Re: Some books on category and topos theory
Bruno Marchal in an older post wrote: >> Also, >> can you elaborate a bit more on the motivation behind category theory? >> Why >> was it invented, and what problems does it solve? What's the relationship >> between category theory and the idea that all possible universes exists? > > > Tim makes a very genuine remark (but he writes so much I fear that has > been unnoticed!). He said: read Tegmark (Everything paper), then learn > category, then read again Tegmark. Indeed I would say category theory has Bruno, which of the Tegmark's 'Everything papers' did you have in your mind? > emerged from the realisation that mathematical structures are themselves > mathematically structured. Categorist applies the every-structure principle > for each structure. Take all groups, and all morphism between groups: you > get the category of groups. It is one mathematical structure, a category > (with objects = groups and arrows = homomorphism) which, in some sense > capture the essence of group. Cheers, mirek --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
Le 06-nov.-08, à 21:45, rmiller a écrit : > > At 10:54 AM 11/6/2008, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> On 06 Nov 2008, at 02:37, Thomas Laursen wrote: >> >>> >>> Hi everyone, I am a complete layman but still got the illusion that >>> maybe one day I would be able to understand the probability part of >>> MW >>> if explained in a simple way. I know it's the most controversal part >>> of MW and that there are several competing understandings of >>> probability in MW, but still: none of them make sense to me! If every >>> line of history is realized then how can any line of history be more >>> probable than any other? >> >> Wolf's answer is probably correct, but certainly incomplete. If you >> take QM (without collapse) norma distribution and measure can be >> extracted from Gleason theorem. Born rule can be deduce from first >> person indeterminacy or more politically correct variant through >> decison theory (like Deutsch and Wallace). It is a whole field. My >> point in this list consists to show that if you assume the mechanist >> thesis (like Everett) then even if Deutsch proposal works it is not >> enough to justify the probabilities. There is a big work which remains >> to be done, but it has the advantage of taking into account the non >> communicable part of the experiments (usually known as "the >> experience"). But there are more abherant histories to evacuate (like >> infinities in field theories). >> >> Anna Wolf's answer can be wrong in case physics is eventually purely >> discrete, in which case probabilties should arise from pure relative >> proportion based on dircrete relative partitioning of the multiverse. >> I think the comp hyp excludes this though, like I think M theory, as >> far as I grasp something there, too. Loop gravity, if literally true, >> could lead to such ultimate discretization or provide models. >> >> For each position of an electron in your brain there is a (quantum) >> computational history going through that state, and probabilities are >> eventually all related self-indiscernibility relations (if it is >> english). >> >> Bruno Marchal >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> First of all, Bruno, that answer seemed Palenesque in the extreme, >> even for someone whose job it is to know this stuff. The >> correspondent indicated his was a layman's perspective. I agree I was a bit quick. >> How about >> another go at it without shortcut references to Born, David Deutsch, >> Wallace (who?) et al. >> As a firm believer in the adage that one who >> really knows the subject should be able to explain it in such a way >> that a bright ten-year-old can understand the concept. I love and use this adage very much. I have developed UDA and AGF to make the comp mind-body problem comprehensible by 10 years old. And it works! Later I have discovered that UDA + AGF are more difficult for older people because they have take more time to really strengthen their (aristotelian) prejudices. But Thomas Laursen question was interestingly singling out points we have already discussed a lot in this forum, and (I am sorry for not having been clear on that) my answer was a mean one for everybody. Another problem rised by Laursen question is that it is very different to answer it in the context where we assume QM (where Many World are the Everett quantum Many Worlds), or if we assume comp (discussed a lot in the list) wherethe Many World are of a very different nature a priori. Yet, in both case, probabilities arise from self-multiplication. And in both case the question of how to compute them or to justify them is very difficult, nor even solved. Hope I am a bit more clear. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
Thomas, > MW must be some how different from the same concept in everyday > language? In the latter "probably" just means "likely to happen" but > if EVERYTHING happens then how can the concept make sense? I guess it > must be two different concepts, then? I wouldn't say so. Always look at the word "probably" as referring to uncertainty in the _epistemic state of an agent_; and not as uncertainty what will happen in the world. Then you see that it is the same concept in both cases. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Hello Günther, > > Hello Bruno, > >> More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not >> conscious, >> and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie. >> Thus I can conceive zombies. > > Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think > philosophical > zombies are impossible (=not able to exist in the real world), not > inconceivable. I agree. But I would call "your" zombie "physical zombie". Of course this is because I know the result of the reasoning! > >> Developing this argument makes zombies logically conceivable, even, if >> I would refute the claim that a zombie acting exactly like I would act >> in any situation can exist. Accidental zombie can exist. It could >> depend what we put exactly in the term zombie. > > Ok, I agree with that. > >>> and here you clarify: >>> If this were true, then the movie graph (step 8 without occam) would not been needed. Arithmetical truth is provably full of philosophical zombies if comp is true and step 8 false. > > Hmm - in step 8 you eliminate the physical universe, which is ok *grin* > - but why would arithmetical truth be full of zombies with comp true > and > step 8 false -> physicalism true? do you mean because we could than > program AIs which would behave "correctly" but would not be conscious? > >> So it is just a theorem in computer science: computations are >> encodable >> (and thus encoded) in the (additive+multiplicative) relations existing >> between numbers. > > Ok, I'm with you. > >> So, someone who does not believe in philosophical zombies, does not >> need the step 8 (the Movie Graph Argument MGA), because arithmetical >> truth does contains the computation describing, well, for example this >> very discussion we have here and now. > > Ok, so I guess that would be my position *grin* - I think that all > states have a form of mentality - maybe not full consciousness, but > mentality. I can agree for "all computational states" of some (universal) machine. If you don't precise what you mean by state it is a bit too much general. Imo. > >> For me the MGA is needed because I don't want to rely on the non >> existence of zombie. > > Ok. > > What I still don't get is why you associate mental states only with > _true_ statements. Why not with false ones? Would that not be more in > line with a plenitude-like theory? > > False states could encode very weird psychic experiences (dreams for > instance or whatever...) OK. This I have to answer if you want you to understand the argument. "False state" does not makes sense. Only "false proposition" or "false statement" makes sense. So, in case, for example, you dream that you are Napoleon, or you dream that "17 is not a prime number". Those are false statements, but assuming comp, your consciousness of the statement "17 is not a prime number" will supervene on the TRUE statement that some machine have access the state corresponding to your belief that 17 is not prime. The true arithmetical statement on which consciousness will have to supervene are just description of computation under the form : "the machine XXX has got the state YYY from the input RRR". If consciouness did supervene on true beliefs only, then all white rabbits would be eliminated at the start. OK? This point is important to proceed from UDA to Arithmetical UDA. > >>> I follow you that 1st person is recoverable by a 3rd person number >>> theoretic description - or better, OMs are - but how would a zombie >>> come >>> about? Can you give an example? >> >> >> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real >> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the >> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of >> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? > > Agreed in principle (with my question of why only true sentences > thrown in) So I repeat the key point. Consciousness supervene on computation, and computation are described by proof of true statement of arithmetic, even in the case of dream or error, which occur at a higher level of description. It is really the difference between "17 is not a prime number" (false statement) and "the machine got the state "I believe 17 is not prime", which can be a true statement if the machine indeed believe 17 is not prime. > >> such a > computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and >> would >> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. > > Ok, I think it would not be a zombie - already once we accept _comp_ - > maudlin notwithstanding; I think Maudlin saw his argument rather as > causing a problem for _comp_ Both Maudlin (1989) and me (1988) shows : (MECHANISM WRONG OR PHYSICALISM WRONG) But (NOT A or NOT B) is equivalent with (A -> NOT B). and is equiavlent with (B -> NOT A). So (NOT MECH or NOT PHYS) is equivalent with MECH implies NOT PHYS, and is equivalent again with PHYS implies N
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Hi Bruno, > I can agree for "all computational states" of some (universal) machine. > If you don't precise what you mean by state it is a bit too much > general. Imo. I mean either: all computational states OR all physical states -> depending on whether comp or phys is true. Where the difference would then only be that with phys the states where not turing emulable. > that "17 is not a prime number". Those are false statements, but > assuming comp, your consciousness of the statement "17 is not a prime > number" will supervene on the TRUE statement that some machine have > access the state corresponding to your belief that 17 is not prime. The > true arithmetical statement on which consciousness will have to > supervene are just description of computation under the form : "the > machine XXX has got the state YYY from the input RRR". Ok thanks - this is clear now. > Maudlin assume PHYS and thus concludes there is a problem with MECH. > I assume MECH and thus conclude there is a problem with PHYS. > But the reasoning are equivalent. Yes, that is how I understood it. > All right? It seems to me you have everything to understand the seven > steps of the UDA. You are OK with 1...7. My point was that if you > don't believe in arithmetical (as a particular case of philosophical) > zombie, the the Movie Graph Argument is not needed. If you don't > believe in what I would call physical zombie, and yet believe in > primary physical things, then the MGA is needed (step 8). All right? I understand Step 8 as showing that if one accepts COMP, one has to associate conscious experience with abstract computations, not with physical implementations - by appeal to a thought experiment, which leaves me a bit queasy; but I tend to agree. I still do not understand what an "arithmetical zombie" should be - do you mean a computational state which would not be conscious? Now if I don't believe in arithmetical zombies, why would I not need step 8 to exclude the physical universe? I could dispute that arithemetics by itself without physical implementation has no consequence whatever, for instance. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
Thomas, "epistemic state of an agent", or in the proverbial 10-year-old's words, knowledge of the state of affairs from a certain point of view. This is the Bayesian interpretation of probability. "EVERYTHING happens" can be interpreted as an expression in terms of the frequentist interpretation of probability. As I see it (of course), "EVERYTHING happens" is the "epistemic state of", or "knowledge from the point of view of", the Plenitude, or Plotinus' One. But this begs the question "What is EVERYTHING?" Tom On Nov 7, 9:43 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Thomas, > > > MW must be some how different from the same concept in everyday > > language? In the latter "probably" just means "likely to happen" but > > if EVERYTHING happens then how can the concept make sense? I guess it > > must be two different concepts, then? > > I wouldn't say so. Always look at the word "probably" as referring to > uncertainty in the _epistemic state of an agent_; and not as uncertainty > what will happen in the world. Then you see that it is the same concept > in both cases. > > Cheers, > Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
On 07 Nov 2008, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > > Hi Jason, > > > Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit : > > > although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the > computer is > > entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the > > computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new > > world/reality. > > I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6, > is that you do survive there like if it was teleportation. And in > that > context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five > preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that > if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that > copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the > virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you > will "stay here" (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is > 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's > closer continuer identity theory fails with comp. > > My only reservation with the above is I am not sure probabilities in > expecting your next observer moment work this way. From a third > person perspective I have a 100% chance of experiencing all 3 > extensions, and as you say, this is interesting because from a first > person POV you do not experience all 3 locations at once. I think > this is where I disagree, you _do_ experience all 3 locations at > once, but due to the isolated locations and lack of communication > between the 3 different brains, they are unable to merge the > experience into a memory of being in all 3 locations. I do agree with you. But in that sense I am already Jason Resch. We come from the same splitting amoeba. This is true, at some level, but it does not seem to me relevant for the understanding that physics *has to* be extracted from probability/credibility measure on computations. > > This is the same reason that though Einstein says we exist in a 4- > dimensional block where time is only subjective, we never experience > being in all times at once, due to the limited, low-bandwidth, > communication from past memories to the present, and complete lack > of communication from future states to the present. The vast > majority of information within our brain state at any one time is > chiefly information of the present and very recent past, giving us > the feeling of living in the present, when of course our true nature > is that of a 4-dimensional snake stretching from the time of birth > to death. > > This lack of communication between individual brains is what fools > us into believing we are each a unique conscious entity, when truly > there is nothing to differentiate one observer from any other, > except for the current content of their experience. You are right. But when you look for the true reason why apples appear to fall on the ground. UDA(+AGF, that is 1...8) explains why the comp correct way to predict the behavior of the apple consists in looking in the universal deployment, and then looking at all computations going through your actual states (the one you have (by comp) once you observet the apple before dropping it), and, looking at the normal most probable stories/computations going through that state. Hmm... perhaps you have a problem with the UD? It does not just generate OM (Observer Moment). The DU generates all third person "observer moments" (as instantaneous state of universal self- observing machine) by generating all the stories (singular computations) going through that state. There is a continuum (from a first person pov) of such stories. The first person moment are different modalities. > I think it is a mistake to use the memories one has access to as a > means to delineate observers, for the vast majority of ones memories > are not in the content of ones OM at any one time. You are right, but not at the level needed to understand why and how, assuming comp, we *have* to explain why apples falls from "pure (mathematical) computer science". (or perhaps you are and there is a misunderstanding, to be sure). The reasoning should show comp testable. So we have to take into account all computations going through each observer moment to have normal relative "expected values". A bit like already with QM and Everett. > I think the importance of a particular computational history in > defining an "observer moment" is not as important as memory/ > communication isolation. You are right if your goal is to discover who you really are. But not if your goal is to understand why we have to derive Schoedinger Equation from computer science and number theory. It makes comp testable, and it provide a fundamental theory which does not eliminate the person. On the contrary it expl
Re: Probability
Anna's explanation was from the frequentist side. Gunther's was from the Bayesian side. On Nov 7, 10:13 am, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Thomas, > > "epistemic state of an agent", or in the proverbial 10-year-old's > words, knowledge of the state of affairs from a certain point of > view. This is the Bayesian interpretation of probability. > "EVERYTHING happens" can be interpreted as an expression in terms of > the frequentist interpretation of probability. As I see it (of > course), "EVERYTHING happens" is the "epistemic state of", or > "knowledge from the point of view of", the Plenitude, or Plotinus' > One. But this begs the question "What is EVERYTHING?" > > Tom > > On Nov 7, 9:43 am, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > Thomas, > > > > MW must be some how different from the same concept in everyday > > > language? In the latter "probably" just means "likely to happen" but > > > if EVERYTHING happens then how can the concept make sense? I guess it > > > must be two different concepts, then? > > > I wouldn't say so. Always look at the word "probably" as referring to > > uncertainty in the _epistemic state of an agent_; and not as uncertainty > > what will happen in the world. Then you see that it is the same concept > > in both cases. > > > Cheers, > > Günther- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 12:16 PM, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Anna's explanation was from the frequentist side. > Gunther's was from the Bayesian side. I actually agree with the Bayesian point of view, but I was trying to avoid injecting expectation into a description of how infinite domains can have probability distributions in a "conceptual" sense. Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Kory Heath wrote: > On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real >> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the >> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of >> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a >> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would >> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. >> > > I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to > count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel > Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't > think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- > automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is > implemented in some physical way. In the standard view, believing in > philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for > there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every > physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think > that's logically impossible.) > > -- Kory > I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g. accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible. But I don't know that Bruno allows that there is such a category as nomological, distinct from logical. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Contradiction. Was: Probability
> But this begs the question "What is EVERYTHING?" I would say the class of all mathematical models which are not self-contradictory constitutes "everything". I'd even go so far as to suggest that's exactly what existence is, in a literal sense: a lack of mathematical contradiction. All things that are consistent exist and all things that exist are consistent. This is broader than the MW interpretation which imposes additional tacit restrictions: that everything which /is constructable/ solely by /quantum perturbations/ occurring /since the Big Bang/ must exist. It also raises the question about whether we can assume there is a universe where I wore a red sweater instead of a blue one today. I would certainly guess that the probability of this happening is nonzero, but I have no way of confirming that there exists a particular model containing this state which is non-contradictory. Certainly the model couldn't be identical to the current universe I'm in, because I don't own a red sweater, and I can't readily envision a situation where quantum perturbations would make me wake up early enough to go purchase one. So I suspect that "everything" has lots of odd holes in it, but perhaps quantum effects smooth them out so well that we can assume nearly any conceivable change to our universe has non-contradictory representatives. I'd prefer not to assume that, even if I believe (as I do) that worlds which are not constructable from out Big Bang exist. Certainly there are worlds out there where I'm deluded into thinking that I have on a red sweater, though. ;) Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
Anna, OK, I understand. Thomas, as another reference point for study, what I refer to as the point of view from the Plenitude, or Plotinus' One, has frequently been referred to as the "God's eye point of view". (I didn't bring that up at first because I believe in a God who is different from the Plenitude or Plotinus' One, both of which are impersonal. By the way, the personal God is the only one in whom a person can possibly believe, but that could be another topic.) Tom On Nov 7, 10:31 am, "A. Wolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 12:16 PM, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Anna's explanation was from the frequentist side. > > Gunther's was from the Bayesian side. > > I actually agree with the Bayesian point of view, but I was trying to > avoid injecting expectation into a description of how infinite domains > can have probability distributions in a "conceptual" sense. > > Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
> (By the way, the personal God is the only one in whom a > person can possibly believe, but that could be another topic.) Absolutist statements make proof by contradiction easy. :) Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
My interpretation/intent of my below statement is a simple logically consistent statement, akin to saying that a person's subjective point of view is subjective, or more closely, a person's point of view is personal (i.e. from the point of view of a person), or 1+1=2. Not all absolutist statements can be easily contradicted. Only the inconsistent ones can. On Nov 7, 10:55 am, "A. Wolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > (By the way, the personal God is the only one in whom a > > person can possibly believe, but that could be another topic.) > > Absolutist statements make proof by contradiction easy. :) > > Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote: > > > On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real >> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in >> the >> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of >> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a >> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would >> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. > > I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to > count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel > Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't > think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- > automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is > implemented in some physical way. Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem in physics, he says). > In the standard view, believing in > philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for > there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every > physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think > that's logically impossible.) It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of what you have already understand. I should do exams or things like that :) Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny, part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind states, through all possible computations, containing notably relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of histories. It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains description of our third person current conversation, including everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc. In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply "the physical Universe exist". But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA is really a logical argument justifying that: IF you buy the mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary- materialist or substantialist explanation of matter. Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation for QM. I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a vast hierarchy of weakening of comp. To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp, I don't believe in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing, with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron relatively to your measurements). Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations and variant, if only that for example ...)? It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do you see what I mean? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
I like this topic. I will think about it a little first. By the way, is your use of blue and red a metaphor for Obama and McCain? ;) Tom On Nov 7, 10:44 am, "A. Wolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > But this begs the question "What is EVERYTHING?" > > I would say the class of all mathematical models which are not > self-contradictory constitutes "everything". I'd even go so far as to > suggest that's exactly what existence is, in a literal sense: a lack > of mathematical contradiction. All things that are consistent exist > and all things that exist are consistent. > > This is broader than the MW interpretation which imposes additional > tacit restrictions: that everything which /is constructable/ solely by > /quantum perturbations/ occurring /since the Big Bang/ must exist. > > It also raises the question about whether we can assume there is a > universe where I wore a red sweater instead of a blue one today. I > would certainly guess that the probability of this happening is > nonzero, but I have no way of confirming that there exists a > particular model containing this state which is non-contradictory. > Certainly the model couldn't be identical to the current universe I'm > in, because I don't own a red sweater, and I can't readily envision a > situation where quantum perturbations would make me wake up early > enough to go purchase one. > > So I suspect that "everything" has lots of odd holes in it, but > perhaps quantum effects smooth them out so well that we can assume > nearly any conceivable change to our universe has non-contradictory > representatives. I'd prefer not to assume that, even if I believe (as > I do) that worlds which are not constructable from out Big Bang exist. > > Certainly there are worlds out there where I'm deluded into thinking > that I have on a red sweater, though. ;) > > Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
... or akin to this from the QTI thread: > In the standard view, believing in > philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for > there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every > physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think > that's logically impossible.) On Nov 7, 11:05 am, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > My interpretation/intent of my below statement is a simple logically > consistent statement, akin to saying that a person's subjective point > of view is subjective, or more closely, a person's point of view is > personal (i.e. from the point of view of a person), or 1+1=2. Not all > absolutist statements can be easily contradicted. Only the > inconsistent ones can. > > On Nov 7, 10:55 am, "A. Wolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > (By the way, the personal God is the only one in whom a > > > person can possibly believe, but that could be another topic.) > > > Absolutist statements make proof by contradiction easy. :) > > > Anna- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:05 PM, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > My interpretation/intent of my below statement is a simple logically > consistent statement, akin to saying that a person's subjective point > of view is subjective, or more closely, a person's point of view is > personal (i.e. from the point of view of a person), or 1+1=2. Not all > absolutist statements can be easily contradicted. Only the > inconsistent ones can. You said "the personal God is the only one..." This suggests that everyone believes in the same subjective view of God, which is silly. The problem here is that the statement is not well-formed. We're discussing things that not only aren't operationally defined, they cannot be operationally defined (belief isn't something that can be directly measured [1]). Absolutist statements can be easily contradicted primarily because any statement can be easily contradicted. ;) Anna References: [1] Jodie Foster, cheezy sci-fi movie, 1997 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:07 PM, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I like this topic. I will think about it a little first. > By the way, is your use of blue and red a metaphor for Obama and > McCain? ;) Wow. :) Subconciously, perhaps in part. But it's mainly because the last pair of comfortable pants in my closet were blue, so I took the blue sweater since the weather was colder. Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
Hin 2008/11/7 Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Anna, OK, I understand. > > Thomas, as another reference point for study, what I refer to as the > point of view from the Plenitude, or Plotinus' One, has frequently > been referred to as the "God's eye point of view". > (I didn't bring that up at first because I believe in a God who is > different from the Plenitude or Plotinus' One, both of which are > impersonal. By the way, the personal God is the only one in whom a > person can possibly believe, but that could be another topic.) > > Tom Well... could you explain why a personal god is the *only one* a person can *possibly* believe ? because there is a little problem here... I do not believe in a personal god... yet I exist... so I'm possible... so believing in a personal god is not the only one a person can believe in... cqfd -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
Günther Greindl wrote: > Thomas, > > >> MW must be some how different from the same concept in everyday >> language? In the latter "probably" just means "likely to happen" but >> if EVERYTHING happens then how can the concept make sense? I guess it >> must be two different concepts, then? >> > > I wouldn't say so. Always look at the word "probably" as referring to > uncertainty in the _epistemic state of an agent_; and not as uncertainty > what will happen in the world. Then you see that it is the same concept > in both cases. > > Cheers, > Günther > > I don't think that resolves the problem. An epistemic state is a state of knowledge, so it just pushes the problem off to the question "knowledge of what?" Or perhaps you're thinking of "epistemic" as a state of belief. But then probabilities become purely subjective and something else is needed to relate them back to things like relative frequencies. In my view probability theory is a mathematical model and it is useful precisely because it applies (not necessarily exactly, but as a good approximation) to things. So one switches between relative frequency, propensity, and subjective interpretations in a single problem. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
A. Wolf wrote: >> But this begs the question "What is EVERYTHING?" >> > > I would say the class of all mathematical models which are not > self-contradictory constitutes "everything". I'd even go so far as to > suggest that's exactly what existence is, in a literal sense: a lack > of mathematical contradiction. All things that are consistent exist > and all things that exist are consistent. > > This is broader than the MW interpretation which imposes additional > tacit restrictions: that everything which /is constructable/ solely by > /quantum perturbations/ occurring /since the Big Bang/ must exist. > > It also raises the question about whether we can assume there is a > universe where I wore a red sweater instead of a blue one today. I > would certainly guess that the probability of this happening is > nonzero, but I have no way of confirming that there exists a > particular model containing this state which is non-contradictory. > If you don't require some mathematical model of evolution of states determining what happens in a Markovian way (like a Schroedinger eqn for example) then one consistent mathematical model is just a list:... "Anna wore a red sweater on 6 Nov 2008", "Anna wore a blue sweater on 7 Nov 2008", Anna wore a coat on 8 Nov 2008",... And there can be no *logical* contradiction between lists. One is as good as another. As I understand it, this sort of list is what Bruno's UD generates all possible instances of and from them, somehow, the physical world emerges as those lists which satisfy some consistency criteria. But I'm not clear on how these consistency criteria emerge from within the theory. Brent > Certainly the model couldn't be identical to the current universe I'm > in, because I don't own a red sweater, and I can't readily envision a > situation where quantum perturbations would make me wake up early > enough to go purchase one. > > So I suspect that "everything" has lots of odd holes in it, but > perhaps quantum effects smooth them out so well that we can assume > nearly any conceivable change to our universe has non-contradictory > representatives. I'd prefer not to assume that, even if I believe (as > I do) that worlds which are not constructable from out Big Bang exist. > > Certainly there are worlds out there where I'm deluded into thinking > that I have on a red sweater, though. ;) > > Anna > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Some books on category and topos theory
On 07 Nov 2008, at 15:57, Mirek Dobsicek wrote: > > Bruno Marchal in an older post wrote: >>> Also, >>> can you elaborate a bit more on the motivation behind category >>> theory? >>> Why >>> was it invented, and what problems does it solve? What's the >>> relationship >>> between category theory and the idea that all possible universes >>> exists? >> >> >> Tim makes a very genuine remark (but he writes so much I fear that >> has >> been unnoticed!). He said: read Tegmark (Everything paper), then >> learn >> category, then read again Tegmark. Indeed I would say category >> theory has > > Bruno, which of the Tegmark's 'Everything papers' did you have in > your mind? I guess it is this one: http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/index.html But it looks the paper is alive and evolves. I was thinking of its diagram of mathematical structures. Category theory put "natural" order in mathematical theories. But recursion theory is a sort of obstacle. category theory works well for sort of first person recursion theory (like with realizability, typed lambda calculus/comobinators, etc.) Then category is a must for knots and geometry ... Well come back, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
On Nov 7, 11:11 am, "A. Wolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:05 PM, Tom Caylor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > My interpretation/intent of my below statement is a simple logically > > consistent statement, akin to saying that a person's subjective point > > of view is subjective, or more closely, a person's point of view is > > personal (i.e. from the point of view of a person), or 1+1=2. Not all > > absolutist statements can be easily contradicted. Only the > > inconsistent ones can. > > You said "the personal God is the only one..." This suggests that > everyone believes in the same subjective view of God, which is silly. > The problem here is that the statement is not well-formed. We're > discussing things that not only aren't operationally defined, they > cannot be operationally defined (belief isn't something that can be > directly measured [1]). > I did not mean to suggest that. I clarified my intent above. > Absolutist statements can be easily contradicted primarily because any > statement can be easily contradicted. ;) > I meant that "Not all absolutist statements can be easily disproven by contradiction. Only the inconsistent ones can." but I shortened it erroneously. > Anna > > References: > [1] Jodie Foster, cheezy sci-fi movie, 1997 "Contact"? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote: > > >> On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real >>> life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in >>> the >>> Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of >>> times) in the set of all arithmetical truth. All right? Such a >>> computation would define an arithmetical version of you, and would >>> constitute a phisophical (indeed arithmetical) zombies. >>> >> I see what you mean, but most philosophers wouldn't be willing to >> count un-implemented computations as zombies. For instance, Daniel >> Dennett is a well-known opponent of philosophical zombies, but I don't >> think he considers the hypothetical creatures in some cellular- >> automaton to be conscious unless that cellular-automaton is >> implemented in some physical way. >> > > > Yes but Dennett takes matter for granted (no more conceptual problem > in physics, he says). > > > > > >> In the standard view, believing in >> philosophical zombies means believing that it's logically possible for >> there to be a physical copy of me that's identical to me in every >> physical way, except that it's not conscious. (Like Dennett, I think >> that's logically impossible.) >> > > > It is not easy for me to explain, the easiest explanation depends of > what you have already understand. > I should do exams or things like that :) > > Arithmetical truth, and even an important *tiny*, but not so tiny, > part of arithmetical truth contains, encodes, defines, implements, the > running of a universal dovetailer going through all possible mind > states, through all possible computations, containing notably > relations between bodies like in the more cellular automata type of > histories. > It is a bit astonishing, but a tiny part of arithmetic contains > description of our third person current conversation, including > everything you need as far as you cut the description of somewhere. So > you can talk about those entities as zombies, once we decide that they > are not conscious, despite they act and behave like us in many > stories, meaning with the right counterfactual, etc. > It's easy enough to agree with "describes", but is describing something the same as creating it? How can we decide these entities (what makes them entities?) are or are not conscious? > In truth, *I* could reverse the game, and ask you what you mean by > physics and physical. What is matter? That is the mystery for me. This > is what truly interest me. I don't buy that theory saying simply "the > physical Universe exist". But I don't, play that game because UDA+MGA > is really a logical argument justifying that: IF you buy the > mechanist theory of the mind, THEN you have to drop out the primary- > materialist or substantialist explanation of matter. > Fuch and Pauli and Wigner have defended already similar interpretation > for QM. > I think they are correct, except that, well Fuch explicitely, want a > singular physical universe. This can't work with COMP or even with a > vast hierarchy of weakening of comp. > > To sum up. Our problem is that I agree with you and Dennett that a > physical zombie cannot exist, (and for the same reason), but assuming > comp, there is no such thing as a physical thing, giving another > reason. The days where I decide to believe in comp, I don't believe > in physical things, be it zombie or people, in general. Those days I > don't believe that people or person are physical. A physical thing, > with comp, does not exist per se, it can only be a map of our personal > ignorance of the story we are in (a bit like an electronic orbital is > a map of the unknown computation story of the position of the electron > relatively to your measurements). > I understand that up to the "map of our personal ignorance" = "physical things" How does our uncertainity as to which histories we are entail phyisical things? Brent > > Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth > contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the > relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations > and variant, if only that for example ...)? > It contains fictions, if you want, but as precise as us to say, the > level of *description* of the quantum strings, again as a picture. Do > you see what I mean? > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
> If you don't require some mathematical model of evolution of states > determining what happens in a Markovian way (like a Schroedinger eqn for > example) then one consistent mathematical model is just a list:... "Anna > wore a red sweater on 6 Nov 2008", "Anna wore a blue sweater on 7 Nov > 2008", Anna wore a coat on 8 Nov 2008",... And there can be no > *logical* contradiction between lists. One is as good as another. As I > understand it, this sort of list is what Bruno's UD generates all > possible instances of and from them, somehow, the physical world emerges > as those lists which satisfy some consistency criteria. But I'm not > clear on how these consistency criteria emerge from within the theory. I'm not certain I was clear in what I described as being extant. When I say "me wearing a red sweater today" I mean "some model of the universe identical to the one that existed yesterday with the difference that today my sweater is red". I'm not talking about time at all. Time is just part of the overall structure of the multiverse. I mean, the main appeal of Everett (to me) is that it reduces a problem which is difficult to define to a structural description of the universe. So you can think of one consistent object as a mathematical structure that models our entire multiverse with all of its possibilities, from the start of the Big Bang according to the physical laws that govern it. For an example of an inconsistent structure I'd have to bust out some set theory, but there are plenty of "ideas" for things which sound nice but end up being mathematically inconsistent. Being mathematically inconsistent takes the cow example I used earlier from the "almost none" realm to the "none" realm. We don't have access to enough information to know with certainty that certain states are possible, though from the psychological perspective, any set of events could be experienced, yes. Maybe I should reformulate what I'm saying because I think I'm being misunderstood. Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno, Thanks for your answers, I think it is safe to say we are on the same page with the UDA. I accept mathematical realism and therefore the existence of abstract Turing machines defining the computational histories of all programs, or the equations of string theory defining all true solutions, etc. Therefore I would say the apparent "physical" universe is a timeless object that exists purely within math, and that our consciousness is formed by computations of processes that take place through one of the dimensions of the universe (time). I also believe there is no single mathematical object to which we can say we exist in, our certainty of which universe we can exist in changes all the time depending on the content of our OM. For example, when not thinking about the color of my tooth brush, and when not directly perceiving it, I exist in all universes where it is possible for my OM to exist, some of which my toothbrush is green, others red, or blue. Only when I stop and recall what color it is do I limit which universes I can belong to. Does your opinion differ in this regard? I am not sure if you believe in the actual existence of shareable physical (mathematical) universes or only in the dreams, which only occasionally give the appearance of shared histories. This to me sounds like the comp equivalent of Boltzmann brains, which I think would be less frequent than brains evolving through the full history of mathematical objects or computational universes. Regarding zombies, I think there can be outwardly appearing accidental zombies (from a third person view) that can appear conscious in certain circumstances but I don't think its possible to have two identical computational histories and only ascribe consciousness to one of them. Jason P.S. I apologize for the difficult to understand and half completed sentences that appeared in my previous post, I was writing notes of thoughts as they were coming to me and forgot to clean them up before sending out the message. On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 11:07 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On 07 Nov 2008, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> >> Hi Jason, >> >> >> Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit : >> > although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is >> > entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the >> > computer is running, then you have also created an entirely new >> > world/reality. >> >> I agree with this too. The only thing necessary to understand step 6, >> is that you do survive there like if it was teleportation. And in that >> context, the calculus of probability remains the same as in the five >> preceding steps. For example, if you understand step 5, you know that >> if a instantenous of you is done, and is not detsroyed, and if that >> copy is reinstantiated in the virtual Moscow tomorrow, and in the >> virtual Washington in one billion of years, the probability that you >> will "stay here" (and not find yourself in the virtual realities) is >> 1/3 (assuming 1/2 for perfect duplication). It means that Nozick's >> closer continuer identity theory fails with comp. > > > My only reservation with the above is I am not sure probabilities in > expecting your next observer moment work this way. From a third person > perspective I have a 100% chance of experiencing all 3 extensions, and as > you say, this is interesting because from a first person POV you do not > experience all 3 locations at once. I think this is where I disagree, you > _do_ experience all 3 locations at once, but due to the isolated locations > and lack of communication between the 3 different brains, they are unable to > merge the experience into a memory of being in all 3 locations. > > > > > I do agree with you. But in that sense I am already Jason Resch. We come > from the same splitting amoeba. This is true, at some level, but it does not > seem to me relevant for the understanding that physics *has to* be extracted > from probability/credibility measure on computations. > > > > > > This is the same reason that though Einstein says we exist in a > 4-dimensional block where time is only subjective, we never experience being > in all times at once, due to the limited, low-bandwidth, communication from > past memories to the present, and complete lack of communication from future > states to the present. The vast majority of information within our brain > state at any one time is chiefly information of the present and very recent > past, giving us the feeling of living in the present, when of course our > true nature is that of a 4-dimensional snake stretching from the time of > birth to death. > > This lack of communication between individual brains is what fools us into > believing we are each a unique conscious entity, when truly there is nothing > to differentiate one observer from any other, except for the current conte
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
A. Wolf wrote: >> If you don't require some mathematical model of evolution of states >> determining what happens in a Markovian way (like a Schroedinger eqn for >> example) then one consistent mathematical model is just a list:... "Anna >> wore a red sweater on 6 Nov 2008", "Anna wore a blue sweater on 7 Nov >> 2008", Anna wore a coat on 8 Nov 2008",... And there can be no >> *logical* contradiction between lists. One is as good as another. As I >> understand it, this sort of list is what Bruno's UD generates all >> possible instances of and from them, somehow, the physical world emerges >> as those lists which satisfy some consistency criteria. But I'm not >> clear on how these consistency criteria emerge from within the theory. >> > > I'm not certain I was clear in what I described as being extant. When I say > "me wearing a red sweater today" I mean "some model of the universe > identical to the one that existed yesterday with the difference that today > my sweater is red". > Does "model" imply a theory which predicts the evolution of states (possibly probabilistic) so that the state of universe yesterday limits what might exist today? > I'm not talking about time at all. So why the reference to "today" and "yesterday". > Time is just part of the overall > structure of the multiverse. I mean, the main appeal of Everett (to me) is > that it reduces a problem which is difficult to define to a structural > description of the universe. > So you're taking a block universe picture in which time is implicit some sequence of states. > So you can think of one consistent object as a mathematical structure that > models our entire multiverse with all of its possibilities, from the start > of the Big Bang according to the physical laws that govern it. > But I'm concerned about what defines "consistent". If it is just non-contradiction then any sequence of states seems to be as good as another. The mathematical consistency only applies within each state. Brent > For an example of an inconsistent structure I'd have to bust out some set > theory, but there are plenty of "ideas" for things which sound nice but end > up being mathematically inconsistent. Being mathematically inconsistent > takes the cow example I used earlier from the "almost none" realm to the > "none" realm. We don't have access to enough information to know with > certainty that certain states are possible, though from the psychological > perspective, any set of events could be experienced, yes. > > Maybe I should reformulate what I'm saying because I think I'm being > misunderstood. > > Anna > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
> Does "model" imply a theory which predicts the evolution of states > (possibly probabilistic) so that the state of universe yesterday limits > what might exist today? No. Model means a mathematical object. One specific, unchanging, crystalline object you can hold in your hand and look at from a bird's-eye view. > So why the reference to "today" and "yesterday". Because those are parts of the object I'm referring to. I'm not looking at a time-sequence of objects...I'm considering time and events and the many universes that stem from it as part of the solitary object itself. > So you're taking a block universe picture in which time is implicit some > sequence of states. It's a static model that includes all that infinite branching. > But I'm concerned about what defines "consistent". If it is just > non-contradiction then any sequence of states seems to be as good as > another. The mathematical consistency only applies within each state. That's not true at all! For example, something going faster than the speed of light would be a contradiction in our current universe. Just because you can envision something doesn't make it mathematically possible. Math is full of contradiction...it's how we prove nearly all mathematical results. Contradictions are those things we know to be false (non-existent). From a physicist's perspective, the universe is a mathematical object. If you need examples of mathematical contradiction I would be happy to supply them. Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
A. Wolf wrote: >> Does "model" imply a theory which predicts the evolution of states >> (possibly probabilistic) so that the state of universe yesterday limits >> what might exist today? >> > > No. Model means a mathematical object. One specific, unchanging, > crystalline object you can hold in your hand and look at from a bird's-eye > view. > > >> So why the reference to "today" and "yesterday". >> > > Because those are parts of the object I'm referring to. I'm not looking at > a time-sequence of objects...I'm considering time and events and the many > universes that stem from it as part of the solitary object itself. > > >> So you're taking a block universe picture in which time is implicit some >> sequence of states. >> > > It's a static model that includes all that infinite branching. > > >> But I'm concerned about what defines "consistent". If it is just >> non-contradiction then any sequence of states seems to be as good as >> another. The mathematical consistency only applies within each state. >> > > That's not true at all! For example, something going faster than the speed > of light would be a contradiction in our current universe. But not a logical contradiction. It would just contradict our assumed model of physics, i.e. a nomological contradiction. > Just because you > can envision something doesn't make it mathematically possible. > It does unless there are some axioms and rules of inference such that adding the thing I envision allows one to infer a contradiction. That's why I was asking about the model - does it have axioms and rules of inference? Brent > Math is full of contradiction...it's how we prove nearly all mathematical > results. Contradictions are those things we know to be false > (non-existent). From a physicist's perspective, the universe is a > mathematical object. If you need examples of mathematical contradiction I > would be happy to supply them. > > Anna > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
> But not a logical contradiction. It would just contradict our assumed > model of physics, i.e. a nomological contradiction. I realize I can't give a concrete example from physics due to the lack of total human understanding, so it is difficult to get across the exact point. If we presume that our understanding of the relationship between space and time is correct, then it would be a contradiction to observe true FTL transmission of information, because that would cause paradoxes (contradictions) in the structure of the universe itself. > It does unless there are some axioms and rules of inference such that > adding the thing I envision allows one to infer a contradiction. That's > why I was asking about the model - does it have axioms and rules of > inference? All models of mathematics have axioms, but only those (I postulate) which are non self-contradictory "exist". A universe that includes a model of naive set theory cannot exist, for one example, because it is self-contradictory. A universe that contains an elementary model capable of describing the ideas of naive set theory can exist, though. Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
A. Wolf wrote: >> But not a logical contradiction. It would just contradict our assumed >> model of physics, i.e. a nomological contradiction. >> > > I realize I can't give a concrete example from physics due to the lack of > total human understanding, so it is difficult to get across the exact point. > If we presume that our understanding of the relationship between space and > time is correct, then it would be a contradiction to observe true FTL > transmission of information, because that would cause paradoxes > (contradictions) in the structure of the universe itself. > > >> It does unless there are some axioms and rules of inference such that >> adding the thing I envision allows one to infer a contradiction. That's >> why I was asking about the model - does it have axioms and rules of >> inference? >> > > All models of mathematics have axioms, but only those (I postulate) which > are non self-contradictory "exist". A universe that includes a model of > naive set theory cannot exist, for one example, because it is > self-contradictory. A universe that contains an elementary model capable of > describing the ideas of naive set theory can exist, though. > > Anna > So universes that consisted just of lists of (state_i)(state_i+1)... would exist, where a state might or might not have an implicate time value. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
> So universes that consisted just of lists of (state_i)(state_i+1)... > would exist, where a state might or might not have an implicate time value. Of course, but would something that arbitrary be capable of supporting the kind of self-referential behavior necessary for sapience? Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
On Nov 7, 10:44 am, "A. Wolf" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > But this begs the question "What is EVERYTHING?" > > I would say the class of all mathematical models which are not > self-contradictory constitutes "everything". I'd even go so far as to > suggest that's exactly what existence is, in a literal sense: a lack > of mathematical contradiction. All things that are consistent exist > and all things that exist are consistent. > I am realizing that I don't have time to get into this. I assume that your use of the word "model" is equivalent to "theory". This brings in Godel's Incompleteness Theorems, and the fact that your definition of Everything implies that Everything is incomplete, i.e. that in many of the mathematical "models"/theories that comprise Everything, there are true statements which cannot be proven in the mathematical model. Actually I think this is OK. I would take consistency/ noncontradiction over completeness any day. God bless you on your journey and search for truth. Tom > This is broader than the MW interpretation which imposes additional > tacit restrictions: that everything which /is constructable/ solely by > /quantum perturbations/ occurring /since the Big Bang/ must exist. > > It also raises the question about whether we can assume there is a > universe where I wore a red sweater instead of a blue one today. I > would certainly guess that the probability of this happening is > nonzero, but I have no way of confirming that there exists a > particular model containing this state which is non-contradictory. > Certainly the model couldn't be identical to the current universe I'm > in, because I don't own a red sweater, and I can't readily envision a > situation where quantum perturbations would make me wake up early > enough to go purchase one. > > So I suspect that "everything" has lots of odd holes in it, but > perhaps quantum effects smooth them out so well that we can assume > nearly any conceivable change to our universe has non-contradictory > representatives. I'd prefer not to assume that, even if I believe (as > I do) that worlds which are not constructable from out Big Bang exist. > > Certainly there are worlds out there where I'm deluded into thinking > that I have on a red sweater, though. ;) > > Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Contradiction. Was: Probability
A. Wolf wrote: >> So universes that consisted just of lists of (state_i)(state_i+1)... >> would exist, where a state might or might not have an implicate time value. >> > > Of course, but would something that arbitrary be capable of supporting > the kind of self-referential behavior necessary for sapience? > > Anna > "Capable of supporting" implies some physical laws that connect an environment and sapient beings. In an arbitrary list universe, the occurrence of sapience might be just another arbitrary entry in the list (like Boltzman brains). And what about the rules of inference? Do we consider universes with different rules of inference? Are universes considered contradictory, and hence non-existent, if you can prove X and not-X for some X, or only if you can prove Y for all Y? You see, that's what I like about Bruno's scheme, he assumes a definite mathematical structure (arithmetic) and proposes that everything comes out of it. I think there is still problem avoiding wonderland, but in Tegmark's broader approach the problem is much bigger and all the work has to be done by some anthropic principle (which in it's full generality might be called "the Popeye" principle - "I yam what I yam."). Once you start with all non-contradictory mathematics, you might as well let in the contradictory ones too. The Popeye principle can eliminate them as well. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
Many thanks for your fine answers, and patience with an ignorant. When I said probability I meant from the frequentist side, or from what Tegmark has called "bird's point of view" (which I guess corospond to what Tom calls "God's point of view", - whether or not one believes) But the subjective probability concept is interesting also, and George's "alternative suicide experiment" is surely thouht provoking. About infinity which Anna mentions. I thouht that infinity was a mathematical concept (and tool) and not something that existed in the real universe? I mean, our universe is limited in space (though expanding), and there's a limited number of particles in it. So even though the number of combinations of ways and places the particles can intermix with each other must be extremely big, I thought that it was still limited / finite. And even space and time is descrete, like energy, as far as I know (but this may be pure speculation I've read) On the other hand, the line between maths and physics is sometimes said to disappear at a point. Anna said: "We should always expect things that are beyond reason not to happen, even though an infinite number of such worlds must exist. A cow could appear directly in front of me right now due to quantum effects, but the odds are virtually zero so I do not expect the occurrence." Neihter do I, otherwise I would go insane :-) But even if the cow only appear in an extremely small number of all worlds, still "an infinite number of such worlds must exist" according to you. I guess the existing of such totally weird worlds is the main reason why most people (and even most physicians?) can't or won't take the MWI seriously. Of course an invalid reason. But since a macro-event like a cow appearing is the result of an encredible number of micro-events, I think my wondering how on earth the concept of probability can make sense if "everything" happens anyway, arises from the fact that I didn't distinguish between the two kind of events. I guess a macro- event is not really a meaningful event when talking atom physics, since it's a sequence of trillions and trillions of "real" (micro-)events. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Probability
> since it's a sequence of trillions and trillions of > "real" (micro-)events. PS. Of course a macro-event is also "real" but it's not a fundamental event, and therefore the concept probability must be USED differently here, even though the concept itself is the same. Does that sound right? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
