Re: [PEIRCE-L] List moderator;s request for a pause in the 'mark' v. 'tone' discussion, Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Ben, Gary, List, As I said in my last note, this thread has wasted everybody's time for no useful purpose. The real expert on this topic is Tony Jappy, who has devoted years of research and publications to this topic. As I said in the first notes, Tony is the expert on this topic.. But he does not enjoy debates of this kind -- for very good reason . So I posted excerpts from Tony's writings. And I would have been happy to discuss those issues, which are far more important then just supporting a choice of one label (tone) vs another (mark). But Jon would never stop. He kept repeating the same claim over and over and over again. He would not even consider the issues that Tony had published in books and articles. In any case, Tony is the expert. If anybody has any doubts on these issues, discuss them with Tony offline. I have zero desire to continue. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Jon, List, On that point, we are in complete agreement: JFS: The word 'instance' is an OPTIONAL term that may be added to almost any noun in the English language. JAS: In general, this is true; but Peirce clearly and repeatedly states that it is important (if not mandatory) to recognize and maintain the distinction between a "graph" as a type and a "graph-instance" as a token, and sometimes he also advocates doing the same with "word" and "word-instance." Yes, indeed. That is also the reason why we need to use exactly the same character string with the option of adding "instance" whenever there might be any possibility of a mistake. As for the choice of Peirce's many character strings to adopt, see the attached 2-page extract from Tony Jappy's article and 2017 book on this subject. That extract contains four tables from his 2017 book, which started this lengthy thread. By the way, this is not an argument from authority. This is a citation of an expert who has done more research and publications on these issues than any of us -- in fact, more than any any subscriber to Peirce list. If anybody has any doubts on this subject, please consult Tony (email address above).Tony prefers not to debate issues on P-list because they can become interminably long (such as this one). But I am sure that he would be very gracious in answering any questions anyone may have. Meanwhile, the issues of relating Peirce's work to the 21st C are a more important topic for most subscribers to P-List. John Jappy_Tables.pdf Description: Adobe PDF document _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Laboratory for phenomenological research
I just came across an announcement of this laboratory at the University of Illinois. https://institutephenom.web.illinois.edu/people/ Note that they mention Heidegger and Husserl, but not Peirce. These are the kind of people we need to educate. Fine points about Peirce's MSS are important for Peirce scholars. But people like these are addressing important issues for today. And they never heard of Peirce. Following is the web page of their leader, Thomas Byrne: https://thomasbyrnephenomenology.com John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
y. In the case of graphs and graph-instances, it is quite the other way. (R 650:10-11, LF 1:164-165, 1910 Jul 23) Note well Peirce's last remark here--the value of accuracy in distinguishing "graphs" (types) and "graph-instances" (tokens) outweighs that of brevity in simply using "graphs" for both. For example ... CSP: "The father g.o." [g.o. = goes out] is a graph, even if it is not scribed on the sheet. For a graph is what is true or false, and its being scribed does not make it so. Also suppose we have on the Sheet of Truth The mother g.o. The mother g.o. The mother g.o. The mother g.o. Then there is only one graph on the sheet, but there are four graph-instances. This is a very useful distinction to prevent misunderstandings. A graph-instance is a single scribing according to this System of that which must either be true or false. A graph is the one form of all possible graph-instances which express the same meaning in precisely the same way. Thus The MOTHER g.o. and The mother goes out are two instances of the same graph because their differences are entirely insignificant, that is do not amount to different ways of expressing the fact, but only to different ways of writing. But The mother g.o. and The mother g.o. The mother g.o. are two different graphs, though their meaning is the same. (R 514:7-8, LF 1:478-479, 1904) Again, a graph is a type, "a definitely significant Form"; while a graph-instance is a token, "A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does" (CP 4.537). Also ... CSP: A Graph, then, as the word is used when it is plain that an Existential Graph is meant, is not a sign or mark or any other existent or actual individual, but is a kind of sign which if scribed on the Phemic Sheet (i.e. if an Instance of it stood on the Sheet) would make an assertion. The individual sign that results from the scribing of a Graph has been called an "Instance" of the Graph. This word "Instance" might conveniently be introduced into ordinary parlance. For example, only two words in our language are called articles; but one of these, the definite article, the, will commonly occur, on an average page of novel or essay, over twenty times. They are reckoned by the editor who asks for an article of so many thousand "words" as distinct words; but in fact they are only twenty or more instances of the same word; and if the editor takes any pleasure in speaking accurately he should call for an article of so many thousand "word-instances." At any rate, it would be highly inconvenient to call "Graph-instances" Graphs. (R 669:9-10, LF 1:579, 1911 May 27) Here Peirce explicitly denies that a graph is a "mark," which he explicitly equates with an "existent or actual individual," i.e., a token--so "mark" is plainly unsuitable for naming a different member of the same trichotomy. In any case, the bottom line is that when a graph is scribed on the sheet, what actually stands on the sheet as a result is not a graph, but a graph-instance. GR: 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the orchestra. 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. JFS: Yes, they are normal sentences because the word 'tone' in these examples is used to refer to the actual sound that is heard, not to some mark that might distinguish one tone of voice from another. No, the word "tone" in Gary's examples is used to refer to a certain quality of the actual sound that is heard, which can distinguish one flute from another or one utterance from another. Likewise, in my own example, all lowercase, all caps, bold, italics, and color can be employed to distinguish different instances (tokens) of the same word (type) from each other such that they have different dynamical interpretants in their different contexts. Such an "indefinitely significant character" is exactly what Peirce defines as a "tone," the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type" (CP 4.537). JFS: Nobody has found anything later (or better at any time) on this topic. Later, maybe not; better is obviously a subjective judgment. I have quoted several passages in this post alone, as well as in my previous posts, that I believe are better in the sense that they are clearer. JFS: My primary concern is that you and Jon have made claims abut Peirce without showing any justification. Anyone who alleges that we have offered no justification
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Jon, Gary, List, Please reread the paragraph below by Peirce from L376 (December 1911). The example he uses is 'existential graph'. He uses exactly the same word with no change whatsoever for the abstract "might be'' (the formal pattern of spots, lines, and ovals) and the visible graph as it is written on a phemic sheet. CSP: Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an assertion is called a graph. If it actually be so scribed, it would be incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet. For that would be an impossibility, since the graph itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general," or as I call it a "might-be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word,"--any word, say camel. (R L376:14-15, 1911 Dec 8) This is Peirce's final word on the subject: the word 'graph' (or the longer phrase 'existential graph') is the correct term to use for BOTH the abstract form and for the visible drawing on a phemic sheet. If you need more examples, look at how Peirce writes about the EGs he is using to SOLVE problem or PROVE a theorem. In every such example, he calls them graphs, not graph-instances. The only cases when he might talk about a graph instance is in METALANGUAGE about the theory. If anybody finds such examples, please let us know. JAS: However, this contradicts John's claim instead of corroborating it, by explicitly stating that we cannot say that what is being observed is the [mark] itself--we need a different word for the embodiment of the [mark], such as "graph-instance" in lieu of "graph." Alternatively, if "mark" is the right word for the embodiment, then we need a different word for the form itself. No. That claim confuses two very different ways of talking about two very different topics. Teachers who are explaining how to draw, use, and talk about EGs call them graphs, not graph instances. However, philosophers who are distinguishing theory and practice, use a metalanguage for distinguishing the abstract form (a might-be) from the actual visible drawings. Just look at any book on geometry from Aristotle to the present. The words such as 'circle' or 'triangle' refer to abstract forms. And EXACTLY the same words are used to describe the drawings in a book or computer screen (or even on sand, as they often did in the olden days). But as a philosopher, Plato made a very sharp METALEVEL distinction between the abstract Platonic forms and the visible patterns drawn in ink, chalk, wax, or sand. Nevertheless, all working mathematicians use the simple words circle, triangle, square... when they're solving problems, proving theorems, and writing explanations for both experts and students. Please note how Peirce writes about EGs when he's using them to solve problems. He does not call them graph-instances. In an earlier note, I commented on the last phrase by Peirce in the above quotation: "in that respect [a graph is] just like a "word,"--any word, say camel."Then I gave the following examples to show why the word 'mark' is better than 'tone' in the trichotomy of (Mark Token Type): 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider the following two sentences: 1. A hump is a tone of a camel. 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant. Those two examples not only sound silly, they show why a word like 'tone', which is limited to sounds is much more confusing than the word 'mark', which may be used for any sensory modality. GR: 1. She preferred the tone of her flute to that of the first flautist in the orchestra. 2. Her tone of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. GR: "Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Yes, they are normal sentences because the word 'tone' in these examples is used to refer to the actual sound that is heard, not to some mark that might distinguish one tone of voice from another. GR: Now consider the following two sentences: 1. She preferred the mark of her flute to that of the first flautist in the orchestra. 2. Her mark of voice changed dramatically when she was angry. In these two sentences, the word 'mark' is incorrect because the literal word 'tone' would be appropriate. GR: Indeed your consistent insistence that you are right -- no discussion needed, your seemingly claiming to be the final arbiter in all Peircean terminological matters Au contraire, please note that I have not claimed any authority of my own. In my comments about Peirce's position, I have used his own words, as he stated them in L376. Nobody has found anything later (or better at any time) on this topic. To reinforce Peirce's claims, I
[PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)
Jon, List, In the concluding note of the thread on (Mark Token Type}, I quoted Peirce's explanation why the word that names an abstract 'might be' should have exactly the same spelling as the word that names the actual thing. See below for a copy of my previous note, which includes a copy of Peirce's statement. But I noticed that in your recent note, you fell back on Peirce's unfortunate choice of 'Tone' as the first term in that trichotomy. In Peirce's explanation below (December 1911), he showed why the term 'existential graph', which names an abstract "might be" has exactly the same spelling as the term for the visible thing that is scribed on a phemic sheet. Then he added that "the graph itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a 'might be' " which is "just like a 'word', any word, say camel". I'm glad that he used the example of 'camel' because it emphasizes the profound difference between the word 'mark' and the word 'tone' as they may be used for the first term in the trichotomy ( token type). Consider the following two sentences: 1. A hump is a mark of a camel. 2. A trunk is a mark of an elephant. Those two sentences are normal sentences that any English speaker would understand, whether or not they had read anything by Peirce. Now consider the following two sentences: 1. A hump is a tone of a camel. 2. A trunk is a tone of an elephant. Those two sentences would sound strange to anyone, even somebody who had read Peirce's writings. For those of us who believe that it's important to bring Peirce's writings to the attention of a much wider audience, we cannot assume that our readers are Peirce scholars (or wannabe Peirce scholars). In his ethics of terminology, Peirce made it clear that if nobody else uses one of his neologisms, he had no obligation to continue its use. It is abundantly clear that philosophers, linguists, and even computer programmers have adopted and used the pair (token type) frequently, and some of them even mention Peirce. But nobody, except Peirce scholars, use 'tone' as the first term. And even Peirce scholars never use it for a broad audience. Fundamental principle: We live in the 21st C. Our readers live in the 21st C. The word 'tone' was confusing to Peirce's readers, and it is confusing to our readers today. It has no redeeming social or academic value whatsoever. Get rid of it. John -- The last note on the thread (Mark Token Type): Great news! I came across a quotation by Peirce that explains why the word that names an abstract "might be" SHOULD have exactly the same spelling as the word that names the actual thing that we observe by any external of internal senses. Furthermore, his explanation takes just three sentences. Peirce's explanation below says that an existential graph REALLY is an abstract might-be. However, we are permitted to call the perceptible replica on a phemic sheet an existential graph PROVIDED THAT we acknowledge the distinction between the might-be and the replica. To generalize, following is my edit of the quotation below. My words are enclosed in brackets (except for "[is]", which was added by the editor of the MS): "Any [observable] form which, if it [were to be observed anywhere] would be [a mark] is called [a mark]. If it actually be so [observed], it would be incorrect to say that the [mark] itself is [observed]. For that would be an impossibility, since the [mark] itself [is] a mere form, an abstraction, a "general", or as I call it a "might be", i.e. something which might be if conditions were otherwise than they are; and in that respect it [is] just like a "word", any word, say camel". As for the reason why 'mark' is the best word for both the might-be and the actual is justified by Peirce: The word that is used for the might-be should be applicable to all the actual occurrences. Peirce's definition of 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary is applicable to marks observable by any or all external and internal senses (i.e. anything that appears in the phaneron).. But the word 'tone', which is applicable to a subset of auditory sensations, is far less general than the word 'mark'. The quotation below, from December 1911, is Peirce's final word on this subject. Although he wrote it about existential graphs, it may be generalized to any type of might-be and actual. If the principle is sufficiently general that it can be applied to camels, it should be applicable to marks. This note answers every question, objection, and alternative that anybody has written in all the notes on this subject. John ___ Any visible form which, if it were scribed on the phemic sheet would be an assertion is called a graph. If it actually be so scribed, it would be incorrect to say that the graph itself is put upon the sheet. For that would be an
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Helmut, Jon, List, That is the reason why the word 'Mark' is the perfect choice: you won't be wrong whether or not you know the details of Peirce's semeiotic. HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. The fact that the academic meaning and the common meaning would both use a word with the spelling M-A-R-K makes it the ideal choice for everybody: academics who insist on being absolutely faithful to Peirce's technical sense and everybody else who doesn't know Peirce's technical sense. In fact, one reason why Peirce chose the word tone is that it would be correct for that subset of marks that have the sound of a tone. He also considered 'tuone' for a larger subset of marks that happened to have the sound of tones or tunes. And he considered the word 'tinge' for that subset of marks that could be tinges. But the word 'mark' covers all those sounds as well as arbitrary sights and feelings. That means that Peirce himself preferred words whose dictionary sense was close to or even identical to the academic sense that he intended. Since the overwhelming majority of professional philosophers know very little about the fine points of Peirce's semeiotic, it's a good idea to choose terms that they are capable of remembering and using correctly. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: HR: I haven´t thoroughly followed the discussion about "mark", because I felt, that in this case the academic meaning (possibly a possible) differs too much from from the common meaning, in which a mark is an actual material sign, intended to be recognizable by anybody else. Indeed, this common meaning of "mark" is one reason why I am concerned about using it as a substitute for tone/tuone/tinge/potisign as defined by Peirce--while such a possible sign must be embodied in an existent token in order to act as a sign, it is never itself "an actual material sign." HR: Now I want to answer to JAS´ quote: The subsequent quote is actually from JFS, not me (JAS), although I agree with the gist of it in accordance with synechism. HR: Taxonomy is a kind of classification, and classification is "either-or". Classification is not always "either-or"--for example, Peirce's 1903 trichotomy for classifying a sign according to its relation with its object is icon/index/symbol, yet this is a matter of degree instead of a sharp distinction. A pure icon would signify an interpretant without denoting any object, and a pure index would denote an object without signifying any interpretant, yet every sign by definition has both an object and an interpretant. That is why a symbol is a genuine sign, an index is a degenerate sign, and an icon is a doubly degenerate sign (see EP 2:306-307, c. 1901). HR: BTW, determination, I´d say, is "if-then", from the "then" to the "if". Determination in sign classification can be described using if-then, but not rigidly so. If the correlate or relation for one trichotomy is a necessitant, then the correlate or relation for the next trichotomy can be in any of the three universes; if it is an existent, then the next can be either existent or possible, but not necessitant; and if it is a possible, the the next is also a possible. That is why, in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a symbol can be an argument, dicisign, or rheme; an index can be a dicisign or rheme; and an icon is always a rheme. HR: I added this, because I think, a certain kind of manifestation of the categories is composition (1ns), determination (2ns), and classification (3ns). Peirce explicitly associates composition with 3ns, not 1ns--"[A] triadic relationship cannot be built up from dyadic relationships. Whoever thinks it can be so composed has overlooked the fact that composition is itself a triadic relationship, between the two (or more) components and the composite whole" (CP 6.321, c. 1907). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Edwina, Jon, List, Edwina is emphasizing points I have also been trying to get across. ET: I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines. JFS: The position [Peirce] recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species. JAS: Peirce did not so much recommend those conventions themselves as the underlying motivation that prompted biologists to embrace them. Yes, of course. As Edwina wrote, everybody knows that. And that is why Peirce's advice is irrelevant for subjects that are so precisely definable that there are national and international committees that set the standards for them. But the overwhelming number of words in any natural language have no precise boundaries because there are no natural boundaries in the world itself. Any attempt to legislate precise boundaries would be counter-productive because it would prevent the words from growing and shifting their meaning with changes over time. Just consider the words 'car' and 'plow' in Peirce's day and today. The things they apply to are so radically different that any precise definition in 1900 would be obsolete today. JFS: And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that the new term 'phaneroscopy' is correct, but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'. JAS: Indeed, this change in terminology for a subtle distinction in meaning was perfectly consistent with the principles that Peirce spelled out... Please note what I was trying to say. I just finished writing an article with the tite "Phaneroscopy: The Science of Diagrams". That article will appear in a book with the title "Phenomenology and Phaneroscopy". For that purpose, Peirce's subtle distinction is important, and I emphasized that distinction in my article. But I'm not convinced that Peirce made a good decision in coining the new term. There is a considerable overlap between the two words, and most people won't get the point. In fact, I have seen many Peirce scholars lumping the two words in one phrase "phenomenology and phaneroscopy". I wonder whether they could explain the difference if anyone asked them.Since the word 'phenomenology' is so much more common, very few people will ever learn or use Peirce's word. I believe that Peirce's theories would be easier for teachers to explain and students to learn if he had NOT coined the word 'phaneroscopy'. It would have been better to say that the subject of phenomenology addresses three major issues: (1) the analysis of external phenomena; (2) the analysis of the internal phaneron, and (3) the relations of each to the other, to the world, and to the experiencer. I use the word phaneroscopy because it is essential to explain Peirce's writings. But I strongly suspect that more people (including Peirce scholars) would get a better understanding of his intentions if he had not coined that word. I believe that Peirce would have written more clearly and even more precisely if he had a regular teaching job where he would talk to students on a daily basis. Those few years at Johns Hopkins, for example, enabled him to create a revolution in logic. I also believe that his writings in his last decade would also have been far clearer and much more convincing if he had met a class of students on a daily basis, Fundamental principle: If Peirce had more feedback from his readers, I believe that he would have made major changes in his choice of terminology and style of writing. He can no longer change his texts, but we can improve the way we teach, talk, and write about his theories. And choice of terminology is a good part of that process. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" List, JAS I think JAS and I, at least, are discussing two different issues. No-one is arguing against the use of specific terminology, accepted by all, in particular, in the scientific disciplines. And this includes the term created by an individual for a specific specimen or action or..medical treatment or… Or - if we are studying one particular person, be it Kant or Aristotle or Peirce - then, obviously, our focus is on and only on, that particular individual’s works and terms. What some of us are discussing is totally different from taxonomy We aren’t talking about any one’s particular terminology but about thought and about Reality, the Real world. - and refers to the processes of semiosic dynamics, ie.., information or cognitive dynamics - in the physicochemical, biological and social realms. And in this area, as Peirce points out - “to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious” 5.265. 1868. And therefore what we are talking about is Reality - and
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Edwina, Gary, Robert, List, I'm sure that we're all familiar with Peirce's note about the ethics of terminology. But it's not clear whether its influence was good, bad, or indifferent. The position he recommended was the Linnaean conventions for naming biological species. But very few things in the world are so rigidly classifiable. And those that are have been classified by international conventions: the integers, the chemical elements, and the chemical compounds. And if you look at Peirce's own practice, he replaced 'phenomenology' with 'phaneroscopy' just a couple of years later. I believe that he was justified in coining the new term 'phaneroscopy', but there is enough overlap that he could have continued to use 'phenomenology'. As for the choice of 'mark' vs 'tone', I believe that 'tone' was a poor choice, and his vacillation in 1908 indicates that he had some misgivings. That vacillation nullifies any obligation to continue his practice. Another poor choice on Peirce's part was to make 'logic' a synonym for 'logic as semeiotic'. Until 1902, he used 'logic' as a synonym for the symbolic logic of Boole and his followers (of which he was one). Instead, he chose the usage for the title of books, such as Whateley's. I believe that Peirce made a serious mistake, and Fisch (in his 1986 book) deliberately chose the term 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'. In my recent article on phaneroscopy, I adopted Fisch's recommendation. And by the way, my citation of Fisch is NOT an appeal to authority. It is the practice of taking the advice of an expert in a field for choosing terminology for that field. I recommend that practice. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, List 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology. I am also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing. I am also aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to the same situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot isolate scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only the terms that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that these different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and should be open to using these different terms for the SAME situation. 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to the meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction into nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality - aka universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different terms, there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as conceptualism. Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s not my point, is it? 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic, idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’. 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that the work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of another scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all - it is perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce using the terms used by other scholars. 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an ‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given conference papers and published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can be made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an example of the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have made reference, - such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those of other people on the list. Edwina On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Edwina, List, This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions: You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence that terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it can constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree (which you appear to), why? And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan Schmidt, and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see how a rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has anything to do with nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include your definition of nominalism. And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with having
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
usly, all these English words are terms--no one is disputing that. The issue here is whether they signify a certain kind of term. As defined by Peirce in Baldwin's dictionary, that is precisely what "mark" signifies; but as defined by Peirce in the various passages that I have repeatedly cited and quoted, that is not at all what "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign" signify. JFS: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a mistake. I have not accused anyone of anything, nor have I claimed that anyone is making a mistake. I have simply spelled out Peirce's relevant views, as amply supported by exact quotations. Besides, as someone once said, "we should all remember that Peirce List is a collaboration, not a competition. If somebody corrects one of our mistakes, we should thank them for the correction" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00089.html)--not treat it as an accusation. JFS: If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so. I have not criticized anyone for believing that "mark" is a better choice than "tone" for the possible counterpart of existent "token" and necessitant "type," even though I strongly disagree. On the contrary, I have explicitly stated more than once that anyone is welcome to hold that opinion and make a case for it. Nevertheless, as I have also stated more than once, no one can accurately claim that it was Peirce's final and definitive choice. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 5:15 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, Gary, List, First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical fallacy". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are required to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims. In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority. Of course, everybody is fallible, even authorities. But rejection of an authority requires some evidence. Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted below): "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated". The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a term. Whatever those terms may be predicated of, something else (a mark) can be predicated. Therefore, the word 'mark' may be used in the same way as the words 'tone' or 'potisign' to refer to a possible mark. In conclusion, the word 'mark' may be used to refer to a possible mark. In fact, it's the simplest and most obvious word for the purpose. In 1908, Peirce recognized that point. Whether or not he vacillated on that point is irrelevant. He did not deny that it may be so used, and many or perhaps most speakers of 21st C English find it more natural and more memorable. That is sufficient justification for preferring it. JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. JAS: Then why keep posting about it? Because I believe that it's important to avoid confusing the subscribers to Peirce list. I will stop correcting your mistakes as soon as you stop sending them to the list. Remark to Gary: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a mistake. If he wants to continue using the word 'tone', he has a right to do so. If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Robert, Jon, List, Thanks for the note. There is nothing controversial about it, and I agree with Jon's comments. But I would note that Peirce's later shift to semes, phemes, and delomes enabled him to simplify, some of the issues, and generalize others. For example, the idea of hypoicons seemed to be a powerful new concept that Peirce discussed in only one MS.He didn't need it later because he introduced semes as a generalization of rhemes. This is just one of many ways that Peirce's system developed during the decade of 1903 to 1913. To avoid disturbing this moment of agreement, I won't say anything more. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 4/12/24 1:18 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci , Anthony Jappy , "Houser, Nathan R." Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type Robert, List: Thanks for the reminder about this brief paper, which we discussed on the List back in November 2021. As I said at that time, it is based on Peirce's 1903 taxonomy with three trichotomies and ten sign classes, not his 1906-1908 taxonomies with ten trichotomies and 66 sign classes; and my only quibble with it is that it seems to equate "token" with "replica," which is why it identifies only six classes of tokens. Instead, "token" directly replaces "sinsign," while "instance" directly replaces "replica" (CP 4.537, 1906). Accordingly, there are six classes of replicas/instances and three additional classes of sinsigns/tokens, which correspond to the outermost oval in each Venn diagram--iconic sinsigns/tokens, rhematic indexical sinsigns/tokens, and dicent sinsigns/tokens. RM: I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. Indeed, here is what Peirce himself says about this. CSP: A Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign. A Sinsign ... is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied. (CP 2:244-245, EP 2:291, 1903) CSP: Second, an Iconic Sinsign is any object of experience in so far as some quality of it makes it determine the idea of an Object. Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely, of whatever it may be like, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will embody a Qualisign. (CP 2.255, EP 2:294, 1903) Although qualisigns/tones as "indefinite significant characters" must be carefully distinguished from legisigns/types as "definitely significant Forms" (CP 4.537; cf. R 339:276r-277r, 1906 Apr 2), both must be embodied in sinsigns/tokens in order to act as signs. In fact, every sinsign/token involves qualisigns/tones of a peculiar kind, and every iconic sinsign/token embodies a qualisign. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 5:30 AM robert marty wrote: List,I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu a few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark, but the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each of the six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind. https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Gary, Jon, List, My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.). My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any word pulled out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible mark. But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even be considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable. Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible mark'. That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the best word for the future. Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement. But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for the triad (mark token type). And he has devoted years of research to the issues. As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but they are more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common Man in the street). And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues in logic, including Peirce's logic. See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for publications. There are even more lecture slides. (Copies upon request.) But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the future. The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians, linguists, and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not the first term, find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone. I discovered that point while talking to them. That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference) one way or the other, please let us know. John From: "Gary Richmond" List, While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going as it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of his reminded me that the principal issue being considered has not been resolved unless you want to accept John's word that it has been and, by the way, completely along the lines of his analysis. In other words, the 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled because John says it has and, so, there's no need for further discussion. I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example, contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's discussion of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For 'mark' is viewed by Peirce as a kind of term and, so, decidedly not a possible sign. Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for 'mark' is always an existential one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a beauty mark. Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions of a possible sign include the idea that its being is a significant "quality of feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely possible, [is] felt to be positively possible." John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a "Vague Quality" that his listeners, typically not schooled in Peircean thought, "find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all his talks and written work. I can only say that that has not been my experience over the years. For example, earlier this year I gave an invited talk at a session of the George Santayana Society at the Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of Peirce's Classification of the Sciences where I found that in discussing tone, token, type that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were familiar with Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and, indeed, one suggested that the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as it may, that notion is certainly trivial (pun intended). Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy used the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing but the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any number of discussions with Peirceans over the past several years, none of whom have faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible" sign. Mark my words! Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with several Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including John. And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this most recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that he in fact did provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the passages
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Jon, Gary, List, First, let me dismiss a false claim: "appeal to authority is a logical fallacy". Whenever Jon, Gary, or anyone else quotes an entry in a dictionary or an encyclopedia, they are making an appeal to authority. The requirement to cite references in an academic publication shows that authors are required to show the experts whose authority they depend on for their own claims. In fact , when Peirce scholars quote Peirce, they are appealing to him as an authority. Of course, everybody is fallible, even authorities. But rejection of an authority requires some evidence. Note the first sentence of Peirce's definition of 'mark' (as quoted below): "To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated". The English words 'tone', 'tinge', 'tuone', and 'potisign' are terms in exactly the same way that the word 'mark' is a term. Whatever those terms may be predicated of, something else (a mark) can be predicated. Therefore, the word 'mark' may be used in the same way as the words 'tone' or 'potisign' to refer to a possible mark. In conclusion, the word 'mark' may be used to refer to a possible mark. In fact, it's the simplest and most obvious word for the purpose. In 1908, Peirce recognized that point. Whether or not he vacillated on that point is irrelevant. He did not deny that it may be so used, and many or perhaps most speakers of 21st C English find it more natural and more memorable. That is sufficient justification for preferring it. JFS: All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. JAS: Then why keep posting about it? Because I believe that it's important to avoid confusing the subscribers to Peirce list. I will stop correcting your mistakes as soon as you stop sending them to the list. Remark to Gary: Please note that Jon keeps accusing me of making a mistake. I am just pointing out that he is making a mistake by claiming that i am making a mistake. If he wants to continue using the word 'tone', he has a right to do so. If I agree with other Peirce scholars that 'mark' is a better word, I have a right to do so without being criticized for doing so. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor. As I have noted twice before, with exact quotations as explicit support, any use of "mark" that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) is inconsistent with his various explanations of what he means by "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign." Again, a mark is a certain kind of term--"to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated"--which entails that it is a necessitant type embodied in existent tokens, not a possible sign. On the other hand, Peirce defines the latter as "what has all its being whether it exists or not" (R 339:275r, 1906 Mar 31), "a quality of feeling which is significant" (R 339:276r, 1906 Apr 2), "a character in its nature incapable of exact identification" (ibid), "an indefinite significant character" (CP 4.537, 1906), a "Vague Quality" (R 339:285r, 1906 Aug 31), and "Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.363, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). JFS: But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why I adopted it in my writings on this topic. The problem with this alleged congeniality is that anyone unfamiliar with Peirce's speculative grammar almost certainly misunderstands the word "mark" when it is used for a possible sign, the counterpart of an existent "token" and a necessitant "type." For example, as a candidate to replace "tone," "tuone," "tinge," and "potisign," it is definitely not "that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-04/msg00035.html). Again, among other differences, a type "is absolutely identical in all its Instances or embodiments, while a Tuone cannot have any identity, it has only similarity" (R 339:277r, 1906 Apr 2). JFS: Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'. Tony Jappy uses "mark" rather than
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Gary, Jon, List To develop a complete and consistent set of terminology, some decisions have to be made. I have stated the reasons why I believe that the trichotomy (potisign, actisighn, famisign) is based on Peirce's best and most detailed reasoning. I also agree with him that (mark token type) are simpler English words that would be better for widespread use. The fact that the word 'mark' is used in a way that is consistent with Peirce's definition in Baldwin's dictionary is another important point in its favor. The words 'tone', 'tinge', or 'tuone' are too narrow. They might be useful for sounds, but they are not as general as 'mark' for images in other sensory modalities. I have also lectured and written articles for a larger audience of professionals who are familiar with the terms 'token' and 'type', but have never used, read, or heard the word 'tone' for the first member. The most likely reason is that nobody except Peirce scholars would ever use the word 'tone'. But when I use the word 'mark', they find it quite congenial. That is why I adopted it in my writings on this topic. Furthermore, Tony Jappy has been studying and analyzing the evolution of Peirce's writings during the last decade of his life. I find his analyses quite compatible with my own studies. Therefore, I am pleased to note that he has reached a similar conclusion about adopting 'mark' rather than 'tone'. I have also read Jon's recent note on this subject. There is nothing new. I am not asking him to do anything he doesn't want to do. All I'm saying is that there is no reason to continue discussing this issue. John From: "Gary Richmond" John, Jon, List, JFS: I'm sorry, but I don't understand why you're jumping through all kinds of hoops to defend a rather poor choice of terminology that Peirce happened to mention just once. (Except for once more in the LNB.) GR: It appears to me that if Jon has been 'jumping through hoops' to argue his position, then you have been doing no less hoop jumping. But more to the point, it is your mere opinion that 'tone' is Peirce's "rather poor choice of terminology' whereas, as I see it, it has been argued rather convincingly by Jon that there is a strong case for preferring 'tone' to 'mark'. Since you have settled on 'mark' in your own work, I can see why you might want to argue for it exclusively. But -- and as I've followed this discussion closely -- in my estimation, Jon's argument for 'tone' is stronger than yours for 'mark'. And I know I am not alone in that opinion. This is brought home especially when you throw up your arms and argue from authority, principally, your own. But not exclusively your own: JFS: "I find Tony's [Jappy's] analyses convincing and compatible with my own studies and with other studies of Peirce's last decade." GR: Far different from this approach, Peirce made a whole hearted effort to solicit criticism of his own views. Even more than that, he called for scientists and other scholars to try to refute his work where possible in the interest of correcting possible errors. That seems to me to be almost a corollary of the method of science as opposed to the other methods of inquiry. With the exception of well-prepared scientists offering testable hypotheses, inquiry is, for Peirce, essentially a communal affair, and the methods of tenacity (mere stubborn clinging to a position), the a Priori method (pretty much a 'taste' or a 'feel' that some way of looking at some matter is 'right' ), and that of authority are assiduously avoided in scientific inquiry. Of course I needn't remind you, or any logician, that the appeal to authority is a well-known logical fallacy. JFS: There is nothing further to discuss about this topic. GR: Perhaps not; we shall see. But in any event, it is not for you to determine. After all, this is Peirce-L, not Sowa-L, nor Schmidt-L nor, for that matter, Richmond-L, but Peirce-L. Still, I must agree with you that the arguments for 'mark' and 'tone' have been fairly fully laid out and List members can decide for themselves which argumentation has been strongest, most convincing. This is to say that they needn't take your, or Jon's, or my word for it. JFS: You [Jon] said that you had read Tony's writings. i strongly urge you to study them. GR: Your now repeated request that JAS read and study Jappy's works (which he clearly does) appears to me as condescending as your appeal to authority is unscientific from the standpoint of Peirce's four methods of fixing belief. It is my opinion as List moderator that in light of Peirce's ethics of inquiry, and along with Joe Ransdell's notes on the Peirce-L page of Arisbe meant to apply facets of that ethics to conduct in this forum, that reflecting on those ought give you -- and everyone -- pause as to they consider what conduct is and is not appropriate here. As did Joe, I have always wanted
[PEIRCE-L] The central executive
Dima, Yes, they were in the same field as George Miller (psychology). But they also hung out with enough neuroscientists that some of the blood and guts rubbed off on them. Right now, the major research on the topic depends on neuroscience. That is one among many reasons why I prefer to use the term 'Cognitive Science'. The subject is so complex that collaboration among the different fields is essential. John From: "Dima, Alden A. (Fed)' via ontolog-forum" Hi John, A certain large language model tells me that Alan Baddeley and Graham Hitch were psychologists and not neuroscientists. Alden _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] The central executive
Doug, The central executive controls all the processes that are controllable by the human ego. But the term 'executive' should be considered the equivalent of what the chief executive officer (CEO) of a business does in managing a corporation. There are intermediaries at various points. Baddeley & Hitch wrote their initial article in 1974. They wrote that in response to George Miller's "Magic Number 7, plus or minus 2." They realized that there was much more to short-term memory than just words and phonemes. They called Miller's storage "the phonological loop" and they added a visuo-spatial scratchpad for short-term imagery and feelings. And they continued to revise and extend their hypotheses for another 20 or 30 years. Other neuroscientists, who are specialists in different aspects, have been working on related issues. The idea is an important one that the Generative AI gang has not yet latched onto. But some AI people are starting to take notice, and I believe that they are on the right track. In summary, there is more to come. See the references I cited, and do whatever googling and searching you like. John From: "doug foxvog" John, Baddeley & Hitch's "central executive" (CE) is described as an attentional controlling system. I have just briefly glanced at it, but it seems that the point is coordinating and accessing memory through an episodic buffer, phonological loop, and visio-spatial "sketchpad". The hypothesized CE deals with information, language, memory, imagery, & spatial awareness. That covers a lot, and i assume it would also cover conscious actions and processes. But i don't see it covering neurohormone production or things like heartrate. Lower level processes like basal signaling between neurons would have no need of a central executive, as they are just basal processes. It's the word "all" in "all processes" that indicates to me that the claim is excessive. FWIW, i note that sharks also have brains -- as do "higher" orders of invertebrates. -- doug f > On Wed, April 10, 2024 18:38, John F Sowa wrote: > Doug, > > The central executive was proposed by the neuroscientists Baddeley & > Hitch, not by AI researchers. There is nothing "machine-like" in the > idea, by itself. Without something like it, there is no way to explain > how a huge tangle of neurons could act together and coordinate their > efforts to support a common effort. > > It reminds me of a neighboring town (to my residence in Croton on Hudson, > NY), which was doing some major developments without hiring a general > contractor. They thought that their local town employees could schedule > all the processes. It turned out to be a total disaster. All the > subcontractors did their tasks in a random order, each one interfering > with some of the others, and causing a major mess. There were lawsuits > back and forth, and the town management was found guilty and had losses > that were many times greater than the cost of hiring a general contractor. > > It is certainly true that there is a huge amount of computation going on > in the brain that is below conscious awareness. Most of that is done by > the cerebellum (little brain), which is physically much smaller than the > cerebral cortex. But it contains over four times the number of neurons. > In effect, the cerebellum behaves like a GPU (Graphics Processing Unit) > which is a superfast, highly specialized processor for all the perception > and action that takes place without conscious awareness. > > For example, when you're walking down the street talking on your cell > phone, the cerebellum is monitoring your vision, muscles, and strides -- > until you step off the curb and get run over by a bus. That's why you need > a central controller to monitor and coordinate all the processes. > > Sharks and dolphins are about the same size and they eat the same kind of > prey. Sharks have a huge cerebellum and a small lump for a cerebellum. > Dolphins have a huge cerebral cortex and a huge cerebellum. They are as > agile as sharks, but they can plan, communicate, and coordinate their > activities. When the food is plentiful, they can both eat their fill. > But when it's scarce, the dolphins are much more successful. > > Please look at the citations in my previous note and the attached > Section7.pdf. The cycle of abduction, induction, testing, and induction > depends on a central executive that is responsible for planning, > coordinating, and integrating those steps of conscious feeling, thinking, > reasoning, and acting. With a central executive, an AI system would be > more intelligent. But much, much more R & D would be required before > anything could be called "
[PEIRCE-L] The central executive
Doug, The central executive was proposed by the neuroscientists Baddeley & Hitch, not by AI researchers. There is nothing "machine-like" in the idea, by itself. Without something like it, there is no way to explain how a huge tangle of neurons could act together and coordinate their efforts to support a common effort. It reminds me of a neighboring town (to my residence in Croton on Hudson, NY), which was doing some major developments without hiring a general contractor. They thought that their local town employees could schedule all the processes. It turned out to be a total disaster. All the subcontractors did their tasks in a random order, each one interfering with some of the others, and causing a major mess. There were lawsuits back and forth, and the town management was found guilty and had losses that were many times greater than the cost of hiring a general contractor. It is certainly true that there is a huge amount of computation going on in the brain that is below conscious awareness. Most of that is done by the cerebellum (little brain), which is physically much smaller than the cerebral cortex. But it contains over four times the number of neurons. In effect, the cerebellum behaves like a GPU (Graphics Processing Unit) which is a superfast, highly specialized processor for all the perception and action that takes place without conscious awareness. For example, when you're walking down the street talking on your cell phone, the cerebellum is monitoring your vision, muscles, and strides -- until you step off the curb and get run over by a bus. That's why you need a central controller to monitor and coordinate all the processes. Sharks and dolphins are about the same size and they eat the same kind of prey. Sharks have a huge cerebellum and a small lump for a cerebellum. Dolphins have a huge cerebral cortex and a huge cerebellum. They are as agile as sharks, but they can plan, communicate, and coordinate their activities. When the food is plentiful, they can both eat their fill. But when it's scarce, the dolphins are much more successful. Please look at the citations in my previous note and the attached Section7.pdf. The cycle of abduction, induction, testing, and induction depends on a central executive that is responsible for planning, coordinating, and integrating those steps of conscious feeling, thinking, reasoning, and acting. With a central executive, an AI system would be more intelligent. But much, much more R & D would be required before anything could be called "Artificial General Intelligence" (AGI). That's why I have very little faith in anything called AGI. John From: "doug foxvog" Subject: Re: [ontolog-forum] The central executive On Wed, April 10, 2024 14:07, John F Sowa wrote: > In today's ZOOM meeting, I objected to the term 'neuro-symbolic hybrid' of > artificial neural networks (ANNs) with symbols. Hybrids simply relate two > (sometimes more) distinctly different things. But all the processes in > the mind and brain are integrated, and they all operate continuously in > different parts of the brain, which are all monitored and controlled by a > central executive. ... This seems to me to be modeling the body as a machine and not an accurate description. There are a wide variety of processes in the mind and brain -- many processes in the brain occur independently without being integrated either with each other or with the mind. I am excluding standard cellular level processes that go on in every cell and the processes of the circulatory system in the brain. Every neuron regularly chemically interacts with adjacent neurons & passes electrical signals along its surface. As far as i understand, much that goes on in the brain we are unaware of, neurohormone production, for example. Sensory input processing does not seem to be integrated with a number of other processes. I have seen no evidence of a central executive in the brain that monitors and controls all the other processes. I'm not sure how such a central executive could have evolved. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
, and sure enough, there is nothing in Peirce's definition of "mark" for Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology about it being a sign whose mode of being, apprehension, or presentation is "merely possible" as distinguished from an existent token and a necessitant type. On the contrary ... CSP: Mark. To say that a term or thing has a mark is to say that of whatever it can be predicated something else (the mark) can be predicated; and to say that two terms or things have the same mark is simply to say that one term (the mark) can be predicated of whatever either of these terms or things can be predicated. The word translates the Latin nota. It has many practical synonyms such as quality, mode, attribute, predicate, character, property, determination, consequent, sign. Most of these words are sometimes used in special senses; and even when they are used in a general sense, they may suggest somewhat different points of view from mark. (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) By this definition, a mark is a term that can be predicated of things of which other terms are predicated. For example, "scarlet" and "crimson" are different terms that both have the term "red" as a mark--anything that is scarlet or crimson is also red. However, the term "red" is obviously not a tone/potisign, it is always a token/actisign of a type/famisign. On the other hand, the color red--as well as a specific shade like scarlet or crimson--can be a tone/potisign when and where it serves as "an indefinite significant character." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 9:11 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, List, We acknowledge that Peirce introduced the trichotomy (Tone Token Type) in the Prolegomena article of 1906, and his choice of the name 'Tone' was based on one example, "a tone of voice". After two more years of intensive study, analysis, and writings, he presented a more precise specification of the trichotomy (Potisign, Actisign, and Famisign) in a letter to Welby (EP2, p. "Thirdly, that which is stored away in one's Memory; Familiar, and as such, General. Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are divisible (o) into: "A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible; as for eample the seventh ray that passes through the three intersections of opposite sides of Pascal's hexagram.8 "B. Actisigns, or Objects which are Signs as Experienced hie et nunc; such as any single word in a single place in a single sentence of a single paragraph of a single page of a single copy of a Book. There may be repetition of the whole paragraph, this word included, in another place. But that other occurrence is not this word. The book may be printed in an edition of ten thousand; but THIS word is only in my copy." Peirce defined this trichotomy without making any reference to (Tone Token Type). We don't know what he was thinking when he specified it. But later (EP2, pp. 485-488) he continued to discuss Potisigns, Actisigns, and Famisigns without making any references to the signs he defined in 2006. He also discussed universes in considerable detail. That is a topic he began to discuss in the Prolegomena, where he introduced (Tone Token Type). But he is now introducing this new triad without making any reference to it. But he is discussing this new version in quite a bit of detail, and he is referring to universes repeatedly. Then on p. 488, he writes: "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906,1 devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs.9 It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone,an Actisign a Token. a Famisign a Type I think Potisign Actisign Famisign might be called Mark Token Type (?)... Then he continues: "I have now given as much time to this letter as I can afford and I cannot now reexamine the remaining Trichotomies, although I must do so as soon as possible. So I just give them as they stood two years and more ago. In particular, the relations I assumed between the different classes were the wildest guesses and cannot be altogether right I think... In short, Peirce himself called some of his earlier discussions of trichotomies "the wildest guesses". That should not encourage anyone to consider them as having any reliable status. The best definition of (Mark Token Type) should be considered the equivalent of (Potisign Actisign Famisign) with the definitions stated in EP pp. 485-488. For the definition of Mark, by its
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Jeff, There seem to be quite a few people who are interested in discussing applications of Peirce's logic and philosophy to current issues. That was certainly a hot topic in the various Peirce -ennials. I believe that it would be a topic of general interest. John From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" Sent: 4/8/24 12:35 AM To: "Michael J.J. Tiffany" , "s...@bestweb.net" Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) Hello Michael and John, Nice to hear from you on the List, Michael. I agree with your suggestions in (1) and (2). How might we further draw out some of Peirce’s suggestions for explaining the evolution of cooperation in a wide variety of systems, ranging from ecosystems to human economic and political systems? Complex emergent phenomena, such as the flow of information across the world wide web, provide us with fruitful case studies for modeling and explaining the growth of order in systems having parts that stand in relations of reciprocity and interdependence. I think Peirce’s central model for explaining the growth of order in physical, chemical, biological, and human social systems is the cycle of logical inquiry. Let me know if you are interested in exploring these ideas further on the list or as part of a small research and discussion group. Yours, Jeff Downard Flagstaff, AZ Philosophy, NAU From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of Michael J.J. Tiffany Date: Sunday, April 7, 2024 at 10:57 AM To: s...@bestweb.net Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, List: I agree with John regarding the urgent relevance of Peirce to this century. I have been a subscriber to this list for 17 years (since I was 26). In that time, among other things, I co-founded a billion dollar cybersecurity company (HUMAN Security, also one of the TIME100 Most Influential Companies 2023). Two personal observations: 1. Agapism has greater predictive power than the "Gospel of Greed" Peirce railed against in "Evolutionary Love", his fifth article for the Open Court. In evolutionary biology, I think this is substantially clearer now than in Peirce's time, with the careful study of countless cases of group selection > individual selection. However, Peirce's insight is still underappreciated in today's thinking about socio-economic evolution. Wealth creation -- distinct from zero sum wealth transfer -- comes from a kind of sustainable generosity. There are many examples of successful wealth aggregators whose success could be predicted with naive selection pressure heuristics like "survival of the fittest" or even "greed is good." However, those heuristics cannot account for the extraordinary wealth creation of the past 200 years nor the motivations of the most successful creators and the massive amount of cooperation they shepherded. Peirce's model isn't just nicer or more inspiring. It's a literally more useful model for understanding and predicting reality, especially complex emergent phenomena (the "worlds hidden in plain sight" as the Santa Fe Institute once put it). 2. An understanding of Peirce's notion of abduction dramatically accelerates understanding of the (surprising!) emergent functionality of large pretrained transformer models like GPT-4. (BTW it is a CRAZY tragedy that there's another, vastly less useful, meaning of "abduction" now, hence having to write qualifiers like "Peirce's notion of...".) In fact, I don't see how you can understand how this emergent behavior arises -- what we're calling the reasoning capabilities of these models -- without an understanding of abduction as a kind of activity that you could be better or worse at. Warm regards, Michael J.J. Tiffany Portsmouth, New Hampshire On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 11:58 AM John F Sowa wrote: Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our present. John Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM To: John Sowa Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
ignificant form" that can be embodied in any number of different tokens (ibid), each of which might also embody different tones/marks as indefinite characters. Consequently, two different tokens of the same type can possess different tones/marks, and two different tokens of two different types can possess the same tone/mark--there is no strict alignment between indefinite tones/marks and definite types. JFS: But Peirce explicitly defined 'mark' or 'tone' as a 'potisign' -- a sign of a possibility. To help avoid mistakes, I recommend providing exact quotations when attributing explicit definitions to Peirce. In this case, he never defines a tone/mark/potisign as a sign of a possibility, as if its (dynamical) object were a possibility. Instead, he defines it as a sign that is itself merely possible. "A Sign may itself have a 'possible' Mode of Being ... For a 'possible' Sign I have no better designation than a Tone, though I am considering replacing this by 'Mark.' Can you suggest a really good name?" (EP 2:480, 1908 Dec 23). "Consequently, Signs, in respect to their Modes of possible Presentation, are divisible into: A. Potisigns, or Objects which are Signs so far as they are merely possible, but felt to be positively possible" (CP 8.347, EP 2:483, 1908 Dec 24). In short, a tone/mark is a possible sign, distinguished from a token as an existent sign and a type as a necessitant sign. Again, none of this is at all controversial among Peirce scholars. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 7, 2024 at 1:47 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, List, See the recent notes about the ZOOM talk on Friday. It is essential for Peirce scholars to bring his philosophy and its applications to the attention of philosopher, scientists, and engineers in the 21st century -- Peirce worked in all three professions. The word 'tone' is a special case that Peirce himself forgot when he coined the new term 'potisign'. He later recalled his definition for 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary (consciously or not) when he suggested it as a replacement for 'tone'. I have lectured and adopted Peirce's logic and semeiotic for a broad modern audience, and I realize that 'mark' is far more natural, more understandable, and more memorable than 'tone' for any purpose other than a detailed textual criticism of the MS. As Peirce himself said, if nobody else adopted a word he coined, he was under no obligation to keep it. JFS: Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type. JAS: A tone of voice is merely the example that Peirce gives in CP 4.537 (1906) to illustrate what he has in mind. His definition of a tone in that passage is "an indefinite significant character," as opposed to a token as a "Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does," and a type as "a definitely significant Form." No. A tone or mark is not "opposed to a token". It is that part of an image that determines it as a token of some type. The image, the mark, and the token are the same physical "thing". They are not three separable things.. Bur the word 'tone' is an poor choice, which caused the misunderstanding. Lady Welby assumed that the word 'tone' was an actisign that referred to an existing thing -- some feeling of the speaker. But Peirce explicitly defined 'mark' or 'tone' as a 'potisign' -- a sign of a possibility. As another example, consider the images on Mayan temples. For years, they were considered decorations or images of some significant things. But linguists discovered that they could be interpreted as a notation for Mayan words. By assuming that ancient Mayan was an earlier stage of modern spoken Mayan, linguists learned to read those "decorations" as a notation for the words of the Mayan language. The same images from one point of view are marks of tokens of decorations. From another point of view, they are marks of tokens of morphemes of the Mayan language. In textual criticism, Peirce's exact words in any MS must be recorded exactly. But in publications about Peirce's intentions, the terminology must be adapted to the way modern readers would interpret the words. Max Fisch, for example, realized that Peirce's decision to use the word 'logic' as an abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic'. In his 1986 book, Fisch stated that he was using the word 'semeiotic' as the abbreviation for 'logic as semeiotic". Fisch is certainly a respectable authority on the subject, and I believe that we should follow his example in choosing which of P
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
unlike icon/index/symbol, this trichotomy is not a matter of degree. Consider its terminological predecessor--a qualisign cannot also be a replica (sinsign) of some legisign. Instead, a qualisign must be embodied in a sinsign, and likewise, a mark/tone must be embodied in a token. Regards, Jon On Fri, Apr 5, 2024 at 4:55 PM John F Sowa wrote: On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item in the trichotomy: "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token." The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to the sound of a voice that is speaking something. I have a high regard for Peirce's choices, but the word 'tone' applies to a tiny subset of marks. Just look at Peirce's definition of mark in Baldwin's dictionary. Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type. But only a tiny subset of marks are tones. I have a high regard for Peirce's decisions, but when he himself has doubts about his previous choice, that is not a solid endorsement. There is no ethical reason for keeping it. Now go to the letter to Welby (also CP 8.363): "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906, I devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a Token, a Famisign a Type;... CP 367. "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives... Note Peirce's choice of Mark. That is consistent with his definition of 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary. That was written before 1903, when the only trichotomy was "Icon Index Symbol". Every tone of voice is a mark, but most marks are not tones of voice or tones of anything else. Note that Peirce had also considered the word 'tinge' instead of 'tone'. Every tinge is also a mark. JAS: his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). I admit that he slipped back to an old (bad) habit in that example two days later. But that example does not negate (1) the fact that a tone of voice is a limited special case of a mark, as in his own definition in Balwin's dictionary; (2) the fact that he had coined the word 'potisign' as a general technical term for the first item in the trichotomy; (3) the fact that he selected 'mark', not 'tone', as the replacement for potisign; and finally (4) the modern world has adopted Peirce's terms 'token' and 'type', but not 'tone'. But I have found from my lectures and writings that modern logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists very readily accept the trichotomy (mark token type), but not (tone token type). Since Peirce was always writing for the future, that makes 'mark' the choice for the future. A tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark. On this point, Tony made the correct choice. The word 'tone' should be used ONLY in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS. In all discussions of Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Following is an offline note endorsing my note that endorses Jerry's note about the upcoming talk on Friday, which emphasizes the importance of Peirce's writings for our time (the 21st C). Basic point: Peirce was writing for the future. Those of us who value his contributions should emphasize his contributions to his future, which is our present. John Sent: 4/7/24 10:36 AM To: John Sowa Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) John, I harbor a suspicion, perhaps more like a fantasy, that had Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’ carried the day against James & Dewey, logical and empirical positivism and the ‘linguistic turn’ wouldn’t have established the beachhead in philosophy of science that has pretty clearly, imho, led to the global existential crisis we’re facing today at the event horizon of mass extinction. Similarly, perhaps if Karl Popper had succeeded more widely in his opposition to the “Scientific World Conception” of the Vienna Circle in his day and since, the affinities of those two men’s philosophical views would have led to a radically different paradigmatic foundation of the sciences than the ‘value-free’ paradigm that apparently remains entrenched nearly a century later. I imagine Kuhn would agree we’re long overdue for a revolution. In this paragraph from his 2021 article on Peirce in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rober Burch seems to report some similar thoughts about Peirce’s perspective … An especially intriguing and curious twist in Peirce’s evolutionism is that in Peirce’s view evolution involves what he calls its “agapeism.” Peirce speaks of evolutionary love. According to Peirce, the most fundamental engine of the evolutionary process is not struggle, strife, greed, or competition. Rather it is nurturing love, in which an entity is prepared to sacrifice its own perfection for the sake of the wellbeing of its neighbor. This doctrine had a social significance for Peirce, who apparently had the intention of arguing against the morally repugnant but extremely popular socio-economic Darwinism of the late nineteenth century. The doctrine also had for Peirce a cosmic significance, which Peirce associated with the doctrine of the Gospel of John and with the mystical ideas of Swedenborg and Henry James. In Part IV of the third of Peirce’s six papers in Popular Science Monthly, entitled “The Doctrine of Chances,” Peirce even argued that simply being logical presupposes the ethics of self-sacrifice: “He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, collectively.” To social Darwinism, and to the related sort of thinking that constituted for Herbert Spencer and others a supposed justification for the more rapacious practices of unbridled capitalism, Peirce referred in disgust as “The Gospel of Greed.” All merely hypothetical or purely conjectural, of course. But your admonition to relate Peirce to our 21st century world nudged me into sharing the idea. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of John F Sowa Sent: Saturday, April 6, 2024 5:53 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) Jerry, Thanks for that note. The following sentence shows why we need to relate Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today: >From the abstract: "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a >canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science." I have attended a few APA conferences where I gave a talk in a Peirce session and attended other talks in more general sessions. And I have not heard anybody mention Peirce (except me in the discussions after a talk). The logicians are constantly talking about Frege, despite the fact that nobody else had ever used his notation for logic. But they don't mention Peirce, despite the fact that every logician uses his algebra of logic (with minor notational changes by Peano). In fact, the reason why Peano changed the notation was for ease of publication. Peirce used the Greek letters, sigma and pi, for the quantifiers, which were rarely available in those days. But any typesetter could easily turn letters upside down and backwards. So instead of mentioning Peirce, they give credit to Peano for the algebraic notation. It's essential for Peirce scholars to relate his writings to the big, wide, modern world. Susan Haack does that very well. Some others do that. And it's essential for Peirce scholars to do much, much more to relate Peirce's work to the hot topics of the 21st century. Peirce himself expected his writings to be hot issues for 400 years. We're almost halfway there, and we need to heat up the discussions. John --
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)
Jerry, Thanks for that note. The following sentence shows why we need to relate Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today: >From the abstract: "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a >canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science." I have attended a few APA conferences where I gave a talk in a Peirce session and attended other talks in more general sessions. And I have not heard anybody mention Peirce (except me in the discussions after a talk). The logicians are constantly talking about Frege, despite the fact that nobody else had ever used his notation for logic. But they don't mention Peirce, despite the fact that every logician uses his algebra of logic (with minor notational changes by Peano). In fact, the reason why Peano changed the notation was for ease of publication. Peirce used the Greek letters, sigma and pi, for the quantifiers, which were rarely available in those days. But any typesetter could easily turn letters upside down and backwards. So instead of mentioning Peirce, they give credit to Peano for the algebraic notation. It's essential for Peirce scholars to relate his writings to the big, wide, modern world. Susan Haack does that very well. Some others do that. And it's essential for Peirce scholars to do much, much more to relate Peirce's work to the hot topics of the 21st century. Peirce himself expected his writings to be hot issues for 400 years. We're almost halfway there, and we need to heat up the discussions. John From: "Jerry LR Chandler" Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) FYI JLRC Friday, April 12th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT This talk will also be available live streamed on: Zoom at https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94576817686 Title: Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism Abstract: Scholars of the history of philosophy of science read and hear a lot about Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, and the members of the Vienna Circle. C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist movement in the United States, Peirce received a warm reception from prominent representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of logical empiricism including Charles Morris, Ernst Nagel, Herbert Feigl, Phillip Frank, and W.V.O. Quine. This reception was short-lived though and Peirce gradually disappeared from the mainstream philosophy of science while logical empiricism turned into a formidable movement. In this talk, I begin by discussing examples of the early reception of Peirce’s philosophy in the works of Morris, Nagel (and his student Justus Buchler), Feigl, and Frank. I show the variety of topics (including logic, probability theory, theories of truth and meaning, and social dimensions of science) in which Peirce received a warm (though not uncritical) reception. We see that the engagements with his works are persistent from the late 1920s to the 1950s and get more refined over time. I then provide some explanations for the eventual marginalization of Peirce in mainstream philosophy of science. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Jon, Edwina, List, Please note the subject line. The 1903 Harvard and Lowell lectures were an important starting point for the major developments in Peirce's final decade. And note Tony's word 'evolving' for the developments during that decade. In any decision about Peirce's directions and intensions, it's important to note the evolution of Peirce's thinking and writing. JAS: As John Sowa observes, the shift is instead from phenomenology to phaneroscopy--hypostasizing the three categories (predicates) into the constituents of the three universes (subjects). That's not what I observed. I observed that Welby's emphasis on concrete examples led Peirce to make phaneroscopy closer to observation than to the abstract theories of Kant's phenomenology. In 1903, Peirce was right to object to Kant's Ding an sich. But he had no good replacement. For Welby, significs had no need for anything different from what we see, feel, think about, talk about, and act upon. When Peirce adopted phaneroscopy, he chose Wellby's foundation as a replacement for Kant's. Whenever there is any discrepancy between any MS from 1903 and a later MS, the later one takes precedence. The only exceptions are when an even later MS takes precedence over the middle one. (For example, his recto-verso cuts were a disaster, which he dumped in June 1911 -- along with several words he had used for many years: cut, scroll, recto, verso, illative, illation.) Re the classification of the sciences: That is an idea from 1903 that is generally acceptable. But Max Fisch wrote that the term 'logic as semeiotic' should be abbreviated as 'semeiotic', not 'logic'. The use of the term 'logic' for the Trivium was acceptable in Whateley's day, but it was archaic in 1903, and confusing for everybody who reads Peirce today. For other issues, I agree with Tony Jappy's writings about developments beyond 1903. John _ From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Edwina, List: ET: I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the ’phaneroscopic analysis' differs from the ‘classification of signs’. I will try one more time to explain, and then I will likely have to leave it at that. Peirce's well-known 1903 taxonomy for sign classification includes only three correlates--the sign (or representamen) itself, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. However, its three trichotomies that result in ten sign classes are for the first correlate itself and its dyadic relations to the other two correlates (S, S-Od, S-If). These are divisions based on Peirce's three categories. CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law [qualisign/sinsign/legisign]; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its [dynamical] object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant [icon/index/symbol]; thirdly, according as its [final] Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason [rheme/dicisign/argument]. (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903) Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating soon leads Peirce to recognize that there are really six correlates, not just three--each sign has two objects and three interpretants. The sign itself is the first and simplest correlate of that relation, with no degenerate sub-correlates. The object is the second correlate of that relation, of middling complexity, with not only the genuine (dynamical) correlate, but also a degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. The interpretant is the third and most complex correlate of that relation, with not only the genuine (final) correlate and a degenerate (dynamical) sub-correlate, but also a doubly degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. This is all grounded in the principle that in addition to genuine 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, "there is such a thing as the 1ns of 2ns and such a thing as the 1ns of 3ns; and there is such a thing as the 2ns of 3ns" (CP 1.530, 1903). In this context, the sub-correlates that correspond to 1ns of 2ns (immediate object) and 1ns of 3ns (immediate interpretant) are internal to the first correlate (sign), such that they have only degenerate dyadic relations with it--like the inherence of a quality in a thing. Accordingly, Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification (e.g., EP 2:478-490, 1908 Dec 23-25) have ten trichotomies that result in 66 sign classes. Those trichotomies are for the six correlates themselves (Od, Oi, S, If, Id, Ii), their three genuine dyadic relations (S-Od, S-If, S-Id), and the genuine triadic relation (S-Od-If). Instead of the three categories, they are divisions into the three universes of possibles, existents, and necessitants. Tony Jappy suggests that this
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
On this issue, the evidence for the trichotomy (Mark Token Type) is overwhelming.Just look at the first instance in the Prolegomena, or the copy in CP 4.537 where Peirce adopts 'Tone' as the name of the first item in the trichotomy: "An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token." The word 'tone' in that example is a very special case that is limited to the sound of a voice that is speaking something. I have a high regard for Peirce's choices, but the word 'tone' applies to a tiny subset of marks. Just look at Peirce's definition of mark in Baldwin's dictionary. Every tone is a mark, which may also be a token of some type. But only a tiny subset of marks are tones. I have a high regard for Peirce's decisions, but when he himself has doubts about his previous choice, that is not a solid endorsement. There is no ethical reason for keeping it. Now go to the letter to Welby (also CP 8.363): "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906, I devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a Token, a Famisign a Type;... CP 367. "an Abstractive must be a Mark, while a Type must be a Collective, which shows how I conceived Abstractives and Collectives... Note Peirce's choice of Mark. That is consistent with his definition of 'mark' in Baldwin's dictionary. That was written before 1903, when the only trichotomy was "Icon Index Symbol". Every tone of voice is a mark, but most marks are not tones of voice or tones of anything else. Note that Peirce had also considered the word 'tinge' instead of 'tone'. Every tinge is also a mark. JAS: his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). I admit that he slipped back to an old (bad) habit in that example two days later. But that example does not negate (1) the fact that a tone of voice is a limited special case of a mark, as in his own definition in Balwin's dictionary; (2) the fact that he had coined the word 'potisign' as a general technical term for the first item in the trichotomy; (3) the fact that he selected 'mark', not 'tone', as the replacement for potisign; and finally (4) the modern world has adopted Peirce's terms 'token' and 'type', but not 'tone'. But I have found from my lectures and writings that modern logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists very readily accept the trichotomy (mark token type), but not (tone token type). Since Peirce was always writing for the future, that makes 'mark' the choice for the future. A tone is a limited and confusing special case of mark. On this point, Tony made the correct choice. The word 'tone' should be used ONLY in exact quotations of Peirce's MSS. In all discussions of Peirce's system in the 21st C, (Mark Token Type) is the recommended choice. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two tokens of the same type. This is another reason why "tone" is a better choice than "mark" for "an indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice." Two things can have different tones, yet be tokens of the same type; and two things can have (some of) the same tones, yet be tokens of different types. JFS: It confirms Peirce's final choice. Indeed--his final choice of "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 8:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark': Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two tokens of the same type. It confirms Peirce's final choice. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/use
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, Jon, List, The following observation is a good starting point for analyzing the development iof Peirce's thought and writing from 1903 to 1908 and later: ET: I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. Yes indeed. Peirce's shift from Kant's language-based phenomenology to an image-based phaneroscopy was necessary to get rid of Kant's struggle with a Ding an sich, Peirce's1903 terminology was based on language, which, by itself, is hopelessly inadequate for mapping the phaneron to a linear notation. But his shift from phenomenology to phaneroscopy coincided with an emphasis on diagrams and images as more fundamental representations than language or even his 1885 algebra of logic. That shift coincided with his generalization of term, proposition, argument to seme, pheme, and delome. For example, the following paragraph from 1906 summarizes the issues: "It is necessary that the Diagram should be an Icon in which the inferred relation should be preserved. And it is necessary that it should be insofar General that one sees that accompaniments are no part of the Object. The Diagram is an Interpretant of a Symbol in which the signification of the Symbol becomes a part of the object of the icon. No other kind of sign can make a Truth evident. For the evident is that which is presented in an image, leaving for the work of the understanding merely the Interpretation of the Image in a Symbol." (LNB 286r, 1906) In his version of phenomenology, Kant was left with an unbridgeable gap between a Ding an sich and the words that describe it. Peirce removed that gap by replacing phenomenology with phaneroscopy. Too many people treat those two words as synonyms. But the crucial difference is that the phaneron is in direct contact with the Ding an sich. by means of the sensations, feelings, and physical actions. The images and feelings become semes, and constructions of them become phemes. Phaneroscopy is the science of images, diagrams of images, and their mapping to symbols that may be expressed in various ways, including language. But language is secondary. It is not the primary medium of thought. That is why the 1903 lectures are just the starting point for his last decade of research and his evolution to completely new ways of thinking and a revolution in his methods of analyzing and diagramming his own thoughts and his system of representing it. I started to write an article for the book Kees was editing, but I missed the deadline because I kept revising it over and over again, as I kept running into all these issues. It eventually evolved into an article on phaneroscopy for the book that Ahti was editing. And after I finished that article, I saw how those issues were related to (1) the topics that Tony was working on and (2) the topics that Peirce was addressing with his Delta graphs. I believe that if Peirce had not had that accident in December 1911, he would have written an outstanding proof of pragmatism with the help of his Delta graphs and the methods he developed in the years after 1903. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" List I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his. But just a few points: 1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in the set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, which is” “Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new ideas and elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there before” …He continues on with this examination of the development of entirely new ideas in the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a man to escape the predestined opinion" . Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process of investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference”
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Jon, I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy that explain these issues in far greater depth and generality. I strongly urge you to study his writings. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 4/4/24 12:39 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end List: While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations. Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following restrictions. - A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only feelings. - Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might instead produce exertions or feelings. - A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can only present those effects as abstract qualities. - Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract qualities. Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a different universe from that of its final interpretant's purpose, the direction of the deviation is always from necessitant to existent to possible--which makes sense since 3ns always involves 2ns, which always involves 1ns. By contrast, reversing the order of the interpretant trichotomies would require the opposite, such that deviation would always be from possible to existent to necessitant--which does not make sense since 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns. A sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce feelings could sometimes (somehow) actually produce exertions or further signs as its dynamical interpretants instead, while a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control would always actually produce further signs as its dynamical interpretants. Moreover, as I discussed on the List a few weeks ago, the trichotomy according to the nature or mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant is hypothetic/categorical/relative, directly corresponding to the three kinds of propositions that are distinguishable by the number of lines of identity that they require in Existential Graphs (EGs)--zero/one/two or more. The phemic sheet is a strictly logical quasi-mind, so it can only be determined to a further sign, namely, an EG that is explicitly scribed on it. Since all three kinds of propositions can be represented by such an EG, the trichotomy for the immediate interpretant must come after the one for the dynamical interpretant--if it were the other way around, then only relative propositions with at least two lines of identity could be scribed on the phemic sheet, which is obviously not the case. That said, since the trichotomy for the
[PEIRCE-L] Mark Token Type
Jon, I forgot to thank you for including the link to Peirce's definition of 'mark': Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark) Yes indeed. That definition shows that two things that have the same mark are two tokens of the same type. It confirms Peirce's final choice. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
quot;Your exposition of the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer tone to mark for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his words, but to his tone'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). I agree with her, especially since Peirce himself gives essentially the same rationale for "tone" when he introduces it--"An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a Sign a Tone" (CP 4.537, 1906). Besides, "mark" already had a well-established and quite different definition in logic, which Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark); and as discussed on the List recently, "markedness" is now an unrelated technical term in linguistics. JFS: In computer science and applications, the Lewis-style of modal logic has been useless in practical computations. Again, "useless" strikes me as an overstatement, and even if accurate, it does not entail that modern formal systems of modal logic will never turn out to be useful in these or any other applications. More to the point, such an assessment is utterly irrelevant for ascertaining what Peirce had in mind when writing R L376, including his statement, "I shall now have to add a Delta part [to Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals." A straightforward reading of that text itself is that he simply needs a new notation to replace the unsatisfactory (broken) cuts of 1903 and nonsensical tinctures of 1906 for representing and reasoning about propositions involving possibility and necessity. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa wrote: To provide some background and alternative interpretations of Peirce's theories during his last decade, the attached article by Tony Jappy discusses issues from a different perspective than the recent discussions about Delta graphs. The article by Jappy is a 14-page summary of issues that he discussed in much more detail in a book he wrote in 2017. I inserted commentary at various points marked by "JFS:". But I did not add, delete, or change any of Jappy's text. My comments do not discuss any issues about Delta graphs, but they provide some background information that may be helpful for interpreting L376. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. -- Tony Jappy CRESEM : Centre de recherches sur les Sociétés et Environnements en Méditerranée University of Perpignan-Via Domitia, 66860 Perpignan Cedex, France e-mail: anthony.ja...@gmail.com, t...@univ-perp.fr _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Mistake about sodium sulfate (was Meta-languages...
Jerry, In the note below, I made a careless mistake of writing NaSO4 for sodium sulfate instead of Na2SO4. (I know chemistry quite well. I skipped the freshman year at MIT, and took organic chemistry instead -- and got an A.) Before correcting and clarifying the mistake I made in my previous note, I'll answer your question: JLRC: What is a reasonable interpretation about the “blanks” in sentences relative to concatenations of logical operations between the posits and the consequences? The example by Roberts (page 22) is a copy of CP 3.421. A formal technical answer is: For Peirce, a sentence with one or more blanks is equivalent to the lambda calculus by Church with a variable, such as x1, x2, ..., xN inserted in each blank space and with the prefix (lambda x1, x2, ..., xN) in from of the result. In other words, it corresponds to a function from a list of N English words or phrases (which Peirce called rhemata) to a complete sentence in English that represents a proposition. Simpler answer: If you replace each blank with an English word or phrase, you will get a complete sentence that represents a proposition. Each word or phrase that you insert is called a rhema. The complete sentence could be mapped to an EG, in which each rhema is mapped to a node in the EG, possibly with some additional subgraphs attached to it. As in the more technical explanation above, it represents a function from English phrases to English sentences that represent propositions. Back to the note below: I had started to write an example of sodium chloride, NaCl, as the example for subject + verb phrase. But I changed the example to sodium sulfate without adding 2 after Na. Reason for the change: an SO4 ion with five atoms is a better illustration of a complex verb phrase. It illustrates Peirce's point of saying that a relation has two subjects instead of subject + object (or even three subjects instead of subject + object + indirect object}. I corrected the text below, and added more explanation. The point of this chemistry is to illustrate a question that Peirce never asked or answered: Is there any kind of chemical combination that could represent the word 'that' as a marker of metalanguage. Since the word 'metalanguage' was coined about 20 years after Peirce, his term was "graph of graphs" or "graphs about graphs". I know enough chemistry to understand an answer, but not enough to know what chemical structure could represent metalanguage. I would guess that it might be some organic pattern, perhaps with nitrogen, or maybe a metal. John ---- From: "John F Sowa" Jerry, As you know very well, there is a huge difference in the various kinds of chemical bonds.In a combination of a noun phrase (NP) and a verb phrase (VP). The NP is analogous to a sodium ion Na with a negative charge, and the VP is analogous to a Chloride ion CL with a positive charge. The neutral NaCL, which is analogous to a proposition, illustrates a rheme (NP) linked to an EG with an unattached line of identity that represents the VP. Sodium sulfate (Na2SO4) is even more interesting, since a sulfate ion (SO4) has two positive charges. The resulting compound with a neutral charge states a proposition. The two negative Na ions (NPs) correspond to rhemes. One of them corresponds to a subject of the SO4 verb phrase, and the other corresponds to the object. But Peirce preferred to call both of them subjects. They combine with a verb phrase to represent a proposition. But in organic chemistry, bonds between carbon atoms share electrons. Those chemical bonds don't have the same kinds of analogies with linguistic bonds or with the links in EGs. JLRC: Which of the logical particles would associated with a metalanguage in the example cited by Roberts? Peirce's first recorded example of metalanguage in RLT had a complete sentence "you are a good girl" (which would correspond to a neutral chemical compound) as the subject of a verb phrase, which would have a positive charge. In effect, the word 'that' when attached to a neutral sentence gives it a negative charge so that it could be used as the subject of a positively charged verb phrase "--is much to be wished." As far as I know, Peirce did not use a chemical analogy to explain that combination. Can you suggest some example in chemistry that would correspond to the word 'that'? It would have to take a neutral compound that would correspond to a sentence such as "You are a good girl" and attach some atoms that could form a link to a positive radical, such as "--is much to be wished." For example, the organic acid pattern -COOH would link a neutral organic radical to negative -OH radical or to a negative Na ion. Is there some organic pattern that could link a neutral compound to a positive ion? That c
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jerry, As you know very well, there is a huge difference in the various kinds of chemical bonds.In a combination of a noun phrase (NP) and a verb phrase (VP). The NP is analogous to a sodium ion Na with a negative charge, and the VP is analogous to a sulfate ion (SO4) with a positive charge. The resulting combination NaSO4 is a compound with a neutral charge that corresponds to a sentence that states a proposition. The negative NP ion corresponds to a rheme, which combines with a positive VP ion to form a neutral proposition. But in organic chemistry, bonds between carbon atoms share electrons. Those chemical bonds don't have the same kinds of analogies with linguistic bonds or with the links in EGs. JLRC: Which of the logical particles would associated with a metalanguage in the example cited by Roberts? Peirce's first recorded example of metalanguage in RLT had a complete sentence "you are a good girl" (which would correspond to a neutral chemical compound) as the subject of a verb phrase, which would have a positive charge. In effect, the word 'that' when attached to a neutral sentence gives it a negative charge so that it could be used as the subject of a positively charged verb phrase "--is much to be wished." As far as I know, Peirce did not use a chemical analogy to explain that combination. Can you suggest some example in chemistry that would correspond to the word 'that'? It would have to take a neutral compound that would correspond to a sentence such as "You are a good girl" and attach some atoms that could form a link to a positive radical, such as "--is much to be wished." For example, the organic acid pattern -COOH would link a neutral organic radical to negative -OH radical or to a negative Na ion. Is there some organic pattern that could link a neutral molecule to a positive ion? That could correspond to the word 'that'. John__ On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 8:20 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote: John, Jon: In my opinion your responses to the issues surrounding Tarski’s “metalanguage" are so weak from a scientific point of view that it is simpler to just pose an example of the meanings of metalanguages in the relevant logic used by CSP. The following is an excerpt from Robert’s book, page 22: What is a reasonable interpretation about the “blanks” in sentences relative to concatenations of logical operations between the posits and the consequences? How would the blanks be relative to the copula? Copula’s of “metalanguages? What would be the number of metalanguages necessary for a conclusion from a posited pragmatic sentence with n blanks? Which of the logical particles would associated with a metalanguage in the example cited by Roberts? Have fun! Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
ssibility of a single straight line; while this possibility is only asserted in the postulate that there is, or may be, a straight line through any two points of space. In that statement the possibility of every single straight line in space is asserted, including the single one whose existence is pertinent and concerning which a similar postulate directly or mediately asserts something which is an essential ingredient of the conclusion. Consistent with R 514, postulates "pronounce that certain things are possible." Moreover, the only kind of investigation that Peirce discusses here is a mathematical demonstration. JFS: The complexity of the investigation is the reason why Delta graphs are a completely new branch of EGs. Again, Peirce's only stated reason for needing "to add a Delta part" to EGs is "in order to deal with modals"--not for metalanguage, and not for complex investigations. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Mar 23, 2024 at 4:46 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jerry, Jon, List, JLRC: If the critical concept that is under scrutiny here the issue of “graphs of graphs” , how is this related to the arithmetical notion of division? I agree with Jon's explanation below that Peirce did not use the word "division" to mean the numerical operation of dividing two numbers. He was talking about dividing different parts of a text. As for the phrase "graph of graphs", that excerpt occurred in the introductory paragraphs of Lecture V of Peirce's Lowell lectures of 1903. Immediately before that, he used the synonym "graphs about graphs''. Since the word 'metalanguage' had not yet been introduced in English, the phrase "graphs about graphs" is his best and clearest term. It he had used his Greek, he might have coined the word 'metagraph'. I am happy to say that I completely agree with Jon's note below. However, the following passage from another note is misleading about Peirce, Euclid, and mathematical practice from ancient times to the present. JAS: The "red pencil" notation (1909) is entirely different from this--a red line is drawn just inside the physical edge of the sheet, and postulates are written in the resulting margin. These are not propositions about the propositions written inside the red line (metalanguage), they are premisses (antecedent) from which the propositions written inside the red line follow necessarily as deductive conclusions (consequent). For example, if the EGs for Euclid's five postulates are scribed in the margin, then they can be iterated to the interior, where the EGs for all the theorems of Euclidean geometry can be derived from them in accordance with the usual permissions. It's true that postulates are iterated (or copied) during the process of proving a theorem. But it's also possible to iterate a statement from a that-clause of metalanguage to a collection of statements that are being discussed in other ways. In mathematical texts, it's common to say "Given A1, A2, A3..., it follows THAT T1, T2, T3... where the A's are axioms, and the T's are theorems that follow from the axioms. Note the word 'that'. It is a sign of METALANGUAGE, between two clauses of a sentence. It is not a sign of implication. The word 'follows' or more precisely 'my be proved from' indicate the steps of a proof. As for the notations in R514 and L376, Peirce made another distinction: postulates are propositions on which the utterer and the interpreter agree. The choice of postulates is the result of an AGREEMENT between the utterer and the interpreter. The results inside the red line are the result of an INVESTIGATION that may be far more complex than an mathematical proof. The complexity of the investigation is the reason why Delta graphs are a completely new branch of EGs. In summary, metalanguage is the "secrete sauce" that makes Gamma graphs a third branch. But investigation makes Delta graphs the fourth branch. That difference is very important. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
Jerry, Jon, List, JLRC: If the critical concept that is under scrutiny here the issue of “graphs of graphs” , how is this related to the arithmetical notion of division? I agree with Jon's explanation below that Peirce did not use the word "division" to mean the numerical operation of dividing two numbers. He was talking about dividing different parts of a text. As for the phrase "graph of graphs", that excerpt occurred in the introductory paragraphs of Lecture V of Peirce's Lowell lectures of 1903. Immediately before that, he used the synonym "graphs about graphs''. Since the word 'metalanguage' had not yet been introduced in English, the phrase "graphs about graphs" is his best and clearest term. It he had used his Greek, he might have coined the word 'metagraph'. I am happy to say that I completely agree with Jon's note below. However, the following passage from another note is misleading about Peirce, Euclid, and mathematical practice from ancient times to the present. JAS: The "red pencil" notation (1909) is entirely different from this--a red line is drawn just inside the physical edge of the sheet, and postulates are written in the resulting margin. These are not propositions about the propositions written inside the red line (metalanguage), they are premisses (antecedent) from which the propositions written inside the red line follow necessarily as deductive conclusions (consequent). For example, if the EGs for Euclid's five postulates are scribed in the margin, then they can be iterated to the interior, where the EGs for all the theorems of Euclidean geometry can be derived from them in accordance with the usual permissions. It's true that postulates are iterated (or copied) during the process of proving a theorem. But it's also possible to iterate a statement from a that-clause of metalanguage to a collection of statements that are being discussed in other ways. In mathematical texts, it's common to say "Given A1, A2, A3..., it follows THAT T1, T2, T3... where the A's are axioms, and the T's are theorems that follow from the axioms. Note the word 'that'. It is a sign of METALANGUAGE, between two clauses of a sentence. It is not a sign of implication. The word 'follows' or more precisely 'my be proved from' indicate the steps of a proof. As for the notations in R514 and L376, Peirce made another distinction: postulates are propositions on which the utterer and the interpreter agree. The choice of postulates is the result of an AGREEMENT between the utterer and the interpreter. The results inside the red line are the result of an INVESTIGATION that may be far more complex than an mathematical proof. The complexity of the investigation is the reason why Delta graphs are a completely new branch of EGs. In summary, metalanguage is the "secrete sauce" that makes Gamma graphs a third branch. But investigation makes Delta graphs the fourth branch. That difference is very important. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Jerry, List: No one is claiming that Peirce ever used the term "metalanguage," only the concept. Specifically, he provided a Gamma EG notation for asserting a proposition about a proposition--the lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) oval for treating a complete proposition as a subject that fills the blank in a rheme attached to the oval by a lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) line to compose another complete proposition (CP 4.560, 1906). For example, here is the Gamma EG for "A thinks that it is possible that B," where A is a person, B is a proposition, "A thinks ___" and "___ is possible" are rhemes, and each instance of "that" in English corresponds to a dotted oval/line in the graph. [image.png] The "red pencil" notation (1909) is entirely different from this--a red line is drawn just inside the physical edge of the sheet, and postulates are written in the resulting margin. These are not propositions about the propositions written inside the red line (metalanguage), they are premisses (antecedent) from which the propositions written inside the red line follow necessarily as deductive conclusions (consequent). For example, if the EGs for Euclid's five postulates are scribed in the margin, then they can be iterated to the interior, where the EGs for all the theorems of Euclidean geometry can be derived from them in accordance with the usual permissions. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 11:43 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Jon, List On Mar 20, 2024, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: - Peirce's 1898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are identical, except that the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in the latter. - Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Cuts are out. Tinctures are in.
al length of the article as originally published in The Monist, which is where he introduces the tinctures. Moreover, he explicitly bemoans "my nonsensical 'tinctures' and heraldry" two years later, in a letter addressed to F. A. Woods (R L477, 1913 Nov 8). I will not further belabor the points that I have already made at length about the "many papers." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 21, 2024 at 4:37 PM John F Sowa wrote: I just wanted to clarify some issues that may be unclear in what Peirce wrote in L376: "in the Monist of Oct. 1906... I made an attempt to make the syntax cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to the lines called “cuts” which simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet”. Many people interpreted this text as implying that Peirce was condemning the tinctures. But as he said explicitly, it was "chiefly due to the lines called cuts”, which in 1906 were defined as cuts through the paper from the recto side to the verso side. The last mention of recto/verso was in R669 (May 1911). From R670 (June 1911) to the last long letter in 1913, negative areas were marked by shading, not by cuts. From L231 (June 1911) to the end, Peirce also avoided the word 'cut'. In R670, he also mentioned tinctures as an option: “The nature of the universe or universes of discourse (for several may be referred to in a single assertion) in the rather unusual cases in which such precision is required, is denoted either by using modifications of the heraldic tinctures, marked in something like the usual manner in pale ink upon the surface, or by scribing the graphs in colored inks”. I'm not discussing these issues as a criticism of anybody. I'm just clarifying several points: (1) A notation for distinguishing "the universe or universes of discourse" is important. (2) Tinctures, by themselves, are not a bad way to express the distinction, but they could not be used in print in the early 20th C. (3) But methods for distinguishing the UoD are necessary in any text that happens to mention two or more. (4) This issue is important for any discussion about L376, because Peirce explicitly mentioned the division of the phemic sheet into multiple papers, which might express different opinions by an utterer and an interpreter. (5) In R670 above and in L376 below, the utterer and interpreter may refer to different UoDs and discuss entities in them. Those discussions, when expressed in EGs, would involve lines of identity (or quantified variables) that refer to universes and to entities in them that may be abstract, imaginary, possible, or impossible. Note that they may also discuss "special understandings". An understanding is another ens rations, as Peirce would say. >From L376; "If 'snows' is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in >the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter >has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to >relate, it sometimes does snow. For they two may conceive that the “phemic >sheet” embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common >attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions >between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to >one subject and part to another”. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Cuts are out. Tinctures are in.
I just wanted to clarify some issues that may be unclear in what Peirce wrote in L376: "in the Monist of Oct. 1906... I made an attempt to make the syntax cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to the lines called “cuts” which simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet”. Many people interpreted this text as implying that Peirce was condemning the tinctures. But as he said explicitly, it was "chiefly due to the lines called cuts”, which in 1906 were defined as cuts through the paper from the recto side to the verso side. The last mention of recto/verso was in R669 (May 1911). From R670 (June 1911) to the last long letter in 1913, negative areas were marked by shading, not by cuts. From L231 (June 1911) to the end, Peirce also avoided the word 'cut'. In R670, he also mentioned tinctures as an option: “The nature of the universe or universes of discourse (for several may be referred to in a single assertion) in the rather unusual cases in which such precision is required, is denoted either by using modifications of the heraldic tinctures, marked in something like the usual manner in pale ink upon the surface, or by scribing the graphs in colored inks”. I'm not discussing these issues as a criticism of anybody. I'm just clarifying several points: (1) A notation for distinguishing "the universe or universes of discourse" is important. (2) Tinctures, by themselves, are not a bad way to express the distinction, but they could not be used in print in the early 20th C. (3) But methods for distinguishing the UoD are necessary in any text that happens to mention two or more. (4) This issue is important for any discussion about L376, because Peirce explicitly mentioned the division of the phemic sheet into multiple papers, which might express different opinions by an utterer and an interpreter. (5) In R670 above and in L376 below, the utterer and interpreter may refer to different UoDs and discuss entities in them. Those discussions, when expressed in EGs, would involve lines of identity (or quantified variables) that refer to universes and to entities in them that may be abstract, imaginary, possible, or impossible. Note that they may also discuss "special understandings". An understanding is another ens rations, as Peirce would say. >From L376; "If 'snows' is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in >the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter >has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to >relate, it sometimes does snow. For they two may conceive that the “phemic >sheet” embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common >attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions >between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to >one subject and part to another”. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
the use of metalanguage has all the important practical applications that he anticipates--but it is his own idea, not Peirce's. Accordingly, my only major objection to his article-in-progress is the unqualified claim in its title and proposed content that it describes what Peirce had in mind for Delta EGs, which indeed is "not backed sufficiently by Peirce's own statements." As far as I know, no other Peirce scholar has ever suggested that his December 1911 letter to Risteen presents a "specification" of Delta EGs, presumably because there is no basis in the text itself for such an interpretation. In fact, there is nothing in its extant 19 pages that deals with modals or is otherwise unique to the new Delta part. As Peirce himself says up-front, "the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System" are "a cross division"--orthogonal to the division into the Alpha/Beta/Gamma parts in "the better exposition of 1903," and thus applicable to all of them. This includes the "many papers" concept for the phemic sheet, where different pages contain graphs about different subjects that the utterer and interpreter give their "common attention" at different times, which is not novel in 1911--it reiterates something that Peirce had stated at least twice previously. Moreover ... - Peirce's 1898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are identical, except that the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in the latter. - Peirce never again uses either of these notations in manuscripts after 1903, so it is equally unlikely that he would have revived either of them in 1911. - Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, with the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent (theorems) inside the red line. - Those pages in R 514 are among the "Fragments on Existential Graphs" that properly belong there and are dated 1909, not from the misfiled letter to Kehler of June 1911 (R L231) that includes a "tutorial" on EGs (NEM 3:162-169). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 19, 2024 at 10:16 PM Mike Bergman wrote: Hi All, As many have noted, I, too, have learned much and have (generally) enjoyed this interchange between JAS and JFS. Further, I have no dog in this hunt and certainly do not claim any special understanding about Peirce's existential graphs. So, as a voting matter, my impression of this interchange is that I would have no problems with a thesis put forward such as, "Sowa has studied Peirce's EGs for many decades and believes that 'metalanguage' helps exposit . . . " Where I concur with JAS is that these assertions are not backed sufficiently by Peirce's own statements. Further, now from my own perspective, I think these kind of minutiae arguments are deflective from understanding the more important points of what Peirce was trying to do, what he was striving for, what his mindset and thought process and logical rigor were striving to achieve. Much has changed in the six score decades since Peirce but his ultimate objective of trying to reason about the nature of things remains. That is a conversation I welcome, and may initiate at some point myself. If the protagonists want to keep slugging it out, I say, OK, go for it. But the fight from my perspective is growing tiresome. Best, Mike On 3/19/2024 9:04 PM, John F Sowa wrote: To refresh my memory, I reread Peirce's Lowell Lectures about Gamma graphs. And the following passage from Lecture V (NEM 3, p. 365) explains what he meant in L376 when he said that he would keep the Gamma division: "I must begin by a few words concerning gamma graphs; because it is by means of gamma graphs that I have been enabled to understand these subjects... In particular, it is absolutely necessary to representing the reasoning about these subjects that we should be able to reason with graphs about graphs and thus that we should have graphs of graphs." That explains the issues we have been debating recently. Peirce had recognized the importance of graphs of graphs when he wrote "The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a DIVISION I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals", That division would require some version of metalanguage for specifying modality and higher-order logic. But it does NOT imply all (or any) details that he happened to specify in 1903. Since he had earlier specified a version of metalanguage in 1898 (RLT), he had previously recognized the importance of metalanguage.
[PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta
To refresh my memory, I reread Peirce's Lowell Lectures about Gamma graphs. And the following passage from Lecture V (NEM 3, p. 365) explains what he meant in L376 when he said that he would keep the Gamma division: "I must begin by a few words concerning gamma graphs; because it is by means of gamma graphs that I have been enabled to understand these subjects... In particular, it is absolutely necessary to representing the reasoning about these subjects that we should be able to reason with graphs about graphs and thus that we should have graphs of graphs." That explains the issues we have been debating recently. Peirce had recognized the importance of graphs of graphs when he wrote "The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a DIVISION I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals", That division would require some version of metalanguage for specifying modality and higher-order logic. But it does NOT imply all (or any) details that he happened to specify in 1903. Since he had earlier specified a version of metalanguage in 1898 (RLT), he had previously recognized the importance of metalanguage. The examples in the Lowell lectures are similar to his 1898 version. Since he never again used the details he specified in 1903 in any further MSS, it's unlikely that he would revive them in 1911. The only feature he was reviving was the use of metalanguage. The 1898 version was just as good as anything he specified in 1903. Since it was simpler than the Gamma graphs, that would make it better. In fact, Peirce mentioned another version of metalanguage in R514 (June 1911) that was logically equivalent and syntactically similar to what he was writing in L376 (December 1911). The novel features of L376 are sufficiently advanced to qualify as a fourth branch of EGs. But they require a bit more explanation. As I said before, they depend critically on the expertise of Allan Risteen. For that information, see the references to Risteen that are listed in the index to EP2. And the applications discussed in L376 have strong resemblances to the applications of the very similar IKL logic in 2006. For those, see the brief discussion and detailed references in https://jfsowa.com/ikl . I'll write more about these topics in another note later this week. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Delta Graphs (was Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
Jerry, Jon, List, The attached file contains the abstract and outline of the article I'm writing and a complete copy of L376. JLRC: The question is, what aspects of “21st C developments” are you referring to? Except for a few experimental projects, all computer programs and systems that do any kind of modal reasoning use some version of metalanguage. That was a feature that Peirce introduced in 1898 (RLT). He also added a similar notation for metalanguage to his 1903 Lowell lectures on modal logic. And he used a slightly different, but equivalent notation for metalanguage in June 1911 (R514). But the Delta graphs of L376 combine metalanguage with a novel method of organizing the phemic sheet into a growing and evolving structure of multiple "papers" (see the appendix of the attached file), In the IKRIS project (2004 to 2006), a group of researchers built a very rich system of reasoning on top of a logic that that includes a metalanguage feature that is equivalent to Peirce's 1898 addition to EGs. For a brief summary of the IKRIS project, see https://jfsowa.com/ikl . My summary includes links to the original documents for the project and to the IKL logic, which is based on an ISO standard for Common Logic (CL) plus a metalanguage feature added to CL. The IKRIS documents describe developments that use IKL to support science and engineering projects. I believe that those projects demonstrate that Peirce's methods described in L376 can indeed support his methods of pragmatism. JAS: we were having a respectful and substantive discussion despite our ongoing disagreements. I am disappointed that this is no longer the case and inclined to refrain from any further engagement after one more attempt to set the record straight. With all due respect, I believe that you made a serious mistake by ignoring 90% of the only document in which Peirce mentions Delta graphs, as I said in a previous note: JFS: The critical additions [for a proof of pragmatism] are closely related to what Peirce specified in L376. I call that material a specification of Delta graphs. I don't care what you call it. The specifications are important. The names are irrelevant. There is nothing insulting in that note. I have repeatedly cited the texts I mentioned in my reply to Jerry. I tried to explain how important they are to understand what Peirce was writing about Delta graphs. And I offered to help you correct your article. But you refused to look at those references, and you kept insisting that Peirce was not writing about Delta graphs in the only text in which he wrote "I shall NOW have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals." In the next sentence, he describes how he is "HERE" describing "the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System." Then the paragraph that immediately follows that sentence begins to describe the conventions.That is a very clear connection. I cannot imagine how anyone could mistake it. The remainder of L376 (see below) continues to describe a novel version of EGs that uses features (Cayley's writings) that Peirce had discussed with Risteen in the 1890s. (See the comments by Nathan Houser in EP2.) It also discusses issues that are related to IKL and the IKRIS project. (See my reply above to Jerry.) You refused to read the references to Risteen or the references to IKRIS and IKL. And you kept on searching for references to anything other than the contents of L376. I don't believe that you can blame me for being annoyed. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: Up until the off-List message that you sent me late Saturday evening, we were having a respectful and substantive discussion despite our ongoing disagreements. I am disappointed that this is no longer the case and inclined to refrain from any further engagement after one more attempt to set the record straight. JFS: The critical additions [for a proof of pragmatism] are closely related to what Peirce specified in L376. I call that material a specification of Delta graphs. I don't care what you call it. The specifications are important. The names are irrelevant. The name is relevant when it is one that Peirce himself used. If he had never mentioned a Delta part of EGs at all, then anyone would be free to invent one and give it that name. However, he did mention it, albeit in only one sentence-- "I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals"--so no one should misleadingly use the name "Delta graphs" for anything that deviates from or goes well beyond this very brief description. As I have explicitly and repeatedly acknowledged, unless additional pages of R L376 turn up that spell it out, no one can know for sure exactly what he had in mind. That is why I have carefully and consistently referred to the notation that he scribed on R 339:[340r] as a candidate for Delta EGs. JFS: I realize
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
peatedly, the EGs scribed on R 339:[340r] cannot be properly interpreted as Beta EGs. The heavy lines for "circumstances" or "times" do not denote indefinite individuals, they represent possible states of things--exactly what is needed for modal logic but missing from previous versions of EGs. The attached letters "p" and "q" do not denote general concepts being attributed to individuals, they denote propositions that would be true in those possible states of things--i.e., modal propositions. The additional modal axioms added to classical propositional logic do not correspond to valid theorems in first-order predicate logic as implemented with Beta EGs. There are no counterparts in the latter for propositions that are non-modal (no attached heavy lines) or that include iterated modalities (multiple attached heavy lines). JFS: Those topics would explain why Delta graphs (as described in L376) have much more structure than just a notation for metalanguage. Peirce used that structure to support a phemic sheet that has multiple "papers". Nothing in the extant 19 pages of R L376 describes Delta EGs. Everything in that letter is applicable to the other three parts, as confirmed by your ongoing refusal/inability to provide any exact quotations from it to the contrary, despite my repeated requests. The "many papers" are neither new nor unique to Delta EGs--they correspond to different subjects that attract "the common attention" of the utterer and interpreter at different times, such that the collection of all of them represents the entire universe of discourse. Accordingly, nothing precludes them from being employed with Alpha, Beta, and Gamma EGs; in fact, Peirce was simply reiterating in 1911 what he had already written previously (R 280, c. 1905; CP 4.561n, 1908; https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-03/msg4.html). JFS: And the remainder of L376 describes how they may be used in an "investigation". That is necessary to support a logic of pragmatism. Why did you put "investigation" in quotation marks? That word never appears in R L376. Can you provide an exact quotation from that letter where Peirce describes how the "many papers" may be used in an "investigation"? I am not seeing it. JFS: That additional structure is what makes Delta graphs the fourth kind of logic that goes beyond Gamma graphs. You say that as if you somehow know exactly what Peirce had in mind for Delta graphs. Perhaps you meant to say, "That additional structure is what would make my [John Sowa's] candidate for Delta graphs the fourth kind of logic that goes beyond Gamma graphs." Even so, as I already pointed out, the "many papers" are equally applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma EGs; there is nothing about them that specifically deals with modals or would otherwise be unique to Delta EGs. JFS: And by the way, when you make these additions to your article, you can include an acknowledgment to thank me for all this help in explaining what Peirce was doing. I am glad to see that you are maintaining a sense of humor. Again, I have appreciated the stimulating exchange and have learned quite a bit from it about how Peirce anticipated the use of metalanguage in logic, even though we continue to disagree on whether it has anything to do with Delta EGs. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Mar 17, 2024 at 2:06 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, List, Since your article has just been accepted for publication, you probably still have time to make a few corrections. Following are some suggestions. JAS: Indeed, given that Peirce already had a notation for metalanguage in his 1903 Gamma EGs--in fact, five years earlier--how could that be what he had in mind for the new Delta part that he added in 1911? What exactly are you proposing to add that goes beyond the dotted (or thinly drawn) oval and line for asserting propositions about propositions? What must be added is all of L376. More would be better, but we can look to the future to see what is needed. More precisely, Peirce had a notation for metalanguage in 1898, which is simpler and does not need the useless baggage of Gamma graphs. There is no need for them when you adopt the notation for metalanguage. But metalanguage, by itself, is not sufficient for a proof of pragmatism. There is an open-ended variety of ways for using metalanguage. I also copied page 340r from the logic notebook (see attached). Please note that EGs that refer to "circumstances" can be translated to ordinary statements in Peirce's algebraic notion for first-order logic. There is nothing special about circumstances, by themselves, that makes them modal. You should
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modal EGs in Delta vs. Gamma
Jon, List, Since your article has just been accepted for publication, you probably still have time to make a few corrections. Following are some suggestions. JAS: Indeed, given that Peirce already had a notation for metalanguage in his 1903 Gamma EGs--in fact, five years earlier--how could that be what he had in mind for the new Delta part that he added in 1911? What exactly are you proposing to add that goes beyond the dotted (or thinly drawn) oval and line for asserting propositions about propositions? What must be added is all of L376. More would be better, but we can look to the future to see what is needed. More precisely, Peirce had a notation for metalanguage in 1898, which is simpler and does not need the useless baggage of Gamma graphs. There is no need for them when you adopt the notation for metalanguage. But metalanguage, by itself, is not sufficient for a proof of pragmatism. There is an open-ended variety of ways for using metalanguage. I also copied page 340r from the logic notebook (see attached). Please note that EGs that refer to "circumstances" can be translated to ordinary statements in Peirce's algebraic notion for first-order logic. There is nothing special about circumstances, by themselves, that makes them modal. You should make that correction in your article. Did you read the Wikipedia article about Arthur Cayley and the comments about Risteen in EP2? Those topics would explain why Delta graphs (as described in L376) have much more structure than just a notation for metalanguage. Peirce used that structure to support a phemic sheet that has multiple "papers". And the remainder of L376 describes how they may be used in an "investigation". That is necessary to support a logic of pragmatism. That additional structure is what makes Delta graphs the fourth kind of logic that goes beyond Gamma graphs. I suggest that you include all of L376 in an appendix to your article. That is what I'm doing. In summary, Peirce was years ahead of his time, and it's essential to give him full credit for his accomplishments. It would be insulting to claim that he didn't realize that his logic of 1892, by itself, was sufficient. And by the way, when you make these additions to your article, you can include an acknowledgment to thank me for all this help in explaining what Peirce was doing. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: If Peirce thought that the notations for his Gamma graphs of 1903 were adequate to represent everything in Delta graphs, why did he claim that the he needed to add a fourth part to his system of EGs? If the Gamma EGs of 1903 were adequate to represent metalanguage (as I have demonstrated), then why would Peirce need to add a new Delta part for that purpose in 1911? JFS: In your diagram below, the row of four EGs on the left represent pure first-order predicate calculus. Any sentences outside of the EGs (whether in English or EGs or some other notation) do nothing to change those sentences from FOL to any version of modal logic. They are pure, unadulterated FOL. No, I have refuted this claim repeatedly. There is a fundamental semiotic difference between describing indefinite individuals (lines of identity) with general concepts (names) and describing possible states of things (lines of compossibility) with propositions (letters). The additional axioms of modal propositional logic do not translate into valid theorems of first-order predicate logic as implemented by Beta EGs, and there are no counterparts in the latter for iterated modalities and propositions that are actually true instead of possibly true (analogous to existentially quantified) or necessarily true (analogous to universally quantified). JFS: In short, that thin line attached to an oval is Peirce's 1898 notation for metalanguage--five years before the Gamma graphs. I agree with you about that. I thanked you for correcting my mistake (and Ketner's) in misreading the thin line in the second EG on RLT 151 as part of the cursive "i" in the rheme "is false." I brought to your attention Peirce's slight revision of that 1898 notation in 1903, only changing from the thinly drawn oval and line to the dotted oval and line, presumably to distinguish them from the thinly drawn lines that still represented cuts at that time. I suppose that it makes little difference once shading replaces cuts, but I prefer the dotted oval and line to minimize the potential for confusion. JFS: The metalanguage of 1898 combined with EGs that contain symbols such as "possibly true" in a verb phrase does represent modality. Exactly! That is why it is very unlikely that Peirce had this in mind when he said in 1911 that he needed to add a new Delta part "in order to deal with modals." JAS: As I have spelled out in a soon-to-be-published paper, "Peirce and Modal Logic: Delta Existential Graphs and Pragmaticism"
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
Jon, Every statement about a thought expresses a possibility. Every statement about a claim, a wish, a fear, etc, expresses a possibility. That is why metalanguage is a more explicit method for expressing and reasoning about possibility. Quine said that in the 1960s, and other logicians have been developing methods for doing that since the 1970s. Today, nobody uses the Lewis-style of modal logic for any practical purpose. JAS: how would you scribe the graph for "A thinks that B is possibly true"? I'm sorry that I forgot to answer that question. I was commenting on other points, and I forgot to state the translation for the EG you drew. For my recommended version of metalevel EGs, I would first replace the dotted line of your EG with a solid line. That would express the sentence "A is thinking the proposition that there exists a B." Then I would connect that solid line by a ligature to the word 'possible'. Literally, that new EG could be read "A is thinking the possible proposition that there exists a B." But it could be read more simply "A thinks it's possible that there is a B." Exactly the same procedure can be used to attach any other adjective or phrase, such as 'necessary', 'impossible', 'probable', 'useful', 'desirable', 'feared', 'doubted', 'lawful', 'illegal' or 'written in Holy Scriptures". That is the reason why the version of modality that C. I. Lewis specified in 1932 is a dead end. Anything you can express with it can be expressed more clearly and generally with metalanguage. I believe that Peirce recognized the need for more expressive power. And metalanguage adds that power without losing anything that might be expressed with the 1903 EGs. Some people dabbled with methods for computing with a Lewis-style of reasoning, but they have never been used for any practical applications. Metalanguage is simpler and more general. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' Yes, of course; that is obvious from the syntax of the English sentences that I translated into those two graphs--although, as I said in that post, it is a dotted line, not a thin line. JFS: But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of it. No, of course not; that is obvious from the fact that neither of those two sentences expresses a modal proposition, i.e., one that involves possibility or necessity. JFS: They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta graphs No, this is incorrect; that is obvious from the fact that such propositions about propositions can already be represented by Gamma EGs using the dotted oval/line notation that Peirce introduced in 1903 (LF 2/1:166), which is isomorphic with the thinly drawn oval/line notation that he used in 1898 (RLT 151). In 1911, he did not need a new Delta part of EGs in order to deal with metalanguage; according to his own explicit statement in R L376, he needed a new Delta part of EGs in order to deal with modals, due to his dissatisfaction with the cuts (including broken cuts) of 1903 and the tinctures of 1906. With that in mind, in your candidate for Delta EGs, how would you scribe the graph for "A thinks that B is possibly true"? Or will you continue refusing to provide any examples of how you would represent (and reason about) even very simple modal propositions, despite my multiple requests? By contrast, I am happy to show you how I would scribe that graph in my candidate for Delta EGs based on R 339:[340r] (1909). [image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 4:51 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' A thinks THAT C is a good girl. A is claiming THAT A is thinking THAT C is a good girl. Both of those sentences and both of those EGs can be translated to and from the IKL logic of 2006, which uses the symbol "that" to represent metalanguage. They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta graphs, which can be translated to and from the IKL logic. But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of it. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ►
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
Jerry, Jon, List, Peirce never used the term "graphic object". In his classification of the sciences, pure mathematics does not depend on anything else. Phaneroscopy is free to use any imaginable mathematical patterns to analyze, classify, and interpret anything in the phaneron, no matter where it came from -- by any of the external or internal senses or by some sort of dreaming or imagining, JLRC: Given a graphic object, how does one decipher the logical content of it? By phaneroscopy, whatever is in the phaneron is interpreted as a pattern or diagram that consists of a pieces or parts that may resemble patterns previously observed and classified images together with unfamiliar parts that may be classified according to degrees of resemblance to previously observed and classified patterns. JLRC: What types of semantics can be associated with what types of visual distinctions? That partially interpreted phaneron is further interpreted evaluated according to esthetical, ethical, and semeiotic methods. Semeiotic is a more detailed analysis, which includes anything that may be call semantics. JLRC: How many distinctions are to be associated with a graphic object? And how are these distinctions associated with the forms embodied in the objects with logical premises OF ANY ORDER? There is no limit to the amount or depth of analysis that may be applied to anything in the phaneron. Different individuals with different kinds of background and experience may analyze anything at any level of detail. The kind and amount of logic that anybody may use depends on their knowledge, interests, and experience. JAS: Your questions [by JLRC] as posed are extremely general, and their answers depend heavily on the particular context of interest. I agree. As for Delta graphs, I'll send a partial draft in a few days that goes into more detail. John From: "Jerry LR Chandler" Jon, John, List: The attempts to interpret the on going discussions leads to simple questions about meaning of symbols and logics. Given a graphic object, how does one decipher the logical content of it? What types of semantics can be associated with what types of visual distinctions? How many distinctions are to be associated with a graphic object? And how are these distinctions associated with the forms embodied in the objects with logical premises OF ANY ORDER? I pose these questions because as the discussion unfolds into the vast richness of modal logics within the modern forms of symbolic logics, the roles of individual minds in expressing semes appears to become dominant. In other words, the boundaries between symbols and icons seems to disappearing... Cheers Jerry On Mar 8, 2024, at 9:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Jeff, List: Indeed, as Don Roberts summarizes, "The Gamma part of EG corresponds, roughly, to second (and higher) order functional calculi, and to modal logic. ... By means of this new section of EG Peirce wanted to take account of abstractions, including qualities and relations and graphs themselves as subjects to be reasoned about" (https://www.felsemiotica.com/descargas/Roberts-Don-D.-The-Existential-Graphs-of-Charles-S.-Peirce.pdf, 1973, p. 64). Likewise, according to Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "In the Gamma part Peirce proposes a bouquet of logics beyond the extensional, propositional and first-order systems. Those concern systems of modal logics, second-order (higher-order) logics, abstractions, and logic of multitudes and collections, among others" (LF 2/1:28). Jay Zeman says a bit more about Gamma EGs for second-order logic in his dissertation. JZ: There is also another suggestion, in 4.470, which is interesting but to which Peirce devotes very little time. Here he shows us a different kind of line of identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at least the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able to determine, but it seems to me that there would not be too much of a problem in working it into a graphical system which would stand to the higher order calculi as beta stands to the first-order calculus. The continuity interpretation of the "spot line of identity" is fairly clear; it maps the continuity of a property or a relation. The redness of an apple is the same, in a sense, as the redness of my face if I am wrong; the continuity of the special line of identity introduced in 4.470 represents graphically this sameness. This sameness or continuity is not the same as the identity of individuals; although its representation is scribed upon the beta sheet of assertion, its "second intentional" nature seems to cause Peirce to classify it with the gamma signs. (https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481, 1964, pp. 31-32) The CP
Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
Jon, In both graphs in your note below, the thin line may be read as "that"' A thinks THAT C is a good girl. A is claiming THAT A is thinking THAT C is a good girl. Both of those sentences and both of those EGs can be translated to and from the IKL logic of 2006, which uses the symbol "that" to represent metalanguage. They can also be translated to and from Peirce's Delta graphs, which can be translated to and from the IKL logic. But neither of those two sentences can be translated to any version of modal logic based on the modal logics by C. I. Lewis or later variations of it. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 3/13/24 5:39 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] metalanguage, possibility, WAS: Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics) Helmut, List: Different kinds of possibility can be addressed with different formal systems of modal logic--alethic, deontic, doxastic, dynamic, epistemic, temporal, etc. For example, deontic logic defines possibility as permissibility and necessity as obligation, which is why its alternativeness/accessibility relation is merely serial and not reflexive--every obligation is permissible, but not every obligation is actually fulfilled, i.e., people can (and do) behave in ways that are not permissible. It is a fundamental principle of Peirce's Existential Graphs (EGs) that the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse as already agreed upon by the utterer (or graphist) who scribes discrete EGs on them and the interpreter who reads them. In other words, the underlying assumption is that both are genuine inquirers who are sincerely seeking the truth together. If the utterer scribes the EG for "A thinks that B," then this is true within that universe of discourse--it has nothing to do with what A claims to think, only what A really does think, unless the utterer instead scribes "A claims that A thinks that B." By the way, since B designates a proposition instead of a name for a general concept, the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "thinking," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around B, preferably spelled out as a Beta EG (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Likewise, the Gamma EG for "A claims that A thinks that B" has A attached by a heavy line of identity to "claiming," which is then attached by a dotted line to a dotted oval around the Gamma EG for "A thinks that B" as just described, except that A is not repeated; instead, the one heavy line is branched and extended to "thinking." Here are those Gamma EGs, substituting "C is a good girl" for B. [image.png] As far as I know, the only place in Peirce's writings where he discusses a specific role for God in EGs is R 280 (c. 1905). In three different drafts, he states the following. CSP: The Graphist is really Plastic Nature, or the Artifex of Nature; and the special permissions are the experiences given to the interpreter of Nature, to the man, to which he is at liberty to attend, or not to attend at all, or to attend and immediately put out of sight, as he will. CSP: The sheet of assertion is the mirror of the interpreter’s mind, and through that it is the sign of what the Graphist authorizes. Now the graphist, as the author of truth (for we have seen that falsity is what he forbids and truth what he permits) and source of all the interpreter’s knowledge must be recognized as being either Plastic Nature or the Artifex of Nature. The universe is simply the collective whole of all things to the assertion of whose existence the Graphist interposes no veto, or extends a positive permission. CSP: We further conceive that this feigned sensible state of things is the icon or emblem of a mental state of things. Namely, the immense surface with the graphs scribed upon it is the image of the interpreter’s experience, while the sheet of assertion, his field of view is the image of his field of attention. His experience is forced upon him, while he attends to what he pleases, if he puts forth sufficient effort. The Graphist must be regarded as corresponding to the "Plastic Nature" of Cudworth, or else to the Artifex of Nature. Again, everything that is asserted on the sheet is true, in this case because the one scribing all the EGs is "the author of truth"--either God the Creator himself or what Peirce describes elsewhere (referencing Cudworth) as "a blind agent intermediate between God and the world" (R 870, 1901). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 13, 2024 at 12:15 PM Helmut Raulien wrote: List, I put a new name to this, because I am not inside the discussion, just want to mention a problem I have with the topic. First, there are different types of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
Gary, I have responded precisely to every one of Jon's comments. I am now writing an article with the title "Delta Graphs: The Logic of Pragmatism". I'll send a draft to P-list in a few days. I guarantee that it will include precise reasons why Delta graphs are based on metalanguage -- which is the primary method that is used for computational purposes in the 21st C. The axioms by C. I. Lewis and related developments are a dead end for any purpose in science and engineering. After 1903, Peirce wrote a great deal about possibility and necessity, but he never used his 1903 modal logic for any of that. Once again, Peirce's logic is at the forefront of 21st C developments. John From: "Gary Richmond" Sent: 3/12/24 8:48 PM To: John F Sowa Cc: Peirce-L , Jon Alan Schmidt Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics) John, Despite your earlier comment in a post addressed to me on March 6 where you wrote that "the important references are in the future, not the past" -- a remark which, in this matter of Delta EGs, I cannot say I much agree with insofar as it relates to Peirce's work -- it remains impossible for me, and I'd imagine others, to fully grasp your position on this issue that you've been clearly disagreeing with Jon on. In short, without your addressing Jon's repeated requests for Peirce quotations supporting your claims -- as well as a few examples of how you would represent (and reason about) modal propositions in your "candidate" for Delta EGs -- your contender for Delta graphs continues to be for me unclear, really, unfathomable. Of course those following this discussion look forward to reading the article which you are working on discussing Delta EGs. But it would be more than helpful to forum members if you'd offer some quotations and a few simple examples to clarify your views on the matter. Best, Gary On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 1:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: John, List: CSP: The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. JFS: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the details of the 1903 logics. He is saying that he is preserving that DIVISION into Alpha (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and Gamma (something beyond Alpha and Beta). Please do not put words in Peirce's mouth. Preserving the division without also preserving the details of "the better exposition of 1903" would make no sense. Going straight into a specification for the new Delta part without saying anything at all about the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts, having just stated the intention to "adhere to" that division, would likewise make no sense. Again, can you identify even one sentence from the entire extant letter to Risteen that is about EGs but not applicable to those other three parts, i.e., unique to Delta? JFS: Quine correctly said that modal logic was just a version of metalanguage about logic. That is Quine's opinion, apparently one that you share. However, it is by no means universal, even among logicians today, and there is no basis for claiming that Peirce would agree unless you can provide an exact quotation to that effect. Again, having made up your own mind, I suspect that you are reading that position back into his texts, including R L376. JFS: All the useful applications are based on some version of metalanguage, along the lines of the December 1911 article. It is a letter, not an article, and as far as I can tell, it neither states nor implies anything about the use of metalanguage instead of formal modal logic. Please provide an exact quotation to support your claim. JFS: Logics that use the two operators for necessary and possible, have no practical applications of any kind. Again, I would caution against making such sweeping and dismissive pronouncements. After all, there might very well be practical applications of formal modal logic that have not yet come to your attention or that get discovered in the future. In any case, according to Peirce, "True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). JFS: Peirce has an unusually large percentage of successful revivals. His Delta graphs are among them. I recognized their importance, because I have used and worked with similar logics from the late 20th and early 21st C. No one can say for sure what Peirce had in mind for Delta EGs since he never spelled it out himself, unless there are more pages of R L376 somewhere out there, waiting to be discovered. I still see no evidence in the extant text of that letter nor elsewhere (including R 514) to
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Reading Peirce Reading Others
Jeff, List, Those are important questions: JBD: How important is it to consider the things Peirce is reading for the sake of understanding what he says? Let me start with a simple point. Can we understand what Peirce is explicitly saying about another author's views without reading the passages in their writings to which Peirce is referring? Unfortunately, that evidence doesn't exist. But I certainly agree with the following point: JBD: I think that (1) reading the texts and (2) reading what he is reading go hand in hand. That is, reading what he is reading is essential to understanding the texts--at least in those places where he is explicitly or implicitly referring to, drawing on, or reacting to the ideas of others. I would also emphasize Peirce's uncanny ability to anticipate future developments, especially in logic.. That is why I would add that a knowledge of developments in the century after Peirce is important for evaluating his contributions. Good sources for such evaluations are the talks presented at the Peirce Sesquicentennial in 1989 and the Centennial in 2014. The modern experts in fields that Peirce had pioneered emphasized many of his most significant insights, There are also many ongoing publications that address his contributions to the future. In any case, thanks for preparing that list of authors and the number of references to each. That list is worth saving and consulting as a guide to research. To understand what Peirce wrote at any point in time, it's important to look both forwards and backwards -- both in his own writings and in the writings of his predecessors and successors. Even authors who never read anything by Peirce were influenced by people who had and by people who rediscovered some of his ideas. Tarski and Gentzen, for example, were brilliant logicians, but it's inaccurate to say that Peirce had anticipated their work. In some important respects, he went beyond them. John From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" Jon S, List, How important is it to consider the things Peirce is reading for the sake of understanding what he says? Let me start with a simple point. Can we understand what Peirce is explicitly saying about another author's views without reading the passages in their writings to which Peirce is referring? For the sake of satisfying my own curiosity, I've made a list of the number of pages in the CP that make reference to philosophers, scientists, mathematicians, and literary figures. Given the fact that the CP is only a small portion of his writings, it isn't comprehensive. What is more, it does not count the total number of references made to a given name, which is higher in many cases due to multiple references made on a single page. Nor does it take into consideration discussions of a view that continue for many pages without repetitive references to a specific name. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the CP consists of about 10% of his writings and that they are a representative sample. Under this supposition (which is not accurate), we would need to multiply the numbers below by a factor of 10 in order to approximate the number of pages that involve references to the writings of others. Here is the list: Top 12: Aristotle 227 Kant 218 Hegel 121 Boole 95 Schröder 76 Scotus 66 Plato 60+ Euclid 58 Royce 57 William James 50 Cantor 50 Berkeley 50 Philosophy Pythagoras 12 Parmenides 3 Heraclitus 1 Democritus 5 Zeno 12 Plato, Platonic, Platonism 60+ Aristotle, Aristotelian, Aristotelis 227 Diogenes, Cynic 6 Plotinus, neoplatonic 2 Stoic 16 Boethius 25 (6 in text, 19 in fn) Augustine 11 John of Salisbury 14 Abelard 17 Scotus 66 Ockham 34 Roger Bacon 11 Aquinas 27 Francis Bacon 17 Hobbes 26 Descartes 39 Pascal 5 Spinoza 12 Leibniz 35 Locke 37 Berkeley 50 Hume 40 Reid 19 Kant, Kantian 218 Friedrich Schiller 2 Fichte 6 Schelling 8 Hegel, Hegelian 121 Bentham 13 James Mill 11 Whewell 21 John Stuart Mill 17 William Hamilton 32 Schopenhauer 3 Nietzsche 0 Ferdinand (FCS) Schiller 24 Royce 57 William James 50 Dewey 13 Husserl 3 Science Copernicus 9 Galileo 21 Tycho Brahe 4 Kepler 20 Newton 34 Faraday 5 Clausius 11 Thomson 10 Maxwell 10 Ricardo 4 Adam Smith 1 Comte 22 Spencer, Spencerian 27 Darwin 34 Agassiz 6 Oliver Wendell Holmes 2 Mathematics Pappus 1 Eudoxus 0 Euclid, Euclidean 58 Archimedes 7 Fermat 28 Desargues 1 Bernoulli 9 Playfair, 7 Euler, Euler’s, Eulerian 31 Projective geometry 11 William Rowan Hamilton 38 Gauss 11 Riemann 6 Boole, Boole’s, Boolean 95 DeMorgan 4 Jevons 33 Peano 4 Dedekind 17 Cantor, Cantorian, 50 Kempe 14 Listing 13 Schröder 76 Whitehead 3 Bertrand Russell 2 Literature Homer 1 Aeschylus 0 Sophocles 0 Lucretius 4 Dante 4 Shakespeare 9 Milton 4 Henry James 5 Sherlock Holmes 1 Emerson 6 Religious Jesus 11 Buddha 5 Mohammed 1 Holy Ghost 1 Moses 0 Confuscius 0 Brahma 1 It is remarkable, I think, that Peirce makes so many references to Aristotle and Kant. As far as I can
[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
(only) Delta graphs. On the contrary, Peirce plainly states his intention to describe all four parts of EGs, but he never gets around to explaining their differences, let alone dealing with modals or discussing anything else that is unique to the new Delta part. JFS: Then the paragraph immediately after that begins "The Conventions." And it continues with a specification of the conventions for something. I cannot imagine that the "something" is anything other than Delta graphs. Your failure of imagination is not dispositive. Can you identify even one sentence from the entire section on "The Conventions"--or, for that matter, the rest of the letter--that is about EGs but not applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma? JFS: Note the later discussion about different "parts" of the phemic sheet, which may be asserted and interpreted in different ways. Peirce states, "For they two [utterer and interpreter] may conceive that the 'phemic sheet' embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to one subject and part to another." As I have noted before, the different parts relate to different subjects to which both parties pay attention at different times--equivalent what Peirce describes in previous texts such as R 280 (c. 1905) and CP 4.561n (1908), both of which I quoted last week (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-03/msg4.html). As such, this concept is fully applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma EGs--it does not exclusively "deal with modals," and thus is not unique to Delta EGs. JFS: That is why metalanguage must be used to state the many kinds of modality that Peirce discusses in the attached text. Peirce indeed briefly discusses modality in R L376, but he does not address how to represent and reason about modal propositions using EGs, which is his only stated reason for needing a Delta part. JFS: But the original MS, a copy of which you included in your note, had a thin line that connected the oval to the word 'is'. I suspect that who drew that diagram thought that the thin line between the oval and the word 'is' was just part of the word 'is'. But in his handwiriting, Peirce never drew a line in front of an initial letter 'i'. Therefore, that graph was mistakenly drawn. Thank you for correcting my mistake. I noticed that line, drawn even more lightly than the one in the first EG on RLT 151, but assumed that it was part of Peirce's cursive "i"--just as Ketner evidently did. However, after looking at a few other manuscripts, I agree that Peirce generally did not include such a line when handwriting "i" as the first letter of a word, so there is indeed a lightly drawn line connecting the oval (containing a proposition) to the rheme (whose blank that proposition fills). Of course, I already brought to your attention his similar notation in a later manuscript--R 492 (1903), erroneously reproduced in CP 4.471 but corrected by both Roberts and Pietarinen--where the oval and line are dotted instead of lightly drawn (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). This notation in Gamma EGs asserts a proposition about a proposition, but there is no hint of anything like it in R L376 (nor R 514). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 3:56 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, Jeff, Gary, List, I am now writing the article on Delta graphs. In a few days, I'll send a preview. For convenience, see the attached Delta376.txt. (Since Peirce's paragraphs tend to be very long, I added some additional paragraph breaks,) I believe that there is no way to interpret that text without acknowledging the fact that it is the beginning of a specification of Delta graphs. Note the ending of the second paragraph: "I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. A cross division of the description which here, as in that of 1903, is given precedence over the other is into the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System." Then the paragraph immediately after that begins "The Conventions." And it continues with a specification of he conventions for something. I cannot imagine that the "something" is anything other than Delta graphs. (That paragraph break, by the way, is Peirce's.) Note the later discussion about different "parts" of the phemic sheet, which may be asserted and interpreted in different ways. That is why metalanguage must be used to state the many kinds of modality that Peirce discusses in the attached text. John I'll also mention that three peopl
[PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
Jon, Jeff, Gary, List, I am now writing the article on Delta graphs. In a few days, I'll send a preview. For convenience, see the attached Delta376.txt. (Since Peirce's paragraphs tend to be very long, I added some additional paragraph breaks,) I believe that there is no way to interpret that text without acknowledging the fact that it is the beginning of a specification of Delta graphs. Note the ending of the second paragraph: "I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. A cross division of the description which here, as in that of 1903, is given precedence over the other is into the Conventions, the Rules, and the working of the System." Then the paragraph immediately after that begins "The Conventions." And it continues with a specification of he conventions for something. I cannot imagine that the "something" is anything other than Delta graphs. (That paragraph break, by the way, is Peirce's.) Note the later discussion about different "parts" of the phemic sheet, which may be asserted and interpreted in different ways. That is why metalanguage must be used to state the many kinds of modality that Peirce discusses in the attached text. John I'll also mention that three people misinterpreted the two diagrams on p. 151 of RLT -- you, me, and Ken Ketner. I misinterpreted the first diagram as having a line of identity between an oval that encloses the sentence "You are a good girl". With that interpretation, it would assert "There exists a proposition that you are a good girl, and that proposition is much to be wished." But you correctly noticed that the line is so thin that it cannot be interpreted as a line of identity. Peirce did not state any reading for that complete EG. Therefore, I read it as asserting a complete grammatical sentence "That you are a good girl is much to be wished. That assertion is correct. It is logically equivalent to the above reading, but it is not syntactically equivalent to it. Then Ken Ketner (or somebody else who drew the second EG) did not show an attached line between the oval and the verb phrase "is false." But the original MS, a copy of which you included in your note, had a thin line that connected the oval to the word 'is'. I suspect that who drew that diagram thought that the thin line between the oval and the word 'is' was just part of the word 'is'. But in his handwiriting, Peirce never drew a line in front of an initial letter 'i'. Therefore, that graph was mistakenly drawn. Neither you nor Ken noticed that error. You did mention that Peirce had not introduced the convention of using an oval for negation until the next example. That is true, but it does not excuse the mistake of not noticing the thin line that connects the previous oval to the word 'is. There is much more to say, and I'll include it in the preview, which I plan to send in the next few days. John In that case, I believe that the thin line implies that the proposition in the oval is a THING that is the subject of the verb phrase "is much to be wished." From: "John F Sowa" Sent: 3/9/24 1:02 PM To: "Jon Alan Schmidt" , "Peirce-L" Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic) Jeff, Jon, List, In his 1885 Algebra of Logic, Peirce presented the modern versions of both first-order and second-order predicate logic. The only difference between his notation and the modern versions is the choice of symbols. Since Peano wanted to make his logic publishable by ordinary type setters, he had to avoid Peirce's Greek letters and subscripts. Therefore, he invented the practice of turning letters upside-down or backwards, which type setters could do very easily. For every version of first-order logic, there is a fixed domain D1 of entities in the domain of quantification. Those entities could be anything of any kind -- that includes abstractions, fictions, imaginary beasts, and even hypothetical or possible worlds. For second order logic, the domain D2 consists of all possible functions and/or predicates that range over entities in D1. Second order logic is the only kind of higher order logic that anybody uses for any practical applications in any version of science, engineering, or computer systems. When they use the term HOL, they actually mean some kind of second order logic, which may be the one described above or something with a different way of specifying D2. The first (and most widely cited or defined) version of higher order logic that goes beyond second was developed by Whitehead and Russell (1910). It goes beyond second order logic by introducing domains D3, D4,..., which are so huge that nobody has ever found a use for them in any practical application. Given
[PEIRCE-L] Artificial empathy by a central executive
In my previous note, I forgot to include a link to the updated (March 8} slides for my talk on March 6. Here is the URL: https://ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com/OntologySummit2024/TrackA/LLMs-are-clueless--JohnSowa_20240228.pdf . I also received an offline note about a linguistic theory that emphasizes semantics rather than syntax: The method of Generative semantics by Seuren, https://www.mpi.nl/sites/default/files/2020-07/Seuren_Abralin_Article_2020.pdf . Other linguists and computational linguists have proposed, developed, and/or implemented related versions. Methods that emphasize semantics have been used in conjunction with ontology to correct and avoid the errors and hallucinations created by LLMs. For critical applications, 99% correct can be a disaster. Nobody wants to fly in an airplane that has a 1% chance of crashing. LLMs are very good for translating linear languages and notations. But when accuracy is essential, precise semantics is much more important than elegant syntax. I also want to emphasize Section 3. That begins with slide 32, which has the title Neuro-Cognitive Cycles. The word 'cognitive' is much more general than 'symbolic', since it includes images as well as linear notations for language. Note slide 7, which shows an image in the mind of a policeman, and the attempt by a man who is trying to reconstruct an image from a verbal explanation. In slide 24, I added a picture of a baby who is using sign language. For multi-dimensional topics, a sign language can be more detailed and precise that a spoken language. This section also emphasizes Peirce's methods of reasoning in Slides 33 and 34, and their applications in the remaining slides. Slide 35 on the Central Executive, as defined by neuroscientists, shows how to avoid the errors, hallucinations, and dangers created by the Large Language Models (LLMs): Include a Central Executive, which has the responsibility and the power to evaluate any proposed language or actions and revise or reject those that may be erroneous or even dangerous. Also note slide 39 on "Wicked Problems"; slide 40, which explains "Why Humans are not obsolete; and Slide 41, which asks whether there is "A Path to AGI?" The answer to that question is joke by George Burns, which might be taken seriously. That reminds me of a remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein: "It's possible to write a book on philosophy that consists entirely of jokes." A Zen Buddhist could write a book on religion that consists entirely of jokes. Depending on the definition of 'joke', somebody might say that they have. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
Jeff, Jon, List, In his 1885 Algebra of Logic, Peirce presented the modern versions of both first-order and second-order predicate logic. The only difference between his notation and the modern versions is the choice of symbols. Since Peano wanted to make his logic publishable by ordinary type setters, he had to avoid Peirce's Greek letters and subscripts. Therefore, he invented the practice of turning letters upside-down or backwards, which type setters could do very easily. For every version of first-order logic, there is a fixed domain D1 of entities in the domain of quantification. Those entities could be anything of any kind -- that includes abstractions, fictions, imaginary beasts, and even hypothetical or possible worlds. For second order logic, the domain D2 consists of all possible functions and/or predicates that range over entities in D1. Second order logic is the only kind of higher order logic that anybody uses for any practical applications in any version of science, engineering, or computer systems. When they use the term HOL, they actually mean some kind of second order logic, which may be the one described above or something with a different way of specifying D2. The first (and most widely cited or defined) version of higher order logic that goes beyond second was developed by Whitehead and Russell (1910). It goes beyond second order logic by introducing domains D3, D4,..., which are so huge that nobody has ever found a use for them in any practical application. Given D1 and D2 as above, W & R specified D3 as the set of all possible functions or predicates that may be defined over the union of D1 and D2. Then D4 is defined over the union of D1, D2, D3. And so on. Logicians (usually graduate students who need to find a thesis topic) publish papers about such things in the Journal of Symbolic Logic. And the only people who read them are graduate students who need to find a thesis topic. Peirce never went beyond second order logic. But any statement in any language or logic about any language or logic is metalanguage. Since that word was coined over 20 years after Peirce, he never used it. But there are many uses of metalanguage in Peirce's publications and MSS. But he never chose or coined a word that would relate all the instances. In the example that Jon copied below, "the line of identity denoting the ens rationis", Peirce used the term 'ens rationis' for that example of metalanguage. But he described other examples with other words. In the passage below by Jay Zeman, "a different kind of line of identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at least the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able to determine", Jay mistakenly used the term "second order PC". There is no quantified variable for some kind of logic. It is just another example of metalanguage that makes an assertion about the EG. There is much more to say about metalanguage, which I'll discuss in a separate reply to Jon. But these examples are a small fraction of the many instances of metalanguage throughout Peirce's publications and MSS. Once you start looking for them, you'll find them throughout his writings. Unfortunately, Peirce had no standard terminology for talking about them. I hate to say it, but this is one time when I wish Peirce had found a Greek word for it. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Jeff, List: Indeed, as Don Roberts summarizes, "The Gamma part of EG corresponds, roughly, to second (and higher) order functional calculi, and to modal logic. ... By means of this new section of EG Peirce wanted to take account of abstractions, including qualities and relations and graphs themselves as subjects to be reasoned about" (https://www.felsemiotica.com/descargas/Roberts-Don-D.-The-Existential-Graphs-of-Charles-S.-Peirce.pdf, 1973, p. 64). Likewise, according to Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "In the Gamma part Peirce proposes a bouquet of logics beyond the extensional, propositional and first-order systems. Those concern systems of modal logics, second-order (higher-order) logics, abstractions, and logic of multitudes and collections, among others" (LF 2/1:28). Jay Zeman says a bit more about Gamma EGs for second-order logic in his dissertation. JZ: There is also another suggestion, in 4.470, which is interesting but to which Peirce devotes very little time. Here he shows us a different kind of line of identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at least the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able to determine, but it seems to me
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was Delta Existential Graphs
Gary, In his letter on Delta graphs, Peirce was breaking new ground. He was proposing a totally new foundation for modal logic, based on metalanguage. The important references are in the future, not the past. For Peirce's past, the most relevant references were cited and discussed many times: His 1903 Lowell lectures, his tinctured graphs of 1906, and the references in R514, L231, and the primary source L376. For modern references, I have cited quite a few. The most important one is to the IKL logic of 2006. For that, I repeatedly pointed to the web page, which has hundreds of references: https://jfsowa.com/ikl/ . The title of that web page is "Semantics for Interoperable Systems" with four sections. Each section has multiple short paragraphs with several links for individual systems of that type: 1. From the conceptual schema to the semantic web. 2. The IKRIS project 3. A foundation for multiple projects 4. Supporting an open-ended diversity Section 1 is historical, but many of the systems mentioned there are still in use or are the foundation for later developments. Section 2 and the references there are the basis for IKL and related projects that build on the IKL base. Section 3 also includes some projects that use IKL. And Section 4 discusses issues that are still being debated and developed today. Every section has multiple references. Just look at that article and note all the phrases in blue. Each one is clickable. As for the letter to William James, I was in a hurry, and I didn't have the time to dig up references to a point that was not directly relevant to the topic of the letter. For the record, it's the last letter to WJ in EP2. Unfortunately, the end of the letter was deleted in EP2. The full letter, which mentions the Big Book that Peirce had in mind, is in NEM 3:867-875. Now that I dug up that reference, I realize that I should have mentioned something I wrote in an unfinished article. I think I'll include it in my article on Delta graphs. It shows why Peirce realized the need for a new approach to modality, and it certainly goes far beyond Alpha graphs. I'll say more in another note. And by the way, that letter was written on 25 Dec 1909. In the part that was deleted in EP2, Peirce wrote that he was planning to include a section of the Big Book in an article for Carus. The outline for the Big Book has a large overlap with L231 and with topics in his last long letter of 1913. That suggests that the Big Book was intended to be the long awaited proof of pragmatism. That also suggests that he intended Delta graphs to be the logic for his proof. And by the way, please read that section 2 about the IKRIS project. Its goal was to support interoperability among multiple systems. And the IKL logic is a major part. That shows a definite convergence: a logic of pragmatism would indeed support interoperability among multiple projects in science and engineering. Peirce's Delta graphs and the IKL logic have very similar goals. That's why they are so closely related. I'll mention that in my article on Delta graphs. John From: "Gary Richmond" Sent: 3/5/24 8:44 PM To: John F Sowa Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt , Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was Delta Existential Graphs John, I have been following this exchange between you and Jon Alan with considerable interest. Thank you both for discussing these most interesting -- and I think, important matters relating to modals, Delta graphs, etc. -- in the generally collegial manner in which you have been proceeding. You wrote: And please read what Peirce was writing to William James around that time. He was talking about a Big Book with some rather complex requirements for the logic -- far more than alpha graphs, even with modality. And the content of the Big Book had a large overlap with L231 of June 1911. That letter mentioned his goal of a logic for representing moving motion pictures. That's not possible with Alpha graphs. I would like to suggest that it would be helpful if, instead of suggesting that, for example, Jon (and, I assume, anyone reading this exchange) should "read what Peirce was writing to William James around that time," that you offer exact quotations, something you've not infrequently have suggested is 'best practice' in considering what Peirce actually said, actually had in mind. In truth, I haven't seen many exact quotations in your posts in this exchange (something Jon famously -- or infamously, depending on your perspective -- can't be accused of) and this has often made it difficult to discern exactly what your critique of Jon's position is nor, for that matter, what your's is in certain given cases. I doubt that many, following this recent exchange, have the time or inclination to hunt for quotations that are only very
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was Delta Existential Graphs
Jon, The first point to emphasize is that Peirce's primary goal in the last decade of his life was to provide a proof of pragmatism. That would require a system of logic that could express and analyze rather sophisticated texts about science. The metalanguage of the IKL logic in 2006 is very close to Peirce's EGs supplemented with the operator that he specified in R514 (June 1911), which seems to be very similar to what he was specifying in L376 (December 1911). Alpha graphs for Boolean logic are a trivial subset of EGs. Peirce made an important contribution to Boolean logic by adding the symbol -< for implication. He also made a few other important modifications. But that was a very early project. In 1903, he presented his version of modal logic, which included EGs with lines of identity. As far as I know, there was never a reason for him to say anything further about Alpha graphs other than the fact that they were a simple subset that could be freely mixed with Beta graphs. JAS> I am still wondering exactly how your candidate would represent the five modal propositions that Peirce wrote in his Logic Notebook, if not exactly as he scribed them on that page (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7. Did you read my response? I showed that the five EGs on the excerpt you included were not modal. They were simple first-order (Beta) EGs. And I included a translation of all five to English sentences that did not require a single occurrence of the words 'possible' or 'necessary'. As far as I know, Peirce never used the modal logic of 1903 for any purpose in any MSS after 1903. If you can find any examples, please send us a copy. But he did write quite a bit about modality, including his tinctured graphs of 1906. He did criticize them in L376 for their notation, but not their goal of representing rather sophisticated modal content -- much more than modal alpha graphs. And please read what Peirce was writing to William James around that time. He was talking about a Big Book with some rather complex requirements for the logic -- far more than alpha graphs, even with modality. And the content of the Big Book had a large overlap with L231 of June 1911. That letter mentioned his goal of a logic for representing moving motion pictures. That's not possible with Alpha graphs. Since Risteen had considerable experience with Cayley's trees, that is an excellent reason for his visit, and for Peirce to be constructing a tree of "papers". It's inconceivable that he would have invited Risteen (a former collaborator who had an excellent understanding of his 1885 logic of first order and higher order logic) to discuss some trivial work with a subset of the modal logic of 1903. Four points: (1) there is evidence of metalanguage (postulates in the margin about nested graphs) in R514 and L376: (2) there is no evidence that Peirce intended to adopt a subset of his 1903 modal notation, which he had not used in any MSS after 1903; Risteen's expertise suggests that trees of "papers" are very likely to be involved in the representation and reasoning with and about Delta graphs; and (4) IKL or some version of metalanguage for representing trees of papers can represent a significant amount of computer science and AI today. That is the topic of the article about Delta graphs, which I am writing. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: One reason why I did not respond in detail to your previous note (copied below) is that your citations to the writings by Dunn and Goble only apply to PROPOSITIONAL modal logic (no quantifiers). I have acknowledged this all along--my candidate for Delta EGs is an extension of Alpha EGs, not Beta EGs. After all, the various modal axioms are formulated as extensions of classical propositional logic, not first-order predicate logic (FOPL). The heavy lines of compossibility (LoCs) in my Delta EGs represent possible states of things (PSTs) in which propositions denoted by attached letters would be true, while the heavy lines of identity (LoIs) in Beta EGs represent indefinite individuals to which general concepts denoted by attached names are attributed. Roberts suggests that these two notations could be combined, with LoCs attached to the top of names that are also attached to LoIs (1973, pp. 99-100); but as you rightly observe later in your post, this "opens up a huge can of worms." I have mentioned previously an exception to this cautionary note, which is implementing system P with no iterated modalities. LoCs are then attached to letters for propositions on the one sheet for the actual state of things (AST), which are keyed to different Beta graphs with LoIs on the various sheets for PSTs. This demonstrates the sense in which formal propositional logic as implemented by Alpha EGs is a simple metalanguage for reasoning about propositions, each of which can then be more informatively
[PEIRCE-L] Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic (was Delta Existential Graphs
Jon, One reason why I did not respond in detail to your previous note (copied below) is that your citations to the writings by Dunn and Goble only apply to PROPOSITIONAL modal logic (no quantifiers). Every version of modal logic that Peirce developed included existential graphs as the base logic. And the E of EG refers to the existential quantifier, which corresponds to a universal quantifier in a negated area. Therefore Peirce's modal logic of 1903 included both quantifiers. Any mixture of quantifiers with modal logic opens up a huge can of worms, which Peirce did not address. For a brief summary see the article on the Stanford site: https://plato.stanford.edu/archIves/spr2010/entries/logic-modal/#QuaModLog That article has 13 sections. The first 12 cover the many variations of propositional modal logic. Section 13, the shortest one, summarizes the complexities introduced by mixing the modal operators with quantifiers. Short summary: "Here be dragons." Longer summary: For anybody who considers 13 unlucky, here's more evidence. Solution: Add metalanguage to a conventional (non-modal) logic. That is the solution that is used in nearly all versions of modal reasoning used in computer science, artificial intelligence, etc, That happens to be the solution adopted for the IKL logic of 1906, which appears to be a superset of Peirce's Delta graphs. Furthermore, J. Michael Dunn, whom you cited below, developed a foundation that justifies metalanguage (as in IKL) for combining modality with quantifiers. See the references in the many documents I cited. By the way, Dunn thanked me for all the references in which I cited his work. And he invited me to give a talk on those applications (including IKL) at his university. For a brief (6 page) summary of the issues, see "Modality Si!, Modal Logic No!" by John McCarthy: http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/modality/modality.pdf . McCarthy hosted the founding meeting in 1956 that adopted the term "Artificial Intelligence", and he has been a strong advocate for using logic in AI and other branches of computer science. Although he died before the 2006 project that developed IKL, many of the people who participated in that project were his students and colleagues. As for the two quotations by Peirce below, (1) they're irrelevant to the issues about Delta graphs, and (2) they are not consistent with modern developments in physics and astronomy. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" List: As I continue contemplating my updated candidate for Delta EGs (see earlier posts below), I am finding that, in conjunction with the laws and facts semantics (LFS) developed by Dunn and Goble, it is very helpful for explicating the effects of adding various modal axioms to classical logic. For example, the distribution axiom K = □(p → q) → (□p → □q) that is included in all so-called "normal" modal logics is illustrated by the fact that if p → q is on every sheet for a possible state of things (PST) and p is also on every PST sheet, then q is likewise on every PST sheet or can be derived on any PST sheet where it is initially missing. As I have mentioned before, other axioms assign different properties of the binary alternativeness/accessibility relation (AR) between the actual state of things (AST) and any PSTs, as well as the latter and their higher-order PSTs when there are iterated modalities. - Serial, axiom D = □p → ◇p, or ◇⊤; every law-graph on the AST sheet is a fact-graph on at least one PST sheet, and any graph that can be derived from the blank on the AST sheet can also be derived from the blank on at least one PST sheet. - Reflexive, axiom T = □p → p, or p → ◇p; every law-graph on the AST sheet is also a fact-graph on the AST sheet, and every fact-graph on the AST sheet is a fact-graph on at least one PST sheet. - Symmetric, axiom B = ◇□p → p, or p → □◇p; every law-graph on any PST sheet is a fact-graph on the AST sheet, and every fact-graph on the AST sheet is a fact-graph on at least one second-order PST sheet for every first-order PST sheet. - Transitive, axiom 4 = □p → □□p, or ◇◇p → ◇p; every law-graph on the AST sheet is a law-graph on every PST sheet, and every fact-graph on a second-order PST sheet is a fact-graph on at least one first-order PST sheet. - Euclidean, axiom 5 = ◇□p → □p, or ◇p → □◇p; every law-graph on a PST sheet is a law-graph on the AST sheet, and every fact-graph on a PST sheet is a fact-graph on at least one second-order PST sheet for every first-order PST sheet. LFS effectively stipulates that the AR is serial because every law-graph on the AST sheet is a fact-graph on every PST sheet--its basic principle is that possibility is defined as consistency with the laws of the AST--and any classical tautology can be derived from the blank on every sheet. The AR properties and their corresponding axioms are then combined in different ways for
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
Jon, List, I don't have time to respond right now. But there are two points that are true for every version of modal logic from Aristotle to the Scholastics to Peirce and to the latest and greatest versions of today: 1. For every version of modal logic, there is some reason WHY certain worlds (or contexts within a world) are possible or necessary or not. 2. The postulates or whatever statements are asserted about that world add that additional information. There is more to say, but those two statements are true. Peirce said a great deal more in many ways about many kinds of possibilities in his many years of MSS, publications, reports, etc. There is no need for him to use the word 'modal' in those discussions. That is implicit. In fact, every branch of science and engineering is about possible interpretations (science) and possible designs (engineering). Every thought about what to do when you or Peirce or anybody else gets up in the morning is a thought about the possible world before you or them. CP has 1072 occurrences of the word 'possible'. Every such sentence is a sentence in modal logic. Any version of modal logic that is adequate for supporting ordinary English must be able to represent all of them. That was the goal for the IKL logic. I believe that was the goal for Peirce's Delta graphs: support the logic necessary for pragmaticism. That implies every version of science, including all the practical sciences -- and daily life. A proof of pragmaticism was the primary goal of Peirce's final decade, and everything he wrote must be evaluated according to its utility in supporting it. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
Jon, There are several points that must be considered. The first is that all modern versions of modal logic after C. I. Lewis (including those based on post-1970 methods) are consistent with or variations of one or more of the versions specified by Lewis). That includes the versions of modal logic supported by the IKL logic of 2006. Further qualifiers such as wishing, hoping, fearing, specified in Holy Scriptures. . . may be ADDED to the specifications that determine possibility, actuality, or necessity. Second, Lewis was inspired by Peirce's 1903 specifications, and no one knows how many other MSS Lewis may have read. But Lewis adopted the much more readable basic operators, represented by □ and ◇. For readability, they correspond to the words 'necessary' and 'possible' in English or their equivalents in other languages. Third, all of Peirce's 1903 combinations can be represented by combinations of those two symbols and negation. But the papers of Delta graphs can represent more information about each world, including the reasons why it happens to be possible, actual, necessary, or impossible. That is also true of the worlds specified by Hintikka, Dunn, IKL, and others. The specifications of those worlds can also add further information beyond just those two operators plus negation. Fourth, more issues of modality related to Peirce and modern variations were discussed at a workshop in Bogota hosted by invitation of Zalamea. Some of the presentations were published in the Journal of Applied Logics 5:5, 2018. http://www.collegepublications.co.uk/downloads/ifcolog00025.pdf . Others in the Journal Zalamea edited, Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana 8, 2016. https://ucaldas.academia.edu/CuadernosSistem%C3%A1ticaPeirceana . (Although this version is dated 2016, it was delayed by late submissions and editing until 2019.) Fifth, Risteen's background was significant. He was a former student of Peirce's at Johns Hopkins, and he was a paid assistant to Peirce for definitions in the Century Dictionary from S to Z. His most important contribution (at least for Delta graphs) was his note about Cayley's mathematical trees for the dictionary entry and in the discussions with Peirce in December 1911. It would have been wonderful to have a YouTube of their discussions on 3 Dec. 1911. The specifications about papers in L376 would allow a tree structure of papers. Risteen's knowledge of mathematical trees is a likely reason why Peirce had invited him to visit in December and why he was writing that letter to him shortly after the visit. And note the very strange coincidence that occurred shortly after Peirce began the letter L376: Juliette had washed and scrubbed the floor in December after a visitor had left. There were papers on the floor. Peirce slipped on the floor in an unusual fall that caused the kind of injury that occurs in a twisting motion. And the injury took six months to heal. Scientists, engineers, and crime investigators do not believe in strange coincidences that involve two or more unusual causes. They search for a hidden connection. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" List: As I continue contemplating my updated candidate for Delta EGs (see earlier posts below), I am finding that, in conjunction with the laws and facts semantics (LFS) developed by Dunn and Goble, it is very helpful for explicating the effects of adding various modal axioms to classical logic. For example, the distribution axiom K = □(p → q) → (□p → □q) that is included in all so-called "normal" modal logics is illustrated by the fact that if p → q is on every sheet for a possible state of things (PST) and p is also on every PST sheet, then q is likewise on every PST sheet or can be derived on any PST sheet where it is initially missing. As I have mentioned before, other axioms assign different properties of the binary alternativeness/accessibility relation (AR) between the actual state of things (AST) and any PSTs, as well as the latter and their higher-order PSTs when there are iterated modalities. - Serial, axiom D = □p → ◇p, or ◇⊤; every law-graph on the AST sheet is a fact-graph on at least one PST sheet, and any graph that can be derived from the blank on the AST sheet can also be derived from the blank on at least one PST sheet. - Reflexive, axiom T = □p → p, or p → ◇p; every law-graph on the AST sheet is also a fact-graph on the AST sheet, and every fact-graph on the AST sheet is a fact-graph on at least one PST sheet. - Symmetric, axiom B = ◇□p → p, or p → □◇p; every law-graph on any PST sheet is a fact-graph on the AST sheet, and every fact-graph on the AST sheet is a fact-graph on at least one second-order PST sheet for every first-order PST sheet. - Transitive, axiom 4 = □p → □□p, or ◇◇p → ◇p; every law-graph on the AST sheet is a law-graph on every PST sheet, and every fact-graph on a second-order
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Definitions, Axioms, and Postulates (was Delta Existential Graphs)
definition. In that case, there would also be some possible worlds in which x=y and y=z but it is not the case that x=z, because the symbol "=" is defined as denoting a non-transitive relation (such as incompossibility or negation) instead of a transitive one (such as equality, identity, coexistence, or implication). Of course, "Every triangle has three sides" could also be stated as an if-then statement--"If something is a triangle, then it has three sides." JFS: The distinction between axioms and postulates is one that Peirce adopted from Euclid ... Peirce himself describes the distinction between definitions, postulates, and axioms as follows. CSP: A definition is the logical analysis of a predicate in general terms. It has two branches, the one asserting that the definitum is applicable to whatever there may be to which the definition is applicable; the other (which ordinarily has several clauses), that the definition is applicable to whatever there may be to which the definitum is applicable. A definition does not assert that anything exists. A postulate is an initial hypothesis in general terms. It may be arbitrarily assumed provided that (the definitions being accepted) it does not conflict with any principle of substantive possibility or with any already adopted postulate. By a principle of substantive possibility, I mean, for example, that it would not be admissible to postulate that there was no relation whatever between two points, or to lay down the proposition that nothing whatever shall be true without exception. For though what this means involves no contradiction, it is in contradiction with the fact that it is itself asserted. An axiom is a self-evident truth, the statement of which is superfluous to the conclusiveness of the reasoning, and which only serves to show a principle involved in the reasoning. It is generally a truth of observation; such as the assertion that something is true. (EP 2:302, c. 1901) A definition "does not assert that anything exists," only that if something exists to which the definition is applicable, then the definitum is likewise applicable to that thing, and vice-versa--i.e., logical equivalence, represented in EGs as two scrolls (nested cuts or ring-shaped shaded areas) with the antecedent and consequent trading places between them. A postulate is "an initial hypothesis" that "may be arbitrarily assumed," so in accordance with R 514, it is scribed in the (shaded) margin of the sheet for a possible state of things and thereby "merely asserted to be possible." An axiom is "a self-evident truth," "generally a truth of observation," so it is scribed on the (unshaded) sheet for the actual state of things and thereby asserted to be true, often as an if-then proposition represented by a scroll. Notice how the if-then operation is integral to all three of these. JFS: After re-reading Don Roberts' chapter on Gamma graphs (which I hadn't read for years), I realize that there is no conflict between that chapter and his writings about Delta graphs in L376. ... Furthermore, what Peirce wrote about Delta graphs in L376 is consistent with his 1903 version of modal logic in every possible world. Again, what Peirce writes about Delta graphs in R L376 is only the single statement, "I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals." Everything else in the 19 extant pages of that letter to Risteen is applicable to every part of EG--there is nothing dealing with modals or otherwise unique to Delta. As Roberts summarizes it, "Peirce gives a sketch of the history of EG, reaffirms his opinion that all reasoning is dialogical, and points out that the purpose of EG was not to serve as a calculus, but 'to facilitate the anatomy, and thereby the physiology of deductive reasonings.' This manuscript contains the only reference I have found to a proposed Delta part of EG which would deal with modal logic" (p. 135). JFS: But the "papers" of L376 allow the "postulates" in the margins to state additional information about the nested graphs. For example that the nested graphs, may be wished, hoped, feared, imagined, or occurring at some time in the past, present, future in the real word or in heaven, hell, Wonderland, or the Looking Glass. Again, that is not how postulates work. They are not metalanguage about other propositions, they are hypothetical premisses from which other propositions would follow necessarily as conclusions; or in an if-then proposition, they constitute the antecedent (in the shaded margin) from which other propositions follow necessarily as the consequent (in the remaining unshaded area). That is how all the theorems of Euclidean geometry are derived from its five postulates. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
John, Some observations: For any theory of any kind with any logic of any kind, axioms are always stated in an if-then form. The if-part (shaded) states the condition, and the then part states the conclusion. Even definitions are stated as if-then statements in EGs. For example: "If x=y and y=z, then x=z." "Every triangle has three sides" is equivalent to "If x is a triangle, x has three sides." In that example, the proposition (pheme) about equality is an axiom, since it must be true of every possible world. But the pheme about triangles is a postulate that is true in geometry, but it might not be a postulate in some other possible world. The distinction between axioms and postulates is one that Peirce adopted from Euclid, but modern logicians use the word 'axiom' for the starting assumptions of any theory. They rarely use the word 'postulate. After re-reading Don Roberts' chapter on Gamma graphs (which I hadn't read for years), I realize that there is no conflict between that chapter and his writings about Delta graphs in L376. And L376 is completely consistent with the IKL logic of 2006. But IKL has some features that go beyond L376. Anything stated in Delta graphs may be mapped to IKL, but some IKL statements cannot be mapped to Delta graphs. Furthermore, what Peirce wrote about Delta graphs in L376 is consistent with his 1903 version of modal logic in every possible world. But the "papers" of L376 allow the "postulates" in the margins to state additional information about the nested graphs. For example that the nested graphs, may be wished, hoped, feared, imagined, or occurring at some time in the past, present, future in the real word or in heaven, hell, Wonderland, or the Looking Glass. Wonderland, for example, would be a possible world that could not be actualized -- as Peirce said in CP 8.192, stated below. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" List: I need to amend my previous post explaining my updated candidate for Delta EGs to "deal with modals" (see underline/strikethrough below). It still combines the graphs scribed in R 339:[340r] for representing the actual state of things (AST) with the "many papers" concept in R L376 for representing different possible states of things (PST) and the "red pencil" improvement in R 514 for distinguishing PST sheets with shaded margins from the AST sheet that lacks this feature. However, it is not the case that a PST sheet has its law-graphs in its shaded margin and its fact-graphs in its unshaded area; in fact, there is no requirement for any particular graphs to be in the margin of a PST sheet--the implied antecedent, from which all the EGs in the unshaded area follow necessarily, is "this PST is actualized." Instead, just like the AST, law-graphs on a PST are those where the outermost portion of the outermost line of compossibility (LoC) is in a shaded area, and fact-graphs are those with no LoCs. Moreover, every graph on the AST with at least one LoC is reproduced on PST sheets, except with its outermost LoC removed. If that LoC is shaded, then the graph without it appears on every PST sheet; and if that LoC is unshaded, then the graph without it appears on at least one PST sheet. With these corrections and clarifications, Delta EGs can still be used to implement any of the standard formal systems of modal logic, with iterated modalities requiring another set of PST sheets for every first-order PST sheet that includes any graphs with LoCs. However, according to Peirce, pragmaticism considers the only real possibilities to be facts in PSTs that are directly alternative/accessible to the AST. CSP: That a possibility which should never be actualized, (in the sense of having a bearing upon conduct that might conceivably be contemplated,) would be a nullity is a form of stating the principle of pragmaticism. One obvious consequence is that the potential, or really possible, must always refer to the actual. The possible is what can become actual. A possibility which could not be actualized would be absurd, of course. (R 288:[134-135], 1905) This suggests dispensing with iterated modalities, such that letters on the AST sheet are never attached to more than one LoC, no LoCs appear on any PST sheets, and no second-order PST sheets are needed. An additional benefit is that the graphs on PST sheets could then be scribed more informatively by using lines of identity and attached names as in Beta, instead of just letters as in Alpha, as long as there is a way to match up the AST letters with the PST graphs. Peirce further states that pragmaticism requires every law-proposition for the AST to be a subjunctive conditional whose antecedent is a real possibility; formally, □(p → q) ∧ ◇p. CSP: But what the answer to the pragmatist's self-question [how could law ever reasonably affect human conduct?] does require is that the law should be a truth
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
f things. In that book, the transcription shows a clearly drawn line that connects the oval to the word 'is'. Even in the printed book, the line attached to the first oval on page 151 is thinly drawn, exactly like the oval itself, while the lines of identity on pages 153ff are unambiguously heavy; and again, there is no line attached to the second oval on page 151. Here are those images. [image.png] [image.png] [image.png] JFS: But the two sentences enclosed in ovals are equivalent to what Peirce proposed in R514: Draw a line around the proposition(s) about which the text outside the oval is making assertions. According to R 514, the text in the margin is not making assertions about the propositions inside the red line, it consists of "postulates" that are "merely asserted to be possible," i.e., the hypothetical antecedent from which those propositions would follow necessarily as the consequent. This is a completely different notation from the unique EGs on RLT 151, where the proposition written inside the oval fills the blank in the rheme written outside the oval. JFS: When I studied Peirce's L376 in detail, it was obvious that he was thinking along the same lines. I suspect that you were reading back into his text what you had already decided for yourself when you changed your mind regarding Carnap vs. Quine, namely, that modal logic is "just metalanguage about logic." Peirce never states nor implies this--not in R L376, and as far as I know, not anywhere else. On the contrary, he anticipates the future formalization of modal logic when he states, "The quantified subject of a hypothetical proposition is a possibility, or possible case, or possible state of things" (CP 2.347, c. 1895). Even more specifically, he anticipates C. I. Lewis's development and advocacy of strict implication in the following passage. CSP: The consequence de inesse [material implication], "if A is true, then B is true," is expressed by letting i denote the actual state of things, Ai mean that in the actual state of things A is true, and Bi mean that in the actual state of things B is true, and then saying "If Ai is true then Bi is true," or, what is the same thing, "Either Ai is not true or Bi is true." But an ordinary Philonian conditional [strict implication] is expressed by saying, "In any possible state of things, i, either Ai is not true, or Bi is true." (CP 3.444, 1896) Peirce might have changed his mind about this (like you did) sometime over the next 15 years, but only an exact quotation to that effect from his later writings could warrant such a claim. Can you provide one? JFS: And his description of the phemic sheet as a collection of papers was in line with the specification of papers in R514. What "specification of papers in R 514"? Peirce says nothing in that text about multiple sheets. If you are simply affirming that the "red pencil" operation of R 514 could be applied to each of the "many pages" of R L376, then we agree about that. However, I now advocate shading the margin instead of marking its boundary with a red line, consistent with Peirce's other writings about EGs in 1911 that you have often emphasized. Again, it is a more iconic way of conveying that the margin is a different surface from the interior--it "represents a universe of possibility" (CP 4.579, 1906), while "the main part of the sheet represents existence or actuality" (CP 4.577). In my updated candidate for Delta EGs as outlined last night, there is a separate sheet for each possible state of things (PST), with its law-graphs in the shaded margin and its fact-graphs in the unshaded interior. After all, Goble refers to laws for a possible world as "the fundamental postulates of that world" (https://projecteuclid.org/journalArticle/Download?urlId=10.1305%2Fndjfl%2F1093890890, p. 153), and the fact-graphs on a PST sheet represent what would be fact-propositions if that PST were actualized. By the way, a few paragraphs before the "red pencil" discussion in R 514--the fragmented 1909 manuscript itself, not the misfiled June 1911 letter to J. H. Kehler with its EG tutorial (R L231)--Peirce states, "So much, to explain in the second mode of clearness the three Modalities. The May be, The Actually is, The Would be." In other words, he explicitly reaffirms his definition of modality as possibility/actuality/necessity, although we do not have the preceding pages that presumably provide more details. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Feb 25, 2024 at 10:05 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, I admit that I was looking at the printed book, Reasoning and the logic of things. In that book, th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
Jon, I admit that I was looking at the printed book, Reasoning and the logic of things. In that book, the transcription shows a clearly drawn line that connects the oval to the word 'is'. That is an excellent notation. I admit that the MS copies below are ambiguous. But the two sentences enclosed in ovals are equivalent to what Peirce proposed in R514: Draw a line around the proposition(s) about which the text outside the oval is making assertions. Nevertheless, those assertions outside the oval are examples of METALANGUAGE about the proposition(s) inside the oval. Although Tarski and Carnap introduced that word and developed the theory and applications in some detail, Peirce's writings as early as 1898 showed that he had anticipated some of the issues, which he developed further in R514 and L376. Later in the 20th c, Carnap wrote quite a bit about both modal logic and metalanguage. He had also become a close friend and colleague of Quine, and they had years of correspondence about these issues. Carnap was strongly in favor of modal logic, but Quine said that modal logic was just metalanguage about logic. I admit that I had preferred Carnap's position to Quine's before the 1970s. But a book of collected papers in 1973 had several papers on modal logic by Dana Scott, Jakko Hintikka, and Michael Dunn which sold me on the new ways of thinking about modal logic. That led to the IKL work of 2005, which was published in 2006. When I studied Peirce's L376 in detail, it was obvious that he was thinking along the same lines. And his description of the phemic sheet as a collection of papers was in line with the specification of papers in R514. The IKL project (2004-2006) and the applications for the larger IKRIS project were very impressive. And the topics Peirce was discussing in L376 were so close to the topics we discussed that it almost seemed as if he had been a member of the project. I suggest the references in https://jfsowa.com/ikl . You don't have to believe anything I said. Just browse through the documents about IKRIS and IKL. That project was funded from 2004 to 2006, and the reports were very impressive. But Congress was in one of its wrangling moods about funding and threatened to shut down everything. And research is the first thing that gets cut. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: I already answered these points. I could say the same thing, but I will likewise give it another try. JFS: Please look at the example in RLT. A line of identity by itself is a complete, fully formed EG. There is no line of identity in that one-of-a-kind EG. The line connecting "is much to be wished" to the oval is lightly drawn, just like the oval itself; and in the very next EG, there is no line at all connecting the oval with "is false." At this point in the lecture, Peirce has not even introduced the line of identity yet. When he subsequently does so, he calls it "a heavy line" (RLT 153) and then consistently draws it accordingly. Here are the relevant manuscript images so that you can see the difference for yourself. [image.png] [image.png] [image.png] JFS: According to the way Peirce defined that notation and translated it to English, he chose the word 'that' as the English word that represents that construction (an oval with an attached line of identity). Please look at the actual text of RLT 151. Again, Peirce himself does not provide an English translation of that one-of-a-kind EG; and again, the line attached to the oval is lightly drawn, not a heavy line of identity. Why do you keep claiming otherwise? JFS: I am not asking you to believe anything I say. But I am asking you to look at the references I cited. I am asking you to look carefully at Peirce's own texts, and to set aside your preconceptions about what they say and show. JFS: The postulates of geometry are asserted to be true of whatever version of geometry they define. Peirce explicitly states in R 514 that "in the margin outside the red line, whatever is scribed is merely asserted to be possible. Thus, if the subject were geometry, I could write in that margin the postulates, and any pertinent problems stated in the form of postulates ..." Geometry falls within pure mathematics, which is a strictly hypothetical science that draws necessary conclusions about pure possibilities, as you yourself have observed on multiple occasions. JFS: All the evidence shows that L376 is the definition of Delta graphs. He is clearly defining a new version of modal logic in the same document in which he said that he needed to define a new version of modal logic. To deny that he was defining Delta graphs just does not make any sense of what he was writing. Peirce never says or implies in R L376 (1911) or elsewhere that he needs "to define a new version of modal logic." He simply states, "I shall now have to add a Delta part
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
30, "A shaded oval negates the nested EG. Without shading, the EG expresses a proposition that is neither asserted nor negated." As you know very well, Peirce did not introduce shading for negation until 1911. Up until then, any oval--except the one-of-a-kind RLT example, where a rheme is attached to it--negates the nested EG. Again, the sole reason that Peirce expresses for needing to add a Delta part to EGs is "in order to deal with modals," which for him are propositions involving possibility and necessity. The synthesis that I am now contemplating would satisfy that one criterion by combining the graphs scribed in R 339:[340r] with the "red pencil" improvement in R 514 and the "many papers" concept in R L376. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Feb 24, 2024 at 6:12 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, List, Please note the phrase "a special understanding between utterer and interpreter" in the excerpt below. And note that different "papers" of the phemic sheet may have different special understandings. Although Peirce did not coin the term 'metalanguage', that is the word that has been used for such texts from the 1930s to today. Since the word 'metalanguage' is far more widely used than 'special understandings', Peirce's ethics of terminology would require us to adopt that term for the special understandings that determine the interpretation of any paper of the phemic sheet. The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line. Note that R514 also contains a draft of the EG specifications that he uses in every MS from June 1911 to November 1913. It is quite likely that Peirce would have used the R514 conventions to specify the metalanguage. Since he didn't finish L376, we can only guess what notation he might have chosen for his "papers". The best guess is the notation for "papers" in R514. But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent -- in the sense that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the phemic sheet. In my previous notes, I included many references, each of which includes many more references. For simplicity, I recommend the slides of https://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf starting at slide 14, which begins with a short review of EG notation and continues with applications of EGs for representing the semantics of natural languages. I strongly recommend three slides -- 29, 30, and 31. If you don't read all (or even any) of the others, please look at the diagrams and read the text of those three. Slide 31 shows how different metalanguage can state whether a diagram is interpreted as actual (a fact in current time), possible (modal), or wished (another kind of modality that may also be called intentional). In slide 31, the diagram is drawn as a kind of cartoon. But it could also have been drawn as an EG on a phemic sheet. In fact, the commentary about the cartoon in slide 31 could also have been stated in three different "papers" of a phemic sheet. That would be a good illustration of what Peirce was saying in L376. In fact, note Peirce's own example of the sentence "Sometimes it snows." That's a good example by somebody who is writing a letter in December. One paper might be actual at one time, other papers might be possible at other times, and some paper might be wished for Christmas. He may have been laying out a large phemic sheet of such papers when he slipped. Nobody knows. But it's possible. John _ From L376: All thought, which is the process of forming, under self-control, an intellectual habit, requires two functionaries; an utterer and an interpreter, and though these two functionaries may live in one brain, they are nevertheless two. In order to distinguish the actual performance of an assertion, though it be altogether a mental act, from a mere representation or appearance, the difference between a mere idea jotted down on a bit of paper, from an affidavit made before a notary, for which the utterer is substantially responsible, I provide my system with a phemic sheet, which is a surface upon which the utterer and interpreter will, by force of a voluntary and actually contracted habit, recognize that whatever is scribed upon it and is interpretable as an assertion is to be recognized as an assertion, although it may refer to a mere idea as its subject. If "snows" is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter has mad
[PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
Jon, List, Please note the phrase "a special understanding between utterer and interpreter" in the excerpt below. And note that different "papers" of the phemic sheet may have different special understandings. Although Peirce did not coin the term 'metalanguage', that is the word that has been used for such texts from the 1930s to today. Since the word 'metalanguage' is far more widely used than 'special understandings', Peirce's ethics of terminology would require us to adopt that term for the special understandings that determine the interpretation of any paper of the phemic sheet. The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line. Note that R514 also contains a draft of the EG specifications that he uses in every MS from June 1911 to November 1913. It is quite likely that Peirce would have used the R514 conventions to specify the metalanguage. Since he didn't finish L376, we can only guess what notation he might have chosen for his "papers". The best guess is the notation for "papers" in R514. But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent -- in the sense that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the phemic sheet. In my previous notes, I included many references, each of which includes many more references. For simplicity, I recommend the slides of https://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf starting at slide 14, which begins with a short review of EG notation and continues with applications of EGs for representing the semantics of natural languages. I strongly recommend three slides -- 29, 30, and 31. If you don't read all (or even any) of the others, please look at the diagrams and read the text of those three. Slide 31 shows how different metalanguage can state whether a diagram is interpreted as actual (a fact in current time), possible (modal), or wished (another kind of modality that may also be called intentional). In slide 31, the diagram is drawn as a kind of cartoon. But it could also have been drawn as an EG on a phemic sheet. In fact, the commentary about the cartoon in slide 31 could also have been stated in three different "papers" of a phemic sheet. That would be a good illustration of what Peirce was saying in L376. In fact, note Peirce's own example of the sentence "Sometimes it snows." That's a good example by somebody who is writing a letter in December. One paper might be actual at one time, other papers might be possible at other times, and some paper might be wished for Christmas. He may have been laying out a large phemic sheet of such papers when he slipped. Nobody knows. But it's possible. John _ From L376: All thought, which is the process of forming, under self-control, an intellectual habit, requires two functionaries; an utterer and an interpreter, and though these two functionaries may live in one brain, they are nevertheless two. In order to distinguish the actual performance of an assertion, though it be altogether a mental act, from a mere representation or appearance, the difference between a mere idea jotted down on a bit of paper, from an affidavit made before a notary, for which the utterer is substantially responsible,|I provide my system with a phemic sheet, which is a surface upon which the utterer and interpreter will, by force of a voluntary and actually contracted habit, recognize that whatever is scribed upon it and is interpretable as an assertion is to be recognized as an assertion, although it may refer to a mere idea as its subject. If "snows" is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to relate, it sometime does snow. For they two may conceive that the "phemic sheet" embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to one subject and part to another. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Slides for a quick overview (was Delta Existential Graphs
Jon, Jerry, List, My previous notes cited many references, and I doubt that people will read them all (any?). But I presented some slides at a conference on Knowledge Graphs in May of 2020 (via Zoom because of covid), which I extended in July for a keynote talk at the European Semantic Web Conference, and added a few more slides in September. These slides introduce existential graphs and show how they can be used in a variety of ways: https://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf See slides 14 to 28 for an intro to EGs and a comparison with other notations used in linguistics and AI. For an extension for metalanguage, see slides 29 to 33. This notation can be used for Delta graphs and a wide variety of applications -- including all the examples that follow. The remaining slides cover many issues, including some that I discussed in my recent article on phaneroscopy. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
stems. In modern standard notation, Peirce's five modal propositions are (1) ◇p, (2) ¬◇¬p = □p, (3) ◇p ∧ ◇q, (4) ◇(p ∧ q), and (5) ◇p ∧ ◇q ∧ ¬◇(p ∧ q); in each case, p and q are atomic non-modal propositions. How would you represent them in your candidate for Delta EGs? For example, would ◇p simply be p inside an oval with a heavy line attached to the verb phrase "--is possible," and would □p simply be p inside an oval with a heavy line attached to the verb phrase "--is necessary"? If so, then that seems much more cumbersome--much less iconic--than my candidate for Delta EGs. Instead of formulating new graphical transformation rules, would you just stipulate the usual modal axioms--for example, "necessary" may always be changed to "possible" (D), "actual" (T), or "necessarily necessary" (4)? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 10:18 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, The single most important innovation of Delta graphs is an operator for metalangage or metalogic. Just that one operator, when added to ordinary first-order logic, makes it possible to define a wide range of modal logics and logics for probability. In fact, Peirce's modal logic of 1903 and his tinctured modal logic of 1906 (as well as may other kinds of modalities and probabilities) can all be defined in terms of Delta graphs (which I assume to be first-order EGs with the operator summarized below). The reason why I make that claim is that I was on the committee of 9 logicians and computer scientists that defined the IKL logic of 2006. And as exercises, we showed how to define all those options by extending FOL with just one operator, which is equivalent to what Peirce defined in RLT (1898), in R514 (June 1911), and in L376 (Dec. 1911). See below. Peirce introduced an operator for metalanguage in RLT (1898). The example he used was the sentence "That you are a good girl is much to be wished." The notation he adopted was a plain white oval with a line of identity attached to the oval. Inside the oval was the sentence "You are a good girl". The line of identity attached to the oval may be read "There exists a proposition p, which is stated by the nested graph for 'You are a good girl'."Outside the oval, he attached the verb phrase "--is much to be wished" to the same line of identity. Although Peirce never developed it further (as far as I know), the option of attaching a line of identity to an oval is exactly the same operation as taking a sheet of paper, drawing a line around the nested text (You are a good girl), and stating postulates in the margin (as in R514 and L376). That is identical the IKL extension to the base logic (called Common Logic). See the cited references about IKL. In IKL, the operator for stating postulates outside the nested statements is named 'that' -- which happens to be the first word in Peirce's example of 1898. When the nine of us defined the IKL logic, I was the only person who had read RLT, but I was not the first person who suggested the word 'that' for the operator. (As they say, great minds run in the same rut.) But as an exercise, we showed that first-order logic plus the that-operator can be used to define all the operators that Peirce defined for his 1903 version of modal logic. So if you like Peirce's 1903 version of modal logic, you can have it. Just use the 'that' operator of 1898 or the Delta papers of 1911 to define the 1903 modal graphs. In short, adopting the Delta graphs of 1911 does not reject the modal logic of 1903, because every option of 1903 can be defined in terms of Delta graphs. As for the five EGs from 1909, quoted below, none of them express modal logic. All five of them can be translated to statements in first-order logic: There exists x such that p(x). If there exists x, then p(x). There exist x and y, such that p(x) and q(y). There exists x, such that p(x) and q(x). There exist x and y, such that p(x) and q(y) and x is not equal to y. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
ed by
attached names are attributed as in the Beta part. New transformation rules
implement various commonly employed formal systems of modal logic, which are
readily interpreted by defining a possible world as one in which all the
relevant laws for the actual world are facts, each world being partially but
accurately and adequately described by a closed and consistent model set of
propositions. In accordance with pragmaticism, the relevant laws for the actual
world are represented as strict implications with real possibilities as their
antecedents and conditional necessities as their consequents, corresponding to
material implications in every possible world.
Here is an image of the relevant Logic Notebook entry (R 339:[340r], LF 1:624,
1909 Jan 7).
[image.png]
One limitation of using Gamma EGs with broken cuts for modal logic, identified
by Jay Zeman in his dissertation (https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481), is
that the ordinary transformation rules implement the unusual Ł-modal system of
Łukasiewicz; I wrote about this in a previous paper (https://rdcu.be/cQoIz).
Zeman proposed various restrictions on iteration/deiteration to implement S4
and stronger formal systems, but weaker systems do not seem to be feasible,
especially since insertion/erasure as applied to broken cuts themselves
directly corresponds to axiom T (□p → p, or p → ◇p). By contrast, my candidate
for Delta EGs can implement most of the common systems with different
combinations of permissions, each pertaining to the heavy "lines of
compossibility" (LOCs) and corresponding to one of the well-known modal axioms
(K, D, T, 4, 5) that are added to classical propositional logic.
As you no doubt recognize, the semantics summarized in the penultimate sentence
of my abstract above is the same one that you discuss in your 2003 and 2006
papers, and I explicitly reference the former--it is what first brought J.
Michael Dunn's very interesting approach to my attention, for which I am
grateful. I wrote a separate paper with a more extensive formalization of it,
entitled "Laws and Facts Semantics for Modal Logic," likewise referencing your
2003 paper; it is currently under review, with an initial decision expected
soon. Here is that abstract.
Dunn and Goble proposed a simplified semantics for modal logic in which a
possible world is defined as one where all the relevant laws for the designated
world, usually taken to be the actual world, are facts. When formalized with
Hintikka's closed and consistent model sets serving as partial but accurate and
adequate descriptions of these worlds, different properties of the
alternativeness (or accessibility) relation then correspond to different
containment relations among the sets of propositions representing the relevant
laws and facts. This approach can be helpfully illustrated by Venn diagrams and
is arguably more intuitive than the standard one in which the binary relation
between worlds is primitive and arbitrary.
As I see it, Hintikka's model sets directly correspond to any number of
individual EGs that could be explicitly scribed on the phemic sheet--in Alpha,
Beta, Gamma, or Delta--without ever exhausting the continuum of true
propositions about the universe of discourse. As he says, "In all non-trivial
cases, we have to do with an infinite model. But ... such models are nowhere to
be found as closed finished totalities. We can never know more than a finite
fragment of a model" ("Form and Content in Quantification Theory," 1955). After
all, as Dunn says, "reality may outrun the descriptive powers of a given
language" ("A Truth Value Semantics for Modal Logic," 1973); or as Peirce puts
it, "The actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by
any description" (CP 3.363, 1885).
As for your questions about Peirce's unfortunate accident, again, any answers
to them would be pure speculation. I prefer to stick to his writings as we have
them, and as far as I know, he never says anything in them to suggest that he
was "laying out a diagram of papers" for a new version of EGs when it happened.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 2:57 PM John F Sowa wrote:
Jon, List
I am now busy preparing slides for a Zoom talk on Feb 28, sponsored by Ontolog
Forum. (I'll forward a copy of the announcement to P-List, if anyone is
interested.) But first, I'll respond to some of your doubts.
JFS> The entire letter L376 is about Delta graphs and applications of Delta
graphs.
JAS> This conjecture is quite a leap, considering that--as you
acknowledged--Peirce mentions Delta exactly once in that entire 19-page letter,
which he left unfinished...
The primary subject of L376 is Delta graphs. That i
[PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
hich was also published in 2006. For a list of references to IKL and the IKRIS project that sponsored the development of IKL, see https://jfsowa.com/ikl . Then. look at Five Questions on Epistemic Logic, https://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf . That article, which was published in 2010, discusses how a logic such as IKL or Peirce's delta graphs could represent various issues in modal logic with an emphasis on epistemic logic -- that is also a consideration for my recent article about phaneroscopy. There is much more that could be said, and I plan to write it in the article on Delta graphs. And by the way, I wonder how you would explain the three questions I asked: Why did Juliette wash and scrub the floor in Deceber? Why were there papers on the floor? Why did Peirce slip on them in a very complex way? John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 2/21/24 1:25 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic) John, List: JFS: The entire letter L376 is about Delta graphs and applications of Delta graphs. This conjecture is quite a leap, considering that--as you acknowledged--Peirce mentions Delta exactly once in that entire 19-page letter, which he left unfinished unless additional pages somehow disappeared from the manuscript folder at Harvard's Houghton Library decades ago. Again, here is that lone sentence. CSP: The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. In the remaining text that we currently have, Peirce never gets around to discussing any of the individual parts of EGs and their differences, despite stating plainly that he was going to maintain them as "the better exposition" of the system as a whole. He also says nothing whatsoever about dealing with modals, which is his only stated purpose for adding a Delta part to the other three. JFS: As Peirce wrote, the phemic sheet of a Delta graph contains multiple "papers", each of which represents one possibility specified by "postulates" that govern the remaining content of the sheet. That is not what Peirce wrote in his letter to Risteen. Again, here is the exact quotation. CSP: I provide my system with a phemic sheet, which is a surface upon which the utterer and interpreter will, by force of a voluntary and actually contracted habit, recognize that whatever is scribed upon it and is interpretable as an assertion is to be recognized as an assertion, although it may refer to a mere idea as its subject. If “snows” is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to relate, it sometime does snow. For they two may conceive that the “phemic sheet” embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to one subject and part to another. Again, there is no mention here of Delta, nor of modals. In fact, there is no mention here of any of the different parts of EGs, because Peirce is describing the phemic sheet as employed in every part. He also does not say that the different "papers" correspond to different possibilities, he says that they correspond to different subjects--different universes of discourse--to which the utterer and interpreter together pay attention at different times. So I ask again, how exactly would the use of multiple "papers" and/or the "red pencil" operation of R 514 facilitate implementing formal systems of modal logic with EGs? Which specific one, "invented in 2006," do you have in mind? JFS: Meanwhile, there are some questions to ponder: Any answers to such questions about the details of Peirce's unfortunate accident are pure speculation. It seems to me that if it had happened while he was "laying out a diagram of papers" for a new version of EGs, then he likely would have said so somewhere. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 9:18 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, The entire letter L376 is about Delta graphs and applications of Delta graphs. Since Peirce began the letter to Risteen shortly after his visit, he was assuming that Risteen knew a great deal about the material they had discussed. Therefore, he plunged into examples without much of an intro. As Peirce wrote, the phemic sheet of a Delta graph contains multiple "papers
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
Jon, The entire letter L376 is about Delta graphs and applications of Delta graphs. Since Peirce began the letter to Risteen shortly after his visit, he was assuming that Risteen knew a great deal about the material they had discussed. Therefore, he plunged into examples without much of an intro. As Peirce wrote, the phemic sheet of a Delta graph contains multiple "papers", each of which represents one possibility specified by "postulates" that govern the remaining content of the sheet. There are many ways of partitioning a sheet of paper to distinguish the postulates from the content they govern. The excerpt from R514 is one method, and it happens to fill an entire sheet of paper. He may have thought of some other notation for partitioning the paper, but the logical result would be equivalent. There is much more to say, and I'll send the full preview later this week. Meanwhile, there are some questions to ponder: Why did Juliette scrub and polish the floor in December? Spring cleaning is rarely done in December. Why was there some paper on the floor? Why did Peirce slip n it? Didn't he see it? Why was his accident so serious? If he had been walking in a straight line, he might have fallen on his rear. That might have been painful, but it wouldn't cause a serious injury that took 6 months to heal. Such a serious accident might have occurred if Peirce had been walking fast while turning or twisting. But why would he be doing that? Possible answer: Charles had asked Juliette to wash the floor because he wanted to build a diagram with multiple papers. He was laying out a diagram of papers with a large example of what he was writing about. As he turned to lay our another layer, he turned and slipped. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 2/20/24 2:00 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic) John, List: Here is an exact quotation of what Peirce actually says in R L376 (letter to Risteen) about the phemic sheet consisting of multiple "papers." CSP: I provide my system with a phemic sheet, which is a surface upon which the utterer and interpreter will, by force of a voluntary and actually contracted habit, recognize that whatever is scribed upon it and is interpretable as an assertion is to be recognized as an assertion, although it may refer to a mere idea as its subject. If “snows” is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to relate, it sometime does snow. For they two may conceive that the “phemic sheet” embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to one subject and part to another. There is no mention of Delta, nor anything that would "deal with modals," which again is Peirce's only stated purpose for adding a Delta part to EGs. Instead, the different papers correspond to different subjects that attract "the common attention" of the utterer and interpreter at different times--i.e., different universes of discourse; not different times, aspects, or modalities of the same universe of discourse. There is also nothing about the new "red pencil" operation that Peirce describes in R 514 (as quoted below), and based on his specific example in that text--postulates in geometry--it likewise does not "deal with modals." Instead, it treats the edges of the sheet and the red line drawn a short distance inside them as two cuts, the latter nested within the former, such that what is being represented overall is a conditional--if the propositions in the margin (outer close) are true, then the graphs within the red line (inner close) are also true. In other words, the universe of discourse is made more explicit instead of being entirely taken for granted, and it might be strictly hypothetical--"merely asserted to be possible." In summary, it remains unclear to me what the content of your new article has to do with Delta graphs. How would the use of multiple "papers" and/or the "red pencil" operation facilitate implementing formal systems of modal logic with EGs? Which specific one, "invented in 2006," do you have in mind? Regards, Jon On Mon, Feb 19, 2024 at 10:30 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, That's true: JAS> I am admittedly curious about the content of your new article. As you know, there is only one place in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings where he mentions Delta. But note the following excerpt from R514, which also contains a rough draft of the EGs in L231: "Since my paper of 19
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
Jon, That's true: JAS> I am admittedly curious about the content of your new article. As you know, there is only one place in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings where he mentions Delta. But note the following excerpt from R514, which also contains a rough draft of the EGs in L231: "Since my paper of 1906, I have improved the [EG] system slightly (at least), and the manner of exposition of it greatly, by first stating the force of the different signs without going into their deeper significance in the Since my paper of 1906, I have improved the [EG] system slightly (at least), and the manner of exposition of it greatly, by first stating the force of the different signs without going into their deeper significance in the least... One of my possibly slight improvements, is that I begin by drawing (preferably with a red pencil), a line all round my sheet at a little distance from the edge; and in the margin outside the red line, whatever is scribed is merely asserted to be possible. Thus, if the subject were geometry, I could write in that margin the postulates, and any pertinent problems stated in the form of postulates such as, that "if on a plane, there be circle with a ray cutting it, and two be marked [end of R514] That operation is the way L376 represents multiple parts of the phemic sheet. And it is a way of saying the conditions for the nested graph to be possible. That doesn't say much more. But that operation when combined with a notation for first-order logic is a method for representing modality in various logics in the late 20th and early 21st C. There are also other hints that suggest ways of extending FOL. They don't prove that Peirce intended exactly the same kinds of applications. But it shows that his ways of thinking could lead in promising directions. Following is the abstract of the article I'm writing. Abstract. In December 1911, Peirce wrote an intriguing claim about existential graphs: “I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals.” Although his unfinished draft does not specify the details, it explains how an utterer and an interpreter may use Delta graphs in an investigation. Further hints may be found in several manuscripts he wrote in the previous six months. As another hint, the intended recipient of the letter was Allan Risteen. When that letter is combined with information about Risteen’s expertise and Peirce’s work on a proof of pragmaticism, it suggests that the phemic sheet of a Delta graph consists of multiple “papers”, each of which represents a different time, aspect, or modality of some universe of discourse. Although Peirce did not specify the details of Delta graphs, a combination of features mentioned in several 1911 manuscripts would satisfy the hints about Delta graphs. The result would be similar or perhaps equivalent to a logic for modality that was invented in 2006. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 2/18/24 8:08 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic) John, List: JFS: I am now writing the article on Delta Graphs. That is an example where Peirce was on solid ground with his deep understanding of logic and mathematics. Next week, I'll send the abstract and preview of the new article, which shows how Peirce anticipated a version of logic that was developed in the 21st century (2006 to be exact). (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00038.html) JFS: I'm moving on to the the article on Delta graphs. I'll send a note with a preview of that article later this week. (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00104.html) I am admittedly curious about the content of your new article. As you know, there is only one place in Peirce's entire vast corpus of writings where he mentions Delta. CSP: In this ["Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism," CP 4.530-572, 1906] I made an attempt to make the syntax [of Existential Graphs] cover Modals; but it has not satisfied me. The description was, on the whole, as bad as it well could be, in great contrast to the one Dr. Carus rejected [in 1897]. For although the system itself is marked by extreme simplicity, the description fills 55 pages, and defines over a hundred technical terms applying to it. The necessity for these was chiefly due to the lines called "cuts" which simply appear in the present description as the boundaries of shadings, or shaded parts of the sheet. The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with modals. (R L376, R 500:2-3, 1911 Dec 6) For EGs as described in "the better exposition of 1903," modal logic is implemented with broken cuts in Gamma. However, by the time Peirce wrote this letter to Allan Douglas
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
Jon, Edwina, List, Peirce's writings and Jon's article about "temporal synechism" do not conflict with the following sentence: JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and different theories about time. There is a major difference between Newtonian time, time in Einstein's special relativity, time in general relativity, and time in many variations that physicists have proposed in the past century. Nobody know what theories may be developed in the future. But it's doubtful that any of them will make any noticeable difference in the way that different cultures talk about time. Edwina said that she considered the Hopi way of talking about time as objectionable. I admit that it's different from SAE, which is closer to my way of thinking. But I believe that there is a one-to-one mapping between Hopi times and SAE times -- at least at a level that is humanly perceptible without special instruments. And I can't see any conflict with anything Peirce wrote. Those examples just show that different people think in different ways. I can't see any reason for objecting. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and different theories about time. I wrote a lengthy paper on this subject, "Temporal Synechism: A Peircean Philosophy of Time" (https://rdcu.be/b9xVm). JFS: Since every hypothesis is stated as a proposition, asking the question "Why?" about any 3ns would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the reason that explains why the first and second are related. This is getting closer to the phaneroscopic essence of 3ns as mediation, and it is fully consistent with one of Peirce's own examples that I quoted previously. CSP: Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational agent in making a 3ns genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law according to which she acts. (CP 1.366, EP 1:255, 1886-7) Why did the gunpowder explode? Because a spark ignited it. Indeed, the third (spark) explains why the first (gunpowder) and second (explosion) are related, reflecting the intelligibility of that relation. Nevertheless, this answer does not require a verb that names a triadic relation; and although it provides a reason for what happened, it does not identify a rational agent's goal, purpose, or intention behind it. After all, the explosion might have been entirely accidental, not the result of any goal/purpose/intention at all. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
Edwina, Jon, List, I'm sorry for not responding sooner to this note. But now that I finished the article on phaneroscopy, I'm moving on to the the article on Delta graphs. I'll send a note with a preview of that article later this week. In any case, there is no conflict between Peirce's categories and different theories about time. The important point about Thirdness is that the Third is always an abstract reason (or theory) for relating the first and second. That is why the most direct way to formalize any instance of Thirdness is to clarify and determine that reason. And the starting point for any such determination is to ask a question. The method of asking questions is as old as Socrates. Aristotle adopted and systematized the questions -- every one of his 10 categories is the answer to a question. The medieval Scholastics, which Peirce studied in detail, developed many systematic methods for asking questions. If you search for "question" in CP, you'll get over 1500 answers. I haven't checked every one, but the ones I did check usually lead to the initial stages of an investigation of some sort. As for time, questions about time do not rule out an open-ended variety of answers, In fact, Einstein's questions about time were the starting point of his theory of relativity. Peirce also asked questions about time and space that indicated options that were distinctly different from Newton's assumptions. They were closer to Einstein's, but there was much more work to do -- as Einstein and others showed. There is much more to say about these issues. But the method of asking "Why?" to begin an investigation of Thirdness is consistent with Peirce's method of beginning any kind of investigation. Just look at the many occurrences of the word "question" in CP. There are also 332 instances of 'why' and 1193 instances of 'how' in CP. As just one example of both, note CP 2.717: "The distinction between the 'Why' of hypothesis and the 'How' of induction is not very great; both ask for a statistical syllogism, of which the observed fact shall be the conclusion, the known conditions of the observation one premiss, and the inductive or hypothetic inference the other. This statistical syllogism may be conveniently termed the explanatory syllogism." Note that Peirce wrote "the 'why' of hypothesis'. Since every hypothesis is stated as a proposition, asking the question "Why?" about any Thirdness would lead to a proposition. That proposition is the reason that explains why the first and second are related. Therefore, CP 2.717 justifies my claim about asking a question Why about any instance of Thirdness. It is the beginning of an investigation to determine the reason, goal, purpose, or intention that relates the first and second. QED (Quite Easily Done). John From: "Edwina Taborsky" Sent: 2/13/24 7:08 PM John, list I’m not a fan of the Whorf-Sapir sociolinguistics hypotheses…Objective reality exists, regardless of how we talk about it - and I maintain that its influence can be far stronger than words ie - Secondness has its own way of intruding on our words. And mathematics has nothing to do with sociolinguistic relativism. As for time - I tend to follow Matsuno’s analysis [Koichiro Matsuno] with his three types of time: present, perfect and progressive, which can be compared with Peircean 1ns, 2ns and 3ns. …and Peirce has written about the temporal and spatial nature of these three categories extensively [ ie, no need for quotations]. Yes, 3ns includes continuity -of its habits - but, I don’t see this type of continuity as the same as the continuous semiosic functions of the universe. Imagine what our universe would be, if it stopped transforming x into y via its mediative process?….But, a habit in 3ns can and does change… Edwina On Feb 13, 2024, at 4:40 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Jon, Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum is important. But there are many different ways of talking and thinking about time. And there are also many different mathematical ways of formulating theories. See my previous note in response to Edwina. For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf . The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and the long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not obvious. It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of thinking about time, continuity, or the relation between time and continuity. And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that Cantor formalized. More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce. JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability assures us of its reality, and that this is the only
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Jon, I completely agree with the following paragraph: JAS> Put another way, a who or what question is often a rheme, such that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent. But your paragraph is a discussion of a dialog between two two persons: an inquirer and an respondent. One of them is uttering a sentence (complete or partial) and the other is interpreting it. But Helmut and I were not talking about a dialog between two people. We were talking about a method that a student or scholar of Peirce may use for testing a sign to determine whether it is an instance of 1-ness, 2-ness, or 3-ness. Those are two totally different activities. The test is not a method of communication by means of sentences. It is a method for determining the structure of a sign. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 2/15/24 9:47 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why) John, List: At the risk of belaboring the point, I will take one more stab at showing why I think that Peirce would not have agreed with distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns by aligning them with the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why questions as (allegedly) monadic, dyadic, and triadic. If I ask, "Who retrieved the book?" and you reply, "My dog," then from a logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, you are asserting the dyadic proposition that your dog retrieved the book. If I ask, "What did the man give his wife?" and you reply, "A brooch," then from a logical standpoint, you are not merely uttering the name of a monadic relation, you are asserting the triadic proposition that the man gave his wife a brooch. Put another way, a who or what question is often a rheme, such that the answer fills in the blank to complete the proposition. "___ retrieved the book" becomes "My dog retrieved the book." "The man gave his wife ___" becomes "The man gave his wife a brooch." The key is not the word that begins the question, but the nature of what is missing in the mind of the inquirer until it is supplied by the respondent. In fact, sometimes the answer to a what question is the name of a dyadic or triadic relation. "What did your dog do with the book?" "My dog retrieved the book." "What did the man do with the brooch?" "He gave it to his wife." A when or where question is even less straightforward. If I ask, "When did the man give his wife the brooch?" and you reply, "On Valentine's Day," this is only informative if I already know that Valentine's Day is February 14 and what today's date is--there is an unavoidably indexical aspect here. If I ask, "Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee?" and you reply, "In the eye," this just changes the relevant proposition from "The datestone hit the Jinnee" to "The datestone hit the Jinnee's eye." Again, a how question need not have a dyadic answer. If I ask, "How are you?" and you reply, "I am cold" (after shoveling snow), then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "How did the man celebrate Valentine's Day?" and you reply, "He gave his wife a brooch," then you are obviously asserting a triadic proposition. Likewise, a why question need not have a triadic answer. If I ask, "Why are you shivering?" and you reply, "I am cold," then you are obviously asserting a monadic proposition. If I ask, "Why did the man give his wife a brooch?" and you reply, "He was celebrating Valentine's Day," then you are obviously asserting a dyadic proposition. These examples illustrate the imprecision and resulting flexibility of natural languages. The fact that information can be added to or subtracted from someone's answer to a question in ordinary conversation reflects the context-dependency of both utterances, as well as the dialogic nature of human semiosis. Consequently, it is better to stick with Peirce's own paradigmatic conceptions for distinguishing 1ns/2ns/3ns as discovered in phaneroscopy, namely, quality/reaction/mediation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 3:32 PM John F Sowa wrote: I have to shovel snow right now, but I
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
I have to shovel snow right now, but I'll briefly explain the two sentences. JAS> JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was made. The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. "Why did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a completely different question that would require a completely different answer. By including the verb 'give' in the answer, her husband gave a triadic answer to a dyadic question. That includes more information than was requested. In the other question, with the word 'why', the answer stated less information, and the person who asked would typically ask a follow-on question to get the reason why. The possibility that the answer might not contain exactly the requested information is one reason why Helmut's criterion, although equivalent to a why-question, may be a better way to elicit the correct information. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 2/15/24 2:56 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why) John, List: It seems that we both made mistakes when addressing the e-mails reproduced below. I apologize for sending mine to the List, it was intended for only Gary as its moderator. Because of our unfortunate history of contentious interactions, I often use him as a sounding board whenever I consider replying to one of your posts. I sincerely hope that we can make the best of it and move on. I meant no insult with my last remark, I was simply stating my honest opinion, and my preceding claim was not mistaken. JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of 3ns that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? JAS: How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. JFS: The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was made. The question begins with the word "How," not "Why"; and by your own admission, the answer is triadic, thus a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. "Why did the woman's husband give her the brooch?" is a completely different question that would require a completely different answer. JFS (corrected by JAS): Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word "Why" but is not a genuine example of 3ns? JAS: Why did the gunpowder explode? A spark ignited it. JFS: The stated answer is dyadic. It explains how the explosion occurred, but it does not say why. The question begins with the word "Why," thereby meeting your only stipulation; and by your own admission, the answer is dyadic, thus not a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. The fact that someone might ask additional questions that have triadic answers, such as why the spark occurred, is irrelevant. Here is another counterexample--Why did the woman wear the brooch? It is red. This answer is monadic, thus not a genuine example of 3ns by your criterion. Hence, I stand by my statement that distinguishing 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns solely on the alleged basis that the answers to who/what/when/where, how, and why questions are monadic, dyadic, and triadic indicates a serious misunderstanding of both Peirce's categories and his semeiotic. As you reiterated for the umpteenth time in another thread late last night ... JFS: It's good to explore further developments of his ideas, but we have to be careful to distinguish his words from our extensions. Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended. Accordingly, without exact quotations, nobody can claim that Peirce would have agreed with the novel suggestion that every example of 3ns can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word "why," let alone that he would have been "delighted" by it. Would you really find it unobjectionable for me to say, "I realize that Peirce did not specify the logical order of determination for all ten trichotomies in sign classification, but I think that he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested my solution"? (For the record, I would never actually say such a thing--we should not ascribe sentiments to him without exact quotations, any more than intentions.) Regards, Jon On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 12:17 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, List, Thank you for noting that I had intended to push the SEND ALL button for my previous note (co
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Jerry, Jon, List, Helmut had an excellent suggestion: Every why-question can be answered with a because-answer. Therefore, every instance of Thirdness can be explained in sentence that contains the word 'because'. See my comments below and Helmut's original note below that. If you find my original explanation hard to understand, you might find Helmut's point easier to accept. But either explanation is based on the fact that in any instance of Thirdness, the third item C is the reason or intention or goal or purpose that explains the dyadic relationship between A and B. Again, I repeat: I cannot say for certain that Peirce would be delighted with this explanation, but he was always looking for simpler and more convincing ways of explaining his basic principles. That is the primary reason why he found Lady Welby's correspondence so important: She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations for his abstract ideas. That is the primary difference between his Kantian-influenced phenomenology and his later, more concrete phaneroscopy. There is more to say about these issues. In particular, the emphasis on the explanatory role of C is critical for analyzing Peirce's writings in his last decade. John From: "John F Sowa" Helmut, Thanks for mentioning the word 'because'. That's another way to explain the 3-way connection that answers a why-question, In general, every instance of thirdness that relates (A B C) can be explained by a sentence of the form "A is related to B because C."But some linguistic transformations may be needed to transform the answer sentence into the syntactic form of a because-sentence, Some transformations may sound awkward, but they would be intelligible answers. For your question: The simplest way to show that a four-way connection can be reduced to two three-way connections is to draw a diagram. To avoid going to my drawing tools, I'll just explain how you can draw the diagram with a pencil and paper First draw a large dot that is connected to A, B, C, and D. Then translate that four-way connection to two three way connections. Start by drawing two dots: Then connect the one on the left to A and B, and the one on the right to C and D. You now have two two-way connections. Now draw a line that connects both of the dots. As a result, the left dot has three connections: A, B, and the dot on the right. And the dot on the right also has three connections: C, D, and the dot on the left. You can repeat this procedure for reducing a dot that connects A, B, C, D, and E to a middle dot that has three connections: the first to the A, B pair, the second to the C, D pair, and the third to E. For 6, the dot in the middle will connect to three pairs, A,B, C,D, E,F, For 7 and 8, the dot in the middle will have four connections. Use the procedure for A,B,C,D to split a 4-way connection to two 3-way connections. Then keep going for as many connections as you need. John _ From: "Helmut Raulien" John, List, The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions: -Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible? Best, helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
Helmut, Thanks for mentioning the word 'because'. That's another way to explain the 3-way connection that answers a why-question, In general, every instance of thirdness that relates (A B C) can be explained by a sentence of the form "A is related to B because C."But some linguistic transformations may be needed to transform the answer sentence into the syntactic form of a because-sentence, Some transformations may sound awkward, but they would be intelligible answers. For your question: The simplest way to show that a four-way connection can be reduced to two three-way connections is to draw a diagram. To avoid going to my drawing tools, I'll just explain how you can draw the diagram with a pencil and paper First draw a large dot that is connected to A, B, C, and D. Then translate that four-way connection to two three way connections. Start by drawing two dots: Then connect the one on the left to A and B, and the one on the right to C and D. You now have two two-way connections. Now draw a line that connects both of the dots. As a result, the left dot has three connections: A, B, and the dot on the right. And the dot on the right also has three connections: C, D, and the dot on the left. You can repeat this procedure for reducing a dot that connects A, B, C, D, and E to a middle dot that has three connections: the first to the A, B pair, the second to the C, D pair, and the third to E. For 6, the dot in the middle will connect to three pairs, A,B, C,D, E,F, For 7 and 8, the dot in the middle will have four connections. Use the procedure for A,B,C,D to split a 4-way connection to two 3-way connections. Then keep going for as many connections as you need. John From: "Helmut Raulien" Supplement: Ok, I can access Commens Dictionary again! John, List, The answer to "why", "because" always needs two premisses, with itself being the third. So a thirdness is the answer to "why". Firstness can just say "I". Secondness is a second following a first, and so can say "I am". Obviously, just by having a first for predecessor, not because of something (An observer can say, that it can say "I am", because of that, but the secondness, subjectively, cannot say so, as it doesn´t have the ability of inference. It only has the propositional ability to say "I am"). Thirdness can say "I am, because", because a cause (an argument) needs two sequentally related ancestors to be one. I really think, that the Peircean categories basicly, like this, rely on the sheer numbers one, two, three. BTW, I have two questions: -Can I see anywhere in the internet the mathematical proof, that a triad is irreducible, but a four-ad is reducible? -I donot have access anymore to the Commens Dictionary. Is something wrong with my computer, or with the website? Best, helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)
, not any answers to any questions. JFS: Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why'? These are both the same question. Maybe he intended the second one to be, "Can anybody find an example of an answer to a question that begins with the word 'Why' but is not a genuine example of 3ns?" Of course, I already fulfilled both requests, but he dismissed my counterexamples with a bunch of hand-waving. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 6:29 PM John F Sowa wrote: Jon, Your comments confirm the fact that every example of Thirdness can be explained as the answer to a question that begins with word 'Why'. Although Peirce hadn't mentioned that point, I think he would have been delighted if Lady Welby or some other correspondent had suggested it. JFS: The monadic relations of 1ns express answers to the words Who, What, When, or Where. The dyadic relations of 2ns express answers to the word How. And the triadic relations of 3ns express answers to the word Why. In particular, all examples of 3ns can be expressed as answers to Why-questions. JAS> On the contrary, every answer to every question is an example of 3ns, because every sign is in the genuine triadic relation of mediating between its object and its interpretant. That point, although true, does not distinguish the three kinds of answers. For the first four question words (who, what, when, where), the words in parentheses in your answers are irrelevant, since the single word or phrase is sufficient. JAS> Who retrieved the book? My dog (retrieved the book). What did the man give his wife? (He gave her) a brooch. When did he give it to her? (He gave it to her) on Valentine's Day. Where did the datestone hit the Jinnee? (It hit him) in the eye. The next two sentences show that sentences given as answers may include more or less than what was asked. The person who asked the question may ask a follow-up question if more information is necessary. JAS> How did the woman obtain the brooch? Her husband gave it to her. The verb 'give' is triadic. It implies a dyadic physical transfer (answer to How) plus the reason why: a gift includes the reason why the transfer was made. The word 'lend' could have been used for the same physical transfer, but it would not have implied a transfer of ownership. And by the way, a transfer of ownership does not require a physical transfer. "See that house on the hillside? I bought it for you." JAS> Why did the gunpowder explode? A spark ignited it. The stated answer is dyadic. It explains how the explosion occurred, but it does not say why. Anybody who asked that question would very likely ask for the purpose, goal, or intention: Was it an accident? Was the explosion used for mining coal? For clearing a landslide? For digging a tunnel? For a fireworks display? JAS> Again, defining 3ns in terms of explanation or reason (intelligibility) is more generally accurate than defining 3ns in terms of (conscious) intentionality or purpose. I used the word 'intention' in my previous note but consciousness of the reason is not a requirement. In other writings, I often give a list of related words, such as goal, purpose, or motive as alternatives or additional options for intention. But consciousness is not a requirement. Example: people walking to the store while talking on a cell phone. Peirce emphasized the continuity from lower life forms, including insects and plants, and he did not imply that a human level of consciousness or intellect is a requirement, Please note my response to Mike Bergman, who brought up "crystals and bees". In my response, I discussed two issues: (1) why did Peirce consider the possibility that crystals might have a kind of internal goal; (2) an analysis at a molecular level would show that external forces, not an internal goal of each atom would be sufficient to explain the formation of crystals. But bees, plants, and even bacteria have internal goals or purposes without anything that resembles human consciousness. I realize that Peirce did not mention the connection between the word 'why' and every instance of Thirdness. But if somebody had mentioned that connection to him, I believe that he would have been delighted to have that simple test. Question for Jon or anybody else who may be interested: Can anybody find a genuine example of Thirdness that could not be the answer to a question that begins with the word "Why"? Conversely, can anybody find an example of Thirdness that could not be used as
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
. Sci. 9 (1870), 317-78; E. Schroder [1, vol. Ill]; J. C. C. McKinsey, Jour. Symbolic Logic 6 (1940), 85-97; A. Tarski, ibid. 6 (1941), 73-89. The two Peirce articles mentioned are, of course, included in Birkhoff's bibliography. - Page n290 C. S. Peirce, [1] On the algebra of Logic. Am. Jour. 3 (1880), 15-57; [2] On the algebra of Logic, ibid. 7 (1884), 180-202, It's clear, then, that by the 1870s-80s, Peirce had mastered the fundamentals of Lattice Theory. We may then ask why he failed to see that classes of signs with 3, 6, or 10 elements were organized in lattice structures. Nevertheless, the notion of affinity between triadic classes of signs and his evocation of the syntax of some of them are explicit expressions of this. The answer is not to be found in a possible limitation of his capacity as a mathematician to recognize in the universe of signs forms that were in his mind. The answer lies in the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of breaking out of the set-theoretic framework in which the most advanced mathematics of his time was embedded, a framework that Category Theory considerably expanded and formalized long after his death. I followed in Peirce's footsteps and made my way through Category Theory, a field with which I'm familiar, from 1977 and 1990 in French, and especially from 1982 in English. I quickly obtained the ten classes of triadic signs (naturally associated with the only ten possible functors between two elementary categories). The next step, the one that naturally enables us to understand the relationships between these classes, is that of the natural transformations of these functors, which define the immanent relationships that exist between these ten functors. The point of natural transformations is that they are transformations between functors (of the same source and target). The concept of natural transformation is specific to category theory. Categories can be seen as generalizations of structured sets and functors as generalizations of appropriate transformations for these objects. As for natural transformations, they have no equivalent in these analogies. They do not generalize anything; they are simply a "new product" of category theory. Saunders Mac Lane, one of the founders of this field, is said to have once confided that he didn't "invent categories to study functors [but] to study natural transformations." So, a simple mental move to look at the ten functors we've just obtained as objects of a new category whose morphisms (the relations between these functors that have become objects) are the natural transformations of functors causes the lattice structure of the ten classes to fall like ripe fruit. The same applies to the 28 classes and to the 66 classes (when they are well-defined, which is not yet the case). Moreover, if we situate these lattice structures in the Classification of Sciences, we see that they are at the level of Logic, "the science of the general laws of signs," and more precisely, after trichotomy of Logic, they each constitute the Grammatica Speculativa of the corresponding sets of signs. This is, in a way, confirmed by Peirce when he explicitly refers to the "syntax" of certain classes of signs (Dicent Sinsign, CP 2. 257; Dicent Symbol, CP 2.262). But I posited these results at least 40 years ago, and they haven't percolated down, apart from a few researchers in France, who have used them in fields such as Phenomenology and pragmatics in the medical field, multimedia, epistemological questions linked to the subjectivity of researchers, or the methodology of criminal investigation. However, by confining myself to order structures and relational algebra, I was able to artificially arrive at lattices without evoking these abstract natural transformations, which are undoubtedly major obstacles. In vain ... I'm going to give myself one last chance to convince the only community that can validate my work, whose scientific integrity I do not doubt, by trying to find a third way to lattices that uses the only conceptions set out by Peirce, just clarified and specified unquestionably. I'll soon be publishing the results of my "disabstraction" efforts. Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ Le sam. 10 févr. 2024 à 22:45, John F Sowa a écrit : Gary R, Robert M, Jon AS, Edwina, List, Thanks, Gary, for explaining our points of agreement. As you emphasize in bold face, we all agree with Nathan Houser and with Short that Peirce’s later taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make out, incoherent” (Short 2007, p. 260). But he [GR, Short] quickly went on to point out that it is not the inconclusiveness of Peirce’s own findings but “the kind of project” he had conceived and was pursuing that is important. I also emphas
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)
As I wrote in reply to Jon, there is a cluster of words in English and other languages that express the goal, purpose, intention, desire, or Thirdness that explains why some agent does something. There was no single word in English that exactly expresses the reason until Peirce coined the word Thirdness. The biologist Lynn Margulis explained that all living things from bacteria on up exhibit goal-directed actions that non-living things never do. Her simplest example is a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient. No non-living things would ever do that. Some human for some purpose might design a robot to do that, The non-living robot would not have the intention, but the human who designed it had some goal or purpose or intention to design an artifact that would perform that action under those conditions. That is the most basic form of intentionality or goal-directed behavior or -- in essence -- Thirdness. Consciousness is not a requirement. My recommendation is to ask why. That's a simple test that corresponds to the common intersection of all those words. ET> Did the bus driver intentionally run over the pedestrian? Just ask the question "Why?" John From: "Edwina Taborsky" John, list I think it would help if you defined ‘intentionality’. Is it involved in all human actions? Did the bus driver intentionally run over the pedestrian? Edwina On Feb 13, 2024, at 3:26 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Edwina, Please see my response to Mike. I used the word 'intentionality' because it (or something like it) is involved in all human actions. For example, I can intentionally walk to the store. But what about each step in the walk? In effect, it is intentional, but it's only conscious when there is a puddle or a broken place in the sidewalk. Other animals at every level and even plants act upon principles that would be called intentional if they had been human. But consciousness is not necessary. And even for humans, all actions appear to have the some kind of intentionality, but the actors themselves will often say that they did it "absent mindedly". But absent minded actions are often done when people are "multitasking", such as talking on their cell phones while crossing the street and getting run over by a bus. They didn't intend to get run over by the bus, but they did intend to cross the street. The steps of walking were not conscious, but they were necessary parts of an intentional process. In effect, Thirdness is involved in every intentional action. And every instance of Thirdness by any living being could be called intentional if a human did it. Can anybody find an example of Thirdness in any of Peirce's writings that could not be considered intentional if it had been performed by a human? John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why (was Sign Relations
Jon,
I completely agree with the following principle:
JA> Another aspect of a sign's complete meaning concerns the reference a sign
has to its interpretants...
And there are six kinds of reference that a sign my have to its interpretants.
Each kind corresponds to one of the six basic question words in English (or
their equivalents in other languages). Questions that begin with the first
four question words may be answers with one word or phrase: Who, What, When,
and Where. Any such question may be answered with one word or phrase and a
MONADIC relation.
Questions that begin with How can be answered in a sentence with a dyadic verb,
a DYADIC relation.
And questions that begin with Why require require a sentence with a verb that
requires a subject, object, and an indirect object or a prepositional phrase:
a TRIADIC relation.
In short, that is the distinction between Peirce's Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness. The monadic relations of Firstness express answers to the words
Who, What, When, or Where, The dyadic relations of Secondness express answers
to the word How. And the triadic relations of Thirdness answer questions to
the word Why.
In summary. all examples of Thirdness are answers to Why-questions. They all
express some kind of intention or purpose or explanation or reason for the
triadic connection.
John
From: "Jon Awbrey"
Sent: 2/13/24 9:02 AMc
Another aspect of a sign's complete meaning concerns the reference
a sign has to its interpretants, which interpretants are collectively
known as the “connotation” of the sign. In the pragmatic theory of
sign relations, connotative references fall within the projection
of the sign relation on the plane spanned by its sign domain and
its interpretant domain.
In the full theory of sign relations the connotative aspect of meaning
includes the links a sign has to affects, concepts, ideas, impressions,
intentions, and the whole realm of an interpretive agent's mental states
and allied activities, broadly encompassing intellectual associations,
emotional impressions, motivational impulses, and real conduct.
Taken at the full, in the natural setting of semiotic phenomena, this
complex system of references is unlikely ever to find itself mapped in
much detail, much less completely formalized, but the tangible warp of
its accumulated mass is commonly alluded to as the connotative import
of language.
Formally speaking, however, the connotative aspect of meaning presents
no additional difficulty. The dyadic relation making up the connotative
aspect of a sign relation L is notated as Con(L). Information about the
connotative aspect of meaning is obtained from L by taking its projection
on the sign‑interpretant plane. We may visualize this as the “shadow” L
casts on the 2‑dimensional space whose axes are the sign domain S and the
interpretant domain I. The connotative component of a sign relation L,
alternatively written in any of forms, proj_{SI} L, L_SI, proj₂₃ L, and
L₂₃, is defined as follows.
• Con(L) = proj_{SI} L = {(s, i) ∈ S × I : (o, s, i) ∈ L for some o ∈ O}.
Tables 4a and 4b show the connotative components of the sign relations
associated with the interpreters A and B, respectively. The rows of
each Table list the ordered pairs (s, i) in the corresponding projections,
Con(L_A), Con(L_B) ⊆ S × I.
Tables 4a and 4b. Connotative Components Con(L_A) and Con(L_B)
•
https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sign-relation-twin-tables-con-la-con-lb.png
Resources —
Sign Relations
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation
Connotation
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation#Connotation
Document History
• https://oeis.org/wiki/Sign_relation#Document_history
Regards,
Jon
cc: https://www.academia.edu/community/LmnnXP
cc:
https://mathstodon.xyz/@Inquiry/111891382765624469_
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
Jon, Peirce's observations about the human perception of time as a continuum is important. But there are many different ways of talking and thinking about time. And there are also many different mathematical ways of formulating theories. See my previous note in response to Edwina. For starters, see the Wikipedia article about Whorf: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Lee_Whorf . The IndoEuropean way of thinking about time is by no means universal, and the long-standing puzzle by Zeno shows that the answer by Aristotle is not obvious. It's not true that all people everywhere have the same ways of thinking about time, continuity, or the relation between time and continuity. And the Peirce-Aristotle theory about the continuum is not the one that Cantor formalized. More mathematicians today follow Cantor than Peirce. JAS> he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our having the idea of a true continuum I admit that this statement is consistent with Peirce's quotations. But the languages Peirce knew, although remarkably extensive among 19th century philosophers, do not exhaust the full range of thought about time or continuity or the relations between them. And the different theories about continuity among professional mathematicians does not imply that the way people talk about time implies the way they must formulate theories about continuity. The best we can say is that Peirce's views are consistent with views in SAE (Whorf's abbreviation for Standard Average European), but they are by no means universal. They do not rule out other reasonable human ways of thinking about, talking about, and representing time and continuity. John _ From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: According to Peirce, we discover (not invent) continuity in phaneroscopy--our conception of it comes from directly observing the flow of time, which he calls "the continuum par excellence, through the spectacles of which we envisage every other continuum" (CP 6.86, 1898), so that "to say it is continuous is just like saying that the atomic weight of oxygen is 16, meaning that that shall be the standard for all other atomic weights. The one asserts no more of Time than the other asserts concerning the atomic weight of oxygen; that is, just nothing at all" (CP 4.642, 1908). Here are a few more quotations about this. CSP: To imagine time, time is required. Hence, if we do not directly perceive the flow of time, we cannot imagine time. Yet the sense of time is something forced upon common-sense. So that, if common-sense denies that the flow [of] time is directly perceived, it is hopelessly entangled in contradictions and cannot be identified with any distinct and intelligible conception. But to me it seems clear that our natural common-sense belief is that the flow of time is directly perceived. (NEM 3:60, c. 1895) CSP: That this element [continuity] is found in experience is shown by the fact that all experience involves time. Now the flow of time is conceived as continuous. No matter whether this continuity is a datum of sense, or a quasi-hypothesis imported by the mind into experience, or even an illusion; in any case it remains a direct experience. (CP 7.535, 1899) CSP: One opinion which has been put forward and which seems, at any rate, to be tenable and to harmonize with the modern logico-mathematical conceptions, is that our image of the flow of events receives, in a strictly continuous time, strictly continual accessions on the side of the future, while fading in a gradual manner on the side of the past, and that thus the absolutely immediate present is gradually transformed by an immediately given change into a continuum of the reality of which we are thus assured. The argument is that in this way, and apparently in this way only, our having the idea of a true continuum can be accounted for. (CP 8.123n, c. 1902) Although Peirce acknowledges in the second passage that our direct perception/experience of time might be an illusion, he nevertheless suggests in the other two that its inescapability assures us of its reality, and that this is the only way to account for our having the idea of a true continuum at all. Moreover, right before the statement that I quoted at the end of my last post, he makes the case at greater length that we could not even imagine true continuity unless there were something in reality that corresponds to it. CSP: I will submit for your consideration the following metaphysical principle which is of the nature of a retroduction: Whatever unanalyzable element sui generis seems to be in nature, although it be not really where it seems to be, yet must really be [in] nature somewhere, since nothing else could have produced even the false appearance of such an element sui generis. ... In the same
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)
Edwina, Please see my response to Mike. I used the word 'intentionality' because it (or something like it) is involved in all human actions. For example, I can intentionally walk to the store. But what about each step in the walk? In effect, it is intentional, but it's only conscious when there is a puddle or a broken place in the sidewalk. Other animals at every level and even plants act upon principles that would be called intentional if they had been human. But consciousness is not necessary. And even for humans, all actions appear to have the some kind of intentionality, but the actors themselves will often say that they did it "absent mindedly". But absent minded actions are often done when people are "multitasking", such as talking on their cell phones while crossing the street and getting run over by a bus. They didn't intend to get run over by the bus, but they did intend to cross the street. The steps of walking were not conscious, but they were necessary parts of an intentional process. In effect, Thirdness is involved in every intentional action. And every instance of Thirdness by any living being could be called intentional if a human did it. Can anybody find an example of Thirdness in any of Peirce's writings that could not be considered intentional if it had been performed by a human? John From: "Edwina Taborsky" List I agree with Mike. Thirdness, in my view, does not imply or require intentionality. That, after all, suggests some kind of consciousness - and I think we find Thirdness in chemical and physical matter - and these forms of matter do not include consciousness. I have a problem with the quote of “Continuity presents 3ns almost to perfection’ 1.337. I think that the rules of Thirdness CAN and must be, for a certain period of time, ‘continuous and stable.After all- we cannot live iin a world where a cat suddenly transforms into a dog. BUT, since thirdness also includes 2ns and 1ns, then, it contains within itself, the ability to interact with other units of matter - as well as chance - and thus, has the capacity to accept more data and thus, change these ‘continuous rules’ and so, adapt and evolve. Again - I consider that Peircean ‘continuity’ is not 3ns but is the continuous morphological semiosis formation of energy-into-matter - which is ongoing [ or else, as has been pointed out, entropy sneaks in]…. Edwina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)
Mike, I realize that Peirce mentioned "crystals and bees" in the same sentence. But we have to consider his classification of the sciences. Pure mathematics comes first, and it does not depend on anything else. It incudes all varieties, including formal or mathematical logic, discrete math, and continuous math. And Peirce followed Aristotle in insisting that continuous spaces (of which a line is a 1-D space) do not have points as parts. For Aristotle and Peirce, points are markers that designate a locus ON a space, but are not parts OF the space. That is the basis for Aristotle's solution to Zeno's paradox about Achilles and the turtle, which Peirce knew very well. Phaneroscopy depends only on mathematics, not semeiotic. For Peirce, the phaneron is raw, unprocessed and uninterpreted experience. (Modern cognitive science has more to say about these issues, but it may be deferred for analyzing what Peirce wrote.) The result of analyzing the phaneron is expressed in linguistic terms, which depend on psychic science, which may employ the methods of any and every science that precedes it. That includes all previous sciences, including the physical sciences and other psychic sciences. MB> I categorically disagree. Intentionality may be an example of Thirdness, but is not definitive of it. I agree that Peirce did not define 3ns in terms of intentionality. But every example that he cited does indeed involve intentionality. Can anybody find a single example of Thirdness in any writings by Peirce that does not involve intentions at least at the level of a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient. Even a description of how plants grow would involve Thirdness in the same sense as a bacterium. But a description of a crystal could be stated in two ways. If you consider the structure of the crystal as the desired final state, then a description in those terms would be stated in TERMINOLOGICAL thirdness. That may be the reason why Peirce wrote "crystals and bees". And that answer involves something very close to intentionality: In forming a diamond, each atom of carbon goes to a position where it minimizes the total energy of the crystal structure. In effect, the carbon atom "wants" to minimize energy in the same sense that a bacterium wants to ingest glucose. But if you look at the way crystals actually grow in nature, each atom or molecule in the crystal goes into its spot in the structure by principles of 2-ness -- following the strongest forces that act upon it. Those are EXTERNAL forces that act upon the atoms. That is very different from the INTERNAL forces in the bacterium that govern how it behaves in the presence of an external glucose gradient. Take for example the two most common carbon crystals: graphite and diamond. At modest level of heat, such as burning wood or paper, any unburnt carbon forms soot. If you examine that soot with a powerful microscope, you'll find that the soot particles contain very small graphite crystals mixed with other residues of burning. That can be explained by the atoms clumping together in a low energy state by 2ns, not 3ns, But if you put the graphite under high compression at high temperatures, you can force the carbon atoms even closer together in a state with lower energy: diamond crystals. Those are also external forces that act upon the carbon atoms. Peirce knew the chemistry of his day very well. But the atomic hypothesis of his day and theories about crystal formation were in their infancy. With modern theories, descriptions at the level of 2ns can explain chemical reactions and the way atoms move in forming crystals. John From: "Mike Bergman" Sent: 2/12/24 5:19 PM Hi John, I categorically disagree. Intentionality may be an example of Thirdness, but is not definitive of it. JAS just posted "Continuity represents 3ns almost to perfection" (CP 1.337, c. 1882), which I concur best captures (with Mind) Peirce's prominent view of Thirdness, and contintuity does not require intentionality. You might even diagram it out. And don't forget crystals (and atoms). Best, Mike On 2/12/2024 3:59 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Mike, In every example and application that Peirce wrote or cited, Thirdness involves intentionality. But intentionality is not an anthropomorphic notion, it is biomorphic in the most fundamental sense. Lynn Margulis wrote that a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient is a primitive example of intentionality, and no non-living physical system shows any kind of intentionality, I believe that Peirce would agree, since he cited dogs, parrots, bees, and even plants at various times. And by the way, viruses don't have intentions, since they're not alive. They are signs that are interpreted by living things to produce more signs of the same kind. John ---
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Entropy and the Universal Categories (was Re: The Proper Way in Logic)
Mike, In every example and application that Peirce wrote or cited, Thirdness involves intentionality. But intentionality is not an anthropomorphic notion, it is biomorphic in the most fundamental sense. Lynn Margulis wrote that a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose gradient is a primitive example of intentionality, and no non-living physical system shows any kind of intentionality, I believe that Peirce would agree, since he cited dogs, parrots, bees, and even plants at various times. And by the way, viruses don't have intentions, since they're not alive. They are signs that are interpreted by living things to produce more signs of the same kind. John From: "Mike Bergman" Hi Edwina, Helmut, List, I would like to hear you expand, Edwina, on what you mean about the 'idexicality of locality'. And, speaking of entropy, here is another possible link to the universal categories. flash (of light) [1ns] - energy [2ns] - information [3ns] I've been toying with this thought for quite a few years. Peirce's cosmogony begins with a flash (significantly a reference to light). I don't know if 'flash' is the right analog in Firstness, since both quantum mechanics and the nature of energy can arguably be better traced to the ideas of harmonic oscillators. Still, there is something pregnant in that nexus . . . . For decades there has been confusion and controversy about entropy in the sense of thermodynamics and its relation to Shannon (information) entropy. It strikes me that recasting these in terms of Peircean Secondness (energy) and Thirdness (information) brings sense to the conundrum. Both apply; it is more a matter of contextual interpretation. What say the list? Thanks! Best, Mike _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Jay Zeman's discussion of interpretants
As we know, Peirce's writings have inspired many new theories and discoveries for well over a century. But we must always distinguish his exact words from anybody else's interpretations and extensions. For interpretants, I believe that an article Jay Zeman wrote in 1977 is still one of the best: "Peirce's Theory of Signs", which has 70 occurrences of the word 'interpretant', Since CP is the only source he cites, he avoids the dubious late extensions that Short and others have criticized. It provides a good foundation for readers to distinguish Peirce's earlier, more limited definitions from later extensions that Peirce himself failed to define clearly and precisely. I have a copy of that article on my website, and I checked Google to find a more official site. But the search pointed back to my own website: https://www.jfsowa.com/ikl/Zeman77.pdf After Zeman died, I downloaded a complete copy of his entire website. I believe that it should be preserved somewhere more official. If anybody knows of a more official place to store it, I would be happy to give them access to the whole thing. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)
Edwina, Gary, Jon, List, As Peirce frequently pointed out, he had a solid understanding of all the methods of reasoning from the ancient Greeks to the medieval Scholastics to the methods from the Renaissance to the early 20th C. In general, the "proper way" depends very much on the theorem proving algorithms. Peirce did not invent the method of transforming a sentence to make 'is' the verb that connects subject and predicate. That method was invented by Aristotle and systematized by Boethius. It was widely used in 19th c textbooks, which were the ones that everybody, including Peirce, had studied . For the differences between Plato and Aristotle, see slides 13 to 24 of https://jfsowa.com/talks/patolog1.pdf . For Aristotle's syllogisms and the methods for transforming sentences to make 'is' the main verb, see slides 25 to 32. The remainder of patolog1 discusses other patterns of logic from the middle ages to modern times, including those by Frege and Peirce. For more about modern methods, including Peirce's influence on them, see patolog2, 3, 4, and 5. Fundamental principle: The methods of transforming formal logics are reversible. Anything represented in one format can be translated back and forth without loss of information. But transformations to and from natural languages and other formats -- formal, informal, linguistic, or graphic -- can lose information (or even worse DISTORT or CORRUPT Information). When Peirce wrote anything on logic, he assumed that his readers were familiar with the kind of material summarized in patolog1.pdf. It's helpful to read that in order to distinguish Peirce's innovations from his sources and his assumptions about his readers. Modern methods of reasoning often transform the logic to different formats to adapt them to various algorithms. Those transformations are reversible (provided that both formats have equal expressibility). Re dicisigns: Stjernfelt emphasized the trichotomy of rheme, dicisign, and argument because he was developing methods of reasoning with sources in natural languages. But Peirce moved to the more general triad of seme, pheme, and delome, which allow diagrams and images as representations. He made that switch in 1904-5 when he was mapping images in the phaneron to existential graphs. Note that he continued to use the term 'phemic sheet' up to the end. But he never used the word 'dicisign' after he introduced the word 'pheme'. That is an indication of the way his theories were developing. And I believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby had a strong influence on that development. John ___ From: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary, list Thanks - that book however, is from ten years ago. My point is that current research in information dynamics in the ’natural realms’ - which, very often, doesn’t use Peircean terms but is obviously working within the same analytic framework of morphological formation, information generation, transmission and transformation, and the nature of ‘objective idealism’ [ the integration of matter and mind] …is extensive. I’d say that these are all analyses well within the notion of the dicisign- ie, the concept that information generation, processing etc is not dependent on language or even consciousness but is a basic process in the biological and physico-chemical realms. ..operative within sensate rather than symbolic networking. And - I’d say that these fit the definition of a dicisign propositional interaction, where meanings [Interpretants] are in direct or factual connection to the object. The problem is - as noted - this research doesn’t use Peircean terminology! Edwina On Feb 11, 2024, at 11:39 AM, Gary Richmond wrote: Edwina, List, ET: I’m a bit surprised by your request - since surely you are aware of the focus in science of Peircean principles in the biological, physic-chemical and artificial worlds. Yes, I'm well aware of that focus and have read extensively in the literature. Thank you, though, for providing some recent examples, none of which I knew. My question, however, specifically pointed to Stjernfelt's work on dicisigns. I wrote: "I've been wondering how this move of Peirce [throwing everything possible into the subject] might figure, if it plays a part at all, in consideration of what Stjernfelt called 'Natural Propositions'," the dicisign being a generalization of the proposition. Helmut Pape called Stjernfelt's book "an inter- and transdisciplinary study that discusses and criticizes theories and uses examples coming from psychology, biology, anthropology, neuroscience, biosemiotics etc." So, mine was not a general question as to the influence of Peirce in fields other than logic -- there is no question of that -- but of this particular matter which Jon discusses at length and which may nor may not extend beyond logic as we generally think of it. Btw, here is another book I'd
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Gary R, Robert M, Jon AS, Edwina, List, Thanks, Gary, for explaining our points of agreement. As you emphasize in bold face, we all agree with Nathan Houser and with Short that Peirce’s later taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make out, incoherent” (Short 2007, p. 260). But he [GR, Short] quickly went on to point out that it is not the inconclusiveness of Peirce’s own findings but “the kind of project” he had conceived and was pursuing that is important. I also emphasize our agreement with Max Fisch, who pointed out, during the final six years of Peirce’s life he was engaged on a system of logic considered as semiotic which he hoped would “stand for realism in the twentieth century. I also agree with the other sentences you emphasized in bold. Since I have finished the article on phaneroscopy, I am now writing the article on Delta Graphs. That is an example where Peirce was on solid ground with his deep understanding of logic and mathematics. Next week, I'll send the abstract and preview of the new article, which shows how Peirce anticipated a version of logic that was developed in the 21st century (2006 to be exact). Since I also agree with Robert Marty's emphasis on Peirce's mathematical background, I include his note below. The emphasis on mathematics is essential. It explains Peirce's successes and the areas where he was less successful, such as the points that Short said were sketchy, tentative, and even incoherent. I agree that the questions about interpretants are important, but the answers depend on issues of cognitive science that are so complex that our best known mathematical methods are inadequate. This is still an open research area, and the most we can say is that the problems Peirce attempted to solve are still unsolved. John From: "robert marty" List, I agree with JAS on the architectonic character of the classification of the sciences. I want to complement what he says further and be even more precise about Peirce's deeper thinking. Indeed, JAS is perfectly suitable to note that applying the principle of classification (which Peirce borrows from Auguste Comte, revisiting it as JAS mentioned) leads to placing the Special Sciences in a position to receive their principles from semiotics. But strictly speaking, applying the principle from the first trichotomy of the Sciences of Discovery (CP 1.180) must lead to the more general conclusion that semiotics itself receives its principles from Mathematics and Philosophy (or Cenoscopy). More precisely, as we progress through the successive trichotomies, we see that semiotics receives its principles from a chain of dependencies that necessarily begins with Mathematics and continues with Phenomenology, Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic (the science of the general laws of signs), which then trichotomizes into Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic, before providing its principles to Metaphysics. Peirce is very precise on this point and on what needs to happen in the minds of the scientists concerned: I set out from Comte's well-known scheme (or schemes). It seemed to me that this embodied a most striking truth about the relations of sciences, along with some glowing falsities. That truth I conceived, and still conceive, to be that the results of one science, A, will often be applied by another science, B, as principles or tools wherewith to solve its problems (not of course, without research of its own), while science, B, will perhaps suggest problems to science, A, but will not furnish it with any great aid in solving its problems. I thought I ought to use this principle of Comte's for all it was worth, without allowing it to run away with me. For what I wish to produce is a scheme which shall exhibit, as far as possible, the most real affinities of the different branches of science as these sciences exist in the minds of those who are now actively pursuing them, or better, as these men are coming to regard these affinities. (MS 1339: p.4-5) Peirce situates this schema in the Well of Truth, a metaphor that deserves our attention, for it is in this Well that the Sciences of Discovery, and hence scientific knowledge, will be built: [ …] Auguste Comte wrote that the sciences form a sort of ladder descending into the Well of truth, each one leading on to another, those which are more concrete and special drawing their principles from those which are more abstract and general. (CP 2.119) Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of the sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of steps, each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may adapt our phraseology to the image of the Well of truth with flights of stairs leading down into it (MS 1345, p.001, undated, NEM, vol III.2: 1122) The first step of the ladder into the Well is the mathematical step. The
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Edwina, List, I am not denying the fact that interpretants, as defined by Peirce, exist, and I am not denying that Peirce's 3-way distinction is good. But you said that you had not studied the kinds of details that the linguists observe and specify. My claim is that any theory that does not dig deeply into those details is useless. And by "those", I mean every kind of detail that is studied and analyzed by EVERY ONE of the cognitive sciences: philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology. Any serious theory of interpretants must include ALL POSSIBLE INFLUENCES from any and every branch of cognitive science. The kind of generic theory that Peirce attempted is too weak to make any specific predictions in any particular case. I believe that Lady Welby had a good intuitive sense of the need for considering every possible influence, but she did not have the formal training in math & logic that Peirce had. If you examine the development of Peirce's ideas in the decade after he began their correspondence (from 1903 to the end), you can see how Peirce was moving away from more abstract universal definitions to a more concrete focus on details. The first step was a move from a phenomenology based on Kant's abstractions to a phaneroscopy that paid more attention to Welby's focus on concrete details. But that shift made the task far more complex. It's essential to focus on the concrete details of every method of observation. That is why Peirce was groping. He could no longer make broad generalizations, and every attempt to state a generalization forced him to consider how it would affect every detail of every branch, John From: "Edwina Taborsky" John, list I continue to either misunderstand or object - I don’t know which term I should use - to your rejection of the role of the Interpretants. I simply don’t see how the semiosic process can function - and it IS a function - without the necessary role of the Interpretants. How can you have a semiosic triadic function without the third relation - the relation that provides meaning to the original stimulus? That third relation, the meaning[s] is provided by the Interpretant Relations. And I emphasize the plural ecrus the simple one-node site [ the single interpretant or signified] such as is found in Saussure or ….is simply not enough to explain the complexity of the development of information. If you consider the semiosic process - we can see that there are a number of different ‘cuts’, that divides the experience into different zones of semiotic processes. The first cut’ so to speak, is simple: ontological - the separation of external and internal [ See Atmanspacher, H. 1999. ‘Cartesian Cut, Heisenberg Cut and the Concept of Complexity’, In: The Quest for a unified Theory of Information. Eds. W. Hofkirchner. ; 125-147. Matsumo, K [Resurrection of the Cartesian Physics. Same edition; p 31-44. ] This simply separates the sign-vehicle which stores the habits of the representamen from the external world - as Peirce has written, such that the Immediate Object and the Immediate Intnerpretant are internal to this ‘cut’….and the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant and Final Interpretant are external. Obviously - an internal experience of an incoming data - is not as complex as one that is externalized. But - as you can see in Robert Marty’s outline of the 28 classes of signs [which are hexadic forms, ie, including the two Object Relations and Three Interpretant Relations] that the Internal or Immediate Interpretant can be in any of the three categories - as related to the other Relations in the semiotic triad. The next Interpretant is external to the sign-vehicle - the Dynamic - and inserts a ‘visible’ or objectively knowable and measurable reaction - and moves it into common observance. This is the basis of most of our interactions with the world. BUT - medically, psychologically, and informationally- this external meaning is intimately connected to the data produced within the internal Immediate Interpretant. After all- the Dynamic relies for its ‘base’ on that Immediate input. And the final - as I’ve said before …brings in communal values and habit generation. That is- there are obviously THREE sites/nodes where information is processed, from the internal and possibly isolate form, to the externally reactive and available-to-others …to the development of habits of dealing with this original input data. Information development requires this complexity. My point is that all three developments from the original object-input are vital aspects of the path of informational development, where data moves into information within both the individual and the community. Again - I am either misunderstanding your point or being dumb..… but I consider the three - ie- all three - Interpretants to be vital in the
[PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Edwina, List, As a logician and mathematician, Peirce understood the methods of precise reasoning in lengthy deductions. But as a linguist and engineer, he also understood the issues of continuity or synechism. In ordinary language, every word has a broad range of meanings. The senses listed in a dictionary are a small finite set of the the continuum. Peirce understood that very well in his work for the Century dictionary and Baldwin's dictionary. I have quoted and cited professional lexicographers, who admit "I don't believe in word senses." Lady Welby said something very similar, and Peirce agreed. You don't need to know or apply any linguistic theory to realize that the issues are so complex that trying to build a theory on top of Peirce's three words is extremely difficult. As Short said, Peirce was "groping". I'm not saying that Peirce's writings on the subject are wrong. But I am claiming that if Peirce himself couldn't develop a solid coherent theory, I don't trust anybody else's attempts. Question: Can anybody find a practical version of interpretant theory that is written for anybody other than Peirce scholars? In short, can it be used for any practical purpose? What kind of applications would be possible? I mean USEFUL applications that do something practical that could not be done as well or better without a theory of interpretants. I have written a lot about applications of Peirce's theories in computer science, computational linguistics, and artificial intelligence. But I have never found a use for interpretants. Many other authors have found important applications of Peirce's ideas and theories and cited them in their publications. But I have never seen anybody who mentioned interpretants. Can anybody find any published examples? By anybody for any practical purpose? That reminds me of the parody: "This theory is so perfectly general that no practical application is possible". John ,From: "Edwina Taborsky" John I don't see what linguistic understanding of words has to do with the interpretants. The utterer’s Object [his words] can only carry his reality [phaneron] within the words he knows. - and as Peirce said - [can’t recall the reference] if the Object is unknown, then, the words used to describe it are open to interpretation; and if the utterer doesn’t have the words to describe the phaneron…this is a problem. AND the context for the meaning of the words is held within the knowledge base [ the Represenamen]. This is also a problem - what if the utterer has no context for this phaneron???In a constructive intreating - presumably, the listener shares some of this contextual knowledge base and so, can to a certain extent, understand the Utterer. If he doesn’t share this knowledge base - then- the resultant interpretation is quite different from the utterer’s intended meaning. We all know how such an interaction is open to misunderstanding. And to my knowledge, no scholar has ever been able to reduce the capacity for misunderstanding these verbal interactions. That’s because of so many issues: the different knowledge bases held within the representamens; the multiple meanings of words and the reliance on linguistic context, word order, intonation … I don’t see what these issues have to do with the three interpretants. My view of the interpretants refers to a situation where data/information is moved from the Object via the Representamen’s knowledge base ---and the Interpretant's function is to clarify the nature of the input data…from its first internal reaction…moving on to a reaction to that input…and maybe, sometime…if these interactions are operative within a community - to the development of a habit-of-dealing with this input. So, an animal will develop a thick coat of fur to deal with long term cooling temperatures and this behaviour will be common to all members of the local species. As for linguistics - I’m not a follower of that discipline- and so, can only refer to Bakhtin’s ‘dialogic’ emphasis on context enabling linguistic changes. Edwina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Edwina, I was just copying what Short said. If you don't have it, I'll send you the PDF of his entire book. All Peirce scholars agree that Peirce had settled on three kinds of interpretants. I don't deny that. But there is no information about how anybody can determine how the utterer can express the content of the phaneron as a linguistic sign, and how the listener can interpret the uttered sign. The critical issue for both of them is the context which may be much more difficult to determine than the words in the utterance. In a previous note, I recommended the 70 page article by Keith Devlin, "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis". You don't have to read the whole thing because the early examples show why context is so overwhelmingly important in determining the interpretant. Just look below for an example from page 9 of https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228579637_Confronting_context_effects_in_intelligence_analysis_How_can_mathematics_help Just one example like that undermines everything Peirce wrote about determining the interpretant. And examples like that can be repeated endlessly. Devlin's article is one source, but any detailed analysis of language in context will turn up endless numbers of examples. John __ From: "Edwina Taborsky" John, list I disagree with your view that Peirce never had a coherent theory of the interpretants’. I find his outlines clear and coherent and are all through his writings- in that it is logical and obvious that the triad includes not merely a single interpretant but several - and these several are basic and functional. That is- the notion of not merely one but three Interpretants is, I feel, basic to the Peircena semiosis _ Example from page 9 of "Confronting context effects in intelligence analysis" by Keith Devlin. The actual sentences that were spoken are in BOLD. And the context is in italics. Without the context, it's impossible to determine the interpretant of the sentence. HUSBAND: Dana succeeded in putting a penny in a parking meter today without being picked up. This afternoon as I was bringing Dana, our four-year-old son, home from the nursery school, he succeeded in reaching high enough to put a penny in a parking meter when we parked in a meter zone, whereas before he has always had to be picked up to reach that high. WIFE: Did you take him to the record store? Since he put a penny in a meter that means that you stopped while he was with you. I know that you stopped at the record store either on the way to get him or on the way back. Was it on the way back, so that he was with you or did you stop there on the way to get him and somewhere else on the way back. HUSBAND: No, to the shoe repair shop. No, I stopped at the record store on the way to get him and stopped at the shoe repair shop on the way home when he was with me. WIFE: What for? I know of one reason why you might have stopped at the shoe repair shop. Why did you in fact? HUSBAND: I got some new shoe laces for my shoes. As you will remember I broke a shoe lace on one of my brown Oxfords the other day so I stopped to get some new laces. WIFE: Your loafers need new heels badly. Something else you could have gotten that I was thinking of. You could have taken in your black loafers which need heels badly. You’d better get them taken care of pretty soon. A number of things are obvious about this particular exercise. First, the original conversation is remarkably everyday and mundane, and concerns an extremely restricted domain of family activity. Second, the degree of detail given in the subsequent ‘explanations’ or ‘elaborations’ of what each person said seems quite arbitrary. It is easy to imagine repeating the exercise over again, this time providing still further explanation. And then it could be repeated a third time. Then a fourth. And so on, and so on, and so on. Apart from boredom or frustration, there does not seem to be any obvious stopping point. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Michael, Jon, Edwina, Gary, List, First, I apologize to everybody about my use of "RIP" about anything Peirce wrote. I agree with Edwina that the three-way distinction is important, but I must emphasize that the amount of research in the cognitive sciences during the past century is immense. As the article by Atkin shows, Peirce was unsure of how to continue, there is no consensus among Peirce scholars about how to continue, and Peirce himself was asking Welby for her advice. I also thank Jon for the link to a chapter of Michael's 1983 book. The link below points to one chapter, but it's possible to use that link to go forwards or backwards to download the entire book. So far, I have only downloaded and read that chapter. And it shows the vast amount of linguistic issues that must be considered. But that chapter is already 41 years old. I'd like to ask Michael for any links to more recent writings, by himself or others, that would show ongoing research on the issues that Peirce began to explore. In summary, I don't want to discourage anybody from studying Peirce's writings. It's important to note that his writings on mathematical logic and semeiotic are fundamental. Many of the points he made are still at the forefront of research in the 21st century. But beyond his three-way distinction about interpretants, his writings on that subject are tentative and incomplete. Michael's 1983 book shows how much more was known in linguistics, and I'd like to ask Michael for some pointers to more recent writings by himself or others on this topic John __ From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Michael, List: I honestly do not know much about linguistics, but I wonder if this online chapter from your 1983 book, The Sense of Grammar: Language as Semiotic, is still a good summary of your relevant views. https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/3/oa_monograph/chapter/3056317 Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Gary, I believe that the word 'interpretant' is a good label for the way humans and other living things interpret a sign. I also believe that his theories of semeiotic and his classification of signs and sign types are extremely valuable. But I would ask you, please identify any notable Peirce scholar who said that Pierce's incomplete theories about how to go beyond the first step are integral to his semeiotic. My point is that his inability to complete those theories is a warning sign. If he couldn't complete them and the best Peirce scholars can't show how to complete them, I have strong doubts about any claims that go farther. I am not saying that anybody should stop talking about any topic that Peirce chose to write about. But I am just saying that all Peirce did was to label the first step. For mathematics and mathematical logic, Peirce learned how to go infinitely far. But for commonsense reasoning, his recommendations could just go one step at a time. See that file Section7.pdf, which I circulated a few days ago. Can anybody say more? John From: "Gary Richmond" Sent: 2/2/24 5:22 PM John, Jon, Edwina, Helmut, List, JFS (1/31): "I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants." JFS (2/2): "Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP)." and "Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory to make useful predictions about anything." I would like to suggest that merely because Peirce's writings on interpretants -- which he worked on until near the end of his life and which many scholars see as an integral aspect of his semeiotic -- have not been fully developed is no reason to think that may not be in the future; and no reason for those who remain interested in the possibility of their development to cease their inquiry. "[W]e see arguments that Peirce’s later typology is crucial to a full understanding and application of semiotics (see Quieroz 2012), or claims that it whilst underdeveloped, it holds promise and deserves serious effort and attention (see Houser 1992 and Jappy 2017). [I would especially recommend: Houser, N., 1992. “On Peirce’s theory of Propositions: A response to Hilpinen” GR]. Transactions of Charles S. Peirce Society. 28:3, 489–504.] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/#DivIntot And Edwina's post -- which I just read -- points to the potential value of all three semeiotic elements "for analysis of both biological and societal systems." I agree. My recommendation: Let scholars pursue the inquiries which interest them and which they see potential value in pursuing. To suggest otherwise is to "block the way of inquiry." Best, Gary Richmond On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:30 PM John F Sowa wrote: Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List, Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches of cognitive science. But he never found any informative or useful applications of his writings on interpretants. He was struggling with the ideas up to the end. Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system. He couldn't convince anybody, not even himself. See the end of this note for the citation and quotations from the Stanford article. Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory to make useful predictions about anything. In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say anything useful. Recommendation: Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront of the latest developments in cognitive science. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" John, list Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is Individual External, and the last one is Collective External. And- each of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal categories. That’s how I see it. Edwina On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa wrote: I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended. On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Edwina, I strongly agree with you that Peirce's analyses of those subjects are extremely valuable. I also believe that his analyses are at the forefront of 21st C cognitive science in those areas. That is a conclusion of my recent article, of which I recently sent the completed Section 7 to these lists. But in his important analyses of those subjects, I have not seen him show how his theory of interpretants aided him in the discovery and formulation of his commentary. Can you (or any other reader of P-List) find any important (or just useful) example of an insight in which Peirce's theory of interpretants helped discover that insight? John From: "Edwina Taborsky" Sent: 2/2/24 5:01 PM To: John F Sowa Cc: Peirce List , CG Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants John, list I wouldn’t say that the Interpretants are a muddled uselessness.I think they play a vital role. I think, however, that attempting to find exact and singular meanings of terms is not very functional. I use Peirce primarily for analysis of both biological and societal systems - I find him extremely perceptive, above all, with his analysis of the Categories- The reality of ‘modes of Being’ is extremely difficult to find in other scientific or philosophical outlines - ie - Most analyses of ‘matter’ view it as almost inert ‘stuff’ and focuses more on mechanical interactions or puzzles over quantum ‘weirdness’. But - to outline concepts of ‘feeling’ [ and even protoplasm feels]; the concept of reaction - and - the concept of habit formation - all three categories found as universal - I personally find this very functional in explaining both biological systems and societal systems. . Then - I find his focus on the multiple nodal sites of the semiotic process to be useful; and I view semiotic processes as operative in all of matter, both physical and biological and in societal systems. That is, I full yagree with Peirce’s view that the whole universe is composed of signs [plural]; and indeed, is a vast semiosic process. So- I find the hexadic semiosic process very useful: that is, the interactional information functionality of an external relation of the sign vehicle to its environment [ which relation becomes the Dynamic Object]. And then, the internal nature of the dats from this DO - which is commonly quite different from the ‘full nature’ of the DO - ie, the Immediate Object. Then, the Representamen as mediation. Accepting the input data and analyzing it. And then- the three Interpretants - with the Internal Interpretant as the individual’s local subjective reaction; the external - or Dynamic Interpretent as the Individual’s more objective reaction…and finally - the acknowledgment by Peirce that there could be a commonly developed interpretation of these stimuli. That is - the role of the individual within the community. And of course, all of these ’nodes’ can also function within the three categories, which increases the complexity of the semiosic function. - I DO see a very vital role for the Interpretants. ..in enabling deviation from the data of the Dynamic Object - and enabling adaptation of the sign vehicle and the development of new Habits [held within the representamen of the sign-vehicle. ]. That is - the fact that there are three interepetants, moving from the immediate local perception of the input data , to an external objective result [ does the effect of the input data as expressed...have any functional result? ..and then..on to the larger collective result - does this function to CHANGE THE HABITS OF THE REPRESENTAMEN? Edwina On Feb 2, 2024, at 4:30 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List, Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches of cognitive science. But he never found any informative or useful applications of his writings on interpretants. He was struggling with the ideas up to the end. Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system. He couldn't convince anybody, not even himself. See the end of this note for the citation and quotations from the Stanford article. Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory to make useful predictions about anything. In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say anything useful. Recommendation: Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront of the latest developments in cognitive science. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" John, list Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
Edwina, Jon AS, Jon A, Helmut, List, Peirce made immense contributions to 21st century research in all the branches of cognitive science. But he never found any informative or useful applications of his writings on interpretants. He was struggling with the ideas up to the end. Peirce scholars never built any extensions to his writings on interpretants because Peirce himself was unable to produce a useful system. He couldn't convince anybody, not even himself. See the end of this note for the citation and quotations from the Stanford article. Conclusion: Neither Peirce nor anybody else ever developed the theory to make useful predictions about anything. In short, I wouldn't say that Peirce's writings on interpretants are wrong -- just that they are so vague that nobody has been able to use them to do or say anything useful. Recommendation: Let his writings on interpretants rest in peace (RIP), and focus on the great body of work that is at the forefront of the latest developments in cognitive science. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" John, list Regardless of the terminology, which I acknowledge obscures the analysis, I think that one can conclude that Peirce’s view is that there are three Interpretants. One is Individual Internal; the next is Individual External, and the last one is Collective External. And- each of these three ’nodes’ can be in any one of the three modal categories. That’s how I see it. Edwina On Jan 31, 2024, at 6:37 PM, John F Sowa wrote: I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended. On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic. See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be. I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But since Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what Peirce had intended. John ___ As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional, effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from this view. In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as follows: In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409). . . Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235). How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things militate in favor of the
[PEIRCE-L] Interpretants
I rarely comment on discussions of interpretants, because nobody, not even Peirce, had a complete, coherent, and decisive theory of interpretants. Perhaps some Peirce scholars have developed theories that go beyond what Peirce wrote. That is possible, but nobody can claim that their theories are what Peirce himself had intended. On these issues, I recommend the article by Albert Atkin in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first version in 2006 and major update in 2022: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/ Atkin has a thorough list of references for anybody who intends to study this topic. See below for some quotations from the end of the article that show how incomplete, indefinite, and uncertain Peirce's own writings happen to be. I don't want to discourage anybody from discussing interpretants. But since Peirce himself was uncertain and indecisive, nobody can claim that their interpretation is what Peirce had intended. John ___ As is common with all of Peirce’s work in philosophy, various changes in terminology and subtleties with accompanying neologisms occur from one piece of work to the next. His work on interpretants is no different. At various points in his final accounts of signs, Peirce describes the division of interpretants as being: immediate, dynamic and final; or as emotional, energetic, and logical; or as naïve, rogate and normal; or as intentional, effective and communicational; or even destinate, effective and explicit. As Liszka (1990, 20) notes, “the received view in Peirce scholarship suggests that the divisions of interpretant into immediate, dynamic, and final are archetypal, all other divisions being relatively synonymous with these categories.” There are, however, some dissenters from this view. In discussing the interpretant, Peirce describes one of the trichotomies above as follows: In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought”. I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional”, the “energetic”, and the “logical” interpretants. (EP2. 409). . . Peirce describes the dynamic interpretant as deriving its character from action (CP8 .315 1904), but later says, “action cannot be a logical interpretant” (CP5 .491 1906). This seems to make the two inconsistent. (See Liszka (1990, 21) for more on the problems with Fitzgerald’s claim). Moreover, this inconsistency seems to suggest a problem for Short’s view since his account also suggests that the dynamic interpretant should include the logical interpretant as a subdivision (Short 1981, 213). Short, however, claims textual support for his own view from instances where Peirce mentions the emotional/energetic/logical trichotomy alongside the apparently separate claim that signs have three interpretants. (Short sites (CP8 .333 1904) and (CP4 .536 1906). Short takes this as suggesting that the two should be treated as different and distinct trichotomies. (Short 2004, 235). How far the textual evidence on the matter will prove decisive is unclear, especially given the fragmentary nature of Peirce’s final work on signs. However, one or two things militate in favor of the “received view”. First, Peirce is notorious for experimenting with terminology, especially when trying to pin down his own ideas, or describe the same phenomenon from different angles. Second, it is unclear why trichotomies like the intentional/effectual/communicational should count as terminological experiments whilst the emotional/energetic/logical counts as a distinct division. And finally, there is little provision in Peirce’s projected sixty-six classes of signs for the kind of additional classifications imposed by further subdivisions of the interpretant. (For more on this discussion see, Liszka 1990 and 1996; Fitzgerald 1966; Lalor 1997; Short 1981, 1996, and 2004). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Three universes (was Concluding section 7
Edwina, Helmut, List, Since the issue about Peirce's three universes was mentioned in your notes, I'm including an excerpt that I had intended to include in the article I just finished. (See below) Although it's relevant to the content of that article, it raises too many questions that would require more explanation. After the excerpt below, I include two links to other articles in which I discussed some related topics. John ___ Text omitted from the article on phaneroscopy: Plato and Aristotle disagreed about the role of mathematics. Plato claimed that mathematical forms (such as Peirce’s diagrams) are prior to any physical embodiment, but Aristotle claimed that mathematical entities are not separable from sensible things. Peirce’s three universes of discourse resolve this conflict: the possible, the actual, and the necessitated. The universe of possibilities is the domain of pure mathematics. Every mathematical theory begins with some hypothesis expressed in a diagram or its algebraic linearization. The special sciences study the universe of actuality. The hypotheses (diagrams) of mathematics are applied to aspects of actuality in order to make predictions. The hypotheses that make reliable predictions are the laws of science. They are the best known approximations to the laws of nature. The totality of laws of nature is the universe of the necessitated. Although Aristotle did not discuss signs in his metaphysics, his earlier writings (the Organon) covered logic and semiotic in his analysis of sêmeion, symbolon, and logos. For Peirce, mathematical phaneroscopy leads to the three categories (trichotomy) of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, which classify all the signs of perception, language, and the sciences. The dotted lines of Figure 1 show the flow of diagrams and theorems from mathematics to the other sciences: - Possibility. Every mathematical theory develops the implications of some possible pattern (diagram). There is no reason to exclude any possibility or to deprecate it as a fantasy. Some fantasies may be adopted as plans for engineering projects. They then become aspects of actuality. - Actuality. The special sciences observe patterns in the actual universe, find and apply mathematical theories about those patterns, use those theories to make predictions about what may happen, make new observations to test those predictions, revise the theories, and repeat. - Necessity. The propositions entailed by any pattern by any diagrammatic reasoning are necessarily true of any occurrence of that pattern. All theories of science are fallible, but the best are reliable on those domains for which they have been thoroughly tested. All mathematical theories must be available for applications to the special sciences. All semiotic patterns are necessary for representing natural and artificial languages. In fact, every artificial language in mathematics and computer science is a disciplined application of the syntactic and semantic mechanisms of natural languages. Value judgments are necessary for reasoning about the beliefs, desires, and intentions in any social activity or organization — and the organizations must include colonies of any species from bacteria to humans or even aliens from other galaxies. If the diagramming conventions are precisely defined, these rules are sound: observation and imagination would add duplicate information in some area; and erasure would delete duplicates. For scenes in nature, photographs, and informal drawings, these rules may be useful, but fallible approximations. For more discussion and examples, see “Peirce, Polya, and Euclid: Integrating logic, heuristics, and geometry” (Sowa 2015) and “Reasoning with diagrams and images” (Sowa 2018). I presented the talk on "Peirce, Polya, and Euclid" at an APA session on Peirce. I later presented an extension to the slides at a workshop hosted by Zalamea in Columbia in December 2015. See htttps://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf The article on "Reasoning with diagrams and images" is an extended version of the material in ppe.pdf. See the link in slide 2 of ppe.pdf. It's helpful to read the slides before going to the longer article. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Jon, Helmut, List, I don't disagree with your analysis. But what it shows is that abstract analysis provides zero information about any particular case. Peirce revolutionized the field of logic, he made major contributions to methods of reasoning, to methods of analysis and to methods of representation in lexicography, phaneroscopy, semeiotic, and, scientific research (methodeutic). His 10 classes of signs are important, but beyond that, he could only give a few examples, and he never showed the value of that abstract analysis with any concrete results for any kind of application. Fortunately, Lady Welby had an enormous influence on Peirce. She had zero interest in those abstractions. In evaluating the importance of Peirce's late writings, it's essential to read his letters to her. She kept him focused on reality. It's not an accident that Peirce dropped the word 'phenomenology' and replaced it with 'phaneroscopy', which puts more emphasis on concrete examples, rather than formal analysis. In his last decade, his examples and methods of analysis show a strong influence of Welby's interests and subject matter. He kept working on EGs, but he used them to represent subjects that are more concrete than abstract -- he kept that goal of representing images, especially stereoscopic moving images. Although Welby did not understand EGs, I believe that she kept him focused on representing imagery.And I believe that the importance of imagery is the reason why he replaced the trichotomy of word oriented rheme-dicisign-arguent with the more general trichotomy that included imagery: seme-pheme-delome. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: HR: it is the interpreter, who does the inference ... it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant As I have said before, this is true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is another sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant along with the individual sign being analyzed. That is why the same individual sign can have different dynamical interpretants--different interpreters have different collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Any dynamical interpretant of an individual sign (the effect that it actually does have) is a misinterpretation to the extent that it deviates from the final interpretant of that sign (the effect that it ideally would have), which obviously must be consistent with its immediate interpretant (the range of effects that it possibly could have). The proper aim of inquiry in accordance with the normative science of logic as semeiotic is conforming all our dynamical interpretants of signs to their final interpretants, i.e., adopting only true beliefs such that the corresponding habits of conduct would never be confounded by any possible future experience. HR: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. ... Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. Again, in my view, each individual genuine triadic relation with its three individual correlates is prescinded from the continuous process of semiosis. Prescission should not be seen as an error--it "consists in supposing a state of things in which one element is present without the other, the one being logically possible without the other" (EP 2:270, 1903). We can suppose an individual sign with its individual object and its individual interpretant being present, apart from other signs with their own objects and interpretants, because these are all entia rationis--"fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions" (R 295, 1906). As an engineer, I routinely employ prescission to create diagrams of buildings that include only their primary members and connections, omitting everything else that is really present but incidental to their structural behavior. Such a model is not erroneous as long as it adequately captures every aspect that is significant for the analysis being performed (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 9:13 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: Jon, Cecile, List, Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is
RE: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Helmut, That is certainly true: "I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infer, it is the interpreter, who does the inference." In fact, Peirce said many times in many ways that signs grow. The interpretation of any mark (sign object) depends on the context, the interpreter, and all the background knowledge that the interpreter has. As the person learns more or has different interests and goals, the same mark may be interpreted in very different ways. It's important to recognize that anything may be a mark that some human or animal or living thing of any species may interpret as a sign object. And the same individual may interpret the same or similar marks in different ways at different times for different reasons. It's important to remember that Peirce often talked about dogs, parrots, crystals, bees, and even plants. All of them are sign interpreters. And remember the Mayan inscriptions, which many people thought were decorations, until some observers decided to relate them to the language that living Mayans spoke.The same sign objects took on radically different interpretations. There is no such thing as a unique interpretant for any sign-mark. John From: "Helmut Raulien" Jon, Cecile, List, Jon, in your first paragraph you wrote about inference. I agree. Therefore I find it a bit problematic to say, that the sign determines the interpretant, because the sign doesn´t infere, it is the interpreter, who does the inference. But ok, I guess we might say, that Peirce prescinds the semiosis from the interpreter, so, ok, the flow of determination goes from the sign to the interpretant, because it is the interpreter, who receives the sign, and then forms the interpretant, and, if you donot mention the interpreter, well, then you just skip her/him/it. But I think, that this skipping is only justified, if the interpretant is true, because then it (the interpretant) is a subset of the final interpretant, and not a misinterpretation. But: Can we take that for granted? Talking about precission: The sign anyway is prescinded from the, in reality not reducible, sign triad. If we say, that something prescinded determines something else, this determination too is prescinded. Prescission might be seen as an error, so this is error propagation. That, i guess, is the reason, why this whole determination affair is somehow confusing. It surely is, if we take "determination" too literally, I mean, if we take it too muchly for real. Do you agree? You see, I have been trying very hard to not contradict Peirce. Best, Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships)
Jon, Jerry, List, Peirce was a pioneer in analysis and experiments in psychology, and William James said that he learned more from Peirce than he could ever repay. But it's important to recognize that over a century of research has been done in the field -- some by students of Peirce and some people who were directly or indirectly influenced by Peirce. More recently, the technology of brain scans has made an immense advance in detail, precision, and innovations that go far beyond anything that Peirce could have observed. JAS> This is effectively the conclusion of a much longer passage (CP 7.539-552) in which Peirce spells out in detail what he only summarizes here. He indeed describes primisense (or feeling), altersense, and medisense as "forms of consciousness" and asserts that there are no others. That passage is based on experiments in phaneroscopy that Peirce carried out. He did his best with the limited technology available to him. But it's important to recognize the immense increase in depth and variety of experiments, the precision of observations and measurements, and the much more detailed theories that have been developed in the past century. Any commentary about these issues must be compared to the developments in 21st C neuroscience and cognitive science. Otherwise, the comments are likely to be more misleading than helpful John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 1/19/24 11:27 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Forms of Consciousness (was Categorizations of Triadic Relationships) Jerry, List: Here is the entire referenced paragraph. CSP: There are no other forms of consciousness except the three that have been mentioned, Feeling, Altersense, and Medisense. They form a sort of system. Feeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. It is consciousness in its first state, and might be called primisense. Altersense is the consciousness of a directly present other or second, withstanding us. Medisense is the consciousness of a thirdness, or medium between primisense and altersense, leading from the former to the latter. It is the consciousness of a process of bringing to mind. Feeling, or primisense, is the consciousness of 1ns; altersense is consciousness of otherness or 2ns; medisense is the consciousness of means or 3ns. Of primisense there is but one fundamental mode. Altersense has two modes, Sensation and Will. Medisense has three modes, Abstraction, Suggestion, Association. (CP 7.551, c. 1896) This is effectively the conclusion of a much longer passage (CP 7.539-552) in which Peirce spells out in detail what he only summarizes here. He indeed describes primisense (or feeling), altersense, and medisense as "forms of consciousness" and asserts that there are no others. They are not tones, tokens, or types because they are not signs. Although this text predates Peirce's incorporation of phaneroscopy into his architectonic by several years, it nevertheless exhibits his characteristic categorial analysis of phenomena such that primisense has only one mode, altersense has two modes, and medisense has three modes. Note also that he explicitly identifies sensation as one of the two modes of altersense, thus corresponding to 2ns rather than 1ns--the feeling of a sensation as prescinded from it is 1ns (quality), while the actual sensation itself is 2ns (reaction). CSP: The sensation has two parts: first, the feeling, and second, the sense of its assertiveness, of my being compelled to have it. The consequence is that remembering a sensation is not at all the same thing as having it. For though there is some vestige of compulsiveness, even in the memory, it is not at all comparable to the compulsiveness of the actual sensation. But if I remember, or imagine a feeling, whatever I remember or imagine is a feeling, and I cannot remember or imagine or anywise represent to myself a feeling without having that very feeling then and there. All the existence a feeling can have is had the moment it is thought. But a sensation is not had until I am really acted upon by something out of my control. (CP 7.543) In accordance with this distinction, perhaps people with aphantasia have visual sensations of images at each moment while looking at them, but then are unable to remember them afterwards due to the merely vestigial compulsiveness of such memories and/or an incapacity in their imaginative faculties. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 9:45 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List: On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] 10 Classes of Signs (Question on CP 8.376, 1908)
Cécile, Edwina, Jon, List, James Liszka made an important observation about Peirce's classification of signs: “the theory is more complex than the phenomenon it hopes to explain." Since Peirce himself was constantly rewriting and revising the details, we can't be sure what he would have written if he had a few more years to write. And we have no right to claim that anything we (or anybody else) would write is what Peirce would approve. Peirce's correspondence with Lady Welby is an important key to almost everything he wrote after 1903. Up to 1903, his writings about phenomenology followed abstract issues in a style influenced by Kant -- even on issues where he differed from or went beyond Kant. But after he read Welby's book on significs and began his correspondence with her, his writings on phaneroscopy are very different from anything he had written about phenomenology. They are more concrete and address issues they are both discussing in their letters. Please reread the excerpts from letters to Lady Welby in EP2, pp 477 ff. Note how tentative and uncertain he is about those issues. On p. 483, "The ten divisions appear to me to be all Trichotomies; but it is possible that some of them are not properly so. Of these Ten Trichotomies, I have a clear apprehension of some (which I mark...), and unsatisfactory and doubtful notion of others (which I mark ...), and a tolerable but not thoroughly tried conception of others (which I mark ... for ...), almost clear, for ... hardly better." (The Greek letters do not copy properly.) On p. 488, he writes as if he is not sure of himself: "From the summer of 1905 to the same time in 1906,1 devoted much study to my ten trichotomies of signs. It is time I reverted to the subject, as I know I could now make it much clearer. But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now use If Peirce is unsure of how to proceed, we cannot assume that we know better than he did. Any attempt to say anything beyond what Peirce wrote is an opinion of the person who does the writing. It may be better, it may be worse. But all we can say is that it is not what Peirce wrote. Nobody can claim that their opinion is what Peirce intended. On p. 490, he admits "I don't know whether these trichotomies will suggest anything to you or not. No doubt you [Welby] have studied relations to Interpretants in some directions much further than I.[...] In summary, anything not written by Peirce himself is the opinion of the person who writes it.Nobody can claim that their summary, paraphrase, or extension is anything that Peirce intended.And even writings that Peirce intended on one occasion may be something he later rejected or restated in a different way. Fundamental principle: Any comment about anything Peirce wrote, is a personal opinion of the author. Other people may have good reasons for disagreeing -- or not. That's why we need open-ended discussions, especially about topics that Peirce himself was not clear about. However, there are some subjects -- in mathematics and mathematical logic and in experimental sciences -- where developments during the past century have gone far beyond Peirce. But even in those areas, Peirce has important points to add, and experts in those fields often agree that Peirce was right. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Edwina, Jerry, Helmut, List, Peirce's writings are always worth analyzing, but there has been over a century of research in the cognitive sciences, especially neuroscience. Peirce was familiar with the research of his day.. William James, who was a professional in that field, acknowledged that he had learned more from Peirce than he could ever repay. But another century of research has been done, and the developments have accelerated with the latest technologies of brain scans and implants. I really don't trust speculation about issues of neuroscience that ignore that research. But I believe that it is worthwhile to compare Peirce's writings to the latest developments in the cognitive sciences. Neuroscience, especially, has made immense progress in recent years with the developments in brain scans and implants. It's interesting to evaluate Peirce's writings in terms of the latest developments. In many cases, I have found that Peirce's ideas can serve as guidelines for interpreting recent research, but there is no one-to-one mapping of the details. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" Sent: 1/20/24 9:25 AM Jerry list I'll answer within what I understand as ‘forms of consciousness’. Again - I don’t know what YOU mean by the phrase. But in comparison to your view, I’d have to include the processes of memory or habit - even in primisense, which is a first primal awareness of ‘otherness’.- as in a newborn. But consciosuness, I think, has to gradually include even quasi-mind memory or habits [ ie, the development of habits of association of ’that’ input sensation’ with ’that experience'. This enables anticipation. It need not be symbolic of course, since all matter has this capacity to develop habits and thus, anticipate. A first primal awareness or feeling [primisense] would emerge within the experience of an ‘Other’ [ via Altersense]. This experience would have to be semiosic, ie, triadic, or within the operation of the sign triad, I can thus understand your reference to ’tones, tokens, types’ [ which are comparable to 1ns, 2ns, 3ns] and aren’t confined to words - see 1.322, where he discusses a blind person’s experience of ’scarlet colour’. Therefore the question simply comes down to - is primisense or pure feeling totally alienated from habit? I think that a body’s capacity to even experience feeling, requires ‘habit’ - ie - the existence of a stable ground [even if it’s purely and only physiological ..ie hearing, or sight or touch or..]…which ground sensation within the perimeters of ‘habit’. The subsequent ‘awareness’ of this sensation, develops within multiple experiences [altersense].. Edwina On Jan 20, 2024, at 1:21 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List:Edwina: Please step back a bit from your professional persona as a scholar. Please ask yourself “what do these words mean in terms of my life experiences?” Do you experience “forms of consciousness”? How are the forms of personal consciousness you experience related to or conjoined to your memories? Thanks for considering my “off the wall” questions. Cheers Jerry On Jan 19, 2024, at 8:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jerry, list I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce. These terms refer to his outline of ‘forms of consciousness’. And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means. Edwina On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List: On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 7.551. I am curious about your reasoning here. In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures). Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations? Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from alphabetic symbols). Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” properly…. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the
[PEIRCE-L] Peire's final version of EGs (was Categorizations of triadic Relationships
he term ‘symbol’ today, but how Schelling did: the contexts on which he drew and the conversations into which he entered when forming his theory of the symbol. In what follows, therefore, I will be almost entirely concerned with ‘the romantic symbol’ which emerged in German aesthetics and philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth century— even if one of my aims in what follows is to problematize the very existence of one, monolithic ‘romantic’ symbol. Part I of this book is devoted to the context in which Schelling’s construc- tion of symbolic language takes place. The present chapter considers theories of the symbol written during the Goethezeit, prior to Schelling’s own. I initially consider them historically, then from a synchronic viewpoint, examining in particular the essential properties of a symbol and the typical ways in which it was interpreted. As always, it is the interplay between ‘the romantic symbol’ and the Schellingian symbol in which I am interested: to what extent is Schelling to be positioned unproblematically in a genealogy of ‘the romantic symbol’ and to what extent does his theory in fact react against such an interpretation of the symbol? On Jan 11, 2024, at 6:16 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Jon, Jerry, List, We had discussed this issue many times before. R 669 was an attempt by Peirce to relate all the versions of EGs he had written, published, and toyed with. The result (R 669) was a hodge-podge that had many ad hoc constructions that Peirce was unable to justify by any convincing proof. He knew that it was bad. In R 670, he began to sketch out a new version, and a few weeks later he produced his clearest, most precise, and most elegant foundation for EGs. And he confirmed that version as his final choice in his last major letter in 2013. Peirce's three primitives are conjunction (AND), negation (NOT), and the existential quantifier (line of identity). These three primitives with Peirce's 1911 rules of inference are so general and powerful, that they unify and simplify Gerhard Gentzen's two systems -- clause form and natural deduction. As a result an unsolved research problem about the relationship between the two systems (stated in the 1970s) was finally solved by a simple proof when translated to Peirce's 1911 notation and rules of inference. That is conclusive evidence beyond any shadow of a doubt that Peirce's 1911 system is one of his most brilliant achievements. I'll send another note with all the references. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 1/11/24 6:13 PM Jerry, List: JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, with the others being derived from them. CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902) For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional logic, the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as juxtaposition for conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such that disjunction is then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded area, material conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a shaded area (scroll), and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the antecedent and consequent reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate logic adds one more primitive, the line of identity for existential quantification such that universal quantification is then defined as a line of identity whose outermost part is within a shaded area. *As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on several occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the scroll for material implication as the second primitive such that negation is then defined as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to infinitesimal size, signifying that every proposition is true if the antecedent is true (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51], 1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a me
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Jon, Jerry, List, We had discussed this issue many times before. R 669 was an attempt by Peirce to relate all the versions of EGs he had written, published, and toyed with. The result (R 669) was a hodge-podge that had many ad hoc constructions that Peirce was unable to justify by any convincing proof. He knew that it was bad. In R 670, he began to sketch out a new version, and a few weeks later he produced his clearest, most precise, and most elegant foundation for EGs. And he confirmed that version as his final choice in his last major letter in 2013. Peirce's three primitives are conjunction (AND), negation (NOT), and the existential quantifier (line of identity). These three primitives with Peirce's 1911 rules of inference are so general and powerful, that they unify and simplify Gerhard Gentzen's two systems -- clause form and natural deduction. As a result an unsolved research problem about the relationship between the two systems (stated in the 1970s) was finally solved by a simple proof when translated to Peirce's 1911 notation and rules of inference. That is conclusive evidence beyond any shadow of a doubt that Peirce's 1911 system is one of his most brilliant achievements. I'll send another note with all the references. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 1/11/24 6:13 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce) Jerry, List: JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, with the others being derived from them. CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902) For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional logic, the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as juxtaposition for conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such that disjunction is then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded area, material conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a shaded area (scroll), and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the antecedent and consequent reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate logic adds one more primitive, the line of identity for existential quantification such that universal quantification is then defined as a line of identity whose outermost part is within a shaded area. *As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on several occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the scroll for material implication as the second primitive such that negation is then defined as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to infinitesimal size, signifying that every proposition is true if the antecedent is true (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51], 1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 12:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote: On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: But you already know this Edwinia: If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the grammatical structures of your and other responses. Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between ordered pairs. The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms. Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars. For a discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022. Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation constrained to multi-valued logics? My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of molecular sentences. (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or dogmas or…. Just seeking a scientifically
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Jerry, Jon, List, There is no single theory by Peirce that can explain everything. For any particular quotation, it's important to study the context to determine which theory (or theories) Peirce was using when he wrote that paragraph. JLRC> We seem to be on different wavelengths... It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the exterior world... Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example. Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical meanings than during the CSP era. Peirce's background in philosophy, science, formal logic, and semeiotic is very much at the same level as modern developments in the cognitive sciences (Philosopy, Psychology, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence, Neuroscience, and Anthropology). At Peirce conferences (Sesquicentennial in 1989 and Centennial in 2019), there were many specialists from all those fields who showed how modern and up-to-date his contributions have been. In the quotations cited by Jon (copy below), the context shows that Peirce was addressing different issues from different areas of his vast range of thought. In some cases, the issues are about logic, in other cases phaneroscopy or some other field may be more relevant. I agree with Jon that "We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" in this passage." But it's essential to ask in what context Peirce might happen to mention those three words. If it's merely to use those words as signs, he might talk about them in the same way. But if he is talking about feelings, such as a headache, he is more likely to be talking about phaneroscopy. If he is talking about an orange, he might be talking about the chemistry and methods for analyzing the constituents of orange juice. And he might mention a camel for many other reasons. Issues about signs are relevant to chemical experiments in many ways. But when Peirce talks about any science, he does so with a focus on applications of logic to propositions stated in the terminology of that science. Issues about interpretants of signs are, of course, relevant at the lowest levels of interpretinf anything. But those issues are so detailed that a discussion at that level might obscure, rather than clarify the more relevant issues. Summary: when citing any quotation by Peirce, we need to consider the context of the quotation and how it is related to the context we are discussing -- and consider how Peirce himself would relate those two different contexts. 'when we consider multiple contexts that happen to mention the same words, we may have to interpret those words in different senses. With his deep experience in lexicography for the Century Dictionary, Peirce knew very well how words senses shift from one context to another. We must always consider how and whether words from different contexts might be used in different senses. John From: "Jerry LR Chandler" Sent: 1/11/24 4:09 PM To: Jon Alan Schmidt Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce) Thanks for your answer. We seem to be on different wavelengths. On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" in this passage. It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the exterior world. One example is that combines both an internal feeling and an external experience is sexual copulation. Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example. Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical meanings than during the CSP era. I appreciate your responses. Cheers Jerry From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Peirce-L Every word is a token of a type--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a replica of a rhematic symbol or symbolic rheme, and therefore a peculiar kind of rhematic indexical sinsign. CSP: Eighth, a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is interpreted as a sign of an Object that is an instance of that concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol
