RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Jon, you asked, “are you suggesting that Peirce ultimately abandoned the distinction between the Sign as a general and its Replicas as its individual instantiations?” Certainly not. I am suggesting that the sinsign/legisign distinction of 1903, the replica/sign distinction of 1904, the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Jon, I’m inclined to agree with Bellucci that from NDTR (1903) on, the division that applies to the Sign in itself is always the first trichotomy listed, and is the same trichotomy despite the name changes. (Bellucci also cites another list of the ten trichotomies, R 795, where the first is

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Jon, responses inserted. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 28-Mar-18 10:56 Gary F., List: Interrogative is not one of the classes according to the Nature or Mode of Being of the Dynamic Interpretant; that division is Sympathetic/Percussive/Usual. In fact,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Stephen, you’ve already and repeatedly expressed your lack of interest in a careful study of Peirce’s philosophy and semiotics. What I don’t understand is why you feel compelled to remind the Peirce list of your lack of interest in Peirce, and even to boast about it, while expressing contempt

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

List, Apparently some on the list find Peirce's distinction between the genuine and the degenerate inconvenient. But it's not that elusive for those who really want to know what Peirce is talking about. You could, for instance, consult the index of EP2, or the Commens Dictionary: 1903 |

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

John, Gary R, Jon A.S., Mary et al., I too have been reflecting on the last few sentences of Peirce’s 1909 letter to James, but my thoughts have been tending in a somewhat different direction. When Peirce says that his attempt to distinguish clearly among the three interpretants “relates to a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Jon, In that 1909 letter to James, Peirce is using examples of signs to give James an idea of what he means by “sign”, “object,” “interpretant” and how he distinguishes between subtypes of them. I read it by applying those terms to those examples (and more generally to those types of signs).

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Jon, Gary R, Evidently I was wrong to think that I can follow your reasoning, so I’d better leave this thread to those who can follow it, or those looking for more definitive answers to questions that Peirce left open. What I can do is provide here a more complete quotation from the letter to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Jon, OK, I think I can follow your reasoning, though I don’t find it persuasive. It implies that there is no such thing as an intended interpretant of any given sign, if that means an interpretant intended by the utterer. This makes me wonder what Peirce could possibly be referring to as “the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Gary R, one question for you too. You wrote, “Can one say that the Dynamic Object determines the Immediate Object which determines the Sign? That, at least, has been my understanding.” This suggests to me that either (a) you have abandoned the idea that the Immediate Object is a part of the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

Jon, one question re your statement: “… he had defined the Intentional Interpretant as "a determination of the mind of the utterer" (SS 196, EP 2:478). Apparently he realized that, as such, it obviously cannot be an Interpretant of the Sign that the utterer is currently uttering …” Why not?

RE: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

Gene, It’s questionable whether Political Economy is a science at all in the Peircean sense of that word; maybe to him it was no more genuinely scientific than, well, the Gospel. But if we consider 21st-century Economics as a science, then we should look for self-criticism, and criticism of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

Gary, Jon S, I’ve inserted a few questions below … Gary f From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: 28-Feb-18 19:15 Jon, list, Summarizing Peirce's thought at EP 2.304, Jon wrote: EP 2:304 (1904) - The ideal or perfect Sign is identical, in such identity as a Sign may

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 4.2

List, This part of MS 466 explains why logic is a "positive science" while mathematics is not. It's because the logician investigates "what positive facts about the real universe of things and of thoughts it is from which the necessity of the mathematician's reasonings and the validity of other

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Jon A.S., list, In this thread (and an offline exchange) Jon has been proposing the hypothesis that every quasi-mind (as Peirce uses the term) is a “perfect sign” as Peirce defines that term. He has challenged me to refute this hypothesis by giving an example of a quasi-mind that is not a perfect

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Jon, Yes, that’s what I see as a problem, that you regard “perfect Sign” and “Quasi-mind” as synonyms. “Quasi-mind” is an intentionally vague term, meaning “something of the general nature of a mind” (MS 283). “Perfect Sign,” on the other hand, is a very definite and distinctive kind of sign,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Quasi-mind

Jon, Your collection of Peirce quotes deploying the term “quasi-mind” (if each is taken in context) seemed to me quite enough to clarify what the term signifies — so I haven’t followed your additional explanation very closely, as it seemed to me redundant. But I think it may also be misleading

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 4.2

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 4.1, https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/1903-lowell-lectures/ms-466-467-1903-l owell-lecture-iv/display/13956: The only reason I do not agree with Dedekind in making mathematics a branch of logic is that logic is not a science of pure assumptions but is a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 41

List, Peirce returned often to the subject of relations between logic and mathematics. Defining mathematics as "the science which draws necessary conclusions" implies that "necessary reasoning" is essentially mathematical. As Peirce explains here, that's because the premisses in a mathematical

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell Lectures)

Kirsti, Jon A.S. gave five of Peirce’s formulations of the “pragmatic maxim,” but I haven’t found the place in EP2 where “he gave a final stamp of his approval by explicitly NAMING them AS The first and The second formulation of The Pragmatic Maxim (in EP vol 2).” Can you tell us where to find

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 41

Here's the first instalment of the fourth Lowell Lecture of 1903. My transcription is of two manuscripts, Robin numbers 466 and 467. 467 is identified on its first page as Lecture 4, about the gamma part of existential graphs; but 466 is a bit of a puzzle, as it starts off "Ladies and Gentlemen,"

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims and mediation (Was Lowell Lectures)

Kirsti, I did give your post on ordinality and cardinality a second reading, and I think I see your point, but I don’t have any particular response to it, except to say that these logico-mathematical issues are likely to arise again as we move on to Lowell Lectures 4 and 5, where Peirce has

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs and things

Jon, Helmut, Jon, yes, I’m sure that Peirce’s emphasis is on a sign not being a thing. I think he says it that way, rather than invoking his usual distinction between existence and reality, because “New Elements” was intended to be the preface to an “elementary” book in the sense that it would

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs and things

Jon, list, Gary R is the one to thank for noticing the timeliness of the example — on my blog it started out as just the two translations of the Dogen text, and the semiotic commentary was an afterthought. I recall that years ago, when we were discussing Peirce’s “New Elements” on the list,

[PEIRCE-L] one and the same representamen

List, Gary R suggested that I copy to the list my blog post for today, so here it is, including a bit of Peirce which Jon S also quoted recently: In a Zen community, the monk in charge of cooking for the other monks is called the tenzo. Zen master Dogen

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Jon, Yes, that’s roughly (at least) where I am headed. I’ve been headed in that direction since reading Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions, and thinking of the proposition/dicisign as the basic-level sign, i.e. more basic to semiosis than its functional components such as icons and indices,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Jon, I’ve been trying to catch up with this thread, but am very much daunted by the prospect of responding properly to Gary’s recent post and yours. Gary mentions “problematic terminology” in yours, but he doesn’t appear to recognize “immediate object” as problematic terminology, not to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Jon, As far as the debate is concerned, I concede. You win. Now I’d like to ask you a few questions about the sign “immediate object”: Does it have a dynamic object? Does it have an immediate object? (If yes to both) How do you distinguish between those two objects? Gary f. From:

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Jon, As I said before, I’m not interested in arguing for or against the proposition that “all signs have immediate objects.” Moreover, I don’t see that the “burden of proof” is on anybody engaged in that argument, because it is a terminological issue that I don’t see as being provable or

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Gary R, Jon, Jeff, list, I hesitate to post again in this thread because it has taken a polemical turn that I didn’t anticipate and don’t want to follow. But the last sentence of Gary’s post below renews my hope that our concepts of an “immediate object” and of a “sign” can still be clarified.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Gary R, Thanks for those thought experiments! Now I see where the disagreement lies: your concept of an “immediate object” is very different from mine, because what you have in mind is temporal immediacy, so your “immediate objects” are pretty close to “first impressions.” I on the other

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Jon, Gary R, The crucial question here is: What is the Real Object of the term “sign” in each of these definitions? In each case, we would have to gather what clues we can from the context of the definition (since, as we all know, the sign cannot express its object). And when we do, I think it

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Gary R, Jon et al., What you’ve listed here, Gary, are examples of definitions of “immediate object.” They are not examples of signs which have immediate objects, still less are they examples of immediate objects. I think we need to look at those, if we can find them, to clarify what an

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell Lecture 3.14)

Jon, list, You say “Peirce very clearly maintained in his later writings--beginning already in 1904 (CP 8.336)--that every Sign has an Immediate Object.” I don’t think it’s that clear at all. CP 8.336, to take your example, does not say anything about “every sign.” Moreover, in much of his

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.15 (conclusion)

Jeff, I'm replying on the list to a message that you sent only to me, but obviously intended for the list. I'm not nearly as well versed in Kant as you are, nor have I delved into Peirce's post-1903 classifications of signs as deeply as you have; so this reply may sound simple-minded. But I can

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.15 (conclusion)

Concluding Lowell Lecture 3, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13944 [CP 1.544] The method [the "system of questions" in the preceding paragraph] has a general similarity to Hegel's. It would be historically false

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

Gary R, Jeff, list, Gary, I think my reading of 3.14 is pretty much the same as yours - that is, when Peirce speaks of "much clearer conceptions of the objects of logic" and of the hard fact that the "system of questions" has yielded such fruit, he is referring to his own experience of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

List, A word or two about the second part of Lowell 3.14, CP 1.543 . Whatever "subject of inquiry" we are talking about, it must be something "before the mind" in some way, to use the language Peirce uses to introduce Phenomenology earlier in Lowell 3. That makes it a Phenomenon; hence it

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

Jeff, I only just got round to reading MS 717, which you attached, only to discover that the passage I quoted in my comment to Lowell 3.14 today is part of it! Jungian synchronicity? Anyway, it will probably take me awhile to peruse the whole thing, as I'm still busy with the Lowells, and both

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

List, We are getting close to the end of Lowell 3 - in fact 3.15 will be the last part of the transcription that I'll be posting here. But the manuscript of the third draft of Lowell 3 contains two lengthy parts that I'm not posting here (mainly because he apparently didn't use them in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

Stephen, here’s a Peirce quote that illustrates the point Peter is making: [[ A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale me alienum puto) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, “You see your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.” No doubt it was; and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

John, OK, I didn’t realize that you were looking for advocacy of biosemiotics in Peirce’s writings. I don’t think he ever used the term, and I’m not sure how Peirce would go about advocating it, if that would take something more specific than affirmation of the continuity of biological

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

John, Yes, there are plenty of “earlier thoughts along those lines” of a semiotic generalized beyond the human experience of signs. In fact they are “as plenty as blackberries,” if you read Peirce chronologically looking for them. His anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

Gary R, list, Yes, I agree that the usage of “sign” in reference to a “function” is a significant departure from Peircean semiotics. Peirce does define a function in Lowell 3 (specifically CP 1.540), but he calls it “Representation,” which is “the operation of a sign or its relation to the

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.14

Continuing from Lowell 3.13, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13940: A representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, for a Third, called its Interpretant, this triadic relation

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

Helmut, Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have even made a habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the word, and he did not use it to mean “a function,” or as “consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used it as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

John, you wrote, [[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS. He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology. But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

John, list, I agree with much of what you’ve said here, and my book deals with biosemiotics from Chapter 3 on, so I won’t repeat any of that here. But I’m surprised that no one in this thread has cited Lowell 3.13, as it’s possibly Peirce’s clearest statement of the possibility of genuine

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.13

A few more comments on the terminology of Lowell 3.13: Peirce says "I confine the word Representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation." This implies already that a sign is something that can operate (i.e. do something, either

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

John, It’s a 2015 article, “Exploring Peirce’s speculative grammar: The immediate object of a sign”, http://www.sss.ut.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.4.02/152. I haven’t seen Bellucci’s book yet. Gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

Gary R, Jeff, I’m thinking pretty much along the same lines as both of you, and the question at the end of Jeff’s post is one I’ve been pondering (inconclusively) for some time. I also recall reading in Bellucci that only symbolic propositions have immediate objects. Most of the immediate

RE: [PEIRCE-L] definitions and ethics of terminology

John, Yes, I’m relieved that we’ve put the debate over “polyversity” behind us. As to your recommendations, all I can say is that I’ve already implemented them, though probably not in the way you would. But you’d have to read the whole essay (20 chapters) to see how the various factors

RE: [PEIRCE-L] definitions and ethics of terminology

John, I guess you didn’t notice that I took this exchange offlist, as it wasn’t relevant to the subject. But since you brought it back on … As I said in my reply to Dan, no part of my definition of “polyversity” was intended for use by specialists in linguistics. (By the way, I do not

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.13

List, As I remarked in the other thread, this part of Lowell 3 illustrates several significant points about definitions and terminological matters. As we all know, Peirce in his various writings provided dozens of definitions of the word "sign," and no two of them are exactly alike. Why

RE: [PEIRCE-L] definitions and ethics of terminology

Dan, Yes, that's why I try to make it clear in the book that it's not intended for specialists in linguistics (or any field). It draws data from several fields, and especially from Peircean semiotics, but not for the purpose of making any original contribution to those special sciences. It's a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] definitions and ethics of terminology

John, If you wish to maintain your claim that “The word polyversity implies that there exists a discrete set of meanings,” or that your claim is consistent with my definition of the word in Chapter 2 of Turning Signs, I won’t argue the point, as it’s a matter of opinion too specific to be

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

Jeff, list, To answer your double question at the end, for me your analysis hits pretty close to the 'sweet spot' between the obvious and the dubious, or between the already-known and the incomprehensible. But it's complex enough that I will have to experiment some more with applying it to

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.13

Continuing from Lowell 3.12, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13937: [540] The analysis which I have just used to give you some notion of Genuine Thirdness and its two forms of degeneracy is the merest rough

RE: [PEIRCE-L] definitions and ethics of terminology

John, I’ve changed the subject line here, as I believe the issue concerning “belief in word senses” has been settled by yesterday’s posts. Regarding the new subject, there are a couple of misstatements here that are worth correcting, and my comments are inserted. There’s also an important

RE: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

John, All you say here seems quite reasonable, except your last sentence, which makes me doubt your acceptance (or your interpretation) of Peirce’s 6th rule in his Ethics of Terminology: [[ Sixth. For philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from those for which suitable

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

List, When Peirce gives a phenomenological account of the continuity of semiosis, as he does in this part of Lowell 3, it's even more important than usual for the reader of Peirce to draw upon collateral experience of semiosis to flesh out the immediate objects of Peirce's propositions. I can

RE: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

John, I could respond to this point by point, but that would get very tedious very quickly, and I think my main point is clear enough, “although absolute exactitude is not so much as conceivable” (EP2:264). When Peirce says that philosophy “has positive need of popular words in popular senses”

RE: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

John, I may have misinterpreted Talmy. You also may have misinterpreted Talmy. We would have to ask him to find out — and even then we couldn’t be sure. What I can be sure of is that you’ve misinterpreted my book chapter. This is polyversity in action. You have assigned a meaning to the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

John, Having spent some time perusing the 1997 Kilgarriff article, I can’t agree with you that the time was well spent. The article is obviously intended for specialists in the field of NLP — obviously, because the author does not bother to expand that acronym, expecting readers to be

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

Jeff, Many thanks for this and your other post from yesterday - both are very helpful, to me at least, in rethinking some core semiotic issues. I hope everyone who is following the Lowells is reading them carefully. 1903 was the year that Peirce made some major advances in semeiotics, and with

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.12

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.11, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13934: [CP 1.538] Every sign stands for an Object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that Object in so far as that object is

RE: [PEIRCE-L] "I don't believe in word senses." (was Lowell Lecture 3.11

John, Helmut et al., I haven’t found time to read the article you cite, John, but I dealt with polysemy extensively in Turning Signs — and went beyond it in Chapter 2 (http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm) by coining the word “polyversity” to include not only polysemy (the tendency of a word

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

Jeff, list, This is an interesting sidelight on the concept of degeneracy as it applies to triadic relations, and to semiosis. In the “Logic of Mathematics” (I assume you mean the c.1896 one, subtitled “An Attempt to Develop My Categories From Within”), according to your outline, some triadic

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

One more comment on Lowell 3.11 before we move on: When we analyze a Genuine Thirdness, or the operation of a Sign, we find Thought playing three different roles, which we might call the Firstness of Thought (“which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything else”), its Secondness

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

Gene, Yes — for me it goes without saying that humans are mammals and primates, but now that you’ve said it, I agree. The Nietszche quote does seem timely in some respects … likewise this bit from the Avatamsaka Sutra that I quoted on my blog the other day: “There is not a single

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

Gary R, I think that’s a good exposition of the “reference” issues, including some aspects of the matter that I hadn’t thought of. This is heartening because I find it difficult to write about these ‘categorial’ issues as they are presented in Lowell 3 — difficult because they take us back

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

List, Peirce’s recursive application of the categories seems to reach a climax with the Firstness of Thirdness here, as he tells us that the “slight glimpse” into phenomenology given so far in this lecture is intended “merely to lead up to Thirdness and to the particular kind and aspect of

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.11

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.10, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13928 : [CP 1.533] To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modal logic

John Sowa wrote, “I like to quote a comment that Hilary Putnam made about Aristotle: "Whenever I become clearer about a subject, I find that Aristotle has also become clearer." I would make that same comment about Peirce.” Amen to that! And if I may clarify more minutely: Becoming

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.10

Stephen, This brings out one difference between your triadic thinking and Peirce’s. For him, Thirdness is not the end of the process but the means (as he says in 3.10) or mediation between First and Second, sometimes pictured as the beginning and end of a line (or linear process). That’s

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.10

List, Peirce's attempt to render the 'Firstness of Secondness' (i.e. pure Secondness) comprehensible deals mostly with the difficulty of prescinding it from the experience of willing, separating it from the Thirdness involved in that experience. I think Peirce may be overstating the case when

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Kirsti, We seem to have a language problem here. I don’t understand your distinction between “just interpreting a quote and going beyond it,” or between “paraphrasing Peirce” and stating my own inferences. To me, studying Peirce (or any philosopher) means recreating his or her thought

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Kirsti, you quoted my post in yours and commented that you “cannot understand the use of quotation marks & the lack of use fo them in what follows.” It’s quite simple: The part enclosed in quotation marks is a direct quote of Peirce’s exact words, and the rest is my own words. This is what I

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.10

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.9, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13922 (cf CP 1.532): As to Secondness, I have said that our only direct knowledge of it is in Willing and in the experience of a Perception. It

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.9

List, Peirce has shown that the distinction of the Genuine and the Degenerate applies differently to the three kinds of elements: they differ in the grades of Degeneracy that can affect them. Now he introduces another distinction based on their necessary involvement in one another: Firstness is

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.9

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.8, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13916: I will just mention that among Firstnesses there is no distinction of the Genuine and the Degenerate, while among Thirdnesses we find not

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.8

List, The "analyses of conceptions" which Peirce is carrying out here take us to a very high level of abstraction, but seem to be necessary in order to grasp the involvement of Firstness in Secondness, the relations between quality or possibility and existence, and the distinction between

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.8

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.7, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13906 : . while Secondness is a fact of complexity, it is not a compound of two facts. It is a single fact about two objects. Similar remarks

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Jeff, Interesting little anthology you've put together here, and it certainly shows Peirce referring to parts of signs (also parts of objects and of interpretants), and parts of an illative transformation. However I don't see a clear case here of Peirce referring to a part of a relation. The

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Kirsti, John, list, My source for the usage of SEMEION was Liddell and Scott (which can be searched online). As John says, the primary meaning is “mark”. My answer to the question of whether a sign has parts was, I thought, implied by the Peirce quote in the blog post I linked to,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.7

List, The following text from a few years later may throw some light on Peirce’s remarks about “other categories” and how they differ from the “Universal Categories,” which he also called “formal elements of the phaneron”: [[ There can be no psychological difficulty in determining

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Kirsti, list, Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/. By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for point before

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.7

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.6, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13902 [CP 1.525] I shall not inflict upon you any account of my own labors. Suffice it to say that my results have afforded me great aid in the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Jeff, list, That's an interesting question - for my part, I don't see that Peirce's explanations of the alpha or beta parts of EG in the Lowell Lectures tell us much about what's necessary "to arrive at conclusions about what is observable under different kinds of possible tests." But maybe

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13896 Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy, as most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.5

List, Peirce wraps up this argument for the reality of Thirdness by pointing out that "laws of nature" such as those governing gravitation, elasticity, electricity and thermodynamics ("conservation of energy") are positive laws, while the laws of dynamics "stand on quite a different footing":

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

John, Thanks for this, it’s helpful in reducing somewhat the vagueness of Peirce’s references to physics and chemistry in Lowell 3.4 — and answering the question I posed, which was badly put in the first place. What I was trying to “get” was why Peirce would focus on “substances” of this

RE: Towards welcoming newcomers to Peirce, was, [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Franklin, I think you’re right about James; as for Peirce’s use of the term, all I can find is this bit from the Robin Catalogue: 953. [First and Second Conversazione] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 1-8, with variants. The three views of knowledge: Epicurean, pessimistic, and melioristic. Second

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.1

Thanks, Kirsti, I've fixed that error (which was mine, not Peirce's). By the way, that's in a section of the Lowell 3 manuscript that I don't intend to post to the list but included in the webpage version for the sake of completeness. If anyone has questions or comments about the content of those

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Triads and the meaning triangle ( was Lowell Lecture 3.4

John, responses inserted below as GF: Gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] Sent: 13-Dec-17 16:39 Gary F, I changed the title to focus on the more specific issues. Gary > I dug out my copy of The Meaning of Meaning, and found no triangle

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.5

Continuing from Lowell 3.4, https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-low ell-lecture-iii-3rd-draught/display/13889 As to the common aversion to recognizing thought as an active factor in the real world, some of its causes are easily traced. In the first place,

RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Edwina, a few responses, ET: “this is simply how YOU choose to read Peirce.” GF: Yes. That is exactly what I said in my post, and I gave my reasons for choosing to read that way, and said explicitly that people who read differently have a right to do so. ET: “you cannot claim that your

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Edwina, All I ask of an interpreter of Peirce is that he or she read the whole text, exactly as Peirce wrote it at the time and in the context he was working in, and see for themselves what it means — realizing that its implications for the reader might differ from the implications of a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Jeff, Thanks for drawing our attention to Peirce's remarks on substances in the earlier "Logic of Mathematics" text. They do seem to confirm what I'd suspected, that Peirce is referring to organic compounds as "such active substances." But I still don't know what he's referring to as "those

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

Mary, Edwina, Gary R, list, Getting back to Mary's question, I dug out my copy of The Meaning of Meaning, and found no triangle diagram in it; the brief summary of Peirce's work in the Appendix contains no diagram at all. So I don't know where that diagram started its career, except that it

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