On 22 Jul 2015, at 20:59, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 20 Jul 2015, at 21:40, Terren Suydam wrote:
Question for Bruno or anyone else:
Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing
explanations for what I saw. Doe
On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 20 Jul 2015, at 21:40, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> Question for Bruno or anyone else:
>
> Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations
> for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of th
;> Question for Bruno or anyone else:
>>
>> Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations
>> for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation
>> from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the
>&
On 20 Jul 2015, at 21:40, Terren Suydam wrote:
Question for Bruno or anyone else:
Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing
explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could
be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation
rob
> Question for Bruno or anyone else:
>
> Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations
> for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation
> from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the
> phenomena I ex
atever the relative measure of each, each moment is as real as any other.
Quentin
>
> Cheers,
> Telmo.
>
> On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Terren Suydam
wrote:
>>
>> Question for Bruno or anyone else:
>>
>> Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially
ust a
possibility?
Cheers,
Telmo.
On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Terren Suydam
wrote:
> Question for Bruno or anyone else:
>
> Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations
> for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation
&
Question for Bruno or anyone else:
Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations
for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation
from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the
phenomena I experienced?
In other word
sual way
to use personal pronouns in the comp frame, and yes the transitivity
of personal product is false, but that is often the case in modal or
intensional contexts.
The FPI is only in the understanding that if we iterate such self-
duplication, the distribution of histories match the Bernoui
On 3 March 2015 at 05:23, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 2, 2015 Kim Jones wrote:
>
> > Ambiguity is some kind of disease, is it?
>
>
> Well...it doesn't exactly help in developing a logically healthy mind.
>
>
>> > Aren't you just expressing your distaste for such things?
>
>
> Yes and no.
>
On Mon, Mar 2, 2015 Kim Jones wrote:
> Ambiguity is some kind of disease, is it?
Well...it doesn't exactly help in developing a logically healthy mind.
> > Aren't you just expressing your distaste for such things?
Yes and no.
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are s
On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 9:50 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 4:16 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> >> Who's personal experience?
>>>
>>
>> > Bruno makes it clear that he only considers what someone writes in a
>> diary as being what counts for the purposes of the thought experiment.
>>
> (T
On 2 March 2015 at 04:27, John Clark wrote:
>> > Instead of saying "I hope I win the lottery" they may say, if they are
>> > pedantic, "I hope I end up the version of me that wins the lottery".
>
>
> If the lottery is tomorrow and they are pedantic they would say "I hope the
> day after tomorrow
> On 2 Mar 2015, at 5:30 pm, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 3/1/2015 10:26 PM, Kim Jones wrote:
>>
>>> On 2 Mar 2015, at 2:50 pm, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> But very special type of duplicating machine where the laws of physics
>>> forbid anyone from observing any of the duplicates that the machi
On 3/1/2015 10:26 PM, Kim Jones wrote:
On 2 Mar 2015, at 2:50 pm, John Clark wrote:
But very special type of duplicating machine where the laws of physics forbid anyone from
observing any of the duplicates that the machine has made, so the personal pronoun
"you" never causes ambiguity.
> On 2 Mar 2015, at 2:50 pm, John Clark wrote:
>
> But very special type of duplicating machine where the laws of physics forbid
> anyone from observing any of the duplicates that the machine has made, so the
> personal pronoun "you" never causes ambiguity.
>
> John K Clark
So thinking
On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 4:16 PM, LizR wrote:
>> Who's personal experience?
>>
>
> > Bruno makes it clear that he only considers what someone writes in a
> diary as being what counts for the purposes of the thought experiment.
>
(This is obviously a proxy for memory in most situations, but it simpl
On 1 March 2015 at 16:52, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > Can you clarify where you do and don't have a problem with the pronoun
>> "you"? Presumably there is no problem for you if there is a unique world
>> with only one version of you. What about the
On 1 March 2015 at 14:29, John Clark wrote:
> Who's personal experience?
>
> Bruno makes it clear that he only considers what someone writes in a diary
as being what counts for the purposes of the thought experiment. (This is
obviously a proxy for memory in most situations, but it simplifies matt
On 3/1/2015 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Only personal experience is considered.
Who's personal experience?
All the possible one appearing in the thought experience.
In the functionalist theory of mind that allows for duplication or substitution of brains,
answers to questions of "
On Sun, Mar 1, 2015 at 12:42 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
wrote:
> If we discovered some way of communicating with the other worlds, that
> would be interesting
Interesting is a understatement, communicating with other worlds would
change everything, then the situation really would be equivalent to
you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel
that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying
to push on a string.
> Personal identity is irrelevant in the FPI.
OMG, that means I've forgotten what the "P" in Bruno's j
On Sunday, March 1, 2015, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:
>
> > Can you clarify where you do and don't have a problem with the pronoun
>> "you"? Presumably there is no problem for you if there is a unique world
>> with only one version of you. What about th
On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Can you clarify where you do and don't have a problem with the pronoun
> "you"? Presumably there is no problem for you if there is a unique world
> with only one version of you. What about the MWI
>
With Everett and with everyday life there is n
d I imagine that has actually happened to you at some
>>> point in your life) you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel
>>> that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push
>>> on a string.
>>>
>&g
you'd still feel like Russell Standish, you'd just feel
>> that you've made a mistake. Bruno has got it backwards, he's trying to push
>> on a string.
>>
> > Personal identity is irrelevant in the FPI.
>
OMG, that means I've forgotten what the &q
e first to give that concept a pompous sounding
acronym. As I
said, philosophy around here is finding pretentious and long words to
describe well known but pedestrian ideas.
To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from
the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you
On 28 Feb 2015, at 16:38, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Feb 27, 2015Russell Standish wrote:
> To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes
from the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are,
^^^
John Clark doesn't understand the question. Which perso
t you made me believe it is a findamental
discovery not yet understood by many, or, when understood, not being
taken into account (due in general to people unaware that elementary
arithmetical truth implement all computations.
Sometimes I make the distinction between the local FPI and the global
On Sat, Feb 28, 2015 at 9:38 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Feb 27, 2015Russell Standish wrote:
>
>>
> > To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from the
>> fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are,
>
> ^^^
>
> Joh
On Fri, Feb 27, 2015Russell Standish wrote:
>
> To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from the
> fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are,
^^^
John Clark doesn't understand the question. Which person who is?
> > it seems Evere
sounding acronym. As I
> said, philosophy around here is finding pretentious and long words to
> describe well known but pedestrian ideas.
>
To be fair to Bruno, that is not what he claims. The FPI comes from
the fundamental uncertainty in know which person you are, and
generates genuine
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 6:29 PM, LizR wrote:
>> I don't know about all the peepee stuff but I do know that If Everett is
>> right then all experiences exist, and if Everett is right nothing is random
>> because the Schrodinger wave equation is not random.
>>
>
> > He means it appears random from
On 27 February 2015 at 09:38, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > It is very simple. If we are machine, we are duplicable, and in that
>> case, using the precise (3p) definition of 3p and 1p pov I have given (more
>> than one times), it is an exercise for high s
once, using combinatorics, to show that the 1p experiences are
> random.
>
I don't know about all the peepee stuff but I do know that If Everett is
right then all experiences exist, and if Everett is right nothing is random
because the Schrodinger wave equation is not random.
> Yes, the FPI is
very. I should perhaps be less
modest on that.
I suspect you understood that once we cross step 3, there is no return
possible and you can't miss the reversal mind/matter.
The First Person Indeterminacy certainly deserves the acronym FPI.
It is very simple. If we are machine, we are dup
On Friday, April 11, 2014 8:34:10 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Friday, April 11, 2014 7:31:20 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 11, 2014 7:14:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>>
>>> This hasn't clarified matters, as far as I'm concerned. Maybe you could
>>> go ba
On Friday, April 11, 2014 7:31:20 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Friday, April 11, 2014 7:14:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> This hasn't clarified matters, as far as I'm concerned. Maybe you could
>> go back to my original comment, that wave function collapse isn't an
>> observed fac
On Friday, April 11, 2014 7:14:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> This hasn't clarified matters, as far as I'm concerned. Maybe you could go
> back to my original comment, that wave function collapse isn't an observed
> fact, and tell me if you agree with that, then once we've settled that we
> can
This hasn't clarified matters, as far as I'm concerned. Maybe you could go
back to my original comment, that wave function collapse isn't an observed
fact, and tell me if you agree with that, then once we've settled that we
can move on to the next point (whatever that is), and so on?
On 11 April
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 7:56:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 3 April 2014 16:56, > wrote:
>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 3:07:26 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 3 April 2014 14:39, wrote:
>>>
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 1:24:28 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> gbhibbsa, I'm g
On Friday, April 11, 2014 5:47:43 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 7:56:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> On 3 April 2014 16:56, wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 3:07:26 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>>
On 3 April 2014 14:39, wrote:
>
> On
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 7:56:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 3 April 2014 16:56, > wrote:
>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 3:07:26 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 3 April 2014 14:39, wrote:
>>>
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 1:24:28 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> gbhibbsa, I'm g
On 03 Apr 2014, at 08:56, LizR wrote:
As I understand it, the "QM interpretation movement" stalled for
about 30 years before the MWI came along.
My view on this has changed. I tend to think that the Newton/Huygens
debate, which was a debate about the nature of light (particle, for
Newton
On 03 Apr 2014, at 08:49, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/2/2014 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The original proof of Gleason is not easy, but a more elementary
proof (which remains not that simple) has been found by Cooke,
Keane and Moran, and can be found in the (very good) book by
Richard Hugues (
On 03 Apr 2014, at 05:12, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:
The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?
I found Tegm
On 03 Apr 2014, at 01:16, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tuesday, April 1, 2014 3:40:18 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Mar 2014, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote:
> On 3/31/2014 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>> On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marc
On 02 Apr 2014, at 23:20, LizR wrote:
On 3 April 2014 04:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Suppose R is not transitive, so for all beta (alpha R beta) and
there are some gamma such that [(beta R gamma) and ~(alpha R gamma)].
I cannot parse that sentence, I guess some word are missing. R is
not t
On 02 Apr 2014, at 23:15, LizR wrote:
As instructed I will have a look at Brent's proofs and see if I
follow them, and agree...
On 2 April 2014 15:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/1/2014 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
BTW, are you OK in the math thread? Are you OK, like Liz apparently,
that the K
On 3 April 2014 16:56, wrote:
>
> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 3:07:26 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 3 April 2014 14:39, wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 1:24:28 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
gbhibbsa, I'm getting a bit confused here. All I said is that
wavefunction collapse i
On 4/2/2014 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The original proof of Gleason is not easy, but a more elementary proof (which remains
not that simple) has been found by Cooke, Keane and Moran, and can be found in the (very
good) book by Richard Hugues (you can find a PDF on the net).
Only if you loo
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 3:07:26 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 3 April 2014 14:39, > wrote:
>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 1:24:28 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>>
>>> gbhibbsa, I'm getting a bit confused here. All I said is that
>>> wavefunction collapse isn't an observed fact, which seems to me
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:
>>
>> The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?
>>
>> I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointi
On 3 April 2014 14:39, wrote:
>
> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 1:24:28 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> gbhibbsa, I'm getting a bit confused here. All I said is that
>> wavefunction collapse isn't an observed fact, which seems to me a fairly
>> reasonable statement, because we can't observe entities li
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 1:24:28 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> gbhibbsa, I'm getting a bit confused here. All I said is that wavefunction
> collapse isn't an observed fact, which seems to me a fairly reasonable
> statement, because we can't observe entities like wavefunctions directly,
> and we
gbhibbsa, I'm getting a bit confused here. All I said is that wavefunction
collapse isn't an observed fact, which seems to me a fairly reasonable
statement, because we can't observe entities like wavefunctions directly,
and we certainly can't observe their collapse directly. Some people would
say w
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:40:21 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:35:39 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:03:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>>
>>> On 3 April 2014 11:46, wrote:
>>>
On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:35:39 AM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:03:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> On 3 April 2014 11:46, wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:10:18 PM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>>
On 3 April 2014 10:55, wrote:
>
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 12:03:51 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 3 April 2014 11:46, > wrote:
>
>>
>> On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:10:18 PM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>
>>> On 3 April 2014 10:55, wrote:
>>>
On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> I'm not sure c
On Tuesday, April 1, 2014 3:40:18 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Mar 2014, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote:
>
> > On 3/31/2014 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote:
> >>
> >>> On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > OK...y
On 3 April 2014 11:46, wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:10:18 PM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
>> On 3 April 2014 10:55, wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption
which explains
On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 11:10:18 PM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 3 April 2014 10:55, > wrote:
>
>>
>> On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>>
>>> I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption
>>> which explains how we come to measure discrete values.
On 3 April 2014 10:55, wrote:
>
> On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>>
>> I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption
>> which explains how we come to measure discrete values.
>>
>
> Would mind helping me place your meaning in terms of mine Liz?
> ,
On Monday, March 31, 2014 6:41:55 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
>
> I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption which
> explains how we come to measure discrete values.
>
Would mind helping me place your meaning in terms of mine Liz?
,
Say, if we imagine a process of strippi
On 3 April 2014 04:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Suppose R is not transitive, so for all beta (alpha R beta) and there are
> some gamma such that [(beta R gamma) and ~(alpha R gamma)].
>
>
> I cannot parse that sentence, I guess some word are missing. R is not
> transitive means that there exist a
As instructed I will have a look at Brent's proofs and see if I follow
them, and agree...
On 2 April 2014 15:45, meekerdb wrote:
> On 4/1/2014 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> BTW, are you OK in the math thread? Are you OK, like Liz apparently, that
>> the Kripke frame (W,R) respects A -> []<
On 02 Apr 2014, at 04:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/1/2014 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
BTW, are you OK in the math thread? Are you OK, like Liz
apparently, that the Kripke frame (W,R) respects A -> []<>A iff R
is symmetrical?
Should I give the proof of the fact that the Kripke frame (W,R)
looks like, at first sight, that Gleason + the FPI (+
some abandon of the naïve view on "worlds") might solve the Born Rule.
I might dig on this when I have more time. I have to revise Quantum
logic and algebra to do this, but musing on Gleason theorem augments
my feeling that the
the FPI probabilities that are
measured in controlled quantum experiments.
If what I just said is true, I'm sure you can see my the source of
my skepticism. So please correct my understanding of the Gleason
Theorem.
Richard
Gleason theorem, on the contrary, shows that for Hilbert
On 4/1/2014 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
BTW, are you OK in the math thread? Are you OK, like Liz apparently, that the Kripke
frame (W,R) respects A -> []<>A iff R is symmetrical?
Should I give the proof of the fact that the Kripke frame (W,R) respects []A -> [][]A
iff R is a transitive?
Br
Apparently my conception of Gleason's Theorem is incorrect. However, I was
struck by something the author of the answer, Mitchell Porter, said that is
exactly what I thought the Gleason Theorem was about:
"In my opinion, the sensible interpretation of a nonuniform measure in a
multiverse theory (in
Eek! Am I a mystical many-worlder (on days that don't have a "T" in them) ?
Thank you that was very interesting, although I still don't know what to
make of quantum theory (that's good, right?)
By the way I've seen "Kirk on a rock" before somewhere, maybe it was in a
parallel universe...
On 2
On 4/1/2014 2:25 PM, LizR wrote:
I just read the definition of Gleason's theorem on Wikipedia and now my brain is full. A
"for-dummies" version would be appreciated...
I think what Gleason proved is that the only consistent probability measure on a Hilbert
space is given by the normalized inne
I just read the definition of Gleason's theorem on Wikipedia and now my
brain is full. A "for-dummies" version would be appreciated...
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Bruno, I have a problem with the Gleason Theorem because it appears to me
to be saying that every possible quantum state is realized with equal
probability at first, but the frequency at which each universe reoccurs is
given by the FPI probabilities that are measured in controlled quantum
the set of
"everything" have measure 1. But in this case "everything" is ill
defined and uncountably infinite.
It might be definable though, like "the consciousness of the universal
machine". It is the least Turing emulable entity having some "futures&quo
On 31 Mar 2014, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/31/2014 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically
observed fact actually not be.
But would even that alo
On 1 April 2014 14:33, meekerdb wrote:
> On 3/31/2014 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:
>
> On 1 April 2014 06:04, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would
>> consider a big price since all observation and record keeping which is used
>> to empirically test th
On 1 April 2014 13:56, meekerdb wrote:
> On 3/31/2014 6:41 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Are you saying that the fact that we don't see many worlds is
>> evidence against many worlds?
>>
>>
>> No, the fact that whatever our instrument reads our *theory* says there
>> are infinitely ma
On 3/31/2014 6:41 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Are you saying that the fact that we don't see many worlds is evidence
against many
worlds?
No, the fact that whatever our instrument reads our *theory* says there are
infinitely many other readings.
Is that just a psychologi
On 1 April 2014 12:24, meekerdb wrote:
> On 3/31/2014 5:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On 1 April 2014 04:04, meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed
>>> fact actually not be.
On 3/31/2014 6:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 1 April 2014 06:04, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would consider
a big
price since all observation and record keeping which is used to empirically
test
theories assumes
On 3/31/2014 5:53 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 1 April 2014 04:04, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed
fact actually not be.
But would
On 1 April 2014 06:04, meekerdb wrote:
> The price is not having a unified 'self' - which many people would
> consider a big price since all observation and record keeping which is used
> to empirically test theories assumes this unity. If you observe X and you
> want to use that as empircal tes
On 1 April 2014 04:04, meekerdb wrote:
> On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed
>> fact actually not be.
>>
>> But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of things
>> taken seriously, had there
So for meaningful dsicussion it looks like we need either a good
explanation of the Born rule within the MWI (which I imagined had been
provided by decoherence, but apparently this ain't necessarily so?) or a
disproof of the MWI.
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Goog
On 3/31/2014 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed fact
actually
not be.
But would even that alone have been remotely near the ball
On 31 Mar 2014, at 19:04, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically
observed fact actually not be.
But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of
things taken seriously, had there not been ex
On 3/31/2014 12:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK...you see an elegant explanation sBould the empirically observed fact
actually
not be.
But would even that alone have been remotely near the ballpark of things
taken
seriously, had there not been extreme quantum strangeness irrec
Richard,
On 31 Mar 2014, at 11:33, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno, Is not collapse restored for controlled experiments which are
all first-person?
Yes, collapse is restored in the minds of each observer, but it is, as
you say, a first person perspective, sharable as duplication is
contagio
On 31 Mar 2014, at 12:44, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, March 31, 2014 8:30:35 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Mar 2014, at 07:41, LizR wrote:
I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an
assumption which explains how we come to measure discrete values.
On 31 Mar
On Monday, March 31, 2014 8:30:35 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Mar 2014, at 07:41, LizR wrote:
>
> I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption which
> explains how we come to measure discrete values.
>
>
> On 31 March 2014 16:27, > wrote:
>
>>
>> On Tuesday,
Bruno, Is not collapse restored for controlled experiments which are all
first-person? I know of no 3p experiments.
Richard
On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 5:22 AM, LizR wrote:
> Probably my fault because I was in a hurry & didn't reply under what I was
> answering, as I try to do normally.
>
> On 31 M
Probably my fault because I was in a hurry & didn't reply under what I was
answering, as I try to do normally.
On 31 March 2014 21:06, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Ghibbsa,
>
> I answered to this in my reply to Liz. Usually I try to avoid this, but I
> confused the post. Sorry to Liz too.
>
> Best,
>
Ghibbsa,
I answered to this in my reply to Liz. Usually I try to avoid this,
but I confused the post. Sorry to Liz too.
Best,
Bruno
On 31 Mar 2014, at 05:27, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail
On 31 Mar 2014, at 07:41, LizR wrote:
I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption
which explains how we come to measure discrete values.
On 31 March 2014 16:27, wrote:
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi..
I'm not sure collapse is an observed fact. Collapse is an assumption which
explains how we come to measure discrete values.
On 31 March 2014 16:27, wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Mo
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 3:01:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Mar 2014, at 05:48, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, March 24, 2014 4:48:13 AM UTC, chris peck wrote:
>>
>> The only person in any doubt was you wasn't it Liz?
>>
>> I found Tegmark's presentation very disappointi
On 27 Mar 2014, at 17:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/26/2014 11:38 PM, LizR wrote:
OK, I suppose the argument makes sense, sort of (although it seems
more likely to me that genes would act as though there is one
universe whether that's the case or not, for reasons I already
mentioned). Anyway l
On 27 Mar 2014, at 21:49, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Brent,
If as you say "in the multiverse everything happens and infinitely
many times"
then there can be only one multiverse,
I think I agree, Richard, but you should perhaps added precisions:
like saying everything *consistent* (in some
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