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}Jon - my own quite logical example. I know that he did refer to the
syllogism somewhere but I'm not going to look it up..but, it's
obviously quite a logical assumption.
Edwina
On Mon 05/02/18 3:26 PM , Jon Alan
Edwina, List:
Peirce explicitly associated the conclusion of an Argument with its
Interpretant--e.g., "An *Argument *is a sign which distinctly represents
the Interpretant, called its *Conclusion*, which it is intended to
determine" (CP 2.95; 1902). Just curious--is there any text where he
simila
Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound
is NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'.
IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an
external existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound
II - the I
Gary R., List:
I agree that the difficulties appear to be intrinsic to the subject matter,
and cannot be attributed entirely to our individual idiosyncrasies in
trying to sort it out. I would welcome a focused List discussion on
"Pragmatism," but strongly urge you to include in its scope, besides
Edwina, Jon, Gary, List,
I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural structure, or due to having
Jon, Edwina, list,
I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally,
because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in
different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading
Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereadin
Jon, List:
> On Feb 2, 2018, at 4:17 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> all of the correlates in this example of semiosis happen to be Existents
> (2ns).
In your opinion do you also believe that none of this example of semiosis that
are 2ns?
> As such, it should not be surprising that our anal
Edwina:
I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise
I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me on where
to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the
whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactl
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}Jon - I don't separate Mind and Matter. Mind exists AS matter.
Matter couldn't exist without habits-of-formation. And Mind couldn't
exist without being those habits within Matter...Pure Aristotle.
Edwina
On Mon 0
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}Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic
process. How does the single semiosic action contact the habits?
And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation'
of the external
Edwina, List:
Analyzing the various "Signs within Signs" might be unavoidable eventually,
especially if we end up going down the road of defining Dicisigns (i.e.,
natural propositions) as "complete Signs" and all other classes (except
Arguments) as "incomplete Signs." However, right now it just m
Edwina, List:
As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I understand the
Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for (i.e., *represents*) the
loud sound in the human's mind. The Representamen does not *itself *include
the person's memories and habits; instead, the latter are
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}Jon, list
1. See my most recent post - which has the Representamen as the
mediation between the O and the I. As to whether this semiosic triad
can function 'outside or inside' - to me, that doesn't make any
sense,
Edwina, List:
1. Per my last response to Gary R., it depends on which Sign we are
discussing. The loud sound is obviously outside the bird, while the neural
pattern is obviously inside the bird. In my current thinking, both can be
analyzed as Representamens; in yours, if I understand you correc
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}Jon, list - there are multiple semiosic actions going on 'at the
same time' so to speak.
If we just take this one example of the loud sound/tree
falling...whether the Receiver is a bird or human - there are
multip
Gary R., List:
Your observation that I tend to associate the concept of "Sign" with
something external first (e.g., the loud sound) and internal second (e.g.,
the bird's neural pattern) is accurate. It seems to me that any adequate
model of semiosis must be able to take both kinds of Signs into a
Jon, Gary R, list:
OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different:
DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I
don't know that.
IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it
differently than my cat or dog or c
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}Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out
the necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What
carries out this function of habit? The Representamen.
Edwina
On Sun 04/02
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}Jon, list
1] In your view - where is the location of the Sign - if not in the
bird? Is your Sign floating around as an ICloud?
2] Yes - semiosis only takes place within morphological units, in
this case,
Correction: Oops. Said this just backward. I wrote, "I see you as
emphasizing the external, existential sign, whereas I always tend to turn
to the cognitive one (as at least springboard). In "a sign of a sign" your
emphasis seems to me to be the former, mine the latter."
I *meant *to say that your
Jon S, list,
Perhaps I am making more of Peirce's comment regarding 'a sign of a sign'
than you think is justified (one more individual, the other more general as
I see it). It seems to me that your emphasis in consideration of the
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign on it's being *existent *is but half th
Gary R., List:
Of course the Sign *can *be within the bird; what I said was that I think
it does not necessarily *have to* be be within the bird.
I have tried to avoid human semiosis in this conversation, because I
suspect that Edwina and I will have many more disagreements once we go in
that dir
Jon, Edwina, list,
I'm not quite *back*, but thanks for the welcome back!
Again, I would suggest that a return to a human, cognitive example would be
helpful for clarifying the ideas being considered. Perhaps you hadn't read
my last post when you questioned how those quotations might be helpful.
Jon, Edwina, list,
Jon wrote:
I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily
within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for
now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place
within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis goi
Gary R., List:
Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you will
soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, because
frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current non-human,
non-cognitive example.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe
Edwina, List:
I still think that the IO-R-II triad is within the *Sign*, not necessarily
within the bird (Receiver), but we can set that disagreement aside for
now. More to the point--in your view, does semiosis *only *take place
within the bird? Is there no *other *semiosis going on, in which t
Edwina, Jon S, list,
At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation than
with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in this
matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few
quotes hints towards a direction I think might be f
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}The key action of semiosis that I am examining takes place within
the birdthe IO-Representamen-II.
A Representamen is always internal to the triad.
The loud sound is both the Dynamic Object - which c
Edwina, List:
Just a few comments--not to start another argument, just to highlight more
differences in our views that are becoming apparent.
The loud sound involves the behavior of matter, which is effete mind, and
mediates between the falling tree and the fleeing bird; so I am still not
seeing
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}1]Jon - to me, the Representamen is an act of mediation; it
transforms the data from the IO [Immediate Object] into an
Interpretation...
So- to me, the loud sound is incoming sensate data; It doesn't act
as MIND,
Edwina, List:
Yes, again, we have very different definitions of "Representamen." Just to
clarify--are you saying that in your view, the loud sound *cannot *be
treated as the Representamen in *any *semiotic analysis of this scenario?
If so, why not?
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 5:15 PM
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would disagree. The falling of the tree is a full Sign
[O-R-I]with the actual fall as the Dynamic Interpretant. The
wind-taking-down-the-tree might by a Dynamic Object to the
tree...which then reacts by falling [DI].
Helmut - no the relation between the Representamen and the Object
can be in ANY of the three modes [1stness, 2ndness, 3rdness]. Same
with the Representamen-in-itself. And the relation between the
Representamen and the Interpretant can also be in any of the 2 modes.
Check the ten sign cla
Helmut, List:
In my view, we can indeed take the loud sound to be the Representamen, as I
initially suggested--noting again that my definition differs significantly
from Edwina's. This leads to a different analysis in which the Dynamic
Object is the falling of the tree that *causes *the sound, wi
Edwina, isn´t mediation (thirdness) a matter of the interpretant (thirdness), not the representamen? Well, I see representamen, object, interpretant as 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, which perhaps you don´t. Ok, representamen is also the sign, which is thirdness, because it includes all. This is difficult. Maybe
Helmut - I'll disagree. You are missing the triadic semiosic process
of O-R-I. You are missing the process of mediation between the Object
and the Interpretant - which is the action carried out by the
Representamen.
Therefore - the Representamen is not 'the loud sound' -
Jon, Edwina, List,
I think:
- The representamen is the loud sound, and everything connected with it in the situation (as the representamen is also the sign, so including all following points too)
- The dynamical object is that, what the bird initially feels to be the source of the loud sound, a
Jerry C., List:
As I mentioned previously, before moving the conversation to its own
thread, all of the correlates in this example of semiosis happen to be
Existents (2ns). As such, it should not be surprising that our analysis of
it *resembles* "a simplistic causal sequence"; hence Edwina's worr
List:
> On Feb 2, 2018, at 10:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing a loud sound, our
> analyses of the semiosis
involves
> The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound itself.
> The Immediate Object (IO) is the bird's sensation of the loud
Edwina, List:
I has been a pleasant (and presumably mutual) surprise to discover that, at
least in the specific example of a bird fleeing upon hearing a loud sound,
our analyses of the semiosis involved are substantially in agreement after
all.
- The Dynamic Object (DO) is the loud sound *itse
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