Combining Peirce, Kant and Plato
Hi Bruno Marchal I had forgotten about the relations, namely, the equations. Which are always true and so belong to platonia. -- Consider the following. The short form is that Peirce's I = the intuition of time = 1p = t II = the world of events, which are only true a certain times = event spaces at times t. III = the truth or existence of all spaces, considering all time. = the clombined truth of all event spaces A moresion is this: Let existence or events be true if they currently exist (are happening), and false if not. 1. Firstness, let us say, is simply time or the intuition of consciousness. It is awareness, the individual observer, before events are perceived (1p). Firstness = t = consciousness (individual awareness)= 1p Since no events are involved, T or F is irrelevant. 2. Following Kant's scheme of basic intuitions (space and time), let me suggest that Secondness is the world of events. Now events consist of the intuitions of space or content plus time. Events only happen at specific times, so T if event is happening, F if not. Secondness = contingency= the world of events, which are only T at specific times. Events = intuitions of space + that of time.= contents of space (what happens) + time or consciousness (when it happens) 3. Thirdness is platonia where the many become the time-independent One. This is the world of timeless or eternal truths. Thirdness = necessity (always true, so time independent) = just the truth or existence of all events combined as one. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 14:36:40 Subject: Re: 15 22 4 On 09 Nov 2012, at 13:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Arithmetic is just numbers. Not at all. you need laws so that numbers can enter in relation with each other. The relation x y, for example is Ez(x + z = y) The relation x divides y, for another example is Ez(x* z = y) So you need + and *, and you need axioms to relate the laws, like x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x *0 = 0 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x And by G del this will capture a tiny part of the arithmetical truth, but by Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich (70 years of work by quite talentuopus logician) that theory can (at least now) easily be shown Turing universal. They have no meaning and are (3p) unless observed from a fixed identity (1p). Yes. But their relations can be such that some 1p emerge. That follows either by comp, or by the usual definition of knowledge + the incompleteness theorem (see my papers, but of course this needs some math and computer science to study) As proof of that consider these three arithmetic characters from mandarin: ?? ??? ? The meanings of these are 15 22 4 But you have to makes sense of the characters before you use them. Absolutely. Chinese baby will learn that ? is the number of digits handing the human arm. In other words, you need a fixed, conscious observer. Here you made a jump. I agree with you though, but technically this might need elaboration. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 11:00:12 Subject: Re: Leibniz: Reality as Dust On 08 Nov 2012, at 16:35, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, If the compact manifolds of string theory are all different and distinct (as I claim in my paper from observations of a variable fine structure constant across the universe), then the manifolds should form a Stone space if each manifold instantly maps all the others into itself, my (BEC physics) conjecture, but also a Buddhist belief- Indra's Pearls. If so, youall may be working on implications of string theory- like consciousness. However, in my paper I claim that a 'leap of faith' is necessary to go from incompleteness to consciousness (C). Would you agree? Bruno says C emerges naturally from comp. More precisely, I say that consciousness and matter emerges from elementary arithmetic, *once* you bet on comp, that is the idea that the brain or the body can be Turing emulated at some right level so that you would remain conscious. Bruno And of course what I am hoping as a physicist rather than a mathematician or logician is that the compact manifolds may be the basis of the elementary arithmetic from which spacetime, matter (ie., strings) and consciousness emerge. Is it not more elegant if we can derived the strings (which are rather
Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
Hey all on the list, Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable, but not achievable, which means: congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than, say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus 100) ... this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC, and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project. In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in the computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the same reasons as time travel is impossible. It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you think if we admit that the teleportation required in your thought experiment is simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and therefore not computational, or mechanistic) reasons. Looking forward to your response, Dan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/CJQdSUzCiTMJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Peirce, Kant and Plato simplified
Peirce, Kant and Plato simplified I = Firstness = time alone = awareness= subject = 1p II = Secondness = events (space intuition + time) = time dependent functions = perceiving events = relational = 2p III = Thirdness = space intution (time independent truths or contents) = objects = 3p === I had forgotten about the relations, namely, the equations. Which are always true and so belong to platonia. -- Consider the following. The short form is that Peirce's I = the intuition of time = 1p = t II = the world of events, which are only true a certain times = event spaces at times t. III = the truth or existence of all spaces, considering all time. = the clombined truth of all event spaces A moresion is this: Let existence or events be true if they currently exist (are happening), and false if not. 1. Firstness, let us say, is simply time or the intuition of consciousness. It is awareness, the individual observer, before events are perceived (1p). Firstness = t = consciousness (individual awareness)= 1p Since no events are involved, T or F is irrelevant. 2. Following Kant's scheme of basic intuitions (space and time), let me suggest that Secondness is the world of events. Now events consist of the intuitions of space or content plus time. Events only happen at specific times, so T if event is happening, F if not. Secondness = contingency= the world of events, which are only T at specific times. Events = intuitions of space + that of time.= contents of space (what happens) + time or consciousness (when it happens) 3. Thirdness is platonia where the many become the time-independent One. This is the world of timeless or eternal truths. Thirdness = necessity (always true, so time independent) = just the truth or existence of all events combined as one. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 14:36:40 Subject: Re: 15 22 4 On 09 Nov 2012, at 13:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Arithmetic is just numbers. Not at all. you need laws so that numbers can enter in relation with each other. The relation x y, for example is Ez(x + z = y) The relation x divides y, for another example is Ez(x* z = y) So you need + and *, and you need axioms to relate the laws, like x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x *0 = 0 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x And by G del this will capture a tiny part of the arithmetical truth, but by Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich (70 years of work by quite talentuopus logician) that theory can (at least now) easily be shown Turing universal. They have no meaning and are (3p) unless observed from a fixed identity (1p). Yes. But their relations can be such that some 1p emerge. That follows either by comp, or by the usual definition of knowledge + the incompleteness theorem (see my papers, but of course this needs some math and computer science to study) As proof of that consider these three arithmetic characters from mandarin: ?? ??? ? The meanings of these are 15 22 4 But you have to makes sense of the characters before you use them. Absolutely. Chinese baby will learn that ? is the number of digits handing the human arm. In other words, you need a fixed, conscious observer. Here you made a jump. I agree with you though, but technically this might need elaboration. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 11:00:12 Subject: Re: Leibniz: Reality as Dust On 08 Nov 2012, at 16:35, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, If the compact manifolds of string theory are all different and distinct (as I claim in my paper from observations of a variable fine structure constant across the universe), then the manifolds should form a Stone space if each manifold instantly maps all the others into itself, my (BEC physics) conjecture, but also a Buddhist belief- Indra's Pearls. If so, youall may be working on implications of string theory- like consciousness. However, in my paper I claim that a 'leap of faith' is necessary to go from incompleteness to consciousness (C). Would you agree? Bruno says C emerges naturally from comp. More precisely, I say that consciousness and matter emerges from elementary arithmetic, *once* you bet on comp, that is the idea that
Re: Leinbniz' Analysis Situs
Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. It's rare and very expensive to buy but I can read it online. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-10, 00:38:07 Subject: Leinbniz' Analysis Situs Dear Roger, You might find this Google book on Leibniz' ideas (that lead to modern topology) interesting. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Spotless platonia
Hi Bruno Marchal I sweep the undesireable stuff you mention into contingia and keep platonia spotless and perfect. Time-independent equations or propositions, necessary and/or persistent truths. Platonia is objective thirdness = 3p Secondness = relational, time-dependent truths (events) = 2p Oneness= time allone= iondividual consciousness.= 1p Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 10:15:37 Subject: Re: Communicability On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:42, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/8/2012 6:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King There are no accidents in Platonia. There are also perfect parabolas, because Platonia is the realm of necessary logic, of pure reason and math, which are inextended. Hi Roger, There are no accidents in and all is perfect and there is no extension or time Platonia because we define Platonia that way. But if we are to take Platonia as our basic ontological theory we have a problem, we are unable to explain the necessity of the imperfect world of matter that has time and is imperfect. Not at all. After G?el and Co. we know that Platonia, or simply Arithmetic is full of relative imperfections. The machines which lives in Platonia suffer all from intrinsic limitations. Now, we know that Platonia contains typhoon, black hole, big bangs, taxes and death. Platonism is not the same before and after G?el-Turing. We can perhaps say that comp admits a more nietzchean reading of Plato. This could be called neo-neo-platonism, which is neoplatonism + Church thesis. It is also very pythagorean, as the numbers can, and have to, be seen in a new perspective. It is a utopia that, like all utopias, is put up as a means to avoid the facts of our mortal coil. I am interested in ontologies that imply the necessity of the imperfect and not a retreat to some unaccessible perfection. The real shock with modern comp is that now we know that even heaven is not perfect. It contains many doors to hell. And vice versa: Hell contains doors to heaven. The main difference is that it is easy to find a door to hell in paradise, and it is hard to find a door to paradise in hell. And there is a large fuzzy frontier between both. The idea that arithmetical platonia is perfect is a rest of Hilbert's dream (or nightmare as some call it). With comp even God is not perfect. He is overwhelmed by the No?, and then the universal soul put a lot of mess in the whole. At least we can understand the fall of the soul, and the origin of matter. Matter is where God lost completely control, and that's why the Greek Platonists can easily identify matter with evil. It is the price of Turing universality. The existence of *partial* computable function, and, with comp, of processes which escapes all theories. The happy consequences is that, by such phenomena, life and consciousness resist to normative and reductionist thinking. The universal machine is born universal dissident. Bruno Thrown earthly objects are extended and thus fly contingently, since spin, humidity and dust particles can create flight imperfections and no measurements of their flights can be perfect. I am also told that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does not depend on scale. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 19:45:05 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/7/2012 1:19 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/7/2012 5:52 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Again: we are still left without an explanation as to how the accidental coincidence of a Platonic Truth and an actual fact of the world occurs. Why do you write 'accidental'? Platonia is our invention to describe classes of facts by abstracting away particulars. Brent -- Hi Brent, It seems to be that when we abstract away the particulars we lose the ability to talk about particulars. -- Onward! Stephen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Re: How can words be transformed into numbers ?
Hi Bruno Marchal OK, so it's not numbers alone (pure numbers), something else is required. At the very minimum that something else must be intelligence, the ability to essentially freely make choices of one's own. Nothing can be done without intelligence. But if you can do that, what's special about numbers ? Geometry, such as created network, would make more sense. Or natural language. or arithmetic functions. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 14:26:09 Subject: Re: How can words be transformed into numbers ? On 09 Nov 2012, at 13:41, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal So how would I see a cat. be transformed into numbers ? Maybe 63 7 89 ? I am afraid that will not be enough. I see a cat, to get put in number, with the 1-I and 3-I of you, you will need to scan your brain at the correct comp subst level (which exist by comp assumption), and this when you are looking at a cat. Then the real 1-I is not in that number, but in all the computation going through the state described by that number relatively to our most probable environment. The number can be used to reimplement you in some computer, and then you will be able to manifest your seeing a cat to us. I could do that if I indexed all of the words in Roget's thesaurus, but I don't think the numbers would mean anything besides numbers. Because the meanings of words come from context -- not only in where they are placed in a text but how they arose from culture. Language is culture. You are right. And in mandarin, three characters placed together might not have anything to do with literal meaning. For example, the characters for I touch flowers in vase can mean Final touch No problem with this. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 10:36:49 Subject: Re: Peirce's concept of logical abduction-- a possible moneymaker Hi Roger Clough , On 08 Nov 2012, at 11:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal My principal interest over the years has been to come up with some self-sustaining self-generating method of autopoeisis. That's why I found the I Ching fascinating. It contains sensible links between binary numbers and metaphors. When I look up methods of data mining, all they give is hierarchy diagrams and numbers. How do they link numbers and metaphors or words in general ? Perhaps there is some sort of bayesian scheme to do that. Roget's thesaurus might also be a starting point, since they have words of similar meanings clustered, but where you go from that beats me. You should perhaps study how works a computer (or a universal number). They transforms numbers into words and actions all the time, and this in a non metaphorical way. And they can do much more, like referring to themselves in the 3p but also in the 1p and other senses. There is no more magic than in computer science, imo. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 12:57:14 Subject: Re: Peirce's concept of logical abduction-- a possible moneymaker On 07 Nov 2012, at 18:12, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Cool. Shows you how little I know. Those things are virtually unknown by most. Computer science is very technical, and the number of publications is explosive, almost an industry. It is also a gold mine, alas, most philosophy curriculum does not have good courses in the field. We separate the human and the exact sciences, which does not help. In science we still kill the diplomats, and this means that science is still run by unconscious (pseudo)-religion, if not simply the boss is right theory. Of course the degree of graveness is very variable in time and places. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 12:05:11 Subject: Re: Peirce's concept of logical abduction-- a possible moneymaker Hi Roger Clough, Hi Bruno Marchal Yes, by new I mean contingent. But Kant, although his examples are debatable, at least sought a synthetic a priori, which of course would be a gold mine, or perhaps a stairway to the divine. Pragmatism rejects the idea of there being
14 billion years ago there was a huge explosion
Hi Stephen, Science has meaured the beginning of the universe to have occured about 14 billion years ago. So it has a beginning. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Hal Ruhl Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 12:26:47 Subject: RE: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum Hi Stepen: Interesting post. I indicated in the initiating posts that life should rapidly appear where the conditions supporting it are found. I suspect that in most cases the sphere of influence for a particular instance of a biosphere is small when compared to the size of the universe. Therefore I propose to change heat death to operative heat death re your finite resolving power for observers. This should allow for the possibility of an open universe. I am also considering changing purpose of life to function of life. Thanks Hal Dear Hal, What consequences would there be is the Universe (all that exists) is truly infinite and eternal (no absolute beginning or end) and what we observe as a finite (spatially and temporally) universe is just the result of our finite ability to compute the contents of our observations? It is helpful to remember that thermodynamic arguments, such as the heat engine concept, apply only to closed systems. It is better to assume open systems and finite resolving power (or equivalently finite computational abilities) for observers. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
Hi Russell Standish No, rational beings have to decide which truths they need to apply to what and how to apply them. These are all relational acts, which require choice, hence intelligence. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 17:22:18 Subject: Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ? On Fri, Nov 09, 2012 at 06:01:04AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno In my discussions of intelligence, I define intelligence as the ability to (fairly freely) make one's own choices. A bit of an odd definition, don't you think? A purely rational being does not have a free choice, they must choose what's best according totheir utility function. Your definition entails that purely rational beings (eg homo economicus) are not intelligent. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King Then you will get an incorrect motion, which indeed would be very,very interesting. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 13:22:37 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/9/2012 11:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In idealism, physics is conceptual, so things must happen as they're supposed to. Hi Roger, And this happens without an expectation of an explanation as to how it is the case? You see, I reject this idea because there is an entity that is being tacitly assumed to exist whose sole purpose is to determine what 'is supposed to happen'. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Communicability
Hi Stephen P. King There's no mystery. That's presumably how a machine packed them during manufacture. er Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 13:32:23 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/9/2012 11:24 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Get a box of crackers with the crackers all lined perfectly up inside. No explanation at all is given as to how the cracker got to be perfectly lined up. ... Right. That's Platonia. Now invert the box and let the crackers fall, scattering on the floor and some even breaking. That's our contingent world. Nobody knows why, but that's the way time works. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Communicability
Hi Stephen P. King Perhaps they fly apart because they are a little warm which causes vibrations and there is nothing to hold them together. One will probably have put a little spin on them as well. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 13:33:28 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/9/2012 11:28 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Contingent ordering is what happens to perfection, given time. Because of entropy. But nobody knows why. Care to advance an explanation as to why? Just because it has to be that way is not an explanation. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
It's an imperfect world
Hi Stephen P. King It's an imperfect world. Initial perfection results from assuming the initial crystal entropy to be zero. But in reality there is always an entropy from misfitting planes (dislocations) and there is a thermal equilibrium concentration of vacancies. And impurities cause stresses. And multiple phases, and cracks caused by thermal distributions, etc. etc. etc. I spent a career at NIST studying the resulting effects on strength. lowing content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 13:43:11 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/9/2012 11:36 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King I fall back on my experiment with crackers. Nothing stays perfect if allowed to be free and time passes. Hi Roger, My problem is the assumption of an initial perfection. It is never explained! Boltzmann's theorem S = k ln(W) quantifies that, it emerges from statistical mechanics. A more thorough explanation is given on: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/statphys-Boltzmann/ A very good article! Attention should be paid to this section: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/statphys-Boltzmann/#4.1 -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Plato's cave analogy
Hi Bruno Marchal Plato says that we all live in a dark cave, seeing only shadows on the wall, eager to see the light outside. So there is at least a duality which I call platonia (heaven) and contingia (earth). Platonia contains the necessary stuff, the dark cave we live in contains the contingent stuff. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 10:22:14 Subject: Re: Communicability On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:45, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/8/2012 6:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi meekerdb So how does Platonia's perfect necessary classes restrain or contain this world of contingency ? Or does it ? Hi Roger, That is exactly my question! How does Platonism show the contingent to be necessary? As far as I have found, it cannot show necessity of the contingent. In the rush to define the perfect, all means to show the necessity of contingency was thrown out. This is why I propose that we define existence as necessary possibility; we have contingency built into our ontology in that definition. ;-) In which modal logic? What you say directly contradict G?el's theorem, which shows, at many different levels the necessity of the possible. We even get that for all (true) sigma_1 sentences (the atomic events in the UD execution) p - []p, that is the truth of p implies the necessity of the possibility of p, with []p = either the box of the universal soul (S4Grz1), or the box of the intelligible or sensible matter (Z1* and X1*). The modal logics becomes well defined, and allows, in Platonia, all the imperfections that you can dream of (which of course is not necessarily a good news). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 13:19:38 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/7/2012 5:52 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Again: we are still left without an explanation as to how the accidental coincidence of a Platonic Truth and an actual fact of the world occurs. Why do you write 'accidental'? Platonia is our invention to describe classes of facts by abstracting away particulars. Brent -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: How can words be transformed into numbers ?
Hi Bruno Marchal The Devil is in the details, and why bother with numbers when you could use words ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 14:26:09 Subject: Re: How can words be transformed into numbers ? On 09 Nov 2012, at 13:41, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal So how would I see a cat. be transformed into numbers ? Maybe 63 7 89 ? I am afraid that will not be enough. I see a cat, to get put in number, with the 1-I and 3-I of you, you will need to scan your brain at the correct comp subst level (which exist by comp assumption), and this when you are looking at a cat. Then the real 1-I is not in that number, but in all the computation going through the state described by that number relatively to our most probable environment. The number can be used to reimplement you in some computer, and then you will be able to manifest your seeing a cat to us. I could do that if I indexed all of the words in Roget's thesaurus, but I don't think the numbers would mean anything besides numbers. Because the meanings of words come from context -- not only in where they are placed in a text but how they arose from culture. Language is culture. You are right. And in mandarin, three characters placed together might not have anything to do with literal meaning. For example, the characters for I touch flowers in vase can mean Final touch No problem with this. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 10:36:49 Subject: Re: Peirce's concept of logical abduction-- a possible moneymaker Hi Roger Clough , On 08 Nov 2012, at 11:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal My principal interest over the years has been to come up with some self-sustaining self-generating method of autopoeisis. That's why I found the I Ching fascinating. It contains sensible links between binary numbers and metaphors. When I look up methods of data mining, all they give is hierarchy diagrams and numbers. How do they link numbers and metaphors or words in general ? Perhaps there is some sort of bayesian scheme to do that. Roget's thesaurus might also be a starting point, since they have words of similar meanings clustered, but where you go from that beats me. You should perhaps study how works a computer (or a universal number). They transforms numbers into words and actions all the time, and this in a non metaphorical way. And they can do much more, like referring to themselves in the 3p but also in the 1p and other senses. There is no more magic than in computer science, imo. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 12:57:14 Subject: Re: Peirce's concept of logical abduction-- a possible moneymaker On 07 Nov 2012, at 18:12, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Cool. Shows you how little I know. Those things are virtually unknown by most. Computer science is very technical, and the number of publications is explosive, almost an industry. It is also a gold mine, alas, most philosophy curriculum does not have good courses in the field. We separate the human and the exact sciences, which does not help. In science we still kill the diplomats, and this means that science is still run by unconscious (pseudo)-religion, if not simply the boss is right theory. Of course the degree of graveness is very variable in time and places. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 12:05:11 Subject: Re: Peirce's concept of logical abduction-- a possible moneymaker Hi Roger Clough, Hi Bruno Marchal Yes, by new I mean contingent. But Kant, although his examples are debatable, at least sought a synthetic a priori, which of course would be a gold mine, or perhaps a stairway to the divine. Pragmatism rejects the idea of there being any such universals, but I think by abduction strives to obtain completly new results (if actually new I can't say). I think that's why Peirce came up with the concept of abduction. The concept is very seductive to me for its possible power of discovery of something unknown or new. If comp could do
the grammar of platonia
Hi Bruno Marchal Chomsky says in effect that what we call platonia is grammatically structured, hence the rapidity that children learn language. At the least one can form simple propositions such I see the cat. I suggest that these proposations are at first vocal, as you can see young children moving their lips when learning to read. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 14:36:40 Subject: Re: 15 22 4 On 09 Nov 2012, at 13:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Arithmetic is just numbers. Not at all. you need laws so that numbers can enter in relation with each other. The relation x y, for example is Ez(x + z = y) The relation x divides y, for another example is Ez(x* z = y) So you need + and *, and you need axioms to relate the laws, like x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x *0 = 0 x*(y + 1) = x*y + x And by G del this will capture a tiny part of the arithmetical truth, but by Putnam-Davis-Robinson-Matiyasevich (70 years of work by quite talentuopus logician) that theory can (at least now) easily be shown Turing universal. They have no meaning and are (3p) unless observed from a fixed identity (1p). Yes. But their relations can be such that some 1p emerge. That follows either by comp, or by the usual definition of knowledge + the incompleteness theorem (see my papers, but of course this needs some math and computer science to study) As proof of that consider these three arithmetic characters from mandarin: ?? ??? ? The meanings of these are 15 22 4 But you have to makes sense of the characters before you use them. Absolutely. Chinese baby will learn that ? is the number of digits handing the human arm. In other words, you need a fixed, conscious observer. Here you made a jump. I agree with you though, but technically this might need elaboration. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 11:00:12 Subject: Re: Leibniz: Reality as Dust On 08 Nov 2012, at 16:35, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:51, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, If the compact manifolds of string theory are all different and distinct (as I claim in my paper from observations of a variable fine structure constant across the universe), then the manifolds should form a Stone space if each manifold instantly maps all the others into itself, my (BEC physics) conjecture, but also a Buddhist belief- Indra's Pearls. If so, youall may be working on implications of string theory- like consciousness. However, in my paper I claim that a 'leap of faith' is necessary to go from incompleteness to consciousness (C). Would you agree? Bruno says C emerges naturally from comp. More precisely, I say that consciousness and matter emerges from elementary arithmetic, *once* you bet on comp, that is the idea that the brain or the body can be Turing emulated at some right level so that you would remain conscious. Bruno And of course what I am hoping as a physicist rather than a mathematician or logician is that the compact manifolds may be the basis of the elementary arithmetic from which spacetime, matter (ie., strings) and consciousness emerge. Is it not more elegant if we can derived the strings (which are rather sophisticated mathematical object) from arithmetic (through computationalism)? It seems to me that string theory assumes or presumes arithmetic. Indeed it even assumes that the sum (in some sense, 'course) of all natural numbers gives -1/12. In fact all theories assume the arithmetical platonia, except some part of non Turing universal algebraic structures. However, I do not understand what it means to bet on comp. You bet on comp when you bet that that you can survive with a digital brain (a computer) replacing the brain. Comp is just Descartes Mechanism, after the discovery of the universal machine. The biggest discovery that nature do and redo all the times. Does the whole shebang collapse if brains do not exist? No. But brains cannot not exist, as they exist, in some sense, already in arithmetic. The whole shebang is a sharable dream. I call the computer universal number to help people to keep their arithmetical existence in mind. I will say more in FOAR asap. You can find my papers on that subject from my URL, but don't hesitate to ask any question, even on references. The simplest, concise, yet complete (with the references!) paper is this one:
Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
I always emphasize that there is a evolutionary logic, which unlike any other logic, is tautological, that is assume no axioms beyond natural selection (which is tautological per se) I will define here this logic as clear as I can. Therefore evolutionary logic a good foundation for an absolute notion of both truth (including existence) and morals. Because is-ougth is unified under this logic. This logic is rougly speaking convergent with the classical philosophical-religious logic of common sense. Besides being materialistic, it debunk the humean nominalist-positivist reductionsisms and, as i said, return back to the classical philosophical notions. Really all the modal logics are parts of this evolutionary logic. The directions of the arrows of the modal logics have a clear evolutionary background. for example G x - x, Ox -x, [] x - x, Bx - x, there is a evolutionary reason behind What is this evolutionary logic? Under evolutionary logic, truth, existence and goodness becomes different aspects of the same essence, which have different names when seen from the point of view of logic, epistemology or morals. The truth of this logic is by definition equal to the-continuation-of-the-mind-in-the-world. The non sequitur, the definition of false, is the non-continuation-of-the mind-in-the-world. Everything that contributes to the continuation of the mind is true, exist and is good. Everything that does not contribute does not exist, is false and is evil. If a notion contributes to the mind dead, this notion is, evidently non existent (is disappearing or will disappear soon). It is false (non-sequitur). And it is not good (contributes to the death of the holder and his society) Therefore It is a fuzzy logic which assign various degrees of truth, existence and godness depending on the degree, immediacy and clarity with which something contributes to the persistence of the mind. There immediate evident, and universally consensuated concepts that are truth, exist and are good: For example, that persons are males and females, the existence of persons, to preserve persons lifes.These sentences are respectively true, exist and is morally good because the knowledge included in these statements contribute inmediately and universaly to the persistence of the human minds in a social environment. In the other extreme of fuzziness are more subtle and long term facts that does not produce an inmediate persistence of the mind, but are long term,and in some circumstances The existence of the electron, the existence of God, drug prohibition, the platonic realm etc. The accumulation of knowledge of evolutionary truths happens by many mechanism: biological darwinism, that develop specific circuirtry to recognize humans, recognize human faces, handle social reasoning (This instantiates in brain hardware the above statements about persons). There are also social mechanisms of accumulation of evolutionary knowledge, by tradition, philosophical, scientific debates, and also violent confrontation. among peoples and countries. The reason why Lamarkism is not true is more a factual consequence of the defeat of the USSR than a direct consequence of scientific debate. It may be said that lisenko Lamarkism was disastrous because ti contributed to the defeat of the USSR. But had the USSR won the cold war, we would accept the scientific truth of lamarkism, since socialism would have been sucessful and lamarkism is the only coherent evolutionary theory compatible with marxism, and darwinism is not. It would be far more painful and long term to convince people to get rid of it . All these processes are instances of a single process operating at differente levels: Natural selection. the proces of variation and selection at the biological, social political etc levels. Althougn this is formulated in crude materialistic terms, This is identical to the classical philosophical and religious logic, that takes into account the reality of the whole experience of existence of the mind-soul in the word in all the dimensions: social and individual. You may find Biblical and Philosophical texts that assimilate truth, existence and the good. 2012/11/10 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net Is/ought and modal logic 1) Hume's universe The skeptic Hume said that there is the world of is, which we live in, and the world of the moralists and religious folk, the world as it ought to be, and there was not logical connection between them. --- A speculation The hierarchical ladder of modal logic below suggests that there may in fact be some sort of logical connection through this hierarchy or ontology of logical types possibly rearranged in some ascending way from the following list of types: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/ Modal Logic [] It is necessary that .. It is possible that ? Deontic Logic O It is obligatory
Re: It's an imperfect world
On 10.11.2012 12:17 Roger Clough said the following: I spent a career at NIST studying the resulting effects on strength. Do you know John Hastie and David Bonnell? I have been once an year with them at NIST. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
Better written: 2012/11/10 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com I always emphasize that there is a evolutionary logic, which unlike any other logic, is tautological, that is assume no axioms beyond natural selection (which is tautological per se) I will define here this logic as clear as I can. Therefore evolutionary logic a good foundation for an absolute notion of both truth (including existence) and morals. Because is-ougth is unified under this logic. This logic is rougly speaking convergent with the classical philosophical-religious logic of common sense. Besides being materialistic, it debunk the humean nominalist-positivist reductionsisms and, as i said, return back to the classical philosophical notions. Really all the modal logics are parts of this evolutionary logic. The directions of the arrows of the modal logics have a clear evolutionary background. for example G x - x, Ox -x, [] x - x, Bx - x, there is a evolutionary reason behind What is this evolutionary logic? Under evolutionary logic, truth, existence and goodness becomes different aspects of the same essence, which have different names when seen from the point of view of logic, epistemology or morals. The truth of this logic is by definition equal to the-continuation-of-the-mind-in-the-world. The non sequitur, the definition of false, is the non-continuation-of-the mind-in-the-world. Everything that contributes to the continuation of the mind is true, exist and is good. Everything that does not contribute does not exist, is false and is evil. If a notion contributes to the mind dead, this notion is, evidently non existent (is disappearing or will disappear soon). It is false (non- sequitur). And it is not good (contributes to the death of the holder and his society) Therefore It is a fuzzy logic which assign various degrees of truth, existence and godness depending on the degree, immediacy and clarity with which something contributes to the persistence of the mind. There immediate evident, and universally consensuated concepts that are truth, exist and are good: For example, that persons are males and females, the existence of persons, to preserve persons lifes.These sentences are respectively true, exist and is morally good because the knowledge included in these statements contribute inmediately and universaly to the persistence of the human minds in a social environment. In the other extreme of fuzziness are more subtle and long term facts that does not produce an inmediate persistence of the mind, but are long term,and in some circumstances The existence of the electron, the existence of God, drug prohibition, the platonic realm etc. The accumulation of knowledge of evolutionary truths happens by many mechanism: biological darwinism, that develop specific circuirtry to recognize humans, recognize human faces, handle social reasoning (This instantiates in brain hardware the above statements about persons). There are also social mechanisms of accumulation of evolutionary knowledge, by tradition, philosophical, scientific debates, and also violent confrontation. among peoples and countries. The reason why Lamarkism is not true is more a factual consequence of the defeat of the USSR than a direct consequence of scientific debate. It may be said that lisenko Lamarkism was disastrous because ti contributed to the defeat of the USSR. But had the USSR won the cold war, we would accept the scientific truth of lamarkism, since socialism would have been sucessful and lamarkism is the only coherent evolutionary theory compatible with marxism, and darwinism is not. It would be far more painful and long term to convince people to get rid of it . All these processes are instances of a single process operating at differente levels: Natural selection. the proces of variation and selection at the biological, social political etc levels. Althougn this is formulated in crude materialistic terms, This is identical to the classical philosophical and religious logic, that takes into account the reality of the whole experience of existence of the mind-soul in the word in all the dimensions: social and individual. You may find Biblical and Philosophical texts that assimilate truth, existence and the good. 2012/11/10 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net Is/ought and modal logic 1) Hume's universe The skeptic Hume said that there is the world of is, which we live in, and the world of the moralists and religious folk, the world as it ought to be, and there was not logical connection between them. --- A speculation The hierarchical ladder of modal logic below suggests that there may in fact be some sort of logical connection through this hierarchy or ontology of logical types possibly rearranged in some ascending way from the following list of types:
Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
Sorry, I added some thing particularly: That 1+1=3 is false is a shortcut for the expression: There is no mind that tough seriously that 1+1=3 and acted upon it. Or, if it ever existed, it or its descendants will dissapear. This reduces truth to existence That something is god means that the one that assumes that will survive better. This reduces moral to existence. Ought to is. -- Evolutionary logic: I always emphasize that there is a evolutionary logic, which unlike any other logic, is tautological, that is, it assumes no axioms beyond natural selection (which is tautological per se) My purpose is to define here this logic as clearly as I can. Because it is tautologica, evolutionary logic a good foundation for an absolute notion of both truth (including existence) and morals, because the false dicotomy is-ougth is unified under this logic. This logic is convergent with the classical philosophical-religious logic that depart from common sense, introspection, inspiration and intuition, but also with science in the modern sense. Besides being materialistic, it debunk the Humean nominalist-positivist reductionsisms and, as i said, brings back the classical philosophical notions. Really all the modal logics are parts of this evolutionary logic. The directions of the arrows of the modal logics have a clear evolutionary background. for example G x - x, Ox -x, [] x - x, Bx - x. I hope that you will understand the evolutionary reasons behind these implications and in which degree. What is this evolutionary logic? Under evolutionary logic, truth, existence and goodness becomes different aspects of the same essence, which have different names when seen from the point of view of logic, epistemology or morals. The truth of this logic is by definition equal to the-continuation-of-the-mind-in-the-world. The non sequitur, the definition of false, is the non-continuation-of-the mind-in-the-world. That means that everything that contributes to the continuation of the mind is true, exist and is good. Everything that does not contribute does not exist, is false and is evil. If a notion in the mind contributes to his deat, this notion is, evidently non existent (is disappearing or will disappear soon). It is false (non-sequitur). And it is not good (contributes to the death of the holder and his society). That 1+1=3 is false is a shortcut for the expression: There is no mind that tough seriously that 1+1=3 and acted upon it. Or, if it ever existed, it or its descendants will dissapear. This reduces truth to existence That something is god means that the one that assumes that will survive better. This reduces moral to existence. Ought to is. It is a fuzzy logic which assign various degrees of truth, existence and godness depending on the degree, immediacy and clarity with which something contributes to the persistence of the mind. There are immediate, evident, and universally consensuated concepts that are true, exist and are good: For example, that persons are males and females, the existence of persons, to preserve persons lifes.These sentences are respectively true, exist and are morally good because the knowledge included in these statements contribute inmediately and universaly to the persistence of the human minds in society. In the other extreme, there are more subtle facts that do not contribute to an inmediate and universal persistence of the minds, but perhaps in the long term, and in some circumstances. Or maybe there is no universal consensus: The existence of the electron, the existence of God, drug prohibition, the platonic realm etc. The accumulation of knowledge of these truths happens by many mechanisms at different levels: One of them is biological darwinism, that develop specific circuirtry to recognize humans, recognize human faces, handle social reasoning. These process evolves brain hardware that instantiates the above statements about persons (by the way, besides tat, it has been demonstrated that , due to social evolutionary pressure, we have special circuitry for handling deontic logic). There are also social mechanisms of accumulation of evolutionary knowledge, by tradition, philosophical, scientific debates, and also violent confrontation. among peoples and countries. The reason why Lamarkism is not true is more a factual consequence of the defeat of the USSR than a direct consequence of scientific debate. It may be said that lisenko Lamarkism was disastrous because ti contributed to the defeat of the USSR. But had the USSR won the cold war, we would accept the scientific truth of lamarkism, since socialism would have been sucessful and lamarkism is the only coherent evolutionary theory compatible with marxism, and darwinism is not. It would be far more painful and long term to convince people to get rid of it . Tradition, another way of evolutionary knowledge, is a collection of sucessful best practices All these processes of knowledge adquisition are
Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
Dear Dan, you make a lot of sense. Not so surprizing, though: thought experiments are created for handling impossible (and NOT knowable) circumstances in the tenets of (possible? believed?) scientific figments. Like e.g. the EPR. Or: teleportation (a decade-long bore for me - sorry, Fellows). My argument is mainly time-less: you can 'teleportate' (funny word) any PAST event, not the FUTURE so the Teleport (noun for the teleportated?) will experience a DIFFERENT lifeline from the continuation of the Original. Your reference to time-travel is appreciable (can I kill my grandmother before she gave birth to my mother?). This seems to be a good pastime-game for people who could do smarter. Regards John Mikes On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 4:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 thismindisbud...@gmail.com wrote: Hey all on the list, Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable, but not achievable, which means: congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than, say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus 100) ... this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC, and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project. In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in the computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the same reasons as time travel is impossible. It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you think if we admit that the teleportation required in your thought experiment is simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and therefore not computational, or mechanistic) reasons. Looking forward to your response, Dan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/CJQdSUzCiTMJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On 11/9/2012 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: It seems to me that we automatically get a 'fixed identity' when we consider each observer's 1p to be defined by a bundle or sheaf of an infinite number of computations. The chooser of A and of B is one and the same if and only if the computational bundle that make the choice of A also make the choice of B. What you are considering is just an example of my definition of reality. But what makes the bundle or sheaf stay together? As computations why don't they quickly diverge? That's the question I was raising in the Moscow/Washington thought experiment. We know the M-man and the W-man diverge because they experience different things. But they experience different things because their physical eyes/skin/ears... are in differenct physical places? And those experiences form two different sheafs of computation that have a lot in common within each and differences between them. But there is no computational explanation of why that should be so. Computationally there could be just one sheaf including the M-man and the W-man just as the drone pilot has a sheaf that includes Florida and Afghanistan. So the argument for comp seems to rely on physics. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Arithmetic doesn't even suggest geometry, let alone awareness.
On Fri, Nov 9, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If numbers exist then so does geometry, that is to say numbers can be made to change in ways that exactly corresponds with the way objects move and rotate in space. I'm saying that there would be no such thing as objects, movement, space, or rotation in a comp universe. I don't know what a comp universe is because I no longer know what comp means and I no longer believe that Bruno, the inventor of the term, does either. But I do know that over the past year you have told this list that information does not exist, and neither do electrons or time or space or bits or even logic, so I don't see why the nonexistence of movement in a comp universe or any other sort of universe would bother you. You can prove this by understanding that there are no objects or spaces actually moving around in the chips of your computer. Electrons move around the chips in your computer, and potassium and sodium ions move around the Cerebral Cortex of your brain. make the Real numbers be the horizontal axis of a graph and the imaginary numbers be the vertical axis, now whenever you multiply a Real or Imaginary number by i you can intuitively think about it as rotating it by 90 degrees in a counterclockwise direction. Do you understand why computers don't need to do that? I said a lot of stuff so I'm not sure what that refers to (sometimes pronouns can really suck) but apparently you believe that computers have some innate ability that humans lack, there is something computers already know and so don't need to do that. I do know that computers calculate with complex numbers all the time, especially when rotation in 3D is important, such as calculations involving Maxwell's or Schrodinger's equation. This is my point, we have visual intuition because we have visual sense as a method of participating in a universe of sense. It would be meaningless in a universe of arithmetic. I would maintain that computers are already far better than humans in determining what a complex object will look like when it is rotated. I am saying, IF the universe were purely functional, I don't know what that means, is the universe broken? Why would there even begin to be a theoretical underpinning for a universe which remotely resembles this one? I don't have a theory that explains everything about the universe and neither does anybody else, but unlike some I am wise enough to know that I am ignorant. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Consciousness = life = intelligence
On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Consciousness = life = intelligence. Therefore oak trees are intelligent and conscious. In addition, intelligence requires free will Cannot comment, don't know what ASCII sequence free will means. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/10/2012 6:01 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King There's no mystery. That's presumably how a machine packed them during manufacture. Hi Roger, The order of the crackers has a cause, some physical process lead to the order. When we are considering ontological models and theories and using ideas that depend on epistemological knowledge, it is easy to fall into regress. I have found that regress can be controlled and there is even a nice mathematical theory that uses regressive sets - sets that have no least member and sets that have themselves as a member, but any time that we claim a 'cut off' there has to be sufficient reasons for it. er Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 13:32:23 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/9/2012 11:24 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Get a box of crackers with the crackers all lined perfectly up inside. No explanation at all is given as to how the cracker got to be perfectly lined up. ... Right. That's Platonia. Now invert the box and let the crackers fall, scattering on the floor and some even breaking. That's our contingent world. Nobody knows why, but that's the way time works. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/10/2012 6:05 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Perhaps they fly apart because they are a little warm which causes vibrations and there is nothing to hold them together. One will probably have put a little spin on them as well. Those kinds of behaviors defines those things as 'substances' and we are back to where we started and not found any deeper principles. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 13:33:28 Subject: Re: Communicability On 11/9/2012 11:28 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Contingent ordering is what happens to perfection, given time. Because of entropy. But nobody knows why. Care to advance an explanation as to why? Just because it has to be that way is not an explanation. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On 11/10/2012 11:44 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/9/2012 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: It seems to me that we automatically get a 'fixed identity' when we consider each observer's 1p to be defined by a bundle or sheaf of an infinite number of computations. The chooser of A and of B is one and the same if and only if the computational bundle that make the choice of A also make the choice of B. What you are considering is just an example of my definition of reality. But what makes the bundle or sheaf stay together? Hi Brent, Good question! AFAIK, the bundle is 'held together' by the fact that the computations are equivalent or 'fungible' to each other on or at the bundle. As computations why don't they quickly diverge? That is a possibility. Almost all would diverge if we are considering a wide sample of computational strings. The measure of the similarity or level of substitution is involved. The bundle is just those 'places' in the strings that are equivalent between strings. This seems to imply that the 1p is not stable or persistent in most measures. That's the question I was raising in the Moscow/Washington thought experiment. We know the M-man and the W-man diverge because they experience different things. Right. But they experience different things because their physical eyes/skin/ears... are in differenct physical places? We have to consider the computational aspects that define those 'physical places'. And those experiences form two different sheafs of computation that have a lot in common within each and differences between them. Right! This is the concurrency problem that I keep making a fuss about. But there is no computational explanation of why that should be so. The question is: Can a 'computational string' code for the interactions between computational strings? I have seem many arguments on both sides. It is an open question, AFAIK. Computationally there could be just one sheaf including the M-man and the W-man just as the drone pilot has a sheaf that includes Florida and Afghanistan. So the argument for comp seems to rely on physics. Yeah, it does seem to. I am interested in Bruno's take on this question. You did point out that the attention of the drone pilot cannot simultaneously focus its attention on information from both Florida and Afghanistan simultaneously. How would you characterize the reasons why? This is just another form of the divergence question above. No? It seems to me that some form of topological continuity is involved. Brent -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 09 Nov 2012, at 22:52, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Nov 9, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Or? OR?!! Bruno Marchal just said the Helsinki man will survive in two examples, in M AND in W; and now Bruno Marchal is asking if the Helsinki man will survive in M OR W. It makes no sense! Confusion between 1-view and 3-view. You said the Helsinki man will survive in two examples, in M AND in W. This follows from the comp assumption. and then ask if the Helsinki man will survive in M OR W; so who's the one that's really confused around here? Read the precise sentence. I ask to the guy in Helsinki how he evaluates the chance to feel to be the one in Moscow. He will push on a button, and he already know that whoever he will feel to be, he will feel to be in only on city, so it is normal he has to evaluate his chance, as he knows that he will certainly not feel being in both city at once (always assuming comp). To say W and M is a correct (with comp) 3-view of the 1-views, but the question is about the future 1-view as seen by the 1-view. Bruno The Moscow man can see a continuous trajectory from being the Helsinki man to now being the Moscow man and the same is true of the Washington man, so the Helsinki man has obviously been duplicate But not his first person perspective. PRONOUNS SUCK! Who the hell does his refer to? For that matter what exactly is the Helsinki man? You said the body read in Helsinki is annihilated, I think the man still exists in Washington and Moscow and I thought you did too but apparently not because of various peeing issues you are unable to communicate coherently. You were not satisfied with the testimony of either the Washington or Moscow man and don't want to hear what they have to say, you want to know about his first person perspective. Nobody is experiencing Helsinki anymore so I repeat my question, who is his? After this experiment is concluded who's testimony would convince you that you have received correct infirmation about his first person perspective? Define bruno marchal, and john Clark. First define define. The 3-I is well known to be definable by the Dx = xx trick, I have to inform you that the Dx = xx trick is NOT well known to me and I don't know what you're talking about. So what's the problem? To evaluate your chance, in helsinki, to later feel to be the W or the M man after the duplication is done PRONOUNS SUCK!! You forget to mention that the question was: where will you feel. You forgot to mention where who will feel. You can do the thought experiment in a setting where in Helsinki you take some drug so that you become amnesic, and don't know more who you are. That's 4 yous in just 28 words, a new record. PRONOUNS SUCK!! ? ! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
On 11/10/2012 1:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Hey all on the list, Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable, but not achievable, which means: congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than, say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus 100) ... this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC, and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project. In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in the computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the same reasons as time travel is impossible. I don't see the parallel. Can you spell it out? Brent It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you think if we admit that the teleportation required in your thought experiment is simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and therefore not computational, or mechanistic) reasons. Looking forward to your response, Dan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/CJQdSUzCiTMJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On 11/10/2012 9:58 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/10/2012 11:44 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/9/2012 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: It seems to me that we automatically get a 'fixed identity' when we consider each observer's 1p to be defined by a bundle or sheaf of an infinite number of computations. The chooser of A and of B is one and the same if and only if the computational bundle that make the choice of A also make the choice of B. What you are considering is just an example of my definition of reality. But what makes the bundle or sheaf stay together? Hi Brent, Good question! AFAIK, the bundle is 'held together' by the fact that the computations are equivalent or 'fungible' to each other on or at the bundle. As computations why don't they quickly diverge? That is a possibility. Almost all would diverge if we are considering a wide sample of computational strings. The measure of the similarity or level of substitution is involved. The bundle is just those 'places' in the strings that are equivalent between strings. This seems to imply that the 1p is not stable or persistent in most measures. That's the question I was raising in the Moscow/Washington thought experiment. We know the M-man and the W-man diverge because they experience different things. Right. But they experience different things because their physical eyes/skin/ears... are in differenct physical places? We have to consider the computational aspects that define those 'physical places'. And those experiences form two different sheafs of computation that have a lot in common within each and differences between them. Right! This is the concurrency problem that I keep making a fuss about. But there is no computational explanation of why that should be so. The question is: Can a 'computational string' code for the interactions between computational strings? I have seem many arguments on both sides. It is an open question, AFAIK. Computationally there could be just one sheaf including the M-man and the W-man just as the drone pilot has a sheaf that includes Florida and Afghanistan. So the argument for comp seems to rely on physics. Yeah, it does seem to. I am interested in Bruno's take on this question. You did point out that the attention of the drone pilot cannot simultaneously focus its attention on information from both Florida and Afghanistan simultaneously. How would you characterize the reasons why? This is just another form of the divergence question above. No? It seems to me that some form of topological continuity is involved. It's easy to answer from a physics standpoint - his brain only has finite resources, so whatever constitutes 'focusing on Afghanistan' uses the resources that are needed for 'focusing on Florida' and so he can't focus on both at once. But he can't focus on his desk and his monitor at the same time either. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 09 Nov 2012, at 20:12, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/9/2012 11:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Nov 2012, at 21:47, Stephen P. King wrote: This is wrong and even the opposite of what I am arguing! I take the argument of comp and stop at step 8 and try to reconstruct a necessary reason for the appearance of a physical world for some large but finite number of observer, where each observer is defined as a sheaf of an infinite number of computations. My reason for stopping at step 8 of the UDA is that I see it as deeply problematic because it does to the physical world exactly what Dennett tries to do with the mind. The elimination of the assumption of a physical world in the argument reduces it to a causally ineffective illusion Why ineffective? On the contrary, if it was ineffective, there would'nt be physical laws. The physical reality would not exist, still less be Turing complete. and thus causes the arithmetic body problem. The body problem = the physical laws. UDA is at first a partially constructive explanation of the body problem. It is a weakness of aristotelianism in metaphysics (weak materialism, naturalism). You take as a weakness of comp the fact that it reduce the mind-body problem to a body problem, but it is its main qualitative advantage, as it explains how and where the physical laws can come from, and this in a testable way, making comp scientific (Popperian). A corollary problem that step 8 induces is the implied vanishing of the ability to communicate between minds. You simply refuse to see the problem. Because it is planly wrong, as the ability to communicate between minds is clearly realized in the arithmetical truth, as I have illustrate more than one times with the emulation of the galaxy made by the UD, or realized through even just the diophantine relations among the numbers. It seems that you don't understand the UDA. No, you fail to understand that I can and do understand the UDA and disagree with its conclusion. Then you must show the flaw, without assuming any other theory. Indeed you talk about flaw, and then you never show it, I never show it in the language of formal symbolic modal logic. Touche, yes. There is no modal logic in UDA. I am talking about UDA here, not AUDA. But why do I need to? I am trying to appeal to your intuitions, trying to get you to understand a subtle argument that I do not know how to formally state. UDA is informal, but rigorous, which does not mean flawless. But if you think there is a flaw, you must tell where it is. If you are polite, you will not say: here is the flaw, but you will say, I don't grasp how you go from this line to that line. But ypou must show the line, and not invoke the fact that you might prefer to reason in some other theory. you just point on your different opinion, and you just provide links like if I should read them to find a flaw. No, I provide links for people to read if they wish to know more about a particular idea that I am appealing to. But that is only advertizing, and it divert you from showing the flaw. But this is not a valid way to proceed. Whatever *you* can read and which can help you to find the flaw, should help *you* to find it. This would be a good criticism if I was guilty of not understanding the UDA. So do you agree with steps 1-7. In a big primitive physical universe running the UD, the laws of physics are determined by the relative measure on computations (in arithmetic or in that UD, as they are the same). many people find that this is enough for the reversal, and that the assumption of a primitive physical universe is already refuted. Step 8 helps to make that precise. If it is genuine, I will recognize it, even without reading anything more. Not a humble statement! On the contrary, it is a humble statement. it means that I am open minded toward the idea that that someone finds a flaw. It is just a logical point of reasoning and proving that we don't need to read more to find a flaw. No amount of mathematical discovery can change the discovery that there are no non null natural numbers p and q such p^2 = 2 * (q^2). In science there is just no disagreement, except on axioms or theories. If you believe there is an error, you have to find it and make it clear to everybody. Pointing on your different conception of reality is not the same as finding a flaw in a reasoning. Do you admit to the reality of the arithmetic body problem? It is the modest result of my whole enterprise. Do you have an explanation of how multiple minds can distinguish themselves from each other and interact with each other such that they can gain new knowledge? I see no evidence of this in your papers. It is elementary computer science, and I did explain this to you more than once. Could
Re: Communicability
On 11/10/2012 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You take as a weakness of comp the fact that it reduce the mind-body problem to a body problem, but it is its main qualitative advantage, as it explains how and where the physical laws can come from, and this in a testable way, making comp scientific (Popperian). But I don't see the explanation of how and where. It seems your conclusion is only that it *must* come from numbers - because otherwise there is a flaw in you argument. It's not a constructive argument. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Hey all on the list, Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable, but not achievable, which means: congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than, say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus 100) ... No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality) COMP - NOT MAT MAT - NOT COMP NOT MAT or NOT COMP I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness close to quantum Everett. this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC, and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project. But such loop can exist consistently in solution of the GR equation. that's what Gödel showed. I don't think this was really a problem for Einstein, as he said more than once, that time is an illusion. We would say now that it is a machine mental construction, which obeys the laws of machines. In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in the computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the same reasons as time travel is impossible. But then we cannot be even quantum computer, because they can emulate by a classical machine, and they too exist in the arithmetical realm. Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia, with its quanta part that you can compare with nature, and so test comp. And up to now, it fits well with the facts. It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you think if we admit that the teleportation required in your thought experiment is simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and therefore not computational, or mechanistic) reasons. But the you need to assume non comp. The non clonability is also easy to derive from comp, as the matter which constitutes us is eventually defined by the entire, non computable dovetaling. But puuting the subst level so low that comp is false, force you to use a strong form of non comp, where matter is not just infinite, but have to be a very special infinite not recoverable in the limiting first person indeterminacy. What you do is a bit like introducing an a priori unintelligible notion of matter to just avoid the consequence of a theory. Bilogy and its extreme redundancy and metabolic exchange pleas for comp, as such redundancy and metabolisation would be miraculous if not comp emulable. In fact we don't know in nature any process not emulable by a computer, except for the consciousness selection, like in the WM duplication, or in quantum everett. You are logically right, but abandoning comp is premature, before listening to the machine (AUDA). I know that some aristotelians are ready for all means, to avoid the neoplatonist consequences, but that is normal given the 1500 years of authoritative arguments. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 14 billion years ago there was a huge explosion
Not quite. It has measured that the universe 14 billion year ago was very different from now, ie very hot and dense. All else is theory - some theories have a beginning, others don't. Cheers On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:50:38AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, Science has meaured the beginning of the universe to have occured about 14 billion years ago. So it has a beginning. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Hal Ruhl Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 12:26:47 Subject: RE: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum Hi Stepen: Interesting post. I indicated in the initiating posts that life should rapidly appear where the conditions supporting it are found. I suspect that in most cases the sphere of influence for a particular instance of a biosphere is small when compared to the size of the universe. Therefore I propose to change heat death to operative heat death re your finite resolving power for observers. This should allow for the possibility of an open universe. I am also considering changing purpose of life to function of life. Thanks Hal Dear Hal, What consequences would there be is the Universe (all that exists) is truly infinite and eternal (no absolute beginning or end) and what we observe as a finite (spatially and temporally) universe is just the result of our finite ability to compute the contents of our observations? It is helpful to remember that thermodynamic arguments, such as the heat engine concept, apply only to closed systems. It is better to assume open systems and finite resolving power (or equivalently finite computational abilities) for observers. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:55:03AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish No, rational beings have to decide which truths they need to apply to what and how to apply them. These are all relational acts, which require choice, hence intelligence. I will insist that this is incorrect. The very first line of the Wikipedia page states: In philosophy, rationality is the characteristic of any action, belief, or desire, that makes their choice a necessity.[1] Reference [1] is the Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, which is presumably a more authorative source on the use of the word than Wikipedia, but I don't have a copy. The operative word here is _necessity_: namely the choice is not free, which is what you claimed earlier: In my discussions of intelligence, I define intelligence as the ability to (fairly freely) make one's own choices. BTW - rational beings can encounter situations where they're unable to make the choice - for example because they have insufficient resources to compute the optimum of the utility, or because their utility is too ill-defined on the choices at hand. I have even seen occasions of quite intelligent people, more rational than most, though certainly not perfectly rational, being struck by a kind of paralysis when faced with a choice they cannot compute. Like when asked what restaurant they'd like to go to for dinner :). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 01:31:07PM +0100, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Vaguely interesting, until this point The reason why Lamarkism is not true is more a factual consequence of the defeat of the USSR than a direct consequence of scientific debate. It may be said that lisenko Lamarkism was disastrous because ti contributed to the defeat of the USSR. But had the USSR won the cold war, we would accept the scientific truth of lamarkism, since socialism would have been sucessful and lamarkism is the only coherent evolutionary theory compatible with marxism, and darwinism is not. It would be far more painful and long term to convince people to get rid of it . Lamarckism is just plain wrong in the biological setting. To suggest otherwise, as you do here, is utter relativistic post-modernist nonsense. That Lysenko got such a favourable hearing in the Soviet Union is a reminder just how fallible human institutions are, and a clear smell of what goes wrong in totalitarian states. As for compatibility with Marxism, Marxism is a theory of cultural evolution (to the extent is evolutionary at all). Cultural evolution is inherently Lamarckian anyway (in total contrast to biological evolution), and is considered by some as the reason why cultural evolution runs many times faster than biological evolution. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum
Hi John, I am quite aware of your views, which you descibe below, but I fail to see how it applies to the conversation Hal I were having on the impacts of continuous growth in a bounded world. On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 12:00:42PM -0500, John Mikes wrote: Hal and Russell: my agnostic thinking prevents me from speculating about the details how the world (everything) might have been *before* OUR WORLD (=this universe) arose as well as those details that might come up *after *Homo Sapiens is gone. Our experienced figments are valid only temporarily and even time may be restricted to the views while we 'observe' the world. Even the contemporaneous world-VIEW is restricted to that segment of the totality (everything) that transpired into our scientific(?) *inventory of the knowables*, our 'model' of the infinite world: into as much as we can observe of it. JohnM On Fri, Nov 9, 2012 at 7:32 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Tue, Nov 06, 2012 at 03:55:04PM -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote: Iiia) Current Economic Conditions: The news in this area has been rather bad for some time. The most frequently offered solution has been that national economies and thus the world economy must grow real GDP. In fact grow it exponentially or even super exponentially. Since the planet has only a finite supply of energy - see prior posts under #2 for energy types - a new trick has to be learned. However, the offered solution is in compliance with pAP1. Thus if pAP1 is correct then no other solution can be offered. In this case weep for the children. I hope someone can falsify pAP1. AFAIK, there is no requirement for resource consumption to be proportional to GDP. So it should be possible to save the economy without wrecking the planet. But yes, ultimately life will have to move on from H. Sapiens... Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On 11/10/2012 2:54 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:55:03AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish No, rational beings have to decide which truths they need to apply to what and how to apply them. These are all relational acts, which require choice, hence intelligence. I will insist that this is incorrect. The very first line of the Wikipedia page states: In philosophy, rationality is the characteristic of any action, belief, or desire, that makes their choice a necessity.[1] Reference [1] is the Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, which is presumably a more authorative source on the use of the word than Wikipedia, but I don't have a copy. The operative word here is _necessity_: namely the choice is not free, which is what you claimed earlier: In my discussions of intelligence, I define intelligence as the ability to (fairly freely) make one's own choices. BTW - rational beings can encounter situations where they're unable to make the choice - for example because they have insufficient resources to compute the optimum of the utility, or because their utility is too ill-defined on the choices at hand. I have even seen occasions of quite intelligent people, more rational than most, though certainly not perfectly rational, being struck by a kind of paralysis when faced with a choice they cannot compute. Like when asked what restaurant they'd like to go to for dinner :). I can relate to that. But the definition seems overly restrictive. It's well known that in competitive games the best strategy may random in some way. So I don't see how you can arbitrarily rule out random choices as 'irrational' when they are shown to be optimal by rational analysis. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: WHY FREE WILL IS A BOGUS ISSUE
On 11/6/2012 2:21 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Other concepts, like good, evil, morals etc, that could´n be reduced, were relegated to a individual irrational sphere. This is the era of the false dichotomy between is and ought. Because the most fundamental questions for practical life were denied to rational discussion, they were delegated to demagoges, revolutionaries, and various kinds of saviors of countries and planets. The results are the never ending waves of totalitarianisms within Modernity. No, modernity came with the invention of individualism, the existence of a private sphere of belief and endeavor that was secure from the ecclesiastical authorities who tried to define good, evil, morals etc as extending to every nook and cranny not only of private life, but even of thought and consciousness. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
It is not relativist post modernist, it is just the opposite it is the discovery of an absolute universal truth starting from nothing, or if you like, from the most absolute relativism.. 2012/11/11 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com If All the rest is vaguely interesting for you, then it is no surprise that you don´t understand my reasonning behind this anecdotic case 2012/11/11 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 01:31:07PM +0100, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Vaguely interesting, until this point The reason why Lamarkism is not true is more a factual consequence of the defeat of the USSR than a direct consequence of scientific debate. It may be said that lisenko Lamarkism was disastrous because ti contributed to the defeat of the USSR. But had the USSR won the cold war, we would accept the scientific truth of lamarkism, since socialism would have been sucessful and lamarkism is the only coherent evolutionary theory compatible with marxism, and darwinism is not. It would be far more painful and long term to convince people to get rid of it . Lamarckism is just plain wrong in the biological setting. To suggest otherwise, as you do here, is utter relativistic post-modernist nonsense. That Lysenko got such a favourable hearing in the Soviet Union is a reminder just how fallible human institutions are, and a clear smell of what goes wrong in totalitarian states. As for compatibility with Marxism, Marxism is a theory of cultural evolution (to the extent is evolutionary at all). Cultural evolution is inherently Lamarckian anyway (in total contrast to biological evolution), and is considered by some as the reason why cultural evolution runs many times faster than biological evolution. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 03:27:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: But the definition [of rationality] seems overly restrictive. It's well known that in competitive games the best strategy may random in some way. So I don't see how you can arbitrarily rule out random choices as 'irrational' when they are shown to be optimal by rational analysis. Brent Its not me doing the ruling out. Its the way the term is used in philosophy and economics. There are plenty of examples (such as the ones your refer to) where making random choices is optimal (according to a given utility). But here you have to go to meta-level to say its the choice to play randomly that is rational, not the choices themselves being rational. One can see there are situations where it is rational to be irrational. I sent you a reference to a paper of mine describing just such a sitation in the classic theory of the firm (``Emergent Effective Collusion in an Economy of Perfectly Rational Competitors''). A classic example where it is rational to be irrational is in chess where sometimes one might sacifice a queen in order to gain a competitive advantage. But if it is rational to be irrational, is it possible to be rational any more? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
Sorry instead of depart from common sense. I should say that uses common sense... This is a third try, since many things are written horrendously and unintelligible. Evolutionary logic: I always emphasize that there is a evolutionary logic, which unlike any other logic, is tautological, that is, it assumes no axioms beyond natural selection (which is tautological per se) My purpose is to define here this logic as clearly as I can. Because it is tautological, evolutionary logic a good foundation for an absolute notion of both truth (including existence) and morals, because the false dichotomy is-ought is unified under this logic. This logic is convergent with the classical philosophical-religious logic that uses common sense, introspection, inspiration and intuition, but also with science in the modern sense. Besides being materialistic, it debunk the Humean nominalist-positivist reductionism and, as I said, brings back the classical philosophical notions. Actually, all the modal logics are consequences of this evolutionary logic. The directions of the arrows of the modal logics have a clear evolutionary background. for example G x - x, Ox -x, [] x - x, Bx - x. I hope that you will understand the evolutionary reasons behind these implications with what I would say. What is this evolutionary logic? Under evolutionary logic, truth, existence and goodness becomes different aspects of the same essence, which have different names when seen from the point of view of logic, epistemology or morals. But from the point of view of evolution, Logic and morals are reduced to the notion of existence. Because this login has no axioms, it start from nothing, therefore it can be accused of nihilistic, relativistic, non scientific, because it does not accept scientific methods, morals or beliefs. It does not even accept mathematical truths as axioms!. But it embraces absolute universal and defined notions of truth, existence and morals. The truth of the evolutionary logic is by definition equal to the-continuation-of-the-mind-in-the-world. The non sequitur, the definition of false, is the non-continuation-of-the mind-in-the-world. That means that everything that contributes to the continuation of the mind is true, exist and is good. Everything that does not contribute does not exist, is false and is evil. Something exist is good and is true because it has been necessary for the existence of the human mind. That notion apply both to the fine structure constant as well as the love of a mother for his children. Both are necessary for the existence of humans, and therefore are observable, are true and are good. If a notion in the mind contributes to his death, this notion is, non existent (because no one take it that way). It is false (non-sequitur). And it is not good (contributes to the death of the holder and his society). That 1+1=3 is false is a shortcut for the expression: There is no mind that tough seriously that 1+1=3 and acted upon it. Or, if it ever existed, it dissapeared time ago This reduces truth to existence That something is good means that the individual or society that accept this something and act upon it, will have success and will survive. This reduces morals to existence. It makes Ought a part of the is. EL is a fuzzy logic which assign various degrees of truth, existence and goodness depending on the degree, immediacy and clarity with which something contributes to the persistence of the mind. There are immediate, evident, and universally consensuated concepts that are true, exist and are good: For example, it is true that persons are males and females, no doubt there are persons, it is good to preserve persons lives These sentences are respectively true, exist and are morally good because the knowledge included in these statements contribute immediately and universally to the persistence of the human minds in society. And because these facts are so important for survival we have it hardwired in the brain, so we are unable to doubt about it in the same way that we can not jump from the window of a fifth floor. In the other extreme, there are more subtle facts that do not contribute to an immediate and universal persistence of the minds, but perhaps in the long term, and in some circumstances. Or maybe there is no universal consensus: The existence of the electron, the existence of God, drug prohibition, the platonic realm etc. The accumulation of knowledge of these truths happens by many mechanisms at different levels, Some mechanisms may generate knowledge that contradict apparently the generated by other mechanisms: One of them is biological darwinism, that develop specific circuirtry to recognize humans, recognize human faces, handle social reasoning. These process evolves brain hardware that instantiates the above statements about persons (by the way, besides that, it has been demonstrated that , due to social evolutionary pressure, we have special circuitry
Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
Brent, This is obviously so. and it is not arguable against. It is an observable fact. is obviously true that if you live in a society where everyone take something as true , no matter what, then it is true for one of its members, you, for example. 2012/11/11 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net On 11/10/2012 3:38 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It is not relativist post modernist, it is just the opposite That Lamarckism would be true if society held it to be true? If that's not relativist post modernism, I don't know what is. Brent it is the discovery of an absolute universal truth starting from nothing, or if you like, from the most absolute relativism.. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ **googlegroups.com everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On 11/10/2012 3:56 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 03:27:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: But the definition [of rationality] seems overly restrictive. It's well known that in competitive games the best strategy may random in some way. So I don't see how you can arbitrarily rule out random choices as 'irrational' when they are shown to be optimal by rational analysis. Brent Its not me doing the ruling out. Its the way the term is used in philosophy and economics. There are plenty of examples (such as the ones your refer to) where making random choices is optimal (according to a given utility). But here you have to go to meta-level to say its the choice to play randomly that is rational, not the choices themselves being rational. One can see there are situations where it is rational to be irrational. I sent you a reference to a paper of mine describing just such a sitation in the classic theory of the firm (``Emergent Effective Collusion in an Economy of Perfectly Rational Competitors''). A classic example where it is rational to be irrational is in chess where sometimes one might sacifice a queen in order to gain a competitive advantage. But if it is rational to be irrational, is it possible to be rational any more? No, but you're making a conundrum out of it. The point is that it's rational to be non-deterministic. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Evolutionary logic Re: Some musings on is/ought and modal logic
On 11/10/2012 4:29 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Brent, This is obviously so. and it is not arguable against. It is an observable fact. It is an observable fact that most of a society may believe falsehoods. So it is NOT an observable fact that most of a society believing something makes it true. is obviously true that if you live in a society where everyone take something as true , no matter what, then it is true for one of its members, you, for example. That's relativist post modernism. And it is not 'obviously true' it is only 'true' per relativist post modernist philosophy (which thankfully is on the wane). To write 'true for you' is to already to make 'true' meaningless. Whatever Cardinal Bellarmine thought or what his society thought, it was still the case that the Earth orbited the Sun. Brent To assert that the earth revolves around the sun is as erroneous as to claim that Jesus was not born of a virgin. --- Cardinal Bellarmine, 1615, letter to Paolo Frascioni -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality) COMP - NOT MAT MAT - NOT COMP NOT MAT or NOT COMP I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness close to quantum Everett. But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's why I brought up the location of consciousness. Empirically consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and not reason to be associated with a particular body. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 04:37:55PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 11/10/2012 3:56 PM, Russell Standish wrote: But if it is rational to be irrational, is it possible to be rational any more? No, but you're making a conundrum out of it. The point is that it's rational to be non-deterministic. Only for some extended, loose definition of rational. The non-deterministic choices themselves are not rationally determined. I have never come across the term rational agent applying to a stochastic one in the literature. By contrast, I see definitions such as the one I quoted from Wikipedia's article indicating that rational agents are strictly deterministic. Do you have any contrasting references? BTW - thank you for your response to Albert. Very aptly put! Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality) COMP - NOT MAT MAT - NOT COMP NOT MAT or NOT COMP I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness close to quantum Everett. But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's why I brought up the location of consciousness. Empirically consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and not reason to be associated with a particular body. I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain) is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an anti-solipsism requirement. Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness, leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is required for consciousness. I know that I disagree with Bruno on this matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more restricted. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum
I have tried to post this several times. It appears I am again having issues with my email software. I am sorry if it eventually posts multiple times. Hi John and Russell: As far as I know all the “Laws of Physics” are based on observation and are absent closed form proof. Given the data I have seen, resource consumption and real GDP follow similar size trajectories. Twenty or more years ago I played with ideas on how they [using quality of life experience for which real GDP would be a reasonable proxy] might be decoupled to the benefit of species survival . This included consideration of what I now call pAP1. Recently I had reason to resurrect these old unpublished writings. Review of these writings, conversations with associates and the vantage point of 20 more years of observation have caused me to believe that pAP1 has a global and unbreakable hold on human behavior. I believe even outliers such as survivalists if subjected to accurate energy flow analysis would be shown to be fully in its grasp. The consequences of this would be rather unpleasant as I indicated and Russell appears to support. Thus my recent posts looking for a falsification of pAP1. [I am currently rewriting the early post to improve clarity.] John: I think my response to Stephen re his “finite resolution…” responds to your post also. Hal AFAIK, there is no requirement for resource consumption to be proportional to GDP. So it should be possible to save the economy without wrecking the planet. But yes, ultimately life will have to move on from H. Sapiens... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On 11/10/2012 5:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 04:37:55PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 11/10/2012 3:56 PM, Russell Standish wrote: But if it is rational to be irrational, is it possible to be rational any more? No, but you're making a conundrum out of it. The point is that it's rational to be non-deterministic. Only for some extended, loose definition of rational. The non-deterministic choices themselves are not rationally determined. Of course not by your definition of rational for in that case they would be deterministic and potentially predictable and hence worthless in the game. But the definitions I find in Dictionary of Philosophy by Angeles: 1. Containing or possessing reason or characterized by reason. 2. Capable of functioning rationally. 3. Capable of being understood. 4. In comformity with reason. Intelligble. 5. Adhering to qualities of thought such as consistency, coherence, simplicity, abstractness, completeness, order, logical structure. or online: *1. * Having or exercising the ability to reason. *2. * Of sound mind; sane. *3. * Consistent with or based on reason; logical: rational behavior. See Synonyms at logical http://www.thefreedictionary.com/logical. /a/ *:* having reason or understanding /b/ *:* relating to, based on, or agreeable to reason *: *Or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/ 'Bayesian epistemology' became an epistemological movement in the 20^th century, though its two main features can be traced back to the eponymous Reverend Thomas Bayes (c. 1701-61). Those two features are: (1) the introduction of a /formal apparatus/ for inductive logic; (2) the introduction of a /pragmatic self-defeat test/ (as illustrated by Dutch Book Arguments) for /epistemic/ /*rationality*/ as a way of extending the justification of the laws of deductive logic to include a justification for the laws of inductive logic There are 915 entries turned up by searching the SEP for rational I looked a about a dozen and found nothing that would require rational to be deterministic. I have never come across the term rational agent applying to a stochastic one in the literature. By contrast, I see definitions such as the one I quoted from Wikipedia's article indicating that rational agents are strictly deterministic. In looking at my dictionaries of philosophy I find nothing saying that rational implies deterministic. And it's common knowledge that stochastic decisions can be optimal in games - so I don't see how you can call them anything but rational. The same Wikipedia article you cited goes on to say,A *rational* decision is one that is not just reasoned, but is also optimal for achieving a goal or solving a problem. The Cambridge Philosophical Dictionary cited in the Wikepedia entry on Rationality doesn't actually have an entry defining rationality (although the word rational appears about a 100 times). It has one on rationalism which is contrasted with empiricism. The definition of rationality on page 772 is part of a discussion of rationalism, moral. Brent Do you have any contrasting references? BTW - thank you for your response to Albert. Very aptly put! Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain) is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an anti-solipsism requirement. But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP? Is it just an anthropic selection argument? Brent I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something like: 1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness 2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like Einstein's principle As simple as possible, and no simpler. 3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation, that evolution is the only creative (or information generating) process. 4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically, you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and consequently intersubjectivity. Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint. 1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1) being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical though!). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain) is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an anti-solipsism requirement. But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP? Is it just an anthropic selection argument? Brent I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something like: 1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness 2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like Einstein's principle As simple as possible, and no simpler. But this is the step I questioned. Why not be like the Borg, i.e. one consciousness with many bodies? I think we only 'expect' to find ourselves as we are because we don't have good theory about how we might be otherwise. COMP proposes to explain how we are by the UDA, but it needs to explain why we are associated with bodies - not just assume it to avoid solipism. Brent 3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation, that evolution is the only creative (or information generating) process. 4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically, you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and consequently intersubjectivity. Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint. 1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1) being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical though!). Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 08:43:29PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something like: 1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness 2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like Einstein's principle As simple as possible, and no simpler. But this is the step I questioned. Why not be like the Borg, i.e. one consciousness with many bodies? I think we only 'expect' to Quite possibly because Borgs have lower measure for the anthropic selection to work on than single body minds, particularly with mortal bodies, as I would assume a Borg mind is effectively immortal. I have always felt that one resolution of the Doomsday Argument is that humanity mind melds (or uploads, Singularity-style) so that effectively no new minds get born. I haven't quite figured out what happens if we invert the relationship - many minds to a body. Why don't we all exhibit multiple personality disorder? It probably has to do with the embodiment of the mind, but still I don't know how this connects to the Anthropic Principle. find ourselves as we are because we don't have good theory about how we might be otherwise. COMP proposes to explain how we are by the UDA, but it needs to explain why we are associated with bodies - not just assume it to avoid solipism. Absolutely agree. In fact COMP exacerbates the situation, in that it is a form of idealism, making the Anthropic Principle mysterious rather than ordinary. Whilst this is definitely a strike in favour of materialism, there are so many other disadvantages of materialism that it is worth trying to nut out how COMP can support the Anthropic Principle. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 06:44:36PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 11/10/2012 5:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Only for some extended, loose definition of rational. The non-deterministic choices themselves are not rationally determined. Of course not by your definition of rational for in that case they would be deterministic and potentially predictable and hence worthless in the game. But the definitions I find in Dictionary of Philosophy by Angeles: 1. Containing or possessing reason or characterized by reason. 2. Capable of functioning rationally. 3. Capable of being understood. 4. In comformity with reason. Intelligble. 5. Adhering to qualities of thought such as consistency, coherence, simplicity, abstractness, completeness, order, logical structure. or online: *1. * Having or exercising the ability to reason. *2. * Of sound mind; sane. *3. * Consistent with or based on reason; logical: rational behavior. See Synonyms at logical http://www.thefreedictionary.com/logical. /a/ *:* having reason or understanding /b/ *:* relating to, based on, or agreeable to reason *: I'm sure you would agree that none of those definitions are technical in nature - they are more like what you'd find in a regular English dictionary - so are of little help. *Or the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-bayesian/ 'Bayesian epistemology' became an epistemological movement in the 20^th century, though its two main features can be traced back to the eponymous Reverend Thomas Bayes (c. 1701-61). Those two features are: (1) the introduction of a /formal apparatus/ for inductive logic; (2) the introduction of a /pragmatic self-defeat test/ (as illustrated by Dutch Book Arguments) for /epistemic/ /*rationality*/ as a way of extending the justification of the laws of deductive logic to include a justification for the laws of inductive logic I agree, a rational agent should never choose an action that can be exploited by a Dutch book. I would say this supports my claim that the rational agent doesn't have a free choice in the matter. There are 915 entries turned up by searching the SEP for rational I looked a about a dozen and found nothing that would require rational to be deterministic. I have never come across the term rational agent applying to a stochastic one in the literature. By contrast, I see definitions such as the one I quoted from Wikipedia's article indicating that rational agents are strictly deterministic. In looking at my dictionaries of philosophy I find nothing saying that rational implies deterministic. And it's common knowledge that stochastic decisions can be optimal in games - so I don't see how you can call them anything but rational. The same Wikipedia article you cited goes on to say,A *rational* decision is one that is not just reasoned, but is also optimal for achieving a goal or solving a problem. Correct. A stochastic decision is obviously not reasoned, so the decision itself cannot be rational. The question is whether an agent using a stochastic strategy can be said to be behaving rationally. I do see your point that the choice of strategy is rational, but then in that case the strategy choice is deterministic. What is hard to get a grips on is how the term is used in the literature, particularly vis-a-vis iterated games, where stochatsic strategies can have better payoff. The following thread is interesting, as it would appear the situation is rather more murky than the black-and-white positions we've been arguing. http://www.urch.com/forums/phd-economics/126310-economic-definition-rationality-irrationality.html But for instance the example of me buying an apple instead of an orange one day, then buying an orange instead of an apple the next is usually explained in terms of time dependent utility, rather than me as behaving irrationally! The Cambridge Philosophical Dictionary cited in the Wikepedia entry on Rationality doesn't actually have an entry defining rationality (although the word rational appears about a 100 times). It has one on rationalism which is contrasted with empiricism. The definition of rationality on page 772 is part of a discussion of rationalism, moral. Not much help then. Thanks for looking it up! -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For
Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?
On 11/10/2012 9:53 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Correct. A stochastic decision is obviously not reasoned, so the decision itself cannot be rational. But that wasn't the original assertion. You said that a rational person could, necessarily, on chose one action. So if the rational decision is to flip a coin and do X if it's heads and Y if it's tails, then the action chosen is not deterministic. The question is whether an agent using a stochastic strategy can be said to be behaving rationally. I do see your point that the choice of strategy is rational, but then in that case the strategy choice is deterministic. But the original question was about actions - not beliefs or strategies. Brent What is hard to get a grips on is how the term is used in the literature, particularly vis-a-vis iterated games, where stochatsic strategies can have better payoff. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
