At 05:18 PM 8/20/2008, Juho wrote:
There is a difference between methods where only voters can modify
their votes at any time and methods where the candidate that got some
votes can redirect these votes. The latter case may cause larger and
faster changes. And such changes may lead to reactions a
At 12:59 PM 9/23/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Ralph,
Thank you.
Wow. I just realized - What an absolute arithmetic complicated mess or
arbitrarily unfair system this will be whenever the third choice votes
of voters must be transferred in this same split-vote manner.
Actually, this is not the unfa
At 12:04 PM 9/23/2008, you wrote:
Do you or does anyone know if this muti-seat IRV method that splits
votes of voters to their second choice candidates after some winning
candidates receive the threshold amount of votes, exhibits
non-monotonicity or not like the normal IRV method does? If so, is
At 03:49 PM 9/23/2008, "Raph Frank" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Tue, Sep 23, 2008 at 5:59 PM, Kathy Dopp <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
It should be OK as long as the random selection is actually reasonably random.
In theory. But Kathy Dopp is a voting security expert. They like to
be able to r
At 05:33 PM 9/24/2008, Raph Frank wrote:
A Hare election with 10 seats will end up being a Droop election with
9 seats, except for a 1 in a million chance that all the votes are
assigned under Hare and thus all 10 seats are filled.
If you use Droop quota, simple: an extra seat is allowed shoul
At 07:11 AM 11/8/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
Are you really comfortable supporting and supplying ammunition to a
group of avowed FPP supporters in their effort to have IRV declared
unconstitutional?
So many aspects, so little time
(1) Brown v. Smallwood outlawed preferential voting, period,
I responded later in this thread, I've now gone back to the beginning
of it. I have had, of course, a special interest in Brown v.
Smallwood, the reasoning (or lack of same) behind it, and the
implications. Contrary to a couple of years of propaganda on the
topic, Brown v. Smallwood clearly pro
At 01:23 PM 11/6/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
The third doc is by the Minneapolis, MN City attorney.
11SuplementaryReplyMemoinSupportofMotionforSummaryJudgment.pdf
This document follows the same errors that Austen-Smith promoted, not
surprisingly.
It notes that plaintiff has asserted monotonici
At 01:23 PM 11/6/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I posted three of these most recent affidavits of the defendants of
Instant Runoff Voting and STV here:
http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/
The first two docs listed are by Fair Vote's new expert witness.
11AffidavitofDavidAusten-S
This is an examination and comment on the document filed in the case of
Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al, vs. The City of Minneapolis
being the
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of their
Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaratory Judgment
At the outset it must be stated that Minnesota
At 10:30 PM 11/8/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Abd ul,
From what I can tell, having read all of the affidavits and responses
of the plaintiffs (but not being an attorney), the case against IRV is
only in very small part based on BvS, and is based more on the
requirements of the US and Minnesota consti
At 10:45 AM 11/10/2008, Raph Frank wrote:
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 3:32 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Is this complicated? Yes. Is it fair? Well, up to the election of the last
> candidate, yes, it is clearly fair. With the last candidate, the election
> effe
At 02:07 AM 11/11/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 7:26 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
>
> Here is the problem they face: the matter has been tested many times. The
> only state which has found, to my knowledge, preferential voting to be
> unconstitutional, per se, is Minnes
At 09:51 AM 11/18/2008, Raph Frank wrote:
However, I wonder if all districts were arranged so that 80% of the
voters in each district supported one or other party, would that party
run more than 1 candidate, or would you still have a situation where
the party only runs 1 candidate?
You can do i
And now that rarity from me, an original post
Approval Voting is a special case of Range, with
rating values restricted to 0 and 1. When Brams
proposed Approval, it was as a method free of
vulnerability to "tactical" or "strategic"
voting, i.e., voting with reversed preference in
order t
At 02:58 PM 11/25/2008, Michael Poole wrote:
Your definition is wrong. A strategic vote is one that is not
representative of the voter's honest views or ideal outcome. When
using strictly ranked systems (where no ties are allowed), the only
possible form of insincerity is order reversal. When
At 12:18 PM 11/25/2008, Markus Schulze wrote:
If I remember correctly, Abd wrote that, in every
IRV election for public office ever held in the
USA, the IRV winner was identical to the plurality
winner. Doesn't that mean that -- when we apply
your logic -- plurality voting always elects the
righ
At 05:06 PM 11/25/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
If you want multiple parties in
order to represent more interests, best go to PR in the first place.
I want it to be possible to have multiple viable "parties" in order
to make it more likely that the median voter can get what he actually
wants.
For th
At 04:29 PM 11/25/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 25, 2008, at 1:19 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Or are only IRV supporters allowed to use polling data
to show the greatness of IRV, while advocates of other
methods have to use complete ballot data?
I think we must be careful about using pol
At 11:45 PM 11/25/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> What Approval sincerely represents from a voter is a
> *decision* as to where to place an Approval cutoff.
But is it not true that what *
from one's sincere opinion in order to
win in the election should however be classified
as insincerity (and as unwanted strategic voting).
Juho
--- On Wed, 26/11/08, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM]
At 12:42 AM 11/26/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> If we must have a
> single ballot, and a single winner, period, Range Voting is
> actually a trick: it is the only relatively objective method
At 12:42 AM 11/26/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> If we must have a
> single ballot, and a single winner, period, Range Voting is
> actually a trick: it is the only relatively objective method
>
At 12:54 AM 11/26/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
My own view is first that we're talking about marginal differences
here, and that PR vs single-winner elections is of much, much greater
interest, and second that the interesting difference
between plurality, IRV and other ranked methods is not in ho
At 12:55 AM 11/26/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
You can easily deny that you have an internal concept of "approval,"
but you can also deny that you have an internal transitive ranking
of the candidates. Maybe it's harder to believe, but it can't be
disproven. (Though, I don't really think it is hard
At 01:46 AM 11/26/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
In the EM discussions people seem to assume
that at least one should put the cutoff between
some leading candidates. People seldom talk
about marking those candidates that one approves
(I have seen this approach however in some
mechanically generated ball
At 01:52 AM 11/26/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 25, 2008, at 8:45 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > a écrit :
What Approval sincerely represents from a voter is a
*decision* as to where to place an Approval cutoff.
At 05:53 AM 11/26/2008, Greg wrote:
> Oh, and actually it _is_ likely to be bad. See that first graph? See how
> over thousands of simulated elections it gets lower social satisfaction?
Brian, you're graphs are computer-generated elections that you made
up. They aren't actual elections that took
At 12:35 PM 11/26/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
This (TTR vs IRV) is a matter that we can simply disagree on.
Give it some time. Below, you indicate that you are "partial to the
iterative process." So -- why not iterative process in public
elections? It can be done, you know, the claim of im
At 08:03 AM 11/26/2008, Michael Poole wrote:
(I may not have separated this out correctly, attribution may be
incorrect. Paragraphing and quotations were largely lost, somewhere
in email formatting.)
Jonathan Lundell writes:
"Sincere" is a term of art in this context, not a
> value judgeme
At 12:40 PM 11/26/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I want to add to this by saying that if Approval is about approval,
well, then discussions about frontrunner plus strategies won't
capture the intent or point of the method. If the statement for
Approval voting is "vote for those you like",
At 04:50 PM 11/26/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
I think it depends on the society and its rules (and the method and
election in question) if insincere voting is considered to be
"wrong" or not. In many cases the society will benefit if insincere
voting is generally not accepted. (Strategic voting can
At 06:17 PM 11/26/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
(Which is why I'm partial to ordinal systems; it seems to me that I as
a voter can pretty easily order candidates without considering
strategy, whereas the decision of where to draw the line for Approval,
or how to assign cardinal values to candida
At 02:47 PM 11/27/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
For ordinal systems, it's pretty easy to consider what a honest
ballot would be, assuming a transitive individual preference. "If A
is better than B, A should be higher ranked than B". It's not so
obvious for cardinal systems. What do the po
At 01:21 PM 11/26/2008, Chris Benham wrote:
I have a suggestion for a new strategy criterion I might call
"Unmanipulable Majority".
*If (assuming there are more than two candidates) the ballot
rules don't constrain voters to expressing fewer than three
preference-levels, and A wins being voted a
At 03:34 AM 12/1/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Range and Approval might not be insincere (if we accept your
definition), but they still require voters to use strategy - that
is, to keep the votes of others in mind when they're voting. In
Approval in particular, this is very important (con
At 06:15 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Dec 1, 2008, at 10:31 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
That's correct. We can make some reasonable assumptions, though. We
can look at Plurality elections and look at how many voters vote for
minor candidates with no hope of winning. We can
At 06:30 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I don't really see a need for equal-ranking in a single-winner
election. As a voter, I'm answering the question "if you were
dictator, of this set of candidates, who would you choose?". I don't
really need the option of naming two candidates to the
At 06:38 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 30, 2008, at 9:44 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
It certainly is not an expression of "approval," hence I have often
stated that ballot instructions for voters should not use the word
"Approve." The instructions *might*
At 07:19 PM 12/1/2008, Paul Kislanko wrote:
PS. This is what I don't like about approval. In my generalized
voter-friendly ballot, Approval requires me to vote A=B=C=D... when I really
like A a lot better than the others. But that method doesn't have any way
for me (the voter) to tell it that I d
At 08:36 PM 12/1/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
But seriously, it would be important to extend the experiment to find out
if the respondents would ACT on that pessimistic statement that flies in
the face of probability, or if they were making a mildly humorous
statement as in "I forgot my umbrella,
At 08:47 PM 12/1/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On the strategy question, if you have any doubts, I recommend that
you spend a couple of hours at a blackjack table, and watch your
fellow players. Most of them have a "system", and while there are
rational blackjack strategies that will minimize y
At 03:13 AM 12/2/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On another note, Abd says the only method that got better Bayesian
Regret scores than Range, among those Warren has tested, is Range +
top two runoff. To my knowledge, that's not true, as Warren says a
DSV variant of Range got better scores t
At 06:25 AM 12/2/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
That's not really what an approval cutoff is. An approval cutoff is
used by some methods to denote "the candidates above are those I can
accept; those below, I really don't like". At least that's what I
understand, though some methods may re
At 11:40 AM 12/2/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
That's not really what an approval cutoff is. An approval cutoff is
used by some methods to denote "the candidates above are those I can
accept; those below, I really don't like". At least that's what I
understand, though some methods may reward stra
At 12:31 PM 12/2/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Are there any other ways of defining a sincere and "non-strategic"
ratings ballot? Direct external reference of the sort "I'd pay
amount Z to have X elected" fails because of income differences and
the nonlinearity of money. Definitions based
At 01:11 PM 12/2/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote regarding Approval voting strategy:
"It's also obvious that if, for whatever reason, I vote for candidate X, I
should vote for all the candidates that I prefer to X."
I note that Jonathan said the voter "should," rather than "
At 01:32 PM 12/2/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
Good point; you're quite right. My claim might be right in the context
of zero polling knowledge, but not otherwise.
Which is all the worse for Approval.
I responded to Mr. Bouricius. His example was misleading, in fact,
because the "illogical" v
At 04:47 PM 12/2/2008, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Dec 2, 2008, at 1:24 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Yes. Preference can be determined, generally, rather easily, by one
of two methods. The first method is pairwise comparison. With a
series of pairwise comparisons, we can construct a rank
At 06:25 PM 11/26/2008, Ralph Suter wrote:
To Greg Dennis:
I appreciate your efforts to express your arguments clearly and
defend them with good data. Nevertheless, I find them mostly unpersuasive.
Yes, we noticed. That they were unpersuasive. That Mr. Suter comments
on this is significant,
At 09:07 PM 12/2/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> This is the "relatively objective method of
> assessing" election outcome. When it's easy to
> determine, in a real situation, the absolute individual
> voter utilities, "fully sincere Range Voting"
> implements it as a method. That is, if the voters
At 12:34 AM 12/3/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
--- On Mon, 1/12/08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > One approach to sincerity is to compare voter
> behaviour to the requested behaviour. In Approval if the
> request is to mark all candidates that one approves
At 12:35 AM 12/3/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
Approval is a special case since the votes are so
simple that it is hard to tell when one votes in
line with one's sincere opinion and when not.
Rational Approval votes are never "out of line" with one's sincere
opinion." In Approval, equal ranking, whe
At 02:47 PM 12/4/2008, Peter Barath wrote:
Do you think that if we vote simply with money, the rich have
more power than the poor? Yes, it is true. And exactly that is
the situation right now, too.
Actually, it's not true, it depends on what is done with the money.
Suppose, for example, the ex
At 05:15 PM 12/4/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
If you think the risk is too great even so, have a preface
adjustment where all candidates that fall below a threshold of first
votes are eliminated. The threshold should be very low, say 10. This
will introduce some compromising incentive, b
At 11:31 PM 12/4/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Favored frontrunner? Trying to add some thought.
Agreed to "first rate a favorite and the worst".
Then the standard thought is "the voter rates the frontrunners".
This needs careful thought. It is likely that one of the
frontruners will win. This
At 10:37 AM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Something I've always wondered about Asset Voting. Say you have a
very selfish electorate who all vote for themselves (or for their
friends). From what I understand, those voted for in the first round
become the electors who decide among them
At 03:17 AM 12/4/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2008 10:52 PM
The tragedy is that IRV is replacing Top Two Runoff, an older
reform that actually works better than IRV.
I have seen statements like this quite a
At 10:09 AM 12/4/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm > Sent: Thursday, December 04, 2008 8:17 AM>
> I'm not Abd, but I think the argument goes like this: in TTR, if a
> (usually) third candidate gets enough FPP votes to make it to the second
> round, that candidate has a real chan
At 01:38 PM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Ballots do not ask for the voter's sincere opinion. They ask voters
to make a choice or choices.
I think that is incorrect. Ranked methods ask for the sincere opinion of
the voter, and that opinion can be
At 07:45 AM 12/6/2008, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Hi Adb ul-Rahman,
still, Asset Voting is majoritarian and therefore not democratic.
The reason why we have been studying methods with chance components
(that is, non-deterministic methods) is that we wanted to find a
democratic method, i.e. one that
At 03:08 PM 12/6/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> > In your previous message you seemed content to say
> that voters can't
> > vote "accurately" under Range because they
> don't know how and because
> > the ratings have no inherent meaning.
>
> The two considerations should be kept rigorously separate
At 04:33 PM 12/6/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
So, to try to summarize. You can argue for Range in two ways. On the
one hand, if voters really do vote similarly to how they behave under
the simulations, then Range is the ideal method according to utility.
On the other hand, if Range doesn't work out
At 06:04 PM 12/6/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
> The problem here, Juho, is that "sincere opinion"
> is not the basis for voting,..
What is the alternative basis?
The basis is choice. I can drop a marble in this bucket, or that
bucket. Maybe I can drop a marble in each one I choose of many
bucket
At 02:29 PM 12/7/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But your description confused me somewhat, regarding what's the
assembly and what's the electoral college.
The electoral college is simply a term for the collection of
electors, who are public voters. It's similar to the U.S. electoral
coll
At 01:38 PM 12/5/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
Ballots do not ask for the voter's sincere opinion. They ask voters
to make a choice or choices.
I think that is incorrect. Ranked methods ask for the sincere opinion of
the voter, and that opinion can be
At 06:46 PM 12/8/2008, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If Yee/B.Olson says you're bad, then you're bad. The converse is
not true. If the electoscope does not say you are bad, that doesn't
mean you are good.
There are sometimes other considerations.
Borda doesn't look bad under this electoscope, be
FairVote is like a politician who tells people what they want to
hear. That's the art of spin. When it gets repugnant is when what's
being said is false. A post to the Approval Voting list, from which
I'm still banned from posting, referred to an article in the LA
times. It's worth noting that
I'm quoting the current FairVote "introduction"
to a substantial quote from Robert's Rules of
Order, Newly Revised (RRONR), on preferential voting.
Robert's Rules of Order (RRO), the well-known
guide to fair procedures, makes the point that
an election by a mere plurality may produce an
unre
At 08:57 PM 12/13/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- En date de : Lun 8.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax a écrit :
>> What you're talking about here isn't even "playing nice," it's more
>> like using lower ratings as loose change to toss into an (inadequate)
>&
At 12:49 PM 12/14/2008, Steve Eppley wrote:
Hi,
I think Mr. Lomax missed the big point (though I agree he is right
to criticize Instant Runoff). The big point is that the authors of
books on Robert's Rules showed zero awareness of the existence of
Condorcetian preferential voting methods--or
At 06:50 PM 12/14/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Plurality voters have to be strategic all of the time because
Plurality is a bad voting method.
Well, isn't it totally strange that such a "bad voting method" is so
widely used? Isn't that just a tad suspicious? Are people really that stupi
At 03:36 AM 12/15/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 02:29 PM 12/7/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But your description confused me somewhat, regarding what's the
assembly and what's the electoral college.
The electoral college is simply a te
date de : Dim 14.12.08, Abd
ul-Rahman Lomax a écrit :
Remember, not all voters will
follow >frontrunner strategy. They don't with
Plurality, why should they start with Approval?
Well, I'm not using "frontrunner strategy" but
"better than expectation" st
At 08:49 AM 12/16/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Thus, *all things being equal* (which must
be kept in mind if it's IRV that is on your mind), I would expect that
failing LNHarm will provoke more insincerity (and thus destroy more
information) than failing monotonicity.
Highly speculative. Bucklin p
At 01:24 AM 12/16/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote:
> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2008 02:58:29 + (GMT)
> From: Kevin Venzke
> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
>
> Hi,
>
> --- En date de?: Dim 14.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
a ?crit?:
>> >
At 08:32 PM 12/2/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Ok, so sincerity doesn't matter. It's a red herring, it's something not
to be dwelled upon.
My, my, is this an appeal to the common meaning of "sincerity"? After
all we've done to point out the technical meanings and to respond to
others who have cal
At 06:41 AM 12/18/2008, Peter Barath wrote:
>So my Square Vote proposal gets this simple:
>
>- Every voter pays whatever she wants to the treasury.
>- The square roots are counted.
>- Biggest sum wins.
Sorry, I failed again to invent something new. As someone
kindly informed me, this
"...propos
At 12:00 AM 12/20/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Authors of RR have their own primary goals and properly avoid the election
methods wars that take place in EM, etc, - simply recommending that group's
rules authors should be careful as to what methods they choose to define
for their groups.
Robert's
Well, we have a huge body of work examining the performance of voting
systems under various conditions, but what may be the most common and
most influential condition that real voting systems face,
particularly in political applications, but also elsewhere.
Voter ignorance. Normal, non-reprehe
At 10:36 PM 12/18/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
--- En date de : Mar 16.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax a écrit :
>However, in defense of Venzke, he thinks that the situations where IRV
>is non-monotonic are rare enough that it's not worth worrying about.
What I think would be r
At 02:19 PM 12/20/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2008 12:42 AM
> LNH, has, I think, been pretty widely misunderstood. I don't consider
> it desirable *at all*. That is, it interferes with the very desirable
> process of compr
http://publications.ohiohistory.org/ohstemplate.cfm?action=detail&Page=01117.html&StartPage=7&EndPage=&volume=111¬es=&newtitle=Volume%20111%20Page%207
The URL above, for me, loads some HTML code, which I was able to view
as it was designed by selecting it all and copying it into a text
file, ch
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/113492794/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0
Preferential voting and the rule of the majority
Melvin P. Porter
The progress of the Bucklin system to date (June 1, 1914) can be
seen from the following list of preferential voting cities on page 582.
In the Janua
At 05:31 PM 12/20/2008, Brian Olson wrote:
In a recent post Mr Lomax brought up the topic of poorly informed
voters not being taken into account in various models, but I did
introduce such a factor in my early simulations. I added some amount
of 'error' as a uniformly distributed random variable
At 12:56 AM 12/21/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hello,
--- En date de : Ven 19.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman
Lomax a écrit :
> With LNH, the "harm" is that the voter sees a
> second preference candidate elected rather than the first
> preference.
Actually, the harm need not take tha
At 04:31 AM 12/21/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In any case, it may be possible to have one of the LNHs and be
monotonic and have mutual majority. I'm not sure, but perhaps
(doesn't one of DAC or DSC do this?). If so, it would be possible to
see (at least) whether people strategize in the
At 06:14 PM 12/21/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2008 1:44 AM
> LNH as an absolute principle, which, as an election criterion, it is,
> is harmful.
That is a value judgement - which of course you are perfectly
entitled to make.
At 06:39 PM 12/21/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
It MAY be possible to imaging (one day) a President of the USA
elected by Condorcet who had 32% of the first preferences against 35%
and 33% for the other two candidates. But I find it completely
unimaginable, ever, that a candidate with 5% of the fi
At 11:33 PM 12/21/2008, Michael Allan wrote:
Hi Abd,
> His solution just could make advanced voting systems moot, intellectual
> curiosities, unusual of application. Allow the first preference candidate
> on the ballot to "own" the votes, to be reassigned at the discretion of
> this candidate, "
At 04:47 AM 12/22/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
In a post last night I wrote:
> Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2008 11:14 PM
> I am not going to comment of the rest of your interesting
> post in detail, but I am surprised that anyone should take
> Bucklin seriously. I, and some of our intuitive elector
At 05:18 AM 12/22/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
But, of course, if it were possible to elect a "no first
preferences" candidate as the Condorcet winner, such a result
would completely unacceptable politically and the consequences would
be disastrous.
No example is known to me. It's easy to see ex
At 07:23 PM 12/22/2008, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Disturbing that you would consider clear wins by a majority to be
objectionable.
In Election 2 Condorcet awarded the win to M. Who has any business objecting?
52 of 100 prefer M over D
53 of 100 prefer M over R
Neither R nor D got a ma
At 08:56 PM 12/22/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Dave,
I think you make a common semantic manipulation about the nature of a
Condorcet winner (particularly in a "weak" CW example) by using the term
"wins by a majority."
He wouldn't be the one who invented this practice, Terry.
In fact, each o
At 08:02 AM 12/23/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
Dave, I never said that I would find that result
objectionable. What I did say was that I thought such a result would be
POLITICALLY unacceptable to the ELECTORS - certainly in the UK,
and perhaps also in the USA as there are SOME similarities in
At 10:29 PM 12/23/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
(in response to my post)
This is missing the point. There is no implication anywhere that a
zero-info strategy is supposed to be usable by real voters.
If we use zero-info strategy to judge a method, and that strategy
doesn't apply to real voters, w
At 02:42 AM 12/24/2008, Juho Laatu wrote:
> ... the Condorcet voting system will never get off the ground
> so long as a 5% FP Condorcet winner is a realistic scenario,
> as it is when
> the current (pre-reform) political system is so dominated
> by two big political parties.
The question is if
At 06:59 AM 12/24/2008, James Gilmour wrote:
As I have said many times before, it is my firmly held view that
single-winner voting systems should NEVER be used for the general
election of the members of any assembly (city council, state
legislature, state or federal parliament, House of Represen
At 08:06 PM 12/24/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Abd,
Abd wrote about "center squeeze":
The problem happens with
reasonable frequency with Top Two Runoff, and the principles are the
same. *In this way,* IRV simulates TTR, though, in fact, it is a
little better in choosing among the remaining two.
At 08:06 PM 12/24/2008, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Another shortcoming of two-round elections is the sharply lower voter
participation (primarily among lower income voters) typical in one of the
rounds of a two election system. I know you have written favorably about
such drop off in voter turnout as
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