Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Dec 2017, at 22:27, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 12:49:16PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:

I don't know why he
insists on calling computationalism "mechanist" since it has  
nothing to do

with "mechanisms" or "mechanical".


Mechanist just means related to machines.




Hmm... That could lead to the confusion with using machine as a  
metaphor.


I use the term in the sense: it exists a finitely describable,  
digital, substitution level such that I survive a brain/body  
substitution made at that level.







The most developed, complete
theory we have of machines is that of the Turing machine, and with the
CT thesis, universal Turing machines.


Typo error: I guess you mean universal machine. (once you have the  
Turing machine, you have a universal Turing machine as a theorem, and  
CT is the thesis that the universal turing machine are universal for  
all conceivable digital machines). That is the concept of Turing  
computation encompasses all possible computations.






So Mechanism does include Computationalism, but potentially much more,
since hypercomputers (capable of much more than a Turing machine) are
conceivable, albeit strangely missing from our reality.


Near black holes some are conceivable. With mechanism we could test if  
we are already there or not.







If you subscribe to Deutsch's Turing tropic principle, then mechanism
= computationalism.



Deutsch defines computation by quantum computation, which, in the  
mechanist perspective put the mind-body problem under the rug rather  
elegantly, but that cannot satisfy the universal machine, quantum or  
not.


I use mechanism and computationalism as synonym. I vary for let us say  
musical reason in the presentation. or, I make precise if I use a  
variant. My definition (YD + CT) is the weakest possible logically, as  
the granularity, nor the size of the "brain" involved are bounded in  
any way, yet finite in all utilisation, like a computation on an  
extendible tape.


Bruno





--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Dec 2017, at 22:20, Russell Standish wrote:


On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 11:04:58AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 00:56, Russell Standish wrote:


On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 05:25:12PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:



What is the difference you make between an instrument recording the
result
and an observer? Consciousness? But that is what "Wigner's friend"
shows
difficult to admit, and besides, I thought we all agree that it is
better
that QM is the same for conscious and non conscious beings?



For me, the most important thing is the continuous/discrete
transition. I am ambivalent on whether this requires consciousness  
or

not. The best examplar to think about IMHO is an analogue-digital
converter (aka A/D converter), for example the microphone input
circuit on your computer. Conceptually, this device converts an  
input

voltage into a distinct number (eg 0-255). However, in actual fact
what it does physically is convert a voltage into a time-varying
voltage signal, conventionally interpreted as the zeros and ones  
of a
number communicated serially into the computer (or alternatively,  
fans

the voltages out into a parallel array of volatages). That
"conventionally interpreted" is the wiggle room that smuggles
consciousness back in the picture.

Nevertheless, the most important aspect is the contrast between the
continuous and the discrete. Its the FAPP in the zeroing out of
offdiagonal terms in the einselection picture, as just another
example. We could probably make most progress on the measurement
problem by focussing on just that distinction, and ignoring any  
other
aspect of consciousness or observerhood, since the continuous/ 
discrete
distinction should not be controversial to anyone, and a lot in  
known

mathematically about it.


It seems that you are assuming some physical universe, or at least  
some
analytical universe. But with digital mechanism we can (and  
apparently
should) assume only a digital discrete inductive structure (natural  
number
with add and times, combinators with application and reduction,  
etc.), and
the analytical becomes tools of the mind (and their appearance are  
justified

from the discrete entities pov).


Not so assumed. Your FPI argument shows how observed physics has a
continuous character,


OK, but that is part of the consequence when assuming digital  
mechanism. We got it, without assuming it, but we get it only in the  
mind of the machine, it is phenomenological, like all the infinities  
which will crop up.





yet the domain of knowledge is necessarily
discrete (digital mechanism).


Knowledge is continuous too. S4Grz1 (Bp & p, with p semi-computable,  
leaf of the UD) semantic is a priori close to intuitionism, and, with  
the "1" close to some quantum logic, but the semantics are  
topological, continuous. Knowability and knowledge are not even  
definable by the machine, as least the one concerning itself.


Only G seems to be confronted with the discrete, which is normal as we  
assume some fragment of theory/model (N, 0, +, *) . The transition  
between discrete and continuous is brought by the "non definable by  
the machine" "& p". It is in between G and S4Grz, of between Z and X.


The machine knows that her soul (the knower, the owner of  
consciousness, the one metadescribed by Bp & p) is not a machine, from  
its first person view, and only: could be an (unknown) machine, if God  
is OK with that, when she accept the digitalist surgeon proposition.





ISTM that computationalism proves the
rule, rather than being a counter example.


OK, as part of the consequences of mechanism, which might invalidated,  
or not, your argument, but I lost the line. For me, with mechanism,  
there is no measuremnt problem: Everett+Gleason solves the problem  
completely, ... except that we have to extract the necessity of the  
wave from arithmetical self-reference.  But it works apparently,  
although only the infinite future can show us wrong, if it is correct!


Cheers,

Bruno







Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 12:49:16PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I don't know why he
> insists on calling computationalism "mechanist" since it has nothing to do
> with "mechanisms" or "mechanical".

Mechanist just means related to machines. The most developed, complete
theory we have of machines is that of the Turing machine, and with the
CT thesis, universal Turing machines.

So Mechanism does include Computationalism, but potentially much more,
since hypercomputers (capable of much more than a Turing machine) are
conceivable, albeit strangely missing from our reality.

If you subscribe to Deutsch's Turing tropic principle, then mechanism
= computationalism.
-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Russell Standish]

On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 11:04:58AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 19 Dec 2017, at 00:56, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> > On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 05:25:12PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > What is the difference you make between an instrument recording the
> > > result
> > > and an observer? Consciousness? But that is what "Wigner's friend"
> > > shows
> > > difficult to admit, and besides, I thought we all agree that it is
> > > better
> > > that QM is the same for conscious and non conscious beings?
> > 
> > 
> > For me, the most important thing is the continuous/discrete
> > transition. I am ambivalent on whether this requires consciousness or
> > not. The best examplar to think about IMHO is an analogue-digital
> > converter (aka A/D converter), for example the microphone input
> > circuit on your computer. Conceptually, this device converts an input
> > voltage into a distinct number (eg 0-255). However, in actual fact
> > what it does physically is convert a voltage into a time-varying
> > voltage signal, conventionally interpreted as the zeros and ones of a
> > number communicated serially into the computer (or alternatively, fans
> > the voltages out into a parallel array of volatages). That
> > "conventionally interpreted" is the wiggle room that smuggles
> > consciousness back in the picture.
> > 
> > Nevertheless, the most important aspect is the contrast between the
> > continuous and the discrete. Its the FAPP in the zeroing out of
> > offdiagonal terms in the einselection picture, as just another
> > example. We could probably make most progress on the measurement
> > problem by focussing on just that distinction, and ignoring any other
> > aspect of consciousness or observerhood, since the continuous/discrete
> > distinction should not be controversial to anyone, and a lot in known
> > mathematically about it.
> 
> It seems that you are assuming some physical universe, or at least some
> analytical universe. But with digital mechanism we can (and apparently
> should) assume only a digital discrete inductive structure (natural number
> with add and times, combinators with application and reduction, etc.), and
> the analytical becomes tools of the mind (and their appearance are justified
> from the discrete entities pov).

Not so assumed. Your FPI argument shows how observed physics has a
continuous character, yet the domain of knowledge is necessarily
discrete (digital mechanism). ISTM that computationalism proves the
rule, rather than being a counter example.

Cheers
-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Dec 2017, at 23:35, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 7:18:31 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Dec 2017, at 01:41, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:


On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​According to​ ​Copenhagen​ ​Wigner's friend​ ​opens  
the cat box and that ​​collapses​ ​the cat's wave  
function, and so Wigner's friend​ ​now knows the cat's fate,  
but Wigner's friend​ ​is also in a box and Wigner​ ​ 
himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's  
box his friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a  
live cat state".  And of course you could put Wigner himself in a  
box with somebody outside it and you could keep increasing the  
number of nested boxes until the entire universe is included, and  
that is why the Copenhagen​ ​interpretation is useless if  
you're ​interest is in ​dealing in cosmology because there is  
nobody outside ​to​ universe observe it.


 And God ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses  
God's wave function, ​and even then there would be another  
unanswered question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among  
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved  
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the  
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,  
apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the  
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the  
structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey  
quite different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in  
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is  
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father,  
we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG


Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation  
manifested by a Mathematician. AG
Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very  
elementary arithmetic:


That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different  
successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a  
predecessor)
x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get  
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a  
number y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of  
y, you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x  
with y)


I do not assume anything more than this.

You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas"  
exists that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical  
world,
Yes, but eventually it is limited to a tiny part of math. And yes, I  
tend to believe more in 2+2=4 than in F=GmM/r^2.
with the addition of what you call computationalism, presumably  
something immaterial that can do calculations, and/or is in some  
sense conscious. Those are HUGE ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS.
You might need to study my papers. You might also study computer  
science. The notion of computation has been discovered by  
mathematician, working on the foundations of mathematics (Gödel,  
Post, Kleene, Turing, Church, ...). Do not confuse the arithmetical  
notion of universal machine with the physical implementations of  
universal machine (like brain, computer, cells, ...).


I've worked with the computer operating system on the Galileo  
spacecraft which orbited Jupiter, a very complex system, but I have  
no idea what you mean by "computation". How do you distinguish  
computation from what I am familiar with? AG


I use computation in the original sense of Turing, also found by Post,  
Church, ...


I am not entirely sure that "operating system" will help, because an  
operating system is to a universal machine what a bureaucratic  
environment, if not a straitjacked, is for a human.


But I understand the 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 7:18:31 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Dec 2017, at 01:41, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:

 On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

 ​> ​
> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
> when the box is opened. What am I missing?
>

 ​
 According to
 ​ ​
 Copenhagen
 ​ ​
 Wigner's friend
 ​ ​
 opens the cat box and that 
 ​​
 collapses
 ​ ​
 the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
 ​ ​
 now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
 ​ ​
 is also in a box and Wigner
 ​ ​
 himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
 friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
 And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
 it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
 entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
 ​ ​
 interpretation is useless if you're 
 ​interest is in ​
 dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
 ​to​
  universe observe it.

  And God 
 ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
 ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
 mention.


 And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could 
 *anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all 
 computations?
 But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in 
 the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative way 
 allowed by the local self-referential correctness, apparently.

 Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians in 
 the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).

 Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth 
 level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the 
 machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite 
 different logics.

 Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the 
 head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.

 Bruno

>>>
>>> *Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is 
>>> Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we have 
>>> an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG *
>>>
>>
>> *Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation manifested by 
>> a Mathematician. AG*
>>
>> Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very 
>> elementary arithmetic:
>>
>> That is classical logic +
>>
>> 0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
>> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
>> x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get that 
>> number)
>> x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number y, 
>> you get the successor of x added to y)
>> x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of y, you 
>> get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)
>>
>> I do not assume anything more than this. 
>>
>
> *You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas" exists 
> that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical world,*
>
> Yes, but eventually it is limited to a tiny part of math. And yes, I tend 
> to believe more in 2+2=4 than in F=GmM/r^2.
>
> *with the addition of what you call computationalism, presumably something 
> immaterial that can do calculations, and/or is in some sense conscious. 
> Those are HUGE ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS. *
>
> You might need to study my papers. You might also study computer science. 
> The notion of computation has been discovered by mathematician, working on 
> the foundations of mathematics (Gödel, Post, Kleene, Turing, Church, ...). 
> Do not confuse the arithmetical notion of universal machine with the 
> physical implementations of universal machine (like brain, computer, cells, 
> ...).
>
 
*I've worked with the computer operating system on the Galileo spacecraft 
which orbited Jupiter, a very complex system, but I have no idea what you 
mean by 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Dec 2017, at 01:41, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​According to​ ​Copenhagen​ ​Wigner's friend​ ​opens  
the cat box and that ​​collapses​ ​the cat's wave function,  
and so Wigner's friend​ ​now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's  
friend​ ​is also in a box and Wigner​ ​himself is outside  
that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his friend is in  
a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  And of  
course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside  
it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until  
the entire universe is included, and that is why the  
Copenhagen​ ​interpretation is useless if you're ​interest is  
in ​dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside ​to​  
universe observe it.


 And God ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's  
wave function, ​and even then there would be another unanswered  
question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among  
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved  
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the  
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,  
apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the  
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the  
structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite  
different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in  
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is  
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father,  
we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG


Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation  
manifested by a Mathematician. AG



Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very  
elementary arithmetic:


That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get  
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number  
y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of y,  
you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x  
with y)


I do not assume anything more than this.

You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas"  
exists that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical world,


Yes, but eventually it is limited to a tiny part of math. And yes, I  
tend to believe more in 2+2=4 than in F=GmM/r^2.





with the addition of what you call computationalism, presumably  
something immaterial that can do calculations, and/or is in some  
sense conscious. Those are HUGE ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS.



You might need to study my papers. You might also study computer  
science. The notion of computation has been discovered by  
mathematician, working on the foundations of mathematics (Gödel, Post,  
Kleene, Turing, Church, ...). Do not confuse the arithmetical notion  
of universal machine with the physical implementations of universal  
machine (like brain, computer, cells, ...).


I assume only that the brain is Turing emulable, which is not much as  
we don't have any evidence that there is something in nature which is  
not Turing emulable, except for the controversial wave packet reduction.


Then, I show, by a reasoning, that Mechanism makes Primary Matter not  
able to justify our first person impression with the observable, and  
that reasoning shows that we cannot eventually assume more than RA,  
for the ontology. Then PA or ZF are enough for the epistemology and  
the physics, but we look only to its internal mimic in Q (RA).







Also, you make the claim that from this you can derive or infer QM.  
Sounds like the 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Dec 2017, at 21:53, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/20/2017 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​ I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​ According to ​ ​ Copenhagen ​ ​ Wigner's  
friend ​ ​ opens the cat box and that ​​ collapses ​ ​  
the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend ​ ​ now knows  
the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend ​ ​ is also in a box and  
Wigner ​ ​ himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens  
his friend's box his friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND  
a "I see a live cat state".  And of course you could put Wigner  
himself in a box with somebody outside it and you could keep  
increasing the number of nested boxes until the entire universe  
is included, and that is why the Copenhagen ​ ​ interpretation  
is useless if you're ​interest is in ​ dealing in cosmology  
because there is nobody outside ​to​  universe observe it.


 And God  ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses  
God's wave function, ​and even then there would be another  
unanswered question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among  
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved  
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the  
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,  
apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the  
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the  
structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey  
quite different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in  
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is  
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father,  
we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG


Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation  
manifested by a Mathematician. AG



Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very  
elementary arithmetic:


That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different  
successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a  
predecessor)
x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get  
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a  
number y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of  
y, you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x  
with y)


I do not assume anything more than this.

I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I  
assume some WILL at the core of the creation. With  
computationalism, a will can be ascribed to a machine/number,  
relatively to universal machine/numbers and their computations,  
which provably exist in the theory above.


It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe,  
without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take  
that as an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic  
philosophers with the dream argument. No experience, nor  
experiments can lead to an ontology, except for the personal  
consciousness. Physics is not metaphysics, unless you assume  
Aristotle theology, i.e. you assume a PRIMARY physical universe,  
that is, if you assume physicalism at the start. But then you need  
to abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable.


No you don't.


Digital mechanism logically reverse the charge. If you commit yourself  
in some deity (in the greek sense, it can be non personal), like  
Primary Matter, it is up to you to explain how that deity can make  
some computation more real ... but still Turing emulable. You have to  
explain how your deity can make the selection, and yet without rising  
doubt that the digitalist doctor might not been always missing  
something.


That the physical relations originates from number relations does not  
seem to me more astonishing than the fact that the human relations  
originate from chemo-physical reactions.


Keep in 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Dec 2017, at 21:49, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/20/2017 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point  
(which is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal  
Doevtailer Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist  
explanation of the mind, and physicalism.


This is false.  The argument doesn't show that.  In fact I think it  
implies that the physical is necessary.


That is the point. We assume only arithmetic, and derive that the  
physical is necessary, from the relative machine's pov, and without  
adding any ontologial commitment. So physics is shown, in that frame,  
to be derivable from machine's theology.



Bruno is found of saying that it makes computation basic.  But  
computation apparently explains too much.  So it is only by saying  
that somehow what we experience as mental and physical is picked out  
does computationalism "explain" the world.


That is right, but the "picking up" avoid magic invocation to  
metaphysical principle. It is only the first person indeterminacy, and  
both intuition (by the many-worlds or many histories) and math  
confirms this. So why add an ontologcal commitment ton just prevent a  
simple explanation. That is "bad religion".






I don't know why he insists on calling computationalism "mechanist"  
since it has nothing to do with "mechanisms" or "mechanical".


?

Computationalism, that is the weak version I study, is Church-Turing  
thesis, or the equivalent one by Post and Kleene in terms of set  
instead of functions, and this should made clear the relation between  
digital machines, programs, computers, and ... computations,  
emulations, simulations, ... And with the mechanist hypothesis, this  
automatically concerns dreams, subjective experiences, first person  
phenomena, consciousness, etc.


I do not need Mechanism to doubt materialism. there are just not one  
evidence for materialism, except the natural extrapolation enforced by  
nature wanting us taking seriously predators and preys. Nobody has  
seen either primary matter, or any indirect evidence for it. What I  
see are human persons doing measurements, obtaining numbers, and  
inferring mathematical (usually computable) relations between those  
numbers.


Feynman formulation is close to the Mechanist explanation; all Turing  
emulable histories happens (that is a theorem *about* RA, provable  
*in*, or *by* PA), but we have to add a "phase" to each step of the  
universal machines so that we can make the white rabbit (the long  
stupid explanations) disappearing by phase randomization. The problem  
is that he derives this from observation, so he missed (like all  
physicists) the qualia/consciousness aspect of the phenomenology.


To get it, it is enough to take into consideration that the observer  
are locally Turing emulable, and that all predictions are relative  
fromal 3p indexicals, and so are concerned by the the logic of self- 
reference. The thought experiences, or the antic greek philosophy,  
justifies the standard classical definitions of belief, knowledge,  
observation (intelligible matter and sensible matter), and it works  
(until now).


Physicalism does not work. It can push people into believing that  
consciousness does not really exist, or is an illusion (!). We, the  
universal numbers, are innumerable in arithmetic to have some doubts  
about that.


Kind grin,

Bruno




Brent

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 2:49:19 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/20/2017 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point (which 
> > is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal Doevtailer 
> > Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist explanation of the 
> > mind, and physicalism. 
>
> This is false.  The argument doesn't show that.  In fact I think it 
> implies that the physical is necessary.  Bruno is found of saying that 
> it makes computation basic.  But computation apparently explains too 
> much.  So it is only by saying that somehow what we experience as mental 
> and physical is picked out does computationalism "explain" the world.  I 
> don't know why he insists on calling computationalism "mechanist" since 
> it has nothing to do with "mechanisms" or "mechanical". 
>
> Brent 
>

Without necessarily getting into information theory too deeply we can see 
that computation has some impact on the information theoretic scale of a 
system. An easy example is SU(2) vs SU(3). SU(2) has one weight, 
corresponding to two eigenvalues, and two roots that act as raising and 
lowering operation on the weight. This is seen in the standard spin model 
of fermions. The SU(3) model has two weights with three values, 
corresponding to the 3,3-bar representations of color charges, and 6 roots 
that transform between the weights. This has more computation and also more 
degrees of freedom. So the more computation there is, where a Feynman 
diagram could be thought of as a succession of operations or computations 
that raise or lower various quantum numbers by exchanging with other 
quantum numbers, the more degrees of freedom there are. 

LC

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 11:44:47 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:
>>>
>>> ​> ​
 I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
 According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
 when the box is opened. What am I missing?

>>>
>>> ​
>>> According to
>>> ​ ​
>>> Copenhagen
>>> ​ ​
>>> Wigner's friend
>>> ​ ​
>>> opens the cat box and that 
>>> ​​
>>> collapses
>>> ​ ​
>>> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
>>> ​ ​
>>> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
>>> ​ ​
>>> is also in a box and Wigner
>>> ​ ​
>>> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
>>> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
>>> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
>>> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
>>> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
>>> ​ ​
>>> interpretation is useless if you're 
>>> ​interest is in ​
>>> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
>>> ​to​
>>>  universe observe it.
>>>
>>>  And God 
>>> ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
>>> ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
>>> mention.
>>>
>>>
>>> And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could 
>>> *anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all 
>>> computations?
>>> But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in 
>>> the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative way 
>>> allowed by the local self-referential correctness, apparently.
>>>
>>> Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians in 
>>> the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).
>>>
>>> Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth level, 
>>> of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the machine cannot 
>>> justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite different logics.
>>>
>>> Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the 
>>> head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>> *Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is Plato. 
>> He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we have an 
>> infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG *
>>
>
>
> *Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation manifested by 
> a Mathematician. AG *
>
>
>
> Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very 
> elementary arithmetic:
>
> That is classical logic +
>
> 0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
> x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get that 
> number)
> x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number y, 
> you get the successor of x added to y)
> x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of y, you 
> get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)
>
> I do not assume anything more than this. 
>

*You sound like a Platonist who believes that a "world of ideas" exists 
that LOGICALLY PRECEDES what most regard as the physical world, with the 
addition of what you call computationalism, presumably something immaterial 
that can do calculations, and/or is in some sense conscious. Those are HUGE 
ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTI0NS.  Also, you make the claim that from this you can 
derive or infer QM. Sounds like the case of a monkey at a typewriter, 
which, when given sufficient time, can type out Hamlet, or better yet a 
numerical representation of Beethoven's 9th Symphony. I give you credit for 
the guts to tackle the mind-body problem, but I never found Plato's theory 
of knowledge persuasive. Also, it could very well be the case that our 
concept of arithmetic is Darwinian based; namely, that it originates from 
the primitive observation of self and other, or one and many; that is, 
empirically based. AG*

>
> I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume some 
> WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will can be 
> ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal machine/numbers and 
> their computations, which provably exist in the theory above.
>
> It is the physicalist who do the 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2017 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrayson2...@gmail.com 
 wrote:





On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:




On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM, wrote:

​> ​
I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when
the system measured, which is when the box is opened.
What am I missing?


​
According to
​ ​
Copenhagen
​ ​
Wigner's friend
​ ​
opens the cat box and that
​​
collapses
​ ​
the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
​ ​
now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
​ ​
is also in a box and Wigner
​ ​
himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his
friend's box his friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND
a "I see a live cat state". And of course you could put
Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside it and you
could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the
entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
​ ​
interpretation is useless if you're
​interest is in ​
dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside
​to​
 universe observe it.

 And God
​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's
wave function, ​and even then there would be another
unanswered question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How
could *anything* select a computation, or a class of
computations, among all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers,
involved in the semi-computable relations, localized
themselves in the relative way allowed by the local
self-referential correctness, apparently.

Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the
mathematicians in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the
structure (N, 0, +, x).

Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the
truth level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc., and the fact
that the machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that
they obey quite different logics.

Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the
quantum "in the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he
is right.

Bruno


*Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo OR  There is a God. His name is
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father,
we have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG *


*Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation 
manifested by a Mathematician. AG

*



Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very 
elementary arithmetic:


That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x)                     (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y     (different numbers have different successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))    (except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
x+0 = x                      (if you add zero to a number, you get 
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number 
y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0                   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x    (if you multiply a number x by the successor of y, 
you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)


I do not assume anything more than this.

I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume 
some WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will 
can be ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal 
machine/numbers and their computations, which provably exist in the 
theory above.


It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe, 
without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take 
that as an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic 
philosophers with the dream argument. No experience, nor experiments 
can lead to an ontology, except for the personal consciousness. 
Physics is not metaphysics, unless you assume Aristotle theology, i.e. 
you assume a PRIMARY physical universe, that is, if you assume 
physicalism at the start. But then you need to abandon the idea that a 
brain is Turing emulable.


No you don't.

Brent

personally, I don't know, but I study the logical consequence of 
mechanism, and it predicts that all machine must find quantum physics 
in their head, and this has been partially tested and verified. It is 
all we 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/20/2017 3:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point (which 
is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal Doevtailer 
Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist explanation of the 
mind, and physicalism. 


This is false.  The argument doesn't show that.  In fact I think it 
implies that the physical is necessary.  Bruno is found of saying that 
it makes computation basic.  But computation apparently explains too 
much.  So it is only by saying that somehow what we experience as mental 
and physical is picked out does computationalism "explain" the world.  I 
don't know why he insists on calling computationalism "mechanist" since 
it has nothing to do with "mechanisms" or "mechanical".


Brent

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Dec 2017, at 11:27, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com  
wrote:



On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​According to​ ​Copenhagen​ ​Wigner's friend​ ​opens  
the cat box and that ​​collapses​ ​the cat's wave function,  
and so Wigner's friend​ ​now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's  
friend​ ​is also in a box and Wigner​ ​himself is outside  
that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his friend is in a  
"I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  And of  
course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside  
it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until  
the entire universe is included, and that is why the  
Copenhagen​ ​interpretation is useless if you're ​interest is  
in ​dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside ​to​  
universe observe it.


 And God ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's  
wave function, ​and even then there would be another unanswered  
question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among  
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved  
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the  
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,  
apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians  
in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite  
different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in  
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is  
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we  
have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG


Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation  
manifested by a Mathematician. AG



Not at all. I assume (besides the Mechanist hypothesis) only very  
elementary arithmetic:


That is classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x) (= 0 is not the successor of a number)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y (different numbers have different successors)
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))(except for 0, all numbers have a predecessor)
x+0 = x  (if you add zero to a number, you get  
that number)
x+s(y) = s(x+y)  (if you add a number x to the successor of a number  
y, you get the successor of x added to y)

x*0=0   (if you multiply a number by 0, you get 0)
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x(if you multiply a number x by the successor of y,  
you get the number x added to the multiplication of the number x with y)


I do not assume anything more than this.

I do not see what I could have said making you believe that I assume  
some WILL at the core of the creation. With computationalism, a will  
can be ascribed to a machine/number, relatively to universal machine/ 
numbers and their computations, which provably exist in the theory  
above.


It is the physicalist who do the speculation on a primary universe,  
without any evidence for it. So people knock on the table, and take  
that as an evidence, but this was already refuted by the antic  
philosophers with the dream argument. No experience, nor experiments  
can lead to an ontology, except for the personal consciousness.  
Physics is not metaphysics, unless you assume Aristotle theology, i.e.  
you assume a PRIMARY physical universe, that is, if you assume  
physicalism at the start. But then you need to abandon the idea that a  
brain is Turing emulable. personally, I don't know, but I study the  
logical consequence of mechanism, and it predicts that all machine  
must find quantum physics in their head, and this has been partially  
tested and verified. It is all we can say.


Bruno












​ John K Clark​




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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Dec 2017, at 09:03, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​According to​ ​Copenhagen​ ​Wigner's friend​ ​opens  
the cat box and that ​​collapses​ ​the cat's wave function,  
and so Wigner's friend​ ​now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's  
friend​ ​is also in a box and Wigner​ ​himself is outside  
that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his friend is in a  
"I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  And of  
course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside  
it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until  
the entire universe is included, and that is why the  
Copenhagen​ ​interpretation is useless if you're ​interest is  
in ​dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside ​to​  
universe observe it.


 And God ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's  
wave function, ​and even then there would be another unanswered  
question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among  
all computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved  
in the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the  
relative way allowed by the local self-referential correctness,  
apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians  
in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite  
different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in  
the head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno

Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is  
Plato. He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we  
have an infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG


You need to read the papers or ask question. The starting point (which  
is not obvious and requires the reading of the Universal Doevtailer  
Argument) is that you cannot have both a mechanist explanation of the  
mind, and physicalism.  Then what I say above requires the study of  
the "theology of the universal machine", alias Gödel-Löb-Solovay  
modal logic G*, and the understanding of its interpretation in  
arithmetic, and this requires a bit of mathematical logic.
Then the result is that original, as we just find back the  
neoplatonist conception of reality (where matter is derived from  
theology), but here, the math makes this precise enough to be tested,  
and we do recover a quantum formalism where expected (the statistics  
on all computations). Now, this is usually understood and judged  
conceivable by people open to the idea that there is no collapse in  
nature, or other "everything-like" philosophy. To assume "all" is  
simpler than to assume a specific reality, in general. That is the  
basic guiding principle of this list.


And, no, Plato is not a God, but with Mechanism, the arithmetical  
reality is a god in the sense of Plato. That is a reality which  
explains both matter, consciousness and which is conceptually simple.


Bruno












​ John K Clark​




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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Dec 2017, at 00:56, Russell Standish wrote:


On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 05:25:12PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:



What is the difference you make between an instrument recording the  
result
and an observer? Consciousness? But that is what "Wigner's friend"  
shows
difficult to admit, and besides, I thought we all agree that it is  
better

that QM is the same for conscious and non conscious beings?



For me, the most important thing is the continuous/discrete
transition. I am ambivalent on whether this requires consciousness or
not. The best examplar to think about IMHO is an analogue-digital
converter (aka A/D converter), for example the microphone input
circuit on your computer. Conceptually, this device converts an input
voltage into a distinct number (eg 0-255). However, in actual fact
what it does physically is convert a voltage into a time-varying
voltage signal, conventionally interpreted as the zeros and ones of a
number communicated serially into the computer (or alternatively, fans
the voltages out into a parallel array of volatages). That
"conventionally interpreted" is the wiggle room that smuggles
consciousness back in the picture.

Nevertheless, the most important aspect is the contrast between the
continuous and the discrete. Its the FAPP in the zeroing out of
offdiagonal terms in the einselection picture, as just another
example. We could probably make most progress on the measurement
problem by focussing on just that distinction, and ignoring any other
aspect of consciousness or observerhood, since the continuous/discrete
distinction should not be controversial to anyone, and a lot in known
mathematically about it.


It seems that you are assuming some physical universe, or at least  
some analytical universe. But with digital mechanism we can (and  
apparently should) assume only a digital discrete inductive structure  
(natural number with add and times, combinators with application and  
reduction, etc.), and the analytical becomes tools of the mind (and  
their appearance are justified from the discrete entities pov). If you  
attribute some role to the analytical (real numbers) in the brain (as  
opposed to the first person), it is OK in a non mechanist context, but  
problematic with Digital Mechanism.
In my opinion, there is no measurement problem. That problem comes  
only from a wrong axiom (the collapse). Everett, imo, solves  
completely the "measurement problem", except it is incomplete, because  
with the mechanist assumption the wave/matrix itself must be derived  
from the formalism (any universal machinery).


Bruno







--


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Leo]

So I can't achieve immortality by confining myself to a lonely place where 
nothing can observe me..? Damn shame there are no refunds on pyramids. 


On Thursday, December 14, 2017 at 6:54:01 AM UTC-8, Jason wrote:
>
> The solution was proposed by Everett in 1957, collapse is a subjective 
> illusion.  The dead cat and its history of decomposing for the previous 
> hour does not materialize out of nothing from the mere act of looking at it.
>
>
> No measurement is made of the cat, the Geiger counter, or the atom, by 
> anyone outside the isolated system of the box, so according to the 
> Copenhagen Interpretation the superposition does not collapse. The cat is 
> both alive and dead. That is, until someone opens the door to peek inside. 
> In that instant, the wave function collapses and the system randomly 
> “decides” whether the cat is alive or dead. 
>
> If the state collapses to that of the dead cat, what happens to the 
> experiences of the cat who was in the superposition of being alive and dead 
> over the past hour? Do they suddenly vanish as if they never happened at 
> all? Perhaps they never existed in the first place, as Bohr’s anti-realist 
> approach would answer. But this leads to another problem: if the cat is 
> observed to be alive, do all of its memories and experiences over the 
> past hour suddenly pop into existence? Is the cat’s experience of 15 
> minutes ago ever experienced? 
>
> It is one thing to believe that microscopic particles might be in two 
> different states at once, but quite another to believe the same for a large 
> and complex system, such as a cat. The CI implies that a living, breathing 
> cat, with a consistent history and memories of the previous hour, can 
> instantly materialize from the simple act of observation.
>
> Schrödinger's experiment has also been extended to highlight other 
> problems. The mathematical physicist Eugene Wigner discussed a thought 
> experiment known as Wigner’s friend. In it, Wigner’s friend is in a room 
> that is sealed off from the rest of the world and in that room is a box 
> containing Schrödinger's cat. The friend opens the box after an hour and 
> notices whether or not the cat is alive. Sometime later, Wigner opens the 
> door to the room to check on his friend. When does the wave function 
> collapse, when the friend checks on the cat, or when Wigner checks on his 
> friend? If it is when the friend checks on the cat, then the isolated 
> system, unobserved by Wigner, has already collapsed (in contradiction to 
> the CI). Yet, if it does not collapse for the friend checking on the cat, 
> this is another contradiction, for he has made an observation of a system 
> in a superposition. The CI seems to have difficulties handling multiple 
> observers.
>
> If one takes the stance that the first conscious entity to experience the 
> result of a measurement causes collapse, whether isolated or not, this 
> still leaves the problem of large macroscopic systems with complex 
> histories popping into existence through observation. If we replace the cat 
> with some unconscious device, like a sensor that prints off a receipt with 
> the result of whether or not the poison was released, then a conscious 
> observer opening the box causes the instantaneous appearance of the print 
> out, oddly, with ink that has long-since dried. It has a consistent history 
> seemingly invented at once. 
>
> Einstein was most impressed with Schrödinger's paper, and in 1950 wrote 
> Schrödinger a letter of praise, saying “You are the only contemporary 
> physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the 
> assumption of reality, if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not 
> see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality—reality as 
> something independent of what is experimentally established. Their 
> interpretation is, however, refuted most elegantly by your system of 
> radioactive atom + amplifier + charge of gunpowder + cat in a box, in which 
> the psi- function of the system contains both the cat alive and blown to 
> bits. Nobody really doubts that the presence or absence of the cat is 
> something independent of the act of observation.” 
>
> Einstein never accepted the quantum mechanics as a complete theory. To the 
> end of his life he searched for a theory that better fit his ideals of 
> realism, causality and determinism. But the answer he sought was there all 
> along: in the equations of quantum mechanics. Consciously or unconsciously, 
> however, the answer was simply too strange for anyone to consider, even for 
> a moment. It was not until 1957, more than three decades after quantum 
> mechanics was formulated, that anyone was bold enough to point out the 
> answer that was staring everyone in the face. That person was Hugh Everett 
> III. 
>
>
> Jason
>
> On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 3:04 PM,  
> wrote:
>
>> Not every superposition of states implies interference. Connect the 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, December 19, 2017 at 8:03:00 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>>> when the box is opened. What am I missing?
>>>
>>
>> ​
>> According to
>> ​ ​
>> Copenhagen
>> ​ ​
>> Wigner's friend
>> ​ ​
>> opens the cat box and that 
>> ​​
>> collapses
>> ​ ​
>> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
>> ​ ​
>> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
>> ​ ​
>> is also in a box and Wigner
>> ​ ​
>> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
>> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
>> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
>> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
>> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
>> ​ ​
>> interpretation is useless if you're 
>> ​interest is in ​
>> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
>> ​to​
>>  universe observe it.
>>
>>  And God 
>> ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
>> ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
>> mention.
>>
>>
>> And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could 
>> *anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all 
>> computations?
>> But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in the 
>> semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative way allowed 
>> by the local self-referential correctness, apparently.
>>
>> Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians in 
>> the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).
>>
>> Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth level, 
>> of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the machine cannot 
>> justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite different logics.
>>
>> Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the 
>> head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> *Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is Plato. 
> He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we have an 
> infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG *
>


*Alternatively, you're putting WILL at the core of creation manifested by a 
Mathematician. AG *

>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ​ John K Clark​
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
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>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:37:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>> when the box is opened. What am I missing?
>>
>
> ​
> According to
> ​ ​
> Copenhagen
> ​ ​
> Wigner's friend
> ​ ​
> opens the cat box and that 
> ​​
> collapses
> ​ ​
> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
> ​ ​
> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
> ​ ​
> is also in a box and Wigner
> ​ ​
> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
> ​ ​
> interpretation is useless if you're 
> ​interest is in ​
> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
> ​to​
>  universe observe it.
>
>  And God 
> ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
> ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
> mention.
>
>
> And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could 
> *anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all 
> computations?
> But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in the 
> semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative way allowed 
> by the local self-referential correctness, apparently.
>
> Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians in 
> the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).
>
> Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth level, 
> of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc. , and the fact that the machine cannot 
> justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite different logics.
>
> Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the 
> head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.
>
> Bruno
>

*Translation: CMIIAW: Mumbo Jumbo  OR  There is a God. His name is Plato. 
He knows arithmetic. (Since he learned it from his father, we have an 
infinite regression of turtles within turtles.) AG *

>
>
>
>
>
>
> ​ John K Clark​
>
>
>  
>
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com .
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>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 05:25:12PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> What is the difference you make between an instrument recording the result
> and an observer? Consciousness? But that is what "Wigner's friend" shows
> difficult to admit, and besides, I thought we all agree that it is better
> that QM is the same for conscious and non conscious beings?


For me, the most important thing is the continuous/discrete
transition. I am ambivalent on whether this requires consciousness or
not. The best examplar to think about IMHO is an analogue-digital
converter (aka A/D converter), for example the microphone input
circuit on your computer. Conceptually, this device converts an input
voltage into a distinct number (eg 0-255). However, in actual fact
what it does physically is convert a voltage into a time-varying
voltage signal, conventionally interpreted as the zeros and ones of a
number communicated serially into the computer (or alternatively, fans
the voltages out into a parallel array of volatages). That
"conventionally interpreted" is the wiggle room that smuggles
consciousness back in the picture.

Nevertheless, the most important aspect is the contrast between the
continuous and the discrete. Its the FAPP in the zeroing out of
offdiagonal terms in the einselection picture, as just another
example. We could probably make most progress on the measurement
problem by focussing on just that distinction, and ignoring any other
aspect of consciousness or observerhood, since the continuous/discrete
distinction should not be controversial to anyone, and a lot in known
mathematically about it.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Dec 2017, at 19:00, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for  
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system  
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing?


​According to​ ​Copenhagen​ ​Wigner's friend​ ​opens  
the cat box and that ​​collapses​ ​the cat's wave function,  
and so Wigner's friend​ ​now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's  
friend​ ​is also in a box and Wigner​ ​himself is outside  
that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his friend is in a  
"I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  And of  
course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside  
it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until  
the entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen​ ​ 
interpretation is useless if you're ​interest is in ​dealing in  
cosmology because there is nobody outside ​to​ universe observe  
it.


 And God ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's  
wave function, ​and even then there would be another unanswered  
question too obvious to mention.


And with Digital Mechanism, even a Universe cannot help. How could  
*anything* select a computation, or a class of computations, among all  
computations?
But the first person associated to the universal numbers, involved in  
the semi-computable relations, localized themselves in the relative  
way allowed by the local self-referential correctness, apparently.


Gödel's arithmetization of metamathematics  embed the mathematicians  
in the arithmetical reality/truth/model (the structure (N, 0, +, x).


Remarkably, incompleteness justfies the equivalence, at the truth  
level, of all modes p, Bp, Bp & p, etc.	, and the fact that the  
machine cannot justify those equivalences, and that they obey quite  
different logics.


Kant can be tested, by looking for time, space and the quantum "in the  
head" of the universal machine. Apparently he is right.


Bruno







​ John K Clark​




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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Dec 2017, at 03:47, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Friday, December 15, 2017 at 2:27:46 AM UTC, Jason wrote:


On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 8:20 PM,  wrote:


On Thursday, December 14, 2017 at 2:54:01 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
The solution was proposed by Everett in 1957, collapse is a  
subjective illusion.  The dead cat and its history of decomposing  
for the previous hour does not materialize out of nothing from the  
mere act of looking at it.


No measurement is made of the cat, the Geiger counter, or the atom,  
by anyone outside the isolated system of the box, so according to  
the Copenhagen Interpretation the superposition does not collapse.  
The cat is both alive and dead. That is, until someone opens the  
door to peek inside. In that instant, the wave function collapses  
and the system randomly “decides” whether the cat is alive or dead.



If the state collapses to that of the dead cat, what happens to the  
experiences of the cat who was in the superposition of being alive  
and dead over the past hour? Do they suddenly vanish as if they  
never happened at all? Perhaps they never existed in the first  
place, as Bohr’s anti-realist approach would answer. But this leads  
to another problem: if the cat is observed to be alive, do all of  
its memories and experiences over the past hour suddenly pop into  
existence? Is the cat’s experience of 15 minutes ago ever experienced?



It is one thing to believe that microscopic particles might be in  
two different states at once, but quite another to believe the same  
for a large and complex system, such as a cat. The CI implies that a  
living, breathing cat, with a consistent history and memories of the  
previous hour, can instantly materialize from the simple act of  
observation.



Schrödinger's experiment has also been extended to highlight other  
problems. The mathematical physicist Eugene Wigner discussed a  
thought experiment known as Wigner’s friend. In it, Wigner’s friend  
is in a room that is sealed off from the rest of the world and in  
that room is a box containing Schrödinger's cat. The friend opens  
the box after an hour and notices whether or not the cat is alive.  
Sometime later, Wigner opens the door to the room to check on his  
friend. When does the wave function collapse, when the friend checks  
on the cat, or when Wigner checks on his friend? If it is when the  
friend checks on the cat, then the isolated system, unobserved by  
Wigner, has already collapsed (in contradiction to the CI). Yet, if  
it does not collapse for the friend checking on the cat, this is  
another contradiction, for he has made an observation of a system in  
a superposition. The CI seems to have difficulties handling multiple  
observers. mea



I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen.  
According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured,  
which is when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of the  
cat's memory is a different matter, problematic IMO. AG



The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves  
according to the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not  
collapse.  But it also says observation causes collapse. So when you  
have a conscious observer who is himself part of an isolated system,  
from the point of view of another conscious observer, which rule wins?


If the system isn't isolated, it cannot be in a superposition of  
states. So including the observer as part of the system is self  
defeating if one wants to do a quantum experiment. The existence of  
an observer doesn't contradict isolation of the system if the  
observer is an instrument recording the result. AG


What is the difference you make between an instrument recording the  
result and an observer? Consciousness? But that is what "Wigner's  
friend" shows difficult to admit, and besides, I thought we all agree  
that it is better that QM is the same for conscious and non conscious  
beings?


Later you might understand that there is no "universe" at all. Only  
long histories making people relatively rare, yet with a local measure  
of one, which can stabilize the mundane type of consciousness. We need  
only to assume one universal machinery (and elementary arithmetic that  
everyone know is already such a system).


Eventually "physics" is explained by the bio-psycho-theo-logy of the  
universal machine, itself reducible in arithmetic (but not just on its  
computable part).


Bruno







Jason

If one takes the stance that the first conscious entity to  
experience the result of a measurement causes collapse, whether  
isolated or not, this still leaves the problem of large macroscopic  
systems with complex histories popping into existence through  
observation. If we replace the cat with some unconscious device,  
like a sensor that prints off a receipt with the result of whether  
or not the poison was released, then a conscious observer opening  
the box 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Lawrence Crowell]

I see the issue as similar to chaos theory or statistical mechanics. The 
superposition of states in a system shifts to entanglements with states in 
an apparatus, which evolve through many states. We can think of the 
superposition of photons passing through a double slit, where if we place 
spin states at one slit we convert that superposition into the entanglement 
with spins. If we then have a general needle state this entanglement is 
spread into more states which is associated with the einselected state of a 
classical outcome. This evolution is a sort of diffusion that because of 
its complexity is extremely difficult to track. As a result we have 
decoherent sets that are in effect coarse grained sets of states.

Even if an observer could observe all possible states of the apparatus or 
the general needle state, this leads to the difficulty that the observer 
herself is also a complex of quantum states. This means that a fine grained 
description may be simply impossible. This leads to a situation where a set 
of quantum states are encoding quantum states, which can't be completely 
described in a closed system. Measurements tend to involve a classical 
system that in some ways is an open system, not closed. There is a sort of 
Universal Turing Machine or Godel numbering involved with attempting to 
describe this in a completely axiomatic manner. 

I was going to write more on this, but I am very tied up with other work. 
This is usually a very active time of the year.

Cheers LC

On Sunday, December 17, 2017 at 11:30:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Dec 2017, at 13:47, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, December 15, 2017 at 1:17:09 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15 Dec 2017, at 06:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/14/2017 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>> *I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>>> when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of the cat's memory is 
>>> a different matter, problematic IMO. AG *
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves according 
>> to the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not collapse.  But it also 
>> says observation causes collapse. 
>>
>>
>> That is not CI.  CI always supposed there is a classical realm in which 
>> measurements and observations were made by classical devices.  Wigner toyed 
>> with the idea that consciousness was required, but that was never Bohr's 
>> idea of CI.  In a sense, decoherence filled in CI by providing the 
>> mechanism of collapse.
>>
>>
>> I would say that decoherence explains the illusion of a collapse in the 
>> mind of the machine keeping a diary of the results of measurement. 
>> Decoherence is relative entanglement, and the tracing-out by the relative 
>> observers.
>>
>> The decoherence theory explains that the universe differentiation is 
>> quite speedy, and why macroscopic coherence is hard to be maintained, 
>> although possible for some material, and quantum topology promises 
>> theoretically possible "solid" qubit, etc. Like you said; it is only a 
>> matter or isolation. Now, the lack of isolation makes coherence easy lost, 
>> but that means only the quasi-irreversible lack of interference with some 
>> terms of the universal wave, not their genuine disappearance, which would 
>> contradict linearity, unitarity, well, the SWE-or DIRAC-or Feynman.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> You wrote a part on this with respect to Godel's theorem a few weeks ago, 
> which I lost in the huge sea of posts on this thread. I was going to 
> respond but lost the post. 
>
> Quantum mechanics is independent of measurement. 
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> Quantum amplitudes evolve by unitarity or Schrodinger type of evolution 
> and this is perfectly deterministic. 
>
>
> OK.
>
>
> Once one throws a measurement or decoherence into picture things become 
> less clear. 
>
>
>
> Decoherence is only relative entanglement. It is explicitly how Everett 
> explains the "illusion of collapse" in the mind of the observer-machine. 
> Things become less clear, but only because it is psychologically hard to 
> apply QM to oneself, as it involves our counterparts.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> We might then invoke Kant's *noumena* and *phenomena* as a way of 
> thinking about this. Decoherence is just a way of looking at what happens 
> to a quantum wave that is disturbed by the environment, which can include a 
> laboratory measurement. 
>
>
> Even Bohr admitted, in his reply to EPR, that such a disturbance cannot be 
> entirely mechanical. I don't think there are disturbance, only 
> entanglement. The laws of big numbers justifies the appearance of 
> irreversibility and collapse, but that never happens. Eventually, the wave 
> itself arises from number's incompleteness self-reflected (you need yo 
> study my papers to get this).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Given that an optical photon is about .1eV in 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Dec 2017, at 13:47, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Friday, December 15, 2017 at 1:17:09 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Dec 2017, at 06:20, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/14/2017 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen.  
According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured,  
which is when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of  
the cat's memory is a different matter, problematic IMO. AG



The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves  
according to the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not  
collapse.  But it also says observation causes collapse.


That is not CI.  CI always supposed there is a classical realm in  
which measurements and observations were made by classical  
devices.  Wigner toyed with the idea that consciousness was  
required, but that was never Bohr's idea of CI.  In a sense,  
decoherence filled in CI by providing the mechanism of collapse.


I would say that decoherence explains the illusion of a collapse in  
the mind of the machine keeping a diary of the results of  
measurement. Decoherence is relative entanglement, and the tracing- 
out by the relative observers.


The decoherence theory explains that the universe differentiation is  
quite speedy, and why macroscopic coherence is hard to be  
maintained, although possible for some material, and quantum  
topology promises theoretically possible "solid" qubit, etc. Like  
you said; it is only a matter or isolation. Now, the lack of  
isolation makes coherence easy lost, but that means only the quasi- 
irreversible lack of interference with some terms of the universal  
wave, not their genuine disappearance, which would contradict  
linearity, unitarity, well, the SWE-or DIRAC-or Feynman.


Bruno

You wrote a part on this with respect to Godel's theorem a few weeks  
ago, which I lost in the huge sea of posts on this thread. I was  
going to respond but lost the post.


Quantum mechanics is independent of measurement.


OK.



Quantum amplitudes evolve by unitarity or Schrodinger type of  
evolution and this is perfectly deterministic.


OK.


Once one throws a measurement or decoherence into picture things  
become less clear.



Decoherence is only relative entanglement. It is explicitly how  
Everett explains the "illusion of collapse" in the mind of the  
observer-machine.
Things become less clear, but only because it is psychologically hard  
to apply QM to oneself, as it involves our counterparts.







We might then invoke Kant's noumena and phenomena as a way of  
thinking about this. Decoherence is just a way of looking at what  
happens to a quantum wave that is disturbed by the environment,  
which can include a laboratory measurement.


Even Bohr admitted, in his reply to EPR, that such a disturbance  
cannot be entirely mechanical. I don't think there are disturbance,  
only entanglement. The laws of big numbers justifies the appearance of  
irreversibility and collapse, but that never happens. Eventually, the  
wave itself arises from number's incompleteness self-reflected (you  
need yo study my papers to get this).







Given that an optical photon is about .1eV in energy a 100 light  
source produces then around 10^{22} photons every second, which in  
the Fermi golden rule are emitted by spontaneous emission and thus  
their wave functions are decoherent. This is a numerically massive  
process in the universe at large. We have these various  
interpretations of what happens with these decoherent events, which  
are described phenomenologically. These various interpretations are  
putative noumena for the processes of decoherence or measurement.


I do not assume a physical universe. It can't work with any reasonable  
solution of the computationalist mind-body problem. I assume  
mechanism, and enough of arithmetic to define what are the universal  
turing machines.






If we think of a measurement as a large system with many quantum  
states, say a mole ~ 6x10^{23} of states, that couples to a system  
with a small number of states. In a measurement the large number of  
states produce a classical(like) outcome for the occurrence of the  
small number of states. The process appears to involve a type of  
self reference as well as the necessity for einselected quantum  
states (Zurek etc) that define a classically stable needle state and  
its outcome.


I am OK with Zurek (and he cited Everett for the basic idea).



The process appears to require that states involved with the needle  
state encode quantum numbers as Godel numbers, which in general  
leads to a breakdown of computability.



That would be interesting. Mechanism, paradoxically enough, entails a  
breakdown of computability for two among five nuances of the 3p  
machine provability.


Mechanism implies that "we live in arithmetic", and since Gödel we  
know that most of arithmetic breakdown computability. Most attribute  
of 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, December 17, 2017 at 2:56:59 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 17, 2017 at 2:29:01 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> agrays...@gmail.com
>> ​ Wrote:​
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> Not a problem. Easily solved.
>>
>>
>> ​*Well that's a relief, physicists have been worrying about this for the 
>> last 90 years.​ I guess they can relax now.*
>>  
>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> collapse, or whatever you want to call it, occurs when the isolated 
>>> system interacts with the macro environment, in this case when the box 
>>> opens,
>>
>>
>> *Which box, the cat​'s​ ​box​​, Wigner's friend​'s box, Wigner's box, or 
>> any of the infinite number of other nested boxes?​*
>>
>
> The box containing the cat.The point is to violate its isolation, which is 
> the necessary condition for undoing the superposition of states. AG 
>
>>  
>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> or more generally when the system interacts with a macro system called 
>>> 'the measuring device'.
>>
>>  
>> *​T​he measuring device​ itself is part of the universe, so explain to me 
>> what​ a cosmologist is supposed to do with the Copenhagen interpretation. *
>>
>
> Please be more specific. Maybe they should use Heisenberg's Picture. AG 
>
>>
>> ​>​
>>>  I now tend to agree with Lawrence that the wf has no ontological status.
>>
>>
>> ​*The​*
>> * Schrodinger​ Wave Function is a computational tool with the same 
>> ​ontological status​ as lines of latitude and longitude, but the square of 
>> the absolute value of the wave function at a point is more concrete because 
>> that is a probability and unlike the wave function itself humans can 
>> measure probability. And you can do quantum mechanics without the wave 
>> function, in fact ​Heisenberg came out with a way to do that about 6 months 
>> before Schrodinger​ discovered his wave function; they both give the same 
>> answers but in most situations ​Schrodinger​ way is easier to use. *
>>
>
> I studied it at the graduate level but can't recall any details. If 
> there's no collapse in that theory, maybe collapse isn't a real issue; just 
> a feature of the wave picture. AG 
>
>>
>>
>> *If you dislike the wave function you'll really hate Heisenberg​ method, 
>> its even more abstract and​ Heisenberg​ took pride over the fact its 
>> completely un-visualizable; you input some measured values into 
>> Heisenberg​'s mathematical machinery and it outputs the probability of 
>> getting other measured values  And Heisenberg​ doesn't treat variables that 
>> haven't been measured as having a unknown value, he treats them as having 
>> no value at all. *
>>
>
> It seems like a promising approach. If you use it, will the Many Worlds of 
> the MWI go away? AG 
>
>>
>> * John K Clark*
>>
>
Any waves in Dirac's relativistic approach? Much better than Schrodinger's 
which is non-relativistic. Does MWI survive Dirac? AG 

>
>>  
>>
>>
>>

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, December 17, 2017 at 2:29:01 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> agrays...@gmail.com 
> ​ Wrote:​
>
>
> ​> ​
>> Not a problem. Easily solved.
>
>
> ​*Well that's a relief, physicists have been worrying about this for the 
> last 90 years.​ I guess they can relax now.*
>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> collapse, or whatever you want to call it, occurs when the isolated 
>> system interacts with the macro environment, in this case when the box 
>> opens,
>
>
> *Which box, the cat​'s​ ​box​​, Wigner's friend​'s box, Wigner's box, or 
> any of the infinite number of other nested boxes?​*
>

The box containing the cat.The point is to violate its isolation, which is 
the necessary condition for undoing the superposition of states. AG 

>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> or more generally when the system interacts with a macro system called 
>> 'the measuring device'.
>
>  
> *​T​he measuring device​ itself is part of the universe, so explain to me 
> what​ a cosmologist is supposed to do with the Copenhagen interpretation. *
>

Please be more specific. Maybe they should use Heisenberg's Picture. AG 

>
> ​>​
>>  I now tend to agree with Lawrence that the wf has no ontological status.
>
>
> ​*The​*
> * Schrodinger​ Wave Function is a computational tool with the same 
> ​ontological status​ as lines of latitude and longitude, but the square of 
> the absolute value of the wave function at a point is more concrete because 
> that is a probability and unlike the wave function itself humans can 
> measure probability. And you can do quantum mechanics without the wave 
> function, in fact ​Heisenberg came out with a way to do that about 6 months 
> before Schrodinger​ discovered his wave function; they both give the same 
> answers but in most situations ​Schrodinger​ way is easier to use. *
>

I studied it at the graduate level but can't recall any details. If there's 
no collapse in that theory, maybe collapse isn't a real issue; just a 
feature of the wave picture. AG 

>
>
> *If you dislike the wave function you'll really hate Heisenberg​ method, 
> its even more abstract and​ Heisenberg​ took pride over the fact its 
> completely un-visualizable; you input some measured values into 
> Heisenberg​'s mathematical machinery and it outputs the probability of 
> getting other measured values  And Heisenberg​ doesn't treat variables that 
> haven't been measured as having a unknown value, he treats them as having 
> no value at all. *
>

It seems like a promising approach. If you use it, will the Many Worlds of 
the MWI go away? AG 

>
> * John K Clark*
>
>  
>
>
>

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[John Clark]

agrayson2...@gmail.com
​ Wrote:​


​> ​
> Not a problem. Easily solved.


​*Well that's a relief, physicists have been worrying about this for the
last 90 years.​ I guess they can relax now.*


> ​> ​
> collapse, or whatever you want to call it, occurs when the isolated system
> interacts with the macro environment, in this case when the box opens,


*Which box, the cat​'s​ ​box​​, Wigner's friend​'s box, Wigner's box, or
any of the infinite number of other nested boxes?​*


> ​> ​
> or more generally when the system interacts with a macro system called
> 'the measuring device'.


*​T​he measuring device​ itself is part of the universe, so explain to me
what​ a cosmologist is supposed to do with the Copenhagen interpretation. *

​>​
>  I now tend to agree with Lawrence that the wf has no ontological status.


​*The​*
* Schrodinger​ Wave Function is a computational tool with the same
​ontological status​ as lines of latitude and longitude, but the square of
the absolute value of the wave function at a point is more concrete because
that is a probability and unlike the wave function itself humans can
measure probability. And you can do quantum mechanics without the wave
function, in fact ​Heisenberg came out with a way to do that about 6 months
before Schrodinger​ discovered his wave function; they both give the same
answers but in most situations ​Schrodinger​ way is easier to use. *



*If you dislike the wave function you'll really hate Heisenberg​ method,
its even more abstract and​ Heisenberg​ took pride over the fact its
completely un-visualizable; you input some measured values into
Heisenberg​'s mathematical machinery and it outputs the probability of
getting other measured values  And Heisenberg​ doesn't treat variables that
haven't been measured as having a unknown value, he treats them as having
no value at all.  John K Clark*

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/16/2017 1:18 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 8:22:47 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 1:35:36 PM UTC-6,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 6:00:30 PM UTC, John Clark
wrote:

On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM, wrote:

​> ​
I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when
the system measured, which is when the box is opened.
What am I missing?


​
According to
​ ​
Copenhagen
​ ​
Wigner's friend
​ ​
opens the cat box and that
​​
collapses
​ ​
the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
​ ​
now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
​ ​
is also in a box and Wigner
​ ​
himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his
friend's box his friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state
AND a "I see a live cat state".  And of course you could
put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside it and
you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until
the entire universe is included, and that is why the
Copenhagen
​ ​
interpretation is useless if you're
​interest is in ​
dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside
​to​
 universe observe it.

 And God
​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's
wave function, ​and even then there would be another
unanswered question too obvious to mention.

​ John K Clark​

*|
|Not a problem. Easily solved. Remember; a superposition of
states only exists for isolated systems, and the measurement,
collapse, or whatever you want to call it, occurs when the
isolated system interacts with the macro environment, in this
case when the box opens, or more generally when the system
interacts with a macro system called 'the measuring device'.
The cat problem is an idealized situation. In fact, one can
never isolate a cat from its environment, but this is
irrelevant for the illustrative purpose of Schrodinger's
thought experiment. We don't understand the measurement
process, but this doesn't justify affirming Tegmark and going
off into MWI fantasies. I now tend to agree with Lawrence that
the wf has no ontological status. Believing that it does has
led us into fairy tale land. AG*


It is not that the wave function is not ontological, though in one
sense it fails to be ontological in most standard meanings of that
term. I don't think the wave function is completely
epistemological either. It fails to fit completely into any
existential category we try to cram it into. The quantum wave
exhibits epistemic and ontic properties depending upon which
interpretation you choose to look at it with. However, all
interpretations have holes or problems; none of them is complete
and leave open problems. Most of these problems are with the
interpretation of probabilities and Born's rule.

LC



*I think we know what epistemic means when considering the wf, but 
ontic is murky, and denying it makes the MWI fantasy go away.  How 
would you define ontic so we can get an handle on what we're 
discussing? Clearly, probability waves and their interactions give us 
the right answer, but what are they? Do they "exist" in the physical 
world? AG*


Here's the paper that purports to show the wf must be ontic, 
arXiv:.3328v3


Matthew F. Pusey,  Jonathan Barrett,  and Terry Rudolph
(Dated: April 11, 2012)
Quantum states are the key mathematical objects in quantum theory. It is 
therefore surprising
that physicists have been unable to agree on what a quantum state truly 
represents. One possibility
is that a pure quantum state corresponds directly to reality. However, 
there is a long history of
suggestions that a quantum state (even a pure state) represents only 
knowledge or information
about some aspect of reality. Here we show that any model in which a 
quantum state represents
mere information about an underlying physical state of the system, and 
in which systems that are
prepared independently have independent physical states, must make 
predictions which contradict

those of quantum theory.


Brent

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 8:22:47 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 1:35:36 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 6:00:30 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:
>>>
>>> ​> ​
 I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
 According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
 when the box is opened. What am I missing?

>>>
>>> ​
>>> According to
>>> ​ ​
>>> Copenhagen
>>> ​ ​
>>> Wigner's friend
>>> ​ ​
>>> opens the cat box and that 
>>> ​​
>>> collapses
>>> ​ ​
>>> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
>>> ​ ​
>>> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
>>> ​ ​
>>> is also in a box and Wigner
>>> ​ ​
>>> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
>>> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
>>> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
>>> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
>>> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
>>> ​ ​
>>> interpretation is useless if you're 
>>> ​interest is in ​
>>> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
>>> ​to​
>>>  universe observe it.
>>>
>>>  And God 
>>> ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
>>> ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
>>> mention.
>>>
>>> ​ John K Clark​
>>>
>>
>> *Not a problem. Easily solved. Remember; a superposition of states only 
>> exists for isolated systems, and the measurement, collapse, or whatever you 
>> want to call it, occurs when the isolated system interacts with the macro 
>> environment, in this case when the box opens, or more generally when the 
>> system interacts with a macro system called 'the measuring device'. The cat 
>> problem is an idealized situation. In fact, one can never isolate a cat 
>> from its environment, but this is irrelevant for the illustrative purpose 
>> of Schrodinger's thought experiment. We don't understand the measurement 
>> process, but this doesn't justify affirming Tegmark and going off into MWI 
>> fantasies. I now tend to agree with Lawrence that the wf has no ontological 
>> status. Believing that it does has led us into fairy tale land. AG*
>>
>
> It is not that the wave function is not ontological, though in one sense 
> it fails to be ontological in most standard meanings of that term. I don't 
> think the wave function is completely epistemological either. It fails to 
> fit completely into any existential category we try to cram it into. The 
> quantum wave exhibits epistemic and ontic properties depending upon which 
> interpretation you choose to look at it with. However, all interpretations 
> have holes or problems; none of them is complete and leave open problems. 
> Most of these problems are with the interpretation of probabilities and 
> Born's rule.
>
> LC
>


*I think we know what epistemic means when considering the wf, but ontic is 
murky, and denying it makes the MWI fantasy go away.  How would you define 
ontic so we can get an handle on what we're discussing?  Clearly, 
probability waves and their interactions give us the right answer, but what 
are they? Do they "exist" in the physical world? AG*

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 1:35:36 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 6:00:30 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>>> when the box is opened. What am I missing?
>>>
>>
>> ​
>> According to
>> ​ ​
>> Copenhagen
>> ​ ​
>> Wigner's friend
>> ​ ​
>> opens the cat box and that 
>> ​​
>> collapses
>> ​ ​
>> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
>> ​ ​
>> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
>> ​ ​
>> is also in a box and Wigner
>> ​ ​
>> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
>> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
>> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
>> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
>> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
>> ​ ​
>> interpretation is useless if you're 
>> ​interest is in ​
>> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
>> ​to​
>>  universe observe it.
>>
>>  And God 
>> ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
>> ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
>> mention.
>>
>> ​ John K Clark​
>>
>
> *Not a problem. Easily solved. Remember; a superposition of states only 
> exists for isolated systems, and the measurement, collapse, or whatever you 
> want to call it, occurs when the isolated system interacts with the macro 
> environment, in this case when the box opens, or more generally when the 
> system interacts with a macro system called 'the measuring device'. The cat 
> problem is an idealized situation. In fact, one can never isolate a cat 
> from its environment, but this is irrelevant for the illustrative purpose 
> of Schrodinger's thought experiment. We don't understand the measurement 
> process, but this doesn't justify affirming Tegmark and going off into MWI 
> fantasies. I now tend to agree with Lawrence that the wf has no ontological 
> status. Believing that it does has led us into fairy tale land. AG*
>

It is not that the wave function is not ontological, though in one sense it 
fails to be ontological in most standard meanings of that term. I don't 
think the wave function is completely epistemological either. It fails to 
fit completely into any existential category we try to cram it into. The 
quantum wave exhibits epistemic and ontic properties depending upon which 
interpretation you choose to look at it with. However, all interpretations 
have holes or problems; none of them is complete and leave open problems. 
Most of these problems are with the interpretation of probabilities and 
Born's rule.

LC

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 6:00:30 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>> when the box is opened. What am I missing?
>>
>
> ​
> According to
> ​ ​
> Copenhagen
> ​ ​
> Wigner's friend
> ​ ​
> opens the cat box and that 
> ​​
> collapses
> ​ ​
> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
> ​ ​
> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
> ​ ​
> is also in a box and Wigner
> ​ ​
> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
> ​ ​
> interpretation is useless if you're 
> ​interest is in ​
> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
> ​to​
>  universe observe it.
>
>  And God 
> ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
> ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
> mention.
>
> ​ John K Clark​
>

*Not a problem. Easily solved. Remember; a superposition of states only 
exists for isolated systems, and the measurement, collapse, or whatever you 
want to call it, occurs when the isolated system interacts with the macro 
environment, in this case when the box opens, or more generally when the 
system interacts with a macro system called 'the measuring device'. The cat 
problem is an idealized situation. In fact, one can never isolate a cat 
from its environment, but this is irrelevant for the illustrative purpose 
of Schrodinger's thought experiment. We don't understand the measurement 
process, but this doesn't justify affirming Tegmark and going off into MWI 
fantasies. I now tend to agree with Lawrence that the wf has no ontological 
status. Believing that it does has led us into fairy tale land. AG*

>
>  
>

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Lawrence Crowell]

I think this illustrates how an observation is one a deep level a sort of 
self-observation or about a set of quantum numbers that encode themselves. 
For this reason there is then no complete and consistent way of reconciling 
the quantum and classical worlds with each other according to quantum 
postulates. For this reason there are these various quantum interpretations 
with a range of strengths and weaknesses that are not consistent with each 
other. We might think of these as something we intend to make quantum 
mechanics more complete, but we then end up with various drafts of extended 
QM that are not consistent with each other. 

LC

On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 12:00:30 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>> when the box is opened. What am I missing?
>>
>
> ​
> According to
> ​ ​
> Copenhagen
> ​ ​
> Wigner's friend
> ​ ​
> opens the cat box and that 
> ​​
> collapses
> ​ ​
> the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
> ​ ​
> now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
> ​ ​
> is also in a box and Wigner
> ​ ​
> himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his 
> friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".  
> And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside 
> it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the 
> entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
> ​ ​
> interpretation is useless if you're 
> ​interest is in ​
> dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside 
> ​to​
>  universe observe it.
>
>  And God 
> ​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function, 
> ​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to 
> mention.
>
> ​ John K Clark​
>
>
>  
>

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[John Clark]

On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 9:20 PM,  wrote:

​> ​
> I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen.
> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is
> when the box is opened. What am I missing?
>

​
According to
​ ​
Copenhagen
​ ​
Wigner's friend
​ ​
opens the cat box and that
​​
collapses
​ ​
the cat's wave function, and so Wigner's friend
​ ​
now knows the cat's fate, but Wigner's friend
​ ​
is also in a box and Wigner
​ ​
himself is outside that box, so until Wigner opens his friend's box his
friend is in a "I see a dead cat" state AND a "I see a live cat state".
And of course you could put Wigner himself in a box with somebody outside
it and you could keep increasing the number of nested boxes until the
entire universe is included, and that is why the Copenhagen
​ ​
interpretation is useless if you're
​interest is in ​
dealing in cosmology because there is nobody outside
​to​
 universe observe it.

 And God
​is of no help unless somebody knows who collapses God's wave function,
​and even then there would be another unanswered question too obvious to
mention.

​ John K Clark​

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 6:47:22 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, December 15, 2017 at 1:17:09 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15 Dec 2017, at 06:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/14/2017 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>> *I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>>> when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of the cat's memory is 
>>> a different matter, problematic IMO. AG *
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves according 
>> to the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not collapse.  But it also 
>> says observation causes collapse. 
>>
>>
>> That is not CI.  CI always supposed there is a classical realm in which 
>> measurements and observations were made by classical devices.  Wigner toyed 
>> with the idea that consciousness was required, but that was never Bohr's 
>> idea of CI.  In a sense, decoherence filled in CI by providing the 
>> mechanism of collapse.
>>
>>
>> I would say that decoherence explains the illusion of a collapse in the 
>> mind of the machine keeping a diary of the results of measurement. 
>> Decoherence is relative entanglement, and the tracing-out by the relative 
>> observers.
>>
>> The decoherence theory explains that the universe differentiation is 
>> quite speedy, and why macroscopic coherence is hard to be maintained, 
>> although possible for some material, and quantum topology promises 
>> theoretically possible "solid" qubit, etc. Like you said; it is only a 
>> matter or isolation. Now, the lack of isolation makes coherence easy lost, 
>> but that means only the quasi-irreversible lack of interference with some 
>> terms of the universal wave, not their genuine disappearance, which would 
>> contradict linearity, unitarity, well, the SWE-or DIRAC-or Feynman.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
A small correction below in red font.

LC
 

>
> You wrote a part on this with respect to Godel's theorem a few weeks ago, 
> which I lost in the huge sea of posts on this thread. I was going to 
> respond but lost the post. 
>
> Quantum mechanics is independent of measurement. Quantum amplitudes evolve 
> by unitarity or Schrodinger type of evolution and this is perfectly 
> deterministic. Once one throws a measurement or decoherence into picture 
> things become less clear. We might then invoke Kant's *noumena* and 
> *phenomena* as a way of thinking about this. Decoherence is just a way of 
> looking at what happens to a quantum wave that is disturbed by the 
> environment, which can include a laboratory measurement. Given that an 
> optical photon is about .1eV in energy a 100 watt light source produces 
> then around 10^{22} photons every second, which in the Fermi golden rule 
> are emitted by spontaneous emission and thus their wave functions are 
> decoherent. This is a numerically massive process in the universe at large. 
> We have these various interpretations of what happens with these decoherent 
> events, which are described phenomenologically. These various 
> interpretations are putative noumena for the processes of decoherence or 
> measurement.
>
> If we think of a measurement as a large system with many quantum states, 
> say a mole ~ 6x10^{23} of states, that couples to a system with a small 
> number of states. In a measurement the large number of states produce a 
> classical(like) outcome for the occurrence of the small number of states. 
> The process appears to involve a type of self reference as well as the 
> necessity for einselected quantum states (Zurek etc) that define a 
> classically stable needle state and its outcome. The process appears to 
> require that states involved with the needle state encode quantum numbers 
> as Godel numbers, which in general leads to a breakdown of computability. 
> The quantum classical dichotomy here may reflect a sort of axiomatic 
> incompleteness; the physical axioms of quantum mechanics are unable to 
> compute how a macroscopic outcome, such as a needle state or a particular 
> state in a decoherent set occurs. 
>
> I proposed something of this sort a long time ago, around the same time I 
> illustrated how the Schild's ladder in general relativity and quantum spins 
> had the same Galois field representation. In the latter case I got a muted 
> response, and of course now the idea general relativity and quantum 
> mechanics are categorically equivalent is a hot topic. The idea that 
> quantum outcomes are not computed by quantum evolution, say the quantum 
> computer executing operations on qubits, was met by horror. "Oh the 
> humanity" and so forth was sounded. However, it seems plausible to me to 
> this day that all we can ever have is phenomenology on this, but we will 
> never understand the noumena according to some set of postulates or 
> physical axioms that are complete and consistent in QM. If GR = QM in 
> 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Friday, December 15, 2017 at 1:17:09 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Dec 2017, at 06:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/14/2017 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>> *I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>> when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of the cat's memory is 
>> a different matter, problematic IMO. AG *
>>  
>>
>
> The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves according 
> to the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not collapse.  But it also 
> says observation causes collapse. 
>
>
> That is not CI.  CI always supposed there is a classical realm in which 
> measurements and observations were made by classical devices.  Wigner toyed 
> with the idea that consciousness was required, but that was never Bohr's 
> idea of CI.  In a sense, decoherence filled in CI by providing the 
> mechanism of collapse.
>
>
> I would say that decoherence explains the illusion of a collapse in the 
> mind of the machine keeping a diary of the results of measurement. 
> Decoherence is relative entanglement, and the tracing-out by the relative 
> observers.
>
> The decoherence theory explains that the universe differentiation is quite 
> speedy, and why macroscopic coherence is hard to be maintained, although 
> possible for some material, and quantum topology promises theoretically 
> possible "solid" qubit, etc. Like you said; it is only a matter or 
> isolation. Now, the lack of isolation makes coherence easy lost, but that 
> means only the quasi-irreversible lack of interference with some terms of 
> the universal wave, not their genuine disappearance, which would contradict 
> linearity, unitarity, well, the SWE-or DIRAC-or Feynman.
>
> Bruno
>

You wrote a part on this with respect to Godel's theorem a few weeks ago, 
which I lost in the huge sea of posts on this thread. I was going to 
respond but lost the post. 

Quantum mechanics is independent of measurement. Quantum amplitudes evolve 
by unitarity or Schrodinger type of evolution and this is perfectly 
deterministic. Once one throws a measurement or decoherence into picture 
things become less clear. We might then invoke Kant's *noumena* and 
*phenomena* as a way of thinking about this. Decoherence is just a way of 
looking at what happens to a quantum wave that is disturbed by the 
environment, which can include a laboratory measurement. Given that an 
optical photon is about .1eV in energy a 100 light source produces then 
around 10^{22} photons every second, which in the Fermi golden rule are 
emitted by spontaneous emission and thus their wave functions are 
decoherent. This is a numerically massive process in the universe at large. 
We have these various interpretations of what happens with these decoherent 
events, which are described phenomenologically. These various 
interpretations are putative noumena for the processes of decoherence or 
measurement.

If we think of a measurement as a large system with many quantum states, 
say a mole ~ 6x10^{23} of states, that couples to a system with a small 
number of states. In a measurement the large number of states produce a 
classical(like) outcome for the occurrence of the small number of states. 
The process appears to involve a type of self reference as well as the 
necessity for einselected quantum states (Zurek etc) that define a 
classically stable needle state and its outcome. The process appears to 
require that states involved with the needle state encode quantum numbers 
as Godel numbers, which in general leads to a breakdown of computability. 
The quantum classical dichotomy here may reflect a sort of axiomatic 
incompleteness; the physical axioms of quantum mechanics are unable to 
compute how a macroscopic outcome, such as a needle state or a particular 
state in a decoherent set occurs. 

I proposed something of this sort a long time ago, around the same time I 
illustrated how the Schild's ladder in general relativity and quantum spins 
had the same Galois field representation. In the latter case I got a muted 
response, and of course now the idea general relativity and quantum 
mechanics are categorically equivalent is a hot topic. The idea that 
quantum outcomes are not computed by quantum evolution, say the quantum 
computer executing operations on qubits, was met by horror. "Oh the 
humanity" and so forth was sounded. However, it seems plausible to me to 
this day that all we can ever have is phenomenology on this, but we will 
never understand the noumena according to some set of postulates or 
physical axioms that are complete and consistent in QM. If GR = QM in 
quantum gravity this has an impact there as well, in particular with the 
problem of the firewall.

LC

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Dec 2017, at 06:20, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 12/14/2017 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen.  
According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured,  
which is when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of  
the cat's memory is a different matter, problematic IMO. AG



The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves  
according to the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not  
collapse.  But it also says observation causes collapse.


That is not CI.  CI always supposed there is a classical realm in  
which measurements and observations were made by classical devices.   
Wigner toyed with the idea that consciousness was required, but that  
was never Bohr's idea of CI.  In a sense, decoherence filled in CI  
by providing the mechanism of collapse.


I would say that decoherence explains the illusion of a collapse in  
the mind of the machine keeping a diary of the results of measurement.  
Decoherence is relative entanglement, and the tracing-out by the  
relative observers.


The decoherence theory explains that the universe differentiation is  
quite speedy, and why macroscopic coherence is hard to be maintained,  
although possible for some material, and quantum topology promises  
theoretically possible "solid" qubit, etc. Like you said; it is only a  
matter or isolation. Now, the lack of isolation makes coherence easy  
lost, but that means only the quasi-irreversible lack of interference  
with some terms of the universal wave, not their genuine  
disappearance, which would contradict linearity, unitarity, well, the  
SWE-or DIRAC-or Feynman.


Bruno



Brent

So when you have a conscious observer who is himself part of an  
isolated system, from the point of view of another conscious  
observer, which rule wins?



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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, December 15, 2017 at 5:20:34 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/14/2017 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>> *I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>> when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of the cat's memory is 
>> a different matter, problematic IMO. AG *
>>  
>>
>
> The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves according 
> to the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not collapse.  But it also 
> says observation causes collapse. 
>
>
> That is not CI.  CI always supposed there is a classical realm in which 
> measurements and observations were made by classical devices.  Wigner toyed 
> with the idea that consciousness was required, but that was never Bohr's 
> idea of CI.  In a sense, decoherence filled in CI by providing the 
> mechanism of collapse.
>
> Brent
>

*Jason's comment and yours are not necessarily in contradiction. How did 
decoherence provide the mechanism for collapse? Isn't it more a hope than a 
reality? AG *

>
> So when you have a conscious observer who is himself part of an isolated 
> system, from the point of view of another conscious observer, which rule 
> wins?
>
>
>

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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/14/2017 6:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


*I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for
Copenhagen. According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system
measured, which is when the box is opened. What am I missing? The
issue of the cat's memory is a different matter, problematic IMO. AG
*


The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves 
according to the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not 
collapse.  But it also says observation causes collapse.


That is not CI.  CI always supposed there is a classical realm in which 
measurements and observations were made by classical devices. Wigner 
toyed with the idea that consciousness was required, but that was never 
Bohr's idea of CI.  In a sense, decoherence filled in CI by providing 
the mechanism of collapse.


Brent

So when you have a conscious observer who is himself part of an 
isolated system, from the point of view of another conscious observer, 
which rule wins?


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Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, December 15, 2017 at 2:27:46 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 8:20 PM,  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 14, 2017 at 2:54:01 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>> The solution was proposed by Everett in 1957, collapse is a subjective 
>>> illusion.  The dead cat and its history of decomposing for the previous 
>>> hour does not materialize out of nothing from the mere act of looking at it.
>>>
>>>
>>> No measurement is made of the cat, the Geiger counter, or the atom, by 
>>> anyone outside the isolated system of the box, so according to the 
>>> Copenhagen Interpretation the superposition does not collapse. The cat is 
>>> both alive and dead. That is, until someone opens the door to peek inside. 
>>> In that instant, the wave function collapses and the system randomly 
>>> “decides” whether the cat is alive or dead. 
>>>
>>>  
>>
>>> If the state collapses to that of the dead cat, what happens to the 
>>> experiences of the cat who was in the superposition of being alive and dead 
>>> over the past hour? Do they suddenly vanish as if they never happened at 
>>> all? Perhaps they never existed in the first place, as Bohr’s anti-realist 
>>> approach would answer. But this leads to another problem: if the cat is 
>>> observed to be alive, do all of its memories and experiences over the 
>>> past hour suddenly pop into existence? Is the cat’s experience of 15 
>>> minutes ago ever experienced? 
>>>
>>>  
>>
>>> It is one thing to believe that microscopic particles might be in two 
>>> different states at once, but quite another to believe the same for a large 
>>> and complex system, such as a cat. The CI implies that a living, breathing 
>>> cat, with a consistent history and memories of the previous hour, can 
>>> instantly materialize from the simple act of observation.
>>>
>>>  
>>
>>> Schrödinger's experiment has also been extended to highlight other 
>>> problems. The mathematical physicist Eugene Wigner discussed a thought 
>>> experiment known as Wigner’s friend. In it, Wigner’s friend is in a room 
>>> that is sealed off from the rest of the world and in that room is a box 
>>> containing Schrödinger's cat. The friend opens the box after an hour and 
>>> notices whether or not the cat is alive. Sometime later, Wigner opens the 
>>> door to the room to check on his friend. When does the wave function 
>>> collapse, when the friend checks on the cat, or when Wigner checks on 
>>> his friend? If it is when the friend checks on the cat, then the isolated 
>>> system, unobserved by Wigner, has already collapsed (in contradiction to 
>>> the CI). Yet, if it does not collapse for the friend checking on the cat, 
>>> this is another contradiction, for he has made an observation of a system 
>>> in a superposition. The CI seems to have difficulties handling multiple 
>>> observers. mea
>>>
>>>
>>
>> *I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
>> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
>> when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of the cat's memory is 
>> a different matter, problematic IMO. AG *
>>  
>>
>
> The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves according 
> to the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not collapse.  But it also 
> says observation causes collapse. So when you have a conscious observer who 
> is himself part of an isolated system, from the point of view of another 
> conscious observer, which rule wins?
>

*If the system isn't isolated, it cannot be in a superposition of states. 
So including the observer as part of the system is self defeating if one 
wants to do a quantum experiment. The existence of an observer doesn't 
contradict isolation of the system if the observer is an instrument 
recording the result. AG *

>
> Jason
>  
>
>> If one takes the stance that the first conscious entity to experience the 
>>> result of a measurement causes collapse, whether isolated or not, this 
>>> still leaves the problem of large macroscopic systems with complex 
>>> histories popping into existence through observation. If we replace the cat 
>>> with some unconscious device, like a sensor that prints off a receipt with 
>>> the result of whether or not the poison was released, then a conscious 
>>> observer opening the box causes the instantaneous appearance of the print 
>>> out, oddly, with ink that has long-since dried. It has a consistent history 
>>> seemingly invented at once. 
>>>
>>> Einstein was most impressed with Schrödinger's paper, and in 1950 wrote 
>>> Schrödinger a letter of praise, saying “You are the only contemporary 
>>> physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the 
>>> assumption of reality, if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not 
>>> see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality—reality as 
>>> something independent of what is experimentally established. Their 
>>> 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Dec 14, 2017 at 8:20 PM,  wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, December 14, 2017 at 2:54:01 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>> The solution was proposed by Everett in 1957, collapse is a subjective
>> illusion.  The dead cat and its history of decomposing for the previous
>> hour does not materialize out of nothing from the mere act of looking at it.
>>
>>
>> No measurement is made of the cat, the Geiger counter, or the atom, by
>> anyone outside the isolated system of the box, so according to the
>> Copenhagen Interpretation the superposition does not collapse. The cat is
>> both alive and dead. That is, until someone opens the door to peek inside.
>> In that instant, the wave function collapses and the system randomly
>> “decides” whether the cat is alive or dead.
>>
>>
>
>> If the state collapses to that of the dead cat, what happens to the
>> experiences of the cat who was in the superposition of being alive and dead
>> over the past hour? Do they suddenly vanish as if they never happened at
>> all? Perhaps they never existed in the first place, as Bohr’s anti-realist
>> approach would answer. But this leads to another problem: if the cat is
>> observed to be alive, do all of its memories and experiences over the
>> past hour suddenly pop into existence? Is the cat’s experience of 15
>> minutes ago ever experienced?
>>
>>
>
>> It is one thing to believe that microscopic particles might be in two
>> different states at once, but quite another to believe the same for a large
>> and complex system, such as a cat. The CI implies that a living, breathing
>> cat, with a consistent history and memories of the previous hour, can
>> instantly materialize from the simple act of observation.
>>
>>
>
>> Schrödinger's experiment has also been extended to highlight other
>> problems. The mathematical physicist Eugene Wigner discussed a thought
>> experiment known as Wigner’s friend. In it, Wigner’s friend is in a room
>> that is sealed off from the rest of the world and in that room is a box
>> containing Schrödinger's cat. The friend opens the box after an hour and
>> notices whether or not the cat is alive. Sometime later, Wigner opens the
>> door to the room to check on his friend. When does the wave function
>> collapse, when the friend checks on the cat, or when Wigner checks on
>> his friend? If it is when the friend checks on the cat, then the isolated
>> system, unobserved by Wigner, has already collapsed (in contradiction to
>> the CI). Yet, if it does not collapse for the friend checking on the cat,
>> this is another contradiction, for he has made an observation of a system
>> in a superposition. The CI seems to have difficulties handling multiple
>> observers. mea
>>
>>
>
> *I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen.
> According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is
> when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of the cat's memory is
> a different matter, problematic IMO. AG *
>
>

The problem is according to the CI, an isolated system evolves according to
the Shrodinger equation, and therefore does not collapse.  But it also says
observation causes collapse. So when you have a conscious observer who is
himself part of an isolated system, from the point of view of another
conscious observer, which rule wins?

Jason


> If one takes the stance that the first conscious entity to experience the
>> result of a measurement causes collapse, whether isolated or not, this
>> still leaves the problem of large macroscopic systems with complex
>> histories popping into existence through observation. If we replace the cat
>> with some unconscious device, like a sensor that prints off a receipt with
>> the result of whether or not the poison was released, then a conscious
>> observer opening the box causes the instantaneous appearance of the print
>> out, oddly, with ink that has long-since dried. It has a consistent history
>> seemingly invented at once.
>>
>> Einstein was most impressed with Schrödinger's paper, and in 1950 wrote
>> Schrödinger a letter of praise, saying “You are the only contemporary
>> physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the
>> assumption of reality, if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not
>> see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality—reality as
>> something independent of what is experimentally established. Their
>> interpretation is, however, refuted most elegantly by your system of
>> radioactive atom + amplifier + charge of gunpowder + cat in a box, in which
>> the psi- function of the system contains both the cat alive and blown to
>> bits. Nobody really doubts that the presence or absence of the cat is
>> something independent of the act of observation.”
>>
>> Einstein never accepted the quantum mechanics as a complete theory. To
>> the end of his life he searched for a theory that better fit his ideals of
>> realism, causality and determinism. But the answer he 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, December 14, 2017 at 2:54:01 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
> The solution was proposed by Everett in 1957, collapse is a subjective 
> illusion.  The dead cat and its history of decomposing for the previous 
> hour does not materialize out of nothing from the mere act of looking at it.
>
>
> No measurement is made of the cat, the Geiger counter, or the atom, by 
> anyone outside the isolated system of the box, so according to the 
> Copenhagen Interpretation the superposition does not collapse. The cat is 
> both alive and dead. That is, until someone opens the door to peek inside. 
> In that instant, the wave function collapses and the system randomly 
> “decides” whether the cat is alive or dead. 
>
>  

> If the state collapses to that of the dead cat, what happens to the 
> experiences of the cat who was in the superposition of being alive and dead 
> over the past hour? Do they suddenly vanish as if they never happened at 
> all? Perhaps they never existed in the first place, as Bohr’s anti-realist 
> approach would answer. But this leads to another problem: if the cat is 
> observed to be alive, do all of its memories and experiences over the 
> past hour suddenly pop into existence? Is the cat’s experience of 15 
> minutes ago ever experienced? 
>
>  

> It is one thing to believe that microscopic particles might be in two 
> different states at once, but quite another to believe the same for a large 
> and complex system, such as a cat. The CI implies that a living, breathing 
> cat, with a consistent history and memories of the previous hour, can 
> instantly materialize from the simple act of observation.
>
>  

> Schrödinger's experiment has also been extended to highlight other 
> problems. The mathematical physicist Eugene Wigner discussed a thought 
> experiment known as Wigner’s friend. In it, Wigner’s friend is in a room 
> that is sealed off from the rest of the world and in that room is a box 
> containing Schrödinger's cat. The friend opens the box after an hour and 
> notices whether or not the cat is alive. Sometime later, Wigner opens the 
> door to the room to check on his friend. When does the wave function 
> collapse, when the friend checks on the cat, or when Wigner checks on his 
> friend? If it is when the friend checks on the cat, then the isolated 
> system, unobserved by Wigner, has already collapsed (in contradiction to 
> the CI). Yet, if it does not collapse for the friend checking on the cat, 
> this is another contradiction, for he has made an observation of a system 
> in a superposition. The CI seems to have difficulties handling multiple 
> observers. mea
>
>

*I don't see how Wigner's friend presents a problem for Copenhagen. 
According to the CI, the wf collapses when the system measured, which is 
when the box is opened. What am I missing? The issue of the cat's memory is 
a different matter, problematic IMO. AG *
 

> If one takes the stance that the first conscious entity to experience the 
> result of a measurement causes collapse, whether isolated or not, this 
> still leaves the problem of large macroscopic systems with complex 
> histories popping into existence through observation. If we replace the cat 
> with some unconscious device, like a sensor that prints off a receipt with 
> the result of whether or not the poison was released, then a conscious 
> observer opening the box causes the instantaneous appearance of the print 
> out, oddly, with ink that has long-since dried. It has a consistent history 
> seemingly invented at once. 
>
> Einstein was most impressed with Schrödinger's paper, and in 1950 wrote 
> Schrödinger a letter of praise, saying “You are the only contemporary 
> physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the 
> assumption of reality, if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not 
> see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality—reality as 
> something independent of what is experimentally established. Their 
> interpretation is, however, refuted most elegantly by your system of 
> radioactive atom + amplifier + charge of gunpowder + cat in a box, in which 
> the psi- function of the system contains both the cat alive and blown to 
> bits. Nobody really doubts that the presence or absence of the cat is 
> something independent of the act of observation.” 
>
> Einstein never accepted the quantum mechanics as a complete theory. To the 
> end of his life he searched for a theory that better fit his ideals of 
> realism, causality and determinism. But the answer he sought was there all 
> along: in the equations of quantum mechanics. Consciously or unconsciously, 
> however, the answer was simply too strange for anyone to consider, even for 
> a moment. It was not until 1957, more than three decades after quantum 
> mechanics was formulated, that anyone was bold enough to point out the 
> answer that was staring everyone in the face. That person was Hugh Everett 
> III. 
>
>
> Jason
>
> On 

Re: Schrodinger's cat problem; proposed solution

[Jason Resch]

The solution was proposed by Everett in 1957, collapse is a subjective
illusion.  The dead cat and its history of decomposing for the previous
hour does not materialize out of nothing from the mere act of looking at it.


No measurement is made of the cat, the Geiger counter, or the atom, by
anyone outside the isolated system of the box, so according to the
Copenhagen Interpretation the superposition does not collapse. The cat is
both alive and dead. That is, until someone opens the door to peek inside.
In that instant, the wave function collapses and the system randomly
“decides” whether the cat is alive or dead.

If the state collapses to that of the dead cat, what happens to the
experiences of the cat who was in the superposition of being alive and dead
over the past hour? Do they suddenly vanish as if they never happened at
all? Perhaps they never existed in the first place, as Bohr’s anti-realist
approach would answer. But this leads to another problem: if the cat is
observed to be alive, do all of its memories and experiences over the past
hour suddenly pop into existence? Is the cat’s experience of 15 minutes ago
ever experienced?

It is one thing to believe that microscopic particles might be in two
different states at once, but quite another to believe the same for a large
and complex system, such as a cat. The CI implies that a living, breathing
cat, with a consistent history and memories of the previous hour, can
instantly materialize from the simple act of observation.

Schrödinger's experiment has also been extended to highlight other
problems. The mathematical physicist Eugene Wigner discussed a thought
experiment known as Wigner’s friend. In it, Wigner’s friend is in a room
that is sealed off from the rest of the world and in that room is a box
containing Schrödinger's cat. The friend opens the box after an hour and
notices whether or not the cat is alive. Sometime later, Wigner opens the
door to the room to check on his friend. When does the wave function
collapse, when the friend checks on the cat, or when Wigner checks on his
friend? If it is when the friend checks on the cat, then the isolated
system, unobserved by Wigner, has already collapsed (in contradiction to
the CI). Yet, if it does not collapse for the friend checking on the cat,
this is another contradiction, for he has made an observation of a system
in a superposition. The CI seems to have difficulties handling multiple
observers.

If one takes the stance that the first conscious entity to experience the
result of a measurement causes collapse, whether isolated or not, this
still leaves the problem of large macroscopic systems with complex
histories popping into existence through observation. If we replace the cat
with some unconscious device, like a sensor that prints off a receipt with
the result of whether or not the poison was released, then a conscious
observer opening the box causes the instantaneous appearance of the print
out, oddly, with ink that has long-since dried. It has a consistent history
seemingly invented at once.

Einstein was most impressed with Schrödinger's paper, and in 1950 wrote
Schrödinger a letter of praise, saying “You are the only contemporary
physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot get around the assumption
of reality, if only one is honest. Most of them simply do not see what sort
of risky game they are playing with reality—reality as something
independent of what is experimentally established. Their interpretation is,
however, refuted most elegantly by your system of radioactive atom +
amplifier + charge of gunpowder + cat in a box, in which the psi- function
of the system contains both the cat alive and blown to bits. Nobody really
doubts that the presence or absence of the cat is something independent of
the act of observation.”

Einstein never accepted the quantum mechanics as a complete theory. To the
end of his life he searched for a theory that better fit his ideals of
realism, causality and determinism. But the answer he sought was there all
along: in the equations of quantum mechanics. Consciously or unconsciously,
however, the answer was simply too strange for anyone to consider, even for
a moment. It was not until 1957, more than three decades after quantum
mechanics was formulated, that anyone was bold enough to point out the
answer that was staring everyone in the face. That person was Hugh Everett
III.


Jason

On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 3:04 PM,  wrote:

> Not every superposition of states implies interference. Connect the dots.
> AG
>
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