I think that's a nice outline, Gary. Of course I'll comment.
I won't say anything about Howard's focus on the symbol; I agree with your
outline of his use of the term and anything else - is for him to comment.
However, I disagree with one small part of your attempt to classify Peirce's,
Excellent outline, Vinicius. I very much like your relationship between Psi and
Phi
- Original Message -
From: Vinicius Romanini
To: Catherine Legg
Cc: Peirce List
Sent: Friday, March 21, 2014 12:54 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:5459] Re: What kind of sign
Vinicius, I also don't see how all signs must be hypostatic abstractions, for
doesn't that assume, as you point out, the existence of almost, a final or
even, a dynamic interpretant? Doesn't the internal immediate interpretant,
which is a part of the sign, eg, that alien message, or that
Thanks for your comments, Vinicius. My comments:
1) Agree that a photograph is an iconic index.
2) And yes, the S-FI relation is not the same as that between the S, DO and FI.
I think that the latter is a communal action while the former could be an
individual action. Plus, the former could be
Gary, you wrote:
That's why I'm inclined to think that a pansemiotic view tends to undermine a
synechistic view. But this is not necessarily true of all pansemiotic views.
I certainly agree that a pansemiotic view undermines/underlies a synechistic
view; indeed, it, to me, underlies all
There seem to be three basic modes of time. In the abstract you provide
pretemporal, homogeneous continuity effected by biological rhythmization, via
pretemporal metonymic (Gestalt), chunk-wise partitioning – as a general
precondition for the perception and, based on primary metaphorization,
Dear Michael,
Thank you so much for your two papers on structualism from a Peircean point
of view, and now also for your kind announcement of my book to the
Peirce-listers.
I was glad to have the comment by Edwina Taborsky on my abstract (please,
convey my thanks). It would be most
Stephen, Jerry, I don't think that a rejection of the existential reality of
dualism can be sustained. After all, that was a key criticism of Hegal, made by
Peirce, that Hegel rejected the importance of Secondness - and Secondness is
dualistic and made up of 'we-they'.
Thirdness, after all,
Message -
From: Stephen C. Rose
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List ; Phyllis Chiasson
Sent: Monday, June 02, 2014 10:12 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science
and religion: text 1
There is no gainsaying that dualism is real
I have a problem, Gary Moore, with your focus on 'punishments' in language
learning. Perhaps this is just the vocabulary that you are using but I don't
think that language learning is based around rewards and punishments which is a
reactive (Secondness) and mechanical process.
I think that
Hmm - I think that concepts such as 'all the verbally obvious is a myth' and
'linguistic knowledge' moves us into nominalism and rejects objective reality.
Your reference to Lakoff's 'loosely speaking', 'strictly speaking' and
'technically speaking' has comparisons to Peirce's 'Fixation of
Gary - Peirce has a long discussion on intuition in 'Questions Concerning
Certain Faculties Claimed for Man'. CP5.213---. This is also in the Essential
Peirce, Vol 1, Ch 2, p 11-
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Moore
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu peirce-l@list.iupui.edu ;
I think that it was a naive and ignorant article and as such, because it was
written out of ignorance, not worthy of 'total despair'!
I think that the author is unaware of the difference between a tribal and a
civic society. The former, and China fits in here, operates within the
network and
I don't think that Asma's article had anything to do with pragmatism. Was he
defining pragmatism correctly? No, I think his definition is merely 'if it
works for me, then, it works' which is not merely denying the societal
realities but moves into the 'might-makes-right' mode of existence and
(and in India
and other third world countries) - has nothing to do with pragmatism.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: U Pascal
To: Søren Brier
Cc: Stephen C. Rose ; Edwina Taborsky ; Jon Awbrey ; Phyllis Chiasson ;
peirce-l@list iupui. edu
Sent: Monday, June 09, 2014 1:42 PM
Ulysses - well, we do have our differences; I taught anthro for 30 years - and
certainly don't see a tribe as in any way non-stratified, for there can be and
usually are, hierarchies of hereditary authority in a large tribe. Indeed,
since a tribe is also a political entity, there HAVE to be
Gary F - I would compare my sense of the agenda of 'preventing the dissipation
of matter' within the ongoing evolution of the process of Thirdness with your
'creative urge'. However, I don't see it as ruthless - though I see your point
in its indifference to the individual - I'd simply call it
, are evolving and therefore, operate within matter
and not by some external agent's Will.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Matt Faunce mattfau...@gmail.com; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2014 5:50
Matt - who is barring you from having your own beliefs! I am certainly not
doing so. I am merely outlining MY opinion.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Matt Faunce
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2014 6:39 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar
You are totally ignoring the reality of Secondness and Firstness. They are
an intrinsic part of the triad of categories besides Thirdness.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu
To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Matt Faunce mattfau...@gmail.com
within Plato's outline. After all, Peirce's 'Mind' or
Thirdness
or
habits-of-organization, are evolving and therefore, operate within
matter
and not by some external agent's Will.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Matt
but in images or connections.
Edwina Taborsky
- Original Message -
From: Gary Moore
To: Frank Ransom ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2014 3:21 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ;
Science and Religion
PEIRCE
Sung wrote:
Mathematics is a species of the sign according to Peirce. (070114-1)
All signs are arbitrary according to Saussure. Therefore,
mathematics is arbitrary.
This is invalid for two reasons:
First, it is logically invalid. The error is called 'the fallacy of four
terms'. A valid
Please, Sung - try to read a basic course in logic. Your endless attempts to
link things with each other, whether it's Saussure with Peirce, or Bohr with
Bohm or whatever - run into theoretical problems, empirical problems and
logical problems.
Last time, your syllogism was invalid because
are young.
And even if you try to reverse the conclusion into
All who are young are men...it's still fallacious.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu
To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee;
peirce-l
No, Sung and Matt - your attempt to validate Sung's syllogism sets up yet
another fallacy: the Existential Fallacy. Sung chose the first one of the
three you suggested, Matt - as a 'best fit' for what he was trying to
assert.
But, it's just as invalid as his previous illicit major, for it
assumed the existence of logicians. I'll look more closely at this
and the others later today.
Matt
On Jul 6, 2014, at 8:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote:
No, Sung and Matt - your attempt to validate Sung's syllogism sets up yet
another fallacy: the Existential Fallacy
No, Sung, syllogisms are not arbitrary. They are long-established logical
arguments in particular formats and as such, again, cannot be arbitrary for
that would make all thought illogical (arbitrary).
I gave you simple examples to assist you in seeing how your assertion was
logically
the only who are mean are dogs.
But Sung assumed the existence of logicians. I'll look more closely at
this
and the others later today.
Matt
On Jul 6, 2014, at 8:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
wrote:
No, Sung and Matt - your attempt to validate Sung's syllogism sets up
yet
another
Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works,
rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on
cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote:
Written words are representamens and spoken(073114-7)
(and understood) words are signs.
I think this is the basic distinction between the Representamen, the habits of
formation, which are 'real' but not existentially particular - and the
existentially particular unit or token (the Object and Interpretant) - and the
relation between the two modes: the habit and the existential.
the Forms are
actually existentially real on their own.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Stephen C. Rose
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce List
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 4:20 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Peirce
your own terms and don't misuse his terms.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu
To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu; Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com;
Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent
into Peircean ontology here. As I recall you had some
troubles with aspects of Peirce’s indices and icons so it might be that’s at
play here?
3) On Jul 31, 2014, at 1:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote:
I'm saying that you, who has not read Peirce and yet who constantly
chooses to use
is the basis for
On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote:
I agree that the laws are generals and not material; they couldn't be
general AND material, for materiality is existentially local and particular.
However, following Aristotle, I consider
I agree with John; pure Firstness is totally unanalyzed experience. The
triadic sign in a mode of Firstness (all three Relations in Firstness) has
no 'mind' Relation in itself. Therefore we are not aware of it, as itself,
because awareness requires a separation from that experience and the
Stephen- I think John and you are talking about different things and since you
don't seem to use the Peircean analytic frame - the result is confusing. Yes -
we do have direct experience, as both Firstness and Secondness - but Firstness
is without analytic awareness: a pure feeling...which we
, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
References:
[1] Herbert, N. (1985). Quantum Reality: Beyond New Physics, an
Excursion int6o Metaphysics. Anchor Books, New York. P. 64:
Edwina,
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
I'm not sure that solving the problem
To add another twist, isn't it the case that deduction determines non-local
necessary conclusions while induction is strictly local? That is, in my view,
deduction provides a general rule that is valid and thus necessary in ALL
cases, regardless of spatial and temporal domain. Induction, on the
, Indiana
University Press 2001.)
This was not an attempt to convince you, Edwina, I am just hoping to not
disagree with you about absolutely everything.
Best, Helmut
Von: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Helmut - we'll just have to disagree - on just about everything.
In my
metaphor)..
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Richmond
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 5:48 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction,
Edwina, Helmut, list
As I've argued my
as the Intended
Interpretant is Second to it and is Third to it for an existent termed the
Actual Interpretant, the modes of... [unfinished]
[End quote]
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 4:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
As I keep pointing out, I consider it a serious error to confuse Peirce's
by Peirce elsewhere..See, for example. 5.475 (emotional, energetic and logical).
Edwina
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 6:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Ben, now I'm confused. Where did I say that a sign (which I consider a
triadic set of Relations) is 'priman' or first, i.e., confined
ever of what you mean by
calling a sign a triad. Maybe you mean a trichotomy, a three-way
classification.
Best, Ben
Best, Ben
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 6:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Ben, now I'm confused. Where did I say that a sign (which I consider a
triadic set
in an sequence, not individual signs.
John
At 12:12 AM 2014-08-26, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
I disagree with you, Gary. The Representamen relation is not the same as
'representation'. The sign is a triad and can indeed be called a
'representation'. The sign, which is a triad, is composed
Ben, you wrote:
You have not explained what is so confining about seeing the sign as a first,
object as second, interpretant as third, in a general way. You have not
explained how that creates a problem for the sign classes. You have not said
whether you agree or disagree with Peirce about
1][Ben] You have not explained what is so confining about seeing the
sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as third, in a general way. You
have not explained how that creates a problem for the sign classes. You have
not said whether you agree or disagree with Peirce about whether
,
Mary Libertin
From: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Reply-To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Date: Monday, August 25, 2014 at 6:19 PM
To: Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com, peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu, biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee biosemiot
I have said that I disagree that all three categorical modes are always present
in a triadic Sign. My examples have been taken from the ten classes of signs
provided by Peirce (2.254). Therefore, a sign with all three relations in a
mode of Firstness or Secondness does exist.
Sung asked - how
ideologies, eg, Buddhist, Christian retreat.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Richmond
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Jon Awbrey ; Peirce List 1
Sent: Monday, September 01, 2014 6:57 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Q. Why is there so much falsity in the world?
Edwina, Jon, list
Gary F - thanks for this introduction.
I think it's important to clarify that, first, the interactions between the
sign and the object; and the sign and the interpretant, are relations - my use
of this term has prompted serious criticism on the Peirce list! I continue to
use the Peircean
, Rheme-Dicisign-Argument. I return in more detail
to this in Chapter 3.
Best
F
Den 02/09/2014 kl. 16.32 skrev Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
:
Gary F - thanks for this introduction.
I think it's important to clarify that, first, the interactions between the
sign
processes etc.. But- that's just my impression.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce
List Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 2:36 PM
terms constitutes a sign formally,
what is called sign in common speech being but the foreground element - a
sing only materially, better termed a representamen or 'sign-vehicle' --
representing another than itself to or for an interpretant.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca
Exactly. The Sign, that 'irreducible triad' is a syllogism. The major premise
is the Representamen relation; the minor premise is the Object relation;
Conclusion is the Interpretant. This is a dynamic process, a transformative
process and despite the criticism of some, I consider these three
Gary F - you are incorrect in your description of my view. You wrote:
That excerpt is about the connection of syllogistic logic with
primitive forms of *cognition*, but Edwina reads it pansemiotically as
applying to physical organization of matter all the way down to the
molecular (maybe the
Thanks, Frederik. I agree that biology does need semiosis to understand what
is going on because this realm is 'informationally explosive', filled with
diversity, adaptations, interactions, all of which require networked
informational processeswhile the physico-chemical realm is relatively
In reply to Howard- see my comments:
At 04:47 PM 9/3/2014, Frederik wrote:
Adding semiotic concepts to your description of physical events can be
done, but it does not really add to our understanding of them - while in our
understanding of biological events, semiotic concepts are
I think this outline below by Frederik is excellent. But I'd like to add a few
comments.
Physics as a scientific endeavour does not study cognitive and communication
processes, but, yes, physics in itself functions with the realities of
semiosis. That is, my view is that semiosis - as an
Perhaps I am misreading your post, John, but it seems to me an argument over
semantics. You seem to reject the term 'pansemiosis' - and I'm not sure why-
other than that you understand the term to mean that 'the universe is NOT
composed exclusively of signs..and I don't understand how you come
There are a number of debates on this topic at the moment.
1) Does 'Mind' or reasoning extend into the physico-chemical realm - as well as
the biological and socioconceptual realm? Those of us who consider that it does
are labelled as 'pansemioticians' or even 'panpsychics'. Even the definition
What I was getting out of Ch. 2, was a focus on the nature of reality and
existence. I got the sense that psychologism was based strictly around
individual existence, in particular, that of the human brain/mind - and that
this ignored any consideration of the nature of reality, i.e., of
discuss it properly and to articulate why
it is different from 'pansemiosis'.
Jonathan
On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 11:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote:
John, I don't think that these opposing views - whether semiosic actions
take place within the physico-chemical realm
that, even about physics! The vagueness you attribute to
Frederik's statement is entirely a product of the nonsensical interpretation
you propose for it.
gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 13-Sep-14 11:05 AM
To: Peirce List; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Frederik - a sign is a triadic 'set' of three relations - that between the
Representamen and the Object; the Representamen in itself; and that between the
Representamen and the Interpretant. That's 'triadicity' in my view. These three
relations can be in any of the three categorical modes.
s...@rci.rutgers.edu
To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dk; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee;
Peirce List peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 10:21 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6785] Re: Physics Semiosis: the
Edwina
but the Sign
in itself, is complex and not singular, linear or without acting on, changing,
that input data.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Deely, John N.
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Frederik Stjernfelt ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce
List
Sent: Sunday, September 14
in their own way, contribute to the
morphology of the Sign? It's a complex dynamic process of morphological
formation and in my view this can't be reduced to ONE relation or to three
terms.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Deely, John N.
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Frederik Stjernfelt
Succinct, clear and beautifully outlined. Thanks, Gary F.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List'
Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2014 12:38 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
Lists,
I'd like
- which thus denies a
dyadic interaction.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Richmond
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Deely, John N. ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce List
Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2014 11:59 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6785] Re: Physics
Then why, if these connections: causal, morphological, formal, 'may be taken as
a basis for signs'...then why is this considered a 'pre-semiotic world'?
My view is that morphology = semiosis; therefore, any process that 'makes
forms' is a semiosic process - and that goes on within the
'.
gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 21-Sep-14 2:01 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
Subject: [biosemiotics:6919] Re: Being Trivially A Sign
Then why, if these connections: causal, morphological, formal, 'may be taken
as a basis
: Sunday, September 21, 2014 4:55 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6919] Re: Being Trivially A Sign
Dear E, lists-
Den 21/09/2014 kl. 20.01 skrev Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
:
My view is that morphology = semiosis;
I know. It is not mine.
F
As you say, Gary F, it's a trivial but interesting question on pronunciation.
I myself, to myself, pronounce 'dicent' as 'die-cent'; rather than 'decent' yet
also with the soft c. And 'dicisign' also with the soft c. My 'cultural norm'
(shades of Stan!) suggests a soft c after the vowels of
I'm confused by this argument.
My understanding of 'symbol' is that it refers to a singular and specific
relation; that between the Representamen and the Object - which can be
'iconic, indexical or symbolic'.
The dicisign, on the other hand, is the full triad, a dicent symbolic legisign
-
, may be a Dicisign”
(EP2:282). So for Peirce, the dicent symbolic legisign is not the only kind of
dicisign. Three of the “Ten Classes” (EP2:294-6) are dicisigns.
gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 24-Sep-14 9:16 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Jeff wrote: all regularities-wherever they are found--may be conceived as
inference
chains. Those inference chains that are no longer evolving in their
embodied regularities no longer appear to be changing towards some end and
may, at that point in time, be conceived simply as mechanical
Helmut - I'm confused by your comments.
First, a society, as an existential organism, can't operate solely within a
mode of Thirdness because Thirdness, as the laws-of-continuity is a general and
not a specific and thus itself operates only in relation to the modes of
Secondness and Firstness.
Gary F wrote:
1) Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but their
connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses constitutes
information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually makes such a
connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to
that 'icons commit themselves to nothing at all'.
I think that's enough to show that any further comment would be superfluous,
and any further attempt at dialogue along these lines would be fruitless.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 12:11 PM
to
have agreed with Peirce that 'icons commit themselves to nothing at all'.
I think that’s enough to show that any further comment would be superfluous,
and any further attempt at dialogue along these lines would be fruitless.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 12:11
On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 5:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote:
Part of the problem may also be due to my understanding of the 'icon' in
that it is not a Sign, even though many seem to consider it as such. It is the
term for the Relation between the Dynamic Object
I'd like to ask Frederik about the role of what I consider a basic Peircean
Sign, the Rhematic Indexical Legisign. This triad operates within all three
categorical modes; it's in the centre, so to speak, of the ten classes.
I see it as important because of the openness of its Interpretation
Since some are posting links to various articles, I'll add this from complexity.
http://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304bid=8a63841671#mctoc5
You can see that there are articles (which I haven't reviewed) on such issues
as
Top-Down Causation and the Rise of Information
If we are to touch on learning and reasoning, it might be fruitful to expand
the research domain of this blog to include the research areas of such
people as Leonid Perlovsky and Ricardo Gudwin. Both of them are involved in
cognition, semiotics, learning, evolution. That is, most of this list
doesn't clearly show.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net
To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu; Peirce List
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2014 1:44 PM
Subject: Re: Semiotic
Jon, you seem to be saying that Information is what someone else perceives.
I think this reliance on the decision of another and even, a conscious and
cognizant other, as to what is information and what is not, is problematic.
I consider that information is 'data that has been organized'.
Stephen - it's called The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, and states
that
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
it within the utopianism of 'communal submission'. But
both; it's not an easy task.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Stephen C. Rose
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce List
Sent: Monday, October 13, 2014 11:06 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: PEIRCE-L] More Pragmatism, Not Less
Kohlberg.
Best,
Helmut
Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com wrote:
And of course the iconoclast, obedient to the First Commandment, will add
and none while adhering to these sage rules..
@stephencrose
On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote
: [biosemiotics:7261] Re: Natural Propositions
Chapter 4
At 09:40 AM 10/20/2014, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Howard wrote: That is only a narrow human view of nominalism. I think
Peirce's view of Tychasm and Agapism is more radical. He generalizes signs,
interpreters, mind, habits, and love
Gary R - I can understand, since you are (to my knowledge) one of the
moderators of the Peirce-L list, that you can decide that the discussion some
of us have been having only on the biosemiotics list should not be extended to
the Peirce-L list. But I don't think that you can decide what the
Tyler, thanks for your reply and discussion.
1) I don't think that all Signs are Arguments but all Signs, in my view,
function within the 'universal Mind', which in itself as an aspatial and
atemporal force, is an 'Argument'. I don't see the other Sign formats (the ten
classes) therefore as
I realize that hypostatic abstraction is a topic for chapter 6, but since I've
just received the latest online issue of 'Entropy', I thought I'd refer to an
article in it which, in my view, can be analyzed as a type of hypostatic
abstraction (movement from singular to general). My point is,
language use. Edwina Taborsky , Deacon, Kull, and others seem
to think this set is symbols in general. Dicisign doctrine clearly contradicts
this. I happen to think the book is brilliant, but I would hope to maintain a
taxonomic approach. My thought is that the typology of 66 signs can both apply
purposes, you're
welcome to supply them, but we certainly don't need them for a discussion of NP.
gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 31-Oct-14 10:35 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce list
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural
Again, I think that one must be careful of terminology. When Peirce writes that
habit is 'by no means exclusively mental', I think it is clear that he means
that habit both in its production and in its expression need not be
'conscious'. After all, to repeat yet again, his 4.551 concept -
definitions that better suit your own purposes,
you're welcome to supply them, but we certainly don't need them for a
discussion of NP.
gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 31-Oct-14 10:35 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce list
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re
to the motives which originally governed its selection.
If you want other definitions that better suit your own purposes, you're
welcome to supply them, but we certainly don't need them for a discussion
of
NP.
gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 31-Oct-14 10:35
of being chronological. That's why I usually cite
EP2
in discussions of Peirce's detailed semiotic analysis, including his work
on
Dicisigns, which is the main topic of NP.
gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 1-Nov-14 9:08 AM
To: Jerry LR Chandler
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