Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four
Jerry, list, The molecular formula is an (103114-1) index of the sinsign, is it not? Yes. It is, but sinsign is not the only kinds of signs. As you know, there are in addition the qualisign and the legisign, and each is irreversibly triadic being associated with its object and interpretant, thus generating the 3x3 table of what I call elementary signs. The neologism, elemetnary signs, is useful, I think, in distinguishing them from the 10 classes of signs they comprise which I call composite signs, another neologism. I agree that these are my own terminologies that others may not find useful. In that case they will disappear into oblivion. The key idea that is introduced in my quark model of the Peircean sign referred to in my earlier posts is the Peircean selection rule stating that the numerical values of the sub-indexes, i, j, and k of a composite sign, denoted as S_i,j,k, must obey the inequality, i - j - k, where the symbol - reads less than or equal to, or cannot be greater than. The theoretical rationale for the Peircean selection rule, I believe, resides in Peirces metaphysical categories of Firstness (1ns), Secondness (2ns), and Thirdness (3ns, to use Gary Fs notation) obeying the rule that 1ns is the prerequisite for 2ns and 1ns and 2ns are the prerequisite for 3ns. So, the 9 types of signs Peirce proposed obey two sets of triads -- (i) the sign triad, representamen, object, and interpretant, and (ii) the categorial triad, 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, leading to the 3x3 table of 'elementary' signs. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net List, Sung: Thank you for repeating your personal philosophy. It is a source of curiosity to me. Unfortunately, your response simply adds many logical terms and propositions that are not directly related to the writings of CSP. Why do you feel at liberty to corrupt the original meanings of CSP writings (whatever we speculate about them) with the additional terms, propositions, conjectures and conclusions that are products of your personal world view?? Perhaps my message was not so clear to you, for whatever reason, but I seek to understand first the possible origins of the triadic triad as a set of exactly NINE terms, ordered in a specific manner to as include medads as terms in English language sentences such that logic arguments follow? It is the pattern of this set of categories of meaning that concerns me. To place this is technical terms, the molecular formula of any chemical molecule is composed from a strings of proper names, each represented by CSP as blanks within a sentence, generating his logical notion of a medad. The molecular formula is an index of the sinsign, is it not? Please be so kind as to address the questions I raised? Cheers Jerry On Oct 31, 2014, at 6:26 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: Jerry wrote: If not, what would be a more appropriate term for this (103114-1) ORGANIZED group of terms? (1) It is necessary to distinguish the 9 TYPES of signs in the 3x3 table and the 10 CLASSES of signs built on them constrained by what I call the Piercean selection rule explained below. (2) I suggested in the attached table that the 9 types of signs be referred to elementary signs and the 10 classes of signs, each composed of three of these elementary signs, as the composite signs. (3) Composite signs can be represented systematically as S_ijk, the subindex i referring to the interpretant, j to the object and k to the representamen (see the table attached). (4) The Peircean selection rule simply states that the subindex i cannot be greater than j which in turn cannot be greater than k. (5) According to the 10 classes of signs, dicisign is not a triadic (or composite) sign but one of the 9 types of elementary signs that refer to the relation between representamen and interpretant in the mode of Secondness. (6) Peirce seems to give an alternative definition of dicisign as extensively quoted in NP as a composite sign having both iconic and indexical characters, in violation of his own selection rule embodied int he triadic triad table. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net List: A factual question concerning CSP writings, relative to Gary's and Sung's recent assertions and FS assertions wrt to the meanings of rhetorical logic. Why are rhetorical terms grouped together, anyway? I recall a passage that states the second and third
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four
Edwina wrote: A molecular formula, to me, as a set of letters/words, (1031014-1) has a purely symbolic relation to the actual chemical components.The chemical composition would be a legisign (a sinsign is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign 2.245) while a legisign is a law that is a Sign. icic relation to the actual chemical components.The chemical composition would be a legisign (a sinsign is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign (2.245) while a legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by menit is not a single object but a general type ...2.246. I think this is an excellent analysis of chemical formulas. To me, chemical formulas are dicent symbolic legisign, not any sinsign. The crystals of DNA molecules one can see under microscope would be a dicent indexical sinsign, but DNA as a written word would be just a common noun referring to the actual DNA molecule in testubes or inside living cell, which Peirce may classify as a rhematic symbolic legisign, rhematic since this blank (medad) can be occupied by many different kinds of DNA tokens. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Jerry 1) The nine terms (eg, icon, index, symbol; qualisign, sinsign, legisign; rheme, dicent, argument) refer to the nine possible RELATIONS that the three 'nodes' of the semiosic triad have. Peirce discusses these all through his work. The Relations are defined by two factors: their categorical mode (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) and their Relation (relation to the Object; relation in itself; relation to the Interpretant). See, for example. 8.334 and on (Welby letters), where he writes such statements as In respect to their relations to their dynamic objects, I divide signs into Icons, Indices and SymbolsAnd In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument. (8.337)...and so on. Then, another site (and as I said, Peirce discusses these issues throughout his work, so these are only two)...See 2.243, where he writes that Signs are divisible by three trichotomoies, first according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason. Essentially, these 3 x 3 can be put into a triangular table, a kind of crosstabs with the three Categories (Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness) on, eg, the horizontal line and the three Relations (with Object, Representamen in itself, with Interpretant) on the vertical. You come up with an ordered 9 'types' in this manner. ( Spinks does this in his 'Triadomania' extensive analysis). 2) The ten classes (2.254) are the full triad of Relations: Object-Representamen-Interpretant. Peirce did diagrams of these in, eg, 2.264. Again, it can be set up as an ordered outline according to Categories and Relations. 3) It can become more complicated when the analysis deepens with adding the Immediate Object, and the three types of Interpretantsbut the basic diagrams give us the 9 types of Relations and the 10 classes of signs. 4) As for your comment asking about the 'molecular formula' as an 'index of the sinsign'...I don't understand this statement. A molecular formula, to me, as a set of letters/words, has a purely symbolic relation to the actual chemical components.The chemical composition would be a legisign (a sinsign is an actual existent thing or event which is a sign 2.245) while a legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by menit is not a single object but a general type...2.246. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@me.com To: Peirce List peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Cc: Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca; Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 3:26 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four List: A factual question concerning CSP writings, relative to Gary's and Sung's recent assertions and FS assertions wrt to the meanings of rhetorical logic. Why are rhetorical terms grouped together, anyway? I recall a passage that states the second and third rows of the triadic triad are both aspects of the representamen of objects. Can anyone cite the text? This nine terms are presented, by CSP, in a fixed pattern and related by fixed relations, thus none of them
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions chapter four
Gary F said Peirce makes it very clear that the Dicisign involves(103114-1) at least two object relations, the iconic and the indexical. But Peirce also made it very clear that there are no (1) dicent iconic qualisign, (2) dicent iconic sinsigns or (3) dicent iconic legisign, in his 10 classes of signs, unless he changed his mind later. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Tyler and lists, Thanks, Tyler, this helps to show exactly where the miscommunications are. TB: The problem has to do with associating the highest types of sign use to all instances of semiosis, as Frederik does with NP. When we do this, we lose the ability to meaningfully class different types of sign use. GF: I think what Frederik does in NP is to show that Peirce conceives of semiosis as continuous from its most primitive to its most complex and highly developed forms. But that doesn't stop us analyzing it into different sign types. It certainly didn't stop Peirce, who prided himself on the fact that his analysis of a simple syllogism included eight separate steps. Likewise, his tenfold classification can be used to show how semiosis evolves in a stepwise fashion from qualisign to argument. Peirce did not try to map this semiotic evolution onto biological evolution (probably because he didn't know much biology), but there are some hints in his work of a mapping onto psychological development. I don't see why biosemiotics can't work out this kind of mapping in more detail (though the Peircean classification might need to be modified in the process). TB: To clarify, when I speak of the taxonomic approach I think mainly of Deacon's use in Symbolic Species of the icon-index-symbol trichotomy for distinguishing verbal language semiosis from other kinds. OK, I'm aware of Frederik's objections to that approach; and Deacon himself has gone well beyond it in his more recent work (I've posted about this before). But the problem with Deacon's approach in The Symbolic Species is that its semiotic taxonomy is limited to the icon/index/symbol trichotomy. To me, Peirce's other two trichotomies are no less taxonomic. The one most essential to NP, of course, is rheme/dicisign/argument. TB: Dicisigns do indeed involve icons and indices in a more explicit way than symbols, however the fact remains that Frederik associates symbols and even arguments with all instances of semiosis. For example here: Thus, the perceptual Dicisign of reading the active site on a carbohydrate molecule--a proto version of the proposition 'This is sugar'--is followed by the action Dicisign of swimming in that direction--to form an argument: 'If sugar, swim in its direction. This is sugar. So, swim in its direction'. That this forms a very primitive argument--and not merely a cause-effect chain--can be induced from the fact that the E. coli may be fooled by artificial sweetener whose molecules possess the same molecular surface configuration as the active site in carbohydrates--but otherwise have a rather different chemistry without the easily releasable covalent binding energy of carbohydrates (145-146). GF: The problem here is the vagueness of your verb associates. You seem to use it as if you were saying that Frederik identifies symbols and even arguments with all instances of semiosis. But he certainly does not do that. What he says is that the idea of taking the chain of inferences to form the backbone of cognition makes of Dicisigns its joints (NP p. 118). In the quote you give here - which is from Diagrammatology, not NP, and has been discussed before on the biosemiotics list - he speaks of a proto-proposition, which is neither a symbol nor an argument according to the Peircean taxonomy. What makes it a proto-proposition is that an inference is being made without symbols or arguments. You seem to be ignoring the crucial taxonomic distinction between a Dicisign and an Argument, on the insufficient ground that both involve inference. It's true that Peirce himself sometimes uses proposition when the more exact term would be dicisign, but that usage doesn't override his more formal definition of a proposition as a Dicisign that is a symbol. (Which of course implies that other Dicisigns are not symbols.) TB: As a static taxonomy the table of ten signs commonly referred to as the 1903 classification does not make room for a sign to have more than one object relation(as far as I understand it). GF: Then your understanding has resulted from taking the table out of its context, the Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, EP2:289-99. Both there and in earlier parts of the Syllabus, Peirce
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four
Gary F wrote: . . . we should use the Peircean definitions of symbol, argument and Dicisign,symbol, argument and Dicisign. I am a bit confused here, since symbol is a representamen-object relation, while dicisign and armgument are the representamen-interpretant relations. Are you not comparing apples and orange, unless I misunderstood Peirce ? With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Edwina, it seems to me that for purposes of discussing Natural Propositions, we should use the Peircean definitions of symbol, argument and Dicisign, because that's what Frederik is doing in NP. Peirce's definitions can be found in EP2:272 ff. His definition of symbol in Baldwin's Dictionary also applies here: (1) A SIGN (q.v.) which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection. If you want other definitions that better suit your own purposes, you're welcome to supply them, but we certainly don't need them for a discussion of NP. gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 31-Oct-14 10:35 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce list Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four I agree with much of what Tyler is arguing. A few points and these are about definitions. 1) I think we need a clear definition of 'symbol'. To me, it is a Relation (that between the Representamen and the Object, whether Dynamic or Immediate) that is arbitrary, is consciously assigned by the species or Representamen-Agent, is in the conscious control of the species/Representamen-Agent; and thus, can be changed. As such an unconnected sign, it must be assigned by a collective with the conscious intentionality to so assign it. So, the collective will assign the sound of 'cat' to an animal. Or assign the meaning of STOP to a red light. As such, I consider that the symbol is confined to the human species. 2) As for the definition of the term 'argument', I think that it doesn't refer necessarily to the Sign of that term (Argument Symbolic Legisign) but to the syllogistic process of reasoning. All Peircean Signs are, as triads, also syllogisms. Therefore, all Peircean Signs operate as 'arguments'. (lower case). That is, they have a minor premiss (the Object relation); a Major Premiss (the Representamen) and a Conclusion (the Interpretant relation). 3) What is the Dicisign? To my view, at the moment, it is a powerful physical argument - an argument in the full semiosic or syllogistic framework, where Mind is obviously at work (the Major Premiss) to transform one form of physical /biologicalexistentiality into another form of physical/biological existentiality. What removes this interaction from the mechanical cause-effect interaction and puts it into a syllogistic argument (semiosis) is that insertion of 'thought' or Mind into the interaction. There is no mechanical reason for the E. Coli to swim to sugar, but there certainly is a mental reason. And yes, it would be deductive because of the necessary relation - within the 'mind' of the E. Coli morphology. Edwina - Original Message - From: Tyler Bennett mailto:rogueb...@hotmail.com To: biosemiotics list mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce list mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 10:01 AM Subject: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter four Gary F, list, Thank you for your detailed comments and I apologize for the gap in communication. Gary F. wrote: You suggest that an alternative solution to the problem you raise would be to cede symbols to all instances of semiosis (or at least to some non-humans). Do you mean that at least some semiosis other than human varieties should be regarded as symbolic? If so, I don't get what problem it's supposed to solve, or how it's relevant to the idea that inference is implicit in all cognitive semiosis. This is part of the Dicisign doctrine, and symbols are not essential to the functioning of Dicisigns in the way that icons and indices are; so what difference does it make whether we cede symbols to instances of non-human semiosis? The problem has to do with associating the highest types of sign use to all instances of semiosis, as Frederik does with NP. When we do this, we lose the ability to meaningfully class different types of sign use. I proposed that either symbols should be reserved for higher sign types than at least the E. coli bacteria (Edwina's stated preference), or we should cleave to the later Peirce where
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7302] Re: Ultraviolet catastrophe in 'econophysics' ?
Dear Stan, The original equation that Planck discovered in 1900 that fitted the blackbody radiation spectra exactly is a natural law. That is why the physicists in the early decades of the 20th century called it the Planck radiation law (PRL). Of course, all laws are signs (and not reality itself) which I would identify with decent symbolic legisigns. The so-called Planck distribution (PD) that I derived from PRL in 2008 at Rutgers by replacing its universal constants and temperature with 2 free parameters initially and later with 4 parameters with the help of one of my pre-med students, Kenneth So, is not a natural law like PRL but reflects, nevertheless, deep regularities (Thirdness) hidden behind many fields of inquiries from atomic physics (including blackbody radiation itself), to genomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, glottometrics and now even to econometrics. So, it may be reasonable to conclude that PD is a type and PRL is one of its tokens. With all the best. Sung the Sung, Howard -- Is the Planck model of light really a LAW of nature? Or just a model? STAN On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 9:04 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Hi, In the attached file, I present evidence that the so-called 'econophysics' as currently formulated may be comparable to the Rayleigh- Jeans law in radiation physics that led to the ultraviolet catastrophe (UC). Just as Planck's original radiation law resolved UC in physics in the early decades of the 20th century, it appears to me that the extended version of Planck's law, called the Planck distribution (PD) (see the attached for references), may resolve the ultraviolet catastrophe of the second kind, this time in econometrics. Just as Planck's resolution of the UC of the first kind is associated with the introduction of the new concept of quantum of action into physics, so the resolution of the UC of the second kind by PD may introduce another new concept into the natural and human sciences -- that of ORGANIZATION as the action selecting a subset of events made available by random motions, quantified by the Planckian information, I_P, defined as the binary logarithm of the ratio between the Planckian distribution and the associated Gaussian distribution. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7295] relation concept
Helmut wrote: . . . what is a relation between two sets, or what is a(7295-1) triadic relation (between three sets)? Is there such a thing in mathematics? Of course. The mathematical category is a tridic relation among three sets, A, B and C, with the composition condition satisfied by the associated mappings, f, g and h, i.e., f x g = h, meaning that mapping of elements of A to those of B followed by the mapping of the elements of B to those of the elements of C leads to the indirect mapping of the elements of A to those of the elements of C: f g A -- B -- C | ^ | | |___| h A specific example is provided by the Peircean sign relation or semiosis: f g Object -- Sign -- Intepretant | ^ | | |_| h where f = sign production, g = sign interpretation; and h = information flow. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Hi, Everybody. Semiotics is about relations between two or three entities, and I want to find out, what a relation is. In common sense, a relation is an established information between two actors. But in mathematics it is different. A relation is a subset of of a sets product (multiplication) with itself. So, what is a relation between two sets, or what is a triadic relation (between three sets)? Is there such a thing in mathematics? Anybody got an idea, or a hint about literature? I mean, an index for nonexistance of dyadic relations is the percentage of divorced marriages, but lets avoid sociology and stick with semiotics and mathematics. Best, helmut - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions Chapter four
Tyler, Frederik, Edwina, list, As we all know there are more than one way to skin a cat(fish), but the ultimate goal of doing the skinning the animal is to ENJOY its meat. I think this applies to skinning the Peircean sign as well. Peirce himself experimented with at least 3 ways of skinning/classifying signs 9 types, 10 classes, and 66 classes, etc. But the ultimate goal of classifying signs may be to KNOW what object a sign refers to and how accurately in the mind of some interpreter. When you go to a restaurant, you dont have to know how to skin a fish to enjoy your gourmet fish dinner. So it may be that, when we see a sign, we intuitively KNOW what is the object the sign refers to and how well, even though we dont know anything about classifying the sign into one or more of the various sign types and classes, the task of which belonging to Peircean chefs. I am attaching a SIGN called the Hofstadter cubes that, I believe, refers to, assert or inform the RELATION among Bohrs complementarity, the Peircean sign, and Peircean categories. I cannot yet articulate the name of the relation, but, if I were allowed to classify this sign, I would say that it is an ICONIC, INDEIXICAL, SYMBOLIC LEGISIGN, which may or may not yet be on Pieces fish menu. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Edwina, Gary R, Gary F, Frederik, list, In my initial post I wanted to raise the question of the taxonomic approach mainly because, from one perspective it is not possible within the dicisign doctrine as it is laid out in NP. If all real signs partake of arguments, the details of which are worked out as separate interactions of icons, indices, etc., than these particular workings out are degenerate or fragmentary and as such are not signs per se and have no individual significance. Therefore to use the typology of ten for example to classify different kinds of sign actions would be incorrect. On this topic Edwina wrote: My own view is that the symbol is a semiosic relation (that between the Representamen and the Object) which is confined to human cognition. As a purely artificial relation, I think that it REQUIRES an artificial means of expression - which is language or other cognitively constructed media system. Furthermore, I think that this enabled the human species to free itself from the restrictions of the physical realm and 'imagine' the world as it 'ought to be' rather than 'as it is'...This leaves the non-human realm with the Dicent Indexical Sinsign - a local mechanical reaction, and the Dicent Indexical Legisign which is, by virtue of its Legisign, connected to the truths of the Universal and thus, not merely reactive. While this is one way to preserve the taxonomic use of Peirce's theory of signs (e.g. for distinguishing human from non-human semiosis), it seems to me that the alternative solution could be just as effective. That alternative solution would be to cede symbols to all instances of semiosis (or at least to some non-humans), but to subdivide them and arguments according to the typology of 66 signs, where some kinds of symbols/arguments are applicable to E. coli for example, and others only occur in the case of verbal language signs. One reason I think this approach would be better is that NP already goes beyond the 1903 classification, even if not explicitly. It does so in 3.7 where Frederik maintains that dicisigns have both immediate and dynamic objects. As Gary pointed out, this connection of the parts of the dicisign to immediate and dynamic objects is one of the most interesting portions of the book so far, and explains in a concrete example how one sign action can possess more than one relation to an object (can be an icon, index, and/or a symbol), something for which the 1903 classification does not accommodate. Another reason to prefer this solution has to do with the stress Frederik puts on hypostatic abstraction being the true human semiotic threshold. Hypostatic abstraction is another of Peirce's terms which, although it is not explicitly articulated within any known typologies of the 66 types, certainly could be said to only obtain within one of the six classes of symbolic legisigns (according to Romanini's periodic table of signs). This is just one way that we could both cede symbols to all forms of semiosis, while retaining the possibility of taxonomically differentiating human from non-human semiosis, and would allow us to disambiguate some of the terms in NP. On this disambiguation, Gary R. wrote, your unsettling question concerning the differentiation of proto-propositions from full fledged propositions surely needs
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7274] Re: Natural Propositions Chapter 4
Howard, Edwina, Stan, Gary R, Gary F, Frederick, lists, What I don't understand is why can't we extend nominalism, whatever it is, beyond the human mind to living cells, when Peirce himself extended the concept of Mind to crystals and that of Propositions to non-linguistic things ? Are we all confused because of the ambiguity of words ? Shouldn't we use more of figures, diagrams, tables, and mathematical formulas to help us out of these linguistic mess ? With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net At 03:23 PM 10/20/2014, Gary Richmond wrote: Stan, Edwina, Howard, I have to agree with Edwina's definition of nominalism which is pretty standard. HP: Of course, I also agree that Edwina uses the standard definition of nominalism. The standard definition of proposition is also in terms of human language and human thought. However, we are discussing Frederik's (and Peirce's) more general definition of proposition that applies before humans. In the same functional sense, I am defining epistemology as it can be used before humans. Whether these evolution-dependent definitions are instructive or useful is what biosemiotics is all about. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Indexical unification of physics, semiotics, and metaphysics
Hi, When we think about 'unification', we usually think about mathematical formulas, e.g., unified field theories. Mathematical formulas are symbols, and, according to Peirce, symbols are not the only way to convey information: Indexes can also. As an example, I suggest that the Hofstadter cubes (see attached) are an indexical sign (also called dicisign, or sinsign, depending on which aspects of a sign is prescinded) standing for (i) complementarity, (ii) the Peircean sign, and (iii) Peircean categories. If the Hofstadter cubes are indeed a dicisign, as I believe, it should be able to convey this claim to you with a minimum help from the symbolic signs such as attached thereto. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Hofstadter_cubes.pdf Description: Adobe PDF document - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.12
Dear Gary F, You wrote: . . . this sign is not dicent, nor is it indexical, (101714-1) nor is it a legisign, as Peirce defines these terms. Are you sure ? If the Hofstadter cubes are no dicent, nor indexical nor a legisign, which of the ten classes of signs Peirce defined do you think it is ? As I understand Peirce's 10 classes of signs, it it is a dicent indexical legisign or even an argument symbolic legisign (f you focus your attention on the symbols on the figure, not on the physical objects). To me, the Hofstadter cubes stand for the principle of complementarity, a Third, and hence is a legigsign. Do you think I am mis-interpreting Peirce ? With all the best. Sung Sung, since you ask me, no, this sign is not dicent, nor is it indexical, nor is it a legisign, as Peirce defines these terms. Nor does your particular concept of complementarity have anything to do with NP 3.12. More generally: you have the right to post your original ideas here, but nobody has a responsibility to read or reply to them. gary f. -Original Message- From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu] Sent: 16-Oct-14 8:55 PM Gary F and Frederik, How about what I call the Hofstadter cubes (see the picture attached) as the decent indexical legisign standing for the concept of Complementarity ? N. Bohr never gave any rigorous definition of the concept of complementarity that he introduced to physics and philosophy in the early decades of the 20th century. In 1995 [1, p. 524] I defined complementarity in terms of three logical criteria: (1) EXCLUSIVITY: A and B are mutually exclusive (.e., wave and particle) (2) ESSENTIALITY: A and B are essential to completely describe C (e.g., wave an particle properties of light). (3) TRANSCENDENTALITY: C transcends the level where A and B have meanings and yet serves as the source of A and B. Evidently, the Hofstadter cubes embody all these three criteria, as indicated the letters and other sybmols in the figure. The cubes symbolizing C transcends the three orthogonal planes on which A and B reside, since the cubes are hanging in a 3-dimensional space while A and B reside on 2-dimensional palnes. The figure also illustrates two kinds of complementarities - C and C', the former being 3-dimensional and the latter 2-dimensional. The difference is that C' are in the same planes as A and B so that they can be combined mathematically, as exemplified by the de Broglie equation shown in the bottom of the figure. In contrast, C is in a different space than A and B and hence cannot be mathematically combined. Many physicists and philosophers of science may believe that light (C) is both wave and particle simultaneously because they appear together in a mathematical equation, i.e., C'. But, as the Hofstadter cubes clearly demonstrate, C and C' are not identical and hence light cannot be equated with the combination of wave and particle, as Einstein, de Broglie, Bohm and his followers believe. They in effect may be conflating C and C'. For convenience, the two kinds of complementarities illustrated by the Hofstadter cubes, may be called the 2-D complementarity and 3-D complementarity. Most complementarity pairs written about in numerous books and articles belong to the class of 2-D complementarity, and discussions on 3-D complementary pairs seem rare. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Reference: [1] Ji, S. (1995). Complementarism: A Biology-Based Philosophical Framework to Integrate Western Science and Eastern Tao, in Psychotherapy East and West: Integration of Psychotherapies, Korean Academy of Psychotherapists, 178-23 Sungbuk-dong, Songbuk-ku, Seoul 136-020, Korea, pp. 517-548. PDF available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Proceedings and Abstract. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.12
Gary F and Frederik, How about what I call the Hofstadter cubes (see the picture attached) as the decent indexical legisign standing for the concept of Complementarity ? N. Bohr never gave any rigorous definition of the concept of complementarity that he introduced to physics and philosophy in the early decades of the 20th century. In 1995 [1, p. 524] I defined complementarity in terms of three logical criteria: (1) EXCLUSIVITY: A and B are mutually exclusive (.e., wave and particle) (2) ESSENTIALITY: A and B are essential to completely describe C (e.g., wave an particle properties of light). (3) TRANSCENDENTALITY: C transcends the level where A and B have meanings and yet serves as the source of A and B. Evidently, the Hofstadter cubes embody all these three criteria, as indicated the letters and other sybmols in the figure. The cubes symbolizing C transcends the three orthogonal planes on which A and B reside, since the cubes are hanging in a 3-dimensional space while A and B reside on 2-dimensional palnes. The figure also illustrates two kinds of complementarities C and C, the former being 3-dimensional and the latter 2-dimensional. The difference is that C are in the same planes as A and B so that they can be combined mathematically, as exemplified by the de Broglie equation shown in the bottom of the figure. In contrast, C is in a different space than A and B and hence cannot be mathematically combined. Many physicists and philosophers of science may believe that light (C) is both wave and particle simultaneously because they appear together in a mathematical equation, i.e., C. But, as the Hofstadter cubes clearly demonstrate, C and C are not identical and hence light cannot be equated with the combination of wave and particle, as Einstein, de Broglie, Bohm and his followers believe. They in effect may be conflating C and C'. For convenience, the two kinds of complementarities illustrated by the Hofstadter cubes, may be called the 2-D complementarity and 3-D complementarity. Most complementarity pairs written about in numerous books and articles belong to the class of 2-D complementarity, and discussions on 3-D complementary pairs seem rare. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Reference: [1] Ji, S. (1995). Complementarism: A Biology-Based Philosophical Framework to Integrate Western Science and Eastern Tao, in Psychotherapy East and West: Integration of Psychotherapies, Korean Academy of Psychotherapists, 178-23 Sungbuk-dong, Songbuk-ku, Seoul 136-020, Korea, pp. 517-548. PDF available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Proceedings and Abstract. In Section 12 of Chapter 3, the discussion moves to the three types of Dicisigns listed in Peirce's Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, EP2:289-99. The main difficulty here, as Frederik points out, is that Peirce's examples of the Dicent Indexical Legisign given on EP2:297 seem strangely wanting and peripheral (NP, p. 95) - especially the street-cry, a very vague designation. Here's the passage in question, where Peirce is enumerating varieties of Dicent Sinsign. After giving the usual weathercock as an example of the first variety, he says: A second variety is a Replica of a Dicent Indexical Legisign. Thus any given street cry, since its tone and theme identifies the individual, is not a symbol, but an Indexical Legisign; and any individual instance of it is a Replica of it which is a Dicent Sinsign. A third variety is a Replica of a Proposition. A fourth variety is a Replica of an Argument. Beside the normal variety of the Dicent Indexical Legisign, of which a street cry is an example, there is a second variety, which is that sort of proposition which has the name of a well-known individual as its predicate; as if one is asked, Whose statue is this? the answer may be, It is Farragut. The meaning of this answer is a Dicent Indexical Legisign. Notice that it's the meaning of this answer, and not the sentence expressing it, which is the Dicent Indexical Legisign. As for the street cry, this makes sense to me if I apply it to the cry of a vendor in the street, such as the newsboy shouting Extra! Extra! (back when newspapers used to print extra editions), or the vendor in a stadium yelling Peanuts! Popcorn! or whatever. Here the object of the sign is clearly not the individual vendor but the individual item he's selling. The generic cry is a Legisign, but any instance of it is an index (involving an icon) of the item, and thus can be true or false, depending on whether it corresponds with the stylized description of it embedded in the cry. Anyway, when we get down to such a fine-grained level
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information (STOI)
Jon, I don't understand the significance of the statement that 'A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object.' Is there a sign that does not independently indicate its object ? Can you give me an example or two of such a sign ? Thanks. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Donm't any STOI. Semiotic Theory Of Information JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14551 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14559 Peircers, In trying to remember why I started this thread, I traced it back to the point when various notions of information came up in Chapter 3.3 of Frederik's book. So let us review ... First we have the eureka moment in Kaina Stoicheia where Peirce declares a true definition of a proposition, namely, A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object. And we know that Peirce attaches the label of a Dicisign to the definiens of that definition. From 3.3. Dicisigns : Signs Separately Indicating Their Object http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14350 quote True to Peirce's general way of investigating sign types, he describes Dicisigns compositionally, functionally, and systematically. As Hilpinen (1992) says, Peirce's recurrent and standard definition of Dicisigns is given in the following italicized passage from Kaina stoicheia: It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon or a pure index can assert anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a weathercock does, or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend under the portrait does, does make an assertion, and forms a proposition. This suggests a true definition of a proposition, which is a question in much dispute at the moment. ''A proposition is a sign which separately, or independently, indicates its object.'' (EP2, 307, emphasis Hilpinen's) /quote(Frederik Stjernfelt, ''Natural Propositions'', 5354) To be continued ... -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7
Ben wrote: (100714-1) Peirce did not complete the ten-trichotomy system to his own satisfaction but his effort indicates that he regarded the copula basically as a Third, not as a Second, although it works as a Second at the syntactical level. Can you explain, preferably with some examples, what you mean by the copula is basically a THIRD but can work as a SECOND at the syntactical level ? Also what do you think about distinguishing Dicisign (a Second, according to the 10 classes of signs) and Argument (a Third) as follows ? Dicisign = Second = Natural proposition; (100714-2) Argument = Third = Natural computing With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Gary R., Gary F., Frederik, Jeff D., lists, I don't have the quotes handy at this late (for me) time of day, but: The predicate does denote the subject. Jack is blue: blue denotes Jack, not _/only/_ Jack, but still _/also/_ Jack. Jack, in turn, 'comprehends' blue. You may remember Peirce's discussion of the copula as a relation of 'if-then' or 'is included in'. Jack â blue. Jack is included in blue. If Jack, then blue. Jack materially implies blue. Comprehension is implication. Somewhere Peirce also says that a proposition comprehends the further propositions that it implies, and denotes the propositions that imply it. I wonder whether that applies only in deductive implication (i.e., 'entailment' as it is nowadays called) or in all inference modes of implication (I'm not sure how to say that, but I hope readers understand me). I also have wondered whether an icon may properly be said to have a comprehension. This depends on whether an icon 'comprehends' the character that it presents. I once searched CP, W, CN for discussion of comprehension in relation to icons and found nothing. Peirce speaks of index, icon, and symbol alike as 'denoting.' The icon denotes by virtue of a character of its own. While, as Gary F. recently said, an icon denotes a possible range of objects, some of that range may also be actual. An icon may have actual denotation. The copula as index is index in a 'meta' sense. In a 1908 effort at the ten sign-trichotomies, Peirce classified 'copulants', or 'distributive signs', as Thirds in the trichotomy of (1) descriptive (2) designative/denominative, and (3) copulant / distributive. Peirce did not complete the ten-trichotomy system to his own satisfaction but his effort indicates that he regarded the copula basically as a Third, not as a Second, although it works as a Second at the syntactical level. Best, Ben On 10/6/2014 7:45 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists, I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological discussions relating, on the one hand, to the *subject (*such as /denote/, /designate, indicate/, etc). and on the other to the *predicate*, (such as /signify, comprehend, connote, etc.)/ It seems to me that Frederik here employs such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the /dicisign concept /in, especially, the/ Syllabus/ and /Kaina Stoicheia/ ca.1903/./ I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis that Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying: /In considering the proposition (dicisign)/: *[the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the Predicate signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) * And, further, for Peirce these two are joined /not/, as they've traditionally been, by a *copula, *but rather by an /*index */of a peculiar kind, indeed of a metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the *real fact *joining the Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, the formulation/ breadth x depth = information (/i.e,, the sum of these two as equaling some factual information) for the dicisign means that _true information represents a real fact in some world of experience_. In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact being represented, the index being the /necessary /sign for joining the replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This syntactical index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in this case, exactly the//juxtaposition//of the two, that is, their*/co-localization/*, as Stjernfelt helpfully terms it. /The/ / co-localization of the elements of the dicisign/: *[Subject](Predicate)* (Such a *co-localization syntax* is further understood
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion
Edwina, Jon, lists, If the idea expressed in [biosemiotics:7096] is, in principle, correct that the new semiotics can be viewed as a mathematical category comprising physics, biology and linguistics, among others, it may be necessary for natural scientists to become semioticians and semioticians natural scientists. For example the model of morphogenesis (see attached) proposed in one of the articles collected in the link Edwina provides below states thus: This image is a representation of a regenerating planarian (100714-1) flatworm. The tail portion, which has been amputated, will regrow perfectly. This illustrates the concept of morphostasisthe ability of some living systems to dynamically restore their pattern. The image shows neoblast stem cells (light red dots), blastema (orange tissue at the wound site), and the bioelectrical gradients that are crucial for maintaining long-range anatomical polarity (yellow field lines). The morphogenetic field of patterning information (the target morphology) which will guide the rebuilding of the tail is schematized as a wire framework (white)a scaffold of force and information underlying the subsequent gene expression and anatomy. One possible explanation for the amputated tail regrowing to its original shape would be the action of the wave-particle duality in morphogenesis, since the standing waves determined by the topology of the whole embryo can guide the regeneration of the appropriate cells (i.e., particles) to form the missing tail. I have not yet read the original paper but I am almost sure that the authors non-local explanation for this phenomenon would be consistent witht he wave-particle dual model here described. From the wave-particle model to Peircean theory of categories may not be too far, since semiosis would implicate the irreducible triad of physics (a First), biology (a Second) and linguistics/informatics/genetics (a Third). With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Jon - these people have attempted to move semiotic analysis out of the comfort of the pipe-smoke-filled seminar rooms into the pragmatic realm. So, they've been exploring the semiotic informational and knowledge processes that actually take place within artificial intelligence, within economic processes within societies, within humans both as the individual and as a collective, within societies as cohesive organisms and of course, within the biological realm - where a lot of work is being done within biosemiotics. Therefore these are not trivial but necessarily very specific outlines of the informational processes that take place in these systems. http://www.dca.fee.unicamp.br/~gudwin/compsemio/ http://link.springer.com/journal/12304 http://www.journals.elsevier.com/biosystems/ In many cases they refer to Peirce. In many cases they do not but the actual analytic framework they are developing and using is a triadic semiosic unit with all the complexities of the three categories. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03032647/109/3 In other areas, they are focusing on semiotics as a dynamic complex process not confined to the individual but as operating within the collective..and not as a single interaction but as a network of interactions.. as in, eg, the economic processes (and of course within the biological realm) http://www.frankfurt-school.de/clicnetclm/fileDownload.do?goid=00396632AB4 And entropy and complexity research further explores the basic nature of semiosis, again, often referring to semiosis (and Peirce) and often not. I'm sure you are aware of the COMPLEXITY DIGEST and of Entropy online http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/16/9?utm_source=issue_linkutm_medium=emailutm_campaign=releaseIssue_entropy Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net To: Peirce List peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2014 8:24 AM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14551 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14559 ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14561 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14570 Edwina, List, I don't recall running across Perlovsky before but I have at least skimmed a few papers coming out of the Computational Semiotics group (or maybe it was another such group out of Waterloo?) At any rate, aside from my own humble efforts it has only been the computer science semioticians who actually tackle anything approaching non-trivial examples of sign relations. By tackling a non-trivial example I don't mean simply
[Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion]
(Sorry. I attached a wrong file). Original Message Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion From:Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu Date:Tue, October 7, 2014 11:30 am To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca Cc: Peirce List peirce-l@list.iupui.edu biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee -- Edwina, Jon, lists, If the idea expressed in [biosemiotics:7096] is, in principle, correct that the new semiotics can be viewed as a mathematical category comprising physics, biology and linguistics, among others, it may be necessary for natural scientists to become semioticians and semioticians natural scientists. For example the model of morphogenesis (see attached) proposed in one of the articles collected in the link Edwina provides below states thus: This image is a representation of a regenerating planarian (100714-1) flatworm. The tail portion, which has been amputated, will regrow perfectly. This illustrates the concept of morphostasisthe ability of some living systems to dynamically restore their pattern. The image shows neoblast stem cells (light red dots), blastema (orange tissue at the wound site), and the bioelectrical gradients that are crucial for maintaining long-range anatomical polarity (yellow field lines). The morphogenetic field of patterning information (the target morphology) which will guide the rebuilding of the tail is schematized as a wire framework (white)a scaffold of force and information underlying the subsequent gene expression and anatomy. One possible explanation for the amputated tail regrowing to its original shape would be the action of the wave-particle duality in morphogenesis, since the standing waves determined by the topology of the whole embryo can guide the regeneration of the appropriate cells (i.e., particles) to form the missing tail. I have not yet read the original paper but I am almost sure that the authors non-local explanation for this phenomenon would be consistent witht he wave-particle dual model here described. From the wave-particle model to Peircean theory of categories may not be too far, since semiosis would implicate the irreducible triad of physics (a First), biology (a Second) and linguistics/informatics/genetics (a Third). With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Jon - these people have attempted to move semiotic analysis out of the comfort of the pipe-smoke-filled seminar rooms into the pragmatic realm. So, they've been exploring the semiotic informational and knowledge processes that actually take place within artificial intelligence, within economic processes within societies, within humans both as the individual and as a collective, within societies as cohesive organisms and of course, within the biological realm - where a lot of work is being done within biosemiotics. Therefore these are not trivial but necessarily very specific outlines of the informational processes that take place in these systems. http://www.dca.fee.unicamp.br/~gudwin/compsemio/ http://link.springer.com/journal/12304 http://www.journals.elsevier.com/biosystems/ In many cases they refer to Peirce. In many cases they do not but the actual analytic framework they are developing and using is a triadic semiosic unit with all the complexities of the three categories. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03032647/109/3 In other areas, they are focusing on semiotics as a dynamic complex process not confined to the individual but as operating within the collective..and not as a single interaction but as a network of interactions.. as in, eg, the economic processes (and of course within the biological realm) http://www.frankfurt-school.de/clicnetclm/fileDownload.do?goid=00396632AB4 And entropy and complexity research further explores the basic nature of semiosis, again, often referring to semiosis (and Peirce) and often not. I'm sure you are aware of the COMPLEXITY DIGEST and of Entropy online http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/16/9?utm_source=issue_linkutm_medium=emailutm_campaign=releaseIssue_entropy Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net To: Peirce List peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2014 8:24 AM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14551 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14559 ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14561 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion
Jon, I agree with you. I think f(x) = y is dyadic, not triadic. It has THREE symbols, f, x and y, but that does not mean that they constitute a TRIADIC relation. Another way of saying the same would be that f(x) = y is not a mathematical category, since it has only one arrow, whereas a mathematical category must have at least three arrows that satisfy the composition condition among them. This is another of those simple problems that has escaped a solution on these lists over the past year or two. (What a shame.) With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net STOI. Semiotic Theory Of Information JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14551 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14559 STOI-DIS. Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14561 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14570 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14573 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14577 ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14579 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14581 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14584 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14585 ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14590 Edwina, Sung, List, I see that most likely non-terminating loop going round the bend again, so I'll take my breakpoint here and attend to more promising processes ... In the meantime you might reflect on the fact that a function f : X â Y is a species of dyadic relation, expressible as f â X Ã Y, and thus falls short of capturing the genus of a triadic relation L â O Ã S Ã I among the domains of objects, signs, and interpretant signs. You can say that there is a triadic relation among O = a set of objects, F = a set of functions or function names, and I = a set of interpretant signs, but here once again you are specifying a triadic relation that is far more special than the genus of sign relations we can easily observe in practice. Going down that road would reduce semiotics to a brand of stimulus-response behaviorism that long ago proved itself inadequate to the task at hand. Regards, Jon Edwina Taborsky wrote: Sung - I've still no idea what you mean by semiotics as a mathematical category - despite your frequent descriptions of it. I've advocated, for many years, that the semiosic process, in its single triadic process, is a function. f(x)=y. X is the input data from the Dynamic Object and Y is the output Interpretant. F, of course, is the Representamen. This acknowledges the dynamic mediative nature of 'f', or the Representamen, where input data is transformed/interpreted into one basic conclusion. Your other concepts (besides your 'mathematical category')...such as the wave-particle duality and your complementarism and your formal/material dualism etc - I don't agree with because they have little to do with semiosis...and my views of 'what is matter' and 'what is Mind' are quite different, as I follow the 'matter is effete Mind' view of Peirce. My point in bringing these issues into these discussions is a perhaps sideline attempt to move the discussion from the isolation of the philosophy seminar room into pragmatic reality. That is, biology and evolution, and economics, and artificial intelligence and yes, societal organization, have a great deal to learn from semiotics. I think that Frederik's outline of the dicisign moves semiosis from the heady fields of literature, film, language etc...into the actual material world - and to me, that's where it is innovative and exciting. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca Cc: Peirce List peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Tuesday, October 07, 2014 11:30 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiotic Theory Of Information -- Discussion Edwina, Jon, lists, If the idea expressed in [biosemiotics:7096] is, in principle, correct that the new semiotics can be viewed as a mathematical category comprising physics, biology and linguistics, among others, it may be necessary for natural scientists to become semioticians and semioticians natural scientists. For example the model of morphogenesis (see attached) proposed in one of the articles collected in the link Edwina provides below states thus: This image is a representation of a regenerating planarian (100714-1) flatworm. The tail portion, which has been amputated, will regrow perfectly
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Resources On Category Theory (ROCT)
Dear Jon, Thanks for these and previous links on category theory. They look interesting and informative. I look forward to reading them. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net o~o~o~o~o~o~o ROCT. Note 3 o~o~o~o~o~o~o A few years ago I made an attempt to tease out the underlying continuities connecting diverse ideas of categories through history, from their origins in Aristotle to Kant and Peirce to their echoes in more recent mathematics. Various renditions of that essay can be found at these locations: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/12/20/precursors-of-category-theory-1/ http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/12/30/precursors-of-category-theory-2/ http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/01/03/precursors-of-category-theory-3/ http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Precursors_of_Category_Theory Regards, Jon o~o~o~o~o~o~o academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
Jon wrote: It is necessary to distinguish information (100614-1) from measures of information. Is this because information has three aspects/properties -- i) quantity, ii) meaning, and iii) value, and yest Shannon's information theory and other similar quantitative approaches to information can only capture the first and not the rest ? With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Re: Gary Fuhrman At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544 Gary, Howard, All, Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and the Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the information in my last message got more than a bit corrupted, so here it is by another channel: It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information. Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes Shannon's. A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is to read what he writes about it in his 1865-1866 lectures on the Logic of Science. See also my notes: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Extension Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6]
Excuse me, The following quotations were from Gary F, not from Jon. Sung Original Message Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6 From:Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu Date:Mon, October 6, 2014 3:35 pm To: Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: 'Peirce List' peirce-l@list.iupui.edu biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee -- Jon wrote in the cited link below provides unambiguous definitions of icon, index, and symbol as signs: By focussing on specific relations within the basic triad of Sign-Object-Interpretant, Peirce classified signs in various trichotomies. The most basic and important of these (for our purposes) designates types of signs by their relation to their objects: the icon, or sign of Firstness, is connected to its object only by resemblance to it in some respect. the index, or sign of Secondness, is actually connected to its object usually either by efficient causality, as when the impact of light makes its mark on a photograph, or by forcefully directing attention to the object, as a pointing index finger may do if the object is a visible thing. the symbol, which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection (BD, Symbol). I hope that these statements will permanently silence the odd view often expressed on these lists that An icon is not a sign. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net re Peircean information, there's also my 2010 paper on it, but it's rather long ... http://www.gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm gary f. -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 6-Oct-14 8:54 AM To: 'Peirce List' Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6 Re: Gary Fuhrman At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544 Gary, Howard, All, Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and the Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the information in my last message got more than a bit corrupted, so here it is by another channel: It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information. Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes Shannon's. A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is to read what he writes about it in his 1865-1866 lectures on the Logic of Science. See also my notes: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Ex tension Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
Gary F wrote in the following link: As De Tienne (2006) explains: Peirce's elaborate discussion of dicisigns or propositions (100614-1) in the Syllabus of 1903 (EP2: 27585, 29499) and in New Elements (EP2: 30824) demonstrates clearly how such propositions always involve iconic and indexical elements . . . I am puzzled. How can a dicisign (or propositions) have an icon as its object ? According to the 10 classes of signs, there are only 3 dicisigns that implicate icons -- dicent indexical sinsign, decent indexical legisign, and decent symbolic legisign. There is no decent iconic qulaisign, nor decent iconic sinsign, nor decent iconic legisign, because these violate the so-called 'Peircean selection rule', according to the quark model of the Peircean sign. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net re Peircean information, there's also my 2010 paper on it, but it's rather long ... http://www.gnusystems.ca/Rehabit.htm gary f. -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 6-Oct-14 8:54 AM To: 'Peirce List' Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6 Re: Gary Fuhrman At:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14544 Gary, Howard, All, Between the iPhone spitting out some bytes it found not to its taste and the Auto(spell)bot rewriting wrong some of my writes, I'm afraid the information in my last message got more than a bit corrupted, so here it is by another channel: It is necessary to distinguish information from measures of information. Peirce's concept of information is compatible with but generalizes Shannon's. A good way to get a start on understanding Peirce's idea of information is to read what he writes about it in his 1865-1866 lectures on the Logic of Science. See also my notes: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_×_Ex tension Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Dicisign = Natural Proposition: Argument = Natural Computing (?)
Hi, It seems to me that signs have both formal and material aspects. If true, there should be formal and material rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments. Natural proposition, the topic of the current seminar on these lists, may be considered as the material aspect of dicisign. If this line of reasoning is valid, it may be logical to infer that there exists the material aspect of argument. Can we identify this to be Natural Computing that many computer scientists have been claiming ? With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions . Selected Passages
(The undistorted figure is attached.) Ben wrote: (100414-1) Most generally a triad is a trio. A predicate is called triadic if it is predicated of three objects like so: Pxyz. In Peirce's system a genuine triad is one involving irreducibly triadic action, called semiosis, among three correlates: sign, object, and interpretant. Trichotomy is three-way division, whether as process or as result. I thikn there are at least two kinds of triads an irreducible triad, that may be denoted as A-B-C-A, such as Peirces semiosis, which can be represented diagrammatically as a mathematical category as shown in Figure 1, and a dyadic triad consisting of a linear combination of two dyadic relations, denoted as A-B-C, without the third relation connecting these two relations as in A-B-C-A. In other words, Peirces irreducible triad is characterized by the tree mappings, f, g and h, that form a closed loop, whereas a dyadic triad lacks a closure, which is equivalent to saying that it does not satisfy the composition condition of the mathematical category. fg Object -- Sign -- Intperpteretant | ^ | | |_| h Figure 1. Semiosis as a mathematical category. Sign determines interpretant (see g) in such a way that interpretant ends up having the same relation with object (see h) that the sign itself has with the object (see f). This is equivalent to saying that the composition condition is satisfied, i.e., f x g = h. With all the best, Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 Sungchul, list I know next to nothing about category theory. Most generally a triad is a trio. A predicate is called triadic if it is predicated of three objects like so: /Pxyz/. In Peirce's system a genuine triad is one involving irreducibly triadic action, called semiosis, among three correlates: sign, object, and interpretant. Trichotomy is three-way division, whether as process or as result. Best, Ben On 10/3/2014 2:04 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: Ben, Jeff, Jon, lists, 1) Can we say that there can be many triads, depending one how one defines them, but the Peircean triad is special and identical with a mathematical category ? 2) Triad is a system of three entities, while trichotomy is the process of dividing a system into three parts, either physically or mentally, the latter case of which is called prescinding by Peirce. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Jeff D., Jon, I'd just like to note that the questions of triads versus trichotomies is something that we've discussed a number of times at peirce-l over the years. For my part, I like using those words in the way that Jon and others have recommended - 'triad' for the triadically related sign, object, interpretant, which are involved as the correlates in genuinely triadic action, and 'trichotomy' for three-fold classifications, especially categorially correlated ones such as qualisign, sinsign, legisign. However, it should be noted that there are passages in which Peirce calls trichotomies 'triads', and other passages by Peirce that make no sense unless one follows the 'triad'-versus-'trichotomy' distinction. I don't have the quotes handy but we've been over it many times. A separate issue is the one about whether the sign-object-interpretant triad is also categorially correlated trichotomy. Best, Ben On 10/1/2014 11:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Hello Jon, If you have links to the earlier discussions of the distinction between triadicities and trichotomies, I'd like to take a look. In addition to being interested in distinction you are making, I'd like to read more about how you are thinking about the projection of the triadic relations onto the mutually exclusive and exhaustive partitions of a domain. In his monograph Reading Peirce Reading, Richard Smyth makes much of the conceptions of the restrictions and limitations that apply to a given domain of inquiry. I'd like to see how your account of the partitions of the domain compares to his reconstruction of some arguments Peirce develops in How to Make Our Ideas Clear. Thanks, Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Jon Awbrey
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6)
Dear Stephen, Rest assured that you are not confused. I am afraid it is Edwina who seems confused about the meaning of an icon that has dual meanings -- (i) one of the three relations between the representamen and its object, which is the only meaning of 'icon' to her, and (ii) the name of that relation, which she does not regard as a sign. I have had this debate with her since 2012 on the biosemiotics list, and I am surprised that a questions as basic and as simple as this one has not yet been resolved. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net I'm confused. ET: my understanding of the 'icon' in that it is not a Sign, even though many seem to consider it as such. CP: 1, Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols Peirce: CP 1.192 Cross-Ref:â â Evidently CP is among the many. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 5:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Part of the problem may also be due to my understanding of the 'icon' in that it is not a Sign, even though many seem to consider it as such. It is the term for the Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen. A Sign is a triad and the Icon, as a single Relation, is not a Sign. This Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen (which I also term 'input') can be in any of the three categorical modes and as such, is termed: icon, index or symbol. To actually function as an icon, that 'input sensation' must be in a Relation or connection. Otherwise, ...nothing. But an iconic input certainly has no 'committment' in itself as to how it will be 'read' by the mediative rules of the Representamen or understood within the Interpretant. That is why it, as Firstness, can be considered as open and offering potentiality rather than closed actuality. So, I'd agree that a Sign (that triad) operating within Firstness would indeed by nothing but a Rheme (Rhematic Iconic Qu - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6)
Edwina, Helmut, list, To me, A sign is anything that stands for something other (100414-1) than itself, period. In order for something (called representamen or sign) to stand for something else (called object) to some one, that something must have some effect (called interpretant) on the mind of that some one (called interpreter or sign processor). In this sense the word icon is a sign, since it refers to the relation between it and its object being similarity and it inevitably has the effect on the mind of the interpreter of icon to think of such a relation, unless the interpreter does not understand the word icon, just as apple does not mean the red juicy fruit to a Korean who does not understand any English words. With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Helmut- you have it right. That's why I prefer to use the term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' (note, as you say, lower case first letter). Peirce often used the term 'sign' to mean not only the representamen, but even the relations ..eg..that between the Representamen and the Object and so on. And I do indeed use the term Sign (upper case first letter) to mean the triad. Edwina - Original Message - From: Helmut Raulien To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 6:15 PM Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] iconic commitment (was: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6) I suspect, that in this quote Peirce meant sign for representamen, and by writing whether they be... he meant whether their object relation was This is inaccurate by Peirce. Edwina writes more accurately, and is right, I think: With Sign (first letter capital) she means the whole sign, and with sign (first letter small) representamen. Icon, index, symbol are not Signs, but possible object relations with a sign, and therefore also possible object relations within a Sign. Bu - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions Selected Passages
Jon Trying to comprehend triadic relations by means of their projective trichotomies is a project ultimately doomed to fail. A couple of concrete examples would help in understanding what you mean by the doomed failure you are referring to. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290 GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14313 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14350 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14351 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14352 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14359 GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14383 JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14388 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14394 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14409 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14422 JLRC: These questions penetrate to the heart of CSP's rhetorical stance as illustrated by the triadic triad: qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rhema, dicisign, argument. If these terms are to form a coherent pattern of inferences, is it necessary that the terms themselves, under different situations and constraints, be impure? (That is, have more than one qualitative or quantitative meaning?) Jerry, List, There is something that needs to be said about the proper use of categories and classifications in Peirce's work and what I regard as their mis-use in a great number of contemporary discussions. One of the first issues I can remember pointing out when I joined the Peirce List was the distinction between triadicities and trichotomies, the first relating to properties of triadic relations and the second relating to mutually exclusive and exhaustive partitions of a domain. Although one can form what is known in mathematics as a projective relation between the two structures, the trichotomies remain pale reflections of the richer triadicities, distorting and reducing much of their information. Trying to comprehend triadic relations by means of their projective trichotomies is a project ultimately doomed to fail. To be continued ... Jon Jon Awbrey wrote: Jerry, List, Re: CSP's rhetorical stance Somewhere in the classical part of my education I picked up the notion that rhetoric is an inquiry into the forms of argument, discussion, and reasoning that consider the audience, in other words, that take the nurture and the nature of the interpreter into account. But considering the interpreter, putting the interpreter back into the process of interpretation, is the very thing that sets Peirce's account of information, inquiry, logic, signs, and pragmatic thinking in general apart from the run of logical systems that had been developed to any significant technical degree up to his time and even long after it. The Horror! The Horror! A Spectre Is Haunting Logic The Spectre Of Relativism! Well, no, not really, but you'd think it from the ter-roar that dyad-in-the-wool flatlanders raise at the very idea of moving logic into the 3rd dimension. To be continued ... Jon Jon Awbrey wrote: Jerry, List, If we understand what Peirce is talking about then it's usually fairly easy to understand what he says, but it's almost impossible to understand what he says if we do not understand what he's talking about. That is not a paraphrase of the Meno paradox it is only a clue to the role of collateral acquaintance in escaping the Meno paradox. I'll try address your questions more directly tomorrow ... Jon Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List, Jon: These are excellent questions! What do you think about these extentions? These questions penetrate to the heart of CSP's rhetorical stance as illustrated by the triadic triad: qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rhema, dicisign, argument. If these terms are to form a coherent pattern of inferences, is it necessary that the terms themselves, under different situations and constraints, be impure? (That is, have more than one qualitative or quantitative meaning?) Further questions about the purity of thought arise readily... In particular, does the concept of a decisign emerge because of the differences between pure and impure indices, such as the indices between chains and branched chains of inferences? On a technical note, often CSP's chains of inferences appear to start
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions ⢠Selected Passages
Ben, Jeff, Jon, lists, 1) Can we say that there can be many triads, depending one how one defines them, but the Peircean triad is special and identical with a mathematical category ? 2) Triad is a system of three entities, while trichotomy is the process of dividing a system into three parts, either physically or mentally, the latter case of which is called prescinding by Peirce. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Jeff D., Jon, I'd just like to note that the questions of triads versus trichotomies is something that we've discussed a number of times at peirce-l over the years. For my part, I like using those words in the way that Jon and others have recommended - 'triad' for the triadically related sign, object, interpretant, which are involved as the correlates in genuinely triadic action, and 'trichotomy' for three-fold classifications, especially categorially correlated ones such as qualisign, sinsign, legisign. However, it should be noted that there are passages in which Peirce calls trichotomies 'triads', and other passages by Peirce that make no sense unless one follows the 'triad'-versus-'trichotomy' distinction. I don't have the quotes handy but we've been over it many times. A separate issue is the one about whether the sign-object-interpretant triad is also categorially correlated trichotomy. Best, Ben On 10/1/2014 11:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Hello Jon, If you have links to the earlier discussions of the distinction between triadicities and trichotomies, I'd like to take a look. In addition to being interested in distinction you are making, I'd like to read more about how you are thinking about the projection of the triadic relations onto the mutually exclusive and exhaustive partitions of a domain. In his monograph Reading Peirce Reading, Richard Smyth makes much of the conceptions of the restrictions and limitations that apply to a given domain of inquiry. I'd like to see how your account of the partitions of the domain compares to his reconstruction of some arguments Peirce develops in How to Make Our Ideas Clear. Thanks, Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net] Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 7:44 PM To: Peirce List 1 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions ⢠Selected Passages - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions . Selected Passages
Ben, list, It is my understanding that the mathematical category is another name for semiosis. In other words, a category is to mathematicians hat semiosis is to semioticians. To quote Peirce from http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM: A sign is anything, A, which, (1) in addition to other characters of its own, (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B, (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation Þ. I believe that this definition of a sign is isomorphic with the mathematical definition of a category. With all the best. Sung Sungchul, list I know next to nothing about category theory. Most generally a triad is a trio. A predicate is called triadic if it is predicated of three objects like so: /Pxyz/. In Peirce's system a genuine triad is one involving irreducibly triadic action, called semiosis, among three correlates: sign, object, and interpretant. Trichotomy is three-way division, whether as process or as result. Best, Ben On 10/3/2014 2:04 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: Ben, Jeff, Jon, lists, 1) Can we say that there can be many triads, depending one how one defines them, but the Peircean triad is special and identical with a mathematical category ? 2) Triad is a system of three entities, while trichotomy is the process of dividing a system into three parts, either physically or mentally, the latter case of which is called prescinding by Peirce. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Jeff D., Jon, I'd just like to note that the questions of triads versus trichotomies is something that we've discussed a number of times at peirce-l over the years. For my part, I like using those words in the way that Jon and others have recommended - 'triad' for the triadically related sign, object, interpretant, which are involved as the correlates in genuinely triadic action, and 'trichotomy' for three-fold classifications, especially categorially correlated ones such as qualisign, sinsign, legisign. However, it should be noted that there are passages in which Peirce calls trichotomies 'triads', and other passages by Peirce that make no sense unless one follows the 'triad'-versus-'trichotomy' distinction. I don't have the quotes handy but we've been over it many times. A separate issue is the one about whether the sign-object-interpretant triad is also categorially correlated trichotomy. Best, Ben On 10/1/2014 11:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Hello Jon, If you have links to the earlier discussions of the distinction between triadicities and trichotomies, I'd like to take a look. In addition to being interested in distinction you are making, I'd like to read more about how you are thinking about the projection of the triadic relations onto the mutually exclusive and exhaustive partitions of a domain. In his monograph Reading Peirce Reading, Richard Smyth makes much of the conceptions of the restrictions and limitations that apply to a given domain of inquiry. I'd like to see how your account of the partitions of the domain compares to his reconstruction of some arguments Peirce develops in How to Make Our Ideas Clear. Thanks, Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Jon Awbrey [jawb...@att.net] Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 7:44 PM To: Peirce List 1 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions ââ¬Â¢ Selected Passages - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions Selected Passages
Jon, I am afraid your answer is as incomprehensible to me as was your original remark that prompted my question. With all the best. Sung Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14286 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14290 GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14313 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14350 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14351 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14352 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14359 GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14383 JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14388 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14394 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14409 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14422 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14433 JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14434 BU:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14435 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14436 JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14437 FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14445 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14448 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14476 Sung, List, Working on a TGIF deadline to get some other business done, so only time for a few words an Exercise for the Reader. It is common to speak of icon/index/symbol as forming a trichotomy, but in truth its genealogy is that of a genus and two of its species. Symbols are the generic examples of what it takes to be a sign in an (object, sign, interpretant) triple in a triadic sign relation, while icons and indices are less generic, more specialized, nearly dyadic in the sense that their dyadic denotation relations figure saliently in their use while the virtues whereby they denote their objects and receive their interpretants recede into the ground of their gestalts. But icons and indices are still signs of the Peircean brand, and as such components of elements of triadic sign relations. Icons are icons only because they are interpreted as icons and indices are indices only because they are interpreted as indices. The interpretive character of the genus is visited on the species. But we constantly see that even these taxons intermingle and overlap they are not the slices of a pie but the aspects or facets of a gem. Regards, Jon Sungchul Ji wrote: Jon Trying to comprehend triadic relations by means of their projective trichotomies is a project ultimately doomed to fail. A couple of concrete examples would help in understanding what you mean by the doomed failure you are referring to. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions . Selected Passages
(Sorry if the figure gets distorted.) Clark quoted Sowa as having said that There are other developments, such as DNA and Heisenberg's(100314-1) uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics, which are much closer to themes that Peirce had discussed. Those could be considered support for his positions, but I'd put category theory into an area that is compatible with Peirce's views, but not directly supportive of anything he said in particular. I wonder if Sowa read the following quote of Peirce (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM), which clearly indicates to me that the Peircean sign is a mathematical category which I often represent as: f g Object --Sign --- Interpretent | ^ | | |__| h where the three structure-preserving mappings, f, g and h corresponds to the relations Þ, µ the following quote from Peirce. with the third mapping missing (as far as I can tell): Peirce wrote: A sign is anything, A, which, (1) in addition to other characters of its own, (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B, (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation Þ. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:20 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: On 10/3/2014 2:04 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: Ben, Jeff, Jon, lists, 1) Can we say that there can be many triads, depending one how one defines them, but the Peircean triad is special and identical with a mathematical category ? Category theory is one of those things Iâve always wanted to learn and never have had time. I canât say much about it. However I did have this in my notes. Itâs from *way* back on May 1st, 2006 here on Peirce-L. Itâs from John Sowa whom I suspect most of us are familiar with. This is him replying on connections between category theory and Peirce. I would say that the description of category theory by Irving A. is a reasonable explanation of the subject. But category theory wasn't invented until about 40 years after Peirce died. Therefore, he wasn't aware of it. On the other hand, I don't think that there's much point in arguing whether it can be connected to any part of the work of Peirce in any significant way? He probably would have approved of it, but so what? There are other developments, such as DNA and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics, which are much closer to themes that Peirce had discussed. Those could be considered support for his positions, but I'd put category theory into an area that is compatible with Peirce's views, but not directly supportive of anything he said in particular. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuine triadicity, chirality (handedness) and the origins of life
physiological. Thus, the complete snippet reads: . . . it is a question whether absolute chance -- pure tychism -- ought not to be regarded as /a product of freedom, and therefore of life, not necessarily physiological/ . (emphasis added) But what can that phrase not necessarily physiological be pointing to? Still, and mainly, Peirce offers the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world as being a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life first came about. It would appear that this matter of genuineness really might be a key to resolving a number of issues currently under discussion, and I'm glad you brought it up Gary. Here's the complete passage referred to: a. For forty years, that is, since the beginning of the year 1867, I have been constantly on the alert to find a genuine triadic relation -- that is, one that does not consist in a mere collocation of dyadic relations [. . . ] which is not either an intellectual relation or a relation concerned with the less comprehensible phenomena of life. I have not met with one which could not reasonably be supposed to belong to one or other of these two classes. b. As a case as nearly brute and inorganic as any, I may mention the form of relationship involved in any screw-form which is definitely of the right-hand, or occidental, mode, or is definitely of the Japanese, or left-handed, mode. Such a relation exists in every carbon-atom whose four valencies are saturated by combination with four atoms of as many different kinds. But where the action of chance determines whether the screw be a right-handed or a left-handed one, the two forms will, in the long run, be produced in equal proportions, and the general result will not be definitely, or decisively, of either kind. c. We know no case of a definitely right-handed or left-handed screw-phenomenon, where the decision is not certainly due to the intervention of a definitely one-sided screw in the conditions of that decision, except in cases where the choice of a living being determines it; as when Pasteur picked out under the microscope the two kinds of crystals of a tartrate, and shoved those of one kind to the right and those of the other kind to the left. d. We do not know the mechanism of such choice, and cannot say whether it be determined by an antecedent separation of left-handed screws from right-handed screws or not. No doubt, all that chance is competent to destroy, it may, once in a long, long time, produce; but it is a question whether absolute chance -- pure tychism -- ought not to be regarded as a product of freedom, and therefore of life, not necessarily physiological. It could not be caused, apparently, by the inorganic action of dynamical law. e. For the only way in which the laws of dynamics involve triadic relations is by their reference to second differentials of positions. But though a second differential generally involves a triadic relation, yet owing to the law of the conservation of energy, which has been sufficiently proved for purely inorganic phenomena, the dynamic laws for such phenomena are expressible in terms of first differentials. It is, therefore, a non-genuine, or, as I phrase it, a degenerate form of triadic relationship which is involved in such case. In short, the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life first came about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that of pure chance, which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure chance may itself be a vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the physiological sense would be due to life in the metaphysical sense. . . . CP 6.322 Best, Gary R. Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Genuine triadicity, chirality (handedness) and the origins of life
; but it is a question whether absolute chance -- pure tychism -- ought not to be regarded as a product of freedom, and therefore of life, not necessarily physiological. It could not be caused, apparently, by the inorganic action of dynamical law. e. For the only way in which the laws of dynamics involve triadic relations is by their reference to second differentials of positions. But though a second differential generally involves a triadic relation, yet owing to the law of the conservation of energy, which has been sufficiently proved for purely inorganic phenomena, the dynamic laws for such phenomena are expressible in terms of first differentials. It is, therefore, a non-genuine, or, as I phrase it, a degenerate form of triadic relationship which is involved in such case. In short, the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life first came about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that of pure chance, which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure chance may itself be a vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the physiological sense would be due to life in the metaphysical sense. . . . CP 6.322 Best, Gary R. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6912] Re: Natural Propositions,
Stefan, Excuse me for asking a silly question: You wrote . . . are unable to destinct their own dreams . . . Can you use distinct as a verb ? Or did you mean distinguish ? With all the best. Sung Ben, Gary, R., Gary F., i've got to start from the end of your post. You speak of the society rewarding diciplines and this sheds a light on your idea of sociology in this discussion. Your sociology consists of conscious actors who reward, strive for power, wealth or status. This is more a rational choice approach which is not the thing i was trying to hint at with my Fleck example. And thats also not the thing sociology of knowlede is interested in. It's about the knowledge underlying societal habits. There are so many things we take for granted and we should explore why we (did) take them for granted. And this not only the case in society it is also the case in the sciences. Why did microbiologist search for syphillis in the blood? They searched there because for centuries it was taken for granted that there is something like syphillitic blood. Was it possible to reproduce the results? No, it was almost impossible to stabilize the results. Nowadays we would stop researching with results like this. But they kept on trying and trying until Wassermann found a way to stabilize the experiment. Why did the retry and retry? Because it was clear that it had to be there! The snake example: The snake example is so trivial and easy to understand that we don't have to discuss it. Yes, it bites you - you are dead in tradtion A or B. There is no incompatiblity. But this is not a real world example of a living science. Sciences are complex, they consist of assumptions, crafting in the lab/the field, cognitive training etc.. They are much more than the simple if A then B of logic. Much knowledge and training is needed to come to the point where one can write down a proposition like if A then B. Nobody doubts that when you do exactly the same as another person that the same will happen. Experiences whose conditions are the same will have the same general characters. But since scientific paradigms are such complex structures it is not an easy task to create the same conditions. You think its easy, just go to a lab and try to re-cook a Wassermann-test! You say opinion and truth are not the same thing. Yes, sure ,but how should we deal with the idea of the syphillitic blood? Is it opinion or truth? They found it in the blood! And the idea to find it in the blood is certainly a cultural import into science. But there are different Problems: a) Can there be different truths about one object of investigation b) are there cultural imports into science that influences the content of science and not only the organizational context of research. What is organizational context? Org. context is for me all the stuff you named: funding, rewarding, strive for power, money etc.. An influence on the content instead is everything which is part of the how we see the object of investigation. Karl Mannheim uses in Ideology and Utopia a good metaphor. He says that we can look at a object from different perspectives and objectivation is for him to take different positions relative to the object. Trying to investigate the object beyond this is an absurdity like seeing without perspective. You distinct between opinion and truth. Do you have the truth? No you don't, like i don't. We both have beliefs we are willing to put on test. But when you write somthing like: Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent experience since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other perspectives). It's the fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on the acceptance of that conflation is to build on broken logic, inquiry with its bones broken, inquiry more susceptible than ever to social manipulation, inquiry less likely than ever to be fruitful. it seems to me that you have the truth and you are able to destinct between pseudo-hallucinations and non-hallucinations. You talk like you are one of those who has left the cave and reached the light. Ben, i don't really insinuate this, because it was written by you in the heat of the moment. We are not far away from each other, but nonetheless this paragraph shows we are still standing on different sides of a water devide. There is a hair between us. My impression is you are trying to pull the long-run-perspective on truth into the /now/ to safe some kind of non-perspective-truth in science. Now, truth is for me a perfect sign which incorporates all possible perspectives on an object. But we will be there only at the end of all times. As long as we are not there we only have beliefs we are willing to act upon. And as long we have not reached the all-perspectives-mode we take in positions on objects and phenomena that are influenced by our societal position,
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6985] Re: Natural
(If the figure below is distorted, please refer to one of my earlier emails.) Howard wrote: . . . the bruteness of laws execute in real time at an (6985-1) unalterable rate, whereas mathematical and logical rules may be executed at your leisure with no effect on the result. Laws do not exist by necessity of semiotic rules, nor do semiotic rules occur by necessity of laws. They are essential, irreducible, complementary categories. In the manuscript that I just submitted to Computational and Structural Biotechnology Journal, I suggested that physics, biology and linguistics form a mathematical category: f g Physics --- Biology -- Linguistics = Semiotics (?) | ^ | | |_| h Figure 1. The PBL category theory of semiotics, asserting that physics, biology and linguistics are components of an irreducible triad of Peirce called semiotics(?). Evidence to support the PBL category is provided by the fact that f = the Planckian distribution (discovered in 2008), g = the cell language theory ( proposed in 1997), and h = the statistical mechanical Menzerath-Altman law (recently derived by S. Eroglu; J. Statistical Physics 157:392-405). (I am on the road so that I cannot provide any more details now.) Do you see any conflict defining semiotics/mathematics as the irreducible triad of physics, biology and linguistics ? I know many semioticians (including Peirce?) regard linguistics as something less fundamental than semiotics, but can you imagine doing semiotics without language ? With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net At 02:11 PM 9/24/2014, Benjamin wrote: [snip] I'm just saying that if one regards mathematics mainly as a neural activity, then mathematics would seem absurdly effective in physics and other special sciences, as if an average child by doodling had invented a rocket ship. HP: I do not see antipsychologism as a necessary stance if you understand neural activity as a product of evolution and learning. What do you mean by mainly a neural activity? If you think any mathematics, or any thinking, goes on elsewhere, then that thinking is still neural activity. What Kant says is absurd is thinking that your neural activity is not thinking about things-in-themselves. Kant: . . . though we cannot know these objects as things-in-themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears. Thinking about things-in-themselves is inescapable. That's what Born meant by everything is subjective, without exception, and what Hertz meant by, we do not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our conception of things are in conformity with them except by comparing the necessary behavior of our neural models (denknotwendigen) with the observed necessary behavior of nature (naturnotwendigen). I emphasize that, so far, this is not psychologism, idealism, nominalism, solipsism, Cartesianism, Platonism, or any -ism. It is just evolution, observation (and a snippet of Kant). Anyway, thinking about a more detailed epistemology or ontology -- your own -ism -- would still be your own neural activity. The scientific problem has always been to create neural models of things-in-themselves that generate predictions of observables that are as detached as possible from the states of individual brains.The first arithmetic rules and geometric proofs were invented to do just that. So was analytic geometry and calculus, but thinking about formal mathematical rules self-generated problems and new rules, and much of later mathematics became pure mathematics, freely imagined and not aimed at any application to physics. Its scientific success was at least fortuitous if not unreasonable. BU: I see no reason to regard as a quirk or happenstance the world's alliance of bruteness of force and physical law together, and I can see that physical law involves bruteness in a way that mathematical rules do not, if that's what you're getting at. HP: That is exactly what I was getting at. Note that the bruteness of laws execute in real time at an unalterable rate, whereas mathematical and logical rules may be executed at your leisure with no effect on the result. Laws do not exist by necessity of semiotic rules, nor do semiotic rules occur by necessity of laws. They are essential, irreducible, complementary categories. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions
Frederik wrote: Frege used thought to refer to propositions, (092814-1) as I understand him, and I am not clear whether Peirce did the same. So, it seems to me that, for Frege, propositions include argument. Why was it necessary for Peirce to distinguish between propositions and arguments? Wouldn't texts be more logical than arguments ? With all the best. Dear John, lists, I think you're right - Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting points were propositions. Best F Den 22/09/2014 kl. 18.46 skrev John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za : At 01:41 PM 2014-09-13, Frederik wrote: Dear Sung, lists - To take thought to be but the result of thinking is an idea that may lead us astray - especially if you take thinking in all its aspects to be a psychological process only. Thought is not determined by thinking only but, importantly, by the object of thought and the structure of sound reasoning. So, you might as well say that thought is the result of the norms of reasoning and the features of the object thought about. Thinking then is the process combining these - but not the process producing thought as such. Just like the TV-series you watch is not the product of the printing of the DVD only. Or the meal you prepare in your casserole is not only the product of the cooking process - but also of the objects you add to the casserole and the recipe you follow. Best F I agree with what you say here, but I was wondering if it does not go further. Frege used thought to refer to propositions, as I understand him, and I am not clear whether Peirce did the same. (I studied with a number of Frege experts, but never had a Peirce expert on my committee, though my thesis does make homage to Peirce.) I am thinking in particular of a peculiar passage that Vinicius Romanini brought to my attention: () if, for example, there be a certain fossil fish, certain observations upon which, made by a skilled paleontologist, and taken in connection with chemical analyses of the bones and of the rock in which they were embedded, will one day furnish that paleontologist with the keystone of an argumentative arch upon which he will securely erect a solid proof of a conclusion of great importance, then, in my view, in the true logical sense, that thought has already all the reality it ever will have, although as yet the quarries have not been opened that will enable human minds to perform that reasoning. For the fish is there, and the actual composition of the stone already in fact determines what the chemist and the paleontologists will one day read in them. () It is, therefore, true, in the logicians sense of the words, although not in that of the psychologists, that the thought is already expressed there (EP2: 455). This passage makes much more sense to me, and fits much better my information based ontology, if thought means what I would mean by proposition. John Frederik wrote: Thinking, in this sense, may be the object of,(6729-1) psychology thought not so . Can you separate thinking and thought? Isn't the latter the result of the former? If so, why can't the latter be the object of psychology as well ? With all the best. Sung John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6960] Re: Physics Semiosis
John wrote : I am currently unclear whether the processes he (6960-1) hypothesizes (and creates) are semiotic. It seems to me that semiosis is a complex process consisting of at least three basic steps that constitute a mathematical category: fg Object -- Sign -- Interpretant | ^ | | |__| h Figure 1. A model of semiosis as a mathematical category. f = sign generation; g = sign interpretation; h = information flow. The composition condition, namely, f followed by g leads to he same result as h, holds. Clay mineral surfaces forming templates for catalyzing complex chemical reactions is an attractive possibility which alone is insufficient for semiosis but may constitute an essential component of semiosis, e.g., Step f, where object is mineral template and chemical reactions are signs (?) With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net At 07:26 PM 2014-09-21, Frederik wrote: Dear Koichiro, lists At 9:54 PM 09/19/2014, Frederik wrote: In intellectual history I think the idea that cyclic, self-sustaining processes may play a special role in biology goes at least back to Kant (in the latter half of the 3rd Critique). Philosophically, it could be okay. In practice, however, it says nothing special about the empirical likelihood of the emergence of such a cycle. That is certainly right. Kant's deliberations are sketchy at best. Stil, getting the basic idea is not a bad achievement. But maybe there were anticipators before Kant, I do not know - A key issue must be how the cycle carrying the capacity of searching for the needed resources from within could come into being in the first place. The relationship between the whole reaction cycle and the component reactants looks quite subtle, like the advertisement of life insurance repeating all for one, and one for all. That is correct. We would certainly like to see empirical candidates for such a simple cycle outside of the protective membrane of a cell (which forms another very basic prerequisite to semioitic processes proper, would be my guess). One interesting possibility is that clay minerals form a template on which complex reactions can occur with no encompassing membrane. A champion of this view is my former roommate Robert Hazen. I am currently unclear whether the processes he hypothesizes (and creates) are semiotic. John -- John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons Indices
Jon, I like your diagram, Figure 1, which differs somewhat from mine, Figure 2. As you can see both these diagrams are 4-node networks. One of the differences between Figures 1 and 2, however, is that S is located at the periphery in the former while it is at the hub in the latter. This topological difference may or may not be of fundamental significance. Another difference may be that, in Figure 1, the triadic sign relation R| is a part of the diagram, whereas, in figure 2, it is represented by the whole diagram itself. (The R appearing in Figure 2 is not Relation but representamen, as you know.) S / O--R| \ I Figure 1. Jon's diagram for the Peircean sign. R / O---S \ I Figure 2. Sung' diagram for the Peirecan sign. R = representamen, not triadic relation, R|. With all the best. Sung JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14182 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14184 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14187 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14194 Sung, List, Consider Figure 1 â http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/images/0/01/Aristotle%27s_Sign_Relation.gif from Awbrey Awbrey (1995) â https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry What is a diagram like that intended to represent? Being one of the very authors who intended it to represent something I can tell you with some authority what I had in mind. There's a part of it that looks like this: S / O--R| \ I That part of the picture is supposed to represent a sign relation that we find in Aristotle's On Interpretation, where O is the object, S is the sign, I is the impression that the object makes on the interpreter, and R is the triadic sign relation that relates the preceding three entities. I guess I used to assume that diagrams like that are largely self-explanatory, but years of being called on to supplement their ostensible self-explanations with volume after volume of my own explanations has taught me otherwise. So let's eye these diagrams a little more closely to see where they lead astray. Jon Jon Awbrey wrote: Sung, List, Let's see if we can turn our discussion of these paltry stick figures to some good purpose in the task at hand, namely, to investigate the uses (and abuses) of diagrams and to examine the forms of understanding (and misunderstanding) to which they give rise. People have used these sorts of figures to illustrate the structures of triadic sign relations for as long as I can remember, but their use depends on grasping the stylistic conventions that determine their intended interpretation. We can call them icons without being totally wrong, but the meaning of an icon always depends on knowing what features or structures of its object it bears in common. Because these figures depend on knowing or guessing the stylistic conventions involved in their use, they are also symbols, and very much so. To be continued ... Jon Sungchul Ji wrote: (For undistorted figures and table, see the attached PDF file.) Jon cites the following post he wrote on 6/11/2002: I am still a few hypotheses shy of an explanation of all that (091914-1) our Mister Tuesday Afternoon was saying just now, or a little while ago, about icons and indices, and their symmetries, but I am under the perhaps too facile impression that I have long understood the gist of it, by dint of the particular examples that arise in my application to systems theory, many of which seem to fit the pattern of what Peirce seems to be describing. And so, here for comparison is the picture of an iconic sign: o-o-o | Objective Framework | Interpretive Framework| o-o-o | | | q o| | ·· | | · · | | · · | | · ·| | ·· | | · · | | · · | | · ·| | ·v | | · o u | | ·/ | | v /| | x o
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons Indices
Jon wrote: For another thing, the technical use of the tern (092114-1) network tends to lead techies and others to read the line between O and R as referring to a dyadic relation, and similarly for the other two lines, and to think that the triadic relation denoted by R is somehow composed of or reducible to a compound of those three dyadic relations. Down that road of dyadic intentions the triadic sign relation goes all to hell. Jon, the difference between hell and heaven seems only paper-thin. You can go to hell by interpreting the diagram as a system of THREE DYADIC RELATIONS or to heaven by interpreting the same as ONE TRIADIC RELATION, which I am sure you are favoring. Of course, you can avoid going to hell if you only PRESCIND the three dyadic relations without asserting that they are synonymous with the triadic relation. With all the best. Sung Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14182 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14184 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14187 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14194 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14196 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14197 Sung All, In Awbrey Awbrey (1995) â https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry we used Figure 1 â http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/images/0/01/Aristotle%27s_Sign_Relation.gif to illustrate the following text from Aristotle's On Interpretation. quote Words spoken are symbols or signs (symbola) of affections or impressions (pathemata) of the soul (psyche); written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs (semeia), are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects (pragmata) of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies (homoiomata). /quote (Aristotle, De Interp. i. 16a4). Depending on the order of introduction in a given discussion, one could say that the text is an interpretant of the diagram, as we used it here, or one could say that the diagram is an interpretant of the text, as we used it there. The order of introducing objects, signs, and interpretant signs is an accident of rhetoric and not of the essence in defining the triadic sign relation. With that understanding, let's focus again on this central piece of the picture: S / O--R| \ I I would avoid calling that a 4-node network. My training in graph theory gives the word network too many technical connotations that do not fit the case we are trying to describe. For one thing, the R| piece is intended to denote the entire sign relation under discussion, and that exists at a very different level of abstraction from the respective referents of the O, S, I pieces of the picture. This is true whether you take the relation R in extension, as a set of ordered triples of the form (o, s, i) or whether you take the relation R intensionally, as the necessary and sufficient property that is borne in common by all those triples. For another thing, the technical use of the tern network tends to lead techies and others to read the line between O and R as referring to a dyadic relation, and similarly for the other two lines, and to think that the triadic relation denoted by R is somehow composed of or reducible to a compound of those three dyadic relations. Down that road of dyadic intentions the triadic sign relation goes all to hell. Enough sermon for a Sunday morning ... Jon Sungchul Ji wrote: Jon, I like your diagram, Figure 1, which differs somewhat from mine, Figure 2. As you can see both these diagrams are 4-node networks. One of the differences between Figures 1 and 2, however, is that S is located at the periphery in the former while it is at the hub in the latter. This topological difference may or may not be of fundamental significance. Another difference may be that, in Figure 1, the triadic sign relation R| is a part of the diagram, whereas, in figure 2, it is represented by the whole diagram itself. (The R appearing in Figure 2 is not Relation but representamen, as you know.) S / O--R| \ I Figure 1. Jon's diagram for the Peircean sign. R / O---S \ I Figure 2. Sung' diagram for the Peirecan sign. R = representamen, not triadic relation, R|. With all the best. Sung -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons Indices
are more general, accommodating both rational thoughts and irretionl or non-rational decisions. (3) Changing the name of the sign-interpreatnt relation to Sentence entails a corresponding change in the name legisign, which I recommend to be changed to Patterns, since, just as sentences can be rational, or non-rational, so can Patterns be regular or irregular, ordered or disordered, organized or disorganized, thus conforming to the Yin-Yang doctrine of the Taois philosophy. (4) I almost recommended proposition instead of sentence but decided against it because proposition is too rational and too organized and mind-centered. Sentences, in contrast avoid such a bias, as pointed out above. (5) So, I think the following table is much more consistent with the recent fidnings in glottometrics and physical sciences: __ Table 1. A recommended revision of the naming of the 9 types of Peircean signs tio be compatible with recent glottometric discoveries. __ Firstness Secondness Thirdness _ Representamenqualisign sinsignpattern __ Object icon index symbol __ Interpretantletter word sentence __ With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net [1] Ji, S. (2012). The Quark Model of Peircean Signs. In: Semiotics of Life: A Unified Theory of Molecular Machines, Cells, the Mind, Peircean Signs, and the Universe based on the Principle of Information-Energy Complementarity. In: Reports, Research Group on Mathematical Iinguistics, XVII Tarragona Seminar on Formal Syntax and Semantics, Rovira i Virgili University, Tarragona, 23-27 April 2003. Available online at conformon.net under Publicaitons Proceedings and Abstracts. [2] Altmann, G.: Prolegomena to Menzeraths law. Glottometrika 2 (1980). P. 110. Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14182 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14184 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14187 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14194 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14196 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14197 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14198 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14200 Sung All, My sermon du jour, Signers in the Hands of an Angly Hermenet, pays homage to that preacher of manifestly more iconic sermons who admonished congregations down through the ages about the very Razor's Edge of which you speak, but the distance between Perice-diction and Perdition is all the Elbow Grace we need between â° and â·, so let us say amen and go in peace. We presented an earlier version of Awbrey Awbrey (1995) at a conference on Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences in 1992. It was well-received and the the reception grazed me with the impression, or illusion, that our audience was hip to all the connections, distinctions, and nuances that we sought to convey. More and more lately, however, I begin to suspect that I haven't a clue, haven't the foggiest what is passing through a random receiver's mind when I transmit these bits of diagrams and discursions by way of conveying what I have in mine. Of course, the responsibility for communicating rests with me and not my inert devices, but the longer we have the sorts of discussions we've been having here the less inclined I am to believe that there are any sorts of signs that force the mind along the intended tracks of connotation or denotation. At any rate, I hope you see the larger problem that is looming here. Regards, Jon Sungchul Ji wrote: Jon wrote: For another thing, the technical use of the term network tends to lead techies and others to read the line between O and R as referring to a dyadic relation, and similarly for the other two lines, and to think that the triadic relation denoted by R is somehow composed of or reducible to a compound of those three dyadic relations. Down that road of dyadic intentions the triadic sign relation goes all to hell. Jon, the difference between hell and heaven seems only paper-thin. You can go to hell by interpreting the diagram as a system of THREE DYADIC RELATIONS
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Not REALLY, if a REAL nominalist simply means that there is NON-REAL nominalist or PSEUDO-nominalist. Sorry for taking your humor too seriously. Sung A nominalist in name only would be a nominal nominalist. But a real nominalist would be a contradiction in terms. Checkmate ... Jon Benjamin Udell wrote: So the question is, again, do you think that numbers can be objectively investigated as numbers? - such that (individually, biologically, etc.) various intelligences, proceeding from the same assumptions, would reach the same conclusions. If you do think so, then you are a nominalist or anti-realist in name only. -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Teridentity Triadic Sign Relation
Jon wrote (091814-1) through (091814-3): First off, you appear to be confusing a category with (091814-1) a single composition triple of functions (f, g, h) such that h = f o g, and that is a serious confusion. I know there are more complex compositions than involving three mappings, f, g and h, but for my purpose it is sufficient to use the simplest category. Is that a sign of confusion? Next, you confuse a sign relation, a subset of a (091814-2) cartesian product O x S x I, with a single triple (o, s, i) in a sign relation, and that is another serious confusion. What other possible sign relations do you have in mind other than the (o, s, i) triple defined by the Cartesian product O x S x I ? And also, what are the elements of the sets, O, S and I ? Functions are defined as mappings between sets, . . . (091814-3) But not all mappings may be functions which concept never appeared in my previous email to which you are responding. I need mappings, not functions which sounds too mathematical for my taste. My impression is that you may be trying too hard to apply mathematics to biosemiotics. Your criticism of my work reminds me of what Einstein said about mathematics in general: As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they(091814-4) are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. This statement, called the Einsteins Uncertainty Thesis (EUT) in [1], may well apply to the debate between mathematicians/normative scientists and biologists/biosemioticians/physicists on these lists, leading me to suggest that As far as the laws of mathematics and normative science (091814-5) refer to biosemiosis, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to biosemiosis. For convenience, we may refer to Statement (091814-5) as the Semiotic Uncertainty Principle (SUP). With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Reference: [1] Ji, S. (2012). Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. P. 139. Thread: GR: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14086 JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14122 GR: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14123 JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14124 JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14127 GR: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14128 JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14129 SJ: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14133 Sung, In order to pursue these questions with any degree of seriousness a person would have to take the definition of a triadic sign relation and the definition of a mathematical category seriously, and so far you haven't been doing that. First off, you appear to be confusing a category with a single composition triple of functions (f, g, h) such that h = f o g, and that is a serious confusion. Next, you confuse a sign relation, a subset of a cartesian product O x S x I, with a single triple (o, s, i) in a sign relation, and that is another serious confusion. Finally, you propose what amounts to saying: f maps o to s g maps s to i h maps o to i, where h = f o g Functions are defined as mappings between sets, so we need to have names for the sets of objects, signs, and interpretant signs that are under consideration in a given discussion. Let's call those sets O, S, I, respectively. So what you are saying, more properly stated, amounts to this: f : O - S g : S - I h : O - I, where h = f o g Functions are special cases of dyadic relations. So we have the following: f is a subset of O x S g is a subset of S x I h is a subset of O x I, where h = f o g Right off the bat there is a problem. There is indeed a dyadic relation between objects and signs that can be projected out of a triadic relation, but that dyadic projection is not a function in general. Objects may have many signs that denote them, and signs may have general reference or plural denotation, just for instance. The same thing applies to all the other pairs of domains. That is not the last of the problems, not by a long shot, but it's all I have time for right now. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Teridentity Triadic Sign Relation
(For undistorted figures, see the attached.) Hi, While preparing for my interdisciplinary lecture on complementarity to first-year students at Rutgers, called a Byrne seminar, the following thoughts occurred to me today that may help apply abstract mathematical concepts to Peirces' triadic sign relation which is based on his triadic metaphysics: The Essentiality of Threeness: (1) One has NO RELATION. Two has only ONE RELATION. Three is the minimum to give rise to a RELATION between RELATIONS. The Essentiality of the Threeness for Semiosis or Communication: (2) What characterizes the Peircean sign relation is the transfer of information from the object to the interpretant mediated by the sign: fg Object -- Sign -- Interpretant | ^ | | |___| h Figure 1. The triadic sign relation of Peirce. f = sign generation; g = information transfer from the utterer to the hearer; h = coincidence of the original and the received information. Thus the composition condition of the category theory in mathematics holds, i.e., f x g = h. (3) What mathematicians call a category can be viewed as the generalization of Peirce's triadic sign relation. Both are the mechanisms or the devices for transferring information from the source to the destination through an intermediate. (4) Both Pericean sign relation and mathematical category can be represented as a diagram called the ur-category: f g A --- B --- C | ^ | | |___| h Figure 2. The ur-category to which all categories and triadic relations belong. f = information preserving mapping (e.g., sign generation); g = information-preserving mapping (e.g., Fourier transform, transcription of DNA information to mRNA information, etc.); h = coincidence of the information between its source and receiver or target. (5) Words alone are insufficient to convey the basic ideas behind the sign relations. The diagrams must be combined with words to adequately represent the subtle ideas behind the sign relation and the mathematical category and their mutual relations. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Thread: GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14086 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14122 GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14123 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14124 Gary All, The k-identity relations over a given domain X belong to the panoply of fundamental structures in the general theory of relations, and the fact that 3-identity relations suffice to generate all the other k-identity relations is a fundamental fact of that theory. It goes without saying that such fundamental structures will find application in the theory of relations, and the theory of triadic sign relations in particular, but they are themselves cast in a more general sphere than semiotics itself. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache Jon_09162014.pdf Description: Adobe PDF document - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6820] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
Edwina, To me, Mind is just one aspect of reality or the Universe. The other aspect, which may be referred to as the Mindlessness, is as fundamental and I would not be surprised at all if Peirce did mention something related to such a possibility in his writings. With all the best. Sung I disagree, Sung, for the organizational capacities of Mind are not defined as only continuous habits , but as all categorical modes, which includes the ability for adaptive novelty, the ability for direct dyadic experimental connections..and, the ability to generalize particulars into continuous commonalities. All are properties of Mind. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2014 6:08 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6820] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2 Edwina, The Universe is both organized and disorganized, because without dissipating free energy into heat (i.e, disorganization), no organization is possible. Peirce probably did not know of this principle, which emerged only in the latter part of the 20th century through the works of irreversible thermodynamicists such as I. Prigogine. Since organization and disorganization are equally important in understanding how the Universe works, the following two assertions may be accorded an equal validity: The matter of the universe is organized - and such (6820-1) actions of organization can be identified with Mind. The matter of the universe is disorganized - and such (6820-2) action of disorganization can be identified with the lack of Mind. With All the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net But Stan, aren't you thereby redefining Mind as confined to humans - who alone 'socially construct' their domain. That is, I define 'thought' as 'Mind' and consider that it is the basic organizing principle of the universe. Surely we must consider that the matter of the universe is organized - and such actions of organization, in my view, can be defined as Mind. Consciousness has nothing to do with Mind; that is, Mind would exist without consciousness. Edwina - Original Message - From: Stanley N Salthe To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2014 3:43 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6818] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2 Gary noted: Consciousness may mean any one of the three categories. But if it is to mean Thought it is more without us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in any of usâ? (letter to James, Nov. 1902). S: Why is this not just the â?~Intersubjectivityâ?T of the social constructivism perspective? That is, it is 'out there only in the sense of being in, or saturating, a particular historical moment. STAN On Sun, Sep 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Lists, Iâ?Td like to introduce here a couple of comments on Chapter 2 of NP (specifically, on the beginning of 2.5), but Iâ?Td also like to note that much of the valuable conversation on these issues has been taking place under other subject lines, and this post is meant to reflect on that previous conversation as well. Here are the first three sentences (also the first 3 paragraphs!) of NP 2.5: NP (p.44): Both Peirce's and Hussel's antipsychologicist semiotics are based on the observation that even if simple, singular signs exist, most interesting signs, beyond a certain degree of complexity, are tokens of types, and many of these, in turn, refer to general objects (Peirce) or ideal objects (Husserl). A very important rule here is the Frege-Peircean idea that the semiotic access to generality is made possible by general signs being unsaturated and schematic: the predicate function â?o_ is blueâ?, for instance, is general 1) because referring possibly to all things blue, 2) because of the generality of the predicate blue, having a schematic granularity allowing for a continuum of different particular blue shades.[i] This generality is what makes it possible for the sign to be used with identicalâ?generalâ?meaning, at the same time as the individual users are free to adorn their use with a richness of individual mental imagery and associations (like Ingardenian filling-in during literary reading) without this imagery in any way constituting meaningâ?sameness of meaning in language being granted by successful intersubjective communication, reference, and action. GF: The first sentence above explains the subtitle of this section, which is â?oThe Indispensability
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physics Semiosis
Dear Frederik, I am glad you think so. With all the best. Sung Dear Sung, lists - Interesting proposal, might be right. Best F Den 13/09/2014 kl. 20.46 skrev Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edumailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu : (For undistorted Table 1, see the attached.) Frederik wrote: . . . all of science, no exception, is conducted IN signs. (091314-1) But this does not imply that all those sciences are ABOUT signs. It seems to be that this statement may be derived logically from Peirce's classification of signs into 9 types (see Table 1 below) and 10 classes, which entails the sign having two complementary aspects - the formal (also called phenomenological or syntactic) and the material (also called ontological or semantic). For convenience, I referred to the 9 types of signs as elementary signs and 10 classes of signs as composite signs in formulating the quark model of Peircean signs in [1]. Table 1. Peirce's classification of signs into 9 types (here called elementary signs'). An elementary sign can be denoted as S_x,y, where x and y vary from 1 to 3 as shown below. ___ MATERIAL (y) FORMAL (x) 1ns 2ns 3ns 1ns (Representamen)qualisign sinsign legisign S11 S12 S13 2ns (Object) icon indexsymbol S21 S21 S23 3ns (Interpretant) rheme dicisign argument S31 S32 S33 Out of these 9 elementary signs , Peirce generated 10 composite signs, each produced by combining 3 elementary signs chosen and arranged in such a manner that the following two conditions are met: (i) The order of the first index, x, must be 3, 2 and 1, resulting in the composite sign, S3,i-S2,j-S1,k, and (ii) the order of the second index, y, in the composite sign, denoted as i, j and k, must obey the rule that i cannot be larger than j which in turn cannot be larger than k, which was referred to as the Peircean selection rule [1]. The essence of these rules is that, although the order of the first indexes of the three elementary signs constituting a composite sign is fixed as 3ns, 2ns and 1ns, the order of the second indexes is not so rigidly fixed so that one category can be represented more than once (as in S31-S21-S12, called rhematic iconic sinsgin, an individual diagram) or not at all (as in S32-S22-S12, dicisign indexical sinsign, pointer position in a meter). This is why I have been claiming that All signs are triadic formally but can be (091314-2) less that triadic materially. which to me is synonymous with (091314-1). With all the best. Sung - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6785] Re: Physics Semiosis: the
Edwina wrote: . . . a sign is a triadic 'set' of three relations (6795-1) - that between the Representamen and the Object; the Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen and the Interpretant. I disagree. To me, A sign is a TRIADIC RELATION among the Representamen,(6795-2) the Object, and the Interpretant (which relation being a MATHEMATICAL CATEGORY) and not A SET OF THREE DYADIC RELATIONS -- that between the Representamen and the Object; that between the Representamen and itself; and that between the Representamen and the Interpretant. In other words, I claim that A TRIADIC SET of three DYADIC RELATIONS is not the same (6795-3) as a TRIADIC RELATION among three relata, because the latter is by definition a mathematical category while the former need not be so. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Frederik - a sign is a triadic 'set' of three relations - that between the Representamen and the Object; the Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen and the Interpretant. That's 'triadicity' in my view. These three relations can be in any of the three categorical modes. Thirdness is a specific categorical mode of organization, and yes, all regularity falls within this particular mode. 'Thirdness', as a category, is not a sign - for the sign is a triadic 'set', eg, a Dicent Symbolic Legisign. ...where two of the relations are in a mode of Thirdness and one is in a mode of Secondness. Edwina - Original Message - From: Frederik Stjernfelt To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce List Sent: Saturday, September 13, 2014 4:50 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6785] Re: Physics Semiosis: the Dear Edwina, Stan, lists - But there is triadicity all over the place - all regularity, vague or strong, in the universe falls under Peirce's category of Thirdness. But not all thirdnesses are signs - even if they form a condition of possibility for signs to emerge Best F John, I don't think that these opposing views - whether semiosic actions take place within the physico-chemical realm or only begin in the biological realm - can be definitively resolved. I, for one, like Stan, firmly believe that semiosis operates within the physico-chemical realm; that is, that even an atom emerges within a triadic relation - even if such atom has nil capacity for adaptation within that semiosis - as in the biological realm. As for 'all of science is conducted in signs'...I think this is vague. Science is a human activity. Or, is this statement meant to refer to matter...i.e., all that is material is conducted in signs'. I agree with Frederik that studying semiosic functions within the physico-chemical realm probably does little to provide new knowledge about that realm, but, I agree with Stan that it could examine the emergence of life from that realm. And I'm afraid that my intellectual dimness means that I can't see much difference between your pansemiosis and physiosemiosis...in that both acknowledge that semiosis operates within the physico-chemical realm. After all, physiosemiosis, in order to explore 'where and how', first has to acknowledge that semiosis actually exists in that realm. Edwina -- - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physics Semiosis
Clark wrote in response to my statement (091114-1) below that DNA stands for (phenotypes of living cells) for people. (091214-1) Which I agree with. But the point Clark seems to be missing is the fact that DNA stands for phenotypes for living cells as well. (091214-2) The truth of (091214-2) is evident because cells have been reading DNA long before we humans appeared on this planet (in fact we would not be here if cells could not read DNA) and long before the 20th century when humans discovered this fact. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net On Sep 11, 2014, at 6:41 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: I agree. ÂZ stands for X for YÂ would be an example of smiosis. A concrete example of this would be ÂDNA stands for phenotypes for living cells.Â(091114-1) If I understand him correctly, I donât think that would count as an example. While I donât want to speak for Frederik, I suspect heâd say properly that is DNA stands for (phenotypes of living cells) for people So thereâd be indexical relationships between phenotypes and parts of DNA but that stands for would be on the human side. (Assuming I have your example correct - apologies if Iâm misreading you) I think he wants something more like Mice have eyes to see There we could break that down as eyes - seeing for mice What Frederik is getting at is that âfor miceâ or âto miceâ is possible in biology but thereâs nothing equivalent in physics. The âforâ is always âfor humansâ or more accurately âfor physicists thinking about this. Now as I quibbled I think observers play an abstract role in both QM and GR. As such itâs quite possible to treat observers as a general (in the Peircean sense) that allows the phenomena to change. (Collapse of the wave function not being tied merely to human observers, for example) However I think nearly all physicists see that as an artifact. That is most see it as at best an embarrassment of the way we speak about it and at worse an highly unlikely interpretation. I do think that this distinction between âwhatâs really going onâ and âwhat scientists think about itâ leads to problems. (Itâs an ambiguity that I think frequently plagues philosophy of science - especially naive discussions of physicalism) However ignoring that much more subtle issue I raised in my last post, I have to concede Frederickâs point. At best I think it possible physics will change in the future. Iâm actually very sympathetic to getting rid of observer talk out of physics - I think itâs often a remnant of the neo-kantian approach to science from the early 20th century. Theory is often cast in an epistemological framework rather than an ontological/physical one. However Iâm also quite open to it being impossible to get rid of - especially given my Peircean commitments regarding the universe being filled with mind. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions
Gary F wrote: *a relation can be the object of a sign*. (S090214-1) Beautifully put. Yes. The iconic relation between the reprentamen and its object is called an icon. The causal relation between the representamen and its object is called an index. The conventional or habitual relation between the representamen and its object is called a symbol. Therefore, The frequent criticism we hear on these (S090214-2) lists that 'A symbol is NOT A SIGN but one of the three representamen-object relations' is based on an incomplete understanding of the meaning of the signs. Statement (S090214-1) applies not only to the 9 TYPES of signs of Peirce but also to his 10 CLASSES of triadic signs as well. This why in the quark model of signs first proposed in 2004 [1] and described in great deal in [biosemiotics:46] dated December 16, 2012, I referred to the 9 types of signs as elementary signs and the 10 classes of triadic signs as composite signs. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Reference: [1] Ji, S. Ji, S. (2004b). Semiotics of Life: A Unified Theory of Molecular Machines, Cells, the Mind, Peircean Signs, and the Universe Based on the Principle of Information-Energy Complementarity, in: Reports, Research Group on Mathematical Linguistics, XVII Tarragona Seminar on Formal Syntax and Semantics, Rovira i Virgili University, Tarragona, Spain, April 23-27, 2003. Available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Proceedings and Abstracts. Section 7.5.1. Edwina, yes, I think we all know that you use the Peircean term of 'representamen' for this mediate sign...rather than sign - and that Peirce himself often used the term sign for representamen, as I did in part of my post. Speaking of relations, one specific point about relations in semiosis is that *a relation can be the object of a sign*. This is crucial to our comprehension of the dicisign, as we'll see when we get into Chapter 3. gary f. -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 2-Sep-14 10:55 AM Edwina, Setting terminology aside for just a moment, there is at present a general lack of understanding as to what constitutes (1) a relation, (2) a triadic relation, (3) a triadic sign relation. Those subjects are treated by Peirce in his logic of relative terms and the corresponding mathematics of relations, all of which is clear enough in his early papers. Without a grasp of that background, most of what he writes later is doomed to be mis-interpreted. Jon Edwina Taborsky wrote: Gary F - thanks for this introduction. I think it's important to clarify that, first, the interactions between the sign and the object; and the sign and the interpretant, are relations - my use of this term has prompted serious criticism on the Peirce list! I continue to use the Peircean term of 'representamen' for this mediate sign...rather than sign. I confine the term 'sign' to the full triad of object-representamen-interpretant. And I think it's important to acknowledge that there are nine such relations available to semiosis - not just the three of icon, index and symbol - which refer anyway, only to the relation of the representamen to the object and ignore the other two vital semiosic processes of the representamen-in-itself and the relation to the interpretant. Edwina -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Jon wrote: In technical perspective, none of that makes (S090214-1) much sense. A sign relation is a set of triples of the form (object, sign, interpretant). The things that participate in that sign relation have the roles they have only on account of the places they take in that sign relation. I take (S090214-1) to me that The Peircean sign is a mathematical category. (S090214-2) If (S090214-2) is true, then it would follow that The Peircean sign is a triad of object, representamen(S090214-3) and interpretant that obeys the composition condition of a mathematical category. In a plane language, (S090214-3) sates that The composition condition simply means that the (S090214-4) reprsentamen-interpretant relation must be constrained by or is consistent with the representamen-object relation so that there results a non-arbitrary object-interpretant relation. In other words, The object-representamen-interpretant relation (S090214-5) is one triadic relation. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Re: Edwina Taborsky At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13843 Edwina, I think we have to recognize the difference between informal discussions and technical discussions. Skewly akin to that is the difference between scriptural hermeneutics and scientific theorizing. In casual discussions of semiotics we tend to focus on individual objects, individual signs, or at most individual triples of the form (object, sign, interpretant), and we speak of classifying the sign according to its properties and relations in that context. In technical perspective, none of that makes much sense. A sign relation is a set of triples of the form (object, sign, interpretant). The things that participate in that sign relation have the roles they have only on account of the places they take in that sign relation. That is just the bare minimum of what it will take to make any progress in semiotics. Regards, Jon Edwina Taborsky wrote: I agree with your comment, Jon, that there is a lack of understanding of 'a relation', a 'triadic relation' and a 'triadic sign relation'. BUT, since many of us who acknowledge the analysis of Peirce are not mathematicians, then surely, there is some way to arrive at such an understanding without also being a mathematician. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca Cc: Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 10:54 AM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions Re: Edwina Taborsky At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13840 Edwina, Setting terminology aside for just a moment, there is at present a general lack of understanding as to what constitutes (1) a relation, (2) a triadic relation, (3) a triadic sign relation. Those subjects are treated by Peirce in his logic of relative terms and the corresponding mathematics of relations, all of which is clear enough in his early papers. Without a grasp of that background, most of what he writes later is doomed to be mis-interpreted. Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions
Dear John N, Let me expose my ignorance. What is suprasubjectivity? With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net But do note that what all relations have in common is suprasubjectivity -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2014 9:55 To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Gary Fuhrman; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions Re: Edwina Taborsky At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13840 Edwina, Setting terminology aside for just a moment, there is at present a general lack of understanding as to what constitutes (1) a relation, (2) a triadic relation, (3) a triadic sign relation. Those subjects are treated by Peirce in his logic of relative terms and the corresponding mathematics of relations, all of which is clear enough in his early papers. Without a grasp of that background, most of what he writes later is doomed to be mis-interpreted. Jon Edwina Taborsky wrote: Gary F - thanks for this introduction. I think it's important to clarify that, first, the interactions between the sign and the object; and the sign and the interpretant, are relations - my use of this term has prompted serious criticism on the Peirce list! I continue to use the Peircean term of 'representamen' for this mediate sign...rather than sign. I confine the term 'sign' to the full triad of object-representamen-interpretant. And I think it's important to acknowledge that there are nine such relations available to semiosis - not just the three of icon, index and symbol - which refer anyway, only to the relation of the representamen to the object and ignore the other two vital semiosic processes of the representamen-in-itself and the relation to the interpretant. Edwina -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Q. Why is there so much falsity in the world?
I agree with Edwina, for once, The Taoist philosophy extols moo-wee (in Korean) which translates into no action or not doing as far better than doing something unnecessary, wasteful, harmful or stupid. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net That's an interesting comment, Gary R - but I don't agree. I don't think that creativity is something that can or must be taught. I think that we humans are naturally curious, exploratory and thus, creative. You can watch any young child at play to see this, as they put together strange sandpile shapes or figure out how to manipulate a parent to get that extra sweet. I don't think that destruction is the default position - which it would be if you assume that creativity only exists IF it is taught. I think that destruction emerges out of psychological angst and anger - and - it is not in itself always 'taught', i.e., the result of childhood abuse. I think that sociopathic behaviour can be innate. As for doing nothing - I don't consider it destructive or leading to decline. Releasing oneself from the bondage of action in a retreat is not a destructive action in many ideologies, eg, Buddhist, Christian retreat. Edwina - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Jon Awbrey ; Peirce List 1 Sent: Monday, September 01, 2014 6:57 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Q. Why is there so much falsity in the world? Edwina, Jon, list, A friend of mine, a Peirce scholar not currently in this forum, just happened to include this comment in a personal note. I thought it had some relevance. To the extent that humans are not taught to be creative, they will be destructive (even if only by default; even doing nothing is destructive, or leads to decline). Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 4:00 PM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: You are playing games with us, Jon! You haven't said WHY you consider that people 'prefer falsity to truth, illusion to reality'. And I don't agree with your conclusion, for it carries within it an assumption that truth and reality are unpleasant. Are they? What about - the fact (truth, reality) that our species has the greatest capacity of all living organisms to 'imagine' the world. That capacity for imagination enables man to invent - something that animals, for the most part, have little capacity to do. Rather than waiting for evolution to develop wings, man imagines flying and invents the airplane. And email and And in his capacity for invention, man must deal with truth and reality. Or, the plane won't fly and the computer won't exist or work. So, aren't we a combination of both? And thus, don't we require both? Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net To: Peirce List 1 peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, September 01, 2014 3:50 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Q. Why is there so much falsity in the world? A. Because people prefer falsity to truth, illusion to reality. â Being the drift of my reflections on the plays I saw at Stratford this summer â King Lear, King John, Man of La Mancha, Alice Through the Looking-Glass, Crazy for You, Hay Fever. â The Beauxâ Stratagem ⢠Masks, Madness, Shakespeare's Sonnets ⢠Anthony and Cleopatra â http://web.archive.org/web/2014073015/http://www.stratfordfestival.ca/mobile/plays.aspx?id=63 http://web.archive.org/web/20140901185642/http://www.stratfordfestival.ca/forum/showcases.aspx?id=20472 â The obligatory report on What I Did This Summer, but not unrelated to pressing problems of logic. Cheers, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6536] Re: Abduction,
Gary, Howard, lists,
It seems to me that Fistness of Peirce by definition cannot be Form or
Matter, since Firstness exists all by itself without anything else.
Matter and Form are two and hence must be post-Firstness.
One possibility may be that Firstness is neither Matter nor Form but can
appear to the human mind as From or Matter, or both, depending on how one
prescinds Reality, just as light is neither waves or particles (according
to N. Bohr) but can appear as such upon measurement.
With all the best.
Sung
__
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
Howard,
You asked: Did Peirce himself compare or contrast his Firstness with
Aristotle's Essences?
I don't know of any place where he does this explicitly, but perhaps
someone else on one of these lists does. Meanwhile, you might find this
passage (that Peirce wrote for Baldwin's Dictionary) of interest
(Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, The Macmillan Co.,
New
York, vol. 2, pp. 50-55 (1902):
CP. 6.353. *Matter and Form*
The word matter (Lat. materia, which was used to translate the Gr. {hylé})
is often employed where the more appropriate Greek word would be {söma}
corpus, body; or {to hypokeimenon}, subjectum, or even {hé hypostasis},
translated person in theology. Form (Lat. forma, used to translate the Gr.
{morphé} and {eidos}, though the latter is more exactly represented by
species) is often employed where {schéma} figure, or {typos}, shape, would
be near equivalents. The Greek expressions {morphé, paradeigma, eidos,
idea, to ti esti, to ti en einai} are pretty nearly synonymous.
354. The distinction of matter and form was first made, apparently, by
Aristotle. It almost involves his metaphysical doctrine; and as long as
his
reign lasted it was dominant. Afterwards it was in disfavour; but Kant
applied the terms, as he did many others drawn from the same source, to an
analogous but widely different distinction. In many special phrases the
Aristotelian and Kantian senses almost coalesce, in] others they are quite
disconnected. It will, therefore, be convenient to consider: (1) the
Aristotelian distinction; (2) the Kantian distinction; and (3) special
applications.* [I have quoted only *The Aristotelian distinction*. GR]*
355. *The Aristotelian distinction*. Not only was the distinction
originated by Aristotle, but one of the two conceptions, that of matter,
is
largely due to him. Indeed, it is perhaps true that the Greek word for
matter in the sense of material, {hylé}, was never understood in that
general sense before Aristotle came to Athens. For the first
unquestionable
cases of that meaning occur in certain dialogues of Plato, concerning
which
-- though there are no dates that are not open to dispute -- it seems to
the present writer that it is as certain as any such fact in the history
of
Greek philosophy that the earliest of them was written about the time of
Aristotle's arrival. It is true that, as Aristotle himself says, matter
was
the earliest philosophical conception. For the first Ionian philosophers
directed their thoughts to the question what the world was made of. But
the
extreme vagueness of the notion with them is shown by their calling it {he
arché} the beginning, by the nonsense of the question, and by many more
special symptoms. If the philosophical conception of matter distinguished
the metaphysics of Aristotle that of Plato had been no less marked by its
extraordinary development of the notion of form, to which the mixed
morality and questioning spirit of Socrates had naturally led up; the
morality, because the form is the complex of characters that a thing ought
to have; the questioning, because it drew attention to the difference
between those elements of truth which experience brutally forces upon us,
and those of which reason persuades us, which latter make up the form. But
Aristotle's distinction set form, as well as matter, in a new light.
356. It must not be forgotten that Aristotle was an Asclepiad, that is,
that he belonged to a family which for generation after generation, from
prehistoric times, had had their attention turned to vital phenomena; and
he is almost as remarkable for his capacity as a naturalist as he is for
his incapacity in physics and mathematics. He must have had prominently
before his mind the fact that all eggs are very much alike, and all seeds
are very much alike, while the animals that grow out of the one, the
plants
that grow out of the other, are as different as possible. Accordingly, his
dunamis is germinal being, not amounting to existence; while his entelechy
is the perfect thing that ought to grow out of that germ. Matter, which he
associates with stuff, timber, metal
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness
Edwina, You do not seem to understand my question. Let me repeat it from [biosemiotics:6537], which was in response to your remark that Secondness, after all, is a mode of organization of matter which produces morphologies interacting only within brute action and reaction. There are NO LAWS. My question was: How can anything be organized without obeying LAWS ? Do you think it can ? With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net I have said that I disagree that all three categorical modes are always present in a triadic Sign. My examples have been taken from the ten classes of signs provided by Peirce (2.254). Therefore, a sign with all three relations in a mode of Firstness or Secondness does exist. Sung asked - how can there be anything without Form; he seems to be under the misapprehension that Thirdness provides the Form - and I reject such an assumption. First, I don't separate matter and form except intellectually. Matter cannot exist without form. But form is not Thirdness. Thirdness is the laws-of-habitual formation, which enables continuity of type. But matter can certainly exist without continuity - and when it does, for example, it can be in a mode of Firstness (a local, instantaneous formation of matter) or Secondness (a local current-time formation of matter that exists only in interaction with another form of matter). The laws of continuity (Thirdness) need not have any part in these two modes of organization. Indeed, the reality of these two modes provides the vital potentiality for chance, for innovation, for the development of novel biological species, for the testing of adaptations and so on. Thirdness, or the mode of habits and continuity, would prevent such freedoms. Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness
Edwina wrote: A category of Firstness can, in no way, be (082614-1) a category of Secondness nor can it be a category of Thirdness. Right, and this is because, as Ben pointed out (and I agreed), all phenomena have three basic aspects -- Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness -- that cannot be separated except in our head through the process of what Peirce called prescinding. In other words, all the three universal categories of Peirce apply to all phenomena EQUALLY and SIMULTANEOUSLY. Secondness, after all, is a mode of organization (082614-2) of matter which produces morphologies interacting only within brute action and reaction. There are NO LAWS. How can anything be organized without obeying LAWS ? Such an erroneous conclusion can be avoided if it is understood that all phenomena obey laws and that Secondness is just a prescinded aspect of phenomena and hence obeys laws as well. with all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net 1][Ben] You have not explained what is so confining about seeing the sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as third, in a general way. You have not explained how that creates a problem for the sign classes. You have not said whether you agree or disagree with Peirce about whether all three universal categories are in every phenomenon. I'm less sure than ever of what you mean by calling a sign a triad. Maybe you mean a trichotomy, a three-way classification. [Edwina] 1) The first sentence 'sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as third' cannot refer to the three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, for these categories are modes of organization of matter/concepts. Yet, from what I read of some people on this blog, they seem to see these terms as merged. But a sign, which I understand as a Representamen, i.e., the mediative Relation in the triad of the Sign, cannot exist per se on its own. It is a Relation, an interaction, not a thing in itself. So- the sentence 'sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as third'...can't refer to all three sites (sign, object, interpretant) as each existent on their own. It has to refer to a triadic interaction of three Relations...where the Representamen within, let's say, a human being, is stimulated by external data inputting from an object; this external data is mediated by that Representamen Relation...and transformed into the Interpretant. That's the triadic process. The SIGN is made up of an active process of three Relations. [Ben] Peirce discusses sign, object, and interpretant quite as if they were _relatives_, not _relationships_. In that spirit, he calls them _correlates_, not _correlations_. In logic, he speaks of the logic of relatives, not the logic of relations. He's pretty consistent about that sort of thing through the years. EDWINA: That's strange - in 6.318, Peirce writes 'I have, since 1870, written much about the logic of relations..but, not to quibble, his intense study of the logic of relatives (see CP vol 3; see also his discussion in 1.563-4 on categories and 'the 'logic of relatives' and 'non-relative characters and ..relations between pairs of objects. These are logical interactions between objects. BUT THIS is not what I am talking about. I'm talking about the constitution of the SIGN. And I don't see that Peirce discusses these three aspects of the ONE SIGN, the triad, as 'relatives'. Each part of the triad does not exist per se on its own. He himself calls the three parts 'correlates'. As he says, 'reasoning is of a triadic constitution' 6.321 and he refers to thought itself as 'involves a triadic relation 6.321. And he goes on in this section, to discuss relations, relationships and 'three correlates'. Then, he continues on 'For forty yearsI have been constantly on the alert to find a genuine triadic relation - that is, one that does not consist in a mere collocation of dyadic relationsand he continues on in this whole section 6.322, to discuss triadic relations, triadic relationship..and continues on in 6.323 discussing triadic relationships. In 1.564, he outlines his definition of the representamen, the interpretant and the object which he also calls correlates.See also 2.228. The point of this triad is that the interactions between them are actions that are irreducibly connected with each other. As he says the most important class of triadic relations, those of signs or representamens, to their objects and interpretants 2.233. I read this as meaning that the Representamen has a RELATION to its object and its interpretant. His triadic relations are outlined in 2.234 and from these, we can derive the ten
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6535] Re: Abduction,
Edwina wrote: For me, everything, from the smallest atom(6535-1) to a society is a triadic 'morpheme' of a semiosic process. Please remember that Not all triads are semiosic. (6535-2) For example, y = f(x) may not have anything to do with semiosis, although it contains three elements, y, f and x, which you often associate with output, mediation and input, respectively. Triadic processes will constitute semiosis if and (6535-3) only if they can be shown to be a MATHEMATICAL CATEGORY, i.e., obey the composition condition, which imposes stringent constraints probably not readily met by most triadic processes in atomic physics and chemistry. If Statement (6535-3) turns out to be true, the following corollary would results: It is impossible to tell whether a triad is semiosic(6535-4) unless and until the mathematical category theory is applied. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Mary- yes, I have checked out my copy of Spencer-Brown's Laws of Form - he does reference Peirce; I have long admired Spencer-Brown's focus on morphology, without much of an ability to understand his complex analysis. Ben - I'm beginning to think that a basic reason for our 'two parallel walks' with reference to your and my understanding of Peirce is that you (and others) acknowledge that there is a pre-semiotic world, whereas, I do not. For me, everything, from the smallest atom to a society is a triadic 'morpheme' of a semiosic process. Edwina - Original Message - From: Libertin, Mary To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Monday, August 25, 2014 8:19 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6529] Re: Abduction, Edwina, Ben, Gary, Helmut, Sung and list, I appreciate the confusion. Mine is limited to understanding the process of musement in Peirce's ¡°The Neglected Argument.¡± I applied the play of musement, Peirce¡¯s abduction, deduction, induction, to James Joyce¡¯s works in 1983, but I changed my mind and switched induction and deduction, temporarily, in my classes on Joyce. Recently I returned to defining musement as abduction, deduction and induction. I have no answer that explains the interaction of the Three Relations and the Three Categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. I think Peirce would try to consider the purpose behind the application. I also think it worthwhile to understand it in relation to Peirce¡¯s Existential Graphs, using the Phemic sheet or sheet of assertion. I am thinking of George Spencer-Brown¡¯s Laws of Form, chapter 12, in relation to this discussion of Peirce. It illustrates the importance of the position of the observer. I will provide an extensive quote rather than try to paraphrase him. I do not have the ability to draw circles to copy his figures, but I provide instructions on how it can be drawn. I believe that it is interesting even to those not interested in Brown¡¯s ideas. His ideas do we much to Peirce, who is referenced in Brown¡¯s notes. Here is the passage that puts Peirce into perspective in my opinion: Let us imagine that, instead of writing on the surface of the Earth. Ignoring rabbit holes, etc, we may take it to be a surface of genus 0. Suppose [here Brown inserts a figure with one large circle with a small letter a outside of the circle. Imagine that in the space below. Then inside the large circle draw two separate smaller circles. The circle on the left is labeled b and the circle on the right is labeled c. You will see that b and c are in a circle that is inside another circle. A is outside.] To make it readable from another planet, we write it large. Suppose we draw the outer bracket trough the Equator, and make the brackets containing b and c follow the coastlines of Australia and the South Island of New Zealand respectively. Above is how the expression will appear from somewhere in the Northern Hemisphere, say London. But let us travel. Arriving at Capetown we see [here Brown draws three separate circles containing b, c, and a, respectively] Sailing on to Melbourne, we see [end of page 83 in Laws of Form] [here there is the original format with two circles inside a larger circle but the letters are different. A and c are in the left and right circles. B is outside] And proceeding from there to Christchurch, we see [here there is the original format but A and b are on the inner circles and C is outside.] These four expressions are distinct and not equivalent. Thus it is evidently not enough merely to write down an expression, even on a surface of genus 0, and expect it to be understood. We must also
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: C.S. Peirce ⢠Syllabus ⢠Selection 1
Jon, Jerry, lists, Can we not regard the Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdndness themselves as constituting a mathematical category ? With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Jerry, I probably should explain that I don't have a strong interest in classifications of scientific busy-ness for their own sake, and perhaps have a slight aversion to them, largely on account of the tendency for discussions of their abstract formalisms to become detached from their concrete contents and run to à priori disputations of little to no practical consequence. But I keep coming back to Peirce's statement at the end of this selection whenever I find myself puzzling over the relationship between logic (as a normative science) and mathematics, so I was drawn somewhat against my natural inclination to examine its context. At any rate, I would probably avoid using the word categories for these classes of affairs as that word is confounded to much already in recent discussions. Regards, Jon Jon Awbrey wrote: Jerry, Thanks, you are very welcome. I have to run right now, but just a quick note on your point 6. I think Peirce is using the word business in the generic sense of any practical activity that people busy themselves about, not necessarily in the commercial or corporate sense. In that sense it is indeed one of the meanings of the ancient Greek word pragma. Regards, Jon Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List, Jon: Thanks for posting this quote. On Aug 25, 2014, at 10:10 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: An Outline Classification of the Sciences 180. This classification, which aims to base itself on the principal affinities of the objects classified, is concerned not with all possible sciences, nor with so many branches of knowledge, but with sciences in their present condition, as so many businesses of groups of living men. It borrows its idea from Comte's classification; namely, the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other. Comments: Note the extreme constraints that CSP expresses so clearly. These constraints are often ignored in current discussions. I would pose the following interrogatories: 1. What served as the principle affinities of objects when the classification was made? 2. In the subsequent Century, have any of these affinities changed? 3. Why did CSP choose to omit some sciences? 4. Why did CSP choose to ignore some branches of knowledge? 5. Which sciences have remained in the same condition over the ensuing time span? 6. Why did CSP draw the analogy with businessmen? (A pragmatic question?) 7. How can we arrange the fundamental principles of todayâs sciences into a pattern that meets this stringent criteria of precursors of principles relation or categorization? 8. How would a logic of categories contribute to the construction of principle relations? Cheers Jerry -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abduction, 1ns, Induction, 2ns, Deduction, 3ns and Peirce's brief confusion
Gary R, Helmut, lists, It is interesting that my assignment proposed in [biosemiotics:6468] agrees with Peirce's: Sung: Choice I, i.e., A = Abduction; B =Induction;(6467-1) C = Deduction With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net *Helmut, Cathy, Josh, Mary, lists, * *On several occasions over the years I've taken up the matter of the categorial assignations Peirce gave deduction and induction, the most recent being a peirce-l post of March, 2012, in response to Cathy Legg writing: I don't see how one might interpret induction as secondness though. Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the secondness of surprise due to error. https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00747.html https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu/msg00747.html* *So, this is a subject which clearly keeps coming up, most recently by you, Helmut, while a couple of weeks ago Cathy and Josh Black, at the Peirce Centennial Congress at U.Mass--or more precisely, on the way from that Congress to Milford, PA, where a group of us placed a plaque commemorating that Congress on a wall of Arisbe, Peirce's home there--both held for induction as 3ns and deduction as 2ns, while I've been arguing, as has Mary Libertin on the biosemiotics list recently, just the reverse, that, except for a brief lapse (discusses below), Peirce saw induction as 2ns and deduction as 3ns. * *One can find in Patricia Ann Turrisi's edition of the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism notes for Lecture 5: The Normative Sciences a long note (#3) from which the following excerpt gives an account of Peirce's lapse (his brief change of mind in the categorial assignations), the reason for it, and his late tendency to more or less settle his opinion again as deduction being 3ns and induction 2ns. He writes:* *Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference* *through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or* *trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus* *connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations* *of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected* *with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness,* *Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed* *by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction* *split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of* *Qualities. . . (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right* *Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed.* *276-7).* * Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the matter. * *[In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns* *Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty* *well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is* *the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh* *volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite* *understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction* *in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures* *here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the* *third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277].* * In the sense that for a few years Peirce was confused about these categorial associations of the inference patterns, he is at least partially at fault in creating confusion in the minds of many scholars about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns. Still, he finally sees the error of his ways and corrects himself: * *At present [1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my* *original opinion.* *And yet he adds that he will leave the question undecided. * *Still, after 1903 he never again associates deduction with anything but 3ns, nor induction with anything but 2ns. * *As I wrote in 2012: * *GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but* *thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I* *mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in* *methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in* *consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very* *late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the* *section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468* *- 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction* *(here, 'retroduction', of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the* *retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising
Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary R, Gary F, list, From my cherry-picking readings in the orchard of Peirce, I gathered the impression that Every phenomenon has three aspects he called (081314-1) Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. If this impression of mine is true, why can't phaneron itself have these three aspects, so that there may be (i) phaneron AS IS (i.e., quality), (ii) phaneron AS ENCOUNTERED/EXPERIENCED (i.e., actuality), and (iii) phaneron AS CONCEPTUALIZED/ABSTRACTED/THEORIZED (i.e. lawfulness) ? With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Gary F, list, I'm not at all convinced of the following. GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single feeling is the Firstness of that moment, and the various constituents are the products of the destructive distillation which follows upon reflection as the phenomenon is 'objectified', and not until then do they appear separately [. . . ] the phaneroscopist, who is trying to figure out how anything can *appear* to any kind of mind, considers experience more holistically. Or at least I do, and I think Peirce did. [You then quoted a snippet at EP2:368]. However, it seems to me that one ought to be careful not to conflate what is admittedly the firstness that is the single feeling . . . of that moment of the phaneron with the firstnesses of the individual qualities within the phaneron--certainly the quality 'red' is in no way like the qualities 'round' or 'solid' or 'cool'. They are sui generis and exactly *what each is *in the phaneron. And I think it may be in consideration of this distinction that Andre de Tienne has argued that phenomenology consists not only of 'phaneroscopy' but also of 'iconoscopy' (in my--and, in truth, his--opinion, the second being a wholly inadequate term for the study of those individual qualities and characters appearing within the phaneron). So, earlier in the passage from which you quoted, Peirce writes: [T]hough we cannot prescind redness from superficial extension, we can easily distinguish it from superficial extension, owing (for one thing) to our being able to prescind the latter from the former. Sealing wax red, then is a Priman (EP2. 267). Peirce immediately continues: [Sealing wax red, then is a Priman.] // So is any other quality of feeling. Now the whole content of consciousness is made up of qualities of feeling (EP2.267) [Note the plural: *qualities* of feeling]. So, again, I think that something like de Tienne's 2nd phenomenological science is required since, at the moment of our phenomenological experience, we experience (feel) not only the phaneron in its integrity, but also 'red' as a quality altogether different from the quality 'round', etc. The the attempt to sublate these different qualities into the phaneron seems to me extremely problematic. Perhaps this is why you concluded your post: GF: On the other hand, the question of whether there are many firsts or only one per moment is like the semiotic question of whether a sign such as a proposition has a number of objects or just one complex object. It all depends on the context and the purpose of your analysis. Still, I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our *phenomenological experience* those several qualities are felt as distinct. Best, Gary R. *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 8:29 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: Gary, John, list, GR: Although I agree that Firstness (rather, any given First as quality or character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality, I'm not so certain that we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural. Doesn't it happen that within a moment of a single experience that several Firsts can appear, so that I may be simultaneously aware of, say, the redness, the roundness, the coolness, and the solidity of the apple which I hold in my hand--and without putting a 'word' to any--and surely not in that moment to all--of them? GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is the experience of that moment of the phaneron. The quality of that single feeling is the Firstness of that moment
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6418] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Edwina wrote: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are not (6418-1) 'different aspects of the same entity'. A sign, which is an entity, can exist within only one or two or all three of the categorical modes. . . . Claudio Guerri wrote ( 8/10/2014, PEIRECE-L): . . . all signs have to be considered in its triadic (6418-2) aspects: Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. But, Firstness can not be considered in its own, but related to the other two aspects. Considering a very abstract sign, Firstness can be a feeling and a Qualisign: redness... But 'redness' needs a word, so it involves Thirdness, and it can not exist without the experienced brute force of lots of red objects, so Secondness is also present. . . . My understanding of Peirce is consistent with (6418-2) but not with (6418-2). With all the best. Sung No, Sung, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are not 'different aspects of the same entity'. A sign, which is an entity, can exist within only one or two or all three of the categorical modes. And these are not different aspects - which is trivial (gas and liquid) but have different fundamental roles. Firstness enables novelty; Secondness enables particularity; Thirdness enables continuity. I am now beginning to wonder whether you and Howard are indeed dualists, but rather, materialists, for 'Mind' seems to be absent from your analytic frames. The Platonic model of Form and Matter IS dualistic, as is the Cartesian, for in this analytic frame, 'Form' plays the role of Mind, or, the organizing principle. Howard's 'symbols' seem to play this role in his analysis but, from what I can gather, they seem to be, like your Form, material. Therefore, one wonders what is the functionality of two different 'material aspects of the same material entity'? At least in the dualistic model, there IS a function and it is not a material - that of Mind. To insist on the requirement of 'measurement' (or interaction with an Other) for both the wave and particle puts the wave into a mode of existential particularity. To declare that 'something exists' without interaction is Platonic idealism (his Form). The objective idealist analytic frame instead declares that the wave or 'potentiality' CAN NEVER EXIST per se; it is potentiality not actuality and therefore is REAL but not EXISTENTIAL. Aristotle most certainly was NOT a 'complementarian' as you describe yourself (and as Howard describes himself) for his analysis of the difference between the potential and the actual never reduced the former - as you and Howard do - to the material. Oh- and I'm not into 'argument ad populum'; there's no need to assert your own position by claiming that many others agree with you. The argument has to stand on its own merits. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Sunday, August 10, 2014 2:48 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6414] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Edwina wrote: I don't see that there is any way to resolve the (6410-1) conflict between the complementary model (which I consider dualistic) of Form and Matter (held by Howard and Sung) with the Peircean model which rejects such an analysis. You are mis-understanding my view of complementarity (and most likely that of Howard). I am not a dualist as you assume in that I do not separate waves and particles in quantum objects (or Form and Matter in ordinary objects) but consider them as different aspects of the same entity (as Peirce considered Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as three basic aspects of all phemonena). Physicists often refer to quantum objects 'quons' [1] or 'wavicles'. It is my understanding that Bohm (1917-1992) believed that quons possessed wave and particle properties both before and after measurement (as did de Broglie, Einstein, and Schoredinger) while Bohr (1885-1962) believed that quons are neither particles nor waves before measurement and exhibited one of these behaviors only upon measurement. My impression is that no experimental data nor theories now exist in physics that can discriminate between these two models of quons. This almost a century-old conundrum in physics may be attribute to the Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics (UAM) (for which I have further evidence to be posted later), or the unreasonable arbitrariness of languages (UAL) in general embodied in the well-known concepts of ineffability, the unknowable, etc. If I may correct your mis-undertanding of my philosophical position, I would like to call myself a complementarian, not a dualist, nor a monist. I think Laozi, Aristotle, Spinoza, Merleau-Ponty, Bohr, and Pattee (and probably many others, including some members on this list) belong to the category of complementarians. With all the best Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary F wrote: . . . firstness, secondness and thirdness are (6231-1) elements of every phenomenon as Peirce put it, . . . . This is also how I understood firstness, secondness, and thirdness based on my brief readings of Peirce's originals and secondary sources. In other words, I believe Peirce said somewhere that Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are the (6231-2) different aspects of a phenomenon that the human mind prescind for the convenience of thought. With all the best. Sung John, list, I agree that no phenomenon can be a pure first, but for the reason that firstness, secondness and thirdness are elements of every phenomenon (or as Peirce put it, of the phaneron). However I disagree with your belief that we infer the existence of firsts from a theory of signs. On the contrary, since a sign is a kind of phenomenon, a theory of signs has to be grounded in phaneroscopy, in order to account for the possibility of semiosis. Peirce himself did not fully realize this until 1902, but his subsequent definitions of sign all involve the three elements of the phaneron, either explicitly or implicitly. On this point I disagree not only with you but also with Joe Ransdell, and I gave my reasons in the Ransdell issue of Transactions, so I won't elaborate on them here. The fact that Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are extremely abstract concepts does not imply that we infer them from a theory of signs, and does not preclude them being elements of direct experience, as Peirce said that they were. And this makes a big difference in the way we read Peirce's logic and semiotic, which does indeed apply to dumb animals as well as to words. gary f. From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: 3-Aug-14 1:40 PM To: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Stephen, It seems to me if you are aware of something as distinct from something else, irrespective of if you put a word to it, then it is not a pure first. If you are not aware of it as distinct from something else, I question whether you can be aware of it. In other words,%2 - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
John wrote: I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real;(6231-1) I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. Let me expose my ignorance. Is this what is known as constructive realism? With all the bet. Sung At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing is something you take to be fundamental to reality. Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Edwina wrote (073114-1): Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's (073114-1) original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You have been repeating this admonition whenever you want to criticize my views on signs that differ from yours. There are several things that seem wrong with this attitude which I once referred to as childish, because: (1) You assume that no one can understand what sign is unless he or she studied Peirce as much a as you have. This cannot be true because There are scholars who made fundamental contributions to (073114-2) the science of signs long before Peirce (1839-1914) was born or independently of Peirces work, e.g., Saussure (1857-1913). (2) You assume that secondary sources on Peircean semiotics is not as reliable as Peirces original writings. This may be true in some cases but not always. (3) The science of signs is larger than Peircean semiotics, because The science of signs is not yet complete and constantly (073114-3) evolving with new advances in our knowledge in natural and human sciences and communication engineering. For these reasons I am inclined to believe that Anyone, not versed in Peircean semiotics, can discover truth (073114-4) about signs, although Peircean scholarship can often, but not necessarily always, facilitate such discoveries. So, Edwina, whenever you feel like repeating (073114-1), think about the following admonition to you from me: Edwina, I probably have read more Peirce to be able to (073114-5) discuss signs than you have read thermodynamics to be able to discuss energy. Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: Written words are representamens and spoken (073114-7) (and understood) words are signs. No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing in itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. It seems to me that you are conflating semiosis and its components that make semiosis possible. In other words, you may be conflating nodes and edges in networks. You cannot have edges without nodes ! Likewise, you cannot have semiosis without material things acting as representamens. If you do not agree, please tryh to come up with an example wherein semiosis takes place without a material thing acting as a representamen (which, by definition, TRIADICALLY mediates object and intepretant, the TRIADICITY being the heart of Peircean semiotics and the category theory). The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. You seem to be repeating what I said in my response to Clark at 5:04 am July 31, 2014. See Equation (073114-4) therein. In both cases if you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the 'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has nothing to do with semiosis or the physics of energy dissipation. Please read my discussion on this issue with Ben on the PEIRCE-L list dated July 30, 2014 9:08 pm. I think Ben has a much more realistic understanding of the thermodyanamic and semiotic issues involved here. In a semiotic sense, there is no difference between the two because both are objects; there is only a material difference in their composition - similar to frozen and liquid water. See above. One can go further and consider the word, in both its written and spoken form 'in itself' as a semiotic sign (as the full triad) because each one spatially and temporally exists. In its unread form on the paper, the word remains a sign (in the triadic form) because it exists as a material entity on another material entity; when read, it functions as a dynamic object. The spoken word functions as a dynamic object. See above. Edwina With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote: Written words are representamens and spoken(073114-7) (and understood) words are signs. No. Peircean semiosis is a process; the 'representamen' is not a thing in itself but an action of mediation within a triadic process. The sign is the full triadic process and not a thing or interpretation. In both cases if you interact with the word, in both its written and spoken form, the 'word' is an object in the Peircean sense. The difference between the two has nothing to do
Re: SV: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Søren wrote: Even to produces thoughts and feeling demands work. (073114-1) That would be a biosemiotic view (but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production. I am glad to learn this fact about Peircean semiotics. If Statement (073114-1) is true, I think we can legitimately conclude that Peircean semiotics is incomplete because it does (073114-2) not address the energetics of semiosis, and no semiosis can occur without being supported by energy dissipation, i.e., converting free energy into heat. Another more picturesque way of stating the same conclusion, using the Sohl-Guhs pine tree and birds legend described in my reply to Ben in PEIRCE-L dated July 30, 2014, may be: Semioticians ignoring the energetics of semiosis is akin to (073114-3) Sohl-Guhs birds ignoring the difference between a painted pine tree and a real one. To construct a more complete semiotics (which may be conveniently named the neo-Peircean semiotics), I suggest that It may be necessary to combine both the informatics of(073114-4) semiosis largely embodied in the traditional Peircean semiotics, and the energetics of semiosis that began to emerge only after Peirces passing, for example, in molecular and cell biology. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Dear Clark and list My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal communication or as language from ones feeling and thoughts. Even to produces thoughts and feeling demands work. That would be a biosemiotic view (but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production. Best Søren Fra: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sendt: 31. juli 2014 20:11 Til: Sungchul Ji; Peirce-L Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for On Jul 31, 2014, at 2:37 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edumailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Yes. That is what I am saying, and I too distinguish between material process of semiotics and semiotics in general. My working hypothesis is that Physics of words/signs is necessary but (073114-2) not sufficient for their semiosis. or that No equilibrium structures can carry out semiosis (073114-3) unless and until transformed into dissipative structures by being activated by input of free energy. For example, words on a piece of paper must be lit before they can convey information. Right, but again that is an ontological assumption of the underlying substrate for semiotic process. Those who adopt a more idealist rather than materialist ontology will simply not agree with that. And indeed Peirce, in both his early and mature phases, would disagree with that conception. (Again, noting that one can simply mine Peircean semiotics without taking all his thought) Thus my point about knowledge of a system and whether that system can be conceived of semiotically. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Edwina wrote (073114-1), (-3), (-5), (-8), (-9) and (-10): . . . if you choose to use the Peircean semiosis (073114-1) differently from that outlined by Peirce, then don't use the same terms. Use your own. And don't try to tell us that your use is Peircean when it isn't. Edwina, I believe that All terms, including Peircean, have more than one meanings. (073114-2) Depending on the context of discourse, any term, whether used by Peirce previously, can be used in any discourse, as long as one clearly defines what one means with it. No, I'm not confusing nodes and edges; I don't use them and(073114-3) neither did Peirce. If you choose to use them - that's your choice but don't tell us that it is a Peircean framework. I am afraid you have misunderstood Peirce. Peirce did use nodes and edges since they are intrinsic to the diagram, -, which is a network consisting of 3 edges connecting external 3 nodes to the central node. What is important here is that Peirce used the diagram to represent his concept of irreducible triad. Just because Peirce did not use the terms nodes and edges' (073114-4) does not mean that network did not play a fundamental role in Peircean thought. To deny (073114-4) is akin to denying that Peircean sign is isomorphic with /or related to the mathematical category (on which Jon and I agreed a month or two ago on the PEIRCE_L list) because Peirce did not use the term mathematical category. That's absurd - to insist that a 'material thing acts as a(073114-5) representamen'.Again, you totally fail to understand the nature of and function of the representamen within Peircean semiosis. Do you deny that DNA is matter ? Does it not represent an organism? Do you deny that Semiosis is a material process enabled by the action of the(073114-6) irreducible triad of object, representamen and interpretant. Hence, all the components of semiosis possess material bases. . . . the habits of formation act as the representamen and (073114-8) transforms the input data from the object into the interpretant. So, where is the habit encoded or what embodies the habit ? Thin air or a ghost ? This isn't about thermodynamics and semiosis. (073114-9) How do you know? Have you read enough thermodynamics (and related subjects, statistical mechanics, chemical kinetics and quantum mechanics) to form such an opinion? Rather like a syllogism (something which you (073114-10) also don't understand - as you showed us a few weeks ago). I thought it was you who showed (at least to me) a lack of understanding the limitations inherent in the simplistic version of syllogism you focused on. I think all our debates on this matter have been archived if you are interested in checking the validity of my impression. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Sung - don't divert from the issue by personalizing my criticism. I'm not saying that no-one can understand a sign unless they have read as much Peirce as I have. I'm saying that you, who has not read Peirce and yet who constantly chooses to use Peircean terms in your outline of semiosis, and to inform us of 'what these terms mean', then, you HAVE to have read Peirce and you have to use them as he used them. I've said before - that if you choose to use the Peircean semiosis differently from that outlined by Peirce, then don't use the same terms. Use your own. And don't try to tell us that your use is Peircean when it isn't. And so what if - in yet another of your numbered admonitions to us - you tell us that other scholars have made 'fundamental contributions to the science of signs'. What does that have to do with your misuse and misunderstanding of Peircean terms? I certainly do assume that secondary sources on Peirce are not equivalent to the original writings of Peirce. Your failure to read Peirce in the original and your attempts to twist and distort his analysis to suit your own outline of the world can't be laid at the feet of either the secondary sources or Peirce. It's your outline. Again, you are the one constantly informing us of the 'meaning' of Peircean semiosis - with outlandish claims, including your bizarre crosstabs table of the categories, your misunderstanding of the categories, your equation of Firstness with a priori, and, now your insistence that the Representamen (and that's a Peircean term) is a 'thing'. No, I'm not confusing nodes and edges; I don't use them and neither did Peirce. If you choose to use them - that's your choice but don't tell us that it is a Peircean framework. That's absurd - to insist that a 'material thing acts as a representamen
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Clark wrote: But there can be signs of mind and not matter. (073114-1) Thats more the issue Im getting at. Can there be any signs of mind independent of matter or unsupported by material mechanisms of some sort ? If so, what would be an example of that ? With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net On Jul 31, 2014, at 12:19 PM, Søren Brier sb@cbs.dk wrote: My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal communication or as language from ones feeling and thoughts. Even to produces thoughts and feeling demands work. That would be a biosemiotic view (but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production. Again this gets at ontological issues. Remember Peirces conception of mind and matter which gets a bit tricky. The world of physics is the world of matter which is mind under habit. But there can be signs of mind and not matter. Thats more the issue Im getting at. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
John wrote: I should have said as well that my student, Scott Muller, (073014-1) was able to prove that the information content I refer to is unique. He uses group theory following he argument I made that information originates in symmetry breaking. His book is Asymmetry: The Foundation of Information (The Frontiers Collection) http://www.amazon.com/Asymmetry-Foundation- Information-Frontiers-Collection/dp/3540698833 I purchased his book about a month ago but have not had time to read it yet. It seems like the main content of the book would be consistent with my finding that many organizations (from blackbody radiations to enzymic catalysis to cell metbolism to brain fucntions to comsogenesis) can be viewed as having resulted fron random events obeying the Gaussian function (which is symmetric) selected or 'perturbed' by envrionmental inputs to produce long tailed distributions called the Planckian distributions (which can be mathemtically derived from the Gaussian function assuming some reasonable mechanisms). It is for this reason that I have started to refer to Plakcian distributions as asymmetric Gaussian distributions in my manuscript under preparation. It seems as though I should read your student's book and refer to it before completing my manuscript. If you have any other suggestions, please let me know. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net html body At 06:57 PM 2014-07-30, Clark Goble wrote:brbr blockquote type=cite class=cite cite= blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=On Jul 29, 2014, at 1:44 AM, John Collier lt;a href=mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za;colli...@ukzn.ac.za/agt; wrote:brbr I made the relevant distinctions in a book chapter in 1990,nbsp; ul lia href=http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/intrinfo.pdf;Intrinsic Information/a (1990) /ulbut I had to introduce some new concepts and definitions to the usual thermodynamic ones. The lack of those has caused multiple confusions and misunderstandings when I have discussed the issues on mailing lists. In particular I argued that dissipative and non-dissipative is a scale dependent distinction. The goal was to ask what the world must be like if we get information from the world, as some philosophers hold. At that time I thought that semiotics was too far from my audience that I didn't mention it, tough I have dome some extensions in later papers. /blockquotebr Ill check those out John before going further. I think there are a lot of hidden assumptions at play which I think need clarified or brought out. My apologies for not having been part of the discussion in past dialogs on this. br /blockquoteI should have said as well that my student, Scott Muller, was able to prove that the information content I refer to is unique. He uses group theory following he argument I made that information originates in symmetry breaking. His book is Asymmetry: The Foundation of Information (The Frontiers Collection) a href=http://www.amazon.com/Asymmetry-Foundation-Information-Frontiers-Collection/dp/3540698833; eudora=autourl http://www.amazon.com/Asymmetry-Foundation-Information-Frontiers-Collection/dp/3540698833/a brbr Johnbr /body br body hr Professor John Colliernbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp; colli...@ukzn.ac.zabr Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africabr T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp; F: +27 (31) 260 3031br a href=http://web.ncf.ca/collier; eudora=autourl Http://web.ncf.ca/collierbr /a/body /html - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
know that the semiotic effect of words is more or less independent of their physics, e.g., the word love can be written in many different media without losing its core meaning ink, sand, pebbles, apples, etc. That is why I switched to talking about the event of reading, and the like, in order to try to save some sense from the things that you said. The system involving a person's reading a word on a computer-screen and the system involving a person's reading a word on paper are both of them dissipative systems, while the word's computer-screen display is dissipative and the word's on-paper display is not. Yes. As long as we focus on the semiotics of word, we have no disagreement, reading being one example of that. But our disagreement seems to arise due to our different emphasis placed on the philosophical significance of the physics of words themselves. You and Clark, perhaps representing the views of most Peirceans scholars, seem to think that the physics of words is not that significant in discussing semiotics, whereas I think it is. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Sung, you wrote to Stephen, [QUOTE] Your written word just conveyed energy to my (6231-1) fingers to say NO. I did not write any words on a piece of paper (which would have been an example of equilibrium structure, since no energy would have been required for them to exist on a piece of paper). The words that appeared on your computer screen (when you read my email) are dissipative structures, since they would have disappeared if your computer ran out of energy. As dissipative structures, my words on your computer screen can do work, like stimulating the retina of our eye generating nerve impulses which travel to your visual cortex and thence eventually to the muscle cells in your fingers that produced motions on the keyboard resulting in the visual imageNOÂ on your computer screen. [END QUOTE] Sung, you're saying that words on a computer screen can do work on Stephen but words written on a paper sign can't do work on Stephen - as if seeing Mr. Rose, you have won a million dollars on computer screen at a state .gov website would have an effect on him but seeing it in a notarized letter to him from a state lottery would not. Then you complain that philosophers don't understand physicists. I doubt that many physicists would endorse your view of the physical effects of words. Some might ask you for your physical definition of _/word/_. The big difference to you seems to be whether the word comes to Stephen by variations in illumination by the screen or by variations introduced by the inscribed paper into the light that the paper reflects. To you the computer screen's word IS those variations in illumination, but the paper's word is NOT the variations in reflected light. But usually when philosophers and everyday people speak of the written word, they do not mean simply patterns of ink or pencil lead, but the system involving their being potentially or actually read. This is why I said that the spoken/written distinction has an affinity with the dissipative/equilibrium distinction but is not a straightforward instance of it. The effect of the computer-screen word and the paper-sign word on Steven may be quite the same. The nature of the effect would depend more on what word, with what credibility, etc. That is why I switched to talking about the event of reading, and the like, in order to try to save some sense from the things that you said. The system involving a person's reading a word on a computer-screen and the system involving a person's reading a word on paper are both of them dissipative systems, while the word's computer-screen display is dissipative and the word's on-paper display is not. Best, Ben On 7/26/2014 9:28 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: Benjamin wrote: Verbal speech can be stored, too, in recordings (072614-1) of sounds. You will have to stretch the meaning of the word written to cover such recordings. I do not have to stretch anything. Verbal speech, like spoken words, is a dissipative structure and recorded speech, like written words, is an equilibrium structure. Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categories of structures, equilibrium and dissipative, probably because most philosophies have been done with written, not spoken, words since the invention of writing. This bias for equilibrium structures over dissipative ones in the medium of communcation among philosophers may have left profound influences on the content of written
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Dear Clark, Thanks for your response. What you say below is correct if we accept the meanings of dissipative and equilibrium structures as you define them in your mind, and this applies to Benjamin's previous response as well. But the point I was making in my admittedly provocative email was based on the meanings of dissipative and equilibrium structures carefully defined in irreversible thermodynamics by workers such as I. Prigogine (1917-2003) and his school in Brussels and Austin, for which Prigogine was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1977. Anything that disappears in a physical system upon removing energy supply can be identified with dissipative structures, such as the flame of a candle, images on a computer screen, words coming out of the mouth of a person, melodies coming out of a piano, action potential of neurons, the airplane trajectories in the sky, semiosis between persons or between neurons, etc. Conversely, anything that remains unchanged when energy supply is removed would be equilibrium structures, such as an artificial candle or flower, the photograph of a computer screen with images, words written down on a piece of paper (which lasts a much longer time than a spoken word can after it leaves the vocal cord of the speaker), melodies encoded in sheet music, etc. By denying the distinction between equilibrium and dissipative structures in semiotics or philosophical discourse in general, one is denying the fundamental role that energy plays in these disciplines and hence the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms (or underpinnings) supporting such mental activities. It may be useful, therefore, to distinguish between two types of semiotics (or the study of signs) the classical semiotics wherein no energy consideration is necessary, and the neo-semiotics wherein the role of energy dissipation is fundamental, since No energy, no semiosis. (072814-1) which may be viewed as the First Law of Semiotics, in analogy to the First law of Thermodynamics. Coining these two terms, classical vs. neo-semiotics, conceptualizes the dual necessity for semiosis, i.e., the continuity (as expressed in semiotics) and the discontinuity (as expressed in classical vs. neo-), just as the terms, classical physics and new physics conceptualize the continuity of the Newtonian physics and its discontinuity occasioned by the concept of energy quantization, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and Einsteins relativity. Finally, I would like to suggest the following two statements for possible discussions: Peirces semiotics is a major component of the (072814-2) classical semioticswhile biosemiotics is a major component of the neo-semiotics. Just as classical physics and new physics can co-exist (072814-3) in physics so classical semiotics (e.g., the Peirce-L) and neo-semiotics (e.g., biosemiotics) may be able to co-exist in the semiotics of future. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categories of structures, equilibrium and dissipative, probably because most philosophies have been done with written, not spoken, words since the invention of writing. A perhaps pedantic quibble. I think philosophy has been conducted with writing really just since the modern era and even then only on a large scale in more recent centuries. Its just that the major works of philosophy that we have recorded are written. However I think for a large portion of our history (and perhaps arguably even today or at least until the advent of email) philosophy was dialogical in nature. Of course I think theres a continuum between what you call equilibrium and dissipative (Im a bit unsure what you mean by equilibrium - apologies if youve clarified this before. Im behind in reading the list) Writing is frequently lost after all, we reinterpret its meanings as new contexts are introduced, etc. And of course old recordings degrade over time. Even data stored on hard drive loses data and can become corrupt. At the end all we have are traces of the original dialog. To follow Derrida (although he makes his point in an annoyingly petulant way) all we have are traces rather than some pure presence of communication we call speech. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Stephen wrote (6231-1) and (6231-2): Your written word just conveyed energy to my (6231-1) fingers to say NO. I did not write any words on a piece of paper (which would have been an example of equilibrium structure, since no energy would have been required for them to exist on a piece of paper). The words that appeared on your computer screen (when you read my email) are dissipative structures, since they would have disappeared if your computer ran out of energy. As dissipative structures, my words on your computer screen can do work, like stimulating the retina of our eye generating nerve impulses which travel to your visual cortex and thence eventually to the muscle cells in your fingers that produced motions on the keyboard resulting in the visual image NO on your computer screen. This distinction (between written and spoken words: my (6231-2) addition) like many is a binary fantasy. A needless distinction. I disagree. It is not a binary fantasy. It is what I would call data-driven philosophy in contrast to data-free or data-independent philosophy, as exemplified in your Statements (6321-1) and (6321-2). With all the best. Sung Am I believing my eyes? Your written word just conveyed energy to my fingers to say NO. This distinction like many is a binary fantasy. A needless distinction. Words written and spoken are the transitional stage between signs and our indexing of them as signs move toward expression and action. They are what we use to limit and make manageable the vague and extensive aspects of signs and enable some consideration of them. All words limit. All words are subject to being understood not as they are intended to be understood but as the hearer or reader perceives them. Between what one says and what one writes there is only a difference of means. It is also the case that when we are hearing or reading words stimulate the creation of signs within us which we name with ... more words. You wrote: Thus, we can recognize two classes of words --- (i) written words belonging to ES, and (ii) spoken words belonging to DS. Written words cannot perform any work since they do not have any energy. Again, no. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:01 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Dear Gary F, I hope you don't mind if I jump in. As you know, Prigogine (1917-2003) divided all structures in the Universe into two classes - equilibrium structures (ES) and dissipative structures (DS) [1, 2]. ESs do not but DSs do need to dissipate free energy for them to exist. I think the ES-DS theory of Prigogine can be applied to linguistics and semiotics generally. Thus, we can recognize two classes of words --- (i) written words belonging to ES, and (ii) spoken words belonging to DS. Written words cannot perform any work since they do not have any energy. They are like a hammer, an ES, which cannot move matter until an agent inputs some energy into it by, say, lifting and ramming it down on the head of a nail. But spoken words, being sound waves (which are DSs), can perform work because they possess energy and hence can move matter, for example, causing the ear drum to vibrate. So, I would say that Words, as written, cannot, but words as spoken, (6231-1) can, move matter. or more generally Signs as equilibrium structures cannot but (6231-2) signs as dissipative structures can move matter. A corollary of (6231-2) would be that Since semiosis cannot occur without moving matter, (6321-3) the signs mediating semiosis must be dissipative structures. I postulated that all dissipative structures (or 'dissipatons', more briefly [3]) require both information (gn-) and energy (-ergy), i.e., gnergy, for them to exist. Discrete units of gnergy are referred to as gnergons. Hence, dissipatons are gnergons are more or less synonymous, the former emphasizing thermodynamics and the latter both thermodynamics and informatics. Using these neologisms, Statement (6321-3) can be re-expressed as Signs mediating semiosis are dissipatons (or gnergons). (6321-4) Or Am I believing my eyes? Your written word just conveyed energy to my fingers to say NO. This distinction like many is a binary fantasy. A needless distinction. Words written and spoken are the transitional stage between signs and our indexing of them as signs move toward expression and action. They are what we use to limit and make manageable the vague and extensive aspects of signs and enable some consideration of them. All words limit. All words are subject to being understood not as they are intended to be understood but as the hearer or reader perceives them. Between what one says and what one writes there is only a difference of means. It is also the case that when we are hearing or reading words stimulate the creation of signs within
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Benjamin wrote: Verbal speech can be stored, too, in recordings (072614-1) of sounds. You will have to stretch the meaning of the word written to cover such recordings. I do not have to stretch anything. Verbal speech, like spoken words, is a dissipative structure and recorded speech, like written words, is an equilibrium structure. Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categories of structures, equilibrium and dissipative, probably because most philosophies have been done with written, not spoken, words since the invention of writing. This bias for equilibrium structures over dissipative ones in the medium of communcation among philosophers may have left profound influences on the content of written philosophies. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Sung, list, If you want to take the word written so literally, then consider the writing of an authorized signature on a contract or on legislation. Now, you may say that the system of the individual writing-event is a dissipative system, as opposed to the signature standing written. But having to make such a finicky distinction shows that your spoken-written distinction has only an affinity with the dissipative-nondissipative distinction and is not an unequivocal instance of it. You'll have to go on being finicky in order to distinguish between the signed legislation (at this point one hopes you'll allow the printed and the written to form a single class) and its being copied, its being read, its being remembered via the shaping and maintaining of habits, etc. Verbal speech can be stored, too, in recordings of sounds. You will have to stretch the meaning of the word written to cover such recordings. Yet, let's say that it's indeed a kind of written or printed form. More generally, we would call it stored. You're reaching for the distinction between that which is stored and that which is exerted or freed. The written is more easily stored than the spoken. There's the affinity of the written with the non-dissipative. The saying The pen is mightier than the sword persists for reasons. Best, Ben On 7/26/2014 2:39 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: Stephen wrote (6231-1) and (6231-2): Your written word just conveyed energy to my (6231-1) fingers to say NO. I did not write any words on a piece of paper (which would have been an example of equilibrium structure, since no energy would have been required for them to exist on a piece of paper). The words that appeared on your computer screen (when you read my email) are dissipative structures, since they would have disappeared if your computer ran out of energy. As dissipative structures, my words on your computer screen can do work, like stimulating the retina of our eye generating nerve impulses which travel to your visual cortex and thence eventually to the muscle cells in your fingers that produced motions on the keyboard resulting in the visual image âNOâ on your computer screen. âThis distinction (between written and spoken words: my (6231-2) addition) like many is a binary fantasy. A needless distinction.â I disagree. It is not âa binary fantasyâ. It is what I would call âdata-drivenâ philosophy in contrast to âdata-freeâ or data-independent philosophy, as exemplified in your Statements (6321-1) and (6321-2). With all the best. Sung Am I believing my eyes? Your written word just conveyed energy to my fingers to say NO. This distinction like many is a binary fantasy. A needless distinction. Words written and spoken are the transitional stage between signs and our indexing of them as signs move toward expression and action. They are what we use to limit and make manageable the vague and extensive aspects of signs and enable some consideration of them. All words limit. All words are subject to being understood not as they are intended to be understood but as the hearer or reader perceives them. Between what one says and what one writes there is only a difference of means. It is also the case that when we are hearing or reading words stimulate the creation of signs within us which we name with ... more words. You wrote: Thus, we can recognize two classes of words --- (i) written words belonging to ES, and (ii) spoken words belonging to DS. Written words cannot perform any work since they do not have any energy. Again, no. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:01 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Dear Gary F, I hope you don't mind if I jump in. As you know, Prigogine (1917-2003) divided all structures in the Universe into two classes equilibrium structures (ES) and dissipative structures (DS) [1, 2]. ESs do not but DSs do need to dissipate free energy for them to exist. I think the ES-DS theory of Prigogine can be applied to linguistics and semiotics generally. Thus, we can recognize two classes of words --- (i) written words belonging to ES, and (ii) spoken words belonging to DS. Written words cannot perform any work since they do not have any energy. They are like a hammer, an ES, which cannot move matter until an agent inputs some energy into it by, say, lifting and ramming it down on the head of a nail. But spoken words, being sound waves (which are DSs), can perform work because they possess energy and hence can move matter, for example, causing the ear drum to vibrate. So, I would say that Words, as written, cannot, but words as spoken, (6231-1) can, move matter. or more generally Signs as equilibrium structures cannot but (6231-2) signs as dissipative structures can move matter. A corollary of (6231-2) would be that Since semiosis cannot occur without moving matter, (6321-3) the signs mediating semiosis must be dissipative structures. I postulated that all dissipative structures (or dissipatons, more briefly [3]) require both information (gn-) and energy (-ergy), i.e., gnergy, for them to exist. Discrete units of gnergy are referred to as gnergons. Hence, dissipatons are gnergons are more or less synonymous, the former emphasizing thermodynamics and the latter both thermodynamics and informatics. Using these neologisms, Statement (6321-3) can be re-expressed as Signs mediating semiosis are dissipatons (or gnergons). (6321-4) Or Peircean signs are gnergons. [4] (6321-5) The interesting quotes of Peirce you cite below seem to indicate that Peirce was aware of the essential role(6321-6) of energy dissipation in semiosis. Hence, Peircean semiotics is consistent with the gnergon theory (6321-7) of self-organization, including semiosis. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net References: [1] Kondepudi, D. (2008). Introduction to Thermodynamics, John Wiley Sons, Inc., Chichester. [2] Kondepudi, D. and Prigogine, I. (1998). Modern Thermodynamics: From Heat Engine to Dissipative Structures, John Wiley Sons, Inc., Chichester. [3] Ji, S. (2012). Principle of Self-Organization and Dissipative Structures. In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. Pp. 69-80. PDF available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Book Chapters. [4] Ji, S. (2012). Peircean Signs as Gnergons. In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. Pp. 176-180. PDF available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Book Chapters. Edwina, you say that Words don't move matter. â but Iâd say that human actions move matter quite a lot, and words (or rather signs) can do a lot of teleodynamic work in determining the form of human actions, if the signs have what Peirce called âlogical energyâ: âit is in action that logical energy returns to the uncontrolled and uncriticizable parts of the mindâ (EP2:241). This leads him to the version of the pragmatic maxim with which he ended his Harvard Lectures of 1903: âThe elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason.â If this describes a recursive process of the kind Stan and Wendy and I have in mind, it seems that the âuncontrolled and uncriticizable parts of the mindâ are causally connected to the physical world contiguous to both âgatesâ, and this causal connection actually closes the loop so that logical energy can âreturnâ to the physical world it emerged from (and thus inform it). Does that make sense to you? gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 25-Jul-14 3:45 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:6229] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Stan - the discourses or narratives that we use to 'talk about' reality don't affect that reality. Words don't move matter. The FACT that a species adapts to its environment is found in all cultures; this is not 'very general'. The narrative of causality may
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6209] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Edwina, Stan, list, It seems to me that who is misusing Peirce's three categories remains to be seen. (Plesse refer to my next email.) With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Stan- you totally missed my point. My critique had nothing to do with nominalism vs realism. It had to do with the misuse (by both you and Sung) of the three categories. Edwina - Original Message - From: Stanley N Salthe To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2014 3:38 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6206] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Edwina -- We could sum this all up -- My point of view is social constructivist/non-realist, while yours (and, I think, Sung's) is realist. Thus, I do not think Evolution is REAL *in the realist sense); it is a conceptual construct. As you have said in the past, there is really no point in arguing between us. I will refine my statements as: 1. Evolution as is (at this moment) -- this is a concept embodied in texts that has pulled together data from many different sciences. It is a Thirdness in the sense that it contextualizes much of the thinking of our society. 2. Evolution as lived -- this is individuation, taking place everywhere every moment; in organisms,especially in youth. As such (resulting from continual material interactions at any moment) it is caused within Firstness. 3. Evolution as theorized -- this is a conceptual problem being wrestled with -- the process of theorizing would be Seconds. Make mine tonic water STAN On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Stan - this is a specious analogy, i.e. 'idle chatter' and belongs in the coffee shop. The three categories are not semantic descriptions; they are terms for three different modes of organization of exisentiality. First, Evolution, by definition, is a process that refers to continuity of individual existential organization (type to token) and adaptability of that continuity. Second, existential reality is triadic, therefore evolution as a process operates within a triadic format. So.. If you define an evolutionary process, in its triadic format, as operating purely in a categorical mode of Firstness - you deny the basic reality of evolution, for a triad in Firstness has no connection to the past or future or to anything and thus, cannot fulfil any evolutionary functions. If you define it in pure Secondness - you also deny the basic reality of evolution, for a triad in Secondness has no capacity for continuity; it is pure brute interaction of 'this' with 'that' in current time. If you define it in pure Thirdness - you remove the process from existentiality, for a triad in pure Thirdness is an aspatial and atemporal abstract Argument. Have another coffee. Edwina - Original Message - From: Stanley N Salthe To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2014 9:40 AM Subject: [biosemiotics:6202] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Sung -- Here is my reaction to your characterizations of evolution: 1. Evolution as is -- this is a concept embodied in texts pulling together data from many different sciences. It is a Thirdness 2. Evolution as lived -- this is individuation, taking place every moment, especially in youth. Firstness 3. Evolution as theorized -- this is a problematic concept being wrestled with -- Seconds. STAN On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 5:54 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: (Undistorted Figure 1 is attached.) Howard, Kalevi, Helmut, Stan, Wendy, Phyllis, list, Unless we are careful, we can be unwittingly fooled by the apparently simple looking word, evolution. To me, evolution has three categories of meanings: (1) Evolution as is. (Firstness) (2) Evolution as lived/observed. (Secondness) (3) Evolution as theorized/modeled. (Thirdness) It seems that Howard's excellent description of evolution in terms of variation-communication-selection is primarily concerned with the Secondness of evolution, i.e., with the mechanisms underlying evolution (reminiscent of, but not identical with, Kantâs noumenon-phenomenon relation), and leaves open the Firstness (e.g., evolutionary history as recorded in paleontological data), and the Thirdness of evolution (e.g., mathematical model of evolution such as the one proposed by Zeldovich and Shakhnovich [1]). As I will detail in another email, this mechanism
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Honner 1982 The transcendental philosophy of Niels Bohr
Malcolnm, Thanks for this link to Bohr's transcendental philosophy. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0039368182900024 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A Volume 13, Issue 1, March 1982, Pages 1â29; DOI: 10.1016/0039-3681(82)90002-4 *The transcendental philosophy of Niels Bohr* John Honner - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6152] cell models
Thanks, Kalevi, So perhaps the beginning of theoretical cell biology can be traced at least to Rashevsky in the 1950s (?) If so, my suggestion would be off by 60 years ! I wonder if he published any model of the cell, comparable to the Bhopalator model of the cell that I proposed in 1985 [1] and expanded in [2] by connecting it to a mathematical equation derived from Planck's blackbody radiation equation ? Please remember that I was thinking about the first book not the first article on theoretical cell biology. Of the latter I know of at least one that shows a great promise [3]. With all the best. Sung References: [1] Ji, S. (1985). The Bhopalator A Molecular Model of the Living Cell Based on the Concpets of Conformons and Dissipative Structures. J. theoret. Biol. 116:399-426. PDF at conformon.net under Publications Refereed Journal Articles. [2] Ji, S. (2012). Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. [3] Smith, H, A. and Welch, G. R. (1991). Cytosociology A Field-theoretic View of Cell Metabolism. In: Molecular Theories of Cell Life and Death. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick. Pp. 282-323. PDF available at conformon.net under Links Biology. The earlier whole-cell models were made by Nicolas Rashevsky already in 1950s, the editor of _Mathematical Biophysics_ journal. And there are even earlier ones from the beginning of the 20th century when biophysics became a named field. Best Kalevi 07-07-2014 23:24 kirjutas Sungchul Ji: Edwina, You are probably right. Do you know if any of these authors have proposed any physical theories of the whole cell (not just its parts), preferrably supported by some mathemtical equation ? With all the best. Sung Well, I think, just at a quick glance, that books by Daniel Brooks and Wiley (eg, Evolution as Entropy: toward a unified theory of Biology); and Gerald Pollack's 'Cells, Gels and the Engines of Life' and Bruce Weber and Daniel Depew's many works, and the works of Chris Landauer and Kirstie Bellman..and Robert Rosen...and Jesper Hoffmeyer, Kalevi Kull, Claus Emmeche should not be overlooked. Books and papers by Eugenio Andrade on semiosis within cells (in Spanish). There is great variety in these works but all of them are focused on theories of 'what's going on in cellular systems to enable them to exist, adapt, evolve'. I've probably left out quite a few. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Monday, July 07, 2014 3:21 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6134] Re: personal; Dear Rob, By the way, did you know that my book published iin 2012, Molecular Theory of the Living Cell, is, to the best of my knowledge , the first book on Theoretical Cell Biology? Cell biology until then had been mostly experimental, just as atomic physics was mostly experimental until Bohr proposed his planetary atomic model in 1913. With all the bet. Sung Dear Sung, I do not think so. Your name%2 - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6145] Re: personal;
Edwina, Rob, list, A scientific field as important as theoretical cell biology' should have a first book written about it. If it is not mine, it should be someone else's already published, as Edwina suspects. If anyone can come up with such a publication, I would be more than glad to withdraw my book as the first in theoretical cell biology. The concept of theoretical cell biology is new and not well known among biologists. Around 2010, when I happened to mention to a biochemist colleague of mine at Rutgers that I was wrting a book on Theoretical Cell Biology, his eye widened and asked What is that ?. So, I had to explain what I meant, namely, that Theoretical cell biology is to experimental cell biology (6145-1) what theoretical atomic physics is to experimental atomic physics, i.e., quantum mechanics. We know when quantum mechanics began in physics -- between 1900 and 1925. So the quesiton is, When did theoretical cell biology begin, if at all ?(6145-2) With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net I don't think you read what I wrote, Robert. I had no intention of reviewing or commenting or 'judging' Sung's book. My comment referred only to Sung's comment - if you read it that his book was - the first book on Theoretical Cell Biology. Sung didn't mean to evaluate his own book; he wasn't saying that it was 'the best'. He was merely saying that no other books on this topic had been previously published. My list of authors was to point out that this assertion was inaccurate; it isn't 'the first book on theoretical cell biology'. There has been, as you yourself admit, many books and articles written on 'theoretical cell biology', all previously written before Sung's book. Perhaps you didn't read that part of his comment. Or..perhaps you misunderstand what 'first' means? The word 'first' in English, doesn't just mean 'the best'; it means, in an arithmetic sense with reference to this bookit means the 'earliest book'; it means that no books have been previously written on this topic before. Do you understand? It doesn't mean 'the best', and there's no need to have read it. Also- these types of comments should be 'off-list' and personal. I'm only replying to the list because you accused me of something which I didn't do - being 'abusive' (and I know this is partly the language problem so I don't take offense).. Edwina - Original Message - From: Robert Boroch teoriekult...@gmail.com To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Monday, July 07, 2014 5:33 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6144] Re: personal; Dear Edwina, I am sorry to say that I know all of that. That is why I volunteer here. Thus I am sorry to say but your response sounds a bit abuse to me. I know that I am a country pumpkin from Poland. Sorry but if it say so this conversation has finished as It has started. I would like to pointed out that nobody said that none books on theoretical biology has been written; but how it is that you can judge a book without reading it? Do not think that is a bit of ignorance? Still I am a country pumpkin... but, it does not count, don't you think so? Put it in a different way, sorry to say, but. I admire your wit, but judging a book without reading is beyond my understanding. Sorry. I am out. Rob -Original Message- From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Monday, July 7, 2014 11:06 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:6143] Re: personal; No, I haven't read his book. But it is impossible to declare that 'no books on 'theoretical cell biology' have been written, when the facts show the opposite. Books and articles have been written in this area for years - after all, what do you think this blog and annual conference on biosemiotics is about? There's also a journal, Biosemiotics, edited by Marcello Barbieri (well, yes, I argue with him but that's different)..and Alexei Sharov..and there's a lot of work at the cellular/molecular level. I know I've left out people and events - because it's a huge field, and a lot of credit for this field of research, goes to people like Jesper Hoffmeyer. Edwina - Original Message - From: Robert Boroch teoriekult...@gmail.com To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Monday, July 07, 2014 4:44 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6141] Re: personal; Edwina I am sorry, I do not want to sound rude, but I wanted just make sure. Sorry. Rob -Original Message- From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Monday, July 7, 2014 10:00 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:6136] Re: personal; Well, I think, just at a quick glance, that books by Daniel Brooks
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Burgin's Fundamental Triads as Peirceasn Signs.
Matt, Thank you for your attempt to clarify what I mean by my proposed mathematics-semiotics (MS) syllogism. Of the three syllogisms you constructed, the first one may fit the MS syllogism best, probably because of the existential quantifier some appearing in the conclusion. Interestingly, in the original MS syllogism that I constructed, there is no quantifier at all. However, in Edwinas (mis- ?) interpretation of the MS syllogism, she introduced the universal quantifier, all. I wonder if this is at the root of the controversy between her and me. (Although I have taken no formal course on logic, my thinking, I hope, is logical most, if not all, of the time.) With all the best. Sung Please, Sung - try to read a basic course in logic. Hmmm⦠Sung's syllogism: Burgin's fundamental triad can unify mathematics. [5, 6] (070514-5) Burign's fundamental triad is a Peircean sign. [Figure 3] (070514-6) Therefore Peircean sign (or semiotics) can unify (070514-7) mathematics. (Prediction}. Sung must have meant one of the 3 following valid syllogisms: 1. Major premise: A â B Minor premise: A â C Conclusion: some C â B All logicians are men All logicians are mean Therefore some who are mean are men OR 2. Major premise: A â B Minor premise: A = C Conclusion:C â B All logicians are men All logicians are mean, and everyone mean is a logician Therefore all who are mean are men. OR 3. Major premise: A = B Minor premise: A = C Conclusion:C = B All logicians are men and all men are logicians All logicians are mean and anything mean is a logician Therefore all who are mean are men and all men are mean Matt On Jul 5, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Edwina wrote: . . . your syllogism is both formally false and (p70514-1) logically invalid...the Fallacy of the Illicit Major. The logic behind my syllogism is as follows: Major premise: A = B Minor premise: A = C Conclusion:C = B where A = Burign's fundamental triad, B = the unification of mathematics; and C = the Peircean triad. Do you still think that my syllogism commits the Fallacy of the Illicit Major ? With all the best. Sung Please, Sung - try to read a basic course in logic. Your endless attempts to link things with each other, whether it's Saussure with Peirce, or Bohr with Bohm or whatever - run into theoretical problems, empirical problems and logical problems. Last time, your syllogism was invalid because of the Fallacy of Four terms. This time, your syllogism is both formally false and logically invalid...the Fallacy of the Illicit Major. As a comparison with your format, think about this comparable example. All logicians are men All logicians are mean Therefore all men are mean. Get it? Your syllogism makes the same error. Your terms of 'mathematics' and 'Peircean sign' are undistributed in the premises and therefore, can't be distributed in the conclusion - but you have done just that. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Saturday, July 05, 2014 5:33 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Burgin's Fundamental Triads as Peirceasn Signs. (Undistorted figures are attached.) Stephen R on the Peirce list cited Peirce as saying: The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to (070514-1) make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details. The first step toward this is to find simple concepts applicable to every subject. At least one of the potential simple concepts that Peirce is referring to above may turn out to be his concept of irreducible triadicity embedded in the following quote that Jon recently posted and further explained in Figure 1 and (070514-4): Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. (070514-2) A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this definition, together with a definition of formal, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though
Re: [biosemiotics:6089] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Burgin's Fundamental Triads as Peirceasn Signs.
Edwina, I think you have been mis-interpreting my syllogism with all sorts of irrelevant examples. For instance, the following syllogism is a wrong syllogism to compare with my syllogism (or the Burgin-Peirce syllogism) shown in (6089-4), (6089-5) and (6089-6): All logicians are men. (6089-1) All logicians are mean. (6089-2) Therefore all men are mean. (6089-3) which is obviously wrong. My syllogism below does not contain any quantifiers: Burign's fundamental triad is a Peircean sign. (6089-4) Burgin's fundamental triad can unify mathematics.(6089-5) Therefore Peircean sign can unify mathematics. (6089-6) If you wish to add them for the purpose of increasing clarity, the correct way of doing it would be as follows: All Burgin's triads are a subset of Peircean signs. (6089-7) All Burgins triads can unify mathematics.(6089-8) Therefore a subset of Peircean signs can unify mathematics. (6089-9) which has the same logical form as the following: All logicians are a subset of men. (6089-10) All logicians are mean. (6089-11) Therefore some men are mean. (6089-12) This syllogism is obviously true, as is the Burgin-Peirce syllogism shown above. This recent flurry of debates on syllogism indicate to me that, many, if not all, syllogisms may be arbitrary (not surprisingly becvause they are signs !) in the sense that they can be interpreted in three ways -- positive, negative, and neutral. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Please, Sung - try to read a basic course in logic. Your endless attempts to link things with each other, whether it's Saussure with Peirce, or Bohr with Bohm or whatever - run into theoretical problems, empirical problems and logical problems. Last time, your syllogism was invalid because of the Fallacy of Four terms. This time, your syllogism is both formally false and logically invalid...the Fallacy of the Illicit Major. As a comparison with your format, think about this comparable example. All logicians are men All logicians are mean Therefore all men are mean. Get it? Your syllogism makes the same error. Your terms of 'mathematics' and 'Peircean sign' are undistributed in the premises and therefore, can't be distributed in the conclusion - but you have done just that. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Saturday, July 05, 2014 5:33 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Burgin's Fundamental Triads as Peirceasn Signs. (Undistorted figures are attached.) Stephen R on the Peirce list cited Peirce as saying: The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to (070514-1) make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details. The first step toward this is to find simple concepts applicable to every subject. At least one of the potential simple concepts that Peirce is referring to above may turn out to be his concept of irreducible triadicity embedded in the following quote that Jon recently posted and further explained in Figure 1 and (070514-4): Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. (070514-2) A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this definition, together with a definition of formal, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized. (NEM 4, 20-21). ab C A B | ^ | | |___| c Figure 1
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6096] arbitrarity, arbitrariness
Dear Kalevi, The term Arbitrary probably has many meanings depending on the context involed. But for the purpsoe of my suyllogisms concerning the relations betwee4n mathematics and semitoics and mathemtics and experimental data, the following simple defintions suffice: (i) non-uniqueness (ii) one-to-many related (iii) more than one Examples: (i) two ore more mathematical equations can fit a given set of data (ii) more than one interpretation is possible for a given mathemtical equation (iii) more than one interpretaitons are possible for a statement or propostiions. All thse arbitarinesses may be because all representations, regardless of their forms or types, are imprecise, or the ultimate reality is beyond representations, as the first principle for the Taoist philsophy (as I understand it) informs us. That is, Doh Gah doh, Be Sahng Doh (in Korean, which translate4s into English thus :All principles/concepts, once articulated, are no longer the permanent principels/cocepts), With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Dear colleagues, could anybody provide a good precise definition of ARBITRARITY to be used in the contemporary general semiotics? It's an important concept and should be properly used. Best Kalevi - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6061] Re: Unreasonable
Clark wrote: Thus were left asking why they world seems (070614-1) so mathematical. However if we recognize the world as a system under semiosis - a system in dialog - then rather than being mysterious we see it as natural. What if there exists a regularity in this Universe that is manifest in mathematics, physics, biology, linguistics, and semiotics and this regualrity is the IRREDUCIBLE TRIADICITY of Peirce ? Would we be justified to call it the Ultimate Principle of Nature (UPN)? This idea was motivated by my previous emails on what I elected to call the Burgin-Peirce syllogism. With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net (My apologies if these came through more than once. Id sent them from the wrong email address and despite resending them didnt see them appear in my feed) On Jul 3, 2014, at 4:03 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: You're mixing apples and oranges, using the word 'sign' equivocally. Saussure's 'sign' is not Peirce's 'sign' or even Peirce's 'symbol'; Saussure's 'sign' is Peirce's 'linguistic symbol'. Even there Saussure has limits that Peirce would never countenance. Its best to just not conflate the two. Peirce just thinks so differently that even where you find similarity its easy to be mislead by the similarity. Im trying to recall a really good overview of this. I think Eco has a few places he goes through differences, although Im not always happy with some of Ecos presentations of semiotics. However I *think* he does relate Peirce to other thinkers in his chapter on Symbol in Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. Its been 15 years since I read it last though, and my memory was that he makes errors in various places in it. This appears to get at certain other aspects of the comparison http://www.indiana.edu/~slavicgf/e103/assignments/Chandler_ch1_pt2.pdf Ive only glanced through it quickly, but it seems like the author is very good about noting certain inconsistencies of terminological use by both Saussure and Peirce which can waylay those not as experienced with each. The author also notes that Peirces dialogical thinking is missing from Saussure. I should also note it tends to be missing even from a lot of contemporary philosophy of language - leading to various types of error. Thus the problems with say Searles approach to systematize Austins speech acts. Going back to Sungchuls point, I think this is important when considering mathematics and physics. Consider Peirces Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc., of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte's. Not only is thought in the organic world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must here give Sign a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of arbitrariness. It might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this fault; but in the first place, such an expansion would require a volume - and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is only to be applied to a slight determination of our system of diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it be incorrect, the utmost certain effect will be a danger that our system may not represent every variety of non-human thought. (CP 4.551) The place of a quasi-mind seems rather pertinent in understanding the surprising relationship between say physics and mathematics. Again, I suspect Peirces ontology is the most controversial part of his thought. Most philosophers are rather disparaging to it. However it does make such matters rather understandable. Even if one treats these only
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Burgin's Fundamental Triads as Peirceasn Signs.
Edwina wrote: . . . your syllogism is both formally false and (p70514-1) logically invalid...the Fallacy of the Illicit Major. The logic behind my syllogism is as follows: Major premise: A = B Minor premise: A = C Conclusion:C = B where A = Burign's fundamental triad, B = the unification of mathematics; and C = the Peircean triad. Do you still think that my syllogism commits the Fallacy of the Illicit Major ? With all the best. Sung Please, Sung - try to read a basic course in logic. Your endless attempts to link things with each other, whether it's Saussure with Peirce, or Bohr with Bohm or whatever - run into theoretical problems, empirical problems and logical problems. Last time, your syllogism was invalid because of the Fallacy of Four terms. This time, your syllogism is both formally false and logically invalid...the Fallacy of the Illicit Major. As a comparison with your format, think about this comparable example. All logicians are men All logicians are mean Therefore all men are mean. Get it? Your syllogism makes the same error. Your terms of 'mathematics' and 'Peircean sign' are undistributed in the premises and therefore, can't be distributed in the conclusion - but you have done just that. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Saturday, July 05, 2014 5:33 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Burgin's Fundamental Triads as Peirceasn Signs. (Undistorted figures are attached.) Stephen R on the Peirce list cited Peirce as saying: The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to (070514-1) make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details. The first step toward this is to find simple concepts applicable to every subject. At least one of the potential simple concepts that Peirce is referring to above may turn out to be his concept of irreducible triadicity embedded in the following quote that Jon recently posted and further explained in Figure 1 and (070514-4): Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. (070514-2) A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as the place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. It is from this definition, together with a definition of formal, that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. I also make a historical review of all the definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological conception of logic has virtually been quite generally held, though not generally recognized. (NEM 4, 20-21). ab C A B | ^ | | |___| c Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of the principle of irreducible triadicity as applied to the definition of a sign. A = sign; B = interpretant; and C = object. a = the sign-object relation (which can be iconic, indexical or symbolic); b = the sign-interpretant relation (which can be rheme, dicisign or argument); c = the object-interpretant relation (which is lacking in Peircean semiotics but may be provided by microsemiotics [1] or biosemiotics (e.g., [2, 3, 4]). A is determined by C and determines B in such away (070514-3) that C is indirectly determined by B. The purpose of this email is to suggest the possible connection between the Peircean sign and Burgin's fundamental triad shown in Figure 2 that is postulated by Burgin to underlie all mathematical constructions [5, 6]. f X -- I Figure 2. The fundamental triads (also called named sets) of Burgin [5, attached, 6]. X = set of objects called support; I = set of objects called names, and f = naming relation. The key to connecting Burign's triad and Peircean sign is to re-express the 2-node network in Figure 2 in the form of the 3-node network shown in Figure 3 which is expressed in words in (070514-4). a b X f I | ^ | | |___| c Figure 3. Burign's fundamental triad, Figure 2
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6073] Re:
Dear Rob, Thanks for your informative comments on syllogisms. One thing I don't understand is that you do not seem to think that mathematical equation (such as a double exponential function) is a Peircean. Am I understanding you right ? If so, what would you call a mathematical equation ? I thought anything and everything that we can and do think of is a sign. That is, we think in signs, don't we ? With all the best. Sung Let me ask you one question. Hello Sung, Please find my response attached. Regards, Rob -Original Message- From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu] Sent: Friday, July 4, 2014 12:53 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:6072] Re: Robert, Thanks for your detailed informative comments. I will have to mull over them carefully. In the meantime, I have the following counter-response. You wrote: 1) Mathematics is a species of the sign. (6071-1) Is not equivalent to: (2) Mathematics is a sign. But what if you replace Mathematics with Mathematical equations ? This would make the second proposition read Mathematical equations are signs.(6071-2) As I pointed out on this list several times already, it is important to keep in mind that the term mathematics appearing in my syllogism was meant to be mathematical equations as indicated in the table that accompanied my emails. More specifically, Mathematics was referring to the Planckian distribution, the double exponential function of Lu et al. and the ex-Gaussian distribution of Luce. With all the best. Sung Dear Sung, Sorry, that I am writing so late. There is no doubt that this syllogism is not correct as terms are not correctly set in it. Mathematics is a species of the sign. Signs is arbitrary. Therefore, mathematics is arbitrary. In that case above syllogism looks as: S ââ¬â Mathematics M ââ¬â Sign P ââ¬â Arbitrary SaM MaP SaP Statement: (1) Mathematics is a species of the sign. Is not equivalent to: (2) Mathematics is a sign. Better: Mathematics is a sign. (sic!) Signs is arbitrary. Therefore, mathematics is arbitrary. S ââ¬â Mathematics M ââ¬â Sign P ââ¬â Arbitrary MaP SaM SaP In my opinion, the correctness of syllogism is not a problem; problem is if the statement: ââ¬Åmathematics is arbitraryââ¬Â is true. I understand that ââ¬Åarbitraryââ¬Â here is as kind of ââ¬Åagreementââ¬Â between sb. Sung wrote: ââ¬ÅIf reisim is alternatively called concretism, would abstractism the antonym to reism ? Has anyone suggested this ? Abstraction is not a real item, Kotarbinski call it ââ¬Åhypostasisââ¬Â, or ââ¬Åonomanoidââ¬Â; for example: justice; this is not a real item. (Kotarbià âski example). I believe that there is a kind of the language problem (Polish to English) referring to object and item (?) For example: Item is: 1 1 + 1 are two items in ââ¬Å+ââ¬Â relation ââ¬â this is an object: 1 + 1 consist of two items in ââ¬Å+ââ¬Â relation. According to Poincare, as well as Kotarbinski if I remember so far, Math is arbitrary ââ¬â Kotarbià âski claimed that for example natural numbers does not exist as real items they exist in a kind of the convenional way; well Kotarbià âski bring great rumour having claiming that and was criticized. I have to say that Kotarbià âski approach is not semiotics at all, but as you have said why do not to give a go to try look at Kotarbià âski proposal seriously? After all there is not a valid prove that signs exist as real objects in Kotarbià âski terms. Regards, Rob -Original Message- From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu] Sent: Thursday, July 3, 2014 12:09 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:6042] Re: Dear Rob, Thanks for the link to reism which I reproduce below and intend to study more: Reism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Reism or concretism is a philosophical theory of Tadeusz Kotarbi#324;ski, based on the ontology of Stanislaw Lesniewski, specifically, his calculus of names. In ontological sense, reism was condensed by Kotarbi#324;ski to the two postulates every object is a body, i.e., all abstract concepts are to be reduced to concrete objects. No object is a state or relation, or property. In semantical sense, it is a theory of language which draws a distinction between real names, i.e., names associated with bodies and pseudo-names, onomatoids, which denote states, relations, properties, events, etc. It further elaborates on when a sentence is meaningful, when it has a literal, direct sense or when it is meaningful or has an indirect sense. If reisim is alternatively called concretism, would abstractism the antonym to reism ? Has anyone suggested this ? In this connection, I have been wondering if we can group all intellectual discourses
[PEIRCE-L] [Fwd: Re: [biosemiotics:6037] Re:]
Original Message Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:6037] Re: From:Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu Date:Thu, July 3, 2014 6:09 am To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee -- Dear Rob, Thanks for the link to reism which I reproduce below and intend to study more: Reism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Reism or concretism is a philosophical theory of Tadeusz Kotarbi#324;ski, based on the ontology of Stanislaw Lesniewski, specifically, his calculus of names. In ontological sense, reism was condensed by Kotarbi#324;ski to the two postulates every object is a body, i.e., all abstract concepts are to be reduced to concrete objects. No object is a state or relation, or property. In semantical sense, it is a theory of language which draws a distinction between real names, i.e., names associated with bodies and pseudo-names, onomatoids, which denote states, relations, properties, events, etc. It further elaborates on when a sentence is meaningful, when it has a literal, direct sense or when it is meaningful or has an indirect sense. If reisim is alternatively called concretism, would abstractism the antonym to reism ? Has anyone suggested this ? In this connection, I have been wondering if we can group all intellectual discourses into three mutually exclusive classes (not that I am a trichotomaniac), tentatively named philosophy, science and scientific philosophy, or more abstractly 1-discourse, 2-discourse, and 3-discourse? If we can establish such a categorial distinction, it may be possible to further state that Meaningful debates are possible only within a (6037-1) given category of intellectual discourses, not across categories. If Statement (6037-1) is true, it may help resolve many debates on this list (e.g., the debate on whether or not the UAM (Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics)is a 3-term or 4-term argument) as well as in science, philosophy, and religion, in general. The conclusion that Edwina came to that the UAM thesis commits the fallacy of four terms, I believe, resulted from Edwina not having taken into account of the EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE that I provided to support UAM, namely, the fact that two very different mathematical equations can account for a given set of experimental data -- (i) the Planckian distribution and a double exponential function to account for the single-molecule turnover times of cholseterol oxidase, and (ii) the Planckian distribution and the ex-Gaussian distribution to account for the decision-time histogram. In short, Edwina is talking about philosophy and I scientific philosophy. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Hello Sung, I would like to bring your attention to Reism (KotarbiÅski). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reism Just food for thoughts, Regards, Rob -Original Message- From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu] Sent: Wednesday, July 2, 2014 7:03 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:6035] [Fwd: AW: Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics:: Evidence] Hi, The following response from Ed Dellian seems to raise an interesting possibility for evaluating the UAM thesis. According to Ed, I should not include geometry as a part of mathematics in the expression Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics (UAM). I tend to agree with him, since my evidence supporting UAM comes mainly from algebra, not geometry. If this turns out to be true on further inquiry, then the UAM thesis may have to be modified as The Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Algebra (UAA) (070214-1) With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Original Message Subject: AW: Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics:: Evidence From:Ed Dellian ed.dell...@t-online.de Date:Wed, July 2, 2014 5:08 am To: 'Sungchul Ji' s...@rci.rutgers.edu 'Malcolm Dean' malcol Hello Sung, I would like to bring your attention to Reism (KotarbiÅski). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reism Just food for thoughts, Regards, Rob -Original Message- From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu] Sent: Wednesday, July 2, 2014 7:03 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:6035] [Fwd: AW: Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics:: Evidence] Hi
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6039] Re:
Edwina, Helmut, Rob, and list,
According to reism, as I understand it, objects are real-real and the
relations among them are pseudo-real. So I see no contradiction
between reism and semiotics/semiosis. It all seems to depend on how one
defines his/her terms, the natural consequence of the principle of the
aribitrariness of signs (?).
With all the best,
Sung
___
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
Well, reism certainly isn't semiosis, that's for sure! Semiosis rests
within relations and laws-of-organization. These laws are definitely not
objects (i.e., particular entities) but are laws-of-organization and are
'real' in the universal or Aristotelian sense of realism. Furthermore, in
semiosis, no 'thing' or particular unit stands isolate but exists within
numerous relations.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Helmut Raulien
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2014 4:38 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6038] Re:
Hi Rob, Sung, Edwina, List,
This reism is fantastic! I love it. It has the power to set us free
from- well, many things that make us unfree. How many things in our
everyday-life do we regard for objects, but for real they are just
relations, conditions? Conditions perhaps are just conditions as long as
we regard them for objects, which they are not. Every object has a body,
and we have bodies, but social conditions dont. It reminds me of Kant:
The human doesnt have value, but dignity. The body makes the object, is
the dignity. There is no dignity in property, relation, status. I would
not say, that reism is anarchism, because it does not deny that there is
something like different property or status, but it is profoundly
humanistic, because it denies the object status of social relations, but
not of people. Especially in the country (Germany) where I live in, I
sense some sickness due to conflation of what someone is and what he or
she is showing off. In other countries, eg. England, there is some more
ground-consensus between people, that there is something to just being a
human, i have read somewhere. Mathematics: Are there objects in the
sense of bodies in mathematics, or only variables with values? Does a
variable have a body?
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 02. Juli 2014 um 20:56 Uhr
Von: Robert Boroch teoriekult...@gmail.com
An: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Betreff: [biosemiotics:6037] Re:
Hello Sung,
I would like to bring your attention to Reism (KotarbiÅski).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reism
Just food for thoughts,
Regards,
Rob
-Original Message-
From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 2, 2014 7:03 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [biosemiotics:6035] [Fwd: AW: Unreasonable Arbitrariness of
Mathematics:: Evidence]
Hi,
The following response from Ed Dellian seems to raise an interesting
possibility for evaluating the UAM thesis. According to Ed, I should not
include geometry as a part of mathematics in the expression
Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics (UAM). I tend to agree with
him, since my evidence supporting UAM comes mainly from algebra, not
geometry. If this turns out to be true on further inquiry, then the UAM
thesis may have to be modified as
The Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Algebra (UAA) (070214-1)
With all the best.
Sung
__
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of
Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers
University Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
Original Message
Subject: AW: Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics:: Evidence
From: Ed Dellian ed.dell...@t-online.de
Date: Wed, July 2, 2014 5:08 am
To: 'Sungchul Ji' s...@rci.rutgers.edu
'Malcolm Dean' malcolmd...@gmail.com
--
Dear Sung,
you're absolutely right on UAM with respect to arithmetic and algebra.
This branch of mathematics is arbitrary as it is a product of human
logic and reason only, based on logic, and therefore - as all of logic -
ultimately based on the principle of non-contradiction. In arithmetic
and algebra, this principle appears as the tautology A = A
(equivalently, A is not non-A), on which all equations are built.
As a consequence, different mathematical equations can fit to describe
experimental data, none of which equations tells anything about the real
meaning of the data.
It was Leibniz who held the principle A = A ââ¬Åto be the foundation
of all
[PEIRCE-L] Re: AW: [biosemiotics:6037] Re:
Dear Ed, Yes, but what if Nature appears differently to different individuals, just as the same moon casts different images on differetn lakes in the night ? With all the best. Sung Dear Sung, is not our common subject ânatureâ, and is it not our common endeavour âto understand the works of natureâ? Is not âNatureâ then the âreference systemâ of that endeavour? Which means that we must decide with reference to Nature what we accept as ârealityâ and âtruthâ? Is Nature not the same and only foundation of any intellectual discourse about her works, no matter whether one is an educated âphilosopherâ, a âscientistâ, or a âscientific philosopherâ, or a religious thinker? Is not the question whether or not the earth moves around the sun the same question for all these intellectuals? And, must not the true answer to this question be only one, coming from nothing else but from an investigation of Nature herself? Ed. -Ursprüngliche Nachricht- Von: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu] Gesendet: Donnerstag, 3. Juli 2014 12:09 An: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Betreff: Re: [biosemiotics:6037] Re: Dear Rob, Thanks for the link to reism which I reproduce below and intend to study more: Reism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Reism or concretism is a philosophical theory of Tadeusz Kotarbi#324;ski, based on the ontology of Stanislaw Lesniewski, specifically, his calculus of names. In ontological sense, reism was condensed by Kotarbi#324;ski to the two postulates every object is a body, i.e., all abstract concepts are to be reduced to concrete objects. No object is a state or relation, or property. In semantical sense, it is a theory of language which draws a distinction between real names, i.e., names associated with bodies and pseudo-names, onomatoids, which denote states, relations, properties, events, etc. It further elaborates on when a sentence is meaningful, when it has a literal, direct sense or when it is meaningful or has an indirect sense. If reisim is alternatively called concretism, would abstractism the antonym to reism ? Has anyone suggested this ? In this connection, I have been wondering if we can group all intellectual discourses into three mutually exclusive classes (not that I am a trichotomaniac), tentatively named philosophy, science and scientific philosophy, or more abstractly 1-discourse, 2-discourse, and 3-discourse? If we can establish such a categorial distinction, it may be possible to further state that Meaningful debates are possible only within a (6037-1) given category of intellectual discourses, not across categories. If Statement (6037-1) is true, it may help resolve many debates on this list (e.g., the debate on whether or not the UAM (Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics)is a 3-term or 4-term argument) as well as in science, philosophy, and religion, in general. The conclusion that Edwina came to that the UAM thesis commits the fallacy of four terms, I believe, resulted from Edwina not having taken into account of the EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE that I provided to support UAM, namely, the fact that two very different mathematical equations can account for a given set of experimental data -- (i) the Planckian distribution and a double exponential function to account for the single-molecule turnover times of cholseterol oxidase, and (ii) the Planckian distribution and the ex-Gaussian distribution to account for the decision-time histogram. In short, Edwina is talking about philosophy and I scientific philosophy. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Hello Sung, I would like to bring your attention to Reism (Kotarbià âski). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reism Just food for thoughts, Regards, Rob -Original Message- From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu] Sent: Wednesday, July 2, 2014 7:03 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:6035] [Fwd: AW: Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics:: Evidence] Hi, The following response from Ed Dellian seems to raise an interesting possibility for evaluating the UAM thesis. According to Ed, I should not include geometry as a part of mathematics in the expression Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics (UAM). I tend to agree with him, since my evidence supporting UAM comes mainly from algebra, not geometry. If this turns out to be true on further inquiry, then the UAM thesis may have to be modified as The Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Algebra (UAA
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6061] Re: Unreasonable
Edwina wrote: The difference is as I explained in my original post: (6061-1) that between a model and the process of reasoning which are not the SAME empirical reality; . . . Before I comment on (6061-1), let me repeat what I said about the UAM (Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics) thesis. Major premise: All signs are arbitrary (Saussure) Minor premise: Mathematics is an argument symbolic legisign (Peirce) Coclusion: Mathemtica is arbitrary (consistent with the experimental evidecen provided), where mathematics means mathemtical equations such as the Planckian distribution, the double exponetial function of Lu et al (1998), or the ex-Gaussian function of R. D. Luce (1986, p. 100), and NOT mathematcal reasonig as you wrongly assumed. Based on this anlaysis, I conclude that Statement (6061-1) is a red herring desinged to (6061-2) mis-lead readers, away from the true significance of the UAM thesis, whihc is empiricallly substantiated as evident in the graphs that I pains-takingly provided to help readiers to understand what I mean. With all the best. Sung No, Sung, the difference in meaning between your terms is not similar to 'half-empty' and 'half-full' which uses different terms to describe the SAME empirical reality. The difference is as I explained in my original post: that between a model and the process of reasoning which are not the SAME empirical reality; and the nature of Saussurian semiology. I won't repeat it here. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Thursday, July 03, 2014 3:10 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6057] Re: Unreasonable You can read my syllogism in eithr of two ways -- as a 3-term arguement (as I intended) or as a 4-term argument (as you mis-interpret agaisnt he evidence I presented), just as there are two ways of describing a half-filled galss of water -- half-empty as you prefer, or half-ful as I see it. With all the best. Sung Never mind your endless acronyms, Sung. The fallacy in your syllogism remains. You can divert the issue to the triadic basis of the sign which is not relevant here, but the syllogistic structure itself has to be examined - and your syllogism, though formally correct (Barbara) is invalid because of the ambiguity of its terms. Oh, and by the way, if you want to base your comments on Peirce, then, using the 'data-based' approach, it is normal to provide the exact reference to any quotes or analysis of his that you use. Your equally endless numbers-in-parentheses does not provide the reference sources. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Sent: Thursday, July 03, 2014 1:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6051] Re: Unreasonable (Undistorted Figure 1 is attached.) Edwina wrote: The error is called 'the fallacy of four terms'. (6030-1) A valid syllogism must have exactly three unambiguous categorical terms. But the term 'mathematics' as outlined above is ambiguous. Mathematics is both a process and a producer of models. The specific model chosen may be 'arbitrary' in the sense that it is symbolic, but the process used within that mathematical reasoning is not arbitrary. There are two meanings of mathematics in the syllogism above. It seems to me that, in her zeal to apply the fallacy of four terms to my syllogism, she may have missed or conveniently ignored the EVIDENCE that I provided in my email (see the attached), which unambiguously indicates what is meant by the term mathematics appearing in the UAM thesis, i.e., mathematical equations - more specifically, the Planckian distribution, a double-exponential function, and the ex-Gaussian distribution. To prove me wrong, she should provide the EVIDECNE to support her own conclusion, just as I have done so to support mine. Her failing to provide any such evidence would indicate to me that she is engaged in doing data-free philosophy (DFP), whereas I am interested in doing data-based philosophy (DBP). No wonder we do not communicate with each other. It is my humble opinion that Conflating data-free and data-based philosophies may (6030-2) underlie most, if not all, major unproductive debates in philosophy, semiotics, and natural sciences. To make a long story short, I am of the opinion that data-free philosophies do not deal with genuine triadic signs, since they ignore the third mapping c, in the triadic definition of the Peircean sign: a b Object/Referent - Sign/Representamen/Signifer - Interpretant | ^ | | |___| c Figure 1. The triadic definition
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6051] Re: Unreasonable
Steven, Ben, list, I do not deny that Wigner's Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics(UEM) has empirical support, mainly coming from physics. All I am saying is that the Unreaseaonable Arbitgrariness of Mathematics (UAM) thesis is also supported by empirical results, limitted as they may be as of now, that originate from biology. (Please try to understand the figures that I attached to my prefvious emails, without which you may miss the point I am trying to make with UAM.) Please rememgber also that UAM is an empirical fact, not a theoretical construct, although it may be theoretically derived from semiotics of Peirce and semiolotgy of Saussure (as I have been attempting to, against strong oppositions from some of you). If if this theoreticl attempt happens to fail, as some of you may predict, it would not invalidate UAM, since it is an observational fact, just as Wigner's UEM is, within its own boundary. On the other hand, if the syllogism I suggested as a means to derive the UAM thesis from first principles in semiotics and linguistics happnes to turn out to be valid, it would strongly support the theory of signs of Peirce and the principle of the aribtraness of signs in linguistics, since they would then be judged consistent with an empirical fact recently discovered in biology. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net I have a concern in this discussion. First, this notion of Unreasonable Arbitrariness, has absolutely nothing at all to do with Wigner's Unreasonable Effectiveness. There is no similarity in an argument for arbitrariness and one for effectiveness. Wigner's argument speaks to scalability and applicability of technique, it speaks against the arbitrary and for a profound physical uniformity. Such that techniques that are effective at one level may be universally applied. Regards, Steven On Thursday, July 3, 2014, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Edwina wrote: The difference is as I explained in my original post: (6061-1) that between a model and the process of reasoning which are not the SAME empirical reality; . . . Before I comment on (6061-1), let me repeat what I said about the UAM (Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics) thesis. Major premise: All signs are arbitrary (Saussure) Minor premise: Mathematics is an argument symbolic legisign (Peirce) Coclusion: Mathemtica is arbitrary (consistent with the experimental evidecen provided), where mathematics means mathemtical equations such as the Planckian distribution, the double exponetial function of Lu et al (1998), or the ex-Gaussian function of R. D. Luce (1986, p. 100), and NOT mathematcal reasonig as you wrongly assumed. Based on this anlaysis, I conclude that Statement (6061-1) is a red herring desinged to (6061-2) mis-lead readers, away from the true significance of the UAM thesis, whihc is empiricallly substantiated as evident in the graphs that I pains-takingly provided to help readiers to understand what I mean. With all the best. Sung No, Sung, the difference in meaning between your terms is not similar to 'half-empty' and 'half-full' which uses different terms to describe the SAME empirical reality. The difference is as I explained in my original post: that between a model and the process of reasoning which are not the SAME empirical reality; and the nature of Saussurian semiology. I won't repeat it here. Edwina - Original Message - From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu javascript:; To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee javascript:; Sent: Thursday, July 03, 2014 3:10 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:6057] Re: Unreasonable You can read my syllogism in eithr of two ways -- as a 3-term arguement (as I intended) or as a 4-term argument (as you mis-interpret agaisnt he evidence I presented), just as there are two ways of describing a half-filled galss of water -- half-empty as you prefer, or half-ful as I see it. With all the best. Sung Never mind your endless acronyms, Sung. The fallacy in your syllogism remains. You can divert the issue to the triadic basis of the sign which is not relevant here, but the syllogistic structure itself has to be examined - and your syllogism, though formally correct (Barbara) is invalid because of the ambiguity of its terms. Oh, and by the way, if you want to base your comments on Peirce, then, using the 'data-based' approach, it is normal to provide the exact reference to any quotes or analysis of his that you use. Your equally endless numbers-in-parentheses does not provide the reference sources. Edwina - Original Message
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6067] Re: Unreasonable
Steven, Because two entirely different mathematical equations can account for the same set of empirical data, just as two entirely different words (representamens/signs) can refer to the same object in linguistics (semiotics). With all the best. Sung How, exactly, does this appeal to arbitrariness? On Thursday, July 3, 2014, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Steven wrote: What empirical evidence supports unreasonable arbitrariness? The empirical evidence consists of the following observations: (1) The single-molecule turnover times of cholsterosl oxidase fit both the dobule-exponential function of the form y = A(Exp(-Bx) - Exp (-Cx)) and the Planckian distribution, y = (A/(x + B)^5)/Exp(C/(x + B)) -1) (see the upper panel of Table 1 attached), and (2) The decision-time histograms fit both the Planckian distribution and the ex-Gaussian distribution used by R. D. Luce (Response Times: their roel in Infwerring Elementary Mental Organizaiton, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 100), which is of the form, y = A(Exp(B+C)Exp(-Dx)[(x - E)/F] (see the lower two panels in Table 1 attached.) If you have any question, let me know. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net What empirical evidence supports unreasonable arbitrariness? In fact, I see none at all. On the contrary, I see numerous claims of arbitrary behavior, in non-mathematical statements. In mathematical statements I see only evidence for a uniform and effective world - derived from biophysics. Steven On Thursday, July 3, 2014, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu javascript:; wrote: Steven, Ben, list, I do not deny that Wigner's Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics(UEM) has empirical support, mainly coming from physics. All I am saying is that the Unreaseaonable Arbitgrariness of Mathematics (UAM) thesis is also supported by empirical results, limitted as they may be as of now, that originate from biology. (Please try to understand the figures that I attached to my prefvious emails, without which you may miss the point I am trying to make with UAM.) Please rememgber also that UAM is an empirical fact, not a theoretical construct, although it may be theoretically derived from semiotics of Peirce and semiolotgy of Saussure (as I have been attempting to, against strong oppositions from some of you). If if this theoreticl attempt happens to fail, as some of you may predict, it would not invalidate UAM, since it is an observational fact, just as Wigner's UEM is, within its own boundary. On the other hand, if the syllogism I suggested as a means to derive the UAM thesis from first principles in semiotics and linguistics happnes to turn out to be valid, it would strongly support the theory of signs of Peirce and the principle of the aribtraness of signs in linguistics, since they would then be judged consistent with an empirical fact recently discovered in biology. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net I have a concern in this discussion. First, this notion of Unreasonable Arbitrariness, has absolutely nothing at all to do with Wigner's Unreasonable Effectiveness. There is no similarity in an argument for arbitrariness and one for effectiveness. Wigner's argument speaks to scalability and applicability of technique, it speaks against the arbitrary and for a profound physical uniformity. Such that techniques that are effective at one level may be universally applied. Regards, Steven On Thursday, July 3, 2014, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu javascript:; javascript:; wrote: Edwina wrote: The difference is as I explained in my original post: (6061-1) that between a model and the process of reasoning which are not the SAME empirical reality; . . . Before I comment on (6061-1), let me repeat what I said about the UAM (Unreasonable Arbitrariness of Mathematics) thesis. Major premise: All signs are arbitrary (Saussure) Minor premise: Mathematics is an argument symbolic legisign (Peirce) Coclusion: Mathemtica is arbitrary (consistent with the experimental evidecen provided), where mathematics means mathemtical equations such as the Planckian distribution, the double exponetial function of Lu et al (1998), or the ex-Gaussian function of R. D. Luce (1986, p. 100
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; Science and Religion
Edwina wrote (062414-1) and (062414-2): This order and organization is obvious - as(062414-1) Peirce pointed out. He attributed it to 'Mind' - which 'Mind' is an(062414-2) intrinsic part of matter (as Thirdness). Statement (062414-1) cannot be completely true, since The Universe is both ORGANIZED and DISORGANIZED, because(062414-3) ORGANIZATION cannot exist without the accompanying DISOGANIZATION, according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Ilya Prigogine (1917-2003), often called the poet of thermodynamics, gave two lectures at Rutgers in the 1980s, both of which were entitled The Constructive Role of Irreversible Processes. (062414-4) which nicely captures the essence of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Based on our current knowledge of the laws of thermodynamics, therefore, it may be concluded that Peirces late nineteenth-century understanding of the (062414-5) organization in the Universe must be judged unscientific and so must be his attribution of the Universal organization to Mind, since his Mind cannot account for the equally extant Universal disorganization that necessarily accompanies Universal organization. But Peirces concept of Thirdness is still valid, since both ORDER (e.g., those processes obeying the Planckian distribution law [1], also called BRE, blackbody radiation-like equation [2]) and DISORDER (e.g., those processes obeying the Gaussian distribution law) belong to the same category of Thirdness. With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Reference: [1] Ji, S. (2014). Experimental and Theoretical Evidence for the Energy Quantization in Molecular Machines and Living Cells. Computational and Structural Biotechnology Journal (to be published). See Eq. (2) in the poster version of this manuscript at http://www.conformon.net under Posters and Seminars. [2] Ji, S. (2012). Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. Chapters 11 and 12. See BRE described in the PDF available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Book Chapters. Matt - no, I made and make no attempt to 'explain the yearnings'. These are always personal and psychological and as such, are not part of the actual reality of the 'other things', of 'what we observe'. Because I yearn for 'X', does not make 'X' part of the external world. What I was attempting to explain was the analysis of the causality of order and organization in the world. This order and organization is obvious - as Peirce pointed out. He attributed it to 'Mind' - which 'Mind' is an intrinsic part of matter (as Thirdness). And yes, I consider that many of the comments claiming that 'God exists' are based on arguments of tenacity and authority. Edwina - Original Message - From: Matt Faunce To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, June 23, 2014 5:04 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; Science and Religion Let me address the insult. What you claimed to explain were the yearnings. The yearnings in just me play out differently than those in a friend of mine. So for you, one person, even given that you are the most informed person in the world on psychology, physics, philosophy, and a broad range of disciplines, and considering all the possible means of making sure the yearning considered all belong to the same class, there is no way you could not make gross assumptions about the cause of our yearnings. You probably very carefully self examined, studied the subject a lot, and judged other people yearnings to be under the umbrella of your explanation. But we reject that. It rings hollow. (More on that later) So my insult is that you're a contemporary human only armed with the knowledge of contemporary science, and you over-estimate the security of your conclusion. Your insult to us is that you say we who reject your conclusion and still keep James's hypothesis alive are ignorantly forgoing the method of science and either using the method of tenacity or a priora. I see no reason to bar my will to believe that the explanation may lie in part in what is currently occult. And I'll even add to that that it may be the nature of the relation of the occult to us that the occult will always remain occult. (Peirce would scoff at that addition on the grounds that it entertains nominalism, which I certainly still do at times.) Matt On Jun 23, 2014, at 8:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca wrote: In reply to Matt Faunce: 1) Edwina wrote: 'Science has
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; Science and Religion
Edwina wrote: After all, Peirce's 'Mind' or Thirdness (062414-6) or habits-of-organization, are evolving . . . If Peirce's 'Mind' is identifiable with 'organization' in the Universe, what would be identifiable with the 'disorganization' in the Universe whose existence is mandated by the Second Law of Thermodynamics (as I explained in my previous post) ? 'Mindless' ? Just to stimulate the discussion and based on the thermodynamic argument presented above, I am tempted to make the following assertion: Only the 'Mindless' may be content with the (062414-7) 'Mind' of Peirce. With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Ah, I see, thanks. But I wasn't commenting on your comment that 'Peirce looked askance on James' portrayal of a will to believe'. I was focusing on the fact that Peirce rejected Platonic Forms; he was an Aristotelian - and the 'form' of the matter was never, in Aristotle, separate from that matter, whereas for Plato, it existed as a pure ideal. The notion of a demiurge, i.e., an agent controlling the Forms and using them in moulding matter - would be rejected by Peirce whereas it was accepted within Plato's outline. After all, Peirce's 'Mind' or Thirdness or habits-of-organization, are evolving and therefore, operate within matter and not by some external agent's Will. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca Cc: Matt Faunce mattfau...@gmail.com; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, June 23, 2014 5:50 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; Science and Religion Edwina, Sorry for the ambiguous construction. I meant that Peirce looked askance on James' portrayal of a will to believe. Not sure about the rejection of Forms, as it's hard if not impossible to sift the spirit of Plato from the flesh of Scholastic Realism. And the Timaeus is allegory or parable, so it has to be taken with a grain of hermeneutic salt, to my taste, anyway. Jon Edwina Taborsky wrote: Yes, that's a very good comment - Plato's demiurge who was a 'master craftsman' using the Pure Forms to create matter. And yes, Peirce did indeed reject Platonism is all its forms - both the ideal Forms and the metaphysical Master Craftsman. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net To: Matt Faunce mattfau...@gmail.com Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, June 23, 2014 5:16 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; Science and Religion Matt, List, I was minded more of Plato's demiurge than James' will to believe, a notion on which Peirce looked rather askance, if I recall correctly ... Jon Matt Faunce wrote: Here is William James in his lecture Is Life Worth Living? on the urge y'all are speaking of. Is it not sheer dogmatic folly to say that our inner interests can have no real connection with the forces that the hidden world may contain? In other cases divinations based on inner interests have proved prophetic enough. Take science itself! Without an imperious inner demand on our part for ideal logical and mathematical harmonies, we should never have attained to proving that such harmonies lie hidden between all the chinks and interstices of the crude natural world. Hardly a law has been established in science, hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first sought after, often with sweat and blood, to gratify an inner need. Whence such needs come from we do not know: we find them in us, and biological psychology so far only classes them with Darwin's 'accidental variations.' But the inner need of believing that this world of nature is a sign of something more spiritual and eternal than itself is just as strong and authoritative in those who feel it, as the inner need of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a professionally scientific head. The toil of many generations has proved the latter need prophetic. Why may not the former one be prophetic, too? And if needs of ours outrun the physical universe, why may not that be a sign that an invisible universe is there? What, in short, has the authority to debar us from trusting our religious demands? Science as such assuredly has no authority, for she can only say what is, not what is not; and the agnostic 'thou shall not believe without coercive sensible evidence' is simply an expression (free to anyone to make) of private personal appetite for evidence of a certain peculiar kind. -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; Science and Religion
Matt wrote: You assumed Peirce's Mind is equal to a (062414-8) consistently progressive organization. . . No. I did not assume this. But Peirce apparently did, according to Edwina. . . . so any backwards motion, disassembling, (062414-9) shows that it is not-Mind. No. Any backward motion, as long as it is directional, must be accompanied by the dissiaption of free energy, accodirng to the Second Law. In other words, Mind can disassemble what it assembled previously, as long as it dissipates free energy. It is akin to the situation where it takes, sometimes, as mcuh money to build a building as to 'un-build' it, since both are directed, goal-oriented processes and all such directed processes require dissipating free energy (or disorganzing a part of the Universe) With all the best. Sung Ha! I love it! Inscribed on the walls of every music conservatory in the US are the words If your gonna make a mistake, make it big! Or as Peirce said of Sigwart's idea of Gefhl, Good! This is good intelligent work, such as advances philosophyâa good, square, explicit fallacy that can be squarely met and definitively refuted. You've been assuming Cartesian duality, redefined Peirce's Mind, which is a strictly idealist concept, into dualistic terms, and concluded that it is illogical. You assumed Peirce's Mind is equal to a consistently progressive organization; so any backwards motion, disassembling, shows that it is not-Mind. This distinction for Mind is not necessary. I think Peirce made it clear that Mind is rather marked by the greater tendency toward organization so to reach toward an ultimate end. The backwards motion that you call disorganization is necessary to regroup so to move forward farther toward the end than what would otherwise be possible. Do you look at your own mind only as a mind when it is assembling order and not a mind when disassembling? I know that this disorganizing that precedes regrouping sometimes happens when you think it would be better if it had not happened, that in specific cases the disorganizing is nothing but the evil of randomness, but this is your anthropocentric intrepretation. In the bigger picture Chance is the oil of our machine. Sometimes I'll lose writings or musical compositions and I'm put in the uncomfortable position of trying to recall what I had written. Every time the loosely recalled version is better! I think of Tarkovsky's movie The Stalker, which had to be completely scrapped for some reason, so he had to start over and this time had to rush through it. His movies are excruciatingly slow so I can only imagine that the second version had a better ability to connect with more people, and it certainly wasn't dumbed down. When you earlier asked if I implied that matter is a necessary condition for mind you were assuming a duality. This is why I said I can't agree. Matt On Jun 24, 2014, at 11:53 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Edwina wrote: After all, Peirce's 'Mind' or Thirdness (062414-6) or habits-of-organization, are evolving . . . If Peirce's 'Mind' is identifiable with 'organization' in the Universe, what would be identifiable with the 'disorganization' in the Universe whose existence is mandated by the Second Law of Thermodynamics (as I explained in my previous post) ? 'Mindless' ? Just to stimulate the discussion and based on the thermodynamic argument presented above, I am tempted to make the following assertion: Only the 'Mindless' may be content with the (062414-7) 'Mind' of Peirce. With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Ah, I see, thanks. But I wasn't commenting on your comment that 'Peirce looked askance on James' portrayal of a will to believe'. I was focusing on the fact that Peirce rejected Platonic Forms; he was an Aristotelian - and the 'form' of the matter was never, in Aristotle, separate from that matter, whereas for Plato, it existed as a pure ideal. The notion of a demiurge, i.e., an agent controlling the Forms and using them in moulding matter - would be rejected by Peirce whereas it was accepted within Plato's outline. After all, Peirce's 'Mind' or Thirdness or habits-of-organization, are evolving and therefore, operate within matter and not by some external agent's Will. Edwina - Original Message - From: Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net To: Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca Cc: Matt Faunce mattfau...@gmail.com; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, June 23, 2014 5:50 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: De Waal Seminar Chapter 9 : Section on God ; Science and Religion Edwina, Sorry for the ambiguous
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:5995] Re: QBism, once again
Howard wrote: Quantum physics runs directly into this conceptual(5995-1) problem with the (discrete) particle-(continuous) wave complementarity. Matter cannot be described without using both concepts in an unintuitive relation. I think physicists are ahead of biologists by at least one century, in the sense that biologists (most, if not all, of them) still believe that the wave-particle complementarity (WPC) is unique to physics and not applicable to biology. But I saw several observations on molecular and cell biology reported at the EMBO/EMBL Conference on Molecular Machines held in Heidelberg last month that clearly demonstrated the involvement of both particle and wave properties of matter, but everything is explained away only in terms of the particle aspect, completely ignoring the wave aspect of matter. When I pointed this out at the meeting on several occasions, some young audience (graduate students and postdocs) apparently liked and agree with my commentaries, as evidenced by the fact that I was invited to have a drink and dance with them at Cave in Heidelberg until 3 am ! Also some of the established investigators at the meeting apparently agreed with me (or at least thought my commentaries were thought-provoking), since my poster (Experimental and Theoretical Evidence for the Energy Quantization of Molecular Machines and Living Cells) were chosen as one of the presentations to be published in a special issue of Structural and Computational Biotechnology Journal dedicated to the Conference, the manuscript of which being due in 10 days. In this manuscript, I will emphasize the fundamental significance of WPC in interpreting biological data on the molecular and cellular levels, a conclusion supported by my own recent findings that a wide variety of biological processes, from protein folding to enzyme catalysis and brain functions, obeys the generalized Planck equation (also called BRE, blackbody radiation-like equation, or the Planck distribution) which consists of two terms one related to standing waves and the other to their energies. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net At 02:58 PM 6/19/2014, Edwina wrote, (following Howard's response to Søren): Søren wrote: This understanding of experience as an irreducible aspect of reality is very difficult to swallow for so-called scientific realists. HP: On the contrary, what you call the individual's irreducible aspect of reality was first clearly distinguished by Newton (his greatest discovery according to Wigner). This irreducible aspect is what physicists call the local initial conditions as contrasted with universal nature's laws. Edwina: I think that the 'individual's irreducible aspect of reality' can be traced much further than Newton. How about Aristotle? HP: Agreed. What can't be traced to Aristotle? Nevertheless, to clearly distinguish initial conditions from laws you need Newton's mathematics which described continuity with discrete symbols. In my opinion, Aristotle's greatest discovery was complementarity -- the epistemological fact that to understand reality we need multiple models that are logically irreducible to each other. His four causes are one example. Another example of irreducibility is discreteness and continuity: That which moves does not move by counting. Peirce had trouble accepting the necessity of complementary models because they are often logically inconsistent. He spent many years trying to describe continuity (his synechism) by discrete logic (as did many other mathematicians). He did not solve the problem (e.g., see http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SAAP/USC/DP16.htmlContinuous Frustration: C.S. Peirces Mathematical Conception of Continuity).http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SAAP/USC/DP16.html Quantum physics runs directly into this conceptual problem with the (discrete) particle-(continuous) wave complementarity. Matter cannot be described without using both concepts in an unintuitive relation. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy Introduction
Matt wrote: Just like 'standing still' is a special case of (062014-1) motion, matter is a special case of mind. Do you mean by (062014-1) that Matter is a necessary condition for mind ? Would you agree that Just as 'standing still' is assocaited with a zero(062014-2) velcoity and motion with non-zero velocities, so matter is associated with a zero capacity for thinking while mind has non-zero capacity of thinking ? It may be that Statement (062014-1) is akin to saying that a glass is half full, whereas Statement (062014-2) is akin to saying that a glass is half empty: Both statements are true. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net You're unnecessarily complicating things. Just like 'standing still' is a special case of motion, matter is a special case of mind. Matt On Jun 20, 2014, at 5:26 PM, Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de wrote: I dont think, that materialism and idealism are monisms, but, that monism is a hypothesis, that says, that both, ideas and matter, are derivates of the same thing (genotype or so), of which none is more fundamental than the other. What makes them different derivates on one hand, and combines them and makes them equal in regards of relevance again, is a third, lets say structure. This structure is only there, if the other two concepts are present and separate, otherwise there would be no use of the structure (nothing to separate or to combine). So, such a triadic hypotethis is a monism, because of the irreducibility of the triad ideas, matter, and structures, and because each can be each in a different time scale of a different semiosis, and is therefore essentially, monistically the same. Idealism and materialism are dualisms, I think. So it is possible to choose between idealism, materialism and monism. Von: Matt Faunce mattfau...@gmail.com I don't see how anyone can avoid choosing, either consciously or subconsciously, either monism or dualism. You can switch, but I don't see a way out. I'm not sure if there's a real philosophical difference between the two monistic philosophies or if one is just a more convenient view from which to explain and understand certain issues. If we've successfully boiled our philosophical disagreement down to a difference in the values we hold then I consider this a successful discussion. Matt On Jun 20, 2014, at 10:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote: List, Matt: Thank you for articulating your views. I was somewhat stunned by the notion that the First person pronoun, a simple term of reference from grammar would lead to so many broad philosophical generalizations. To me, your post illustrates a clear example of a relation between Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, within the mindset of philosophers. Firstness is the personal pronoun I, Secondness is the brute action of personality/belief and Thirdness is the relation between the two.:-) :-) :-) We disagree on some issues. Most notably, the following We have to choose between these three philosophies: idealism, where everything is mental; materialism, where everything is material; and pluralism, I am not aware of any imperatives in choosing a philosophy. Perhaps you could explain what/ where/ how/ and why such imperatives exist. If you admit the importance of simplicity, in Ockham's Razor, then you should admit that is everything is continuous, 1. The simple is for simpletons. I admit the critical importance of perplexity in all of nature. 2. The natural sciences of which I am a student of, electricity, chemistry, biology and medicine, are all based on the concept of the discrete identity of the individual parts of the whole. The identity of every human being is discrete and unique. Space and time are continuous. Our differences are so profound that I will read your response and then drop the tread. Cheers Jerry On Jun 17, 2014, at 10:33 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: Jerry asked, What is your understanding of your usage of the term us in your sentence? Could you find a better articulation of your intended meaning(s)? My usage was in response to what Stephen said, quoted here: Pragmaticism is a bastion against the dominant notion that we are all reality is. We are not all of reality. Our individual perceptions are not all reality. Before we are, reality is. After we are, reality remains. The part of my response Jerry asked me to better articulate: The Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti, who were objective idealists, concluded that there could never have been a before us and there will never be an after us. I came to see things their way. And I defined 'we' as those
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: determination in semiosis
Jerry, Sung: On Jun 15, 2014, at 2:34 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: (1) Sign is always Firstness formally but can be Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness ontologically. (2) Object is always Secondness formally but can be Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness ontologically. (3) Interpretant is always Thirdness formally but can be firstness, Secondness or Thridness ontologically. This interpretation is a vast expansion of the original CSP writing. CSP does not use the terms, such as formally, ontologically, and interpretant you added to his carefully crafted sentences. You also omit the term relation. It is my understanding that, when Peirce says that the sign is an irreducible triad of representamen (R), object (O), and interpretant (I), he is asserting that the sign is an irreducible RELATION among the three RELATA, R, O and I. Thus, the sign is a network of R, O, and I, and a network is a combination of edges (representing relations) and nodes (representing relata). The original CSP sentences separates the meaning of firstness and secondness by being a difference in mode of being. CSP uses the concept of Mode of being to indicate and index a difference - possibly a metaphysical difference. I do not see any possibility of the concept of mode of being being a determination in the sense of grammar or logic; it is merely a distinction between two distinct mode of beings. One interpretation could be two metaphysical beings, God the father and God the son Another interpretation could be the abstract notion of a form of matter as either a gas and as a liquid. Another interpretation could be firstness as Hydrogen and secondness as Gold. I dont think this is right. To me, both hydrogen and gold represents the same mode of being. The meaning of the term relation is different in each of the three cases and addresses the question of HOW we choose to associate any two modes of being. I do not understand either how or why you would seek to extend the conceptualization to mathematics. Mathematical category theory requires THREE separate and independent CONTINUOUS variables, (as modes of being?), in order to have a DIRECTED graph with the three domains and three edges NECESSARY for the closure (of triangular form) in the definition of an algebraic category. I think the three categories of Peirce constitute a mathematical category to the extent that the following statement is valid: Firstness determines the Secondness which in turn (061714-1) determines Thirdness, not in any arbitrary manner, but in such a way that Thirdness is indirectly determined by Firstness. Equivalently, one can state that Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are related (061714-2) in such a manner that they satisfy the composition condition of the mathematical category. If you wish to compare your personal mathematical interpretation of category theory with a well-respected mathematician's application of category theory to biology, see the book by Andree Ehresmann, Memory Evolutive Systems. In particular, you could test your numerous hypotheses about categories with demonstrations of the categorical co-limit operations within your framework of thought. Thanks for the link. I agree. It should be instructive to study their category-theoretical model of biology, which seems to be an extension of that of Robert Rosen. It is unfortunate, however, both Rosen and these authors seem to have developed their theories based on the dated concept of mechanisms and machines of Newtonian mechanics, ignoring the neewer development of the concept of molecual machines that are rooted in quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics. With all the best. Sung Sung: On Jun 15, 2014, at 2:34 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: (1) Sign is always Firstness formally but can be Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness ontologically. (2) Object is always Secondness formally but can be Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness ontologically. (3) Interpretant is always Thirdness formally but can be firstness, Secondness or Thridness ontologically. This interpretation is a vast expansion of the original CSP writing. CSP does not use the terms, such as formally, ontologically, and interpretant you added to his carefully crafted sentences. You also omit the term relation. The original CSP sentences separates the meaning of firstness and secondness by being a difference in mode of being. CSP uses the concept of Mode of being to indicate and index a difference - possibly a metaphysical difference. I do not see any possibility of the concept of mode of being being a determination in the sense of grammar or logic; it is merely a distinction between two distinct mode of beings. One interpretation could be two metaphysical beings, God the father and God the son Another interpretation could be be the abstract notion of a form of matter as either a gas and as a liquid. Another interpretation
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM
Gary R wrote: It seems to me that there has come to be a consensus (061514-7) here and in Peirce scholarship more generally that determines should not be seen in this usage as analogous to physically causes but more along the lines of constrains or limits. This is a logical, not a physical, use of the term. Doesn't Statement (061514-7) still imply that Secondness (obejct) contrains the Firstness (sign),(061514-8) and hence Firstness is second to Secondness. With all the best. Sung Sungchul , list, Sung asks, *Vector of Determination - The object determines (2ns) (061514-2)a sign (1ns) for an interpretant (3ns).It seems to me that (061514-2) is consistent with (061514-1) except thefollowing question that arises in connection with the former:How can Firstness be 'determined' by Secondness ? (061514-3)Any suggestion ?* There have been several discussions on peirce-l over the years, beginning in 1998 as I recall, and even recently concerning Peirce's use of the term determines in the phrase the object determines the representamen for the interpretant. It seems to me that there has come to be a consensus here and in Peirce scholarship more generally that determines should not be seen in this usage as analogous to physically causes but more along the lines of constrains or limits. This is a logical, not a physical, use of the term. So, the basic idea seems to be that a sign cannot convey anything approaching the complete meaning of any given object, but only a sort of idea of it, the ground: A [sign] stands for [its] object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the [sign]. CP 2.228 Best, Gary R. circumscribe http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/circumscribe, confine http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/confine, hold down http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hold+down, restrict http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restrict *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 7:53 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Hi, In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trikonic, I find the following two statements: Firstness is the mode of being that of which is such (061514-1) as it is, positively and without reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode of being that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third. Thirdness is the mode of being that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other. Vector of Determination - The object determines (2ns) (061514-2) a sign (1ns) for an interpretant (3ns). It seems to me that (061514-2) is consistent with (061514-1) except the following question that arises in connection with the former: How can Firstness be 'determined' by Secondness ? (061514-3) Any suggestion ? I wonder if the seeming 'contradiction in (061514-2) can be avoided by re-stating it as: The object (2ns) presupposes a sign (1ns) which determines (061514-4) an interpretant (3ns). which then fits the definition of a mathematical category; i.e., The Peircean categories of 2ns, 1ns, and 3ns form(061514-5) a mathematical category. If (061514-4) is true, we can conclude that The concept of 'category' is self-similar similar (061514-6) to a Russian nesting doll. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net RESPONSE TO GARY RICHMOND FROM GCM 1] . But, unlike Hegel's position, 3ns does not Aufheben (i.e., invalidate, annul, cancel out) the other two categories, but rather joins them in a genuine tricategorial relation. GCM: Where does Hegel say Aufheben absolutely cancels out the other two categories? That would seem to go against the general tenor of his philosophy in general - but I have nothing specific to oppose it with. 2] 1º Thanks, but I don't think I'd exactly say that reality is continuity, but, as I wrote today, pragmatism involves 'the recognition that continuity is an indispensable element of reality' [and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives.] CSP GR said, sometimes quoting Peirce: 2º Reality consists in regularity. Real regularity is active law. Active law is efficient reasonableness, or in other words is truly reasonable reasonableness 3º that continuity is an indispensable element of reality, and that continuity is simply what generality becomes in the logic of relatives. GCM: If Reality
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:5973] Re: Yao 2013 The Increase of the Functional
Stan, Yes. That would be one conclusion that can be predicted based on the entropic brain hypothsis of Carhart-Harris et al. which seems supported by the fMRI data of Yao et al. With all the best. Sung Sung -- Would you say, in more general terms, that the tendency to FOCUS decreases with age? STAN On Thu, Jun 12, 2014 at 4:54 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Malcolm, Thanks for this link. Carhart-Harris and his group reported a similar increase in the brain entropy (calculated from the blood oxygen level-dependent fMRI signals), upon the arterial infusion of psilocybin [1]. As evident in the attached figures, their fMRI signals also fit the blackbody radiation- like equation, BRE (also called the generalized Planck equation, GPE, or more simply the Plank distribution, PD) discovered in 2008 and described in [2,3]. The broadening of the histogram induced by psilocybin is captured by the b/A ratio of BRE which increases from 40.0 to 75.0. One possible interpretation for the PD fitting of the fMRI signals of Carhart-Harris et al. is that psilocybin inhibits the âSignal-Induced Deactivation of Thermally Excited Meta-stable states of neurons leading TO Functionsâ, which is referred to as the âSID-TEM-TOFâ hypothesis [3]. In other words, psilocybin inhibits neuronal functions. If the fMRI signals measured by Yao et al. also fit PD (as I suspect they will, based on the skewed shape of the histogram in Figure 2D), the SID-TEM-TOF hypothesis would apply to their data, leading to the conclusion that aging reduces the functions of most of the 90 regions of the human brain they examined. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net References: [1] Carhart-Harris, et al. (2014). The entropic brain: a new theory of conscious states informed by neuroimaging research with psychedelic drugs. Front. Human Neurosci. 8:1-22. [2] Ji, S. (2012). Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. Chapters 11 and 12. PDF available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Book Chapters. [3] Ji, S. (2014). Experimental and Theoretical Evidence for the Energy Quantization of Molecular Machines and Living Cells. Computational and Structural Biotechnology (accepted). http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.1976 *The Increase of the Functional Entropy of the Human Brain with Age* Y. Yao, W. L. Lu, B. Xu, C. B. Li, C. P. Lin, D. Waxman, J. F. Feng We use entropy to characterize intrinsic ageing properties of the human brain. Analysis of fMRI data from a large dataset of individuals, using resting state BOLD signals, demonstrated that *a functional entropy associated with brain activity increases with age*. During an average lifespan, the entropy, which was calculated from a population of individuals, increased by approximately 0.1 bits, due to correlations in BOLD activity becoming more widely distributed. We attribute this to the number of excitatory neurons and the excitatory conductance decreasing with age. Incorporating these properties into a computational model leads to quantitatively similar results to the fMRI data. Our dataset involved males and females and we found significant differences between them. The entropy of males at birth was lower than that of females. However, the entropies of the two sexes increase at different rates, and intersect at approximately 50 years; after this age, males have a larger entropy. Subjects: Quantitative Methods (q-bio.QM); Medical Physics (physics.med-ph); Neurons and Cognition (q-bio.NC) Journal reference: Scientific Reports, 3:2853, 2013; DOI: 0.1038/srep02853 Cite as: arXiv:1406.1976 [q-bio.QM] (or arXiv:1406.1976v1 [q-bio.QM] for this version) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Learning, enzyme catalysis, and synehcism
Gary F wrote, in discussing children's ability to learn a language: They learn it because they are primed to, not (060514-1) because they are forced to. This reminded me of the mechanism of enzyme catalysis, since, according to the pre-fit hypothesis of enzyme catalysis [1], it can be stated that Enzymes transform their substrates because they are (060514-2) primed (or pre-fit) to bind their substrates, but not because they are forced (or induced) to fit them. There are two schools of thought concerning how an enzyme works-- (a) the induced-fit hypopthesis proposed by Koshland in the 1958 and (b) the pre-fit hypothesis that I proposed in the 1974 [2; pp. 433-434]. The experimental and theoretical evidence favoring the latter hypothesis was recently reviewed in [1]. If the pre-fit hypothesis is true, the following inference may be made: Since learning at the brain level is obviously supported (060514-3) by enzyme catalyses on the molecular level, it may not be surprising to find that there exist some common mechanistic principles operating between learning and enzyme catalysis, which may be viewed as an instantiation of Peirces principle of synechism. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net References: [1] Ji, S. (2012). The Kinetics of Ligand-Protein Interactions: The Pre-fit Mechanism Based on the Generalized Franck-Condon Principle. In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. Pp. 209-214. PDF available at conformon.net under Publications Book chapters. [2] Ji, S. (1974). Energy and Negentropy in Enzymic Catalysis. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 227:419-437. PDF available at conformon.net under Publications Refereed Articles. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:5924] Re: Peirce's 1870 âLogic Of Relativesâ ⢠Comment 11. 12
Bob, Sorry for my delayed response. I would agree that z = f(x, y) is more triadic in the Peircesan sense than y = f(x) would be, since x, y and z can form Borromean rings (and a mathematical category) whereas x and y cannot. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net How about the surface z = f (x,y) __ Robert K. Logan Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan On 2014-05-16, at 3:52 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: Jon: I haven't kept up with your emails, but I do have one 'burning' question. You wrote: Since functions are special cases of dyadic relations . . (051614-1) Can there be functions of the type, y = f(x), that are special cases of triadic relations in the Peircena sense ? In other words can the following mapping be considered triadic? f x y(501614-2) With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Post : Peirce's 1870 âLogic Of Relativesâ ⢠Comment 11.12 http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/05/12/peirces-1870-logic-of-relatives-%e2%80%a2-comment-11-12/ Posted : May 12, 2014 at 2:00 pm Author : Jon Awbrey Peircers, Since functions are special cases of dyadic relations and since the space of dyadic relations is closed under relational composition â that is, the composition of two dyadic relations is again a dyadic relation â we know that the relational composition of two functions has to be a dyadic relation. If the relational composition of two functions is necessarily a function, too, then we would be justified in speaking of ''functional composition'' and also in saying that the space of functions is closed under this functional form of composition. Just for noveltyâs sake, let's try to prove this for relations that are functional on correlates. The task is this â We are given a pair of dyadic relations: ⢠P â X à Y and Q â Y à Z The dyadic relations P and Q are assumed to be functional on correlates, a premiss that we express as follows: ⢠P : X â Y and Q : Y â Z We are charged with deciding whether the relational composition P â Q â X à Z is also functional on correlates, in symbols, whether P â Q : X â Z. It always helps to begin by recalling the - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:5949] Borromean rings in pyhysics, biology semiotics
Hi, I have made a mistake in Figure 2 below. The three rings designated as P, B, and S are not Borromean as they stand because removing P or B ring would still leave two rings interlinked. But it is possible to interconnect these three rings in such a way that they become Borromean rings (or that they form a Brunnian link) so that removing any one of them will result in a complete separation of the rings. Despite the error made in Figure 2, the main point of my email remains that P (physics), B (biology) and S (semiotics) are so interconnected to achieve some function (which I assume to be communincation) that removing any one of them will result in the abolition of that function. With all the best. Sung (I forgot to attach the PDF file.) Original Message Subject: [biosemiotics:5948] Borromean rings in pyhysics, biology, and semiotics From:Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu Date:Sat, May 31, 2014 3:42 pm To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu -- (For undistored table and figures, see the attached.) Hi, Benjamin Udell brought to our attention the following interesting article on the Borromean rings: Physicists Prove Surprising Rule of Threes, _Wired_, May 29, 2014, by Natalie Wolchover (_Quanta Magazine_). http://www.wired.com/2014/05/physicists-rule-of-threes-efimov-trimers/ Borromean rings are a set of three rings that are interlinked in such a way that removing any one of them leads to dissolving all the links. The above cited article describes the experimental demonstration of the Borromean rings in atomic physics. I think Borromean rings are present in living cells and Peircean signs as well: (1)The Borromean rings in cell biology. There are three types of forces operating inside the living cell (see Table 1) that act as Borromean rings since removing any one of them will inevitably lead to cell death. ___ Table 1. The three types of the forces and their tokens postulated to form the Borromean rings inside the living cell: i.e., removing any one of these forces will lead to cell death. Forces acting inside the Cell Chemical Mechanical Osmotic ExamplesATP ADPDNA supercoils ion gradients across the cell membrane _ Mechanism electronicconformationalfree energy (i.e., E S) interactions interactions gradients (Quantum (Newtonian(Termodynamics) mechanics)mechanics) _ Alternativebond energy conformationalosmotic energy Namesenergy (or conformons) _ (2)The Borromean rings in semiotics: As previously maintained, the Peircean sign can be represented as a mathematical category with three sets (Object, Sign, and Interpretant), each acting as a Borromean ring due to the fact that their mappings (denoted as f, g, and k in Figure 1) obey the composition condition, i.e., f x g = k. That is, when any one of these mappings are removed, there is no triadic interactions and no mathematical category. f g Object - Sign --- Interpretant | ^ | | |__| k Figure 1. The Peircean sign as a mathematical category consisting of three Borromean rings called Object, Sign and Interpretant, the interpretant ring weaving through the other two rings consecutively following the rule that each intersection is either up or down and different from the previous one (see Figure 2). (3) Finally, it did not escape my attention that the three fields, physics (including chemistry), biology and semiotics may form Borromean rings at a higher level of organization than the level (i.e., the cellular level) discussed in Table 1, so that no higher-order life (including thinking) would be possible without all three fields mutually interacting. _ P_ _B__
[PEIRCE-L] Borromean rings in pyhysics, biology, and semiotics
(For undistored table and figures, see the attached.) Hi, Benjamin Udell brought to our attention the following interesting article on the Borromean rings: Physicists Prove Surprising Rule of Threes, _Wired_, May 29, 2014, by Natalie Wolchover (_Quanta Magazine_). http://www.wired.com/2014/05/physicists-rule-of-threes-efimov-trimers/ Borromean rings are a set of three rings that are interlinked in such a way that removing any one of them leads to dissolving all the links. The above cited article describes the experimental demonstration of the Borromean rings in atomic physics. I think Borromean rings are present in living cells and Peircean signs as well: (1)The Borromean rings in cell biology. There are three types of forces operating inside the living cell (see Table 1) that act as Borromean rings since removing any one of them will inevitably lead to cell death. ___ Table 1. The three types of the forces and their tokens postulated to form the Borromean rings inside the living cell: i.e., removing any one of these forces will lead to cell death. Forces acting inside the Cell Chemical Mechanical Osmotic ExamplesATP ADPDNA supercoils ion gradients across the cell membrane _ Mechanism electronicconformationalfree energy (i.e., E S) interactions interactions gradients (Quantum (Newtonian(Termodynamics) mechanics)mechanics) _ Alternativebond energy conformationalosmotic energy Namesenergy (or conformons) _ (2)The Borromean rings in semiotics: As previously maintained, the Peircean sign can be represented as a mathematical category with three sets (Object, Sign, and Interpretant), each acting as a Borromean ring due to the fact that their mappings (denoted as f, g, and k in Figure 1) obey the composition condition, i.e., f x g = k. That is, when any one of these mappings are removed, there is no triadic interactions and no mathematical category. f g Object - Sign --- Interpretant | ^ | | |__| k Figure 1. The Peircean sign as a mathematical category consisting of three Borromean rings called Object, Sign and Interpretant, the interpretant ring weaving through the other two rings consecutively following the rule that each intersection is either up or down and different from the previous one (see Figure 2). (3) Finally, it did not escape my attention that the three fields, physics (including chemistry), biology and semiotics may form Borromean rings at a higher level of organization than the level (i.e., the cellular level) discussed in Table 1, so that no higher-order life (including thinking) would be possible without all three fields mutually interacting. _ P_ _B__ || || |__ +| _-| |___ | |___|| |___|| - | | + |___ S | Figure 2. Semiotics (S) viewed as a Borromean ring in a system of inter-linked rings in which physics (P)(including chemistry) and biology (B) form its complementary Borromean rings. The symbols + and signify that the semiotic ring is passing over and under the other rings, respectively. If the above arguments are right, it may be inferred that the three concepts, Peircean signs, mathematical categories, and Borromean rings are different names for the same object, perhaps Pierces irreducible tirad(icity). With all the best. __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu
RE: [PEIRCE-L] category theory in math
Jeff D, Jerry, Jon, List, Jeff D, List, In [biosemiotics:5311] posted on March 9, 2014, which is partially reproduced below, I was let to conclude that The Peircean sign is a mathematical category.(043014-1) To the extent that (043014-1) turns out to be true, I wonder if it would be logical to conclude that The category theory of Eilenberg and McLane (043014-2) is a mathematical version of semiotics, mathematical semiotics, or 'mathematicized semiotics. With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (A apartial reproduction of [biosemiotics:5311] dated March 9, 2014) A sign is anything, A, which, (030914-14) (1) in addition to other characters of its own, (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B, (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation Þ. -- SS. pp. 192-193, ca. 1905 The supplementary triadic relation intrinsic to the definition of signs given in (030914-13) and (030914-14) can be represented diagrammatically as shown in Figure 2: Þ x B - A --C | ^ | | |__| µ Figure 2. The Peircean sign as a mathematical category consisting of three objects, A (i.e, sign or representamen), B (or object), and C (or interpretant), and structure-preserving mappings (also called morphisms), Þ, x, and µ ,that are related by commutativity in the sense that the combination of Þ and x has the same effect as the relation, µ, where x is the relation postulated to be missing in Peirces statement above. It is evident that Figure 2 is isomorphic with (i.e., exhibits the same principle as) Figure 1, leading to the conclusion that The Peircean sign is a mathematical category.(030914-15) which can be translated into an algebraic expression based on the definition of supplementarity given (030914-1): Sign = Object + Intepretant(030914-16) This statement seems to contradict my conclusion published elsewhere [4] that Peircean signs are gnergons. (030914-17) where gnergons are defined as discrete units of Gnergy which is in turn defined as as the complementary union of information /form (denoted by gn-) and energy/matter (denoted by --ergy) [5], which can be transformed into another algebraic expression based on the definition of complementarity given in (030914-2): Sign = Form^ Matter (030914-18) The apparent contradiction between (030914-16) which embodies supplementarity and (030914-18) embodying complementarity can be avoided if it is assumed that the Peircean sign is a complete triad, not just a supplementary nor a complementary triad. That is, the Piercean sign may satisfy the triadic closure condition, (0309140-3), and hence constitutes a complete triad: Sign = (Object + Interpretant) (Form^Matter) (030914-19) If this statement turns out to be valid, the following conclusion would hold: Peircean signs can be represented as mathematical(030914-20) categories that embody three principles SUPPLEMENTARITY(symbolized by +), COMPLEMENTARITY (symbolized by ^), and TRIADIC CLOSURE symbolized by ). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Jerry, List, I was not trying to argue for the claim. Rather, I was only reporting what some who work on category theory say. Here, for instance, is John Baez: The point is, that a category is really a generalization of a group. (http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/categories.html) As far as I am able to see, Klein's aim in the Erlanger program and Mac Lane's aim in his early work were quite similar. Here is how it is explained in the Stanford Encyclopedia article: Category theory reveals how different kinds of structures are related to one another. For instance, in algebraic topology, topological spaces are related to groups (and modules, rings, etc.) in various ways (such as homology, cohomology, homotopy, K-theory). As noted above, groups with group homomorphisms constitute a category. Eilenberg MacâLane invented category theory precisely in order to clarify and compare these connections. What matters
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 7, Pragmatism
Gary F, Gary R, List, I always thought that information theorists should study Peircean semiotics because The Peircean sign may be viewed as the fundamental (042414-1) carrier of information. This morning it occurred to me that the Peircean sign, viewed as a mathematical category, may account for the three aspects of information simultaneously i.e., AMOUNT, MEANING, and VALUE thus: (1) In Step a in Figure 1, an object generates n possible signs in the human brain. (2) A possible sign determines m possible interpretants. (3) The human selects only those possible signs connected to their possible interpretants that are in turn compatible with the object. a b Object Sign - Interpretant | ^ | | |_| c Figure 1. The Peircean sign as a mathematical category. a = sign production; b = meaning production; c = value production. I am tempted to suggest that the following quantitative relations may hold for each of the three steps in Figure 1: a = the AMOUNT of information is determined as log_2 n bits. b = the MEANING of information is determined as log_2 m bits. c = the VALUE of information is determined as log_2 (1/D), where D is the dis-similarity or discrepancy between object and an interpretant which reduces the probability of action or the belief to act. With all the bet. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Gary F., List, Gary, thanks for this message. We seem to see things a bit differently terminologically, and there are a couple of substantive matters upon which we seem to be in disagreement as well. You concluded your interesting comments on the question of moving from the phaneron to what is extracted from it for cognitive purposes: GF: The connection is that just as phaneroscopy looks for the essential elements of the phaneron, a scientific definition aims to identify the essential elements of the concept. So, to begin with, the elements we're looking to extract from the phaneron would seem to analogous to the elements which factor in a scientific definition. But that doesn't get us very far. You continued: GF: Kees in 7.1 quotes Peirce as saying that a concept is the living influence upon us of a *diagram*, or*icon*, with whose several parts are connected in thought an equal number of feelings or ideas; so it makes sense to regard this logical analysis as iconoscopy (De Tienne's term), and as a process which moves us from the prelogical into the realm of logic. This forms part of the larger process whose method we call pragmatism or pragmaticism, which I think of as cyclic, or spiralling if it makes some kind of progress. While Iconoscopy is, indeed, de Tienne's term, you may recall that in his paper on that topic that he finds his own term not quite right: *AdT: The fact is that Peirce often uses the word 'image' in many different contexts, from the mathematical to the psychological through the logical, and that not all of his uses refer to the same thing. But the stronger reason that favors using the word 'image' at this juncture rather than the word 'icon' is precisely that Peirce gave the word 'icon' a technical definition that removes it from the field of phaneral experience to the benefit of semeiotic, while he frequently uses the word 'image' in order to insist on the experiential dimension that accompanies icons, whether it be phenomenological or psychological (de Tienne, in Iconoscopy between Phaneroscopy and Semeiotic).* Now calling it something like, say, 'imagoscopy', would certainly be to give it a name ugly enough to protect it from kidnappers. Nonetheless, I agree with the thrust of the above quotation, namely, that 'icon' is a technical term in semeiotic, so perhaps less suitable for use in phenomenology. On the other hand, despite his reservations, de Tienne settled on 'iconoscopy'. You continued: GF: I'm reluctant to say anything about Category Theory as a further step along the pragmatistic path, for two reasons. One is that the definition we arrive at by logical analysis or iconoscopy (such as the definition of *sign* that Peirce works out in MS 318) does not necessarily make explicit use of the three categories (though of course they are implicit everywhere in concepts, and there are often good reasons for making them explicit). I'm a bit confused here as you seem to have leaped from iconoscopy to speculative grammar in speaking of a logical analysis. . .such as the definition
RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
Hi, Speaking about measurement, my students and I at Rutgers have found something quite unusual during the past 6 years: There exists a 3-parameter mathematical equation that (042314-1) fits data measured from (i) atoms (blackbody radiation spectra), (ii) proteins (Gibbs free energy of protein folding), (iii) enzymes (single-molecule turnover times of cholesterol oxidase), (iv)cells (genome-wide transcription rates in budding yeast, genome-wide RNA levels in budding yeast), (v) tissues (genome-wide RNA levels in human breast cancer tissues before and after treating with an anticancer drug), (vi) immune system (the nucleotide sequence variability of human T-cell receptors), and (vii) brains (the fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging, signals before and after arterial infusion of the psychedelic drug, psilocybin). The mathematical equation involved is derived from the Planck equation discovered in 1900 that established the principle of the QUANTIZATION of ENERGY in physics and looks like this, y = A(x + B)^-5)(EXP(C/(x + B) 1)^-1 (042314-2) which I came to call the generalized Planck equation (GPE). The numerical values of the 3 parameters, A, B and C, have been found to depend (sensitively) on the data sets being analyzed. My current explanation (dynamic interpretant ?) for these absurd (as Stephen Wolfram once remarked) observations (signs) is that Quantization and discretization are the prerequisite (042314-3) for all organizations in the Universe. So that The phenomenon of quantization occurs not only (042314-4) at the atomic level but also at the protein, cell, tissue, and organ levels, i.e., at all levels of ORGANIZATION. which may be viewed as the object of the sign, (042314-1) or (042324-2). If these interpretations turn out to be valid, the following generalization may hold: All signs are quantized or have quantitative aspects. (042314-5) I wonder how Peirce would have responded to (042314-5). Any suggestion? With all the best. Sung __ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net Hi Jeff K., Jon, List, Here are a few quick responses about measurement. 1. I was a graduate student at UNC--Chapel Hill, but John Roberts arrived some time after I finished the Ph.D. We did have the opportunity to talk about his work on measurement and the laws of nature during a conference, and there are a number of significant differences between his positions on both measurement and the laws of nature and the positions Peirce developed. In short, Roberts claims that many of the key questions about the foundations of measurement and the nature of the laws of nature (e.g., the symmetries involved, the binding force of the laws, the relations between the laws) can be answered within the special sciences. He is loath to turn to what he calls speculative metaphysics for the answers to these kinds of questions. Time and again, he suggests that the positions he is developing are not inconsistent with a modern Humean outlook in the philosophy of science. Peirce, on the other hand, claims that the methods of the special sciences are ill-equipped to answer a number of key questions about both measurement and law. My sense is that Peirce has a considerably more systematic approach in separating different parts of the questions and in trying to answer some parts using the methods of phenomenology, other parts using the methods of normative sciences, and other parts using the methods of metaphysics. 2. Peirce claims that scientific inquiry will tend to converge on a true explanation of what is really the case. He suggests that it is a significant scientific question as to what kinds of measurements should or shouldn't be used for different kinds of observable phenomena. In fact, he suggests that the question is just as basic as asking what kind of classificatory systems should or shouldn't be applied to one or another case of a given phenomena. Let's ask: what is necessary for different lines of inquiry--drawing on different kinds of observations-- to converge in the long run on one stable answer to any meaningful question about what is really the case? I tend to think that Peirce is drawing an a particular understanding of the foundations of scientific measurement as he develops an answer to this kind of question. 3. For my part, I think there is a lot going on that is of philosophical interest in Peirce's understanding of measurement. I've taken a particular interest in his understanding of the place of topology and projective geometry in setting up different metrical geometries. For instance, Peirce seems to place great weight on Cayley's discovery in the sixth
