Re: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by cognitive science
On 07 Dec 2012, at 01:21, Russell Standish wrote: Re the thread title: it appears the introspection is quite a difficult task, contrary to how it seems. But people are working on the problem. See Brian Scassellati's web page: http://cs-www.cs.yale.edu/homes/scaz/Research.html particularly the section: Self-other discrimination Sound (arithmetically sound) machine's introspection gives right to the 8 hypostases. It comes from the fact that the Löbian machine can prove its own Löb's theorem. Machines become aware of their incompleteness when they introspect themselves, in some 3p manner (with an implicit bet on comp), but the first person associated to it feels immune, and this generates already a sort of conflict between the 3p and 1p linked to the machine. Eventually the machine get the physical laws, by pure introspection or self-reference. Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body are completely different substances, In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as subtance is often considered as primary) no matter what your philosophy or science, and cannot interact. They are logically interacting though. Bruno The failure to solve the hard problem shows that. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science Hi Stephen, This is the case with modern cognitive science: � 1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain) solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating both substances as material. A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus negating dualism. Dear Telmo, 牋� There is no problem of interaction if mind and body are isomorphs of each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of themselves. Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time. � I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. 牋� Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/ explanations for it. I agree but to me first person and consciousness are exactly the same thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered... � -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads
On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:18, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God. 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances. But natural numbers are different because even though they are only mental substances, they're still substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided. So they are of one part each. Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that. That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p. Well, not all numbers, only those with enough cognitive ability with respect to some universal numbers. Bruno WHOOPEE ! [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46 Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive theory has done. On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the numbers see themselves. But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp p definition. It is a bit technical. Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter. We can replace [1p] by its actions - those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object). You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective. That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level. That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations. Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work when living breathing humans are concerned. I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of comp. You have computer science. IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent computer calculations from emulating the mind. The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the comp hope, or the comp fear. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12 Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote: On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p-truth is not codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation). Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp p is NOT codable. Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable. Many things true about us is not codable either. Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p, i.e. that p describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of a machine. No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2. That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is implicit in its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is no part of the state corresponding to I *believe* I am south of my landing point. Then Mars Rover is not L鯾ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover is Turing universal, or that it exploits its Turing universality. But PA and ZF can represent I believe. So we can study the logic of a new 'knowledge operator defined (at the meta level, for each arithmetical proposition) by Bp p. For example if p is 1+1=2,
Re: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads
On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:33, Roger Clough wrote: Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, whatever they be. Natural numbers = the non negatiove integers: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... Bruno - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36 Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads Hi Bruno Marchal 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God. 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances. But natural numbers are different because even though they are only mental substances, they're still substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided. So they are of one part each. Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that. That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p. WHOOPEE ! [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46 Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive theory has done. On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the numbers see themselves. But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp p definition. It is a bit technical. Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter. We can replace [1p] by its actions - those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object). You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective. That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level. That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations. Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work when living breathing humans are concerned. I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of comp. You have computer science. IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent computer calculations from emulating the mind. The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the comp hope, or the comp fear. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12 Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote: On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p- truth is not codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation). Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp p is NOT codable. Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable. Many things true about us is not codable either. Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p, i.e. that p describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of a machine. No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2. That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is implicit in its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is no part of the state corresponding to I *believe* I am south of my landing point. Then Mars Rover is not L?ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover is
Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can be monads. Cool.
On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:57, Roger Clough wrote: Here's an additional observation-- Only the prime numbers can be monads, because all other integers can not be subdivided and still remain integers. Hmm... numbers are monad when seen as index of a partial computable function. the monad are the program, which you can see as a number relative to a universal number. Keep in mind I use comp (renamed CTM for Computationalist theory of Mind). Bruno Cool. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-07, 08:33:37 Subject: Fw: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, whatever they be. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36 Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads Hi Bruno Marchal 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God. 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances. But natural numbers are different because even though they are only mental substances, they're still substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided. So they are of one part each. Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that. That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p. WHOOPEE ! [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46 Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive theory has done. On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the numbers see themselves. But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp p definition. It is a bit technical. Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter. We can replace [1p] by its actions - those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object). You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective. That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level. That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations. Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work when living breathing humans are concerned. I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of comp. You have computer science. IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent computer calculations from emulating the mind. The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the comp hope, or the comp fear. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12 Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote: On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p- truth is not codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation). Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp p is NOT codable. Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable. Many things true about us is not codable either. Let me see if I understand
Re: Against Mechanism
On 07 Dec 2012, at 18:33, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Doing the experience yourself Which one is yourself after duplication? One of them with P = 1/2. That neatly sums up the entire problem, Indeed. the insistence that there is only one correct answer to the question what city will you see? even though you have been duplicated; Because with the CTM, you can't feel the split. You remain one and unique from any or your first person b-view after the duplication, as both copies can confirmed. and the probability figure is worse than useless. Not really, but you have to proceed in the reasoning to see this. AFTER a good experiment has been performed nothing has a probability of 1/2, everything has a probability of 1 or 0. But evaluation of future result of an experiment is done before. After the experiment both will claim to be yourself Rightly so by CTM. and a third party would agree with both of them because a third party could not find any reason to accept one claim and reject the other. OK, but we were specifically NOT asking for the 3-view after duplication, but for the 1-views. And both confirmed a specific city, and no ability to have been able to predict which one. And I have NOT forgotten that each will see one city and one city only, and I have not forgotten that Bruno Marchal's question which one will see Moscow? is a silly question. The question is not which one will see Moscow. that's a silly question indeed. the question is asked before, to the H-man, and the question is how do you evaluate the chance of living the Moscow (or Washington) experience. Seeing Moscow is the one and only thing that turns the Helsinki man into the man who sees Moscow, so the man who sees Moscow will be the Moscow man and the Moscow man will be the man that sees Moscow. That is not deep, tautologies seldom are, but you've built your philosophy on top of it. Trivially, but again you elude the question asked. I can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the 1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you? Yes, with identical in the sense that I am identical with me in the morning. In other words in no sense whatsoever, you are different from what you were this morning in the 3p view and thus obviously in the 1-p view. This contradicts the fact that you ahev agreed that both the M-man and the W-man can identify themselves with the H-man, but not with their respective doppelganger after the duplication. You remember being Bruno Marchal this morning even though you're different, I am different, I feel different, but I am the same person. and Moscow is different from what it was this morning too but it's convenient to use the same word for both. People change over time and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing person will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will change even more suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used. But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and use it correctly in future iterated experiences. You forget that a unique person can be in many different states. And I hope I never remember it because that is nonsense, if there are different versions of something then it's not unique. Then you die at each instant, and CTM becomes meaningless. There is no more sense at all for the word survive. Even for a heart operation. he is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his (unique) diary, open the door, and write I see both W and M. He is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his (unique) diary, open the door, and write I see W or M. I meant he will push on the button. I ill probably write only W, or only M. This makes the W or M prediction correct, by definition of or. But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which city each of them is seeing right now Each of them? In Helsinki there is no each of them for the Helsinki man to pick out, there is only one person. A person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment. I don't understand what you're trying to say because that is not a complete sentence. What about a person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment? It is the H-man, before the experience. He know s with certainty (by CTM, right level, etc.) that he will survive one and entiore in a unique city. Both can confirmed that after. None can confirm W and M. The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the Moscow man That does not help. It does not help what? I admit it doesn't help picking the man who will see Moscow Again, the question is not in picking the
Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas
On 08 Dec 2012, at 00:23, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/7/2012 1:57 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Dec 2012, at 01:51, Stephen P. King wrote: On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stephen P. King God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's metaphysics. Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. A diagonal one. The Boolean algebra with a Löbian transformation. A Magari Algebra. With the CTM. Bruno Dear Bruno, The Magari Algebras ( http://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Magari_algebra) are beautiful and capture the duality relation to Stone Compacta very elegantly! But do they retain the property that a CABA has, as discussed by Pratt, that they are fragile' in the sense that if any of their propositions are changed they collapse into a singleton - so that they can be rebuilt with different propositions? If not this would seem to make them immune to forcing, which becomes an obstruction to my proposal. I need to have a way to use Martin's axiom (and maybe its extension, the proper forcing axiom) to define relative differences between the logical algebras. Write some more longer and precise text if you want me to comment on this. I am looking for something like a 'calculus of distinctioning' for the logical algebras which seems to be necessary for them to represent 'minds'. The motivation for this is that there has to be something meaningful to the idea: I changed my mind. A mind that is fixed cannot know novelty or evolve. Sure. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by cognitive science
Hi Russell Standish He's talking about psychological introspection using everyday language and concepts. Philosophical introspection a la Kant for example, is more formal and precise and uses formal categories. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 19:21:39 Subject: Re: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by cognitive science Re the thread title: it appears the introspection is quite a difficult task, contrary to how it seems. But people are working on the problem. See Brian Scassellati's web page: http://cs-www.cs.yale.edu/homes/scaz/Research.html particularly the section: Self-other discrimination Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Why a supreme monad is necessary
Hi Stephen P. King The supreme monad is as necessary as the CPU of a computer, for Leibniz's world is a system, and systems need a control unit. BTW, the materialist mind/brain has no such governor. I could go on and on, for every part of Leibniz's metaphysics is necessary. and follows logically from his concept of a monad. Here's just a two of many reasons for there being a supreme monad: 1) A supreme monad is needed, for one thing, because monads have no windows to see out of. Their perceptions are supplied by a third party, the supreme monad. 2) Another reason is that monads are ideas, and so are not physical and cannot physically interact with other monads. Also, mind and brain cannot physically interact. The Supreme monad is the third party for such situations who can direct the ingteractions theoretically (not physically). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:57:17 Subject: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God On 12/6/2012 7:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I slipped up, sorry. I usually avoid using the word God since that upsets many people. Instead, you can think of L's universe as a complete system with one control, the Supreme Monad (the One). It only needs one master controller, but that is necessary and more than that wouldn't work. Dear Roger, The way I see the idea, there is no need for a single central control or special monad. God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. I see the language that L used about a one God was merely a way to remain in the good graces of the Church. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Humeian and Leibnizian causation
Hi Stephen P. King I agree. Leibniz's causation is similar in action to Hume's and is really just synchronization via the Supreme Monad, which is the sufficient reason missing from Hume. Hume merely attributes causation to our conventional way of thinking. That doesn't explain anything. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 13:04:53 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/6/2012 7:59 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King L's universe is a case of downward causation from the top (the One). So the top (the One) is absolutely necessary. You must be thinking of materialism, which causes upward from the bottom and is Godless and mindless, at least strictly speaking. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Dear Roger, I disagree. The Humean idea of causation does not apply to Monads. Monads do not 'cause' changes in each other at all. Their perceptions just happen to be synchronous (and thus the possibility of bisimulation between them obtains and the appearance of exchange of information). -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe
Hi Stephen P. King You're right, I short-changed Bruno. He is actually an Idealist like me. And my apologies for calling you a an atheist/materialist. I seem to have been having a bad day. You and I seem to differ principally, if I understand you corrrectly, in that you believe in local dermination/causation while I believe that such causation is (and has to be, because ideas aren't causal) only apparent. To go back to my orchestra analogy, you believe that everything is fine as long as each correctly plays his score, while I believe that an overall conductor (the supreme monad) is needed for maintaining coordination and for composing the score in the first place. Your local governor appears to be a set of relations. L's would also neccesarily include a higher-order governor (the Conductor) to insure that a pre-established harmony exists between sets, as well as insuring that each set ansd its laws are carried out properly. Are synchhronized. In short, you seem to have no means of overall synchronizing the actions of sets. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 14:02:33 Subject: Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe On 12/6/2012 9:00 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. Dear Roger, It is not atheist/materialist at all, my way. It is anti-special, in the sense that the potential of the One must be immanent in all of the Omniverse, not to be confined to special occasions/locations. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. Your thoughts are easily seen to be a mental space when one understand that a 'space' is just a set plus some structure of relations. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenal world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. yes, but Monads offer a very different ontological vision. It is not the atoms in a void vision at all, and yet allows for the appearance of 'atoms in a void' as a mode of perception. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). Actually, Bruno's view is Idealist! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
Hi Stephen P. King Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent collisions, keep oil and water separate. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-07, 07:53:54 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science On 12/7/2012 7:04 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, ? I think that's just more?aterialist wishful thinking, because mind and body are completely different substances, no matter what your philosophy or science,?nd cannot interact. The failure to solve the hard problem shows that. ? ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Dear Roger, ?? There are no substances, there are only processes. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all..
Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. Stephen doesn't see such a need. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:32:51 Subject: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Roger. How can L's monads be blind if they all have perception as clearly expressed in L's Monadology? Richard On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: WHOOPS! My equivalence or as if princple accepting materialism/atheism is wrong for the following reason. The Supreme monad (God) is absolutely needed, because without a supreme monad, the monads are blind and don't work properly. The Supreme Monad has a necessary, irreplaceable function, that of reflecting the perceptions of all of the other monads in the universe back to a given monad that guides his changes. So I have to take back my acceptance of materialism/atheism. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: Roger Clough Time: 2012-12-06, 09:12:38 Subject: Puppets and strings Perhaps a simple analogy might make my thinking plainer. L sees the world and its beings as acting like puppets with strings. Atheism/materialism sees the world as if there are no strings. A similar analogy applies to religion. It all depends on how you look at the world. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 09:00:01 Subject: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's metaphysics. Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email
Synchronizing the subprograms
Stephen, Perhaps my response to Richard, immediately below, would explain better to you why I believe a supreme monad (a CPU) is needed. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 07:24:56 Subject: Re: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. Stephen doesn't see such a need. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:32:51 Subject: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Roger. How can L's monads be blind if they all have perception as clearly expressed in L's Monadology? Richard On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: WHOOPS! My equivalence or as if princple accepting materialism/atheism is wrong for the following reason. The Supreme monad (God) is absolutely needed, because without a supreme monad, the monads are blind and don't work properly. The Supreme Monad has a necessary, irreplaceable function, that of reflecting the perceptions of all of the other monads in the universe back to a given monad that guides his changes. So I have to take back my acceptance of materialism/atheism. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: Roger Clough Time: 2012-12-06, 09:12:38 Subject: Puppets and strings Perhaps a simple analogy might make my thinking plainer. L sees the world and its beings as acting like puppets with strings. Atheism/materialism sees the world as if there are no strings. A similar analogy applies to religion. It all depends on how you look at the world. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 09:00:01 Subject: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's metaphysics. Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God
Hi Richard Ruquist You say, God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. God is the agent that carries out this expression, for only He knows what they all are. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:59:57 Subject: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 12/6/2012 7:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I slipped up, sorry. I usually avoid using the word God since that upsets many people. Instead, you can think of L's universe as a complete system with one control, the Supreme Monad (the One). It only needs one master controller, but that is necessary and more than that wouldn't work. Dear Roger, The way I see the idea, there is no need for a single central control or special monad. God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. I see the language that L used about a one God was merely a way to remain in the good graces of the Church. Hear, Hear [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God
Roger, In order to get a cosmic consciousness, an arithmetic of monads is required. No one monad has consciousness as L has said. Therefore isince God is one monad, it cannot be conscious and IMO therefore cannot be god. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist You say, God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. God is the agent that carries out this expression, for only He knows what they all are. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:59:57 Subject: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 12/6/2012 7:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I slipped up, sorry. I usually avoid using the word God since that upsets many people. Instead, you can think of L's universe as a complete system with one control, the Supreme Monad (the One). It only needs one master controller, but that is necessary and more than that wouldn't work. Dear Roger, The way I see the idea, there is no need for a single central control or special monad. God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. I see the language that L used about a one God was merely a way to remain in the good graces of the Church. Hear, Hear [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Synchronizing the subprograms
Roger, That sounds to me as though it is something you made up. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 7:28 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Stephen, Perhaps my response to Richard, immediately below, would explain better to you why I believe a supreme monad (a CPU) is needed. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 07:24:56 Subject: Re: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. Stephen doesn't see such a need. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:32:51 Subject: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Roger. How can L's monads be blind if they all have perception as clearly expressed in L's Monadology? Richard On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: WHOOPS! My equivalence or as if princple accepting materialism/atheism is wrong for the following reason. The Supreme monad (God) is absolutely needed, because without a supreme monad, the monads are blind and don't work properly. The Supreme Monad has a necessary, irreplaceable function, that of reflecting the perceptions of all of the other monads in the universe back to a given monad that guides his changes. So I have to take back my acceptance of materialism/atheism. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: Roger Clough Time: 2012-12-06, 09:12:38 Subject: Puppets and strings Perhaps a simple analogy might make my thinking plainer. L sees the world and its beings as acting like puppets with strings. Atheism/materialism sees the world as if there are no strings. A similar analogy applies to religion. It all depends on how you look at the world. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 09:00:01 Subject: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's metaphysics. Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: One cannot have 1p if there is no observer.
Hi Stephen P. King For what it's worth, I think Richard referred to Indra's Beads in connection with this problem. Every monad has its own myriad set of perceptions of the other monads, but these are indirect (are constantly updated by the Supreme Monad). Tre Supreme Monad is needed to keep all of these perceptions correct, each from their own viewpoint. Each monad is different. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-03, 17:13:57 Subject: Re: One cannot have 1p if there is no observer. On 12/3/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: RC, So the entire universe can be in 1p at all times. RR Dear Richard, How would one prove that all observations that that 1p has are mutually consistent? Unless you assume that the speed of light is infinite, and thus there exists a unique simultaneity (or absolute and uniform variation of the rate of sequencing of events) for all observed events, mutual consistency is impossible. This implies that there cannot exist a singular 1p for the entire universe. It is for this reason that I reject the 'realist' approach to ontology and epistemology and am trying to develop an alternative. Think about how it is that a Boolean Algebra, which is known to be the faithful logical structure representing a 'classical' universe' (not 'the universe'!), is found to be Satisfiable. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problem In computer science, satisfiability (often written in all capitals or abbreviated SAT) is the problem of determining if the variables of a given Boolean formula can be assigned in such a way as to make the formula evaluate to TRUE. Equally important is to determine whether no such assignments exist, which would imply that the function expressed by the formula is identically FALSE for all possible variable assignments. In this latter case, we would say that the function is unsatisfiable; otherwise it is satisfiable. For example, the formula a AND b is satisfiable because one can find the values a = TRUE and b = TRUE, which make (a AND b) = TRUE. To emphasize the binary nature of this problem, it is frequently referred to as Boolean or propositional satisfiability. SAT was the first known example of an NP-complete problem. That briefly means that there is no known algorithm that efficiently solves all instances of SAT, and it is generally believed (but not proven, see P versus NP problem) that no such algorithm can exist. Further, a wide range of other naturally occurring decision and optimization problems can be transformed into instances of SAT. It seems to me that the content of any 1p that is real must be at least a solution to a SAT problem. On Mon, Dec 3, 2012 at 7:49 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Yes, God is the supreme observer. See Leibniz. The supreme monad sees all clearly. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
Bruno Marchal said They are logically interacting though. Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads. Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical. So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's Hard Problem) is the only possibly correct one. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body are completely different substances, In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as subtance is often considered as primary) no matter what your philosophy or science, and cannot interact. They are logically interacting though. Bruno The failure to solve the hard problem shows that. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science Hi Stephen, This is the case with modern cognitive science: 1)?It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain) solution to the mind/brain problem in favor?f treating both substances as material. A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus negating dualism. Dear Telmo, ? There is no problem of interaction if mind and body are isomorphs of each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of themselves. Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time. I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. ? Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it. I agree but to me first person and consciousness are exactly the same thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: One cannot have 1p if there is no observer.
Stephan, I do assume simultaneity within the monads for the very reasons you specify plus a few more like it makes Cramer's Transactional Analysis instantaneous and Feymann's QED as well. Quantum Electrodynamics is the most accurate theory compared to experiment extant yet is based on particles coming back from the future. Simultaneity, either because of individual monad mapping of the universe or their collective BEC processing solves the QED problem and makes a 1p only universe possible as you so eloquently point out. However, in my theory simultaneity is at the level of a hypothesis even though I present arguments supporting its possibility. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:02 AM, Stephan wrote: Unless you assume that the speed of light is infinite, and thus there exists a unique simultaneity (or absolute and uniform variation of the rate of sequencing of events) for all observed events, mutual consistency is impossible. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
Roger, BECs make that interaction possible. Don't you ever rad my posts? Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Bruno Marchal said They are logically interacting though. Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads. Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical. So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's Hard Problem) is the only possibly correct one. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body are completely different substances, In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as subtance is often considered as primary) no matter what your philosophy or science, and cannot interact. They are logically interacting though. Bruno The failure to solve the hard problem shows that. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science Hi Stephen, This is the case with modern cognitive science: 1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain) solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating both substances as material. A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus negating dualism. Dear Telmo, 牋 There is no problem of interaction if mind and body are isomorphs of each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of themselves. Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time. I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. 牋 Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it. I agree but to me first person and consciousness are exactly the same thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can bemonads. Cool.
Hi Bruno Marchal By universal numbers are you referring to the numbers as seen by Pythagoras ? I'm a little hesistant to get into that stuff or anything esoteric since becoming a Christian. There is a short video of these at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7AyNFpJ6DA [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 05:09:15 Subject: Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can bemonads. Cool. On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:57, Roger Clough wrote: Here's an additional observation-- Only the prime numbers can be monads, because all other integers can not be subdivided and still remain integers. Hmm... numbers are monad when seen as index of a partial computable function. the monad are the program, which you can see as a number relative to a universal number. Keep in mind I use comp (renamed CTM for Computationalist theory of Mind). Bruno Cool. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-07, 08:33:37 Subject: Fw: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, whatever they be. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36 Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads Hi Bruno Marchal 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God. 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances. But natural numbers are different because even though they are only mental substances, they're still substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided. So they are of one part each. Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that. That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p. WHOOPEE ! [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46 Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive theory has done. On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the numbers see themselves. But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp p definition. It is a bit technical. Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter. We can replace [1p] by its actions - those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object). You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective. That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level. That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations. Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work when living breathing humans are concerned. I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of comp. You have computer science. IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent computer calculations from emulating the mind. The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the comp hope, or the comp fear. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12 Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote:
Re: Re: Synchronizing the subprograms
Hi Richard Ruquist Yes, as I said, it's just an analogy. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 07:51:05 Subject: Re: Synchronizing the subprograms Roger, That sounds to me as though it is something you made up. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 7:28 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Stephen, Perhaps my response to Richard, immediately below, would explain better to you why I believe a supreme monad (a CPU) is needed. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 07:24:56 Subject: Re: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. Stephen doesn't see such a need. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:32:51 Subject: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Roger. How can L's monads be blind if they all have perception as clearly expressed in L's Monadology? Richard On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: WHOOPS! My equivalence or as if princple accepting materialism/atheism is wrong for the following reason. The Supreme monad (God) is absolutely needed, because without a supreme monad, the monads are blind and don't work properly. The Supreme Monad has a necessary, irreplaceable function, that of reflecting the perceptions of all of the other monads in the universe back to a given monad that guides his changes. So I have to take back my acceptance of materialism/atheism. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: Roger Clough Time: 2012-12-06, 09:12:38 Subject: Puppets and strings Perhaps a simple analogy might make my thinking plainer. L sees the world and its beings as acting like puppets with strings. Atheism/materialism sees the world as if there are no strings. A similar analogy applies to religion. It all depends on how you look at the world. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 09:00:01 Subject: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's metaphysics. Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this
Re: Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
Hi Richard Ruquist Didn't you just make that up ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 08:20:14 Subject: Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science Roger, BECs make that interaction possible. Don't you ever rad my posts? Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Bruno Marchal said They are logically interacting though. Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads. Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical. So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's Hard Problem) is the only possibly correct one. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body are completely different substances, In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as subtance is often considered as primary) no matter what your philosophy or science, and cannot interact. They are logically interacting though. Bruno The failure to solve the hard problem shows that. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science Hi Stephen, This is the case with modern cognitive science: 1)?It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain) solution to the mind/brain problem in favor?f treating both substances as material. A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus negating dualism. Dear Telmo, ? There is no problem of interaction if mind and body are isomorphs of each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of themselves. Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time. I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. ? Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it. I agree but to me first person and consciousness are exactly the same thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: Re: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God
Hi Richard Ruquist Referring as I did sometimes to the supreme monad as God was not technically correct, only a shorthand version. L's God is who/what perceives and does through the supreme monad. L's God is itself therefore not a monad, it's simply cosmic intelligence or the One. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 07:49:27 Subject: Re: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God Roger, In order to get a cosmic consciousness, an arithmetic of monads is required. No one monad has consciousness as L has said. Therefore isince God is one monad, it cannot be conscious and IMO therefore cannot be god. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist You say, God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. God is the agent that carries out this expression, for only He knows what they all are. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:59:57 Subject: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 12/6/2012 7:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I slipped up, sorry. I usually avoid using the word God since that upsets many people. Instead, you can think of L's universe as a complete system with one control, the Supreme Monad (the One). It only needs one master controller, but that is necessary and more than that wouldn't work. Dear Roger, The way I see the idea, there is no need for a single central control or special monad. God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. I see the language that L used about a one God was merely a way to remain in the good graces of the Church. Hear, Hear [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
No Roger, The BEC properties are known from laboratory experiment. For example, light can skip thru a BEC at infinite speed, leaving the BEC as it enters, or light can be stopped and started in a BEC. My opinion is that a BEC is effectively outside of spacetime. I am not alone in that opinion. For example , See: Hu H and Wu M. Thinking outside the box: the essence and implications of quantum entanglement. NeuroQuantology 2006. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Didn't you just make that up ? [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 08:20:14 Subject: Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science Roger, BECs make that interaction possible. Don't you ever rad my posts? Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Bruno Marchal said They are logically interacting though. Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads. Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical. So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's Hard Problem) is the only possibly correct one. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body are completely different substances, In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as subtance is often considered as primary) no matter what your philosophy or science, and cannot interact. They are logically interacting though. Bruno The failure to solve the hard problem shows that. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29 Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science Hi Stephen, This is the case with modern cognitive science: 1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain) solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating both substances as material. A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus negating dualism. Dear Telmo, 牋 There is no problem of interaction if mind and body are isomorphs of each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of themselves. Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time. I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. 牋 Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it. I agree but to me first person and consciousness are exactly the same thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered... -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To
Re: Re: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God
Roger, Comp or even just Peano arithmetic suggests that the monads do not need a god outside of themselves. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:40 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Referring as I did sometimes to the supreme monad as God was not technically correct, only a shorthand version. L's God is who/what perceives and does through the supreme monad. L's God is itself therefore not a monad, it's simply cosmic intelligence or the One. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 07:49:27 Subject: Re: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God Roger, In order to get a cosmic consciousness, an arithmetic of monads is required. No one monad has consciousness as L has said. Therefore isince God is one monad, it cannot be conscious and IMO therefore cannot be god. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist You say, God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. God is the agent that carries out this expression, for only He knows what they all are. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:59:57 Subject: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 12/6/2012 7:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I slipped up, sorry. I usually avoid using the word God since that upsets many people. Instead, you can think of L's universe as a complete system with one control, the Supreme Monad (the One). It only needs one master controller, but that is necessary and more than that wouldn't work. Dear Roger, The way I see the idea, there is no need for a single central control or special monad. God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. I see the language that L used about a one God was merely a way to remain in the good graces of the Church. Hear, Hear [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
2012/12/8 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 12/7/2012 6:01 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Fantastic links, specially the latter. I´ll read it. This is my standpoint now: First is necessary to define existence. My standpoint is that what exists is what the mind assumes that exist (because it is relevant) . Dear Alberto, But this makes existence subservient on the ability of a mind to apprehend what might exist. This is requires an explanation of how that could occur! How can a mind cause something to exist? I see this as conflating the notion of existence with the notion of definiteness of properties. In my philosophy, I take *existence* as ontological primitive and completely divorsed of innate properties; it replaces 'substance' as the neutral 'bearer of of properties'. Existence is eternal, it cannot be created or destroyed. Properties are that which the mind selects as actual from the possible. If we demand that an entity's existence requires a priori properties, then I would stipulate that all possible properties are implied by bare existence. Dear Stephen: ...Here you express a belief that is coherent with my notion of existence. Mine is historically called Realism, that is, what the mind aprehend is the reality because apart from that, there is no other reality that we can access. Phisical reality is part of this mind created reality. Your idea of existence is also an instance I take an operational approach from outside, and I said that the ontological concepts are the ones in each individual mind shares with others. Outside of that I can not imagine other notion of existence apart from mathematical existence. Do men exist? This is because we have a hardwired category for men. Do cars exists? yes because we have a hardwired categories for man-made things, fast things, dangerous things and so on that are used to construct the category of car. Mathematical existence may be also a necessary consequence of the existence of the mind. I don´t fall into relativism, since the hard and soft architecture of the human mind are the same in all men, and so the categorizations. There are universal categories because there are universal feelings, worries and problems. that humans have and we deal with them in similar ways. If not, there would be no translation possible between languages, and the Arabs would not like south-american soap-operas, as the relativist culturalists used to believe. In this case, the process is what make the category. That something is a substance means that there are patterns in the processes that have a recognizable structure recognized as substantial. A processis composed of patterns, these patterns are categories or substances. Yes, Process defines categories. Substances, in my thinking, are collections of similar bundles of properties. That is unavoidable, because the mind has no infinite power neither the brain has a infinite quantity of connections, therefore it has to reuse functional components, some of which are hard wired. Metaphors are a sign of this re-usability: I can kill an insect, but a bacteria can kill me, I can kill a program... I disagree. The mind has infinite power but is contained such that it can only have extensions that are consistent with precedent. No 'new idea' or thought can be in logical conflict with previously held truths! Remember, a mind is not a fixed 'thing'! So a mind is not consistent with or is the efect-cause of the activity of the brain? how a limited computer like the brain can have infinite power?. At least it is quite slow for some tasks, if we compare with an ordinary calculator. So some limitation apply to the mind, at least in the time parameter In al these processes, the pattern is the same: something that existed before does not exit now because an active subject has acted to kill it. the category of killing has certain properties: it is nor reflexive, has a relation of order etc. Not in my thinking. Some new properties become known to be the case, thus a mind can evolve by gaining new knowledge. Existence is completely passive. Sure, you can make subcategories. But for sure when you and a Yanomamo think about the concept of killing for sure that both of you are thinking about exactly the same concept and could compose phrases in which both of you will agree. I can philosophize about the notion of killing, abstracted from the concrete situation . In the same way I can think about love, or reason, or any other category because they can applied to different processes but have certain patterns and properties that make them different one from the other and thus they are substantial. I can relate one category with other in the abstract, like for example: if you kill something, you don´t love it. I try to not base my philosophical mussing on reasonings that are so emotionally charged. You are in the area of
Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:19 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent collisions, keep oil and water separate. No they don't. The separation of oil and water is just the macroscopic outcome of local interactions between molecules with no overall coordination whatsoever. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why a supreme monad is necessary
On 12/8/2012 6:49 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King The supreme monad is as necessary as the CPU of a computer, for Leibniz's world is a system, and systems need a control unit. Dear Roger, Is this a postulation, a conjecture or an authoritative claim? The way that the physical systems that humans have created to perform computations are arranged is merely for convenience of how we are accessing the results of those computations. What I am considering is more like how a nucleus in a living cell is the CPU of the cell and many cells are combined into a body that has another CPU at that level. Going further, humans compose into societies and form governments that are the CPU of the society. Do you see the pattern of this? The centralization of governorship is not imposed from the outside, but from within! It is more like the 'center of mass' that arises when ever a collection of entities have a mutual relationship of motions. BTW, the materialist mind/brain has no such governor. Could you point to one claim of this by a materialist philosopher? Marx tried to claim this but was only able to make the governor vanish in some perfect future 'utopian' state. I could go on and on, Please do. I would like to understand how these claims follow from some as of know unknown postulates and how do you chose those postulates as inevitable. for every part of Leibniz's metaphysics is necessary. and follows logically from his concept of a monad. Here's just a two of many reasons for there being a supreme monad: 1) A supreme monad is needed, for one thing, because monads have no windows to see out of. Their perceptions are supplied by a third party, the supreme monad. NO! This is inconsistent with L's definition of a monad! Let me quote http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/leibniz.htm: 17.It must be confessed, however, that/perception/, and that which depends upon it,/are inexplicable by mechanical causes/, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the compound nor in a machine that the perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the/internal activities/of the simple substance can consist. 18.All simple substances or created monads may be called/entelechies/, because they have in themselves a certain perfection. There is in them a sufficiency which makes them the source of their internal activities, and renders them, so to speak, incorporeal Automatons. Leibniz proposes God as the coordinator of percepts, not as the 'supplier': 51.In the case of simple substances, the influence which one monad has upon another is only/ideal/. It can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God each monad can rightly demand that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regarded it also. For since one created monad cannot have a physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only through the primal regulation that one can have dependence upon another. 52.It is thus that among created things action and passivity are reciprocal. For God, in comparing two simple substances, finds in each one reasons obliging him to adapt the other to it; and consequently what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view,/active/in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to give a reason for what occurs in another, and/passive/in so far as the reason for what occurs in it is found in what is distinctly known in another. 53.Now as there are an infinity of possible universes in the ideas of God, and but one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason' for the choice of God which determines him to select one rather than another. It is what is delineated in #53 that find important and that which I seek to elaborate upon in my thinking. This sufficient reason I take to be mutual consistency of pairs of percepts (in a combinatorial and concurrent sense) in the sense of satisfiability for a Boolean Algebra. But as to your claim above let us look further: 60.Besides, in what has just been said can be seen the/a priori/reasons why things cannot be otherwise than they are. It is because God, in ordering the whole, has had regard to every part and in particular to each monad; and since the monad is by its very/nature representative/, nothing can limit it to represent merely a
Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe
On 12/8/2012 7:16 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King You're right, I short-changed Bruno. He is actually an Idealist like me. And my apologies for calling you a an atheist/materialist. I seem to have been having a bad day. Dear Roger, It is OK, we all have our 'bad days'. :-) You and I seem to differ principally, if I understand you corrrectly, in that you believe in local dermination/causation while I believe that such causation is (and has to be, because ideas aren't causal) only apparent. I am claiming that local determination/causation' and 'apparent causation' are the same thing! This implies that there is no global or total cause or 'orchestration'. To go back to my orchestra analogy, you believe that everything is fine as long as each correctly plays his score, while I believe that an overall conductor (the supreme monad) is needed for maintaining coordination and for composing the score in the first place. Could you consider that this overall conductor' is an imaginary entity and not a real entity? Your local governor appears to be a set of relations. Yes. L's would also neccesarily include a higher-order governor (the Conductor) to insure that a pre-established harmony exists between sets, as well as insuring that each set ansd its laws are carried out properly. Are synchhronized. Yes, but I am pointing out that this assumption that a pre-established harmony exists between sets is an a priori global partitioning on the percepts and this is explicitly disallowed for mathematical reasons. Do you understand the discussion about NP-Hard problems that I have previously mentioned? In short, you seem to have no means of overall synchronizing the actions of sets. Exactly. In order to have an overall synchronization of the actions there must be a computation of such and this is an infinite NP-hard problem that simply cannot occur prior to the availability of the resources for the computation. To think otherwise is equivalent to imagining that a physical computer can run without a power source. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] mailto:rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-12-06, 14:02:33 *Subject:* Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe On 12/6/2012 9:00 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. Dear Roger, It is not atheist/materialist at all, my way. It is anti-special, in the sense that the potential of the One must be immanent in all of the Omniverse, not to be confined to special occasions/locations. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. Your thoughts are easily seen to be a mental space when one understand that a 'space' is just a set plus some structure of relations. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenal world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. yes, but Monads offer a very different ontological vision. It is not the atoms in a void vision at all, and yet allows for the appearance of 'atoms in a void' as a mode of perception. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). Actually, Bruno's view is Idealist! -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
On 12/8/2012 7:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent collisions, keep oil and water separate. Dear Roger, What determines the property of immiscibility of oil and water? I am asking you to consider the nature of properties and how it is that they become definite, instread of jsut assuming that the properties are innate and definite in an a priori sense. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all..
On 12/8/2012 7:24 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. Stephen doesn't see such a need. Dear Roger, What I am claiming is that the action of consciousness *is* the local 'coming to be mutually consistent' of the percepts for each and every monad. Percepts are strictly first person, they are not objects, like a stone, that we can hold in our hand and look at from several differing angles. We can conceptualize this action as a separate action itself in the sense that it is what all monads have as their internal act of cogitation, but to think of such as being determined from the outside by some separate entity demands a sufficient reason for such a thought. Why have an entity whose only function is to coordinate the internal activity of monads when 1) this is disallowed by the definition of a monad as windowless and 2) such a coordinating action requires the equivalent of a computation that can be proven mathematically to be impossible? Why do we even need the hypothesis of the existence of an external entity when everything that it is presupposed to do is already done by the monads themselves? What is amazing to me is that I am in fact making a claim that is identical to Bruno's claim that the appearance of a physical world is nothing more than the shareability of 'dreams of numbers'. The fact that percepts of a pair of monads happen to synchronize does not require that they be set up to be synchronous in some special event. The mere possibility of the existence of Monads, as defined in the Monadology, might give us the idea that they somehow have distinct properties from each other, but this is a mistake as it is assuming that monads are object that we can somehow think of as objects! Monads do not have an outside! The example of a CPU of a physical computer is an object like the stone discussed earlier, it has an 'outside'. It is not a monad, but it is something that exists as a pattern of mutuality in the percepts of many monads. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: One cannot have 1p if there is no observer.
On 12/8/2012 8:02 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King For what it's worth, I think Richard referred to Indra's Beads in connection with this problem. Every monad has its own myriad set of perceptions of the other monads, but these are indirect (are constantly updated by the Supreme Monad). The Supreme Monad is needed to keep all of these perceptions correct, each from their own viewpoint. Each monad is different. Dear Roger, The analogy of monads to Indra's beads (or jewels) is exact. Each monad's perception (it is a singular integration not fragmented plurality) is identical to a set of perceptions of other monad's, in the sense that one of the Jewels in Indra's net 'reflects all others'. But we have to be careful. If the word all is absolute, then the jewels (monads) are identical to each other and thus all monads are One. It is only then the 'all' of the reflections is not absolute that we obtain distinctions between monads. We cannot just consider the ideal case, we must also consider the non-idea cases, such as when monads do not have complete images of each other and thus do not have a global harmony. We are considering here something known as mereology. See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/ A good formal mathematical consideration of this mereology is found in Non-Well founded sets, where the special case of a well founded set appears. The well founded set plays the role of the special absolute case of the absolute 'all' , as in one of the Jewels in Indra's net 'reflects all others' . This is the ideal case only such as the case where we can consider monads to have a global pre-established harmony! There is a difference between assuming that a harmony exists and thinking about how it is that such a harmony is possible. Leibniz did only the former, I am asking questions of the latter: How is a pre-ordained harmony possible?! Julian Barbour made the same mistake as Leibniz and had no idea, in the conversation that I had with him, why I was asking him how it is that Time Capsules came to have a best-matching?. When I told him that his best-matching was an example of a computation of an NP-hard problem, he seemed to be dumbfounded, not having any idea what I was talking about and yet he explicitly bemoaned how long it took for his computer to run a Best-matching for a simple example of a time capsule. Geee! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe
Dear Stephen, it is amazing how we formulate our (belief) systems similarly, except for yours in a descriptive - mine in an agnostic explanation (=a joke). I deny to be an atheist because one would need a God to deny and I do not detect the concept for such. Also: when you wrote * I am claiming that local determination/causation' and 'apparent causation' are the same thing! This implies that there is no global or total cause or 'orchestration'.* * * it resonates with my denial of classic causation in which it is presumed to know about ALL initiative entailment - what my agnosticism denies from our present knowable. I am struggling with the 'changes' that occur: the best I can think of is the least obstructed possibility in 'relations' to go for, considering more than we may know within our presently knowable model of the world. I am also struggling with the driving force behind all 'that' (meaning the infinite complexity) IMO the origination of anything. A have no identification for the 'relations' either. Nor for any 'interchange' - a possible and inevitably occurring 'cause' for violating the (presumed?) infinite symmetry (call it equilibrium?) - generating undefinable universes (in my narrative). *Orchestration *is a good word, thank you. All I can think of is the 'least obstructed way' of *change* substituting even for 'evolution'-like processes. The 'Overall Conductor' (God?) is a requirement of human thinking within those limitations we observed over the past millennia. The 'local governor' is within the model-limitations of yesterday. By no means an 'absolute' denomination (not a *'real entity'*). I want to press that I do not feel above such limitations myself, but at least I try to find wider boundaries. I would not say: *...to imagining that a physical computer can run without a power source.* * * rather push such driving force (see above) into my agnostic ignorance, Bundle it up with 'energy', 'electricity' and the other zillion marvels our conventional sciences USE, CALCULATE, DIFFERENTIATE, without the foggiest idea WHAT they are and HOW they work. I accept our overall ignorance. Best regards John Mikes On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:12 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 12/8/2012 7:16 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King You're right, I short-changed Bruno. He is actually an Idealist like me. And my apologies for calling you a an atheist/materialist. I seem to have been having a bad day. Dear Roger, It is OK, we all have our 'bad days'. :-) You and I seem to differ principally, if I understand you corrrectly, in that you believe in local dermination/causation while I believe that such causation is (and has to be, because ideas aren't causal) only apparent. I am claiming that local determination/causation' and 'apparent causation' are the same thing! This implies that there is no global or total cause or 'orchestration'. To go back to my orchestra analogy, you believe that everything is fine as long as each correctly plays his score, while I believe that an overall conductor (the supreme monad) is needed for maintaining coordination and for composing the score in the first place. Could you consider that this overall conductor' is an imaginary entity and not a real entity? Your local governor appears to be a set of relations. Yes. L's would also neccesarily include a higher-order governor (the Conductor) to insure that a pre-established harmony exists between sets, as well as insuring that each set ansd its laws are carried out properly. Are synchhronized. Yes, but I am pointing out that this assumption that a pre-established harmony exists between sets is an a priori global partitioning on the percepts and this is explicitly disallowed for mathematical reasons. Do you understand the discussion about NP-Hard problems that I have previously mentioned? In short, you seem to have no means of overall synchronizing the actions of sets. Exactly. In order to have an overall synchronization of the actions there must be a computation of such and this is an infinite NP-hard problem that simply cannot occur prior to the availability of the resources for the computation. To think otherwise is equivalent to imagining that a physical computer can run without a power source. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-12-06, 14:02:33 *Subject:* Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe On 12/6/2012 9:00 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2)
Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe
On 08 Dec 2012, at 13:16, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King You're right, I short-changed Bruno. He is actually an Idealist like me. Hmm... First I am silent on my beliefs. I am just a logician who say if you believe this (that you can survive with an artificial digital brain, Comp or CTM) then you have to believe this (that arithmetic is the realm of everything, then rest are definition and theorems). Then I show that CTM, and the first definition (borrowed to Plato, Theaetetus mainly, and Plotinus, for matter) illustrates a rationalist non Aristotelian conception of reality (the physical reality emerge from something else). I prefer to say that CTM leads to neutral monism, instead of idealism. Numbers cannot be taken as idea because idea are more complex than numbers, and eventually ideas are defined by the kind of things accessible to universal numbers. Bruno And my apologies for calling you a an atheist/materialist. I seem to have been having a bad day. You and I seem to differ principally, if I understand you corrrectly, in that you believe in local dermination/causation while I believe that such causation is (and has to be, because ideas aren't causal) only apparent. To go back to my orchestra analogy, you believe that everything is fine as long as each correctly plays his score, while I believe that an overall conductor (the supreme monad) is needed for maintaining coordination and for composing the score in the first place. Your local governor appears to be a set of relations. L's would also neccesarily include a higher-order governor (the Conductor) to insure that a pre-established harmony exists between sets, as well as insuring that each set ansd its laws are carried out properly. Are synchhronized. In short, you seem to have no means of overall synchronizing the actions of sets. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 14:02:33 Subject: Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe On 12/6/2012 9:00 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. Dear Roger, It is not atheist/materialist at all, my way. It is anti- special, in the sense that the potential of the One must be immanent in all of the Omniverse, not to be confined to special occasions/locations. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. Your thoughts are easily seen to be a mental space when one understand that a 'space' is just a set plus some structure of relations. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenal world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. yes, but Monads offer a very different ontological vision. It is not the atoms in a void vision at all, and yet allows for the appearance of 'atoms in a void' as a mode of perception. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). Actually, Bruno's view is Idealist! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all..
On 08 Dec 2012, at 13:24, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. For having a computation, you need a computer. But there are many, they are very variate, and they reflect each other. Some does not synchronize anything, some have no data, some have all data, some exploits parallelism, some don't, some exploit the physical (appearances, which still obeys laws), some don't, etc. The universal numbers can be said supreme monads (note the plural), but it is not the supreme monad, which is more like the whole arithmetical truth (in the CTM setting). Bruno Stephen doesn't see such a need. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:32:51 Subject: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Roger. How can L's monads be blind if they all have perception as clearly expressed in L's Monadology? Richard On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: WHOOPS! My equivalence or as if princple accepting materialism/atheism is wrong for the following reason. The Supreme monad (God) is absolutely needed, because without a supreme monad, the monads are blind and don't work properly. The Supreme Monad has a necessary, irreplaceable function, that of reflecting the perceptions of all of the other monads in the universe back to a given monad that guides his changes. So I have to take back my acceptance of materialism/atheism. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: Roger Clough Time: 2012-12-06, 09:12:38 Subject: Puppets and strings Perhaps a simple analogy might make my thinking plainer. L sees the world and its beings as acting like puppets with strings. Atheism/materialism sees the world as if there are no strings. A similar analogy applies to religion. It all depends on how you look at the world. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 09:00:01 Subject: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's metaphysics. Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit
Re: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads
Bruno: how about expanding our closed (mathematical) minds into not only decimal, binary, etc., but also a (hold on fast!) 12/17ary number systems? in that case 17 would be non-primary, divisible by 2,3,4,6 besides the 1. Just playing my mind on math. (You may have an even wider mind). Also zero can be thought of in non-human logic as participant in calculations. John M PS: no response required indeed. My agnosticism at work. On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 5:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:33, Roger Clough wrote: Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, whatever they be. Natural numbers = the non negatiove integers: 0, 1, 2, 3, or 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... Bruno - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36 Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads Hi Bruno Marchal 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God. 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances. But natural numbers are different because even though they are only mental substances, they're still substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided. So they are of one part each. Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that. That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p. WHOOPEE ! [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46 Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive theory has done. On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the numbers see themselves. But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp p definition. It is a bit technical. Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter. We can replace [1p] by its actions - those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object). You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective. That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level. That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations. Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work when living breathing humans are concerned. I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of comp. You have computer science. IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent computer calculations from emulating the mind. The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the comp hope, or the comp fear. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12 Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote: On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p-truth is not codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation). Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp p is NOT codable. Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable. Many things true about us is not codable either.
Re: One cannot have 1p if there is no observer.
On 08 Dec 2012, at 14:02, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King For what it's worth, I think Richard referred to Indra's Beads in connection with this problem. Every monad has its own myriad set of perceptions of the other monads, but these are indirect (are constantly updated by the Supreme Monad). Tre Supreme Monad is needed to keep all of these perceptions correct, Like arithmetical truth will do for the machines/numbers. each from their own viewpoint. Each monad is different. Making God into something which is *not* a monad. He is above the monads, which are more like windows through which he can see (and lost himself by filtering the possible). I work like this: anything you say I translate in arithmetic and ask a Löbian machine what she thinks about it. If it is not too much complex I can easily find the answer (thanks to G, G*, etc.). But I can change the definitions, until it fits the most, of course. Up to now: God = Arithmetical truth (a result of Askanas give a trick to interrogate the machine about that, without ever naming truth. I don't master it, unfortunately and I should search for Askana thesis ...) Monad = intensional numbers = programs = machines, Supreme monad = universal (Lôbian) numbers, machine, ... Bp Inner God = the knower = the first person (or its greatest common divisor) = Bp p = S4Grz Then intelligible matter = the measure base = Bp Dt = observable (p sigma_1, cf the UD) Sensible matter = Bp Dt p (p sigma_1, cf the UD) That gives eight hypostases, because G, split into G and G*, as both material secondary hypostases. p Bp Bp Bp p Bp Dt Bp Dt Bp Dt p Bp Dt p Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-03, 17:13:57 Subject: Re: One cannot have 1p if there is no observer. On 12/3/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: RC, So the entire universe can be in 1p at all times. RR Dear Richard, How would one prove that all observations that that 1p has are mutually consistent? Unless you assume that the speed of light is infinite, and thus there exists a unique simultaneity (or absolute and uniform variation of the rate of sequencing of events) for all observed events, mutual consistency is impossible. This implies that there cannot exist a singular 1p for the entire universe. It is for this reason that I reject the 'realist' approach to ontology and epistemology and am trying to develop an alternative. Think about how it is that a Boolean Algebra, which is known to be the faithful logical structure representing a 'classical' universe' (not 'the universe'!), is found to be Satisfiable. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problem In computer science, satisfiability (often written in all capitals or abbreviated SAT) is the problem of determining if the variables of a given Boolean formula can be assigned in such a way as to make the formula evaluate to TRUE. Equally important is to determine whether no such assignments exist, which would imply that the function expressed by the formula is identically FALSE for all possible variable assignments. In this latter case, we would say that the function is unsatisfiable; otherwise it is satisfiable. For example, the formula a AND b is satisfiable because one can find the values a = TRUE and b = TRUE, which make (a AND b) = TRUE. To emphasize the binary nature of this problem, it is frequently referred to as Boolean or propositional satisfiability. SAT was the first known example of an NP-complete problem. That briefly means that there is no known algorithm that efficiently solves all instances of SAT, and it is generally believed (but not proven, see P versus NP problem) that no such algorithm can exist. Further, a wide range of other naturally occurring decision and optimization problems can be transformed into instances of SAT. It seems to me that the content of any 1p that is real must be at least a solution to a SAT problem. On Mon, Dec 3, 2012 at 7:49 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Yes, God is the supreme observer. See Leibniz. The supreme monad sees all clearly. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can bemonads. Cool.
On 08 Dec 2012, at 14:23, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal By universal numbers are you referring to the numbers as seen by Pythagoras ? I'm a little hesistant to get into that stuff or anything esoteric since becoming a Christian. Good! No, by universal numbers I mean a code for a universal Turing machine (what a physical computers approximate very well). Enumerate all the programs in some fixed universal programming language: p_0, p_1, p_2, p_3, ... Call phi_i the corresponding partial computable function. u is said to be a universal number if phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y). u is the computer, x is the program, and y is the data. x,y is a bijection from NXN to N, so as to keep the phi_i having all one input/variable. Nothing esoteric here, it is computer science. Bruno There is a short video of these at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i7AyNFpJ6DA [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 05:09:15 Subject: Re: An additional observation-- But only the prime numbers can bemonads. Cool. On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:57, Roger Clough wrote: Here's an additional observation-- Only the prime numbers can be monads, because all other integers can not be subdivided and still remain integers. Hmm... numbers are monad when seen as index of a partial computable function. the monad are the program, which you can see as a number relative to a universal number. Keep in mind I use comp (renamed CTM for Computationalist theory of Mind). Bruno Cool. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-07, 08:33:37 Subject: Fw: Whoopie ! The natural INTEGERS are indeed monads Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, whatever they be. - Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36 Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads Hi Bruno Marchal 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God. 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances. But natural numbers are different because even though they are only mental substances, they're still substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided. So they are of one part each. Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that. That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p. WHOOPEE ! [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/7/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46 Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive theory has done. On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to understand that physics emerge from the way the numbers see themselves. But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp p definition. It is a bit technical. Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and it plays the key role for consciousness and matter. We can replace [1p] by its actions - those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object). You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective. That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their necessary statistical relation at some level. That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations. Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work when living breathing humans are concerned. I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of comp. You have computer science. IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a
Re: Avoiding the use of the word God
On 08 Dec 2012, at 14:40, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Referring as I did sometimes to the supreme monad as God was not technically correct, only a shorthand version. L's God is who/what perceives and does through the supreme monad. L's God is itself therefore not a monad, it's simply cosmic intelligence or the One. Nice! Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 07:49:27 Subject: Re: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God Roger, In order to get a cosmic consciousness, an arithmetic of monads is required. No one monad has consciousness as L has said. Therefore isince God is one monad, it cannot be conscious and IMO therefore cannot be god. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist You say, God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. God is the agent that carries out this expression, for only He knows what they all are. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:59:57 Subject: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 12/6/2012 7:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I slipped up, sorry. I usually avoid using the word God since that upsets many people. Instead, you can think of L's universe as a complete system with one control, the Supreme Monad (the One). It only needs one master controller, but that is necessary and more than that wouldn't work. Dear Roger, The way I see the idea, there is no need for a single central control or special monad. God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. I see the language that L used about a one God was merely a way to remain in the good graces of the Church. Hear, Hear [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Avoiding the use of the word God
On 08 Dec 2012, at 14:48, Richard Ruquist wrote: Roger, Comp or even just Peano arithmetic suggests that the monads do not need a god outside of themselves. Hmm... we need to believe in some truth which might transcend us a little bit ... Arithmetical truth transcends *all* machines. Bruno Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:40 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Referring as I did sometimes to the supreme monad as God was not technically correct, only a shorthand version. L's God is who/what perceives and does through the supreme monad. L's God is itself therefore not a monad, it's simply cosmic intelligence or the One. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 07:49:27 Subject: Re: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God Roger, In order to get a cosmic consciousness, an arithmetic of monads is required. No one monad has consciousness as L has said. Therefore isince God is one monad, it cannot be conscious and IMO therefore cannot be god. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist You say, God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. God is the agent that carries out this expression, for only He knows what they all are. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:59:57 Subject: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 12:57 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 12/6/2012 7:52 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I slipped up, sorry. I usually avoid using the word God since that upsets many people. Instead, you can think of L's universe as a complete system with one control, the Supreme Monad (the One). It only needs one master controller, but that is necessary and more than that wouldn't work. Dear Roger, The way I see the idea, there is no need for a single central control or special monad. God is the totality of all Monads and its creation is expressed on and in all of them. I see the language that L used about a one God was merely a way to remain in the good graces of the Church. Hear, Hear [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email
Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
On 08 Dec 2012, at 16:23, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:19 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent collisions, keep oil and water separate. No they don't. The separation of oil and water is just the macroscopic outcome of local interactions between molecules with no overall coordination whatsoever. OK. But Roger was perhaps referring to the laws making those interaction occurring, the thing which, in a way or another implement those laws, I am not sure ... Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:19 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Processes still have to have overall coordination to prevent collisions, keep oil and water separate. No they don't. The separation of oil and water is just the macroscopic outcome of local interactions between molecules with no overall coordination whatsoever. OK. But Roger was perhaps referring to the laws making those interaction occurring, the thing which, in a way or another implement those laws, I am not sure ... Fair enough. The reason why I dislike the term overall coordination in this case is that it is a loaded term. To me it implies intelligent control. Of course intelligence is a mushy concept in itself, so we are thrown into a world of fuzzy concepts and start to lose meaning. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe
On 12/8/2012 2:28 PM, John Mikes wrote: Dear Stephen, it is amazing how we formulate our (belief) systems similarly, except for yours in a descriptive - mine in an agnostic explanation (=a joke). Dear John, ;-) I try hard to stay in a superposed state, somewhere between serious and 'just kidding. We understand each other here. :-) I deny to be an atheist because one would need a God to deny and I do not detect the concept for such. Exactly! This is partly why I make such a big deal about how people use the concept of 'existence'. It is impossible to deny the existence without first assuming the possibility that it could indeed exist! To avoid this trap, why not pull existence completely away from any dependence on anything else and take it as an ontological primitive. We then say (with Ayn Rand) existence exists. Full Stop. Also: when you wrote */ I am claiming that local determination/causation' and 'apparent causation' are the same thing! This implies that there is no global or total cause or 'orchestration'./* */ /* it resonates with my denial of classic causation in which it is presumed to know about ALL initiative entailment - what my agnosticism denies from our present knowable. 'What is Knowledge' is almost as difficult a question as 'what is truth'! I really like Bruno's proposed solution, but he seems to have a hard time with my attempt to parametrize truth using agreements or mutual consistency in a game theoretical sense. What I propose is no different from the solution to the problem of perfect knowledge in game theory! Thinking of knowledge and truth via semantic games has the nice bonus of allowing for a nice extension into statistics and probability. I really like when one mathematical idea connects to another. I am struggling with the 'changes' that occur: the best I can think of is the least obstructed possibility in 'relations' to go for, considering more than we may know within our presently knowable model of the world. OK. What I do to think of this is to ask: what situation is necessary for the appearance of a type of change to vanish, in some class of related circumstances? I first noticed that this implies that for a change to be non-vanishing there has to be a non-vanishing means to measure the change or otherwise keep track of its effects. Take away the means to measure change, and what is left? I am also struggling with the driving force behind all 'that' (meaning the infinite complexity) IMO the origination of anything. A have no identification for the 'relations' either. Nor for any 'interchange' - a possible and inevitably occurring 'cause' for violating the (presumed?) infinite symmetry (call it equilibrium?) - generating undefinable universes (in my narrative). The way I see it, perfect infinite symmetry is changeless. Why? What would act as the measure of change of the P.I.S.? Nothing! If we some how break the symmetry, we get an immediate potential difference and, check it out, the difference between the perfectly symmetric case and the not so symmetric case is the same kind of difference that we see between the states of a system in a maximum entropy state and a state some distance away from maximum entropy. Voila! We have at least an intuitive way to think of change and a measure of such. *Orchestration *is a good word, thank you. All I can think of is the 'least obstructed way' of *change* substituting even for 'evolution'-like processes. Yeah, this is, IMHO, the main reason why people have such a problem understanding the nature of time! The fact that the sequence of events can be mapped to the Real numbers gets all the attention and leads to thoughts that time is a dimension and the question as to How did the events get sequenced like that in the first place? gets ignored. The 'Overall Conductor' (God?) is a requirement of human thinking within those limitations we observed over the past millennia. I agree, it is a comforting idea. The 'local governor' is within the model-limitations of yesterday. By no means an 'absolute' denomination (not a */'real entity'/*). Take me to your leader, explained the invader. Whatr is a leader?, asked the native. None of you rules over the rest? asked the invader in surprise. Why should there be such?, We are all different and have our own unique thoughts, why should some 'one' rule over the rest?. Oh my!, exclaimed the invader, I had better rethink my tactics!. I want to press that I do not feel above such limitations myself, but at least I try to find wider boundaries. Boundaries are merely horizons to expand. I would not say: */...to imagining that a physical computer can run without a power source./* */ /* rather push such driving force (see above) into my agnostic ignorance, Right, does my line of reasoning make sense? Bundle it up with 'energy', 'electricity' and the other zillion
Re: Against Mechanism
On 12/8/2012 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: People change over time and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing person will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will change even more suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used. But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and use it correctly in future iterated experiences. I suppose P=1/2 comes from an implicit symmetry. But that's not analogous to probabilities in QM which and take a range of real values. And that's one of the problems with Everett's MWI - it implies that when there are two equi-probable choices then there must be two orthogonal worlds which by symmetry have probability 1/2, but if the two outcomes have probabilities 0.5+x and 0.5-x where x is some transcendental number then infinitely many parallel worlds must come into existence to instantiate the right measure, even though x is very small. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by cognitive science
On Sat, Dec 08, 2012 at 06:34:56AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish He's talking about psychological introspection using everyday language and concepts. Philosophical introspection a la Kant for example, is more formal and precise and uses formal categories. I don't see a distinction in the topic, or problem being solved - just a difference in tools used. Modern AI uses less formal logic these days, and more statistical modelling (such as in the website I referenced). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
