Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 20 May 2011, at 19:44, meekerdb wrote: On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me that being unconscious is more that just not remembering. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit feelings of being conscious but not those of having been uncouscious. But those are always extrapolations. The feeling of being conscious in the present is undoubtable. The feeling of being unconscious in the present is contradictory. This goes back to the question of the role of memories and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, I think it is a consequence of mechanism. This is something already defended by Descartes. With some training I think it is not so difficult to realize that we are conscious in all the phases of sleep, but we forget it very easily. or make it true by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. Why? Only absolute 3rd person time is denied. But this is common among physicists too, and almost obvious in the mechanist frame. But this strikes me as trying to save a theory by redefining words. All words need to be redefine in new theories. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 20 May 2011, at 22:18, meekerdb wrote: On 5/20/2011 3:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2011, at 19:47, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Rex, A very good point! There must be a place for false memories in our modal logics. Indeed. and G* proves DBf. Lies and falsities abounds in the mind of the average Löbian machines. An interesting statement (although I doubt you mean it). A lie means to state something you know to be false. Can a mind to this? Yes, and the point is that it can remain consistent. It becomes unsound. A correct Löbian machine can lie. But never does (by definition). Careful, G* says that correct machine can lie, in a more general sense that your's above. Also, once the machine lies, or is non correct; G* does no more applies to it. A bad news is that even in arithmetic, false but consistent theory can be more efficacious, in proving correctly true statement of arithmetic, that sound theories. I am not a long way from believing that a statement like 'real numbers exist' is a lie. Even if provably useful in arithmetic. It is a point on which I do not insist, but falsities an lies does have a positive role in the building of realities and in our surviving there. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 20 May 2011, at 22:44, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent and Bruno, From: meekerdb Sent: Friday, May 20, 2011 1:44 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me that being unconscious is more that just not remembering. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit feelings of being conscious but not those of having been uncouscious. This goes back to the question of the role of memories and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, or make it true by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. But this strikes me as trying to save a theory by redefining words. Brent -- [SPK] Let me be clear, if we say that X supervenes on Y then the existence of X is dependent on the existence of Y, right? Yes. Consciousness, stripped of the notions of self-awareness, is what I was considering. This corresponds, crudely stated, the idea of some kind of correlation between the content of any given individual 1p and that which is the same for many 1p or even invariant over transformations from one 1p to any other in the equivalence class of 1p. 1p can be seen as or related to (roughly speaking) equivalence classes of 3p. I am not sure what you mean by equivalence class of 1p. In that sense, if consciousness does not necessitate memory – any form of correlation with representations of prior events – then why does consciousness require any persistent structure at all to exist? What motivation does persistence of structure have in any discussion? This disallows for Last Thursdaysm, I realize, and that is kind of the point that I was trying to make. It seems to me that self-awareness requires memory but bare consciousness does not. Hmm... OK. This seems consistent with the notion of an OM as have been considered by Russell and Bruno, but it makes my confusion about how OMs are sequenced even more profound! 3-OMs are sequenced by the computations they belongs too. 1-OM are structured by the topology on those computations derived from the application of Theaetetus' theory of knowledge. We may posit that 2+2=4 is what undergirds reality, We have too if we say yes to the doctor. but what the heck does “feelings” have to do with 2+2=4? Bp Dt p are arithmetical propositions, divided into the true and non provable, the provable, etc. There is no alternative to 2+2=4 except for falsehood; but “feelings” seems to be a nonsense term without the notion of some form of comparison between, for example, “I experience a qualia that is incompatible with nothing other than having been unconscious yesterday.” How is the truth of this statement evaluated? To put such statements in the same domain as 2+2=4 seems to be a massive error. 2+2=4 was just a generic form for any theorem of Robinson Arithmetic (say). Feeling something requires a comparative process and a process that requires persistence in time (or over many separate and irreducible computations) so that the content of consciousness is not identical to some stochastic variable (giving rise to the White Rabbit problem). To bring propositions like 2+2=4, which are universal true statements and even tautologies, Not really. I guess you extend the usual meaning of tautologies. as support for the idea that consciousness supervenes from Arithmetic Realism (implicit in the 2+2=4) then is to reduce consciousness to a trivial mapping, like the identity 0 – 0 = 0. ? I have tried to ask Bruno if the logical propositions that he is considering include 1p statements such as this one and, more generally, statements about the local state of affairs as seen from
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/21/2011 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 May 2011, at 19:44, meekerdb wrote: On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me that being unconscious is more that just not remembering. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit feelings of being conscious but not those of having been uncouscious. But those are always extrapolations. Almost everything we think about the world is extrapolations. The feeling of being conscious in the present is undoubtable. The feeling of being unconscious in the present is contradictory. But the feeling of having been unconscious is not. And it works nicely as an explanation of why I'm lying on the ground looking up a stranger who is saying, Are you all right? and I don't remember how I got there. This goes back to the question of the role of memories and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, I think it is a consequence of mechanism. This is something already defended by Descartes. With some training I think it is not so difficult to realize that we are conscious in all the phases of sleep, but we forget it very easily. I wasn't thinking of sleep. I've been anesthetized and I've been knocked unconscious. Of course you can claim that I was really conscious, just paralyzed and unresponsive and I've just forgotten it, but that seems like a stretch. Or that my consciousness is continuous in a 1st person sense - although this seems contrary to all those who take OMs to be discrete. or make it true by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. Why? Only absolute 3rd person time is denied. But this is common among physicists too, and almost obvious in the mechanist frame. One could claim that while I was unconscious that no (3p) time passed - contrary to the reports of everyone else. That's not what physicist claim when they deny absolute time. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/21/2011 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 3-OMs are sequenced by the computations they belongs too. 1-OM are structured by the topology on those computations derived from the application of Theaetetus' theory of knowledge. What topology is that? What's the open set? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 21 May 2011, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote: On 5/21/2011 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 May 2011, at 19:44, meekerdb wrote: On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me that being unconscious is more that just not remembering. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit feelings of being conscious but not those of having been uncouscious. But those are always extrapolations. Almost everything we think about the world is extrapolations. I can't agree more, but not everything we live. Consciousness here and now is not an extrapolation. And unconsciousness is not well defined, and does not make much sense in the mechanist theory. The feeling of being conscious in the present is undoubtable. The feeling of being unconscious in the present is contradictory. But the feeling of having been unconscious is not. And it works nicely as an explanation of why I'm lying on the ground looking up a stranger who is saying, Are you all right? and I don't remember how I got there. But I am working in a theory, and I suggest that in such a theory you were disconnected from a reality, not unaware of *any*reality. This goes back to the question of the role of memories and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, I think it is a consequence of mechanism. This is something already defended by Descartes. With some training I think it is not so difficult to realize that we are conscious in all the phases of sleep, but we forget it very easily. I wasn't thinking of sleep. I've been anesthetized and I've been knocked unconscious. Of course you can claim that I was really conscious, just paralyzed and unresponsive and I've just forgotten it, but that seems like a stretch. Or that my consciousness is continuous in a 1st person sense - although this seems contrary to all those who take OMs to be discrete. The 3-OMs are discrete. But the 1-OMs are not, although the math have only been scratched. or make it true by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. Why? Only absolute 3rd person time is denied. But this is common among physicists too, and almost obvious in the mechanist frame. One could claim that while I was unconscious that no (3p) time passed - contrary to the reports of everyone else. That's not what physicist claim when they deny absolute time. They are related. Consciousness, which is intrinsically first person, does not supervene on computations, but on their mathematical organization, taking into account the first person view and its a priori huge 1-indeterminacy. You might still use the 1-1 identity thesis brain-mind, but it is a many-one relation. Things are more complex. I just try to help people to intuit that amazing and counterintuitive complexity, in the comp frame (assumed by everybody, but not always consciously). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 21 May 2011, at 19:15, meekerdb wrote: On 5/21/2011 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 3-OMs are sequenced by the computations they belongs too. 1-OM are structured by the topology on those computations derived from the application of Theaetetus' theory of knowledge. What topology is that? What's the open set? The topology you can associate to the open set semantics, or neighborhood semantics of the intuitionistic logic corresponding to the inverse of Goldblatt-Boolos-Grzegorczyk from S4Grz logic representation in G, when the arithmetical interpretation is restricted to the sigma_1 prposition, that is the logic I call S4Grz1. And the same for X1*, except that the transformation is different, and use another reporesentation theorem by Goldblatt. Some more recent works by Ysapia and Blok suggest Scattered Hausdorff topological spaces. But it is highly technical and beyond the scope of the list, I think. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Bruno, -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Saturday, May 21, 2011 3:28 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 21 May 2011, at 19:15, meekerdb wrote: On 5/21/2011 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 3-OMs are sequenced by the computations they belongs too. 1-OM are structured by the topology on those computations derived from the application of Theaetetus' theory of knowledge. What topology is that? What's the open set? The topology you can associate to the open set semantics, or neighborhood semantics of the intuitionistic logic corresponding to the inverse of Goldblatt-Boolos-Grzegorczyk from S4Grz logic representation in G, when the arithmetical interpretation is restricted to the sigma_1 prposition, that is the logic I call S4Grz1. And the same for X1*, except that the transformation is different, and use another reporesentation theorem by Goldblatt. Some more recent works by Ysapia and Blok suggest Scattered Hausdorff topological spaces. But it is highly technical and beyond the scope of the list, I think. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- HA! I will sit by the river and meditate. Sooner or later you will see the relevance of the logic-topology duality to your work. Will you give me some credit then? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Dear Stephen, On 18 May 2011, at 18:10, Stephen Paul King wrote: I am interested in more of your thinking on several ideas that you mention in this post. 1) The 8 hypostases as N-OM; N = 1 - 8 I suggest you to read the sane04 paper where they are explained in the part 2, or the Plotinus paper. They are the 8 variants of the provability logic G.: p truth Bp provability Bp p knowability Bp Dt 'or Bp Dp) observation Bp Dt p 'or Bp Dp p) feeling Three of them inherits the provability/truth splitting, like G and G*. The laws of physics are given by inversing Goldblatt transforms on the true observable (given by the true relation on the observation hypostases. That should give the quantum logic von Neumann was searchning, and which is such that it defines the whole quantum probability calculus. It makes testable comp+classical theory of knowledge. 2) Is this physical instantiation of a 3-OM is an infinite mathematical object phrasing equivalent to saying that the physical instantiation of a 3-OM a model (in Model theory terms) of an infinite mathematical object. What is the nature of this object. Remember that the whole physicalness is of the type first person plural. So, contrary to physicalism, a material object is not an objective object, but a sharable perceptible reality, like in a multi- user video game. There is still a difference with the video-games, which is that such material object are projection from infinities of computations, in fact from all computations going through the computational states of those who observe that object. It is not really a model in the sense of model theory. It would be more like an infinity of fungible models. Such material object, for example is not Turing emulable, nor generated anywhere by the universal dovetailer, it is entirely based on the first person plural indeterminacy. 3) About the the notion that OM overlap is what is managed by the modalities distinguishing the points of views? Please elaborate on this. The modalities, mathematically, add different types of structure on the way the computational states refer to each others, and those modalities emerges from the constraints of being self-referentially correct. The motivation and informal but rigorous reason why is given by the UDA, and the math is given by the AUDA. You might study the papers and aks question from there, because your last question is almost like asking to summarize the whole thing, which I do from times to times, but I can't do without boring the reader. Take the time to study the proofs and ask specific question. best, Bruno Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 10:58 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 18 May 2011, at 02:46, meekerdb wrote: On 5/17/2011 5:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. If you accept mechanism, many times emerges. Many 1-times (feeling of duration), and 3-times (clock). Their logic is provably given by the variant of self-reference, which each structured the numbers in different way. Actually 1-times is given by S4Grz1 and X1*, and 3- times is given by Z1*, or slight variant if you nuance the theory of knowledge (this is the toy theology of the ideally correct Löbian number). If you reject mechanism, tell me what is your theory of mind and your theory of matter. [Brent] You misunderstand. I'm objecting to the idea that a thought = a single state of a digital computation. It seems to me that observer moment, OM, is used equivocally to refer to both as though they were the same thing. [Bruno] Yes, I agree. That is a very usual confusion. That is why I suggest people to always distinguish clearly the 3-OMs (computational states belonging to 3-describable computations) and the 1-OMs (which are typically NOT describable, except by reference to a notion of truth, which is itself not describable). Eventually the 3-OMs are handled by the self-reference logic G (and G*), and the 1-OMs are described by the self-reference logic S4Grz1 and X1*. It is the difference between Bp, Bp p, and Bp Dt p. The additions of p, Dt and Dt p change the logical and topological structures bearing on the OMs. I use the notion of OM because people here use that vocabulary, but it is a bit misleading. Given that there is 8 hypostases, we should distinguish the 1-OM, 2-OM, 3-OM, ... 8-OM, and even more due to the others possible arithmetical nuances entailed by the incompleteness phenomenon. If my brain or some part thereof were replaced by digital computer I think its states would be a level far below those of my thoughts (1_OM?) - just as the computational state of my neurons is below the level of my consciousness. You
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno From: meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 11:38 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self- consciousness. Brent -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 18 May 2011, at 19:47, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Rex, A very good point! There must be a place for false memories in our modal logics. Indeed. and G* proves DBf. Lies and falsities abounds in the mind of the average Löbian machines. Could these be included in the Bp p where the p is not necessarily true in all worlds? It can, because p means in that context that p is arithmetically true, like Dt for a consistent machine, so we can have by incompleteness BDt Dt. Of course BDt - Bf (incompletness), and G* proves BDt - f. But this concerns the correct machine. All this work because we cannot know that we are consistent. Bruno Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Rex Allen Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 1:30 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 11:38 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self- consciousness. I tend to disagree. What is memory? Just representation in some material substrate? When you “recall” a memory into the present is it still a memory or part of the present? What about false memories? Isn’t the experience of reflecting on a memory just another kind of experience, no different really than day-dreaming about something that never happened? Rex -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me that being unconscious is more that just not remembering. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit feelings of being conscious but not those of having been uncouscious. This goes back to the question of the role of memories and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, or make it true by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. But this strikes me as trying to save a theory by redefining words. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Brent and Bruno, From: meekerdb Sent: Friday, May 20, 2011 1:44 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/20/2011 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2011, at 18:54, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Me too. Consciousness requires logically the entire arithmetical reality, for example (with mechanism). Without 2+2=4, there is no consciousness, nor computation, nor matter. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness We don't know that. With comp nothing interrupt consciousness. I have experienced it, a gap in my consciousness. Of course you may say it is only a gap in my memory of consciousness, but a loss of memory can be induced in by drugs that do not cause one to be unresponsive at the time which is not remembered. This tells me that being unconscious is more that just not remembering. and erase memories. That can indeed happens locally and relatively. And that can give the feeling of having been unconscious. Bruno But consciousness is a matter of having feelings. Why credit feelings of being conscious but not those of having been uncouscious. This goes back to the question of the role of memories and whether memory is essential to consciousness. You may hypothesize that nothing interrupts consciousness, or make it true by a definition that denies physical (3rd person) time. But this strikes me as trying to save a theory by redefining words. Brent -- [SPK] Let me be clear, if we say that X supervenes on Y then the existence of X is dependent on the existence of Y, right? Consciousness, stripped of the notions of self-awareness, is what I was considering. This corresponds, crudely stated, the idea of some kind of correlation between the content of any given individual 1p and that which is the same for many 1p or even invariant over transformations from one 1p to any other in the equivalence class of 1p. In that sense, if consciousness does not necessitate memory – any form of correlation with representations of prior events – then why does consciousness require any persistent structure at all to exist? What motivation does persistence of structure have in any discussion? This disallows for Last Thursdaysm, I realize, and that is kind of the point that I was trying to make. It seems to me that self-awareness requires memory but bare consciousness does not. This seems consistent with the notion of an OM as have been considered by Russell and Bruno, but it makes my confusion about how OMs are sequenced even more profound! We may posit that 2+2=4 is what undergirds reality, but what the heck does “feelings” have to do with 2+2=4? There is no alternative to 2+2=4 except for falsehood; but “feelings” seems to be a nonsense term without the notion of some form of comparison between, for example, “I experience a qualia that is incompatible with nothing other than having been unconscious yesterday.” How is the truth of this statement evaluated? To put such statements in the same domain as 2+2=4 seems to be a massive error. Feeling something requires a comparative process and a process that requires persistence in time (or over many separate and irreducible computations) so that the content of consciousness is not identical to some stochastic variable (giving rise to the White Rabbit problem). To bring propositions like 2+2=4, which are universal true statements and even tautologies, as support for the idea that consciousness supervenes from Arithmetic Realism (implicit in the 2+2=4) then is to reduce consciousness to a trivial mapping, like the identity 0 – 0 = 0. I have tried to ask Bruno if the logical propositions that he is considering include 1p statements such as this one and, more generally, statements about the local state of affairs as seen from some place and time so that I can better understand if there is a place for an OM in his result, but I get the feeling that there is no answer yet to this question. I am trying to advance the discussion. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 1:35 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: It may have started a nanosecond ago, even though I remember starting to count up from zero and am now at the number ten. That is, I am at the number ten but it may only be the last part, the n of the ten that I have actually thought; it's only a ten when I look back and have the false memory of counting. Isn't that what Bruno calls last Tuesdayims? If OMs are continuous (or overlap) then that would provide a sequence and at least an implicit time. Or Last Thursdayism. Last Tuesdayism is a heresy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omphalos_hypothesis The important point for this argument is that we would have no way of knowing if Last Tuesdayism is true, and this shows that the OM's can be sequenced implicitly from their content. If this were not so, and the subjective sequencing and normal perception of time could only happen if the OM's were generated objectively in sequence, then Last Tuesdayism could be falsified from the fact that we do not remember a discontinuity. When I have a small thought it doesn't necessarily include memories of previous thoughts, and certainly not of my whole past life. But if that presented a problem for sequencing of disjointedly generated OM's it would present the same problem for a stream of consciousness generated by a normally functioning brain. If I have a sufficiently vague moment I may not, in fact, be aware of where, when or even who I am. When I snap out of it, I recall the vagueness, and I recall that it happened after I had a cup of coffee and before I stood up to go for a walk. But the same sequencing would have happened if the coffee, the vagueness and the walk had all been generated in a disjointed manner, and there is nothing in the experience which can indicate to me that this is not in fact what happened. But there is much in other experiences that indicate it did not happen that way. Are you saying you have no theory of the world and OMs, but only immediate experience which could be an illusion. How the experiences are generated is a separate question. Probably Monday was generated before Tuesday, since some information from Monday's experiences is contained in Tuesday's experiences. However, it is not true as a matter of logical necessity that Monday was generated before Tuesday. The subjective sequencing would occur no matter how Monday and Tuesday were generated. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/19/2011 4:45 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 1:35 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: It may have started a nanosecond ago, even though I remember starting to count up from zero and am now at the number ten. That is, I am at the number ten but it may only be the last part, the n of the ten that I have actually thought; it's only a ten when I look back and have the false memory of counting. Isn't that what Bruno calls last Tuesdayims? If OMs are continuous (or overlap) then that would provide a sequence and at least an implicit time. Or Last Thursdayism. Last Tuesdayism is a heresy: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omphalos_hypothesis The important point for this argument is that we would have no way of knowing if Last Tuesdayism is true, and this shows that the OM's can be sequenced implicitly from their content. Only if their content is sufficiently comprehesive. If OM=digital computation state, then it will be sufficient. BUT that's my whole objection to line this discussion. Nobody ever defines OM that way. They want an OM to correspond to a thought of an elementary experience. If this were not so, and the subjective sequencing and normal perception of time could only happen if the OM's were generated objectively in sequence, then Last Tuesdayism could be falsified from the fact that we do not remember a discontinuity. When I have a small thought it doesn't necessarily include memories of previous thoughts, and certainly not of my whole past life. But if that presented a problem for sequencing of disjointedly generated OM's it would present the same problem for a stream of consciousness generated by a normally functioning brain. If I have a sufficiently vague moment I may not, in fact, be aware of where, when or even who I am. When I snap out of it, I recall the vagueness, and I recall that it happened after I had a cup of coffee and before I stood up to go for a walk. But the same sequencing would have happened if the coffee, the vagueness and the walk had all been generated in a disjointed manner, and there is nothing in the experience which can indicate to me that this is not in fact what happened. But there is much in other experiences that indicate it did not happen that way. Are you saying you have no theory of the world and OMs, but only immediate experience which could be an illusion. How the experiences are generated is a separate question. Probably Monday was generated before Tuesday, since some information from Monday's experiences is contained in Tuesday's experiences. Not necessarily. If an OM is the smallest unit of experience then it very likely does not refer to any other experience. However, it is not true as a matter of logical necessity that Monday was generated before Tuesday. Logic neccessitates only that we not affirm X and not X. It is worthless in answering questions about facts. The subjective sequencing would occur no matter how Monday and Tuesday were generated. No, that's what I disagree with. A subjective experience need not contain information about the past. The computational states (and there are many) must, but you are not aware of the computational state of your neurons. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 1:41 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The important point for this argument is that we would have no way of knowing if Last Tuesdayism is true, and this shows that the OM's can be sequenced implicitly from their content. Only if their content is sufficiently comprehesive. If OM=digital computation state, then it will be sufficient. BUT that's my whole objection to line this discussion. Nobody ever defines OM that way. They want an OM to correspond to a thought of an elementary experience. It doesn't matter if the content of a thought is insufficient to sequence it precisely from a third person perspective, since it will be sequenced *precisely enough* from a first person perspective. I think this is our point of misunderstanding: you seem to be talking about objective sequencing, whereas I am talking about subjective sequencing. If I have a moment where I'm so vague that I lack awareness of time, person and place then ipso facto there is no possibility of subjectively sequencing that moment, regardless of how it was generated. If I have a moment where I reflect on who, where and when I am, what I did yesterday, what I will do tomorrow, then ipso facto that moment is subjectively sequenced regardless of how it was generated. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 10:37:29AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 1:41 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The important point for this argument is that we would have no way of knowing if Last Tuesdayism is true, and this shows that the OM's can be sequenced implicitly from their content. Only if their content is sufficiently comprehesive. If OM=digital computation state, then it will be sufficient. BUT that's my whole objection to line this discussion. Nobody ever defines OM that way. They want an OM to correspond to a thought of an elementary experience. It doesn't matter if the content of a thought is insufficient to sequence it precisely from a third person perspective, since it will be sequenced *precisely enough* from a first person perspective. I think this is our point of misunderstanding: you seem to be talking about objective sequencing, whereas I am talking about subjective sequencing. If I have a moment where I'm so vague that I lack awareness of time, person and place then ipso facto there is no possibility of subjectively sequencing that moment, regardless of how it was generated. If I have a moment where I reflect on who, where and when I am, what I did yesterday, what I will do tomorrow, then ipso facto that moment is subjectively sequenced regardless of how it was generated. In my book, I use OM in two distinctly different contexts. In chapter 4, the concept OM is introduced in the context of the strong self-sampling assumption. It is meant to be an experiential unit of sampling. In chapter 7, OMs are identified with the quantum state \psi, including identifiying the amplitude of \psi with the (necessarily complex) measure of the observer moment. \psi contains just that information needed to define where the observer is in space and time (coordinates are not enough to specify a location in the mulitverse). Are these two usages equivalent (or at least compatible). For the moment, I don't see why not, which is why I wrote the book that way. However, these things are not the states of Bruno's universal dovetailer (assuming that particular ontology). Multiple programs will generate the same sequence of experiences, the same sequence of \psi's. Can we answer the question of whether successive \psi's are related to each other? If \psi_1 and \psi_2 are related by a unitary transformation, the we can say that they're related, but the temporal relationship is undefined. Given an operator (observable), we can determine if \psi_2 lies in a lower dimensional eigenspace of the operator than \psi_1, hence \psi_2 is potentially a successor to \psi_1. Also if the magnitude of \psi_2 (if known) is less than \psi_1, it is also potentially a sucessor. But this is all a bit nebulous. I would perhaps like to put it this way - if \psi_1 and \psi_2 can be related by means of a projection operator corresponding to an observable that a conscious being may possibly make, then there is a consious observer in the Multiverse for whom those experiences are so related. Otherwise, they're not related. This probably entails that the set of observers is more likely the powerset of observer moments, depending on how much bite the anthropic principle has. Sorry for rabbitting on here... this is getting a bit speculative. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/19/2011 6:08 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 10:37:29AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 1:41 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: The important point for this argument is that we would have no way of knowing if Last Tuesdayism is true, and this shows that the OM's can be sequenced implicitly from their content. Only if their content is sufficiently comprehesive. If OM=digital computation state, then it will be sufficient. BUT that's my whole objection to line this discussion. Nobody ever defines OM that way. They want an OM to correspond to a thought of an elementary experience. It doesn't matter if the content of a thought is insufficient to sequence it precisely from a third person perspective, since it will be sequenced *precisely enough* from a first person perspective. I think this is our point of misunderstanding: you seem to be talking about objective sequencing, whereas I am talking about subjective sequencing. If I have a moment where I'm so vague that I lack awareness of time, person and place then ipso facto there is no possibility of subjectively sequencing that moment, regardless of how it was generated. If I have a moment where I reflect on who, where and when I am, what I did yesterday, what I will do tomorrow, then ipso facto that moment is subjectively sequenced regardless of how it was generated. In my book, I use OM in two distinctly different contexts. In chapter 4, the concept OM is introduced in the context of the strong self-sampling assumption. It is meant to be an experiential unit of sampling. In chapter 7, OMs are identified with the quantum state \psi, including identifiying the amplitude of \psi with the (necessarily complex) measure of the observer moment. \psi contains just that information needed to define where the observer is in space and time (coordinates are not enough to specify a location in the mulitverse). Are these two usages equivalent (or at least compatible). For the moment, I don't see why not, which is why I wrote the book that way. Is this the psi of the universe or just of the observer (which observer)? How is it unit of experience? However, these things are not the states of Bruno's universal dovetailer (assuming that particular ontology). Multiple programs will generate the same sequence of experiences, the same sequence of \psi's. Can we answer the question of whether successive \psi's are related to each other? If \psi_1 and \psi_2 are related by a unitary transformation, the we can say that they're related, but the temporal relationship is undefined. Given an operator (observable), we can determine if \psi_2 lies in a lower dimensional eigenspace of the operator than \psi_1, hence \psi_2 is potentially a successor to \psi_1. Also if the magnitude of \psi_2 (if known) is less than \psi_1, it is also potentially a sucessor. But this is all a bit nebulous. I would perhaps like to put it this way - if \psi_1 and \psi_2 can be related by means of a projection operator corresponding to an observable that a conscious being may possibly make, then there is a consious observer in the Multiverse for whom those experiences are so related. Otherwise, they're not related. This probably entails that the set of observers is more likely the powerset of observer moments, depending on how much bite the anthropic principle has. Sorry for rabbitting on here... this is getting a bit speculative. I thought you relied on an MWI model in which psi just evolves unitarily and there are no projection operators instantiated by consciousness? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 07:50:57PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: Is this the psi of the universe or just of the observer (which observer)? How is it unit of experience? It is closer to the psi of the universe concept than anything else. Here, a universe means either a single observer moment, or a history (depending on context). Obviously psi refers to a single point in time, not history, and contains all information relating to observation (not the observer). I thought you relied on an MWI model in which psi just evolves unitarily and there are no projection operators instantiated by consciousness? There are definitely projection operators involved - see the PROJECTION postulate from my book (the combination of multiverse variation and anthropic selection). What I don't rely on is the Born rule - that is derived. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 5:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and discrete. In that case they would have to be strung together by some internal reference, one to another. I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small amounts of information - when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory of or reference to previous thoughts. It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. The OM's are just moments of subjective experience. They are continuous rather than discrete, since they can be arbitrarily divided. I am having a thought right now, but I can't say with certainty when the thought started. It may have started a nanosecond ago, even though I remember starting to count up from zero and am now at the number ten. That is, I am at the number ten but it may only be the last part, the n of the ten that I have actually thought; it's only a ten when I look back and have the false memory of counting. When I have a small thought it doesn't necessarily include memories of previous thoughts, and certainly not of my whole past life. But if that presented a problem for sequencing of disjointedly generated OM's it would present the same problem for a stream of consciousness generated by a normally functioning brain. If I have a sufficiently vague moment I may not, in fact, be aware of where, when or even who I am. When I snap out of it, I recall the vagueness, and I recall that it happened after I had a cup of coffee and before I stood up to go for a walk. But the same sequencing would have happened if the coffee, the vagueness and the walk had all been generated in a disjointed manner, and there is nothing in the experience which can indicate to me that this is not in fact what happened. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 18 May 2011, at 02:46, meekerdb wrote: On 5/17/2011 5:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 May 2011, at 19:40, meekerdb wrote: On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers your example, I think... I am wondering how they are strung together, to use the analogy of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a separate dimension of time to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed that term) of one OM get related to that of another? Onward! Stephen I think they must be strung together by overlapping, since as computations I don't think they correspond to atomic states of the digital machine but rather to large sequences of computation (and in Bruno's theory to equivalence classes of sequences). It is just that if you believe that your consciousness (first person experience) is manifested through a digitalisable machine, you have to distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. Intuitively (cf UDA) and computer science theoretically (cf AUDA). The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and discrete. I think Stathis and me share the same theory (a brain can be substituted by a (material) digital mechanism). The OMs Stathis is referring to are the 3-OMs. By digitalness they can be considered as atomic and discrete. If we start from addition and multiplication (of non negative integers) as initial universal base, the 3-OMs are numbers. Now, and here perhaps Stathis might disagree, a sequence of numbers is only a computation when it is defined relatively to a universal number, to begin by one self. The 1-OM arises from the first person indeterminacy. Our actual consciousness depends on the topology and relative measure on all equivalent states reached by all (universal) numbers. This is a non trivial structure whose mathematics can be derived from the self-reference logics + the classical theory of knowledge. As I try to explain, this gives a conceptual explanation of quanta and qualia, and, accepting also the classical theory of knowledge (Timaeus, Theaetetus) a mathematical theory of quanta and qualia. In that case they would have to be strung together by some internal reference, one to another. Stathis has the correct picture, I think. I mean correct relatively to the mechanist assumption. The internal reference is given by the logic of the self-reference. But pure internal reference makes no sense, we need both globally and locally refer to other universal number (other that oneself) to make sense of the notion of computation. But it is the self which create the past and the continuation by maintaining enough self-consistency. Stathis might just study a bit more the math of computer science, perhaps. I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small amounts of information - Computational states (3-OM) are as atomic as natural numbers. Some contains HUGE amount of information. when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory of or reference to previous thoughts. That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Brains only change their probability of manifestation relatively to probable relative universal numbers. Consciousness is a 'natural' property of universal numbers relatively to probable others universal numbers. Those relations define an information differentiating flux in arithmetical truth. It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. If you accept mechanism, many times emerges. Many 1-times (feeling of duration), and 3-times (clock). Their logic is provably given by the variant of self-reference, which each structured the numbers in different way. Actually 1-times is given by S4Grz1 and X1*, and 3- times is given by Z1*, or slight variant if you nuance the theory of knowledge (this is the toy theology of the ideally correct Löbian number). If you reject mechanism, tell me what is your theory of mind and your theory of matter. You misunderstand. I'm objecting to the idea that a thought = a single state of a digital computation. It
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/18/2011 7:51 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 5:40 PM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and discrete. In that case they would have to be strung together by some internal reference, one to another. I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small amounts of information - when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory of or reference to previous thoughts. It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. The OM's are just moments of subjective experience. They are continuous rather than discrete, since they can be arbitrarily divided. I am having a thought right now, but I can't say with certainty when the thought started. Which is what makes the term moment misleading. It implies arbitrarily short duration; which I think is impossible. Digital computational states have no duration, but it doesn't follow that the computation corresponding to an experience does not have duration in the sense of extending over many states. It may have started a nanosecond ago, even though I remember starting to count up from zero and am now at the number ten. That is, I am at the number ten but it may only be the last part, the n of the ten that I have actually thought; it's only a ten when I look back and have the false memory of counting. Isn't that what Bruno calls last Tuesdayims? If OMs are continuous (or overlap) then that would provide a sequence and at least an implicit time. When I have a small thought it doesn't necessarily include memories of previous thoughts, and certainly not of my whole past life. But if that presented a problem for sequencing of disjointedly generated OM's it would present the same problem for a stream of consciousness generated by a normally functioning brain. If I have a sufficiently vague moment I may not, in fact, be aware of where, when or even who I am. When I snap out of it, I recall the vagueness, and I recall that it happened after I had a cup of coffee and before I stood up to go for a walk. But the same sequencing would have happened if the coffee, the vagueness and the walk had all been generated in a disjointed manner, and there is nothing in the experience which can indicate to me that this is not in fact what happened. But there is much in other experiences that indicate it did not happen that way. Are you saying you have no theory of the world and OMs, but only immediate experience which could be an illusion. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Dear Bruno, I am interested in more of your thinking on several ideas that you mention in this post. 1) The 8 hypostases as N-OM; N = 1 - 8 2) Is this physical instantiation of a 3-OM is an infinite mathematical object phrasing equivalent to saying that the physical instantiation of a 3-OM a model (in Model theory terms) of an infinite mathematical object. What is the nature of this object. 3) About the the notion that OM overlap is what is managed by the modalities distinguishing the points of views? Please elaborate on this. Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 10:58 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 18 May 2011, at 02:46, meekerdb wrote: On 5/17/2011 5:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. If you accept mechanism, many times emerges. Many 1-times (feeling of duration), and 3-times (clock). Their logic is provably given by the variant of self-reference, which each structured the numbers in different way. Actually 1-times is given by S4Grz1 and X1*, and 3- times is given by Z1*, or slight variant if you nuance the theory of knowledge (this is the toy theology of the ideally correct Löbian number). If you reject mechanism, tell me what is your theory of mind and your theory of matter. [Brent] You misunderstand. I'm objecting to the idea that a thought = a single state of a digital computation. It seems to me that observer moment, OM, is used equivocally to refer to both as though they were the same thing. [Bruno] Yes, I agree. That is a very usual confusion. That is why I suggest people to always distinguish clearly the 3-OMs (computational states belonging to 3-describable computations) and the 1-OMs (which are typically NOT describable, except by reference to a notion of truth, which is itself not describable). Eventually the 3-OMs are handled by the self-reference logic G (and G*), and the 1-OMs are described by the self-reference logic S4Grz1 and X1*. It is the difference between Bp, Bp p, and Bp Dt p. The additions of p, Dt and Dt p change the logical and topological structures bearing on the OMs. I use the notion of OM because people here use that vocabulary, but it is a bit misleading. Given that there is 8 hypostases, we should distinguish the 1-OM, 2-OM, 3-OM, ... 8-OM, and even more due to the others possible arithmetical nuances entailed by the incompleteness phenomenon. If my brain or some part thereof were replaced by digital computer I think its states would be a level far below those of my thoughts (1_OM?) - just as the computational state of my neurons is below the level of my consciousness. You are right. And this is why physics is eventually transformed into a statistics on (relative) computations. Whatever is below my substitution level is multiplied into infinities, because no machine can singularize itself on one computation. We are spread across the whole universal dovetailing, or on the whole sigma_1 arithmetical truth. Those states (are those what you are calling 3-OM?) would contain far more information than that contained in the conscious part. Indeed, a real physical instantiation of a 3-OM is an infinite mathematical object (if we are machine). They would have a much shorter duration than a thought and so a thought would not be atomic, but would have parts that could overlap and hence provide the experience of time. I agree. The overlap is what is managed by the modalities distinguishing the points of views. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 18 May 2011, at 17:38, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. Mystics often distinguishes the little ego from the higher self. Memory, and, usually, many bodies and things are needed for the little ego, but I am not sure memory is needed for the higher self- consciousness. But this might be a word play. It is possible that consciousness is always the same as higher self-consciousness. In that case the (little) ego-consciousness appears when the higher self *forgets* its status, and begin to identify itself with the memories and the many things it believes it owns. Bruno What, you ask, was the beginning of it all? And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen From: meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 11:38 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. Brent -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness and erase memories. Brent *From:* meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net *Sent:* Wednesday, May 18, 2011 11:38 AM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. Brent -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 1:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers your example, I think... I am wondering how they are strung together, to use the analogy of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a separate dimension of time to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed that term) of one OM get related to that of another? Onward! Stephen I think they must be strung together by overlapping, since as computations I don't think they correspond to atomic states of the digital machine but rather to large sequences of computation (and in Bruno's theory to equivalence classes of sequences). The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and discrete. In that case they would have to be strung together by some internal reference, one to another. I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small amounts of information - when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory of or reference to previous thoughts. It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. It seems to me that the time that we experience can’t be “real” time. I don’t see how we could have direct access to time any more than we have direct access to anything else “in the world”. The time that we know must be an artifact of how we represent the world...an artifact of our model of the world...an aspect of our experience. I’m not a materialist, but if I were I would take a computationalist/representationalist view of the mind. In this view, our experience of the world would be “represented” in some information storage medium, and then changes to that representation would result in changes to our experience. What would be the mapping from the representation to any particular experience? Well, for any *change* in experience, there would have to be a change in the representation. But you can’t notice anything, can’t experience anything, *unless* there is a change in the underlying representation that would represent “noticing it” or “experiencing it”. So your awareness of time would have to be within the “bits” of information representing your experience...it could not be anywhere else. Not every change in the bits would *necessarily* equate to a change in experience - but no change in experience could occur without a change in the underlying representation. And of course change wouldn't necessarily have to happen in time. The X value of a line on a 2D graph changes with respect to the Y value...but this is not a change in time. So time would exist within experience, not external to or independent of it. Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 11:38 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. I tend to disagree. What is memory? Just representation in some material substrate? When you “recall” a memory into the present is it still a memory or part of the present? What about false memories? Isn’t the experience of reflecting on a memory just another kind of experience, no different really than day-dreaming about something that never happened? Rex -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Brent, True, but we are trying to get out of anthropocentric constrains ( I hope!). The question is aimed at trying to drill down further into the concept of consciousness and to see if Russell’s ideas are correct (as discussed in his book) and those of Bruno by exploring their implications, a sort of attempt at a reductio ad absurdum. Onward! Stephen From: meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 12:54 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 9:21 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Interesting! If we follow this idea, that memory is not necessary for consciousness, then consciousness does not require a persistent structure to supervene upon. No? Onward! Stephen I don't see how that follows. Require in what sense: logical, nomological,...? We know that a blow to the head can interrupt consciousness and erase memories. Brent From: meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 11:38 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. Brent -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Dear Bruno, How beautifully said! This is a rediscovery of ideas that we find in many mythological systems. We are God that forgot what we truly are. Onward! Stephen From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 12:11 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 18 May 2011, at 17:38, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. Mystics often distinguishes the little ego from the higher self. Memory, and, usually, many bodies and things are needed for the little ego, but I am not sure memory is needed for the higher self-consciousness. But this might be a word play. It is possible that consciousness is always the same as higher self-consciousness. In that case the (little) ego-consciousness appears when the higher self *forgets* its status, and begin to identify itself with the memories and the many things it believes it owns. Bruno What, you ask, was the beginning of it all? And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Rex, I agree with you 100%! I am amazed that this idea is considered as a horrid heresy by most physicists that continue to think of “space-time” as some kind of “container” that we exist in much like insects trapped in amber. Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Rex Allen Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 1:24 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 1:40 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers your example, I think... I am wondering how they are strung together, to use the analogy of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a separate dimension of time to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed that term) of one OM get related to that of another? Onward! Stephen I think they must be strung together by overlapping, since as computations I don't think they correspond to atomic states of the digital machine but rather to large sequences of computation (and in Bruno's theory to equivalence classes of sequences). The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and discrete. In that case they would have to be strung together by some internal reference, one to another. I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small amounts of information - when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory of or reference to previous thoughts. It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. It seems to me that the time that we experience can’t be “real” time. I don’t see how we could have direct access to time any more than we have direct access to anything else “in the world”. The time that we know must be an artifact of how we represent the world...an artifact of our model of the world...an aspect of our experience. I’m not a materialist, but if I were I would take a computationalist/representationalist view of the mind. In this view, our experience of the world would be “represented” in some information storage medium, and then changes to that representation would result in changes to our experience. What would be the mapping from the representation to any particular experience? Well, for any *change* in experience, there would have to be a change in the representation. But you can’t notice anything, can’t experience anything, *unless* there is a change in the underlying representation that would represent “noticing it” or “experiencing it”. So your awareness of time would have to be within the “bits” of information representing your experience...it could not be anywhere else. Not every change in the bits would *necessarily* equate to a change in experience - but no change in experience could occur without a change in the underlying representation. And of course change wouldn't necessarily have to happen in time. The X value of a line on a 2D graph changes with respect to the Y value...but this is not a change in time. So time would exist within experience, not external to or independent of it. Rex -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Rex, A very good point! There must be a place for false memories in our modal logics. Could these be included in the Bp p where the p is not necessarily true in all worlds? Onward! Stephen -Original Message- From: Rex Allen Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 1:30 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 11:38 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. I tend to disagree. What is memory? Just representation in some material substrate? When you “recall” a memory into the present is it still a memory or part of the present? What about false memories? Isn’t the experience of reflecting on a memory just another kind of experience, no different really than day-dreaming about something that never happened? Rex -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/18/2011 10:44 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Rex, I agree with you 100%! I am amazed that this idea is considered as a horrid heresy by most physicists You seem to have an uninformed opinion of physicists. The physicists I know don't consider anything heresy because they consider time and space and all of physics to be models which are invented to represent our best guesses about reality. Brent that continue to think of “space-time” as some kind of “container” that we exist in much like insects trapped in amber. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/18/2011 10:39 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, How beautifully said! This is a rediscovery of ideas that we find in many mythological systems. We are God that forgot what we truly are. Onward! Stephen Careful. Don't go all Deepak Chopra on us. :-) Brent *From:* Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be *Sent:* Wednesday, May 18, 2011 12:11 PM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 18 May 2011, at 17:38, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. Mystics often distinguishes the little ego from the higher self. Memory, and, usually, many bodies and things are needed for the little ego, but I am not sure memory is needed for the higher self-consciousness. But this might be a word play. It is possible that consciousness is always the same as higher self-consciousness. In that case the (little) ego-consciousness appears when the higher self *forgets* its status, and begin to identify itself with the memories and the many things it believes it owns. Bruno /What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?/ /And it is this .../ /Existence that multiplied itself/ /For sheer delight of being/ /And plunged into numberless trillions of forms/ /So that it might/ /Find / /Itself/ /Innumerably /(Aurobindo) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/18/2011 10:30 AM, Rex Allen wrote: On Wed, May 18, 2011 at 11:38 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. I tend to disagree. What is memory? Just representation in some material substrate? When you “recall” a memory into the present is it still a memory or part of the present? What about false memories? Isn’t the experience of reflecting on a memory just another kind of experience, no different really than day-dreaming about something that never happened? Rex I don't see that we're in disagreement. Except possibly when you say memory is *just* another experience. It is an experience *of remembering* and so differs from experiences that are not memories; it is qualitatively different. Of course that is separate from the question of whether it is veridical, whether it has causal connection and similarity to some earlier experience. I think earlier can be defined in terms of the underlying computation. How that sequence relates to the sequence of experience seems to be part of the difficult question of how to recover physics from computation. I can see that earlier experiences must be encoded in the states of computation in order for them to be experienced as memories. My point was only that an experience must correspond to a sequence of computational states, not just to one (a moment) and that its information content must be very small compared to that of the underlying states. So a moment (computational state) is to short to constitute an observation (an experience). And an observation is to small (not enough information) to constitute a moment (a computational state). So observer moment seems like an incoherent and confusing term. I guess that's why Bruno resorts to 1-OM and 3-OM; but that seems to imply there a such a thing as an OM that is just looked at from two different viewpoints. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Brent, I am happy to be wrong inn that opinion! But nevertheless finding a physicists what will admit publicly what you mention is difficult. Onward! Stephen From: meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 2:00 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 10:44 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Rex, I agree with you 100%! I am amazed that this idea is considered as a horrid heresy by most physicists You seem to have an uninformed opinion of physicists. The physicists I know don't consider anything heresy because they consider time and space and all of physics to be models which are invented to represent our best guesses about reality. Brent that continue to think of “space-time” as some kind of “container” that we exist in much like insects trapped in amber. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Brent, Oh you bet! Chopra and those like him have not done us any favors, but can we truly begrudge people from making a buck of a book that is a soft version of the ideas we are considering? Not all people are on the far right hand side of the bell curve. Onward! Stephen From: meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 2:01 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 10:39 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, How beautifully said! This is a rediscovery of ideas that we find in many mythological systems. We are God that forgot what we truly are. Onward! Stephen Careful. Don't go all Deepak Chopra on us. :-) Brent From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 12:11 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 18 May 2011, at 17:38, meekerdb wrote: On 5/18/2011 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Are you claiming that every thought includes a memory? A memory of what? The immediately preceding thought? You lost me. I was pretending the contrary. I was with you on this. It is *because* a thought (a conscious thought) does not necessarily include a memory or a reference to previous thoughts that you can remain conscious when taking a drug which disconnect you from all memories. Ok. I mistook your point. I agree that memory is not necessary for consciousness - though I think it is necessary for self-consciousness. Mystics often distinguishes the little ego from the higher self. Memory, and, usually, many bodies and things are needed for the little ego, but I am not sure memory is needed for the higher self-consciousness. But this might be a word play. It is possible that consciousness is always the same as higher self-consciousness. In that case the (little) ego-consciousness appears when the higher self *forgets* its status, and begin to identify itself with the memories and the many things it believes it owns. Bruno What, you ask, was the beginning of it all? And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/18/2011 11:26 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, I am happy to be wrong inn that opinion! But nevertheless finding a physicists what will admit publicly what you mention is difficult. Onward! Stephen My friend Vic Stenger (a physicist) not only admits it publicly he has attempted to popularize it in books and lectures. I don't know of any physicist who's bothered to disagree in print. The Comprehensible Cosmos Where Do The Laws of Physics Come From? The laws of physics were not handed down from above. Nor are they somehow built into the logical structure of the universe. They are human inventions, though not arbitrary ones. They are not restrictions on the behavior of matter. They are restrictions on the way physicists may describe that behavior. In order to describe an objective reality, those descriptions cannot depend on the point of view of observers. They must be point-of-view-invariant. When point-of-view invariance is implemented, the laws of physics follow with few additional assumptions. We live in a comprehensible cosmos. Here's a review. http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Nothing/NewSciRev.pdf Brent *From:* meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net *Sent:* Wednesday, May 18, 2011 2:00 PM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 10:44 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Rex, I agree with you 100%! I am amazed that this idea is considered as a horrid heresy by most physicists You seem to have an uninformed opinion of physicists. The physicists I know don't consider anything heresy because they consider time and space and all of physics to be models which are invented to represent our best guesses about reality. Brent that continue to think of “space-time” as some kind of “container” that we exist in much like insects trapped in amber. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/18/2011 11:29 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Oh you bet! Chopra and those like him have not done us any favors, but can we truly begrudge people from making a buck of a book that is a soft version of the ideas we are considering? I can certainly begrudge a charlatan who charges money to tell people that they can recover from cancer by thinking the right thoughts. Brent Not all people are on the far right hand side of the bell curve. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Brent, Absolutely, but do we need to spend time chasing off the charlatans? I leave it to people like Sam Harris and James Randi to do that. OTOH, we must be careful that we are not imposing an authoritarian regime upon the world such that only “authorized” persons can put form ideas and ask ontological questions. ;-) Onward, Stephen From: meekerdb Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2011 3:17 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On 5/18/2011 11:29 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, Oh you bet! Chopra and those like him have not done us any favors, but can we truly begrudge people from making a buck of a book that is a soft version of the ideas we are considering? I can certainly begrudge a charlatan who charges money to tell people that they can recover from cancer by thinking the right thoughts. Brent Not all people are on the far right hand side of the bell curve. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 16 May 2011, at 19:40, meekerdb wrote: On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers your example, I think... I am wondering how they are strung together, to use the analogy of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a separate dimension of time to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed that term) of one OM get related to that of another? Onward! Stephen I think they must be strung together by overlapping, since as computations I don't think they correspond to atomic states of the digital machine but rather to large sequences of computation (and in Bruno's theory to equivalence classes of sequences). It is just that if you believe that your consciousness (first person experience) is manifested through a digitalisable machine, you have to distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. Intuitively (cf UDA) and computer science theoretically (cf AUDA). The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and discrete. I think Stathis and me share the same theory (a brain can be substituted by a (material) digital mechanism). The OMs Stathis is referring to are the 3-OMs. By digitalness they can be considered as atomic and discrete. If we start from addition and multiplication (of non negative integers) as initial universal base, the 3-OMs are numbers. Now, and here perhaps Stathis might disagree, a sequence of numbers is only a computation when it is defined relatively to a universal number, to begin by one self. The 1-OM arises from the first person indeterminacy. Our actual consciousness depends on the topology and relative measure on all equivalent states reached by all (universal) numbers. This is a non trivial structure whose mathematics can be derived from the self-reference logics + the classical theory of knowledge. As I try to explain, this gives a conceptual explanation of quanta and qualia, and, accepting also the classical theory of knowledge (Timaeus, Theaetetus) a mathematical theory of quanta and qualia. In that case they would have to be strung together by some internal reference, one to another. Stathis has the correct picture, I think. I mean correct relatively to the mechanist assumption. The internal reference is given by the logic of the self-reference. But pure internal reference makes no sense, we need both globally and locally refer to other universal number (other that oneself) to make sense of the notion of computation. But it is the self which create the past and the continuation by maintaining enough self-consistency. Stathis might just study a bit more the math of computer science, perhaps. I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small amounts of information - Computational states (3-OM) are as atomic as natural numbers. Some contains HUGE amount of information. when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory of or reference to previous thoughts. That is how meditation and dissociative drug can help you to remind the consciousness of the blanche machine, the consciousness of the virgin Löbian machine. Memories only differentiate consciousness. Brains only change their probability of manifestation relatively to probable relative universal numbers. Consciousness is a 'natural' property of universal numbers relatively to probable others universal numbers. Those relations define an information differentiating flux in arithmetical truth. It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. If you accept mechanism, many times emerges. Many 1-times (feeling of duration), and 3-times (clock). Their logic is provably given by the variant of self-reference, which each structured the numbers in different way. Actually 1-times is given by S4Grz1 and X1*, and 3- times is given by Z1*, or slight variant if you nuance the theory of knowledge (this is the toy theology of the ideally correct Löbian number). If you reject mechanism, tell me what is your theory of mind and your theory of matter. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On Wed, May 11, 2011 at 9:57 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Brent and Everything List Members, Let me start over and focus on the sequencing of OMs. I argue that the Schrodinger Equation does not work to generate a sequencing of Observer moments for multiple interacting observers because it assumes a physically unreal notion of time, the Newtonian Absolute time which is disallowed by the experimentally verified theory of general relativity. I will concede that I might be mistaken in my claim that the complex valuation of the observables (or, in the state vector formalism, the amplitudes) nor the hermiticity will generate a natural or well ordering that can be used to induced an a priori sequencing of the OMs, but I would like to see an argument that it does. Is there one? The paper by Ischam argues that there is not... I see this problem of OM sequencing as separate from the ideas about clocks since clocks are a classical concept that depends, in a QM universe, on decoherence or something similar to overcome the effects of the HUP on its hands. Onward! Stephen The subjective sequencing is independent of any real world sequence that might occur. Today is Monday and I recall that yesterday was Sunday. I assume that my brain generated Sunday's subjective experiences first and then used them to generate Monday's. But this need not necessarily be the case: it could be that that Sunday was generated a century ago in real time, or not generated at all, and my memories of it are false ones. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Stathis, -Original Message- From: Stathis Papaioannou Sent: Monday, May 16, 2011 9:08 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On Wed, May 11, 2011 at 9:57 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Brent and Everything List Members, Let me start over and focus on the sequencing of OMs. I argue that the Schrodinger Equation does not work to generate a sequencing of Observer moments for multiple interacting observers because it assumes a physically unreal notion of time, the Newtonian Absolute time which is disallowed by the experimentally verified theory of general relativity. I will concede that I might be mistaken in my claim that the complex valuation of the observables (or, in the state vector formalism, the amplitudes) nor the hermiticity will generate a natural or well ordering that can be used to induced an a priori sequencing of the OMs, but I would like to see an argument that it does. Is there one? The paper by Ischam argues that there is not... I see this problem of OM sequencing as separate from the ideas about clocks since clocks are a classical concept that depends, in a QM universe, on decoherence or something similar to overcome the effects of the HUP on its hands. Onward! Stephen The subjective sequencing is independent of any real world sequence that might occur. Today is Monday and I recall that yesterday was Sunday. I assume that my brain generated Sunday's subjective experiences first and then used them to generate Monday's. But this need not necessarily be the case: it could be that that Sunday was generated a century ago in real time, or not generated at all, and my memories of it are false ones. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- [SPK] I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers your example, I think... I am wondering how they are strung together, to use the analogy of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a separate dimension of time to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed that term) of one OM get related to that of another? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 16 May 2011, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, May 11, 2011 at 9:57 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Brent and Everything List Members, Let me start over and focus on the sequencing of OMs. I argue that the Schrodinger Equation does not work to generate a sequencing of Observer moments for multiple interacting observers because it assumes a physically unreal notion of time, the Newtonian Absolute time which is disallowed by the experimentally verified theory of general relativity. I will concede that I might be mistaken in my claim that the complex valuation of the observables (or, in the state vector formalism, the amplitudes) nor the hermiticity will generate a natural or well ordering that can be used to induced an a priori sequencing of the OMs, but I would like to see an argument that it does. Is there one? The paper by Ischam argues that there is not... I see this problem of OM sequencing as separate from the ideas about clocks since clocks are a classical concept that depends, in a QM universe, on decoherence or something similar to overcome the effects of the HUP on its hands. Onward! Stephen The subjective sequencing is independent of any real world sequence that might occur. Yes. It is even independent of the nature (physically real, virtual, or arithmetical) nature of that sequence. Today is Monday and I recall that yesterday was Sunday. I assume that my brain generated Sunday's subjective experiences first and then used them to generate Monday's. But this need not necessarily be the case: it could be that that Sunday was generated a century ago in real time, or not generated at all, and my memories of it are false ones. You are right. Now, in concreto, all such sequences of (3-OM) states exist in a tiny part of arithmetic. They are still sequences, and not isolated states, by virtue of being linking by universal numbers (if not, the notion of computation would have no meaning at all). This justifies that if we are machine, at some level of description, the laws of nature are given by a relative statistic on all computations existing in that tiny part of arithmetic, precisely by all the competing universal numbers linking those 3-OMs. Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 16 May 2011, at 16:13, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Stathis, -Original Message- From: Stathis Papaioannou Sent: Monday, May 16, 2011 9:08 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments On Wed, May 11, 2011 at 9:57 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Brent and Everything List Members, Let me start over and focus on the sequencing of OMs. I argue that the Schrodinger Equation does not work to generate a sequencing of Observer moments for multiple interacting observers because it assumes a physically unreal notion of time, the Newtonian Absolute time which is disallowed by the experimentally verified theory of general relativity. I will concede that I might be mistaken in my claim that the complex valuation of the observables (or, in the state vector formalism, the amplitudes) nor the hermiticity will generate a natural or well ordering that can be used to induced an a priori sequencing of the OMs, but I would like to see an argument that it does. Is there one? The paper by Ischam argues that there is not... I see this problem of OM sequencing as separate from the ideas about clocks since clocks are a classical concept that depends, in a QM universe, on decoherence or something similar to overcome the effects of the HUP on its hands. Onward! Stephen The subjective sequencing is independent of any real world sequence that might occur. Today is Monday and I recall that yesterday was Sunday. I assume that my brain generated Sunday's subjective experiences first and then used them to generate Monday's. But this need not necessarily be the case: it could be that that Sunday was generated a century ago in real time, or not generated at all, and my memories of it are false ones. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- [SPK] I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers your example, I think... I am wondering how they are strung together, to use the analogy of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a separate dimension of time to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed that term) of one OM get related to that of another? For the 3-OM, some universal number. For the 1-OMs, infinities of universal numbers (the one running the computation below your substitution level). The initial time is given by the succession of the natural numbers, like in the UD. I am curious to know if Stathis and others agree with this, or at least see what I mean. It is always enlightening to imagine yourself in a (concrete) universe with a UD running in it, then a mere understanding that the number relations does execute (not just describe) the UD can help to understand how all OMs organize themselves, so that with OCCAM we don't need to postulate an initial concrete universe. The movie graph shows that not only we don't need it, but even if that would exist, we just cannot use it to singularize consciousness. OK? Bruno Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers your example, I think... I am wondering how they are strung together, to use the analogy of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a separate dimension of time to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed that term) of one OM get related to that of another? Onward! Stephen I think they must be strung together by overlapping, since as computations I don't think they correspond to atomic states of the digital machine but rather to large sequences of computation (and in Bruno's theory to equivalence classes of sequences). The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and discrete. In that case they would have to be strung together by some internal reference, one to another. I don't think that's a viable theory since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small amounts of information - when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily include any memory of or reference to previous thoughts. It is also difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted for in this theory. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Dear Brent,
-Original Message-
From: meekerdb
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2011 1:40 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
On 5/16/2011 7:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
[SPK]
I was trying to be sure that I took that involves the possibility
that the OMs are computationally disjoint into account. This covers
your example, I think...
I am wondering how they are strung together, to use the analogy
of putting beads on a string. My point is that we cannot appeal to a
separate dimension of time to act as the sequencer of the OMs. So
how do they get sequenced? How does the information (if I am allowed
that term) of one OM get related to that of another?
Onward!
Stephen
I think they must be strung together by overlapping, since as
computations I don't think they correspond to atomic states of the
digital machine but rather to large sequences of computation (and in
Bruno's theory to equivalence classes of sequences).
The other theory that Stathis is explicating takes OM's to be atomic and
discrete. In that case they would have to be strung together by some
internal reference, one to another. I don't think that's a viable
theory since in order to make them atomic, they must have only small
amounts of information - when I have a thought it doesn't necessarily
include any memory of or reference to previous thoughts. It is also
difficult to see how the empirical experience of time can be accounted
for in this theory.
Brent
--
It could be that Stathis' theory is using the notion of atomicity that is
used in logics relating to formulas. It relates to the original Greek notion of
an atom as indivisible. Atomic logics can be considered as such that to add
or subtract some part of them (prepositions and/or relations) would make them
collapse. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_formula and in a wider
context here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-order_logic . I would like to
see more of Stathis’ ideas.
I am sanguine toward this idea as it would apply to OMs in the sense of
inducing the stratifications that we see in terms of Bruno’s “substitution
level” for a wider notion of machines – not just humans - and Russell’s idea
that an OM has a minimum quantity of chance involved, like a result of constant
of action of sorts. The Yes Doctor thesis of digital substitution would apply
to planetary and even galactic sized sentient entities if it applies to amoeba
and humans! (I only worry that Bruno is too easily dismissing the implications
of quantum entanglement and the canonical conjugacy of observables.)
Complete atomic Boolean algebras are part of these explorations. For
instance see:
http://planetmath.org/encyclopedia/RepresentingACompleteAtomicBooleanAlgebraByPowerSet.html
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_algebras_canonically_defined . I am
interested in more general logics (where the truth values can range over the
complex numbers instead of just those that have binary ({0,1} valuations) and
their topological Stone duals and considerations of if and how they can be
considered as dynamic (instead of just static a priori given structures). Thus
my questions about how OMs are sequenced. It is part of the idea that I am
exploring using the Stone duality (similar to line discussed here
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field_of_sets ) to rehabilitate Cartesian dualism
as first proposed by Vaughan Pratt since it has become obvious to me that
monist ontologies have severe problems.
It could be that considerations of OMs as defined in terms of equivalence
classes of computational sequences or as atomic formulas or algebras are
consistent with each other, just different semantical methods of addressing the
same idea. We run into difficulties in these discussion because we can easily
mix metaphors when translating between technical discussions of the formal
mathematics and our personal folk theologies about our experiences and
interpretations of the mathematics. I am often guilty of this metaphor mixing
and appreciate error correction when needed. ;-)
Onward!
Stephen
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Re: On the Sequencing of Observer Moments
Hi Brent and Everything List Members, Let me start over and focus on the sequencing of OMs. I argue that the Schrodinger Equation does not work to generate a sequencing of Observer moments for multiple interacting observers because it assumes a physically unreal notion of time, the Newtonian Absolute time which is disallowed by the experimentally verified theory of general relativity. I will concede that I might be mistaken in my claim that the complex valuation of the observables (or, in the state vector formalism, the amplitudes) nor the hermiticity will generate a natural or well ordering that can be used to induced an a priori sequencing of the OMs, but I would like to see an argument that it does. Is there one? The paper by Ischam argues that there is not... I see this problem of OM sequencing as separate from the ideas about clocks since clocks are a classical concept that depends, in a QM universe, on decoherence or something similar to overcome the effects of the HUP on its hands. Onward! Stephen From: meekerdb Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 8:04 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis On 5/9/2011 3:22 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, From: meekerdb Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 12:17 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis On 5/8/2011 10:22 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Bent, From: meekerdb Sent: Monday, May 09, 2011 12:31 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Against the Doomsday hypothesis On 5/8/2011 9:19 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi Brent, No, the Newtonian case would be such that the logical non-contradiction requirement would be trivial as the number of physical alternatives that could occur next per state is one, this generates a one to one to one to one to one ... type of sequencing. There is no “choice” in the Newtonian case. And hence no measure problem. [SPK] I agree. But the universe we experience is not Newtonian... On the other hand, in QM we have a clear example of irreducible and non-trivial alternatives that could occur next per state. IN QM, observables are defined in terms of complex valued amplitudes which do not have a well ordering as Real numbered valuations do. No, observables are defined by Hermitean operators which have real eigenvalues. The Hamiltonian generates time evolution. [SPK] I am sorry but you are wrong. The Hamiltonian generation of time evolution is only known for the non-relativistic version of QM, simple cases of relativistic particle dynamics and quantum field theory as currently defined. These use the absolute time of Newton. It is well known that the Newtonian version of time is disallowed by General Relativity. Chris Isham discuses this here: http://arxiv.org/abs/grqc/9210011 “The problem of time in quantum gravity is deeply connected with the special role as- signed to temporal concepts in standard theories of physics. In particular, in Newtonian physics, time—the parameter with respect to which change is manifest—is external to the system itself. This is reflected in the special status of time in conventional quantum theory:” I'm well aware of the problem of time in quantum gravity. But I don't think you need to consider relativistic QFT and solve the problem of quantum gravity just to have examples of non-trivial alternatives that could occur. I don't see the relevance to ordering OMs. [SPKnew] But it is the same problem! If our notion of OMs is not related to the content of observations involved in such things as “inertial reference frames” and the general covariance of physical laws, what is the point of OMs? The Hermitean operators only requires that the observed “pointer bases” are Real numbers. In other words, the Hermiticity requirement only applies to the outcomes of measurements, it does not pre-order the measurements. No, but they are not unordered because the wave-function is complex valued as you implied. The observables, which are presumably the content of OMs are real valued and would be ordered by, for example, reading a clock. [SPK] Did you actually read what I wrote? I was explicit. There was no implication that “they are not unordered because the wave-function is complex valued“, maybe I need to be even more clear and explicit. The Hermiticity requirement of observables DOES NOT GENERATE A WELL ORDER. Can you read that? The fact that each measurement is required to manifest as some Real number does not sequentially map the measurements into the Real line. I welcome you to show otherwise. What you wrote was. On the other hand, in QM we have a clear example of irreducible and non-trivial alternatives that could occur next per state .IN QM, observables are
