens
/ex hypothesi /in//MWI. We observe that time evolution is
unitary - and that observation is naturally always within the
context of individual branches. Therefore it seems to me to
be over-extending the principle to even try to apply that
rule across branches as well. Perhaps there is some
"renormalization" we can do to make a preserved quantity, but
why bother - just so that we can say, hey, look at that, we
preserved it!? I tried to explain MWI to a physics-naive
friend once and she said, "but then you'd see the other
copies!" (or something like that). Well of course that is
silly, but fundamentally it's the same mistake - thinking
that principles that apply across individual branches must
also apply between them.

Fair enough. That sounds reasonable. The trouble is that
conservation in the wave function comes from unitary evolution.
And unitary evolution applies only to the universal wave function
-- time development on individual branches is not unitary.

Although it's not in the way contemplated for MWI, it has been
known since Wigner that some measurements will not conserve energy
(even locally) it was proven in general for conserved quantities
in the WAY theorem: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.04607.pdf

Does not the Wigner result (and the WAY theorem) depend on the dubious
assumption that since measurements are represent by hermitian
operators, all hermitian operators correspond to measurements?
Clearly, not all hermitian matrices commute with the Hamiltonian.

As I understand it the theorem says that any exact measurement must
commute with the Hamiltonian in order that energy be conserved. But the
catch is "exact". It means putting the system measured into the
eigenstate corresponding to the measured value. But if a very small
deviation is allowed, so that the measured state includes a very small
admixture of orthogonal states then the energy conservation can be
satisfied even for operators that don't commute with the
Hamiltonian...but then the measurement is not "exact" in von Neumann's
sense of leaving the system in an exact eigenstate.

Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 11:49 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 11/27/2019 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:47 AM Pierz  wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 9:51:55 AM UTC+11, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

 *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws
> is interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a
> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and get
> charge conservation in every branch?*


 Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems
 likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem
 like much of a problem.

>>>
>>>
>>> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number
>>> of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can
>>> land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very
>>> large number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>>>
>>> I think it's a misapplication of rules that empirically apply (locally,
>> as JC points out) within branches, which is the only world we ever directly
>> know. "Where did the extra charges come from?" is the same question as
>> "where did the extra matter come from?", yet that is simply what happens *ex 
>> hypothesi
>> *in MWI. We observe that time evolution is unitary - and that
>> observation is naturally always within the context of individual branches.
>> Therefore it seems to me to be over-extending the principle to even try to
>> apply that rule across branches as well. Perhaps there is some
>> "renormalization" we can do to make a preserved quantity, but why bother -
>> just so that we can say, hey, look at that, we preserved it!? I tried to
>> explain MWI to a physics-naive friend once and she said, "but then you'd
>> see the other copies!" (or something like that). Well of course that is
>> silly, but fundamentally it's the same mistake - thinking that principles
>> that apply across individual branches must also apply between them.
>>
>
> Fair enough. That sounds reasonable. The trouble is that conservation in
> the wave function comes from unitary evolution. And unitary evolution
> applies only to the universal wave function -- time development on
> individual branches is not unitary.
>
>
> Although it's not in the way contemplated for MWI, it has been known since
> Wigner that some measurements will not conserve energy (even locally) it
> was proven in general for conserved quantities in the WAY theorem:
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.04607.pdf
>

Does not the Wigner result (and the WAY theorem) depend on the dubious
assumption that since measurements are represent by hermitian operators,
all hermitian operators correspond to measurements? Clearly, not all
hermitian matrices commute with  the Hamiltonian.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 11:46 AM Pierz  wrote:

> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 11:05:29 AM UTC+11, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:47 AM Pierz  wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 9:51:55 AM UTC+11, Bruce wrote:

 On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws
>> is interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a
>> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and 
>> get
>> charge conservation in every branch?*
>
>
> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems
> likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem
> like much of a problem.
>


 Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number
 of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can
 land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very
 large number. Where did the extra charges come from?

 I think it's a misapplication of rules that empirically apply (locally,
>>> as JC points out) within branches, which is the only world we ever directly
>>> know. "Where did the extra charges come from?" is the same question as
>>> "where did the extra matter come from?", yet that is simply what happens 
>>> *ex hypothesi
>>> *in MWI. We observe that time evolution is unitary - and that
>>> observation is naturally always within the context of individual branches.
>>> Therefore it seems to me to be over-extending the principle to even try to
>>> apply that rule across branches as well. Perhaps there is some
>>> "renormalization" we can do to make a preserved quantity, but why bother -
>>> just so that we can say, hey, look at that, we preserved it!? I tried to
>>> explain MWI to a physics-naive friend once and she said, "but then you'd
>>> see the other copies!" (or something like that). Well of course that is
>>> silly, but fundamentally it's the same mistake - thinking that principles
>>> that apply across individual branches must also apply between them.
>>>
>>
>> Fair enough. That sounds reasonable. The trouble is that conservation in
>> the wave function comes from unitary evolution. And unitary evolution
>> applies only to the universal wave function -- time development on
>> individual branches is not unitary.
>>
>
> But that is because of "collapse", which MWI does away with.
>


Are you claiming that MWI does away with individual branches? What about
the branch we live on?

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-27 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/27/2019 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:47 AM Pierz > wrote:

On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 9:51:55 AM UTC+11, Bruce wrote:

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark
wrote:

On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and
it seems likely all of them are, so preserving
conservation of charge doesn't seem like much of a problem.

I think it's a misapplication of rules that empirically apply
(locally, as JC points out) within branches, which is the only
world we ever directly know. "Where did the extra charges come
from?" is the same question as "where did the extra matter come
from?", yet that is simply what happens /ex hypothesi /in//MWI. We
observe that time evolution is unitary - and that observation is
naturally always within the context of individual branches.
Therefore it seems to me to be over-extending the principle to
even try to apply that rule across branches as well. Perhaps there
is some "renormalization" we can do to make a preserved quantity,
but why bother - just so that we can say, hey, look at that, we
preserved it!? I tried to explain MWI to a physics-naive friend
once and she said, "but then you'd see the other copies!" (or
something like that). Well of course that is silly, but
fundamentally it's the same mistake - thinking that principles
that apply across individual branches must also apply between them.

Fair enough. That sounds reasonable. The trouble is that conservation
in the wave function comes from unitary evolution. And unitary
evolution applies only to the universal wave function -- time
development on individual branches is not unitary.

Although it's not in the way contemplated for MWI, it has been known
since Wigner that some measurements will not conserve energy (even
locally) it was proven in general for conserved quantities in the WAY
theorem: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.04607.pdf

Brent

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-27 Thread Pierz



On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 11:05:29 AM UTC+11, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:47 AM Pierz > 
> wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 9:51:55 AM UTC+11, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

 *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws 
> is interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a 
> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and 
> get 
> charge conservation in every branch?*


 Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems 
 likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem 
 like much of a problem.

>>>
>>>
>>> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number 
>>> of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can 
>>> land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very 
>>> large number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>>>
>>> I think it's a misapplication of rules that empirically apply (locally, 
>> as JC points out) within branches, which is the only world we ever directly 
>> know. "Where did the extra charges come from?" is the same question as 
>> "where did the extra matter come from?", yet that is simply what happens *ex 
>> hypothesi 
>> *in MWI. We observe that time evolution is unitary - and that 
>> observation is naturally always within the context of individual branches. 
>> Therefore it seems to me to be over-extending the principle to even try to 
>> apply that rule across branches as well. Perhaps there is some 
>> "renormalization" we can do to make a preserved quantity, but why bother - 
>> just so that we can say, hey, look at that, we preserved it!? I tried to 
>> explain MWI to a physics-naive friend once and she said, "but then you'd 
>> see the other copies!" (or something like that). Well of course that is 
>> silly, but fundamentally it's the same mistake - thinking that principles 
>> that apply across individual branches must also apply between them.
>>
>
> Fair enough. That sounds reasonable. The trouble is that conservation in 
> the wave function comes from unitary evolution. And unitary evolution 
> applies only to the universal wave function -- time development on 
> individual branches is not unitary.
>

But that is because of "collapse", which MWI does away with.  

>
> Bruce
>

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-27 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 5:46:46 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:39 AM Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfield...@gmail.com > wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, November 27, 2019 at 4:51:55 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

 *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws 
> is interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a 
> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and 
> get 
> charge conservation in every branch?*


 Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems 
 likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem 
 like much of a problem.

>>>
>>>
>>> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number 
>>> of sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can 
>>> land. There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very 
>>> large number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> The electric charge in one branch is the same electric charge in all 
>> other branches.
>>
>
> Yes. There is charge conservation in each branch separately. The challenge 
> is to explain this when the number of branches increases exponentially.
>
> Bruce
>

There are no charges created in this branching. The electric charge in one 
branch is the same electric charge in all others.

LC 

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:47 AM Pierz  wrote:

> On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 9:51:55 AM UTC+11, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws is
 interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a
 state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and get
 charge conservation in every branch?*
>>>
>>>
>>> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems
>>> likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem
>>> like much of a problem.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number of
>> sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can land.
>> There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very large
>> number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>>
>> I think it's a misapplication of rules that empirically apply (locally,
> as JC points out) within branches, which is the only world we ever directly
> know. "Where did the extra charges come from?" is the same question as
> "where did the extra matter come from?", yet that is simply what happens *ex 
> hypothesi
> *in MWI. We observe that time evolution is unitary - and that observation
> is naturally always within the context of individual branches. Therefore it
> seems to me to be over-extending the principle to even try to apply that
> rule across branches as well. Perhaps there is some "renormalization" we
> can do to make a preserved quantity, but why bother - just so that we can
> say, hey, look at that, we preserved it!? I tried to explain MWI to a
> physics-naive friend once and she said, "but then you'd see the other
> copies!" (or something like that). Well of course that is silly, but
> fundamentally it's the same mistake - thinking that principles that apply
> across individual branches must also apply between them.
>

Fair enough. That sounds reasonable. The trouble is that conservation in
the wave function comes from unitary evolution. And unitary evolution
applies only to the universal wave function -- time development on
individual branches is not unitary.

Bruce

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

2019-11-27 Thread Pierz



On Thursday, November 28, 2019 at 9:51:55 AM UTC+11, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:29 AM John Clark  > wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 5:13 PM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>> *> I think your* [Brent Meeker] *point about other conservation laws is 
>>> interesting -- especially charge. How would you divide the charge of a 
>>> state among the superposed basis states according to the Born rule and get 
>>> charge conservation in every branch?*
>>
>>
>> Our branch of the multiverse is electrically neutral and it seems 
>> likely all of them are, so preserving conservation of charge doesn't seem 
>> like much of a problem.
>>
>
>
> Consider firing an electron at a screen. There are a very large number of 
> sub-branches created -- one for every position that the electron can land. 
> There was only one negative charge originally -- now there are a very large 
> number. Where did the extra charges come from?
>
> I think it's a misapplication of rules that empirically apply (locally, as 
JC points out) within branches, which is the only world we ever directly 
know. "Where did the extra charges come from?" is the same question as 
"where did the extra matter come from?", yet that is simply what happens *ex 
hypothesi 
*in MWI. We observe that time evolution is unitary - and that observation 
is naturally always within the context of individual branches. Therefore it 
seems to me to be over-extending the principle to even try to apply that 
rule across branches as well. Perhaps there is some "renormalization" we 
can do to make a preserved quantity, but why bother - just so that we can 
say, hey, look at that, we preserved it!? I tried to explain MWI to a 
physics-naive friend once and she said, "but then you'd see the other 
copies!" (or something like that). Well of course that is silly, but 
fundamentally it's the same mistake - thinking that principles that apply 
across individual branches must also apply between them.
 

> Bruce
>

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Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds