Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

Spudboy,


> On 17 Jun 2020, at 22:25, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Bruno, we must also ask how well Goedel's maths fit the observable universe?

That is the whole point, indeed. And the facts is that it fits well, thanks to 
the “quantum weirdness” which is a consequence of the digital mechanist 
assumption (qualitatively cf many worlds, and quantitatively, through the 
quantum logics and their interpretations).




> Is the Hubble Volume rotating or not?


That is way beyond what we can say today. We have not yet derived the idea of 
“volume”.

Or are you talking about Gödel’s work in GR (the rotating universe). That is a 
different subject. But here too, Gödel’s main motivation was logical or 
philosophical, notably by showing that the existence of circular time was 
consistent with GR.



> We have not detected it through astronomy, yet it could still be possible. 
> We'll know more (I believe) when we are able as a species, to place lots of 
> massive telescopes at the edge of solar system, avoiding interference from 
> solar emissions. Then, we will receive a better view of where we all are. 


With Mechanism, we are not human beings dreaming about numbers (and universes), 
but we are numbers dreaming about humans (and universes).

My goal is not doing physics or astronomy, but to explain where the physical 
reality comes from, and how to relate it coherently with the universal 
machine’s theory of consciousness.

Metaphysics and Physics are just not the same domain of inquiry, unless you 
*assume* a physical universe and assume that you have to assume it, (i.e a 
primitive or primary universe)? Yet that  can be shown incoherent with the idea 
that a brain capture consciousness in virtue of implementing a universal 
machine (aka computer). This is more fundamental cognitive science or 
epistemology than physics.

Bruno









> 
> Mitch
> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Tue, Jun 16, 2020 4:15 am
> Subject: Re: My view of Bruno's theory
> 
> 
>> On 15 Jun 2020, at 21:21, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> I have liked the arguments about 15 years ago tween Hameroff and Penrose on 
>> one side and Max Tegmark on the other. What was involved with the idea that 
>> the brain's microtubles function as quantum computing, while Tegmark said, 
>> No it can't be because quantum computing involved insanely COLD environments 
>> and that is not the human brain. What Penrose and Hameroff were really 
>> promoting were quantum fields aka quantum electrodynamics, which we find 
>> everywhere in nature, including bird splat on the sidewalks. I could surely 
>> see that quantum fields functioning as a basis for consciousness. Tegmark 
>> and Hameroff ended their argument several years, ago, amicably, with Tegmark.
> 
> 
> But here, Hameroff has NOT follow Penrose “anti-mechanism”. Hameroff has 
> defended the idea that the brain is a quantum computer, which are emulated in 
> arithmetic. Hameroff has always been Mechanist, and his view is coherent with 
> the consequence of Mechanism. It just put he substitution level very low. 
> Tegmark put it implicitly, like Putnam’s functionalism, at some high level, 
> and seems to miss entirely the first person indeterminacy. On the contrary 
> Penrose get the right conclusion, like Maudlin, i.e. the impossibility to 
> keep both Mechanism and Materialism. They seem to both keep Materialism and 
> to abandon Mechanism. I keep Mechanism (because it is my working hypothesis, 
> and my goal was to show it testable).
> Maudlin argument was valid, but Penrose argument was based on a 
> misunderstanding of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. He saw the error, and 
> corrected it in his second book volume, but dismiss it, where in reality, 
> that correction makes the whole difference. Penrose thought, like Lucas, that 
> machine’s ineluctable incompleteness shows that we are not machine, but it 
> shows only that IF we are machine, we cannot know which one (among infinitely 
> many in arithmetic) which is the reason of the first person indeterminacy.
> 
> The physicist have the right metaphysical motivation, but ignore mathematical 
> logic.
> Mathematical logicians have the right tools, but for historical reason, have 
> no interest in metaphysics. That is well explained in the book by Daniel E. 
> Cohen(*), although the roots of this problem come from much early (the 
> separation of metaphysics/theology from science around +500).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> (*) Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian 
> Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
> 
> 
> 
> 
&

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

 Bruno, we must also ask how well Goedel's maths fit the observable universe? 
Is the Hubble Volume rotating or not? We have not detected it through 
astronomy, yet it could still be possible. We'll know more (I believe) when we 
are able as a species, to place lots of massive telescopes at the edge of solar 
system, avoiding interference from solar emissions. Then, we will receive a 
better view of where we all are. 

Mitch
 
 
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tue, Jun 16, 2020 4:15 am
Subject: Re: My view of Bruno's theory



On 15 Jun 2020, at 21:21, spudboy100 via Everything List 
 wrote:
I have liked the arguments about 15 years ago tween Hameroff and Penrose on one 
side and Max Tegmark on the other. What was involved with the idea that the 
brain's microtubles function as quantum computing, while Tegmark said, No it 
can't be because quantum computing involved insanely COLD environments and that 
is not the human brain. What Penrose and Hameroff were really promoting were 
quantum fields aka quantum electrodynamics, which we find everywhere in nature, 
including bird splat on the sidewalks. I could surely see that quantum fields 
functioning as a basis for consciousness. Tegmark and Hameroff ended their 
argument several years, ago, amicably, with Tegmark.



But here, Hameroff has NOT follow Penrose “anti-mechanism”. Hameroff has 
defended the idea that the brain is a quantum computer, which are emulated in 
arithmetic. Hameroff has always been Mechanist, and his view is coherent with 
the consequence of Mechanism. It just put he substitution level very low. 
Tegmark put it implicitly, like Putnam’s functionalism, at some high level, and 
seems to miss entirely the first person indeterminacy. On the contrary Penrose 
get the right conclusion, like Maudlin, i.e. the impossibility to keep both 
Mechanism and Materialism. They seem to both keep Materialism and to abandon 
Mechanism. I keep Mechanism (because it is my working hypothesis, and my goal 
was to show it testable).Maudlin argument was valid, but Penrose argument was 
based on a misunderstanding of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. He saw the 
error, and corrected it in his second book volume, but dismiss it, where in 
reality, that correction makes the whole difference. Penrose thought, like 
Lucas, that machine’s ineluctable incompleteness shows that we are not machine, 
but it shows only that IF we are machine, we cannot know which one (among 
infinitely many in arithmetic) which is the reason of the first person 
indeterminacy.
The physicist have the right metaphysical motivation, but ignore mathematical 
logic.Mathematical logicians have the right tools, but for historical reason, 
have no interest in metaphysics. That is well explained in the book by Daniel 
E. Cohen(*), although the roots of this problem come from much early (the 
separation of metaphysics/theology from science around +500).
Bruno
(*) Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian 
Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.






-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Mon, Jun 15, 2020 7:49 am
Subject: Re: My view of Bruno's theory



On 14 Jun 2020, at 16:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:


On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 5:26:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:



How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures Can Be 
Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of Our 
Experiences And ChoicesGerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  

Crazy.

Yes.
Bruno



I found this to be the most interesting (in physical terms) by a grad student:
Which abstract (talks or posters) is most interesting to you?
Is Subjectivity a Field? 

Subjectivity concerns the first person experience. We cannot equate a first 
person notion with a third person notion. May be subjectivity can be associated 
to some filed, and indeed, to any Turing universal one, but we cannot associate 
a field to any subjective experience, we have to associate all computation 
leading to that experience, which will contains those supported by Turing 
universal fields, but also those supported by the game of life, the lambda 
expressions, the natural numbers, etc.
I let you read the paper to mention, and to see if it is coherent with 
mechanism.
Bruno
PS I am interrogating student “at a distance” right now …. Apology if I am to 
short in my answers. Ask any question, and be patient for the answer.



Greg Horne ( https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/ )(Philosophy, 
University of Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada)
https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872
(in Poster Sessions, TSC Consciousness Reboot, 
https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents )
@phiiiptjhrift

 
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Jun 2020, at 21:21, spudboy100 via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> I have liked the arguments about 15 years ago tween Hameroff and Penrose on 
> one side and Max Tegmark on the other. What was involved with the idea that 
> the brain's microtubles function as quantum computing, while Tegmark said, No 
> it can't be because quantum computing involved insanely COLD environments and 
> that is not the human brain. What Penrose and Hameroff were really promoting 
> were quantum fields aka quantum electrodynamics, which we find everywhere in 
> nature, including bird splat on the sidewalks. I could surely see that 
> quantum fields functioning as a basis for consciousness. Tegmark and Hameroff 
> ended their argument several years, ago, amicably, with Tegmark.


But here, Hameroff has NOT follow Penrose “anti-mechanism”. Hameroff has 
defended the idea that the brain is a quantum computer, which are emulated in 
arithmetic. Hameroff has always been Mechanist, and his view is coherent with 
the consequence of Mechanism. It just put he substitution level very low. 
Tegmark put it implicitly, like Putnam’s functionalism, at some high level, and 
seems to miss entirely the first person indeterminacy. On the contrary Penrose 
get the right conclusion, like Maudlin, i.e. the impossibility to keep both 
Mechanism and Materialism. They seem to both keep Materialism and to abandon 
Mechanism. I keep Mechanism (because it is my working hypothesis, and my goal 
was to show it testable).
Maudlin argument was valid, but Penrose argument was based on a 
misunderstanding of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. He saw the error, and 
corrected it in his second book volume, but dismiss it, where in reality, that 
correction makes the whole difference. Penrose thought, like Lucas, that 
machine’s ineluctable incompleteness shows that we are not machine, but it 
shows only that IF we are machine, we cannot know which one (among infinitely 
many in arithmetic) which is the reason of the first person indeterminacy.

The physicist have the right metaphysical motivation, but ignore mathematical 
logic.
Mathematical logicians have the right tools, but for historical reason, have no 
interest in metaphysics. That is well explained in the book by Daniel E. 
Cohen(*), although the roots of this problem come from much early (the 
separation of metaphysics/theology from science around +500).

Bruno

(*) Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian 
Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.




> 
> 
> -Original Message-
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Mon, Jun 15, 2020 7:49 am
> Subject: Re: My view of Bruno's theory
> 
> 
>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 16:12, Philip Thrift > <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 5:26:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures Can 
>>> Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of Our 
>>> Experiences And Choices
>>> Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Crazy.
>> 
>> Yes.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I found this to be the most interesting (in physical terms) by a grad 
>> student:
>> 
>> Which abstract (talks or posters) is most interesting to you?
>> 
>> Is Subjectivity a Field? 
> 
> Subjectivity concerns the first person experience. We cannot equate a first 
> person notion with a third person notion. May be subjectivity can be 
> associated to some filed, and indeed, to any Turing universal one, but we 
> cannot associate a field to any subjective experience, we have to associate 
> all computation leading to that experience, which will contains those 
> supported by Turing universal fields, but also those supported by the game of 
> life, the lambda expressions, the natural numbers, etc.
> 
> I let you read the paper to mention, and to see if it is coherent with 
> mechanism.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> PS I am interrogating student “at a distance” right now …. Apology if I am to 
> short in my answers. Ask any question, and be patient for the answer.
> 
> 
> 
>> Greg Horne ( https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/ 
>> <https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/> )
>> (Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada)
>> 
>> https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872 
>> <https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872>
>> 
>> 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Jun 2020, at 16:48, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 15, 2020 at 5:43:43 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 14:01, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 4:55:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 03:06, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 2:52:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>> 
>>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
>>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
>> 
>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. 
>> Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need 
>> of randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is 
>> shown to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay 
>> theorem in the mathematics iff self-reference.
>> 
>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a 
>> year ago.
>> 
>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
>> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without 
>> using more than the two axioms above. 
>> 
>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
>> 
>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
>> 
>> Bohr:
>>  - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>  - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
>> 
>> Everett
>>  - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>  - Mechanism
>> 
>> Your servitor:
>>  - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>>  - Mechanism.
>> 
>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is 
>> the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
>> predict everything.
>> 
>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is 
>> not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from 
>> mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be 
>> done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise 
>> a lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of 
>> the machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if 
>> you want to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are 
>> possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a 
>> possible Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to 
>> our universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field 
>> approximation of GR. AG 
>> 
>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of 
>> arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another,
> 
> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in 
> the theory of mind (implicitly).
> 
> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the 
> physical universe.
 
 OK.
 
 
 
 
> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not 
> have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of 
> physical theories,
 
 I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition 
 and multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when 
 taking together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing 
 universal system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the 
 existence of all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, 
 so to make any physical (observable) 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

I have liked the arguments about 15 years ago tween Hameroff and Penrose on one 
side and Max Tegmark on the other. What was involved with the idea that the 
brain's microtubles function as quantum computing, while Tegmark said, No it 
can't be because quantum computing involved insanely COLD environments and that 
is not the human brain. What Penrose and Hameroff were really promoting were 
quantum fields aka quantum electrodynamics, which we find everywhere in nature, 
including bird splat on the sidewalks. I could surely see that quantum fields 
functioning as a basis for consciousness. Tegmark and Hameroff ended their 
argument several years, ago, amicably, with Tegmark.


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Mon, Jun 15, 2020 7:49 am
Subject: Re: My view of Bruno's theory



On 14 Jun 2020, at 16:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:


On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 5:26:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:



How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures Can Be 
Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of Our 
Experiences And ChoicesGerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  

Crazy.

Yes.
Bruno



I found this to be the most interesting (in physical terms) by a grad student:
Which abstract (talks or posters) is most interesting to you?
Is Subjectivity a Field? 

Subjectivity concerns the first person experience. We cannot equate a first 
person notion with a third person notion. May be subjectivity can be associated 
to some filed, and indeed, to any Turing universal one, but we cannot associate 
a field to any subjective experience, we have to associate all computation 
leading to that experience, which will contains those supported by Turing 
universal fields, but also those supported by the game of life, the lambda 
expressions, the natural numbers, etc.
I let you read the paper to mention, and to see if it is coherent with 
mechanism.
Bruno
PS I am interrogating student “at a distance” right now …. Apology if I am to 
short in my answers. Ask any question, and be patient for the answer.



Greg Horne ( https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/ )(Philosophy, 
University of Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada)
https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872
(in Poster Sessions, TSC Consciousness Reboot, 
https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents )
@phiiiptjhrift

 
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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Monday, June 15, 2020 at 5:43:43 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Jun 2020, at 14:01, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 4:55:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 03:06, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 2:52:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>

 It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
 Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 


 Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. 
 Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need 
 of 
 randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
 (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is 
 shown 
 to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem 
 in the 
 mathematics iff self-reference.

 The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have 
 explained a year ago.

 The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional 
 (modal) variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified 
 without using more than the two axioms above. 

 “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 

 Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:

 Bohr:
 - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
 - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.

 Everett
 - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
 - Mechanism

 Your servitor:
 - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
 - Mechanism.

 If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” 
 theory is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all 
 theories predict everything.

 I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It 
 is not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from 
 mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already 
 be 
 done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which 
 summarise a 
 lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of 
 the 
 machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you 
 want 
 to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.

 Bruno

>>>
>>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are 
>>> possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a 
>>> possible 
>>> Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our 
>>> universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field 
>>> approximation of GR. AG 
>>>
>>
>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of 
>> arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another,
>>
>
> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in 
> the 
> theory of mind (implicitly).
>

 Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of 
 the physical universe. 


 OK.




 What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not 
 have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of 
 physical theories, 


 I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition 
 and multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when 
 taking together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing 
 universal system. They can define 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Jun 2020, at 16:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 5:26:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures Can 
>> Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of Our 
>> Experiences And Choices
>> Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  
>> 
>> 
>> Crazy.
> 
> Yes.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I found this to be the most interesting (in physical terms) by a grad student:
> 
> Which abstract (talks or posters) is most interesting to you?
> 
> Is Subjectivity a Field? 

Subjectivity concerns the first person experience. We cannot equate a first 
person notion with a third person notion. May be subjectivity can be associated 
to some filed, and indeed, to any Turing universal one, but we cannot associate 
a field to any subjective experience, we have to associate all computation 
leading to that experience, which will contains those supported by Turing 
universal fields, but also those supported by the game of life, the lambda 
expressions, the natural numbers, etc.

I let you read the paper to mention, and to see if it is coherent with 
mechanism.

Bruno

PS I am interrogating student “at a distance” right now …. Apology if I am to 
short in my answers. Ask any question, and be patient for the answer.



> Greg Horne ( https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/ )
> (Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada)
> 
> https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872
> 
> (in Poster Sessions, TSC Consciousness Reboot, 
> https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents )
> 
> @phiiiptjhrift
> 
> 
>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
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> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6cddb11d-c46b-4f37-bfe7-c37213bd030co%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Jun 2020, at 14:01, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 4:55:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 14 Jun 2020, at 03:06, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 2:52:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>> 
>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
> 
> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except 
> that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of 
> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown 
> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in 
> the mathematics iff self-reference.
> 
> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a 
> year ago.
> 
> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without 
> using more than the two axioms above. 
> 
> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
> 
> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
> 
> Bohr:
>   - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>   - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
> 
> Everett
>   - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>   - Mechanism
> 
> Your servitor:
>   - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>   - Mechanism.
> 
> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is 
> the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
> predict everything.
> 
> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is 
> not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from 
> mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be 
> done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise 
> a lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the 
> machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you 
> want to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, 
> it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
> gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let 
> alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 
> 
> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of 
> arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another,
 
 I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
 geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
 re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
 universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in 
 the theory of mind (implicitly).
 
 Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the 
 physical universe.
>>> 
>>> OK.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not 
 have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of 
 physical theories,
>>> 
>>> I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition and 
>>> multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when taking 
>>> together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing 
>>> universal system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the 
>>> existence of all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so 
>>> to make any physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into 
>>> account  to make any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work 
>>> without invoking an ontological primary physical “computation selection” 
>>> which can be shown incompatible with mechanism.
>>> 
>>> I 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 5:26:11 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> *How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures 
> Can Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of 
> Our Experiences And Choices*
> Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  
>
>
> Crazy.
>
>
> Yes.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
I found this to be the most interesting (in physical terms) by a grad 
student:

Which abstract (talks or posters) is most interesting to you?

*Is Subjectivity a Field? *
Greg Horne ( https://philosophy.utoronto.ca/directory/greg-horne/ )
(Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ONTARIO Canada)

https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/report_poster_detail.php?abs=3872

(in Poster Sessions, *TSC Consciousness Reboot*, 
https://consciousness.arizona.edu/concurrents )

@phiiiptjhrift


 

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, June 14, 2020 at 4:55:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Jun 2020, at 03:06, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 2:52:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

 It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

>>>
>>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
>>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
>>>
>>>
>>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. 
>>> Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need 
>>> of 
>>> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
>>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is 
>>> shown 
>>> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in 
>>> the 
>>> mathematics iff self-reference.
>>>
>>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have 
>>> explained a year ago.
>>>
>>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional 
>>> (modal) variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified 
>>> without using more than the two axioms above. 
>>>
>>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
>>>
>>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
>>>
>>> Bohr:
>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
>>>
>>> Everett
>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>> - Mechanism
>>>
>>> Your servitor:
>>> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>>> - Mechanism.
>>>
>>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory 
>>> is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
>>> predict everything.
>>>
>>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It 
>>> is not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from 
>>> mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already 
>>> be 
>>> done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which 
>>> summarise a 
>>> lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the 
>>> machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you 
>>> want 
>>> to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are 
>> possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a 
>> possible 
>> Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our 
>> universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field 
>> approximation of GR. AG 
>>
>
> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of 
> arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another,
>

 I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
 geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
 re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
 universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in 
 the 
 theory of mind (implicitly).

>>>
>>> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the 
>>> physical universe. 
>>>
>>>
>>> OK.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not 
>>> have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of 
>>> physical theories, 
>>>
>>>
>>> I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition 
>>> and multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when 
>>> taking together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing 
>>> universal system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the 
>>> existence of all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so 
>>> to make any physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into 
>>> account  to make any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work 
>>> 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 14 Jun 2020, at 03:06, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 2:52:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
 
 
 On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
 
 
 On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
> 
> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
 
 Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except 
 that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of 
 randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
 (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown 
 to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in 
 the mathematics iff self-reference.
 
 The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a 
 year ago.
 
 The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
 variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without 
 using more than the two axioms above. 
 
 “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
 
 Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
 
 Bohr:
- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
- a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
 
 Everett
- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
- Mechanism
 
 Your servitor:
- arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
- Mechanism.
 
 If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is 
 the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
 predict everything.
 
 I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not 
 mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism 
 and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by 
 Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are 
 the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in 
 one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really 
 address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
 
 Bruno
 
 I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, 
 it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
 gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let 
 alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 
 
 Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of arithmetic, 
 can distinguish one G from another,
>>> 
>>> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
>>> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
>>> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
>>> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the 
>>> theory of mind (implicitly).
>>> 
>>> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the 
>>> physical universe.
>> 
>> OK.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not 
>>> have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of 
>>> physical theories,
>> 
>> I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition and 
>> multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when taking 
>> together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing universal 
>> system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the existence of 
>> all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so to make any 
>> physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into account  to make 
>> any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work without invoking an 
>> ontological primary physical “computation selection” which can be shown 
>> incompatible with mechanism.
>> 
>> I disagree. One need not assume any ontological status for the physical 
>> universe, but one can still determine whether Newtonian physics "works". AG
> 
> No problem. But whatever the physics you are assuming, eventually, if you 
> want to get 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Jun 2020, at 15:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 3:45:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Jun 2020, at 11:52, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 4:43:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) 
>> universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some “base” 
>> phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring 
>> perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, 
>> as related to its brain.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But can it be conscious?
> 
> 
> If “it” means the body, or the (extensional) number, the answer is no. Now, 
> the person associated to all equivalent relative states can be conscious. 
> Indeed, all relative universal number in arithmetic initiate a consciousness 
> flux, and the physical reality emerges from that internal arithmetic flux, 
> somehow. To be continued.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> No one but me and you will probably even look at the abstracts of this fall's 
> The Science of Consciousness conference (online presentations) 
> 
> https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/abs_report_bysession.php?p=C 
> 
> 
> (these are just the 139 concurrent session papers)
> 
> but there's a lot of stuff that might be fun to read (for those who have any 
> imagination), like
> 
> How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures Can 
> Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of Our 
> Experiences And Choices
> Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  
> 
> The Penrose-Hameroff paradigm plays a crucial role in the current shift from 
> a causal and local (classical physics) view of brain processes to a 
> quantum-mechanical indeterministic and non-local, entanglement view. The most 
> important ingredient is the Orchestrated Objective Reduction process (Orch 
> OR). Each Orch OR event is a self-selection of space-time geometry, coupled 
> to the brain via microtubules and other biomolecules. Each instantaneous (and 
> non-computable) Orch OR or self-collapse is equated with a discrete conscious 
> event, a perception or a choice, the outcome of the Orch OR. Roger Penrose 
> has contended that, at a deeper level of description, the choice of which 
> outcome of an Orch OR event will occur (which of the superposed space-time 
> geometries will become real) may arise as a result of a presently unknown 
> non-computational mathematical/physical (i.e. Platonic realm) theory, that is 
> it cannot be deduced algorithmically. In my presentation I want to suggest 
> what the outline of such a non-computational theory might look like: The 
> central idea is that the outcome of an Orch OR is not determined by an 
> already existing hidden variable, but by a non computable free choice of the 
> ontologically independent consciousness essence, the I of the mind, defined 
> as abstract Ego by John Von Neumann. In the common non-quantum mechanical 
> view of brain processes the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) must 
> somehow encode all details of the sensory and mental experiences that we have 
> at a given moment, as well as all choices for physical and mental movement 
> that we make at that time. Similarly the space-time geometry selected in an 
> Orch OR process must contain the same detailed information of all these 
> qualia of the total of our experience and choose perspective in the coded 
> form of space-time curvatures in the substrate in which they are located. 
> These space-time curvatures arise from the mass distribution in the 
> biomolecules involved, such as tubulin in microtubules, and can be described 
> by the respective metric tensor field. We could imagine this coding of qualia 
> by space-time curvatures, much as meanings are coded for by letters, 
> sentences, paragraphs. Then all aspects and elements of the total of our 
> experiences and choices at a certain moment can be considered to be made up 
> of both elementary and compound Platonic ideas or forms. As a result, the 
> Platonic ideas are not only limited to mathematical ideas such as point, 
> line, circle, number or to ideas like beauty, courage, love, etc.,but are 
> applied very generally and generously to all senses, thoughts, feelings, as 
> well as to all aspects of choices, decisions, plans, visions. The primitives 
> of these experiences etc. (e.g. this color green, this sound on the piano, 
> this artistic feeling), these elementals are used as letters in words to 
> build up the sentences and paragraphs of the total of our experiences and 
> choices. Because they together form the space-time geometry selected in an 
> Orch OR, they must be coded by fundamental space-time geometry letters, 
> phrases etc.
> 
> 
> Crazy.

Yes.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 2:52:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>>
>>
>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
>>
>>
>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. 
>> Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need 
>> of 
>> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is 
>> shown 
>> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in 
>> the 
>> mathematics iff self-reference.
>>
>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have 
>> explained a year ago.
>>
>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional 
>> (modal) variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified 
>> without using more than the two axioms above. 
>>
>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
>>
>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
>>
>> Bohr:
>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
>>
>> Everett
>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>> - Mechanism
>>
>> Your servitor:
>> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>> - Mechanism.
>>
>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory 
>> is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
>> predict everything.
>>
>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It 
>> is not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from 
>> mechanism and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be 
>> done by Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise 
>> a 
>> lot are the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the 
>> machine in one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you 
>> want 
>> to really address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are 
> possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible 
> Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our 
> universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field 
> approximation of GR. AG 
>

 Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of 
 arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another,

>>>
>>> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
>>> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
>>> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
>>> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the 
>>> theory of mind (implicitly).
>>>
>>
>> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the 
>> physical universe. 
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not 
>> have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of 
>> physical theories, 
>>
>>
>> I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition 
>> and multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when 
>> taking together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing 
>> universal system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the 
>> existence of all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so 
>> to make any physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into 
>> account  to make any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work 
>> without invoking an ontological primary physical “computation selection” 
>> which can be shown incompatible with mechanism.
>>
>
> *I disagree. One need not assume any ontological status for the physical 
> universe, but one can still determine whether Newtonian physics "works". AG*
>
>

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, June 13, 2020 at 3:45:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Jun 2020, at 11:52, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 4:43:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) 
>> universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some 
>> “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring 
>> perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, 
>> as related to its brain.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
> But can it be conscious?
>
>
>
> If “it” means the body, or the (extensional) number, the answer is no. 
> Now, the person associated to all equivalent relative states can be 
> conscious. Indeed, all relative universal number in arithmetic initiate a 
> consciousness flux, and the physical reality emerges from that internal 
> arithmetic flux, somehow. To be continued.
>
> Bruno
>
>
No one but me and you will probably even look at the abstracts of this 
fall's *The Science of Consciousnes*s conference (online presentations) 

https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/abs_report_bysession.php?p=C

(these are just the 139 concurrent session papers)

but there's a lot of stuff that might be fun to read (for those who have 
any imagination), like

*How In The Penrose-Hameroff Paradigm The Forms of Space-time Curvatures 
Can Be Connected With The Eternal Platonic Ideas Or Forms In The Qualia Of 
Our Experiences And Choices*
Gerard Blommestijn (Amstelveen, Netherlands)  

The Penrose-Hameroff paradigm plays a crucial role in the current shift 
from a causal and local (classical physics) view of brain processes to a 
quantum-mechanical indeterministic and non-local, entanglement view. The 
most important ingredient is the Orchestrated Objective Reduction process 
(Orch OR). Each Orch OR event is a self-selection of space-time geometry, 
coupled to the brain via microtubules and other biomolecules. Each 
instantaneous (and non-computable) Orch OR or self-collapse is equated with 
a discrete conscious event, a perception or a choice, the outcome of the 
Orch OR. Roger Penrose has contended that, at a deeper level of 
description, the choice of which outcome of an Orch OR event will occur 
(which of the superposed space-time geometries will become real) may arise 
as a result of a presently unknown non-computational mathematical/physical 
(i.e. Platonic realm) theory, that is it cannot be deduced algorithmically. 
In my presentation I want to suggest what the outline of such a 
non-computational theory might look like: The central idea is that the 
outcome of an Orch OR is not determined by an already existing hidden 
variable, but by a non computable free choice of the ontologically 
independent consciousness essence, the I of the mind, defined as abstract 
Ego by John Von Neumann. In the common non-quantum mechanical view of brain 
processes the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) must somehow encode 
all details of the sensory and mental experiences that we have at a given 
moment, as well as all choices for physical and mental movement that we 
make at that time. Similarly the space-time geometry selected in an Orch OR 
process must contain the same detailed information of all these qualia of 
the total of our experience and choose perspective in the coded form of 
space-time curvatures in the substrate in which they are located. These 
space-time curvatures arise from the mass distribution in the biomolecules 
involved, such as tubulin in microtubules, and can be described by the 
respective metric tensor field. We could imagine this coding of qualia by 
space-time curvatures, much as meanings are coded for by letters, 
sentences, paragraphs. Then all aspects and elements of the total of our 
experiences and choices at a certain moment can be considered to be made up 
of both elementary and compound Platonic ideas or forms. As a result, the 
Platonic ideas are not only limited to mathematical ideas such as point, 
line, circle, number or to ideas like beauty, courage, love, etc.,but are 
applied very generally and generously to all senses, thoughts, feelings, as 
well as to all aspects of choices, decisions, plans, visions. The 
primitives of these experiences etc. (e.g. this color green, this sound on 
the piano, this artistic feeling), these elementals are used as letters in 
words to build up the sentences and paragraphs of the total of our 
experiences and choices. Because they together form the space-time geometry 
selected in an Orch OR, they must be coded by fundamental space-time 
geometry letters, phrases etc.


Crazy.

@philipthrift 

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Jun 2020, at 04:01, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
 It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
 
 It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
 Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
>>> 
>>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except 
>>> that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of 
>>> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
>>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown 
>>> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the 
>>> mathematics iff self-reference.
>>> 
>>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a 
>>> year ago.
>>> 
>>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
>>> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using 
>>> more than the two axioms above. 
>>> 
>>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
>>> 
>>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
>>> 
>>> Bohr:
>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
>>> 
>>> Everett
>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>> - Mechanism
>>> 
>>> Your servitor:
>>> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>>> - Mechanism.
>>> 
>>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the 
>>> Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict 
>>> everything.
>>> 
>>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not 
>>> mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and 
>>> computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, 
>>> Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two 
>>> theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one 
>>> modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really 
>>> address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, 
>>> it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
>>> gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let 
>>> alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 
>>> 
>>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of arithmetic, 
>>> can distinguish one G from another,
>> 
>> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
>> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
>> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
>> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the 
>> theory of mind (implicitly).
>> 
>> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the 
>> physical universe.
> 
> OK.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not have 
>> sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of physical 
>> theories,
> 
> I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition and 
> multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when taking 
> together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing universal 
> system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the existence of all 
> of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so to make any 
> physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into account  to make 
> any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work without invoking an 
> ontological primary physical “computation selection” which can be shown 
> incompatible with mechanism.
> 
> I disagree. One need not assume any ontological status for the physical 
> universe, but one can still determine whether Newtonian physics "works". AG

No problem. But whatever the physics you are assuming, eventually, if you want 
to get the qualia, you need to explain the physical laws from arithmetic (and 
its internal meta-arithmetic-aka-computer science).




>  
> With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more 
> tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Jun 2020, at 11:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 4:43:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) 
> universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some “base” 
> phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring perfectly 
> (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, as related 
> to its brain.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> But can it be conscious?


If “it” means the body, or the (extensional) number, the answer is no. Now, the 
person associated to all equivalent relative states can be conscious. Indeed, 
all relative universal number in arithmetic initiate a consciousness flux, and 
the physical reality emerges from that internal arithmetic flux, somehow. To be 
continued.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b4046c98-59fd-4e4a-9efd-43af044cb880o%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 3:43:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>
>
> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
>
>
> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. 
> Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of 
> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown 
> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in 
> the 
> mathematics iff self-reference.
>
> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained 
> a year ago.
>
> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without 
> using 
> more than the two axioms above. 
>
> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
>
> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
>
> Bohr:
> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
>
> Everett
> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
> - Mechanism
>
> Your servitor:
> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
> - Mechanism.
>
> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory 
> is the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
> predict everything.
>
> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is 
> not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from 
> mechanism 
> and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by 
> Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot 
> are 
> the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine 
> in 
> one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to 
> really 
> address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
>
> Bruno
>

 I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are 
 possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible 
 Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our 
 universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field 
 approximation of GR. AG 

>>>
>>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of 
>>> arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another,
>>>
>>
>> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
>> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
>> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
>> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the 
>> theory of mind (implicitly).
>>
>
> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the 
> physical universe. 
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not 
> have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of 
> physical theories, 
>
>
> I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition 
> and multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when 
> taking together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing 
> universal system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the 
> existence of all of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so 
> to make any physical (observable) prediction, we have to take them into 
> account  to make any prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work 
> without invoking an ontological primary physical “computation selection” 
> which can be shown incompatible with mechanism.
>

*I disagree. One need not assume any ontological status for the physical 
universe, but one can still determine whether Newtonian physics "works". AG*
 

> With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is made more obvious, more 
> tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject it, QM becomes a 
> confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we have infinitely 
> many relative “bodies”. 
>

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, June 12, 2020 at 4:43:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> So when I say that a number can think, observe, or even just be (Turing) 
> universal, it is always a short manner to say that relatively to some 
> “base” phi_i, that number belongs to a (true) relation making it mirroring 
> perfectly (at the mechanist substitution level) the behaviour of a person, 
> as related to its brain.
>
> Bruno
>
>

But can it be conscious?

@philipthrift 

>
>
>
>

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Jun 2020, at 17:35, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>> 
>>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
>>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
>> 
>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except 
>> that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of 
>> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown to 
>> be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the 
>> mathematics iff self-reference.
>> 
>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a 
>> year ago.
>> 
>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
>> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using 
>> more than the two axioms above. 
>> 
>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
>> 
>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
>> 
>> Bohr:
>>  - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>  - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
>> 
>> Everett
>>  - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>  - Mechanism
>> 
>> Your servitor:
>>  - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>>  - Mechanism.
>> 
>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the 
>> Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict 
>> everything.
>> 
>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not 
>> mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and 
>> computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, 
>> Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two 
>> theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one modal 
>> logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really address the 
>> “mechanist mind-body problem”.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, it 
>> seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
>> gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let 
>> alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 
>> 
>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of arithmetic, 
>> can distinguish one G from another,
> 
> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the 
> theory of mind (implicitly).
> 
> Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the 
> physical universe.

OK.




> What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of numbers do not have 
> sufficient inherent information to distinguish the validity of physical 
> theories,

I doubt this. Since 1931/1936, we know that the simple laws of addition and 
multiplication of the natural numbers (not the real numbers), when taking 
together, leads to a Turing-complete theory, i.e. notably a Turing universal 
system. They can define what is a computation, and prove the existence of all 
of them. Assuming Mechanism, we belongs to all of them, so to make any physical 
(observable) prediction, we have to take them into account  to make any 
prediction. Newtonian-like physics does not work without invoking an 
ontological primary physical “computation selection” which can be shown 
incompatible with mechanism. With QM: that selection (the wave collapse) is 
made more obvious, more tangible, and … more doubtful, and indeed, if we reject 
it, QM becomes a confirmation of the main startling aspect of mechanism (we 
have infinitely many relative “bodies”. 




> where validity means predictability.

Actually, I believe only that predictability of the absurd means non-validity. 
Non predictability by itself does not lead to non validity, unless … you take 
Aristotle physicalist stance at the start (which *is* invalid).




> Good predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories,


OK.



> and this has nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical 
> universe.

It has, if you want to predict some physical happening, you 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:15:30 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson  wrote:



 On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>

 It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
 Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 


 Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. 
 Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of 
 randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
 (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown 
 to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in 
 the 
 mathematics iff self-reference.

 The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained 
 a year ago.

 The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
 variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without 
 using 
 more than the two axioms above. 

 “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 

 Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:

 Bohr:
 - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
 - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.

 Everett
 - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
 - Mechanism

 Your servitor:
 - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
 - Mechanism.

 If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is 
 the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
 predict everything.

 I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is 
 not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from 
 mechanism 
 and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by 
 Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are 
 the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in 
 one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really 
 address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.

 Bruno

>>>
>>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are 
>>> possible, it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible 
>>> Newtonian gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our 
>>> universe, let alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field 
>>> approximation of GR. AG 
>>>
>>
>> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of 
>> arithmetic, can distinguish one G from another,
>>
>
> I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is 
> geographical. Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to 
> re-define the physical by the laws on the observable available to all 
> universal numbers. If not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the 
> theory of mind (implicitly).
>

Firstly, I don't take any firm position on the ontological status of the 
physical universe. What I AM saying is that logic alone and the property of 
numbers do not have sufficient inherent information to distinguish the 
validity of physical theories, where validity means predictability. Good 
predictions are what we use to distinguish good theories, and this has 
nothing to do with the ontological status of the physical universe. As for 
"the observable available to all universal numbers", I also doubt that 
numbers can observe anything. AG 

>
>
>
> to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or 
>> that the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source 
>> and recipient. AG 
>>
>
> I got my answer, by default. AG 
>
>
> ?
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
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>  
> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Thursday, June 11, 2020 at 5:10:32 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Jun 2020, at 19:38, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 10:25:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 5:42:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 



 On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>


 http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html
  :

 Predictions are overrated 

 
  


 She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good 
 description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the 
 question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from 
 a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons 
 means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a 
 theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend 
 that 
 he did. 

 Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with 
 other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous 
 predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates 
 "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what 
 constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that 
 qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside 
 arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

 Brent

>>>
>>>
>>> It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general 
>>> relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" 
>>> (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has 
>>> "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed 
>>> theories. 
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
>>> engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never *know *we 
>>> have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.  
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>> Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
>>> theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her 
>>> view).
>>>
>>> But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>>
>> *All descriptions of reality are inadequate, Feyerabend said. "You think 
>> that this one-day fly, this little bit of nothing, a human being--according 
>> to today's cosmology!--can figure it all out? This to me seems so crazy! It 
>> cannot possibly be true! What they figured out is one particular response 
>> to their actions, and this response gives this universe, and the reality 
>> that is behind this is laughing! 'Ha ha! They think they have found me 
>> out!'"*
>>
>>
>> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/was-philosopher-paul-feyerabend-really-science-s-worst-enemy/
>>
>> @philipthrift 
>>
>
> This guy's a "philosopher"? He's just a jerk and you shouldn't waste our 
> time with this total crap! AG 
>
>
> I tend to agree with you on this. In fact, philosophy, metaphysics, 
> theology, …  has lost its scientific attitude after the separation of 
> theology and science, mainly done by terror, violence, and the mix of state 
> and religion (the authentic blasphemy arguably, as it confuse Earth and 
> Heaven, in their abstract sense). Yet, that does not mean that all 
> philosophers or all theologian, even from the institutions, are jerk. 
> Feyerabend is just not quite convincing on this matter.
>
> Bruno
>

I am not crucifying all philosophers, but this guy, Feyerabend, is just 
plain stupid. Any civilization hugely in advance of us, will be just that; 
hugely in advance! Should we cease our research, as meager as it is from 
some ridiculous pov? I think we should be very proud of our scientific 
accomplishments, but nonetheless humble due to what we don't know. AG 

>
>
>
>
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>  
> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Jun 2020, at 04:00, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>> 
>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with Shakespeare's 
>> plays, or the Bible. AG 
> 
> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except 
> that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of randomness 
> at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true (semantic) 
> relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown to be an 
> internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the 
> mathematics iff self-reference.
> 
> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a year 
> ago.
> 
> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using 
> more than the two axioms above. 
> 
> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
> 
> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
> 
> Bohr:
>   - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>   - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
> 
> Everett
>   - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>   - Mechanism
> 
> Your servitor:
>   - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>   - Mechanism.
> 
> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the 
> Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict 
> everything.
> 
> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not 
> mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and 
> computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, 
> Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two 
> theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one modal 
> logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really address the 
> “mechanist mind-body problem”.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, it 
> seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
> gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let alone 
> show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 
> 
> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of arithmetic, 
> can distinguish one G from another,

I don’t know. If you are right on this, this entails that “G” is geographical. 
Of course, this comes from the fact that mechanism has to re-define the 
physical by the laws on the observable available to all universal numbers. If 
not, some non Turing elulable magic is brought in the theory of mind 
(implicitly).



> to obtain the weak field approximation of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that 
> the measured velocity of light is independent of the motions of source and 
> recipient. AG 
> 
> I got my answer, by default. AG 

?

Bruno




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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Jun 2020, at 19:38, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 10:25:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 5:42:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>> 
>>> 
>>> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html 
>>>  :
>>> 
>>> Predictions are overrated
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>> She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good description 
>> of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the question, which is 
>> how do we tell a theory that is a good description from a theory that is a 
>> bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons means the theory is 
>> bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a theory good...although 
>> Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did. 
>> 
>> Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with other 
>> good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous 
>> predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates 
>> "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what 
>> constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that 
>> qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside 
>> arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general 
>> relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" 
>> (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has 
>> "confirmation"   successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately 
>> failed theories. 
> 
> I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
> engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never know we have an 
> ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.  
> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
>> theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her 
>> view).
>> 
>> But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
> 
> 
> All descriptions of reality are inadequate, Feyerabend said. "You think that 
> this one-day fly, this little bit of nothing, a human being--according to 
> today's cosmology!--can figure it all out? This to me seems so crazy! It 
> cannot possibly be true! What they figured out is one particular response to 
> their actions, and this response gives this universe, and the reality that is 
> behind this is laughing! 'Ha ha! They think they have found me out!'"
> 
> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/was-philosopher-paul-feyerabend-really-science-s-worst-enemy/
>  
> 
> 
> @philipthrift 
> 
> This guy's a "philosopher"? He's just a jerk and you shouldn't waste our time 
> with this total crap! AG 

I tend to agree with you on this. In fact, philosophy, metaphysics, theology, … 
 has lost its scientific attitude after the separation of theology and science, 
mainly done by terror, violence, and the mix of state and religion (the 
authentic blasphemy arguably, as it confuse Earth and Heaven, in their abstract 
sense). Yet, that does not mean that all philosophers or all theologian, even 
from the institutions, are jerk. Feyerabend is just not quite convincing on 
this matter.

Bruno



> 
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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Jun 2020, at 00:42, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>> 
>>> 
>>> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html 
>>>  :
>>> 
>>> Predictions are overrated
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>> She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good description 
>> of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the question, which is 
>> how do we tell a theory that is a good description from a theory that is a 
>> bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons means the theory is 
>> bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a theory good...although 
>> Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did. 
>> 
>> Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with other 
>> good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous 
>> predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates 
>> "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what 
>> constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that 
>> qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside 
>> arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general 
>> relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" 
>> (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has 
>> "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed 
>> theories. 
> 
> I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
> engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never know we have an 
> ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.  

Indeed. The best we can hope is to derive it from some simpler assumption, but 
those will also never be known as such.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
>> theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her 
>> view).
>> 
>> But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> -- 
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>> "Everything List" group.
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>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f3405b30-dfe9-4e64-9332-0dcd77a8ca9fo%40googlegroups.com
>>  
>> .
> 
> 
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> .

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Jun 2020, at 21:32, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>> 
>> 
>> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html 
>>  :
>> 
>> Predictions are overrated
>> 
>>  
>> 
> She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good description 
> of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the question, which is 
> how do we tell a theory that is a good description from a theory that is a 
> bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons means the theory is 
> bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a theory good...although 
> Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did. 
> 
> Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with other 
> good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous 
> predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates 
> "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what 
> constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that 
> qualification things like "God did it”


Which is the error of the materialist. 



> or "It's all simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

Not at all. This is refuted by Mechanism (Descartes, Darwin, Turing, …). The 
physical universe is NOT simulated by any computer, given that it arises from a 
non computable (non simulable) statistics on all simulations. It might be, or 
not, relatively well approximable by some computations, but that’s all we can 
hope.

Bruno





> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> anyway.
>> 
>> @philipthrift 
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>>  
>> .
> 
> 
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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Jun 2020, at 19:25, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>> 
>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with Shakespeare's 
>> plays, or the Bible. AG 
> 
> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except 
> that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of randomness 
> at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true (semantic) 
> relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown to be an 
> internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the 
> mathematics iff self-reference.
> 
> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a year 
> ago.
> 
> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using 
> more than the two axioms above. 
> 
> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
> 
> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
> 
> Bohr:
>   - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>   - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
> 
> Everett
>   - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>   - Mechanism
> 
> Your servitor:
>   - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>   - Mechanism.
> 
> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the 
> Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict 
> everything.
> 
> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not 
> mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and 
> computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, 
> Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two 
> theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one modal 
> logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really address the 
> “mechanist mind-body problem”.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, it 
> seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
> gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let alone 
> show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 
> 
> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of arithmetic, 
> can distinguish one G from another, to obtain the weak field approximation of 
> GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is 
> independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 


You seem to assume a physical reality. That’s all good for doing physics, but 
cannot work when doing mechanist metaphysics. With Mechanism, invoking an 
ontological commitment is no more available. You would need to explain how it 
would make possible to distinguish the arithmetical and the physical reality 
from introspection only, which is not possible when we assume digital 
mechanism. Eventually, you might understand that there are no evidence for a 
primary physical universe (primary = in need to be assumed and not explainable 
from something non physical).

Bruno 





> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
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>>  
>> .
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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Jun 2020, at 18:29, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>> 
>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with Shakespeare's 
>> plays, or the Bible. AG 
> 
> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except 
> that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of randomness 
> at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true (semantic) 
> relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown to be an 
> internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the 
> mathematics iff self-reference.
> 
> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a year 
> ago.
> 
> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using 
> more than the two axioms above. 
> 
> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
> 
> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
> 
> Bohr:
>   - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>   - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
> 
> Everett
>   - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>   - Mechanism
> 
> Your servitor:
>   - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>   - Mechanism.
> 
> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the 
> Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict 
> everything.
> 
> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not 
> mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and 
> computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, 
> Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two 
> theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one modal 
> logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really address the 
> “mechanist mind-body problem”.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> I am not motivated to study your theory.

I have no theory, just a theorem in the Digital Mechanist theory of mind. You 
can bypass it to do physics, but not to do metaphysics.




> If all computation are possible,

They are all “actual”. Would you say that “all prime numbers are possible” 
needs to be assumed to understand Rieman hypothesis?



> it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
> gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let alone 
> show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 


The contrary is true. With mechanism, physics become a statistic on all 
(relative) computations, and it can be shown that this leads to one physics. 
The laws of physics are entirely determined once we assume mechanism. There 
will be opportunities to say more on this, but you might study some of may 
papers, also. 

Bruno




> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
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>>  
>> .
> 
> 
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> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b27beb6d-967e-4c39-b2a5-6cc14836412bo%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 11:25:51 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:

 It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

>>>
>>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
>>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
>>>
>>>
>>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. 
>>> Except that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of 
>>> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
>>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown 
>>> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the 
>>> mathematics iff self-reference.
>>>
>>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a 
>>> year ago.
>>>
>>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
>>> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using 
>>> more than the two axioms above. 
>>>
>>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
>>>
>>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
>>>
>>> Bohr:
>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
>>>
>>> Everett
>>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>>> - Mechanism
>>>
>>> Your servitor:
>>> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>>> - Mechanism.
>>>
>>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is 
>>> the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
>>> predict everything.
>>>
>>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is 
>>> not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism 
>>> and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by 
>>> Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are 
>>> the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in 
>>> one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really 
>>> address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, 
>> it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
>> gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let 
>> alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 
>>
>
> Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of arithmetic, 
> can distinguish one G from another, to obtain the weak field approximation 
> of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is 
> independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 
>

I got my answer, by default. AG 

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 5:04:07 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 1:51:32 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 12:46:34 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 12:38:08 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:



 On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 10:25:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 5:42:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: 

 It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html
>>>  :
>>>
>>> Predictions are overrated 
>>>
>>> 
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>> She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good 
>>> description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the 
>>> question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description 
>>> from 
>>> a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong 
>>> predicitons 
>>> means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make 
>>> a 
>>> theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend 
>>> that 
>>> he did. 
>>>
>>> Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience 
>>> with other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and 
>>> unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   
>>> Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I 
>>> think 
>>> the preceding are what constitute explantory power in the scientific 
>>> sense.  Without that qualification things like "God did it" or "It's 
>>> all 
>>> simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although 
>> general relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is 
>> (literally) 
>> "wrong" (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also 
>>  
>> has "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately 
>> failed theories. 
>>
>>
>> I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
>> engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never *know *we 
>> have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.  
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
>> theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in 
>> her 
>> view).
>>
>> But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
> *All descriptions of reality are inadequate, Feyerabend said. "You 
> think that this one-day fly, this little bit of nothing, a human 
> being--according to today's cosmology!--can figure it all out? This to me 
> seems so crazy! It cannot possibly be true! What they figured out is one 
> particular response to their actions, and this response gives this 
> universe, and the reality that is behind this is laughing! 'Ha ha! They 
> think they have found me out!'"*
>
>
> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/was-philosopher-paul-feyerabend-really-science-s-worst-enemy/
>
> @philipthrift 
>

 This guy's a "philosopher"? He's just a jerk and you shouldn't waste 
 our time with this total crap! AG 

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> When the extraterrestrials come with their science orders of magnitudes 
>>> beyond ours that makes us look like little ants just building anthills, 
>>> then we will see who the jerks are.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>
>> Do us all a favor and cease posting crap from wannabe philosophers. AG 
>>
>
>
>
>
> He was a famous philosopher of the 20th century.
>
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feyerabend/
>
> I'm sure you too with your Ph.D. and publications are revered for your 
> knowledge in your field.
>
>
> @philipthrift
>

Face it. His words are revealing. Your "philosopher" is a stupid prick.  AG

>
>
>
>
>  
>

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To view this 

Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 1:51:32 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 12:46:34 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 12:38:08 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 10:25:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 5:42:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>>
>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html
>>  :
>>
>> Predictions are overrated 
>>
>> 
>>  
>>
>>
>> She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good 
>> description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the 
>> question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description 
>> from 
>> a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong 
>> predicitons 
>> means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make 
>> a 
>> theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend 
>> that 
>> he did. 
>>
>> Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience 
>> with other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and 
>> unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   
>> Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I 
>> think 
>> the preceding are what constitute explantory power in the scientific 
>> sense.  Without that qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all 
>> simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although 
> general relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is 
> (literally) 
> "wrong" (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  
> has "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately 
> failed theories. 
>
>
> I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
> engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never *know *we 
> have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.  
>
> Brent
>
>
> Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
> theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in 
> her 
> view).
>
> But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
 *All descriptions of reality are inadequate, Feyerabend said. "You 
 think that this one-day fly, this little bit of nothing, a human 
 being--according to today's cosmology!--can figure it all out? This to me 
 seems so crazy! It cannot possibly be true! What they figured out is one 
 particular response to their actions, and this response gives this 
 universe, and the reality that is behind this is laughing! 'Ha ha! They 
 think they have found me out!'"*


 https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/was-philosopher-paul-feyerabend-really-science-s-worst-enemy/

 @philipthrift 

>>>
>>> This guy's a "philosopher"? He's just a jerk and you shouldn't waste our 
>>> time with this total crap! AG 
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> When the extraterrestrials come with their science orders of magnitudes 
>> beyond ours that makes us look like little ants just building anthills, 
>> then we will see who the jerks are.
>>
>>
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> Do us all a favor and cease posting crap from wannabe philosophers. AG 
>




He was a famous philosopher of the 20th century.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feyerabend/

I'm sure you too with your Ph.D. and publications are revered for your 
knowledge in your field.


@philipthrift




 

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 12:46:34 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 12:38:08 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 10:25:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 5:42:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



 On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>
>
>
> On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>
>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>
>
>
> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html
>  :
>
> Predictions are overrated 
>
> 
>  
>
>
> She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good 
> description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the 
> question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description 
> from 
> a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons 
> means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a 
> theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend 
> that 
> he did. 
>
> Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with 
> other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and 
> unambiguous 
> predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder 
> advocates 
> "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are 
> what 
> constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that 
> qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside 
> arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.
>
> Brent
>


 It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although 
 general relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is 
 (literally) 
 "wrong" (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  
 has "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately 
 failed theories. 


 I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
 engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never *know *we 
 have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.  

 Brent


 Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
 theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in 
 her 
 view).

 But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.

 @philipthrift


>>> *All descriptions of reality are inadequate, Feyerabend said. "You think 
>>> that this one-day fly, this little bit of nothing, a human being--according 
>>> to today's cosmology!--can figure it all out? This to me seems so crazy! It 
>>> cannot possibly be true! What they figured out is one particular response 
>>> to their actions, and this response gives this universe, and the reality 
>>> that is behind this is laughing! 'Ha ha! They think they have found me 
>>> out!'"*
>>>
>>>
>>> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/was-philosopher-paul-feyerabend-really-science-s-worst-enemy/
>>>
>>> @philipthrift 
>>>
>>
>> This guy's a "philosopher"? He's just a jerk and you shouldn't waste our 
>> time with this total crap! AG 
>>
>
>
>
>
>
> When the extraterrestrials come with their science orders of magnitudes 
> beyond ours that makes us look like little ants just building anthills, 
> then we will see who the jerks are.
>
>
>
> @philipthrift
>

Do us all a favor and cease posting crap from wannabe philosophers. AG 

-- 
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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 12:38:08 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 10:25:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 5:42:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 



 On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>


 http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html
  :

 Predictions are overrated 

 
  


 She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good 
 description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the 
 question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from 
 a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons 
 means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a 
 theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend 
 that 
 he did. 

 Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with 
 other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous 
 predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates 
 "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what 
 constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that 
 qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside 
 arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

 Brent

>>>
>>>
>>> It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general 
>>> relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" 
>>> (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has 
>>> "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed 
>>> theories. 
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
>>> engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never *know *we 
>>> have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.  
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>> Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
>>> theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her 
>>> view).
>>>
>>> But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>>
>> *All descriptions of reality are inadequate, Feyerabend said. "You think 
>> that this one-day fly, this little bit of nothing, a human being--according 
>> to today's cosmology!--can figure it all out? This to me seems so crazy! It 
>> cannot possibly be true! What they figured out is one particular response 
>> to their actions, and this response gives this universe, and the reality 
>> that is behind this is laughing! 'Ha ha! They think they have found me 
>> out!'"*
>>
>>
>> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/was-philosopher-paul-feyerabend-really-science-s-worst-enemy/
>>
>> @philipthrift 
>>
>
> This guy's a "philosopher"? He's just a jerk and you shouldn't waste our 
> time with this total crap! AG 
>





When the extraterrestrials come with their science orders of magnitudes 
beyond ours that makes us look like little ants just building anthills, 
then we will see who the jerks are.



@philipthrift

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Tuesday, June 9, 2020 at 10:25:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 5:42:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: 

 It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG

>>>
>>>
>>> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html
>>>  :
>>>
>>> Predictions are overrated 
>>>
>>> 
>>>  
>>>
>>>
>>> She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good 
>>> description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the 
>>> question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from 
>>> a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons 
>>> means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a 
>>> theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that 
>>> he did. 
>>>
>>> Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with 
>>> other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous 
>>> predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates 
>>> "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what 
>>> constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that 
>>> qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside 
>>> arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general 
>> relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" 
>> (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has 
>> "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed 
>> theories. 
>>
>>
>> I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
>> engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never *know *we 
>> have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.  
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
>> theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her 
>> view).
>>
>> But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
> *All descriptions of reality are inadequate, Feyerabend said. "You think 
> that this one-day fly, this little bit of nothing, a human being--according 
> to today's cosmology!--can figure it all out? This to me seems so crazy! It 
> cannot possibly be true! What they figured out is one particular response 
> to their actions, and this response gives this universe, and the reality 
> that is behind this is laughing! 'Ha ha! They think they have found me 
> out!'"*
>
>
> https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/was-philosopher-paul-feyerabend-really-science-s-worst-enemy/
>
> @philipthrift 
>

This guy's a "philosopher"? He's just a jerk and you shouldn't waste our 
time with this total crap! AG 

-- 
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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 5:42:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>>
>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>>
>>
>>
>> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :
>>
>> Predictions are overrated 
>>
>> 
>>  
>>
>>
>> She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good 
>> description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the 
>> question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from 
>> a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons 
>> means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a 
>> theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that 
>> he did. 
>>
>> Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with 
>> other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous 
>> predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates 
>> "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what 
>> constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that 
>> qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside 
>> arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general 
> relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" 
> (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has 
> "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed 
> theories. 
>
>
> I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
> engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never *know *we have 
> an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.  
>
> Brent
>
>
> Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
> theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her 
> view).
>
> But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
*All descriptions of reality are inadequate, Feyerabend said. "You think 
that this one-day fly, this little bit of nothing, a human being--according 
to today's cosmology!--can figure it all out? This to me seems so crazy! It 
cannot possibly be true! What they figured out is one particular response 
to their actions, and this response gives this universe, and the reality 
that is behind this is laughing! 'Ha ha! They think they have found me 
out!'"*

https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/was-philosopher-paul-feyerabend-really-science-s-worst-enemy/

@philipthrift 

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 6/8/2020 2:24 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG



http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html
 :


  Predictions are overrated







She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good
description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding
the question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good
description from a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says
making wrong predicitons means the theory is bad.  He didn't say
making correct predictions make a theory good...although
Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that he did.

Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience
with other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise
and unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of
comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a
better critereon.  I think the preceding are what constitute
explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that
qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated
inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.

Brent



It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although 
general relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is 
(literally) "wrong" (for very small stuff anyway), and quantum 
mechanics, which also  has "confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. 
So both are ultimately failed theories.


I think that's strange meaning of "failed".  90% of (very successful) 
engineering is based on Newton and Maxwell.  We will never /*know */we 
have an ultimately successful theory even if we do have it.


Brent



Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless 
(in her view).


But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.

@philipthrift






@philipthrift
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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 2:32:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>
>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>
>
>
> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :
>
> Predictions are overrated 
>
> 
>  
>
>
> She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good 
> description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the 
> question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description from 
> a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong predicitons 
> means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct predictions make a 
> theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter examples pretend that 
> he did. 
>
> Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with 
> other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and unambiguous 
> predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension.   Hossenfelder advocates 
> "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I think the preceding are what 
> constitute explantory power in the scientific sense.  Without that 
> qualification things like "God did it" or "It's all simulated inside 
> arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.
>
> Brent
>


It's not clear, but a point she has made before is that although general 
relativity has a bunch of "confirmation" success, it is (literally) "wrong" 
(for very small stuff anyway), and quantum mechanics, which also  has 
"confirmation" successes, is is incomplete. So both are ultimately failed 
theories. 

Physicists who leap from the the "success" of the mathematics in the 
theories to claims about what physical stuff really is are clueless (in her 
view).

But as Jim Baggott has said (in a tweet), she is a sloppy writer.

@philipthrift






@philipthrift

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 6/7/2020 11:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:

It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG



http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :


  Predictions are overrated

 





She writes, "If I have a scientific theory, it is either a good 
description of nature, or it is not."  But that is just avoiding the 
question, which is how do we tell a theory that is a good description 
from a theory that is a bad description.  Popper says making wrong 
predicitons means the theory is bad.  He didn't say making correct 
predictions make a theory good...although Hossenfelder's made-up counter 
examples pretend that he did.


Obviously there are other criteria for a good theory: Consilience with 
other good theories.  Broad scope of application.  Precise and 
unambiguous predictions.   Clarity and ease of comprehension. 
Hossenfelder advocates "explanatory power" as a better critereon.  I 
think the preceding are what constitute explantory power in the 
scientific sense.  Without that qualification things like "God did it" 
or "It's all simulated inside arithmetic" have perfect explanatory power.


Brent





anyway.

@philipthrift
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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 10:29:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>>
>>
>> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
>> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
>>
>>
>> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except 
>> that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of 
>> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
>> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown 
>> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the 
>> mathematics iff self-reference.
>>
>> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a 
>> year ago.
>>
>> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
>> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using 
>> more than the two axioms above. 
>>
>> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
>>
>> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
>>
>> Bohr:
>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
>>
>> Everett
>> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
>> - Mechanism
>>
>> Your servitor:
>> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
>> - Mechanism.
>>
>> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is 
>> the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
>> predict everything.
>>
>> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is 
>> not mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism 
>> and computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by 
>> Gödel, Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are 
>> the two theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in 
>> one modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really 
>> address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, 
> it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
> gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let 
> alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 
>

Also, I don't believe that logic alone, with the postulates of arithmetic, 
can distinguish one G from another, to obtain the weak field approximation 
of GR, aka Newtonian gravity; or that the measured velocity of light is 
independent of the motions of source and recipient. AG 

>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/42839686-3300-4fb6-bc61-987be7103c1ao%40googlegroups.com
>>  
>> 
>> .
>>
>>
>>

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Monday, June 8, 2020 at 6:26:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>>
>
> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
> Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 
>
>
> Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except 
> that the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of 
> randomness at that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true 
> (semantic) relations implementing computations, and then physics is shown 
> to be an internal measure, isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the 
> mathematics iff self-reference.
>
> The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a 
> year ago.
>
> The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) 
> variants imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using 
> more than the two axioms above. 
>
> “My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 
>
> Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:
>
> Bohr:
> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
> - a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.
>
> Everett
> - the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
> - Mechanism
>
> Your servitor:
> - arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
> - Mechanism.
>
> If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is 
> the Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories 
> predict everything.
>
> I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not 
> mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and 
> computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, 
> Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two 
> theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one 
> modal logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really 
> address the “mechanist mind-body problem”.
>
> Bruno
>

I am not motivated to study your theory. If all computation are possible, 
it seems to imply, for example, that any G describes a possible Newtonian 
gravity law, but can't tell is which G corresponds to our universe, let 
alone show that Newton's law is just a weak field approximation of GR. AG 

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com .
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> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/42839686-3300-4fb6-bc61-987be7103c1ao%40googlegroups.com
>  
> 
> .
>
>
>

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Jun 2020, at 08:21, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
> 
> 
> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html 
>  :
> 
> Predictions are overrated
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> anyway.





To predict is not the same as to explain. I agree with this. René Thom wrote 
convincing text about this.

But an explanation which cannot make predictions is a poor explanation.

Bruno




> 
> @philipthrift 
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:56, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
> 
> It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with Shakespeare's 
> plays, or the Bible. AG 

Using this analogy, it is more like the monkey typing *all* books. Except that 
the monkey is elementary arithmetic, and there is non need of randomness at 
that stage, and also, the books are not books, but true (semantic) relations 
implementing computations, and then physics is shown to be an internal measure, 
isolated from the Göde-Löb-Solvay theorem in the mathematics iff self-reference.

The theory is Kxy = x together with Sxyz = xz(yz), as I have explained a year 
ago.

The theology is the modal logics G and G*, and the intensional (modal) variants 
imposed by incompleteness, and all that is justified without using more than 
the two axioms above. 

“My” theory is a sub theory of al scientific theories. 

Look at the conceptual progresses even just on physics:

Bohr:
- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
- a dualist unintelligible theory of mind.

Everett
- the wave equation (full arithmetic + analysis)
- Mechanism

Your servitor:
- arithmetic (a tiny part of arithmetic)
- Mechanism.

If “my" theory (which is actually a theorem showing that “my” theory is the 
Universal machine theory) predicts everything, then all theories predict 
everything.

I suspect that you have not really try to understand the theory. It is not 
mine, it is the theory that any patient being can derive from mechanism and 
computer science/arithmetic. The hard work have already be done by Gödel, 
Kleene, Löb, and others. Two key theorems which summarise a lot are the two 
theorem by Solovay, which summarise the theology of the machine in one modal 
logic G*. Such question or read the papers if you want to really address the 
“mechanist mind-body problem”.

Bruno







> 
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>  
> .

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Jun 2020, at 17:00, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG


It refutes Newton’s physics, and it makes me discover QM, including the 
“many-histories”, which was enough to be mocked, by people, who have eventually 
admitted that they were wrong (the wiser among them at least).
It certainly does not predict everything. 

Even Schmidhuber theory (which missed the first person indeterminacy, 
consciousness, qualia) does not predicts everything, despite david Deutsch 
attacked him in this way.

I think you might not have grasped the theory. I am pretty sure that you have 
not study it, for sating that it predicts everything, which is just obviously 
false (unless inconsistent of course). 

Keep in mind that the TOE extracted from Mechanism, is very clear. It is just 
two equations (and some identity rules): 
Kxy = x + Sxyz = xz(yz). 
This does not predict everything, but explain entirely the phenomenological 
existence of quanta and qualia, and their relations, which is just impossible 
to do with physicalism (that is why physicalist dismiss consciousness since 
2000 years).

Physics only works (for prediction) by requiring Descartes and Darwin to be 
false. It necessitates magic.

Explain me how to predict a solar eclipse, and I will show you the exact place 
you will be obliged to use some non-mechanist theory of mind.

Mechanism is the only theory today which explains both consciousness and the 
appearance of matter. As it predicts the whole of physics, it is hard to 
imagine a theory less refutable, but not yet refuted today. 

Bruno



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>  
> .

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 10:00:46 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>


http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html :

Predictions are overrated




anyway.

@philipthrift 

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Re: My view of Bruno's theory

[Alan Grayson]

On Sunday, June 7, 2020 at 9:00:46 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> It predicts everything, so it predicts nothing. AG
>

It's not unlike the monkey typing at random and coming up with 
Shakespeare's plays, or the Bible. AG 

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