Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 31 Jan 2014, at 13:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Liz, Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving! The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. The problem is that you are denying the flow of time. We deny a *primitive* and *ontological* flow of time. We don't deny the internal experience of flow of time. For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be active processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that... Arithmetic is full of active processor cycles. Bruno Edgar On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Why do some people have such a problem with how change can emerge from something static ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing something changing. Change is by definition things being different at different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you will naturally get a static universe, just as putting together all the moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a God's eye perspective. This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be isomorphic to reality). Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non- problem, and has been since Newton published his Principia. There are problems with comp, of course, like the white rabbit problem. Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than worrying about straw men? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 31 Jan 2014, at 14:32, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Telmo, Block time and Bruno's comp can only tell us how a set fixed static sequence of events could be perceived by some observer as a fixed static sequence of events. It simply CANNOT tell us how time moves ALONG that sequence. Correct. But we just abandon the idea that there is a time moving along that sequence. That does not change the experience of time flow by the person. The fact that time flows, that things change, is a fundamental EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION. It is a fundamental aspect of person experience. There is no empirical evidence for it. Not one. It is not some intuitive illusion. It is the basic measurable observation of our existence and it never ceases from birth to death. It simply cannot be disregarded as some sort of survival mechanism. In fact if block time were actually real survival mechanisms would not be needed because the future is already written deterministically contrary to QM and in violation of all sorts of physical laws. So you assume QM? And QM with collapse? QM without collapse admits a block multiverse description, with profusion of different relative futures. If you think block time exists then where does that entire block come from? It comes from 2+2=4. It is amazing, but well known in theoretical computer science. Did it create itself? No. Bruno Sequentially or all at once? Did something outside of it create it? What? How? Was it created causally in time? Or did it just magically appear like some kind of miracle? The believers in block time have an unfortunate habit of not thinking through the implications of their crazy theory. Again, the best way I can say it is that your mouth has to move plenty to tell me it isn't moving! Best, Edgar On Friday, January 31, 2014 8:08:32 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Edgar, On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 at 1:13 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Liz, Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving! The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. The problem is that you are denying the flow of time. Why is this a problem? How can you know for sure that there is a flow of time? Block universe hypothesis can explain how time would appear to flow for each observer. This doesn't prove that block universe hypothesis are correct, but they cannot be dismissed that easily either. Now you could argue that this is counter-intuitive, but I would remind you that nature doesn't care. Our intuition is just a bunch of heuristics evolved to deal with a very narrow set of survival scenarios. For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be active processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that... I wonder. Telmo. Edgar On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Why do some people have such a problem with how change can emerge from something static ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing something changing. Change is by definition things being different at different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you will naturally get a static universe, just as putting together all the moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a God's eye perspective. This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be isomorphic to reality). Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non- problem, and has been since Newton published his Principia. There are problems with comp, of course, like the white rabbit problem. Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than worrying about straw men? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 31 Jan 2014, at 19:27, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, I HAVE explained my computational space and how it relates to p- time. Here it is again copied from my post of Jan. 25 since you missed it. I did not miss it, but apparently you missed my comment on it. Bruno, Once again a summary of my computational universe: The fundamental level of reality consists of pure abstract computationally evolving information in the LOGICAL (not physical, not dimensional) space or presence of reality. I cannot accept a definition which invoke reality. reality is what we search on. What do you mean by evolving, if the fundamental level is abstract computations? What do you mean by logical? Which logic? Soory but what you say does not make sense in term of the standard definitions. What exists here is NOT static arithmetic truth. What exists here is the ACTUAL computations (and nothing else) Define actual computation. necessary and sufficient to compute the current state of the universe as science observes it and confirms it. You assume a universe? This occurs as myriads of computations in interaction with each other. What is interaction. You seem to assume everything (physics, psychology, etc.). This is a dynamic active process which occurs in a common present moment. What is is it? This present moment is NOT the same as clock time. Clock time and all the other measurable observable information states of the universe are the RESULTS of these fundamental computations which occur in the present moment of p-time. How could a computation occur in a present moment. A physical computation needs more than one moment, like a computation in arithmetic needs more than one step or one natural number. Ah, perhaps the present moment changes all the time? I don't see a theory, only a personal view on physics. If clock time is the RESULTS of computations those computations MUST occur in some other type of time. That is the present moment. That does not make much sense to me. You assume far too much primitives, without clearly defining them. What we assume should be amenable to agreement, even if temporary, just to see what your theory is. This process is entirely independent of human observation. It is not a matter of perspective, though obviously every extant observe will have its own perspective on and internal mental model of this process. And observers will interpret this perspective as the familiar physical dimensional world. All observers are sub-programs in this single computational reality which themselves continually computationally interact with the computations of their environments. You assume a form of digital physics. But what about my argument (given two or three times) that this is self-contradictory? What do you mean by computations? It seems you assume physical computations, but nobody can defined this without assuming the standard mathematical definition. The entire universe consists ONLY of these active computations, consists ONLY of information computationally evolving. But the computational reality, to be complete, involves non computable aspect. The universe cannot be 100% computational and Turing complete. Are you assuming a finite physical reality? The apparently physical classical world is how observers INTERPRET or model or simulate this information reality internally in their minds. They have evolved to do this to make it easier to compute their functioning and survival Thus the actual reality is not physical, dimensional or material, it consists only of actively computationally evolving pure abstract information in a logical space ONLY. No logic is rich enough to define computation. you need arithmetic (or equivalent). What does mean evolving in a logical space only? As for the present moment of p-time, that is the present moment of time that provides the computational processor cycles to take place within. Then you must give a non physical account of the time, but your refer all the time to physical attribute. Time can be physical, psychological, computer science theoretica, arithmetical, but not purely logic. Or you assume some special temporal logic? Clock time and everything else that constitutes the actual state of the actual observable scientific world is computed in p-time by these computations. Hope that makes it clearer I have still no clue what you mean by computation. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 31 Jan 2014, at 20:24, David Nyman wrote: On 31 January 2014 18:30, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip OK. But you could also start by saying something like the POPJ assumes by default a primitively-physical basis). Especially that it is certainly arguable that comp does not solve it to our *entire* satisfaction yet. OK. Actually, I'm trying to persuade Craig that it still applies on a primitively-sensory basis. But not in comp. Hopefully. BTW, although you say that Craig can perhaps avoid the POPJ by appealing to a non-comp theory, ISTM that the problem of reference is still there so long as his fundamental-sense theory relies on causally-closed extrinsic *appearances. I think Craig does not believe that his fundamental sense relies on causally-closed extrinsic *appearance*. he would say that sense makes those causally-closed extrinsic appearance, which makes sense in comp, actually (to bad he believes only non comp guaranties that). Of course his theory does not explain mind, consciousness or sense, as it assumes it. And I fail to see how it relates to the *appearances*, except by making a sort of naive identification of sense with some matter (up to some convolution which he does not describe in any precise way). But if he makes that naive identification (modulo any convolution, which I've offered him the opportunity to explain) the POPJ can still bite him. However, under questioning he's so far been rather unclear about this aspect of his theory. That's clear. He assumes sense, and try to make it into a form of matter, sometimes. May be the last reference to tTegmark might help him. It seems to be a form of panpsychism. It would seem so. But POPJ can still bite panpsychism, I think, although this doesn't seem to be widely recognised. My post to Craig elaborates on this. I am afraid he is too much vague to be really bitten. but you can put him in the corner, if patient enough, but then he might change the subject, or something. The eventual contradiction is probably in the fact that he needs extrinsic causality to have machines zombies, but he needs the absence of extrinsic causality (like in comp, somehow) to escape the POPJ. So I think you are right. Panpsychism can be bitten by POPJ when Pan contains non psychic things, as Craig alludes often (but unclearly) to those non psychic things, like zombies bodies. Are such appearances causally closed? Do we not rely on such physical consistency? Maybe, sometimes, who knows, whatever. I might go so far as to say that he's been dodging the question. By assuming sense, he dodges the mind. And by being unclear of matter, well he might dodge the issue of matter too. It is still better than the person elimination of the materialists. I agree. snip The plausible resolution of the paradox, if I've understood you, lies in the capability of the machine to refer to non-shareable but incorrigible truths beyond formal proof and demonstration. Yes. In more than one sense, and those sense are related. One sense can be attributed to Gunderson, and is very simple. Once you have build some numbers of robots, having enough cognitive abilities to recognize themselves and name the other robots, it will recognize some basic difference between itself and the other, just by the virtue of being itself. Like not seeing his own neck. UDA does not need more than that simple assymetry. It provides the comp solution of the problem why am I the W person and not the M person. A negative solution, as it says nobody could have predicted that. Here appears already a stock of 1-truth, or 1-1 truth, which are non logically justifiable and sometimes unexpressible (having non definite name or description). But formally, we get more senses for this, all deriving directly or indirectly from incompleteness. If you want the usual boolean logic of any extrinsic 3p, enough rich to describe itself (like we could ask for an explanatively close physics) extends into a modal logic, naturally, when that 3p self is taken into account. That's the modal logic G. G is the logic of the 3p self in a 3p reality. OK. But by incompleteness, some truth about that 3p self cannot be logically justifiable by that 3p self, and Solovay theorems gives the precious gift of a modal logic of the whole self-referential truth (whole at the propositional modal logic level: it is not the whole truth!). That is the logic G*. OK. To give the simple but important example, the consistency, that it is the non provability of the false (t = ~[]f) is an example of true statement (trivially if we limit ourself to sound machines), which is not provable by the machine (by the 3p self about its 3p self, at the right level of descriotion: here by construction). G* is decidable, and so a correct machine can produce a lot of truth about itself that she cannot justify
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 31 Jan 2014, at 20:57, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't need a proof because I have something better, I have direct experience of the subjective. Nice for you. Indeed. But that does not invalidate the point that you can't prove this to an other person, I can't even prove that there is another person that I could present a potential proof to. Exactly. Problem? What's the problem? If I do not believe in your subjective experience, as you say above, then I certainly don't need to explain it. And if I do believe in your subjective experience then I can say it was caused by the way matter interacts (which can be fully described by information) just as I already know from direct experience that my subjective experience is caused. That mundane explanation might be locally valid, but your own idea that consciousness is not localized Yes. Do you find a contradiction in that? I don't. I don't either. Only an interesting problem for the computationalists. Indeed, you are presently delocalized into an infinity of computations, And if Everett is correct there are a infinite number of Bruno Marchals , that would certainly be odd but where is the contradiction? Nobody said there was a contradiction. Only an interesting problem. And if I also believe that consciousness is fundamental, that is to say a sequence of What caused that? questions is not infinite and consciousness comes at the end, then there is nothing more that can be said on the subject. Yes, but you have to invoke some non-comp to localize yourself in some unique reality Fine, then feel free to invoke some non-comp or invoke more comp if that floats your boat, I no longer care. I've given up trying to find a consistent definition of your silly little word comp that is used on this list and nowhere else. False. You stop at step 3, not step 0, which means that you accept the definition of comp provided here. Your endless homemade acronyms that you pretend every educated person should know get tiresome too. Childish immature remark. once you believe that your consciousness is invariant for some digital transformation I do believe that. Good. That's comp. then you can begin to understand that we have to justify the physical from modalities associated to that those digital transformations. Although it doesn't necessarily follow the digital transformation of consciousness is perfectly consistent with the matter in the desk I'm pounding my hand on right now as simply being a subroutine in the johnkclak program, and the same is true of the matter in my hand. Only by a confusion 1p and 3p, that you illustrate the day you are stuck at the step 3. Somehow, you just say that you are not interested in the mind-body problem. Well, nobody around here has said anything very interesting about the mind-body problem. Because you confuse 1p and 3p, again and again and again, despite in some post you don't. Which rise the question of what is your agenda. And if the sequence of what caused that? questions are not infinite than after a certain point there just isn't anything more of interest to say about the mind-body problem. That applies to all problem. Like you said once, we can't predict, in Helsinki, W or M, and that's all. I can't predict the answer because you haven't precisely formulated what the question is. I did. You are the one systematically ADDING confusion, by dismissing the 1p/3p distinction, or asking for no relevant point on personal identity. You are the only person stuck in step 3 that I know. I thank you for making public the kind of hand waving needed to stop there indeed. Bruno I stay in the 3p, because in UDA we use only the most superficial aspect of the first person I've looked yet again but I still don't see it: http://uda.varsity.com/ John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 1 Feb 2014, at 8:24 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Your endless homemade acronyms that you pretend every educated person should know get tiresome too. Try Vitamin B 12. It is known to have a positive effect on the mind's ability to accept new input. Failing that, you might give dandelion coffee a go or even cannabis. This last may prove fatal to your inflated self-confidence concerning everything you write. Kim Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL Email: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au Mobile: 0450 963 719 Landline: 02 9389 4239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
Actually, John Clark wrote... On 1 Feb 2014, at 8:34 pm, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: On 1 Feb 2014, at 8:24 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Your endless homemade acronyms that you pretend every educated person should know get tiresome too. Try Vitamin B 12. It is known to have a positive effect on the mind's ability to accept new input. Failing that, you might give dandelion coffee a go or even cannabis. This last may prove fatal to your inflated self-confidence concerning everything you write. Kim Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL Email: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au Mobile: 0450 963 719 Landline: 02 9389 4239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL Email: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au Mobile: 0450 963 719 Landline: 02 9389 4239 Web: http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On 31 Jan 2014, at 21:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, January 31, 2014 2:47:01 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Jan 2014, at 03:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Maybe it will help to make the sense-primitive view clearer if we
think of sense and motive as input and output.
This is only a step away from Comp, so it should not be construed to
mean that I am defining sense and motive as merely input and output.
My purpose here is just to demonstrate that Comp takes so much for
granted that it is not even viable as a primitive within its own
definitions.
Can we all agree that the notion of input and output is
ontologically essential to the function of computation?
Bad luck Craig!
Not only the notion of input-output is not essential for computation,
but we can argue in many ways that input-output are inessential.
A deep one is the discovery of the combinators, which provides a way
to do math and computers without variables. You still need some
variable at the metalevel, but all formal objects, program and
computations are object without variables. This is exploited in
compilation theory, and in some proof theory.
Then there is the SMN theorem, which says basically that you can
simulate a function with two variables (two inputs) by mechanically
enumerable collection of functions of one variable.
Here too, the S90 particular case says that you can simulate functions
of 9 variables with effective enumeration of functions of 0 variables,
that is without input.
Recursion theory is fundamentally non dimensional.
Take the UD.
A UD dovetailing only on the programs without input is equivalent with
a UD dovetailing on the programs having infinitely many inputs
(streams).
And, to finish, the UD itself is a program without input and without
output. It computes in an intensional very complex way, nothing from
nothing.
The UD has this in common with the common aristotelian conception of
the physical universe. A physical universe cannot have input nor
output, without stopping being *the* physical universe.
This does not mean, than in the relative computation, some input can't
help.
Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no
program or data is input and from which no data is expected as
output?
The UD.
Isn't everything output from the UD?
No. The UD has no output. It is a non stopping program. everything
physical and theological appears through its intensional activity.
In fact it uses an intensional Church thesis. Not only all universal
machines can compute all computable functions, but they can all
compute them in all the possible ways to compute them. The intensional
CT can be derived from the usual extensional CT. Universal machines
computes all functions, but also in all the same and infinitely many
ways.
This would suggest that computation can only be defined as a
meaningful product in a non-comp environment, otherwise there would
be no inputting and outputting, only instantaneous results within a
Platonic ocean of arithmetic truth.
A computation of a program without input can simulate different
programs having many inputs relative to other programs or divine (non-
machines) things living in arithmetic
How does the program itself get to be a program without being input?
OK. Good question.
The answer is that the TOE has to choose an initial universal system.
I use arithmetic (RA).
Then all programs or number are natural inputs of the (tiny)
arithmetical truth which emulates them.
You need to understand that a tiny part of arithmetic defines all
partial computable relations. The quintessence of this is already in
Gödel 1931.
Where do we find input and output within arithmetic though?
It is not obvious, but the sigma_1 arithmetical relation emulates all
computations, with all sort of relative inputs.
It seems to me though, and this is why I posted this thread, that i/
o is taken for granted and has no real explanation of what it is in
mathematical terms.
It is the argument of the functions in the functional relations.
If phi_i(j) = k then RA can prove that there is a number i which
applied to j will give k, relatively to some universal u, (and this
trivially relatively to arithmetic).
What makes it happen without invoking a physical or experiential
context?
Truth. The necessary one, and the contingent one.
Does truth make things happen?
Yes. truth('p') - p.
If Obama is president is true, then Obama is president.
As an aside, its interesting to play with the idea of building a
view of computation from a sensory-motive perspective. When we use a
computer to automate mental tasks it could be said that we are
'unputting' the effort that would have been required otherwise. When
we use a machine to emulate our own presence in our absence, such as
a Facebook profile, we are onputting ourselves in some digital
context.
The brain does that a lot. Nature does
Re: Unput and Onput
On 31 Jan 2014, at 22:16, LizR wrote: On 1 February 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no program or data is input and from which no data is expected as output? The UD. Isn't everything output from the UD? No, as I understand it, only the appearance of everything. (Comp answers the question why is there something rather than nothing by it depends what you mean by something...) How does the program itself get to be a program without being input? See genetic algorithms for one example. See genetics for another. A blind watchmaker can make a computer programme, although we can normally write one a lot more efficiently. It seems to me though, and this is why I posted this thread, that i/ o is taken for granted and has no real explanation of what it is in mathematical terms. No mathematical explanation for what input and output are?! They both come down to binary digits, how mathematical do you want it to be? The rest of your post seems a lot more sensible and I will leave those questions for Bruno to agree or disagree, I would also like to know how numbers can make an effort (as would Xenocrates! If John will forgive the reference...) The soul is a number which moves itself (Xenocrates). Curiosity is a robot on mars, and it moves its software all alone by itself, relatively to the planet Mars. Sometimes his wheels go on some big pebbles (which shows there was water!), and the robot has to make some effort. Curiosity has a digital brain. The relation between his inputs on Mars, and his attempt to get rid of the pebbles, are entirely described infinitely often in the arithmetical relations corresponding to the emulation of that computation in arithmetic. Even before the human relations took places, funnily enough. Now, the possible consciousness of Curiosity is not really based on this or that arithmetical relations, but on all of them. Only there the effort can be hurting and felt by curiosity, if that is the case. Does this help? Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On 31 Jan 2014, at 22:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, January 31, 2014 4:16:12 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 1 February 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no program or data is input and from which no data is expected as output? The UD. Isn't everything output from the UD? No, as I understand it, only the appearance of everything. (Comp answers the question why is there something rather than nothing by it depends what you mean by something...) Ok, so then everything is output from the UD plus output from whatever computater you are saying generates everything that is not an appearance. It is misleading to say that the UD output anything, as it is a non stopping program. It has no output in the common computer science meaning. Think about a dreaming brain. Your partner in bed is sleepy and make a dream. there are no input output, but there is still an experience which can be related to the brain activity. In that dreams, some entities can have inputs and outputs. Input and outputs are relative notions. Then a machine without inoput and output can imitate machines having them. How does the program itself get to be a program without being input? See genetic algorithms for one example. See genetics for another. A blind watchmaker can make a computer programme, although we can normally write one a lot more efficiently. Genetics are absorbing all kinds of inputs and producing outputs. The blind watchmaker is a theory about evolution, not an example of a real computation which is known to be without input or output. It seems to me though, and this is why I posted this thread, that i/ o is taken for granted and has no real explanation of what it is in mathematical terms. No mathematical explanation for what input and output are?! They both come down to binary digits, how mathematical do you want it to be? What are the binary digits which define input? Look up any assembly language. Bruno The rest of your post seems a lot more sensible and I will leave those questions for Bruno to agree or disagree, I would also like to know how numbers can make an effort (as would Xenocrates! If John will forgive the reference...) Cool. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 1 February 2014 16:48, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/31/2014 9:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: We are potentially immortal in the same way as a car can potentially survive indefinitely provided parts can be repaired or replaced indefinitely. At present, we can repair or replace some parts in the human body, but not enough to prolong life for more than a few years. Actually I think we can make people live indefinitely now. I have seriously considered starting a business to do this. I certainly think I can do it more legitimately than those cryogenic preservation services. What I would do it is gather as much information about the person as possible. If they were still alive this would include extensive video recordings and interviews. Then they would be 3d-modeled in CGI, with adjustment of age appearance as desired. This model would then be inserted as an avatar of the person in an artificial CGI world, similar to many computer games. The avatar would be provided with an AI based on all the writings, video, interviews etc so that it would respond like the person modeled in most conversation. It could access current events etc from the internet so it would be able to discuss things. Would the avatar be conscious? According to Bruno it would be if it's AI were Lobian - which isn't that hard. But really it's beside the point. AI, such as Watson, could easily appear as conscious and intelligent as your 90yr old aunt and tell the stories she tells and exhibit the quirks she has. Would the avatar be alive? conscious? Who would care? Not the loved ones that paid to preserve Grandma for future generations. Anybody want to invest? It'll take big bucks to do it right. If you really could do that, we could send these AI's into the world to work for us and represent us. We are nowhere near doing that. Then there is the additional question of whether the AI is a continuation of the person's consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 01 Feb 2014, at 06:48, meekerdb wrote: On 1/31/2014 9:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: We are potentially immortal in the same way as a car can potentially survive indefinitely provided parts can be repaired or replaced indefinitely. At present, we can repair or replace some parts in the human body, but not enough to prolong life for more than a few years. Actually I think we can make people live indefinitely now. I have seriously considered starting a business to do this. I certainly think I can do it more legitimately than those cryogenic preservation services. What I would do it is gather as much information about the person as possible. If they were still alive this would include extensive video recordings and interviews. Then they would be 3d-modeled in CGI, with adjustment of age appearance as desired. This model would then be inserted as an avatar of the person in an artificial CGI world, similar to many computer games. The avatar would be provided with an AI based on all the writings, video, interviews etc so that it would respond like the person modeled in most conversation. It could access current events etc from the internet so it would be able to discuss things. Would the avatar be conscious? According to Bruno it would be if it's AI were Lobian - which isn't that hard. But really it's beside the point. AI, such as Watson, could easily appear as conscious and intelligent as your 90yr old aunt and tell the stories she tells and exhibit the quirks she has. Would the avatar be alive? conscious? Who would care? Not the loved ones that paid to preserve Grandma for future generations. Anybody want to invest? It'll take big bucks to do it right. Is that not the normal future of facebook or Linkedin, or personal family memory? That is like saying yes to the current doctor, meaning, that the level is *very* high. The children will not be glad. It is already annoying to listen to grandpa nth account of 14-18, every sunday, but now, you have to listen to grandpa and grandma, and to their grandgrand-pa, and their grandgrand-ma, and so one. Chinese have a name for that, it is the cult of ancestors. It is good, it is human. You can do money but you have to act quickly, because that emerges naturally from the net. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 12:15:26 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 1 February 2014 13:22, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Friday, January 31, 2014 5:32:49 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: It emerges along the time axis. Evolution, for example, can operate in a block universe. All the phenomena we experience can occur in a block universe, otherwise no one would entertain the possibility that we live in one. I don't think that very many people do seriously entertain the possibility that we live in a block universe. Except physicists, who have accepted it since Minkowski, if not Newton. (And science fiction writers, like Robert Heinlein.) It's not that the effect of evolution couldn't exist in a block universe, its that it wouldn't make sense to say that it 'operates', since the beginning and ending of the operation would be, from an absolute perspective, simultaneous. No they wouldn't, they'd be separated by hundreds of millions of years along the time axis. The time axis is only a label for one measure of the block. The separation that you are assuming is not explained by the block modeling itself. The model doesn't support any inherent separation, because it is a homogeneous block. If there is separation, then it would have to be explained by further facts about the block. The time axis is not 'operating', it is nothing at all but an inert scalar. What is not explained is why, if there was a block universe, would being inside of it be filled with both simultaneous and chronological sensations. What would restrict some part of the block to the point of blindness to most of the time axis, and then insert some kind of illusion of timing associated with that axis? Physics. Yes, but that just makes physics a Machine of the Gaps. Without a theory of why and how physics plays in illusion, we have no justification to claim that the contemporary version of physics can hold consciousness of time. The fact that it is all there from the god's (physicist's) perspective doesn't stop things changing and emerging within the block. It doesn't stop it, but it makes it implausible. What does a block want with _ing anything? It doesn't want anything. It's just the outcome of the laws of physics. What I'm saying though is that the block universe interpretation of the laws of physics directly contradicts any possibility of any interpretation of the laws of physics in which change is ever experienced chronologically. But there *is* time in a block universe. It's a 4D manifold, and time is a particular axis within it. You seem to want an extra time above and beyond the existing one. Just the opposite. I am fully embracing time a just one of the four D axes. What the block universe does not explain is why that axis is presented as a verb while the other three are not, and why that axis is irreversible seeming while the others are not. We're embedded in time, and the thermodynamic arrow of time is a subject that has already been discussed at length. We can be embedded in time whether it is experienced chronologically or not. The whole point is that the Block Universe spatializes time so that the arrow of time becomes some kind of local 'illusion'. The question of whether or not we are even 'embedded in time' is a whole other debate. I would say that the experience of being embedded in time is not primordial, but is rather derived from public relations. Time is not implicit within private consciousness, although it contains the seeds of chronological time. The native ontology of time is experiential and multiplexed, rooted in significance rather than explicit duration. Time is an accounting and comparison of groups of experiences, not a tangible location or firmament. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 12:26:34 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 1 February 2014 17:30, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: It's not an assumption, it is a question. I am asking, what good is computation without input/output and isn't the fact of i/o completely overlooked in the ontology of computationalism. Given that, isn't it more likely that computationalism is false? Your original question was: Can we all agree that the notion of input and output is ontologically essential to the function of computation? Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no program or data is input and from which no data is expected as output? I answered that. I gave an example. You didn't ask what good it was, you asked if it's ontologically essential. They are the same thing. In a Computationalist (or Digital Functionalist) universe, the phenomenon of consciousness is reduced to a computational function based on the idea that function is ontologically supreme. If you have phenomena popping up out of nowhere without any function, then we must ask why we are picking on consciousness. By asserting that input/output is ontologically essential to the function of computing, I am saying that there is no functional reason why computation would emerge unless it produces something new, and I'm saying that production essentially entails what we think of as input and output: some kind of formal partitioning of a function and a sending-receiving of computational products from that partition. Without the sending-receiving, you have a Platonic Block that makes sending-receiving redundant. There does not seem to be any functional purpose for computation within a Platonic Block, since every possible UD coordinate is already there. And it isn't, computation can proceed happily without I/O. Empirically, in the machines that we create, given our distance from the experience of those machines, but I'm talking about as a theory of the universe - if computation can proceed without I/O, then of course it would, and I/O would be impossible. Since we know in our own experience that I/O is the only reason to ever compute anything, we cannot assume that there can be any such thing as computation in a universe that lacks I/O (sensory-motive participation). That is what I meant by ontologically essential. Not essential locally, but essential on the eternal, existential level. You asked if I/O is ontologically essential to computation and I answered, no, and gave a load of examples that showed why it isn't. Because you are looking at computation from within a computer science perspective. I'm looking at it from a foundational perspective. If you want to ask what good computation is without I/O that's fine, go ahead. But that wasn't the question you asked and I answered, or the question you have gone to such extraordinary lengths to object to my answers to. Anyway I won't make the mistake of trying to give you an honest answer, or any answer, if all you can do is bleat about how square it is to try to hold a meaningful discussion. Since you've clearly already decided that you're right, and are happy to twist everything round endlessly to prove it, at least to yourself, you may as well shout in a bucket. From my perspective, that sounds like I didn't really consider your question thoroughly the first time, so my answer was superficial, and now I'm angry, so I'm putting my fingers in my ears and blaming you. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 5:09:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Jan 2014, at 22:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, January 31, 2014 4:16:12 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 1 February 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no program or data is input and from which no data is expected as output? The UD. Isn't everything output from the UD? No, as I understand it, only the appearance of everything. (Comp answers the question why is there something rather than nothing by it depends what you mean by something...) Ok, so then everything is output from the UD plus output from whatever computater you are saying generates everything that is not an appearance. It is misleading to say that the UD output anything, as it is a non stopping program. It has no output in the common computer science meaning. Then what does it actually do? Think about a dreaming brain. Your partner in bed is sleepy and make a dream. there are no input output, Not with the world outside of your body, but within the dream, the whole thing is input and output. You receive dream experiences and you project your participation in them, just as you would with your body in a world of bodies. In a dream, you are in a semi-world of perceptions instead. but there is still an experience which can be related to the brain activity. In that dreams, some entities can have inputs and outputs. Input and outputs are relative notions. Then a machine without inoput and output can imitate machines having them. Imitation is an output. It's based on an input. If you have never heard how someone speaks, you cannot imitate them - because imitation is an output which requires sensory input. How does the program itself get to be a program without being input? See genetic algorithms for one example. See genetics for another. A blind watchmaker can make a computer programme, although we can normally write one a lot more efficiently. Genetics are absorbing all kinds of inputs and producing outputs. The blind watchmaker is a theory about evolution, not an example of a real computation which is known to be without input or output. It seems to me though, and this is why I posted this thread, that i/o is taken for granted and has no real explanation of what it is in mathematical terms. No mathematical explanation for what input and output are?! They both come down to binary digits, how mathematical do you want it to be? What are the binary digits which define input? Look up any assembly language. But assembly language must be input into a computer before that. Craig Bruno The rest of your post seems a lot more sensible and I will leave those questions for Bruno to agree or disagree, I would also like to know how numbers can make an effort (as would Xenocrates! If John will forgive the reference...) Cool. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 4:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Jan 2014, at 21:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, January 31, 2014 2:47:01 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Jan 2014, at 03:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Maybe it will help to make the sense-primitive view clearer if we
think of sense and motive as input and output.
This is only a step away from Comp, so it should not be construed to
mean that I am defining sense and motive as merely input and output.
My purpose here is just to demonstrate that Comp takes so much for
granted that it is not even viable as a primitive within its own
definitions.
Can we all agree that the notion of input and output is
ontologically essential to the function of computation?
Bad luck Craig!
Not only the notion of input-output is not essential for computation,
but we can argue in many ways that input-output are inessential.
A deep one is the discovery of the combinators, which provides a way
to do math and computers without variables. You still need some
variable at the metalevel, but all formal objects, program and
computations are object without variables. This is exploited in
compilation theory, and in some proof theory.
Then there is the SMN theorem, which says basically that you can
simulate a function with two variables (two inputs) by mechanically
enumerable collection of functions of one variable.
Here too, the S90 particular case says that you can simulate functions
of 9 variables with effective enumeration of functions of 0 variables,
that is without input.
Recursion theory is fundamentally non dimensional.
Take the UD.
A UD dovetailing only on the programs without input is equivalent with
a UD dovetailing on the programs having infinitely many inputs
(streams).
And, to finish, the UD itself is a program without input and without
output. It computes in an intensional very complex way, nothing from
nothing.
The UD has this in common with the common aristotelian conception of
the physical universe. A physical universe cannot have input nor
output, without stopping being *the* physical universe.
This does not mean, than in the relative computation, some input can't
help.
Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no
program or data is input and from which no data is expected as output?
The UD.
Isn't everything output from the UD?
No. The UD has no output. It is a non stopping program. everything
physical and theological appears through its intensional activity.
Appears = output.
In fact it uses an intensional Church thesis. Not only all universal
machines can compute all computable functions, but they can all compute
them in all the possible ways to compute them. The intensional CT can be
derived from the usual extensional CT. Universal machines computes all
functions, but also in all the same and infinitely many ways.
How do we know they compute anything unless we input their output?
Craig
This would suggest that computation can only be defined as a
meaningful product in a non-comp environment, otherwise there would
be no inputting and outputting, only instantaneous results within a
Platonic ocean of arithmetic truth.
A computation of a program without input can simulate different
programs having many inputs relative to other programs or divine (non-
machines) things living in arithmetic
How does the program itself get to be a program without being input?
OK. Good question.
The answer is that the TOE has to choose an initial universal system. I
use arithmetic (RA).
Then all programs or number are natural inputs of the (tiny) arithmetical
truth which emulates them.
You need to understand that a tiny part of arithmetic defines all partial
computable relations. The quintessence of this is already in Gödel 1931.
Where do we find input and output within arithmetic though?
It is not obvious, but the sigma_1 arithmetical relation emulates all
computations, with all sort of relative inputs.
It seems to me though, and this is why I posted this thread, that i/o is
taken for granted and has no real explanation of what it is in mathematical
terms.
It is the argument of the functions in the functional relations.
If phi_i(j) = k then RA can prove that there is a number i which applied
to j will give k, relatively to some universal u, (and this trivially
relatively to arithmetic).
What makes it happen without invoking a physical or experiential
context?
Truth. The necessary one, and the contingent one.
Does truth make things happen?
Yes. truth('p') - p.
If Obama is president is true, then Obama is president.
As an aside, its interesting to play with the idea of building a
view of computation from a
Tegmark's new book
Liz I should have typed which of the two diametrically opposed camps has the most members in it. For another try I have read the following: arXiv:0704.0646 [pdf, ps, other] Title: The Mathematical Universe Authors: Max Tegmark (MIT) arXiv:0707.2593 [pdf, ps, other] Title: Many lives in many worlds arXiv:0905.1283 [pdf, ps, other] Title: The Multiverse Hierarchy Authors: Max Tegmark (MIT) arXiv:0905.2182 [pdf, ps, other] Title: Many Worlds in Context including arXiv:1401.1219 [pdf, other] Title: Consciousness as a State of Matter Am I going to getting anything different or more clearly explained in his book? Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:05:34 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: There seems to be a bit of confusion about this idea. Some people on the list seem to abhor the idea of a block universe, but when they attack the concept, they invariably go for straw men, making statements like change can't happen in a block universe (which are obviously nonsense, or Einstein et al would hardly have entertained the idea in the first place). So, I'd like to maybe clarify what the idea means, and give them a proper target if they still want to demolish it. A block universe is simply one in which time is treated as a dimension. So Newtonian physics, for example, specified a block universe, in which it was believed (e.g. by Laplace) that in principle the past and future could be computed from the state of the present. The Victorians made much of time being the fourth dimension, probably most famously in Wells' The Time Machine. This was the Newtonian concept of a block universe, and was generally treated quite fatalistically (Wells didn't indicate that history could be changed, for example). Then special relativity came along and unified space and time into space-time. The reason SR gives rise to a block universe is the relativity of simultaneity. The relativity of simultaneity, like the fatalistic Victorian view reveal that the BU makes all change epiphenomenal from the God's Eye perspective. That's ok, but we then have to find a way to meet ourselves halfway and explain why a universe in which change is present at all is even plausible, let alone the kind of intentional change that we seem to find ourselves participating in. The BU makes the physical equations make sense, but it doesn't explain anything about our experience of physics. Just as the relativity of simultaneity makes the absolutely solid-seeming sense of time's uniformity into a local arrangement, the BU makes all change into an unexplained localization and animation of the static block. You can slice up space-time in various ways which allow two observers to see the same events occurring in a different order. Hence there is no way to define a hyperplane of simultaneity that can be agreed upon by all observers as being a present moment. This indicates that space-time is a four-dimensional arena in which events are embedded. Indeed, I have never heard of an alternative explanation of the relativity of simultaneity that gets around this result - if it's correct, space-time is a block universe, that is to say, time is just another dimension. Just another dimension does not sit so well with thermodynamic irreversibility. Could another dimension become irreversible instead. Could a creature exist who can travel backward in time using their feet, but is incapable of making a left turn? So classical physics posits a BU. Before worrying about QM, let's see what the classical picture has to say about whether things can change in a block universe. Change is defined as something being different at different times - say the position of the Earth relative to the centre of the galaxy (it traces out a wobbly spiral like a spring as it follows the Sun around an almost circular orbit around the galactic centre every quarter of a billion years). Does the fact that the Earth's orbit is a spiral embedded in space-time prevent the Earth's position from changing? Clearly not. It changes all the time. Clearly from our perspective, which is not the perspective that the BU predicts, as far as I can tell. The same applies to any other changes that we observe. A person changes as they get older - in the relativistic view these are cross sections through their world-tube (or lifeline as Robert Heinlein put it). Particles move through space - they trace out 4 dimensional world lines, but they can still move. Everything we observe takes place in a manner that can be placed within a space-time continuum such that a god's eye view (or the relevant equations) would see it as static. But of course *we* don't see it like that. This appears to be the source of the problem a few people have with this concept, however - they appear to confuse the god's eye view with ours. But of course we're embedded in space-time - along for the ride. So of course we see change all the time. Why 'of course'? How does the block embed parts of itself in itself? We see change, sure. We are along for the ride. What does the BU say about rides though? QM, perhaps a bit boringly, goes back to the Newtonian view. Or maybe catastrophically. Space and time are a background arena in which wave functions evolve with time - which is of course a process that can be mapped out within a 4D manifold. Indeed the equations involved are determinstic, and the famous quantum probabilities have to be added by hand - so this is rather close to the Newtonian view, apart from the ad hoc
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
Hi John, One might think it was the acceleration that slowed time on A's clock, BUT the point is that A's acceleration was only 1g throughout the entire trip which was exactly EQUAL to B's gravitational acceleration back on earth. So if the accelerations were exactly equal during the entire trip how could A's acceleration slow time but B's not slow time by the same amount? Edgar On Friday, January 31, 2014 1:59:59 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: A is traveling at near light speed most of the trip. That's why B sees A's clock slow Yes. And from A's point of view he's standing still and B is traveling at near light speed, so A sees B's clock running slow. Both would see the others clock as running slow. However if A decided to join B so they could shake hands and directly compare the times their clocks show then A is going to have to accelerate, and then things would no longer be symmetrical, then A would see B's clock running FAST but B would still see A's clock run SLOW. So when they joined up again and compared clocks they would not match, B's clock would be ahead and B would have aged more than A. So my question is this: Why does A's clock slowing turn out to be ACTUAL (agreed by both A and B) when he stops at the center of the galaxy, and B's slow clock slowing doesn't? Because A stopped, and that means A must have accelerated but B did not. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
Brent, But see my response to John. How can that work since the accelerations are both = 1g throughout the entire trip? By the Principle of Equivalence shouldn't they have the same effect on time then? But if you say it's not the acceleration, but the distance through spacetime, then the distance through spacetime as measured by whom? A sees B move the exact SAME distance at the exact SAME rate through spacetime as B sees A move. So why then has only A's clock ACTUALLY slowed when he reaches the galactic center? That seems to imply that there is some real absolute background space that A traveled through but not B. It seems to imply that spatial motion relative to the galaxy is somehow real and absolute. Is that what you are saying? Isn't that notion inconsistent with relativity? Another point: A couple days ago you said geometry doesn't slow time Yesterday you said Everything is geometry Yet time does slow... So aren't those 2 statements contradictory? Edgar On Friday, January 31, 2014 8:25:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: On 1/31/2014 10:59 AM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: A is traveling at near light speed most of the trip. That's why B sees A's clock slow Yes. And from A's point of view he's standing still and B is traveling at near light speed, so A sees B's clock running slow. Both would see the others clock as running slow. However if A decided to join B so they could shake hands and directly compare the times their clocks show then A is going to have to accelerate, and then things would no longer be symmetrical, then A would see B's clock running FAST but B would still see A's clock run SLOW. So when they joined up again and compared clocks they would not match, B's clock would be ahead and B would have aged more than A. So my question is this: Why does A's clock slowing turn out to be ACTUAL (agreed by both A and B) when he stops at the center of the galaxy, and B's slow clock slowing doesn't? Because A stopped, and that means A must have accelerated but B did not. That's right, but don't be misled into thinking it's the stress or force of acceleration that slows the clock. The acceleration just changes the distance through spacetime. It's not some effect that's making the clock keep the wrong time. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
Liz, But see my responses to John and Brent on this .. The question I'd ask you is why A's frame cannot be put into a single inertial frame of reference if his 1g acceleration was exactly the same as B's 1g acceleration during the ENTIRE trip? Are you saying that the simple fact that the DIRECTION of A's 1g acceleration REVERSED at midpoint is the ONLY cause of A's clock slowing relative to B's? Thanks, Edgar On Friday, January 31, 2014 11:17:06 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 1 February 2014 07:59, John Clark johnk...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: A is traveling at near light speed most of the trip. That's why B sees A's clock slow Yes. And from A's point of view he's standing still and B is traveling at near light speed, so A sees B's clock running slow. Both would see the others clock as running slow. However if A decided to join B so they could shake hands and directly compare the times their clocks show then A is going to have to accelerate, and then things would no longer be symmetrical, then A would see B's clock running FAST but B would still see A's clock run SLOW. So when they joined up again and compared clocks they would not match, B's clock would be ahead and B would have aged more than A. So my question is this: Why does A's clock slowing turn out to be ACTUAL (agreed by both A and B) when he stops at the center of the galaxy, and B's slow clock slowing doesn't? Because A stopped, and that means A must have accelerated but B did not. That's true, and can be rephrased as A's trajectory cannot be put into a single inertial frame of reference, while B's can. Hence the symmetry between them has to be broken at some point. There's an even simpler way to view this. A's path through space-time forms two sides of a triangle, while B's forms the base. Since the two sides of any triangle must be longer than the base, A must have taken a longer path through space-time, which according to SR means he experienced less duration. The twin paradox comes down to 4D geometry! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On 1 February 2014 09:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: My poor car followed the schroedinger equation without effort, but at a higher level, it tooks her a lot of effort to climb some steep roads. Well, she died through such effort, actually. RIP :-( -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
Bruno, You have a very strange view of arithmetic if you think it is full of processor cycles. Can you explain how that works? It seems to imply an innate notion of time. Note that I agree with this, it's my p-time, but block universe and your block comp seem to be lacking it... PLease explain in PLAIN ENGLISH rather than your usual cryptic notations and (undefined in the context) terminology.. Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 3:27:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Jan 2014, at 13:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Liz, Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving! The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. The problem is that you are denying the flow of time. We deny a *primitive* and *ontological* flow of time. We don't deny the internal experience of flow of time. For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be active processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that... Arithmetic is full of active processor cycles. Bruno Edgar On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Why do some people have such a problem with how change can emerge from something static ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing something changing. Change is by definition things being different at different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you will naturally get a static universe, just as putting together all the moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a God's eye perspective. This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be isomorphic to reality). Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem, and has been since Newton published his Principia. There *are* problems with comp, of course, like the white rabbit problem. Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than worrying about straw men? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Thursday, January 30, 2014 2:35:49 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Dear Ghibbsa, Thanks for stepping in. And quite pleased to see you accept the obvious fact that the twins DO share a common p-time present moment with different clock times. , There are major distinctions between 'allowing' that someone is right at one point, so as to pose a question at another point, and accepting what is being said. I Then there are further distinctions between accepting the components of obviousness in an argument and accepting the reasoning for what it all may, or must, mean. Within that there are many distinctions arising from 'obviousness' itself, that impact heavily on what can be gleaned from that. You know the advantages...that it is reasonable to infer obviousness is saying something that is true. But the downside is that obviousness doesn't tell us how or little or what sense it is true at fundamental layers. The message from scientific methodologies is that it isn't the part that is true about obviousness that you have to worry about, but the implicit unrealized assumptions that sneak in under the cloak of obviousness. Because the downside of obviousness is the way our ability to make distinctions between things like that are diminished by it. Intuition - obviousness - because the process does not have access to wological reasoning components in our minds, has to work two ways to make something obvious. The thing to obvious has to be brought front and centre in our minds. And so, all the little distinctions that stand in the way of that, have to be pulled back into the murk. If you want to use obviousness directly you have to compensate heavily for that. And that is a methodological challenge, and with no offense meant, I do not see the hallmarks that you have done the necessary work in that area. Most notably because the most typical development in any serious concerted effort to make obviousness a useable perception, is recognition that the end argument you end up with, has to be free of all dependency on obviousness, or that absolutely minimized. Which necessary but insufficiently includes linguistically, because if someone says obviousness ever second sentence it's really hard to make an assessment just how flawed the argument is due to real as opposed to linguistic instances of leaving it in the end argument. Obviousness also makes for poor listening - another blow to making and sharing distinctions. I put a certain effort into framing my question, and you repeated your standard argument in response, which I have Obviously already read. What you didn't do is give me a little bit of r-time, to allow that I might just have a distinct matter resolved, but whether I do or not, I clearly want my question to be answered in the context I went to so much trouble to set up. I'm not complaining. There's a lot of problems with my own style...if I see traits in someone else the first importance is to use the perception to look to see where I'm doing a lot of the same thing myself. Where I would say I'm more clean is recognizing that for all the reasons above, obviousness needs to be taken out of end-arguments. Because yes those items are obvious, and yes there is something that is being said that is true with obviousness. Unfortunately, if Im right, you won't have listened that closely to anything said here. In which case, I'll mention I got some personal value saying it. Also...don't worry, be happy...being rock-solid committed to one's own long term progress trying to know the world, is far from the exception in science or human affairs. I feel just the same way about my own long term effort, except in my case I obviously hope I'm right. OK, so it is agreed that there is a shared LOCAL p-time present moment, but, as you note, we still need to prove there is a common universal p-time present moment. The argument that demonstrates that is simple, clear and convincing. 1. The twins share a common p-time present moment BEFORE one starts his trip. 2. The twins share a common p-time present moment AFTER they meet up again after the trip. 3. DURING the trip each twin is always continually in his own local p-time present moment. 4. Local p-time flows continuously for both twins DURING the trip from the time they part to the time they meet up again. There are no gaps in either Twin's p-times. 5. Therefore the other twin must ALWAYS be doing something in his p-time present moment at the same time the other twin is also doing something in his, because there is no time that each twin is not existing in their local present moment. And that must be a one to one relationship, that is there is always one and only one p-time present moment shared by the parted twins. 6. Therefore there must be a common universal p-time present moment in which every observer in the entire universe is currently doing
Re: Unput and Onput
On 1 February 2014 12:13, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: No. The UD has no output. It is a non stopping program. everything physical and theological appears through its intensional activity. Appears = output. I think I see the confusion here. Remember that in comp, as in any TOE, we begin by hypothesising an ontological base for a universe (or multiverse) from which we will attempt to derive all-else-that-exists (heaven help us!). Hence ex hypothesi, there can be nothing outside that universe and therefore no input or output in that sense. Neither comp nor any other TOE can consistently make reference to input or output extrinsic to itself, because that would simply be a contradiction in terms. Hence appearance here can only refer to interactions or relationships between subsystems of the universe entailed by the TOE and that must be true of any TOE whatsoever. A fortiori, since comp *assumes* the presence of the UD and its trace in arithmetic (in the same sense that any TOE starts by assuming some ontological base), it cannot make any further sense to ask who or what input the program. OK? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Ghibbsa, I'm wondering why you'd want to suddenly change the subject from time to a rather rambling post on epistemology? Perhaps you were afraid you might be coming close to agreeing with me on a present moment and afraid of the public consequences of that here on this group? I agree you'd have to be a pretty brave man to do that here! :-) And of course it is OBVIOUS that the twins share a common present moment when they compare clocks. Otherwise they couldn't compare clocks now could they? And you question that and condemn me for pointing it out? Not only that you already AGREED with it in your previous post! Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 8:45:40 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, January 30, 2014 2:35:49 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Dear Ghibbsa, Thanks for stepping in. And quite pleased to see you accept the obvious fact that the twins DO share a common p-time present moment with different clock times. , There are major distinctions between 'allowing' that someone is right at one point, so as to pose a question at another point, and accepting what is being said. I Then there are further distinctions between accepting the components of obviousness in an argument and accepting the reasoning for what it all may, or must, mean. Within that there are many distinctions arising from 'obviousness' itself, that impact heavily on what can be gleaned from that. You know the advantages...that it is reasonable to infer obviousness is saying something that is true. But the downside is that obviousness doesn't tell us how or little or what sense it is true at fundamental layers. The message from scientific methodologies is that it isn't the part that is true about obviousness that you have to worry about, but the implicit unrealized assumptions that sneak in under the cloak of obviousness. Because the downside of obviousness is the way our ability to make distinctions between things like that are diminished by it. Intuition - obviousness - because the process does not have access to wological reasoning components in our minds, has to work two ways to make something obvious. The thing to obvious has to be brought front and centre in our minds. And so, all the little distinctions that stand in the way of that, have to be pulled back into the murk. If you want to use obviousness directly you have to compensate heavily for that. And that is a methodological challenge, and with no offense meant, I do not see the hallmarks that you have done the necessary work in that area. Most notably because the most typical development in any serious concerted effort to make obviousness a useable perception, is recognition that the end argument you end up with, has to be free of all dependency on obviousness, or that absolutely minimized. Which necessary but insufficiently includes linguistically, because if someone says obviousness ever second sentence it's really hard to make an assessment just how flawed the argument is due to real as opposed to linguistic instances of leaving it in the end argument. Obviousness also makes for poor listening - another blow to making and sharing distinctions. I put a certain effort into framing my question, and you repeated your standard argument in response, which I have Obviously already read. What you didn't do is give me a little bit of r-time, to allow that I might just have a distinct matter resolved, but whether I do or not, I clearly want my question to be answered in the context I went to so much trouble to set up. I'm not complaining. There's a lot of problems with my own style...if I see traits in someone else the first importance is to use the perception to look to see where I'm doing a lot of the same thing myself. Where I would say I'm more clean is recognizing that for all the reasons above, obviousness needs to be taken out of end-arguments. Because yes those items are obvious, and yes there is something that is being said that is true with obviousness. Unfortunately, if Im right, you won't have listened that closely to anything said here. In which case, I'll mention I got some personal value saying it. Also...don't worry, be happy...being rock-solid committed to one's own long term progress trying to know the world, is far from the exception in science or human affairs. I feel just the same way about my own long term effort, except in my case I obviously hope I'm right. OK, so it is agreed that there is a shared LOCAL p-time present moment, but, as you note, we still need to prove there is a common universal p-time present moment. The argument that demonstrates that is simple, clear and convincing. 1. The twins share a common p-time present moment BEFORE one starts his trip. 2. The twins share a common p-time present moment AFTER they meet up again after the trip. 3. DURING
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 8:54:12 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 12:13, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: No. The UD has no output. It is a non stopping program. everything physical and theological appears through its intensional activity. Appears = output. I think I see the confusion here. Remember that in comp, as in any TOE, we begin by hypothesising an ontological base for a universe (or multiverse) from which we will attempt to derive all-else-that-exists (heaven help us!). That can help explain why it is hard for others to understand my approach. I begin from the reductio ad absurdum of Cartesian doubt. I make no hypothesis and then see what must be unavoidably conceived. Ironically, it is from early experiences with programming games that it was impressed on me that the sense of things cannot be taken for granted. If you want graphics to bounce off of each other when they are moving, you have to define that collision detection and the behavior that follows. The problem with comp is that is does not see that computation itself also runs on a lower level language which (and here is where I start my hypothesis) is neither an immutable given nor is it an accumulation of accidents, but is the fundamental capacity for presence, participation, and the aesthetic enrichment of that presence through participation. Computation is, at best, a thin silhouette of sense, which does not participate and has no presence, but rather is the shared abstractions drawn from the same. Computation does not enrich itself qualitatively, nor does it have any plausible motive to pursue or avoid aesthetic discernments. Hence ex hypothesi, there can be nothing outside that universe and therefore no input or output in that sense. Right. That's why Comp is a hypothesis about a mathematical toy model of some of the effects we associate with consciousness, not about consciousness itself. Neither comp nor any other TOE can consistently make reference to input or output extrinsic to itself, Unless, like mine, your TOE makes I/O (unified as a sensory-motive dipole 'sense') the foundation of Everything. because that would simply be a contradiction in terms. Hence appearance here can only refer to interactions or relationships between subsystems of the universe entailed by the TOE and that must be true of any TOE whatsoever. Not if the TOE is sense-primitive. Since the whole idea of input and output stems from the aesthetic qualities of inside and outside, those terms, as well as all possible sensible terms, have in common the continuity of sense. A fortiori, since comp *assumes* the presence of the UD and its trace in arithmetic (in the same sense that any TOE starts by assuming some ontological base), it cannot make any further sense to ask who or what input the program. OK? I agree that is how it must appear to any non-sense based TOE. Only sense can allow theory to go beyond itself...in theory. Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
On 1 February 2014 07:05, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Everything we observe takes place in a manner that can be placed within a space-time continuum such that a god's eye view (or the relevant equations) would see it as static. But of course *we* don't see it like that. This appears to be the source of the problem a few people have with this concept, however - they appear to confuse the god's eye view with ours. But of course we're embedded in space-time - along for the ride. So of course we see change all the time. Hi Liz I'd just like to be clear that I'm not one of those attacking block (in the sense of co-existent) models in physics or TOEs in general (comp, for example). In fact I'd come to this view already some years back after finally losing confidence in my previous adherence to presentism - despite (or rather because of) trying unsuccessfully to defend it against experts. That said, as you may have noticed, I'm rather interested in the heuristics people employ to make intuitive sense of the frog view from within the block, as Mad Max Tegmark calls it. So in that spirit could I ask you to enlarge a little on just what you are thinking about when you use the term we in your statements above? Who or what are the we who don't see it like that, are along for the ride and see change all the time? I'm thinking here specifically of the frog or first-person perspective. Should we think of an extended frog, for example, that is spread out over a co-existent series of moments, each of which encodes a slightly different spatial-temporal perspective? If so, how specifically can we account for the momentary frog that believes itself always to be restricted to only one moment of that series, but is convinced that it's not always the same one? After all, from the frog's perspective, the appearance of an irreversible progression through a series of changes in a singular spatial-temporal location is the most non-negotiable feature of its very life. If you feel that the best available answer is that it's all an illusion, actually I wouldn't dispute that. But I'm interested in investigating the detailed logic of that very illusion, in approximately the sense that we can investigate and account logically for other illusions like the apparent continuity of vision despite constant rapid ocular saccades. With respect to the latter, we could probably say quite a lot about how the brain contrives that particular illusion Funnily enough, physicists also tend to appeal loosely to the brain in response to the illusion of the passage of time (it's psychology - not my subject). But, presumably we can say a little more about what a brain might be doing in deleting the gaps between ocular fixations, whereas we might be a bit in the dark about how the brain (itself now conceived as a four-dimensional physical object spread out over time) might contrive to manage the illusion of change in its own apparent spatial-temporal location. Is a series of frogs spread out over time, each believing it occupies a different spatial-temporal location, equivalent to the apparent experience of one frog occupying a single moment that keeps changing? By what logic do we suppose this would this be distinguishable from the permanently separated experiences of a series of individual frogs? IOW, why wouldn't each of us have the permanent experience of being many different frogs stuck in time, rather than one frog moving through time? These are not intended to be rhetorical questions, by the way. IOW, saying that something is an illusion is only the beginning of an explanation, not the conclusion of one. Comp may fare better here because it sets out on the path of elucidating exactly how a we might be defined such that this we might entertain the specific illusion of successive changes in its spatial-temporal location. But for me, at least, this is more difficult to intuit with any precision in a non-comp block concept, precisely because of the under-definition of the referent for we. The frog perspective is assumed, rather than elucidated. Anyway, as ever, your own thoughts would be much appreciated. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:00:16 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, I'm wondering why you'd want to suddenly change the subject from time to a rather rambling post on epistemology? I don't see it as epistemology save in the most literal sense of the word with no baggage allowed. I see it as potentially one of the really hard scientific obstacles in human discovery of the nature of reality. Hard because the sciences corresponding to this matter are far too early in the process of science to offer reliable knowledge. Certainly one choice is turning to philosophy. But the decision itself to do that, implicitly assumes an answer to the original fundamental question the scientific revolution threw up, which all other philosophical questions about science derive out of. Which actually begins as an obvious observation that no one has ever disagreed about: that something historically unique was happening with science, of a fundamental nature. It's the answer to that question the philosophies disagree about. More precisely, it was how to reason the matter the philosophies disagreed about, given it is reasoning by which one philosophy distinguishes itself from another. The general problem I have with that process, arises from the fact the question being asked was Is there a component of this historical uniqueness that is fundamental to science and only science Doing philosophy on that question, implies that that question can be resolved by non-scientific philosophy, which implies if something was fundamental and totally unique to one thing, it could nevertheless be fundamentally discovered and understood by something else that did not contain anything of that thing being understood. I don't think that makes sense, not in the end. Because it is assuming the answer is NO, nothing was unique about science and only science. I think that about this much, we should be in agreement, because you draw on precisely the same insight, but in a different context, that computability pre-requires sameness. Albeit that's only a core agreement. It doesn't mean that I apply it correctly, or that you do. We don't have to agree about that even if we do agree about the fundamental insight. Because how something is applied is fundamental in its own right. By the same coin we can agree that you draw on perceptions that are obvious, and which do say something true. But that does not mean we will agree about how that truth needs to be treated and applied. I seriously fell off my chair laughing at your response here Edgar. Just stop for a moment, and see this from an equally true alternative angle. What are you drawing on is obviously true. But it's obviously true to everyone. You don't own the obvious part Edgar. We all own that part. What you own, is how you apply it. You own your methods. You own your reasoning. You own your conclusions. But you own the original obviousness, that you can attach obviousness to your conclusions. That you cannot do. Or you can, but you won't be taking rationality or logic with you. So you won't be taking other serious thinkers either. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 3:53:06 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:00:16 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, I'm wondering why you'd want to suddenly change the subject from time to a rather rambling post on epistemology? I don't see it as epistemology save in the most literal sense of the word with no baggage allowed. I see it as potentially one of the really hard scientific obstacles in human discovery of the nature of reality. Hard because the sciences corresponding to this matter are far too early in the process of science to offer reliable knowledge. Certainly one choice is turning to philosophy. But the decision itself to do that, implicitly assumes an answer to the original fundamental question the scientific revolution threw up, which all other philosophical questions about science derive out of. Which actually begins as an obvious observation that no one has ever disagreed about: that something historically unique was happening with science, of a fundamental nature. It's the answer to that question the philosophies disagree about. More precisely, it was how to reason the matter the philosophies disagreed about, given it is reasoning by which one philosophy distinguishes itself from another. The general problem I have with that process, arises from the fact the question being asked was Is there a component of this historical uniqueness that is fundamental to science and only science Doing philosophy on that question, implies that that question can be resolved by non-scientific philosophy, which implies if something was fundamental and totally unique to one thing, it could nevertheless be fundamentally discovered and understood by something else that did not contain anything of that thing being understood. I don't think that makes sense, not in the end. Because it is assuming the answer is NO, nothing was unique about science and only science. I think that about this much, we should be in agreement, because you draw on precisely the same insight, but in a different context, that computability pre-requires sameness. Albeit that's only a core agreement. It doesn't mean that I apply it correctly, or that you do. We don't have to agree about that even if we do agree about the fundamental insight. Because how something is applied is fundamental in its own right. By the same coin we can agree that you draw on perceptions that are obvious, and which do say something true. But that does not mean we will agree about how that truth needs to be treated and applied. I seriously fell off my chair laughing at your response here Edgar. Just stop for a moment, and see this from an equally true alternative angle. What are you drawing on is obviously true. But it's obviously true to everyone. You don't own the obvious part Edgar. We all own that part. What you own, is how you apply it. You own your methods. You own your reasoning. You own your conclusions. But you own the original obviousness, that you can attach obviousness to your conclusions. That you cannot do. Or you can, but you won't be taking rationality or logic with you. So you won't be taking other serious thinkers either. But you own the original obviousness, that you can attach obviousness to your conclusions was OBVIOUSLY meant to say you do not own -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 9:00 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: And of course it is OBVIOUS that the twins share a common present moment when they compare clocks. Otherwise they couldn't compare clocks now could they? The fact that they can compare clocks, and agree for example that twin A's turning 30 coincides with twin B's turning 40, is because they are making the comparison at the same point in spacetime (assuming ideal point-like observers*), and in relativity, all observers agree on which events coincide at the same point in spacetime (I've asked you several times whether you agree this is always true in relativity but you have refused so far to answer). Another way of putting it is that in any spacetime coordinate system for labeling the space and time coordinates of different events, the event twin A turns 30 would have to be labeled with the same coordinate time (and coordinate position) as the event twin B turns 40. In no way does any of this imply the notion of an objective common present for events which do NOT coincide at the same point in spacetime. *Of course real observers aren't point-like, but if you think of extended observers who compare clocks a few feet apart, there could be disagreements over which event happened first in precise terms (whether we're talking about visual observations of the events, or which event happened first in some inertial frame), but we can say that everyone would agree the two events happened within a few tiny fractions of a nanosecond from each other, so for all practical purposes there is no disagreement about the fact that twin A turning 30 coincided with twin B turning 40. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On 1 February 2014 15:44, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote Neither comp nor any other TOE can consistently make reference to input or output extrinsic to itself, Unless, like mine, your TOE makes I/O (unified as a sensory-motive dipole 'sense') the foundation of Everything. So are you saying, as it would appear above, that your TOE refers to explanatory entities outside of its own domain? If so it would be incoherent in its own terms. I'm sorry Craig, but I can't really make head or tail of your arguments or even most of your vocabulary. I responded to you in this case because you appeared to be making a criticism of comp based on its lack of input and output. I attempted to make the point that no TOE, in general, can do this and remain consistent. In your reply to me you indicate agreement (right) at various junctures but without apparently grasping the significance to your argument of the actual points I'm making. The same comment applies to the discussion I've been attempting to have with you about the POPJ, which you have not, as yet, replied to. If you do decide to reply, I would appreciate it if you would do so in a manner that directly addresses the points I'm making, rather than changing the subject or talking as though your theory somehow automatically trumps any logical objection without actually addressing it. I don't mean to sound patronising (although I suspect it's unavoidable that I will) but your ideas strike me as very similar to many others in Theory of Mind, of the general flavour of panpsychism or panexperientialism, going back to Berkeley and indeed much farther than that. For a number of years I entertained similar ideas as the only way to reconcile the indubitability of consciousness with an apparently physical world. In fact, I developed a whole vocabulary for this not dissimilar to your own, with which I proceeded to confuse anyone who would listen to me, including some of those on this list a few years ago. However, eventually I came to see that this approach isn't in fact capable of solving the problems it sets out to tackle, though I appreciate this isn't necessarily widely recognised. The problem with panpsychist approaches isn't that it's obvious that everything isn't conscious (because we shouldn't expect that to be obvious) but rather that everything we perceive as extrinsic (and most particularly including our own apparently physical selves) specifically *behaves* according to a rigorous set of rules that vitiate and make redundant any notion of consciousness and block any access to it. This is, in effect, the POPJ. It bites panpsychism as it bites physicalsim and - forgive me - I think it would behove you to give the matter some more serious thought. As to comp, my reading of your criticisms lead me to the conclusion that you have never yet properly understood it (independent of whether it turns out to be true of our reality). Like you, I have spent much time with computers and had independently reached the conclusion that thinking and experiencing could not in any way be the same as what computers do. Indeed this was my frame of mind when in 1984 I encountered John Searle's Chinese Room argument which he presented very convincingly in his BBC Reith Lectures of that year. So when I came across Bruno's ideas on this list about seven years ago I had plenty of arguments, as I thought, to demolish them. However, I gradually came to realise, through Bruno's patience and expertise, that computer science is no more the study of computers (the study of which is a branch of engineering) than astronomy is the study of telescopes. Hence your criticisms of comp on the basis of your observations of the current state of computer engineering are simply beside the point. You need to up your game here if you really seek to defeat Bruno's arguments rather than simply misunderstand them. Anyway, back to the POPJ, if you have the stomach for it! Cordially David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 11:30 AM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: The fact that they can compare clocks, and agree for example that twin A's turning 30 coincides with twin B's turning 40, is because they are making the comparison at the same point in spacetime (assuming ideal point-like observers*), and in relativity, all observers agree on which events coincide at the same point in spacetime Sorry, ignore The fact that at the beginning of that sentence, it was part of a different first sentence which I edited in writing up my message. Jesse -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 11:32:03 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 15:44, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote Neither comp nor any other TOE can consistently make reference to input or output extrinsic to itself, Unless, like mine, your TOE makes I/O (unified as a sensory-motive dipole 'sense') the foundation of Everything. So are you saying, as it would appear above, that your TOE refers to explanatory entities outside of its own domain? If so it would be incoherent in its own terms. It refers to explanatory entities which would be identical to its own domain, but the domain is greater than all 'entity' or 'domain'. I'm sorry Craig, but I can't really make head or tail of your arguments or even most of your vocabulary. I responded to you in this case because you appeared to be making a criticism of comp based on its lack of input and output. I attempted to make the point that no TOE, in general, can do this and remain consistent. In your reply to me you indicate agreement (right) at various junctures but without apparently grasping the significance to your argument of the actual points I'm making. I'm saying that you are right in your reasoning based on your assumptions, but I'm proposing that the hypothesis I'm using is a completely new kind of assumption which breaks from previous expectations. Your account is right because it matches the consensus, but the hypothesis I'm using goes beyond the consensus. The same comment applies to the discussion I've been attempting to have with you about the POPJ, which you have not, as yet, replied to. If you do decide to reply, I must have lost the thread. This Google Groups format is always burying threads for me. If I can find it, I'll definitely reply. I would appreciate it if you would do so in a manner that directly addresses the points I'm making, rather than changing the subject or talking as though your theory somehow automatically trumps any logical objection without actually addressing it. I would appreciate it if you would stick with the subject that I'm trying to communicate also. If you don't see how my 'theory' automatically trumps any logical objection then you don't understand my theory fully. Primordial Identity Pansensitivity means that logic is derived as a second order phenomenon within sense. I don't mean to sound patronising (although I suspect it's unavoidable that I will) but your ideas strike me as very similar to many others in Theory of Mind, of the general flavour of panpsychism or panexperientialism, going back to Berkeley and indeed much farther than that. Berkeley was on the right track, but you need to also add in Leibniz, Einstein, maybe Deleuze, and Lao Tzu. I don't mean to sound patronizing, but your objections strike me as very similar to many others who I have had conversations with before. For a number of years I entertained similar ideas as the only way to reconcile the indubitability of consciousness with an apparently physical world. In fact, I developed a whole vocabulary for this not dissimilar to your own, with which I proceeded to confuse anyone who would listen to me, including some of those on this list a few years ago. However, eventually I came to see that this approach isn't in fact capable of solving the problems it sets out to tackle, though I appreciate this isn't necessarily widely recognised. The problem with panpsychist approaches isn't that it's obvious that everything isn't conscious (because we shouldn't expect that to be obvious) but rather that everything we perceive as extrinsic (and most particularly including our own apparently physical selves) specifically *behaves* according to a rigorous set of rules that vitiate and make redundant any notion of consciousness and block any access to it. This is, in effect, the POPJ. It bites panpsychism as it bites physicalsim and - forgive me - I think it would behove you to give the matter some more serious thought. I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not because their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each other's presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical. There is more to it than that, but the new principle I'm introducing I call eigenmorphism. http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/6-panpsychism/eigenmorphism/ As to comp, my reading of your criticisms lead me to the conclusion that you have never yet properly understood it (independent of whether it turns out to be true of our reality). Like you, I have spent much time with computers and had independently
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Ghibbsa, Boy, you are really taking some giant leaps here! Just because I point out that a local present moment is obvious IN NO WAY is a claim that that insight is original with me! That's a crazy inference. The fact is that 99.999% of everyone on earth throughout history has had the same insight which they also knew was obvious. That in fact is one reason it can be stated as obvious with such confidence. Because everyone (expect a few who's heads are so deep in their physics books they can't pull them out to look around at actual reality) observes it first hand in their own experience every moment of their lives... All I can conclude is that your comment above was not objective but unfortunately based on some personal antipathy... Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 10:53:06 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:00:16 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, I'm wondering why you'd want to suddenly change the subject from time to a rather rambling post on epistemology? I don't see it as epistemology save in the most literal sense of the word with no baggage allowed. I see it as potentially one of the really hard scientific obstacles in human discovery of the nature of reality. Hard because the sciences corresponding to this matter are far too early in the process of science to offer reliable knowledge. Certainly one choice is turning to philosophy. But the decision itself to do that, implicitly assumes an answer to the original fundamental question the scientific revolution threw up, which all other philosophical questions about science derive out of. Which actually begins as an obvious observation that no one has ever disagreed about: that something historically unique was happening with science, of a fundamental nature. It's the answer to that question the philosophies disagree about. More precisely, it was how to reason the matter the philosophies disagreed about, given it is reasoning by which one philosophy distinguishes itself from another. The general problem I have with that process, arises from the fact the question being asked was Is there a component of this historical uniqueness that is fundamental to science and only science Doing philosophy on that question, implies that that question can be resolved by non-scientific philosophy, which implies if something was fundamental and totally unique to one thing, it could nevertheless be fundamentally discovered and understood by something else that did not contain anything of that thing being understood. I don't think that makes sense, not in the end. Because it is assuming the answer is NO, nothing was unique about science and only science. I think that about this much, we should be in agreement, because you draw on precisely the same insight, but in a different context, that computability pre-requires sameness. Albeit that's only a core agreement. It doesn't mean that I apply it correctly, or that you do. We don't have to agree about that even if we do agree about the fundamental insight. Because how something is applied is fundamental in its own right. By the same coin we can agree that you draw on perceptions that are obvious, and which do say something true. But that does not mean we will agree about how that truth needs to be treated and applied. I seriously fell off my chair laughing at your response here Edgar. Just stop for a moment, and see this from an equally true alternative angle. What are you drawing on is obviously true. But it's obviously true to everyone. You don't own the obvious part Edgar. We all own that part. What you own, is how you apply it. You own your methods. You own your reasoning. You own your conclusions. But you own the original obviousness, that you can attach obviousness to your conclusions. That you cannot do. Or you can, but you won't be taking rationality or logic with you. So you won't be taking other serious thinkers either. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Jesse, Yes, that being at the same point in spacetime is CALLED the present moment that I'm talking about. You are probably repeating the claim that 'coordinate time' falsifies p-time. It doesn't. Coordinate time is an attempt to explain the obvious problems with clock time not actually explaining a common present moment that obviously exists. This is done by coordinate time saying OK we have to account for the twins being at the same point in spacetime when they compare clocks so let's just invent a coordinate system that acts as if clock time doesn't have any effect on something we will call coordinate time. Basically coordinate time is just an attempt to account for the obviousness of a present moment without actually calling it a 2nd kind of time but rather just a 2nd kind of spacetime coordinate system in a single kind of time. Coordinate time is half way to p-time but hasn't incorporated the whole insight... It basically says let's pretend clock time doesn't really happen so the twins can end up at the SAME point of spacetime because it's obvious they actually did. But then it remembers that clock time is real and actual too because it is measurable. Therefore there is a CONTRADICTION between coordinate time and clock time that p-time resolves by recognizing that p-time and clock time are actually 2 separate kinds of time, which coordinate time doesn't. Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 11:30:26 AM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 9:00 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: And of course it is OBVIOUS that the twins share a common present moment when they compare clocks. Otherwise they couldn't compare clocks now could they? The fact that they can compare clocks, and agree for example that twin A's turning 30 coincides with twin B's turning 40, is because they are making the comparison at the same point in spacetime (assuming ideal point-like observers*), and in relativity, all observers agree on which events coincide at the same point in spacetime (I've asked you several times whether you agree this is always true in relativity but you have refused so far to answer). Another way of putting it is that in any spacetime coordinate system for labeling the space and time coordinates of different events, the event twin A turns 30 would have to be labeled with the same coordinate time (and coordinate position) as the event twin B turns 40. In no way does any of this imply the notion of an objective common present for events which do NOT coincide at the same point in spacetime. *Of course real observers aren't point-like, but if you think of extended observers who compare clocks a few feet apart, there could be disagreements over which event happened first in precise terms (whether we're talking about visual observations of the events, or which event happened first in some inertial frame), but we can say that everyone would agree the two events happened within a few tiny fractions of a nanosecond from each other, so for all practical purposes there is no disagreement about the fact that twin A turning 30 coincided with twin B turning 40. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
You're so a joke... cannot doubt your own genius eh ! 2014-02-01 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net: Jesse, Yes, that being at the same point in spacetime is CALLED the present moment that I'm talking about. You are probably repeating the claim that 'coordinate time' falsifies p-time. It doesn't. Coordinate time is an attempt to explain the obvious problems with clock time not actually explaining a common present moment that obviously exists. This is done by coordinate time saying OK we have to account for the twins being at the same point in spacetime when they compare clocks so let's just invent a coordinate system that acts as if clock time doesn't have any effect on something we will call coordinate time. Basically coordinate time is just an attempt to account for the obviousness of a present moment without actually calling it a 2nd kind of time but rather just a 2nd kind of spacetime coordinate system in a single kind of time. Coordinate time is half way to p-time but hasn't incorporated the whole insight... It basically says let's pretend clock time doesn't really happen so the twins can end up at the SAME point of spacetime because it's obvious they actually did. But then it remembers that clock time is real and actual too because it is measurable. Therefore there is a CONTRADICTION between coordinate time and clock time that p-time resolves by recognizing that p-time and clock time are actually 2 separate kinds of time, which coordinate time doesn't. Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 11:30:26 AM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 9:00 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: And of course it is OBVIOUS that the twins share a common present moment when they compare clocks. Otherwise they couldn't compare clocks now could they? The fact that they can compare clocks, and agree for example that twin A's turning 30 coincides with twin B's turning 40, is because they are making the comparison at the same point in spacetime (assuming ideal point-like observers*), and in relativity, all observers agree on which events coincide at the same point in spacetime (I've asked you several times whether you agree this is always true in relativity but you have refused so far to answer). Another way of putting it is that in any spacetime coordinate system for labeling the space and time coordinates of different events, the event twin A turns 30 would have to be labeled with the same coordinate time (and coordinate position) as the event twin B turns 40. In no way does any of this imply the notion of an objective common present for events which do NOT coincide at the same point in spacetime. *Of course real observers aren't point-like, but if you think of extended observers who compare clocks a few feet apart, there could be disagreements over which event happened first in precise terms (whether we're talking about visual observations of the events, or which event happened first in some inertial frame), but we can say that everyone would agree the two events happened within a few tiny fractions of a nanosecond from each other, so for all practical purposes there is no disagreement about the fact that twin A turning 30 coincided with twin B turning 40. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 7:57 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: One might think it was the acceleration that slowed time on A's clock, BUT the point is that A's acceleration was only 1g throughout the entire trip which was exactly EQUAL to B's gravitational acceleration back on earth. So if the accelerations were exactly equal during the entire trip how could A's acceleration slow time but B's not slow time by the same amount? If A were going into space and accelerating upward off the surface of the Earth at one g (32 feet per second per second), then he would be experiencing 2g, one g from the Earth and one g from his continuing change in upward velocity. both = 1g throughout the entire trip No, not during the entire trip. And if the space traveler ever wants to return to Earth to rejoin his friend so they can directly compare their clocks then he's going to have to change the direction of his acceleration by 180 degrees. So their clocks will not match because their travel experiences were not symmetrical. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you don't see how my 'theory' automatically trumps any logical objection then you don't understand my theory fully. That is truly hilarious Craig! I cannot help being reminded of Luther's admonition that To be a Christian, you must pluck out the eye of reason.. Are you looking for converts rather than debate? I have no idea how you expect me or anyone else to understand your theory if you continue sidestep all logical objections to your ideas. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 5:13:29 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Boy, you are really taking some giant leaps here! Just because I point out that a local present moment is obvious IN NO WAY is a claim that that insight is original with me! That's a crazy inference. The fact is that 99.999% of everyone on earth throughout history has had the same insight which they also knew was obvious. That in fact is one reason it can be stated as obvious with such confidence. Because everyone (expect a few who's heads are so deep in their physics books they can't pull them out to look around at actual reality) observes it first hand in their own experience every moment of their lives... All I can conclude is that your comment above was not objective but unfortunately based on some personal antipathy... Edgar I didn't mean and wasn't talking about ownership in that totally trivial and commonplace sense Edgar. I have more respect for anyone in a science list to assume they'd make a mistake that stupid, certainly including you. But are you showing me any reciprocal respect in the totally superficial way you are interpreting everything I am saying? I can assure you there's no antipathy. But may I point out these threads are littered with similar allegations from you to various others, in one form or another. And most of the rest have been pointing to more or less the same shortcoming that I now have to point to. You don't read anything carefully. You don't take arguments seriously. You don't entertain you might be wrong, or that someone else might have an important criticism for you that you need to hear. Your words might say different here and there, but in the thick of it, your behaviour says something else. Why didn't you respect me that I wouldn't be making such a stupid point as you think you own the present moment? Why didn't you respect Liz that she wouldn't be raising questions if she didn't think they were important problems your theory was facing? How do you think things work Edgar? Several other people too. And the rest clearly not respected in terms of the distinctive point they are trying to make being entertained properly by first you establishing, say by asking clarifying questions, what that distinctive point actually is. Why do you not entertain, that these paranoid allegations you are throwing out so often, have something to do with the pattern of superficial readings of other peoples contributions by you, despite these threads being even more littered with other people pointing this out, one way or another? What I just said to you, was pointing to what you are effectively DOING, not what you are explicitly believing. 'Ownership' is a metaphor in a context like this. I'm saying you are ASSUMING your conclusions have a similar obviousness - certainty - about them as the seed insights. You are doing that. In your words and vocabularly. In your responses to people, in that you Obviously feel your conclusions are so obvious or concrete, that any prolonged resistence must be poorly motivated one way or another. In the way you are reading what people have to say, that no more than intellectual skimming is necessary becausemore obviousness. You are attaching obviousness through your reasoning and conclusions. Effectively you are doing that. That's a criticism Edgar. It isn't antipathy. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I must have lost the thread. This Google Groups format is always burying threads for me. If I can find it, I'll definitely reply. I see you use gmail, like me. Why don't you just filter messages from this group to a gmail folder? Then gmail manages each thread as a conversation very naturally. I've found it very easy to keep track this way and it's much quicker too. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Jesse, Perhaps i could understand better what you are saying if you could kindly explain in detail step by step a COORDINATE time analysis of how the twins start at the SAME point in spacetime and end up at the SAME point in spacetime but with different clock times. And please describe what the actual coordinates of that SAME point are? What is the common t value of that same point that makes it the same point? If there is no common t value that describes that point then how can it be the same point? How do you know it's the same point if it doesn't have a common t value? Explain please? The t value of that point obviously can't be the clock time t values of that point because they are different. Thanks, Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 11:30:26 AM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 9:00 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: And of course it is OBVIOUS that the twins share a common present moment when they compare clocks. Otherwise they couldn't compare clocks now could they? The fact that they can compare clocks, and agree for example that twin A's turning 30 coincides with twin B's turning 40, is because they are making the comparison at the same point in spacetime (assuming ideal point-like observers*), and in relativity, all observers agree on which events coincide at the same point in spacetime (I've asked you several times whether you agree this is always true in relativity but you have refused so far to answer). Another way of putting it is that in any spacetime coordinate system for labeling the space and time coordinates of different events, the event twin A turns 30 would have to be labeled with the same coordinate time (and coordinate position) as the event twin B turns 40. In no way does any of this imply the notion of an objective common present for events which do NOT coincide at the same point in spacetime. *Of course real observers aren't point-like, but if you think of extended observers who compare clocks a few feet apart, there could be disagreements over which event happened first in precise terms (whether we're talking about visual observations of the events, or which event happened first in some inertial frame), but we can say that everyone would agree the two events happened within a few tiny fractions of a nanosecond from each other, so for all practical purposes there is no disagreement about the fact that twin A turning 30 coincided with twin B turning 40. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 12:47:31 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: If you don't see how my 'theory' automatically trumps any logical objection then you don't understand my theory fully. That is truly hilarious Craig! I cannot help being reminded of Luther's admonition that To be a Christian, you must pluck out the eye of reason.. Are you looking for converts rather than debate? I have no idea how you expect me or anyone else to understand your theory if you continue sidestep all logical objections to your ideas. I don't expect anything and I'm not looking for anything. I'm explaining why logic is theoretical representation rather than aesthetic presentation, and that the distinction between the two is the key to solving the hard problem of consciousness, explanatory gap, symbol grounding problem, and binding/combination problem. It doesn't matter what we think about it, it just matters that we understand why logic has limits and emerges from feeling rather than the other way around. Once we understand why logic has limits, and that representations of truth do not have any power to experience or cause experience, the we can stop demanding that reality conform to the expectations of theory. Craig David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 12:54:10 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: I must have lost the thread. This Google Groups format is always burying threads for me. If I can find it, I'll definitely reply. I see you use gmail, like me. Why don't you just filter messages from this group to a gmail folder? Then gmail manages each thread as a conversation very naturally. I've found it very easy to keep track this way and it's much quicker too. Eh, I've had formatting issues in the past when I try to respond through Gmail. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On 1 February 2014 18:14, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Eh, I've had formatting issues in the past when I try to respond through Gmail. Try using rich formatting and just interpolate your answers, snipping as necessary. It works really well for me. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 12:31 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Jesse, Yes, that being at the same point in spacetime is CALLED the present moment that I'm talking about. But your present moment goes beyond that and says that there is an objective common present moment for events that are *not* at the same point in spacetime. My point is that you have no real argument for generalizing there is an objective truth about whether events coincide at the same point in spacetime to there is an objective truth about whether events occur at the same time, event if they are at different points in spacetime--the first does not in any way imply the second. You are probably repeating the claim that 'coordinate time' falsifies p-time. It doesn't. Coordinate time is an attempt to explain the obvious problems with clock time not actually explaining a common present moment that obviously exists. This is done by coordinate time saying OK we have to account for the twins being at the same point in spacetime when they compare clocks so let's just invent a coordinate system that acts as if clock time doesn't have any effect on something we will call coordinate time. No, coordinate time is not meant to explain how events can coincide in spacetime--rather the basic starting assumption is that spacetime has an objective geometry, different coordinate systems are just ways of labeling that geometry. Think of a globe, with outlines of continents, rivers etc. on it. It's certainly true that you can *describe* the shape of a river or coastline or whatever using some coordinate system defined on the globe (latitude and longitude for example), but the actual geometry of the shapes--including the notion of the length along a particular path between two points (like the length along a river between between two branching points)--is assumed to be more fundamental, prior to any choice of coordinate system. Physicists think of spacetime like that--it has an objective geometry, defined in terms of the lengths of any possible path (whether timelike, spacelike or lightlike). Coordinate systems are just ways of labeling this preexisting geometry, and all coordinate systems must agree on these more basic geometric facts (like the proper time along a timelike path between two events). In general relativity the basic idea of the metric is to translate between coordinate intervals and real geometric quantities like proper time--the equations of the metric will look different when expressed in different coordinate systems, but in each coordinate system you can integrate the metric to calculate proper time along any timelike path, and you'll get the same answer in each case. Suppose instead of a globe we are talking about geometry on a flat plane, which has some roads on it. The geometry of the shape of the roads, the distance along each road between any two points, is again taken as fundamental, but here it would be natural to define a Cartesian coordinate system on the plane to label points, with an x and a y axis. But we have a choice of how to orient these axes--depending on the angle of the axes relative to the geometric features like roads, we may get different answers to questions like do these two points along the road have the same y-coordinate or different y coordinates? This is akin to how in flat spacetime, we can choose different inertial coordinate systems which give different answers to questions like do these two events have the same t-coordinate or different t coordinates? But clearly for roads on a plane, there is an objective geometric truth about questions like do these two roads ever meet at the same point on the plane? or if these two roads cross at points A and B, what is the length along each road between A and B? The answers to these questions don't depend on your choice of cartesian coordinate system. Similarly there is an objective answer, in terms of the geometry of paths through spacetime, to questions like do these two worldlines ever meet at the same point in spacetime? or if these two worldlines cross at events A and B, what is the proper time elapsed on each worldline between A and B? In contrast, your argument seems to be that in order to make sense of questions like how much has each twin aged between the point where they departed and the point where they reunited, we need an objective t-coordinate which gives a single correct answer to whether two events happened at the same t-coordinate or different t-coordinates. But in terms of the analogy, this would be like if someone claimed there was no way to talk about the distance along different roads between places where they cross without having an objective cartesian coordinate system which gives a single correct answer to whether two points in space share the same y-coordinate. Presumably you understand why this is silly in the case of 2D geometry, so why isn't it just as silly when it comes to the geometry of paths in 4D spacetime?
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
John, First, 2 substantial errors in your post below. 1. I stated that A began his trip from earth ORBIT, not from blasting off from earth's surface, so A's acceleration is 1g for the ENTIRE trip. But even if he blasted off from earth's surface at 2g that would have a negligible and irrelevant effect on his clock because it would only last for a few minutes. This is obvious because returning astronauts' clocks are different by a hardly measurable amount. 2. A's direction of acceleration doesn't JUST change if he decides to return. It reverses at the MIDPOINT of the trip so he can slow and stop at the galactic center. If he returns if would have to change it again at midpoint. So the points you make are not relevant to the discussion. However note also that the DIRECTION of B's acceleration is also continually changing relative to A's motion simply because the earth is rotating. So how does any change in the direction of acceleration of A have an effect but the continual change in direction of B's acceleration does not? Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 12:46:17 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 7:57 AM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: One might think it was the acceleration that slowed time on A's clock, BUT the point is that A's acceleration was only 1g throughout the entire trip which was exactly EQUAL to B's gravitational acceleration back on earth. So if the accelerations were exactly equal during the entire trip how could A's acceleration slow time but B's not slow time by the same amount? If A were going into space and accelerating upward off the surface of the Earth at one g (32 feet per second per second), then he would be experiencing 2g, one g from the Earth and one g from his continuing change in upward velocity. both = 1g throughout the entire trip No, not during the entire trip. And if the space traveler ever wants to return to Earth to rejoin his friend so they can directly compare their clocks then he's going to have to change the direction of his acceleration by 180 degrees. So their clocks will not match because their travel experiences were not symmetrical. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On 01 Feb 2014, at 14:31, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 09:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: My poor car followed the schroedinger equation without effort, but at a higher level, it tooks her a lot of effort to climb some steep roads. Well, she died through such effort, actually. RIP :-( Well I was a bit metaphorical 'course, and thanks to God my poor car was not haunted by metaphysical question on its own effort---I think. But stress is a term in material resistance, and some metal have some memories. In his book réflexion sur la science des machines, 1932, Jacques Lafitte' favorite example of machine is ... the house. House can have memories, so much they can look haunted, which is all pleasure for the movie makers. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: then feel free to invoke some non-comp or invoke more comp if that floats your boat, I no longer care. I've given up trying to find a consistent definition of your silly little word comp that is used on this list and nowhere else. False. False? Who else besides you and a few other members of this list has even heard of comp? Take a look at this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comp Wikipedia lists 27 possible meanings of the word comp and not one of those 27 meanings has anything to do with AI or mind or the brain or consciousness or determinism or materialism or information. Not one! Your endless homemade acronyms that you pretend every educated person should know get tiresome too. Childish immature remark. Perhaps, but out of the mouth of babes comes truth. The fact is your acronyms are even more obscure than comp is. once you believe that your consciousness is invariant for some digital transformation I do believe that. Good. That's comp. Apparently comp involves a great deal more than that, in particular a lot of vague pee pee crap. Although it doesn't necessarily follow the digital transformation of consciousness is perfectly consistent with the matter in the desk I'm pounding my hand on right now as simply being a subroutine in the johnkclak program, and the same is true of the matter in my hand. Only by a confusion 1p and 3p, OK now were getting to the heart of the matter (no pun indented). Explain exactly why my statement above is confused and or wrong and you will have won this year old debate. you are stuck at the step 3. John Clark is stuck when Bruno Marchal constantly sneaks in personal pronouns like you and I in a proof about personal identity, and when reading about the 3p as if were one universal thing, but Bruno Marchal's 3p is John Clark's 1p. You are the only person stuck in step 3 that I know. I guess they didn't make it that far, but it's been over a year and to be honest I don't even remember what the first 2 steps were, they may have been just as silly as step 3. John k Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Jesse, Not correct. My present moment does NOT say that there is an objective common present moment for events that are *not* at the same point in spaceTIME (my emphasis). My theory says that there is a common universal present moment shared by all points in SPACE, not spaceTIME. Because clocktimes can obviously have different t values within that present moment. Second, thanks for the long explication following, which I more or less agree with. But my question remains: If coordinate time is just an alternate coordinate system then for the twins to be at the SAME place in that coordinate system there must be some actual t-value describing that point that both twins agree upon. What is that t value, and how does it relate to the t values of the clock times of the twins' two different clocks? What is the actual coordinate time t-value of that point in which the twins have different clock time t-values? If coordinate time is just a different choice of coordinate system you must be able to answer this question and provide a t value that is the same for both twins. And of course there simply is NO clock that displays that coordinate time t value is there? Doesn't that make it highly suspect and give my argument some merit? There seems to be NO way to actually measure coordinate time. So as I said, it's just a calculation, not an actual OBSERVABLE empirical FACT. That seems to imply it has no objective reality doesn't it? Thanks, Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 1:21:41 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 12:31 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Jesse, Yes, that being at the same point in spacetime is CALLED the present moment that I'm talking about. But your present moment goes beyond that and says that there is an objective common present moment for events that are *not* at the same point in spacetime. My point is that you have no real argument for generalizing there is an objective truth about whether events coincide at the same point in spacetime to there is an objective truth about whether events occur at the same time, event if they are at different points in spacetime--the first does not in any way imply the second. You are probably repeating the claim that 'coordinate time' falsifies p-time. It doesn't. Coordinate time is an attempt to explain the obvious problems with clock time not actually explaining a common present moment that obviously exists. This is done by coordinate time saying OK we have to account for the twins being at the same point in spacetime when they compare clocks so let's just invent a coordinate system that acts as if clock time doesn't have any effect on something we will call coordinate time. No, coordinate time is not meant to explain how events can coincide in spacetime--rather the basic starting assumption is that spacetime has an objective geometry, different coordinate systems are just ways of labeling that geometry. Think of a globe, with outlines of continents, rivers etc. on it. It's certainly true that you can *describe* the shape of a river or coastline or whatever using some coordinate system defined on the globe (latitude and longitude for example), but the actual geometry of the shapes--including the notion of the length along a particular path between two points (like the length along a river between between two branching points)--is assumed to be more fundamental, prior to any choice of coordinate system. Physicists think of spacetime like that--it has an objective geometry, defined in terms of the lengths of any possible path (whether timelike, spacelike or lightlike). Coordinate systems are just ways of labeling this preexisting geometry, and all coordinate systems must agree on these more basic geometric facts (like the proper time along a timelike path between two events). In general relativity the basic idea of the metric is to translate between coordinate intervals and real geometric quantities like proper time--the equations of the metric will look different when expressed in different coordinate systems, but in each coordinate system you can integrate the metric to calculate proper time along any timelike path, and you'll get the same answer in each case. Suppose instead of a globe we are talking about geometry on a flat plane, which has some roads on it. The geometry of the shape of the roads, the distance along each road between any two points, is again taken as fundamental, but here it would be natural to define a Cartesian coordinate system on the plane to label points, with an x and a y axis. But we have a choice of how to orient these axes--depending on the angle of the axes relative to the geometric features like roads, we may get different answers to questions like do these two points along the road have the same y-coordinate or different y coordinates? This is akin to how in flat
Re: Unput and Onput
On 1 February 2014 18:08, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I don't expect anything and I'm not looking for anything. I'm explaining why logic is theoretical representation rather than aesthetic presentation, and that the distinction between the two is the key to solving the hard problem of consciousness, explanatory gap, symbol grounding problem, and binding/combination problem. It doesn't matter what we think about it, it just matters that we understand why logic has limits and emerges from feeling rather than the other way around. Once we understand why logic has limits, and that representations of truth do not have any power to experience or cause experience, the we can stop demanding that reality conform to the expectations of theory. But in general you don't explain it, you merely assert it. And from what I can understand from a reading of your assertions on the subject, you don't seem to be saying much that hasn't been said in some form many times before, and which turns out to have formidable problems of its own (unsurprisingly, given the intractability of the subject area to the best minds of history). What I've presented to you in the form of the POPJ, for example, is a strong objection and merely asserting that it doesn't apply doesn't cut the mustard. By the way, you often seem to use the term theory in a naively disparaging way, as in it works in theory but it doesn't work in practice. This of course is a contradiction in terms. If it doesn't work in practice it can't work in the (correct) theory. No one else, AFAICT - certainly not me - is demanding that reality conform to the expectations of theory if that theory is incorrect. For that very reason a theory is only useful insofar as its assumptions and principles of derivation can be made sufficiently constrained and explicit. We then have some hope of comparing theory with practice (not reality, since we can have only ever make a bet on some connection between belief and truth). Nowhere in my reading of you do you explicitly state your assumptions, or how their consequences are to be derived. Bruno for one repeatedly asks you to do this but you don't respond. I've tried most recently to intuit what some of them might be (it's not that hard, actually) and offer you some straightforward objections but your typical response is to deflect, ignore, rhapsodise, change the subject or claim, without argument, that they don't apply in your case. Actually, if in addition you can't find the threads this creates a further barrier to communication. But whatever the reason the overall effect is to vitiate the whole point and purpose of discussion and frankly it makes me wonder why you bother. I see that I am scolding you and that is not really my goal. I would like to penetrate further into your theory if that is possible using the medium of rational discourse. I have a life-long interest in the subject area and if you could persuade me that you really were the possessor of a totally new insight I should certainly not want to miss it. So if you can find the thread (actually I pretty much restated the paradox in this one) by all means let's have another go. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On 01 Feb 2014, at 13:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 5:09:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Jan 2014, at 22:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, January 31, 2014 4:16:12 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 1 February 2014 09:39, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no program or data is input and from which no data is expected as output? The UD. Isn't everything output from the UD? No, as I understand it, only the appearance of everything. (Comp answers the question why is there something rather than nothing by it depends what you mean by something...) Ok, so then everything is output from the UD plus output from whatever computater you are saying generates everything that is not an appearance. It is misleading to say that the UD output anything, as it is a non stopping program. It has no output in the common computer science meaning. Then what does it actually do? It generates all programs, petit-Ă -petit, and all inputs, petit-Ă - petit, and it present those inputs to the programs, in such a way that it emulates all programs, including those who never stop, as we can purge them in advance. The UD itself has no input and no output, but it generates all programs and emulate their executions on all inputs. Think about a dreaming brain. Your partner in bed is sleepy and make a dream. there are no input output, Not with the world outside of your body, but within the dream, the whole thing is input and output. Possible. Apparently at the level of neurons, and perhaps below. You receive dream experiences and you project your participation in them, just as you would with your body in a world of bodies. In a dream, you are in a semi-world of perceptions instead. In a nocturnal dream, OK. With comp when awake we are in infinities of such dreams, and comp explains why this has to interfere statistically below our common substitution level. but there is still an experience which can be related to the brain activity. In that dreams, some entities can have inputs and outputs. Input and outputs are relative notions. Then a machine without inoput and output can imitate machines having them. Imitation is an output. Imitation, like emulation, is more a process, or a program activity. It is a sequences or a tree of states. Output are like number, you can write them, or transforms them into pixels. It's based on an input. If you have never heard how someone speaks, you cannot imitate them - because imitation is an output which requires sensory input. In our history, but we write books, and we have memories which sum up well the relevant information. But in arithmetic you have freely all informations, and this structured, notably by the presence of universal numbers. The universal numbers can only explore a reality that transcend them. How does the program itself get to be a program without being input? See genetic algorithms for one example. See genetics for another. A blind watchmaker can make a computer programme, although we can normally write one a lot more efficiently. Genetics are absorbing all kinds of inputs and producing outputs. The blind watchmaker is a theory about evolution, not an example of a real computation which is known to be without input or output. It seems to me though, and this is why I posted this thread, that i/ o is taken for granted and has no real explanation of what it is in mathematical terms. No mathematical explanation for what input and output are?! They both come down to binary digits, how mathematical do you want it to be? What are the binary digits which define input? Look up any assembly language. But assembly language must be input into a computer before that. Yes, that is why we need to postulate one computer, or one turing universal system. I take arithmetic (the natural numbers + the laws of addition and multiplication) as everyone knows that. That very elementary arithmetic is Turing universal is well known by computer scientist. The arithmetical truth is vastly bigger than the computable arithmetical truth, but with comp, that computable part plays the key role in structuring both the computable and the non computable part of the (arithmetical) truth. Bruno Craig Bruno The rest of your post seems a lot more sensible and I will leave those questions for Bruno to agree or disagree, I would also like to know how numbers can make an effort (as would Xenocrates! If John will forgive the reference...) Cool. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit
Re: Unput and Onput
On 01 Feb 2014, at 13:13, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 4:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Jan 2014, at 21:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, January 31, 2014 2:47:01 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Jan 2014, at 03:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: Maybe it will help to make the sense-primitive view clearer if we think of sense and motive as input and output. This is only a step away from Comp, so it should not be construed to mean that I am defining sense and motive as merely input and output. My purpose here is just to demonstrate that Comp takes so much for granted that it is not even viable as a primitive within its own definitions. Can we all agree that the notion of input and output is ontologically essential to the function of computation? Bad luck Craig! Not only the notion of input-output is not essential for computation, but we can argue in many ways that input-output are inessential. A deep one is the discovery of the combinators, which provides a way to do math and computers without variables. You still need some variable at the metalevel, but all formal objects, program and computations are object without variables. This is exploited in compilation theory, and in some proof theory. Then there is the SMN theorem, which says basically that you can simulate a function with two variables (two inputs) by mechanically enumerable collection of functions of one variable. Here too, the S90 particular case says that you can simulate functions of 9 variables with effective enumeration of functions of 0 variables, that is without input. Recursion theory is fundamentally non dimensional. Take the UD. A UD dovetailing only on the programs without input is equivalent with a UD dovetailing on the programs having infinitely many inputs (streams). And, to finish, the UD itself is a program without input and without output. It computes in an intensional very complex way, nothing from nothing. The UD has this in common with the common aristotelian conception of the physical universe. A physical universe cannot have input nor output, without stopping being *the* physical universe. This does not mean, than in the relative computation, some input can't help. Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no program or data is input and from which no data is expected as output? The UD. Isn't everything output from the UD? No. The UD has no output. It is a non stopping program. everything physical and theological appears through its intensional activity. Appears = output. Appears to me appears more like input to me. Output of of some universe? Input/output, like hardware/software are important distinction, but yet they are relative. My output to you is your input, for example. They are indexicals too. In fact it uses an intensional Church thesis. Not only all universal machines can compute all computable functions, but they can all compute them in all the possible ways to compute them. The intensional CT can be derived from the usual extensional CT. Universal machines computes all functions, but also in all the same and infinitely many ways. How do we know they compute anything unless we input their output? Oh! It is a bit perverse to input the output, but of course that's what we do when we combine two machines to get a new one. Like getting a NAND gate from a NOT and a AND gates. We can also input to a machine its own input, which is even more perverse, and usually this leads to interesting fixed points, many simple iterations leads to chaos. The Mandelbrot set illustrates this. But the point is that we don't have to feed the program at the bottom level, if you can imagine that 17 is prime independently of you, then arithmetic feeds all programs all by itself, independently of you. This is not entirely obvious, and rather tedious and long to prove but follows from elementary computer science. Bruno Craig This would suggest that computation can only be defined as a meaningful product in a non-comp environment, otherwise there would be no inputting and outputting, only instantaneous results within a Platonic ocean of arithmetic truth. A computation of a program without input can simulate different programs having many inputs relative to other programs or divine (non- machines) things living in arithmetic How does the program itself get to be a program without being input? OK. Good question. The answer is that the TOE has to choose an initial universal system. I use arithmetic (RA). Then all programs or number are natural inputs of the (tiny) arithmetical truth which emulates them. You need to understand that a tiny part of arithmetic defines all partial computable relations. The quintessence of this is already in Gödel 1931. Where do we find input and output within arithmetic though? It is not
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 01 Feb 2014, at 14:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, You have a very strange view of arithmetic if you think it is full of processor cycles. It is the standard understanding of computer science. That is understood (by the theoricians) since Gödel 1931 (symbolically, as some have seen this before, and some have made the point more transparent, and stronger later). Can you explain how that works? It seems to imply an innate notion of time. You need the ordering 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... that you can derive from the first axioms: 0≠s(x) (for all x) x≠y - s(x) ≠s(y), (for all x, and y). and x + 0 = x (for all x) x + s(y) = s(x + y), (for all x, and y). x y van be defined by Ez(y + z = x (z ≠0)) This gives already a digital time which can be used to defined the step notion for the computations. A computation is the sequence of steps of a universal machine when emulated by another universal machine. As elementary arithmetic is Turing complete, we can take elementary arithmetic as the base system, and define computation in term of all the universal numbers that we can define in arithmetic (we get them all, by Church thesis). It is long to define a universal numbers, and its computations, just in terms of 0, s, + and *, but that can be done, and is done in most textbook in theoretical computer science. Note that I agree with this, it's my p-time, but block universe and your block comp seem to be lacking it... I still don't know what is your p-time. I still don't know if it is 1p or 3p, mathematical or physical, etc. PLease explain in PLAIN ENGLISH rather than your usual cryptic notations and (undefined in the context) terminology.. Just ask when you don't understand, but you seem to ignore what is a computation for a computer scientists. You might read the original papers assembled by Martin Davis 1964. It exists in the Dover edition now. Or a good introductory book like the one by Neil Cutland. Or wait that I rexplain the real basic 5cantor and Kleene diagonal) which unlike logic, are rather simple, I think. But a priori, computability has nothing to do with physics, or physical implementation of computer. A computation is an intensional relative (relational) number property. Bruno Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 3:27:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Jan 2014, at 13:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Liz, Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving! The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. The problem is that you are denying the flow of time. We deny a *primitive* and *ontological* flow of time. We don't deny the internal experience of flow of time. For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be active processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that... Arithmetic is full of active processor cycles. Bruno Edgar On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Why do some people have such a problem with how change can emerge from something static ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing something changing. Change is by definition things being different at different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you will naturally get a static universe, just as putting together all the moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a God's eye perspective. This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be isomorphic to reality). Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non- problem, and has been since Newton published his Principia. There are problems with comp, of course, like the white rabbit problem. Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than worrying about straw men? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: Unput and Onput
On 01 Feb 2014, at 16:44, Craig Weinberg wrote: Only sense can allow theory to go beyond itself...in theory. Löbian machine can use their G*-G difference to go beyond itself, and perhaps generate sense, at their own risk and peril. But the sense will be mediated by the different points view. Only the 1p views (with the p occurrence in their arithmetical definition) get the 1p sense (the sense per se). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Jesse, Not correct. My present moment does NOT say that there is an objective common present moment for events that are *not* at the same point in spaceTIME (my emphasis). My theory says that there is a common universal present moment shared by all points in SPACE, not spaceTIME. Because clocktimes can obviously have different t values within that present moment. That's just semantics, I was using the standard terminology of relativity, if you want to change the meaning of terms you're free to translate my statement into your own terminology, but I don't think I got the *meaning* of your theory wrong. When I said not at the same point in spacetime I meant events that someone using the labeling system of mainstream physics would say occur at different points in spacetime, which in terms of your own theory could cover both events at different p-times as well as events at the same p-time but different points in space. You believe that for any pair of events that a physicist says happen at different points in spacetime, there is an objective truth about whether they happened at the same time, different points in space or different times. The set of all events that are happening at the same p-time as what I am experiencing here and now would be the objective common present moment, and these are events a physicist would label as having different points in spacetime, regardless of how you would label them. So that's what I meant when I said that you believed there was an objective common present moment for events that are not at the same point in spacetime. Second, thanks for the long explication following, which I more or less agree with. But my question remains: If coordinate time is just an alternate coordinate system then for the twins to be at the SAME place in that coordinate system there must be some actual t-value describing that point that both twins agree upon. What is that t value, and how does it relate to the t values of the clock times of the twins' two different clocks? Actual t value in a specific coordinate system, or in some objective coordinate-independent sense? If the former then sure, within the context of any given inertial coordinate system there is a specific t-value where they reunite. You asked in another comment I hadn't responded to yet for an example, so I'll give you one here. Suppose we have an inertial coordinate system in which the Earth is at rest (ignoring the fact that it orbits and doesn't really move inertially for the sake of argument), and in this system it's located at position x=0 light-years, and there is another distant planet which I'll call Planet X which is 24 light years away from Earth, and at rest in Earth's frame so it's always located at x=24 light years in this frame (assume they both lie along the x-axis so the other spatial dimensions can be ignored). At t=0 years in this system, two twins, Alan and Bob, are born on Earth, and each one is given a clock to mark their age (proper time). Then Bob is immediately placed on a ship which accelerates in a negligible time to 0.8c in the Earth frame, after which it moves at constant velocity towards Planet X. Since Planet X is 24 light-years away it arrives there after 24/0.8 = 30 years, at time t=30 in the Earth frame. Then the ship accelerates in a negligible time so it is moving at 0.6c back towards Earth. Then the return leg will take a time of 24/0.6 = 40 years in the Earth frame. So when Bob returns to Earth, a total of 30+40 years have elapsed in the Earth frame, so they reunite at coordinate time t=70 in this frame (and position x=0, since Earth is at rest at this position). Since Alan has been at rest on Earth the whole time, his clock has been keeping pace with coordinate time in this frame (or with the actual physical clocks at rest in this frame which can be used to define coordinate time, as I mentioned in my last comment), so he will be 70 years old. To find Bob's age we must use the time dilation equation, which says that if a clock is moving at speed v relative to a given inertial frame, in a time interval of T in that frame it will only elapse a time of T*sqrt(1 - v^2/c^2). So if the first leg of the journey from Earth to Planet X lasted a time of T=30 years in the Earth frame, and Bob was traveling at 0.8c, he will have aged by 30*sqrt(1 - 0.8^2) = 18 years between leaving Earth and reaching Planet X. Then since the second leg from Planet X back to Earth lasted a time of T=40 years in the Earth frame, and Bob was traveling at 0.6c, during this leg his age increased by 40*sqrt(1 - 0.6^2) = 32 years. So, when Bob arrives back at Earth his age is 18+32=50 years, twenty years younger than Alan. If we transform this whole scenario into a different frame, the time coordinates at which Bob arrives at Planet X and arrives back at Earth will be different, and these frames won't agree that Alan was 30 years
Re: Unput and Onput
On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not because their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each other's presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical. I don't see that you make your point here. How does your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame get around anything? ISTM rather that the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical because when placed under examination at any scale it can be observed to adhere to an unvarying and causally-closed set of rules (the ones we group under the heading of physical). In effect, it appears to be a mechanism at all scales. The inexorable progress of this analysis of physical appearances has so far trumped every historical attempt to interpolate novel top-down rules operating at other levels (spiritualism, vitalism, holism, dualism etc.). Comp, as I've said, at the least confronts the problem and offers the possible shape of a solution (but that alone, of course, doesn't guarantee its correctness). The value of any genuinely new insight (Relativity Theory, for example) is not in ignoring the previous theory (Newtonian mechanics in this case) but rather in providing a better explanation for the predictions of the old theory whilst simultaneously making new and surprising ones that turn out to match observation better. Consequently, if your theory is to prevail, it must be able to explain why appearance - and especially the appearance of conscious behaviour, not excluding your own - conforms to physical causation as precisely as we observe. This physical conformity of appearance is the reason that the theory cannot avoid the POPJ - in essence that we don't need, or seem even be able to apply, the notion of consciousness or sense to explain why the creatures that appear to us - including ourselves - make the claims to those phenomena that they do. What you say above doesn't suffice to address this formidable issue at all. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:16:43 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Feb 2014, at 13:13, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 4:54:47 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Jan 2014, at 21:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, January 31, 2014 2:47:01 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Jan 2014, at 03:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: Maybe it will help to make the sense-primitive view clearer if we think of sense and motive as input and output. This is only a step away from Comp, so it should not be construed to mean that I am defining sense and motive as merely input and output. My purpose here is just to demonstrate that Comp takes so much for granted that it is not even viable as a primitive within its own definitions. Can we all agree that the notion of input and output is ontologically essential to the function of computation? Bad luck Craig! Not only the notion of input-output is not essential for computation, but we can argue in many ways that input-output are inessential. A deep one is the discovery of the combinators, which provides a way to do math and computers without variables. You still need some variable at the metalevel, but all formal objects, program and computations are object without variables. This is exploited in compilation theory, and in some proof theory. Then there is the SMN theorem, which says basically that you can simulate a function with two variables (two inputs) by mechanically enumerable collection of functions of one variable. Here too, the S90 particular case says that you can simulate functions of 9 variables with effective enumeration of functions of 0 variables, that is without input. Recursion theory is fundamentally non dimensional. Take the UD. A UD dovetailing only on the programs without input is equivalent with a UD dovetailing on the programs having infinitely many inputs (streams). And, to finish, the UD itself is a program without input and without output. It computes in an intensional very complex way, nothing from nothing. The UD has this in common with the common aristotelian conception of the physical universe. A physical universe cannot have input nor output, without stopping being *the* physical universe. This does not mean, than in the relative computation, some input can't help. Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no program or data is input and from which no data is expected as output? The UD. Isn't everything output from the UD? No. The UD has no output. It is a non stopping program. everything physical and theological appears through its intensional activity. Appears = output. Appears to me appears more like input to me. Output of of some universe? Input/output, like hardware/software are important distinction, but yet they are relative. My output to you is your input, for example. They are indexicals too. Sure, but they are absolute within a given frame of reference. You cannot write a program which bypasses the need for inputs and outputs by substituting them for a different kind of function. It goes back to what I keep saying about not being able to substitute software for a cell phone charger or a video monitor, or the difference between playing a sport and playing a game which simulates a sport. In fact it uses an intensional Church thesis. Not only all universal machines can compute all computable functions, but they can all compute them in all the possible ways to compute them. The intensional CT can be derived from the usual extensional CT. Universal machines computes all functions, but also in all the same and infinitely many ways. How do we know they compute anything unless we input their output? Oh! It is a bit perverse to input the output, but of course that's what we do when we combine two machines to get a new one. Like getting a NAND gate from a NOT and a AND gates. We can also input to a machine its own input, which is even more perverse, and usually this leads to interesting fixed points, many simple iterations leads to chaos. The Mandelbrot set illustrates this. But the point is that we don't have to feed the program at the bottom level, if you can imagine that 17 is prime independently of you, then arithmetic feeds all programs all by itself, independently of you. This is not entirely obvious, and rather tedious and long to prove but follows from elementary computer science. The arithmetic truth of 17 being prime doesn't do anything though. That fact needs to be used in the context of some processing of an input to produce an output. Craig Bruno Craig This would suggest that computation can only be defined as a meaningful product in a non-comp environment, otherwise there would be no inputting and
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
Bruno, A mathematical ordering is static and does NOT move. It is not a flowing time. Doesn't matter if you claim there is some 1p perspective that is a mathematical ordering. Unless some primitive time, such as my p-time, flows then nothing moves and you most certainly would NOT be posting your opinions here. And I don't care what is a computation for a computer scientists [sic] is. I care what actual computations continually compute the current state of reality. You claim various problems with computations but reality actually does continually compute its current state with NO problem at all. Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:33:43 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Feb 2014, at 14:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, You have a very strange view of arithmetic if you think it is full of processor cycles. It is the standard understanding of computer science. That is understood (by the theoricians) since Gödel 1931 (symbolically, as some have seen this before, and some have made the point more transparent, and stronger later). Can you explain how that works? It seems to imply an innate notion of time. You need the ordering 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... that you can derive from the first axioms: 0≠s(x) (for all x) x≠y - s(x) ≠s(y), (for all x, and y). and x + 0 = x (for all x) x + s(y) = s(x + y), (for all x, and y). x y van be defined by Ez(y + z = x (z ≠0)) This gives already a digital time which can be used to defined the step notion for the computations. A computation is the sequence of steps of a universal machine when emulated by another universal machine. As elementary arithmetic is Turing complete, we can take elementary arithmetic as the base system, and define computation in term of all the universal numbers that we can define in arithmetic (we get them all, by Church thesis). It is long to define a universal numbers, and its computations, just in terms of 0, s, + and *, but that can be done, and is done in most textbook in theoretical computer science. Note that I agree with this, it's my p-time, but block universe and your block comp seem to be lacking it... I still don't know what is your p-time. I still don't know if it is 1p or 3p, mathematical or physical, etc. PLease explain in PLAIN ENGLISH rather than your usual cryptic notations and (undefined in the context) terminology.. Just ask when you don't understand, but you seem to ignore what is a computation for a computer scientists. You might read the original papers assembled by Martin Davis 1964. It exists in the Dover edition now. Or a good introductory book like the one by Neil Cutland. Or wait that I rexplain the real basic 5cantor and Kleene diagonal) which unlike logic, are rather simple, I think. But a priori, computability has nothing to do with physics, or physical implementation of computer. A computation is an intensional relative (relational) number property. Bruno Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 3:27:08 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Jan 2014, at 13:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Liz, Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving! The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. The problem is that you are denying the flow of time. We deny a *primitive* and *ontological* flow of time. We don't deny the internal experience of flow of time. For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be active processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that... Arithmetic is full of active processor cycles. Bruno Edgar On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Why do some people have such a problem with how change can emerge from something static ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing something changing. Change is by definition things being different at different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you will naturally get a static universe, just as putting together all the moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a God's eye perspective. This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be isomorphic to reality). Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem, and has been since Newton published his Principia. There *are* problems with comp, of course, like the white rabbit problem. Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than worrying about straw men? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
Hi Edgar, Block time and Bruno's comp can only tell us how a set fixed static sequence of events could be perceived by some observer as a fixed static sequence of events. It simply CANNOT tell us how time moves ALONG that sequence. The fact that time flows, that things change, is a fundamental EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION. It is not some intuitive illusion. It is the basic measurable observation of our existence and it never ceases from birth to death. Can you show me this to be the case with resorting to some memory? If not, can you see why you cannot possibly be sure of what you just said? It simply cannot be disregarded as some sort of survival mechanism. In fact if block time were actually real survival mechanisms would not be needed because the future is already written deterministically contrary to QM and in violation of all sorts of physical laws. Here I claim that you still fail to understand Everett's and Bruno's ideas. First person indeterminacy is precisely how you recover QM at the 1p level from a static 3p multiverse. There is no proof that these ideas are correct and your is wrong, but there is proof that you cannot just dismiss like I do here. If you think block time exists then where does that entire block come from? Did it create itself? Sequentially or all at once? Did something outside of it create it? What? How? Here I like Russells' Theory of Nothing. You probably already know about the book: http://www.hpcoders.com.au/nothing.html But if I had to ĂĽber-summarise the relevant part here: Nothing = everything, then add the anthropic principle. (I hope Russell isn't too annoyed by this) Again, nothing is certain, but it's an interesting possibility to contemplate. Was it created causally in time? Or did it just magically appear like some kind of miracle? The believers in block time have an unfortunate habit of not thinking through the implications of their crazy theory. Careful with this causality concept. The believers in causality have similar habits... Again, the best way I can say it is that your mouth has to move plenty to tell me it isn't moving! There are a lot of memories of my mouth moving, that's for sure :) Cheers Telmo. Best, Edgar On Friday, January 31, 2014 8:08:32 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Edgar, On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 at 1:13 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Liz, Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving! The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. The problem is that you are denying the flow of time. Why is this a problem? How can you know for sure that there is a flow of time? Block universe hypothesis can explain how time would appear to flow for each observer. This doesn't prove that block universe hypothesis are correct, but they cannot be dismissed that easily either. Now you could argue that this is counter-intuitive, but I would remind you that nature doesn't care. Our intuition is just a bunch of heuristics evolved to deal with a very narrow set of survival scenarios. For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be active processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that... I wonder. Telmo. Edgar On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:24:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: Why do some people have such a problem with how change can emerge from something static ? It's as simple as F = ma - a static equation describing something changing. Change is by definition things being different at different times. If you map out all the times involved as a dimension, you will naturally get a static universe, just as putting together all the moments making up a movie gives you a reel of film - but only from a God's eye perspective. This is the perspective science gives us, the perspective given by using equations and models and maps to describe reality; it isn't the world of everyday experience, which (at best) views those equations and so on from within (assuming for a moment they are so accurate as to be isomorphic to reality). Obtaining change from the static view used by science is a non-problem, and has been since Newton published his Principia. There are problems with comp, of course, like the white rabbit problem. Does anyone have any new views on the real problems, rather than worrying about straw men? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On 01 Feb 2014, at 18:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, Boy, you are really taking some giant leaps here! Just because I point out that a local present moment is obvious IN NO WAY is a claim that that insight is original with me! That's a crazy inference. The fact is that 99.999% of everyone on earth throughout history has had the same insight which they also knew was obvious. That in fact is one reason it can be stated as obvious with such confidence. Because everyone (expect a few who's heads are so deep in their physics books they can't pull them out to look around at actual reality) observes it first hand in their own experience every moment of their lives... It is obvious we are conscious here-and-now. OK. It is hardly doubtable. But what is not obvious is that there is an here and now in the ontology. It *might* be an internal epistemological absolute truth, for a class of internal creature/entity/person. once you assume even quite weaker version of computationalism, you cannot avoid the dream argument. The obviousness of an experience does not validate the content of that experience. In the 1p view, consciousness is obvious. But this does not make consciousness 3p relations, nor the person/bodies relations, obvious at all. Bruno All I can conclude is that your comment above was not objective but unfortunately based on some personal antipathy... Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 10:53:06 AM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:00:16 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Ghibbsa, I'm wondering why you'd want to suddenly change the subject from time to a rather rambling post on epistemology? I don't see it as epistemology save in the most literal sense of the word with no baggage allowed. I see it as potentially one of the really hard scientific obstacles in human discovery of the nature of reality. Hard because the sciences corresponding to this matter are far too early in the process of science to offer reliable knowledge. Certainly one choice is turning to philosophy. But the decision itself to do that, implicitly assumes an answer to the original fundamental question the scientific revolution threw up, which all other philosophical questions about science derive out of. Which actually begins as an obvious observation that no one has ever disagreed about: that something historically unique was happening with science, of a fundamental nature. It's the answer to that question the philosophies disagree about. More precisely, it was how to reason the matter the philosophies disagreed about, given it is reasoning by which one philosophy distinguishes itself from another. The general problem I have with that process, arises from the fact the question being asked was Is there a component of this historical uniqueness that is fundamental to science and only science Doing philosophy on that question, implies that that question can be resolved by non-scientific philosophy, which implies if something was fundamental and totally unique to one thing, it could nevertheless be fundamentally discovered and understood by something else that did not contain anything of that thing being understood. I don't think that makes sense, not in the end. Because it is assuming the answer is NO, nothing was unique about science and only science. I think that about this much, we should be in agreement, because you draw on precisely the same insight, but in a different context, that computability pre-requires sameness. Albeit that's only a core agreement. It doesn't mean that I apply it correctly, or that you do. We don't have to agree about that even if we do agree about the fundamental insight. Because how something is applied is fundamental in its own right. By the same coin we can agree that you draw on perceptions that are obvious, and which do say something true. But that does not mean we will agree about how that truth needs to be treated and applied. I seriously fell off my chair laughing at your response here Edgar. Just stop for a moment, and see this from an equally true alternative angle. What are you drawing on is obviously true. But it's obviously true to everyone. You don't own the obvious part Edgar. We all own that part. What you own, is how you apply it. You own your methods. You own your reasoning. You own your conclusions. But you own the original obviousness, that you can attach obviousness to your conclusions. That you cannot do. Or you can, but you won't be taking rationality or logic with you. So you won't be taking other serious thinkers either. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:53:30 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not because their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each other's presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical. I don't see that you make your point here. How does your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame get around anything? Because it is not that consciousness follows rules, it is that rules are the result of one conscious experience modeling others. What we can know about the universe outside of our body is limited by our body. The mind has different limitations, but it is much more directly sensitive to physics than our body, and its view of other bodies. ISTM rather that the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical because when placed under examination at any scale it can be observed to adhere to an unvarying and causally-closed set of rules (the ones we group under the heading of physical). That's because the variation is closed to our vantage point. If an alien astronomer looked at any individual or group of people, they would conclude a causally-closed set of rules as well, but that's only because they are looking at the behavior of our bodies. The behavior of bodies is not that interesting compared to the aesthetic content of experiences. You could have a life changing epiphany and the alien astronomer would see nothing very interesting. In effect, it appears to be a mechanism at all scales. Appears. What about feels? Why would mechanisms have an experience that feels like something? The inexorable progress of this analysis of physical appearances has so far trumped every historical attempt to interpolate novel top-down rules operating at other levels (spiritualism, vitalism, holism, dualism etc.). Because it is looking for the head (temporary experiences) at the tail end (bodies in space). They are aesthetically orthogonal views. If you measure something with an instrument, you can only measure the outside of the instrument interacting with the outside of another body. The result is an inside out view of the universe. Comp, as I've said, at the least confronts the problem and offers the possible shape of a solution (but that alone, of course, doesn't guarantee its correctness). Yes, Comp is almost correct, but at the absolute level, when it comes to putting the horse of sense before the cart of information, it gets it exactly wrong. The value of any genuinely new insight (Relativity Theory, for example) is not in ignoring the previous theory (Newtonian mechanics in this case) but rather in providing a better explanation for the predictions of the old theory whilst simultaneously making new and surprising ones that turn out to match observation better. This is not about making predictions, although someone could take it in that directions. This is about understanding the nature of consciousness and physics. Consequently, if your theory is to prevail, it must be able to explain why appearance - and especially the appearance of conscious behaviour, not excluding your own - conforms to physical causation as precisely as we observe. Because observation is a narrow constraint on sense which is invariably reflected in the result of the observation. Why do the Blind Men each conclude that the elephant is a different thing? You are underestimating the depth of the pansensitivity that I'm proposing - which is what I have come to expect. Turning your model of the universe inside out takes some practice. When I say that sense is Absolutely Primordial, I mean that nothing - not appearances, not realism, not sanity or logic - nothing whatsoever is anything except a local feature within it. This physical conformity of appearance is the reason that the theory cannot avoid the POPJ - in essence that we don't need, or seem even be able to apply, the notion of consciousness or sense to explain why the creatures that appear to us - including ourselves - make the claims to those phenomena that they do. What you say above doesn't suffice to address this formidable issue at all. It's not formidable if you bite the bullet and actually consider the sense primitive without equivocating. Once you see that logic is a kind of sense but sense is not a kind of logic, then everything falls into place nicely. As long as you try to force the concrete presence of sensation and sense-making into an abstract theory, the hard problem will always be formidable.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Jesse, No, it's not just semantics. It's my definition of the present moment. You claim the present moment means something else, but then you don't even believe there IS a present moment which seems a little strange! But be that as it may. The example you give is just standard relativity theory, just a restatement of the twins. As you yourself note it is frame dependent so that doesn't address my question. There are still two frames with two different clock times that DO NOT agree on any shared coordinate time. Your claim that they are at the SAME point in coordinate time when they meet up again seems to imply there is some absolute time common to both twins. If this is NOT your claim, and any particular coordinate time (such as the example you give of a clock left behind with the earth bound twin) is used to somehow claim that they are both at the SAME point in spacetime that would equally be true of a clock that traveled with the OTHER twin. If that is your point then you are still faced with the same problem that those 2 coordinate times do not agree. They claim different coordinate times for the same present moment meeting of the twins and you are faced with the exact same problem you were before, of 2 different clock times AND now coordinate times also in the same actual present moment. It seems to be that you are saying that coordinate time is just some arbitrary choice of clock time. If that's not what you are saying then please explain how the coordinate time in your example in your last sentence differs from the simply being the clock time of the stay at home twin, and why O why should the returning twin accept that, rather than his own clock time, as the ACTUAL time of the meeting up at the same point in spacetime? See my point? Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:45:17 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Jesse, Not correct. My present moment does NOT say that there is an objective common present moment for events that are *not* at the same point in spaceTIME (my emphasis). My theory says that there is a common universal present moment shared by all points in SPACE, not spaceTIME. Because clocktimes can obviously have different t values within that present moment. That's just semantics, I was using the standard terminology of relativity, if you want to change the meaning of terms you're free to translate my statement into your own terminology, but I don't think I got the *meaning* of your theory wrong. When I said not at the same point in spacetime I meant events that someone using the labeling system of mainstream physics would say occur at different points in spacetime, which in terms of your own theory could cover both events at different p-times as well as events at the same p-time but different points in space. You believe that for any pair of events that a physicist says happen at different points in spacetime, there is an objective truth about whether they happened at the same time, different points in space or different times. The set of all events that are happening at the same p-time as what I am experiencing here and now would be the objective common present moment, and these are events a physicist would label as having different points in spacetime, regardless of how you would label them. So that's what I meant when I said that you believed there was an objective common present moment for events that are not at the same point in spacetime. Second, thanks for the long explication following, which I more or less agree with. But my question remains: If coordinate time is just an alternate coordinate system then for the twins to be at the SAME place in that coordinate system there must be some actual t-value describing that point that both twins agree upon. What is that t value, and how does it relate to the t values of the clock times of the twins' two different clocks? Actual t value in a specific coordinate system, or in some objective coordinate-independent sense? If the former then sure, within the context of any given inertial coordinate system there is a specific t-value where they reunite. You asked in another comment I hadn't responded to yet for an example, so I'll give you one here. Suppose we have an inertial coordinate system in which the Earth is at rest (ignoring the fact that it orbits and doesn't really move inertially for the sake of argument), and in this system it's located at position x=0 light-years, and there is another distant planet which I'll call Planet X which is 24 light years away from Earth, and at rest in Earth's frame so it's always located at x=24 light years in this frame (assume they both lie along the x-axis so the other spatial dimensions can be ignored). At t=0 years in this system, two twins, Alan and Bob, are born on Earth, and each one is given a
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
Hi Telmo, No, because I don't have to remember that my clock moved. I can actually OBSERVE it in the process of moving. That's one of many reasons block times including Bruno's don't make sense. I don't accept that QM indeterminacy is dependent on the existence of a human observer. That's simply nutty as the human observation 'causes' collapse interpretation always was. Decoherence conclusively falsifies it... As for Russell's theory that everything exists it depends on how it is understood. I would agree, and in my book on Reality I note this, that reality consists of everything that actually exists. In that sense everything that does exist does actually exist. But if it is meant in what I take to be Bruno's sense that everything, in say some human notion (Bruno's) of what arithmetic is, exists in some Platonic non actual, non observable sense, then there is no evidence for that. Also Russell seems to misunderstand the notion of nothing. It is most certainly not =everything. And I am very careful with the notion of causality. In my book I note that in a computational universe there is no actual causality in the usual sense because we can't really claim that 1+1 causes 2. I note that there is no actual term for causality in ANY equation of science. Causality is simply a metatheory that describes the fact of the time sequential order of computations. When we are able to deprecate causality that leads to a number of important other conclusions that I describe in my book... Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 3:24:05 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Edgar, Block time and Bruno's comp can only tell us how a set fixed static sequence of events could be perceived by some observer as a fixed static sequence of events. It simply CANNOT tell us how time moves ALONG that sequence. The fact that time flows, that things change, is a fundamental EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION. It is not some intuitive illusion. It is the basic measurable observation of our existence and it never ceases from birth to death. Can you show me this to be the case with resorting to some memory? If not, can you see why you cannot possibly be sure of what you just said? It simply cannot be disregarded as some sort of survival mechanism. In fact if block time were actually real survival mechanisms would not be needed because the future is already written deterministically contrary to QM and in violation of all sorts of physical laws. Here I claim that you still fail to understand Everett's and Bruno's ideas. First person indeterminacy is precisely how you recover QM at the 1p level from a static 3p multiverse. There is no proof that these ideas are correct and your is wrong, but there is proof that you cannot just dismiss like I do here. If you think block time exists then where does that entire block come from? Did it create itself? Sequentially or all at once? Did something outside of it create it? What? How? Here I like Russells' Theory of Nothing. You probably already know about the book: http://www.hpcoders.com.au/nothing.html But if I had to ĂĽber-summarise the relevant part here: Nothing = everything, then add the anthropic principle. (I hope Russell isn't too annoyed by this) Again, nothing is certain, but it's an interesting possibility to contemplate. Was it created causally in time? Or did it just magically appear like some kind of miracle? The believers in block time have an unfortunate habit of not thinking through the implications of their crazy theory. Careful with this causality concept. The believers in causality have similar habits... Again, the best way I can say it is that your mouth has to move plenty to tell me it isn't moving! There are a lot of memories of my mouth moving, that's for sure :) Cheers Telmo. Best, Edgar On Friday, January 31, 2014 8:08:32 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Edgar, On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 at 1:13 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Liz, Your mouth sure has to move a lot to tell us it's not moving! The problem is not that static equations DESCRIBE aspects of reality. The problem is that you are denying the flow of time. Why is this a problem? How can you know for sure that there is a flow of time? Block universe hypothesis can explain how time would appear to flow for each observer. This doesn't prove that block universe hypothesis are correct, but they cannot be dismissed that easily either. Now you could argue that this is counter-intuitive, but I would remind you that nature doesn't care. Our intuition is just a bunch of heuristics evolved to deal with a very narrow set of survival scenarios. For equations to compute (not just describe) reality, there must be active processor cycles. There is simply NO way around that...
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Jesse, PS: If coordinate time is just saying that when the twins meet up again they are actually at the SAME point in spacetime, but we don't know (can't agree) what clock time that corresponds to then I agree completely. That is exactly what my theory says and what I've always said. I just call that same point in spacetime the present moment because it's standard nomenclature, and it's consistent with everyone's direct experiential observation. Is that your understanding of coordinate time? Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:45:17 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Jesse, Not correct. My present moment does NOT say that there is an objective common present moment for events that are *not* at the same point in spaceTIME (my emphasis). My theory says that there is a common universal present moment shared by all points in SPACE, not spaceTIME. Because clocktimes can obviously have different t values within that present moment. That's just semantics, I was using the standard terminology of relativity, if you want to change the meaning of terms you're free to translate my statement into your own terminology, but I don't think I got the *meaning* of your theory wrong. When I said not at the same point in spacetime I meant events that someone using the labeling system of mainstream physics would say occur at different points in spacetime, which in terms of your own theory could cover both events at different p-times as well as events at the same p-time but different points in space. You believe that for any pair of events that a physicist says happen at different points in spacetime, there is an objective truth about whether they happened at the same time, different points in space or different times. The set of all events that are happening at the same p-time as what I am experiencing here and now would be the objective common present moment, and these are events a physicist would label as having different points in spacetime, regardless of how you would label them. So that's what I meant when I said that you believed there was an objective common present moment for events that are not at the same point in spacetime. Second, thanks for the long explication following, which I more or less agree with. But my question remains: If coordinate time is just an alternate coordinate system then for the twins to be at the SAME place in that coordinate system there must be some actual t-value describing that point that both twins agree upon. What is that t value, and how does it relate to the t values of the clock times of the twins' two different clocks? Actual t value in a specific coordinate system, or in some objective coordinate-independent sense? If the former then sure, within the context of any given inertial coordinate system there is a specific t-value where they reunite. You asked in another comment I hadn't responded to yet for an example, so I'll give you one here. Suppose we have an inertial coordinate system in which the Earth is at rest (ignoring the fact that it orbits and doesn't really move inertially for the sake of argument), and in this system it's located at position x=0 light-years, and there is another distant planet which I'll call Planet X which is 24 light years away from Earth, and at rest in Earth's frame so it's always located at x=24 light years in this frame (assume they both lie along the x-axis so the other spatial dimensions can be ignored). At t=0 years in this system, two twins, Alan and Bob, are born on Earth, and each one is given a clock to mark their age (proper time). Then Bob is immediately placed on a ship which accelerates in a negligible time to 0.8c in the Earth frame, after which it moves at constant velocity towards Planet X. Since Planet X is 24 light-years away it arrives there after 24/0.8 = 30 years, at time t=30 in the Earth frame. Then the ship accelerates in a negligible time so it is moving at 0.6c back towards Earth. Then the return leg will take a time of 24/0.6 = 40 years in the Earth frame. So when Bob returns to Earth, a total of 30+40 years have elapsed in the Earth frame, so they reunite at coordinate time t=70 in this frame (and position x=0, since Earth is at rest at this position). Since Alan has been at rest on Earth the whole time, his clock has been keeping pace with coordinate time in this frame (or with the actual physical clocks at rest in this frame which can be used to define coordinate time, as I mentioned in my last comment), so he will be 70 years old. To find Bob's age we must use the time dilation equation, which says that if a clock is moving at speed v relative to a given inertial frame, in a time interval of T in that frame it will only elapse a time of T*sqrt(1 - v^2/c^2). So if the first leg of the journey from
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
Stathis, I rereply a statement you made. On 31 Jan 2014, at 01:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 31 January 2014 04:19, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't think there is a problem if consciousness is an epiphenomenon. Is it not that very idea which leads to the notion of zombie? If consciousness is an epiphenomenon, eliminating it would change nothing in the 3p. There can be no zombies if consciousness is epiphenomenal. Just to be sure, I agree with that. I asked why? because I was thinking at the meta-level. The problem, is that if we can conceive that consciousness is epiphenomenal, we can conceive that consciousness does not exist. That is why I am afraid that epiphenomenalism makes a step toward the elimination of the person. With comp we can eliminate or own person or ego, but that's the kind of thing which needs our own personal consent. Equivalently, if consciousness is epiphenomenal we could say it does not really exist and we are all zombies; but I think that's just semantics, and misleading. As I said, that's eliminativism. Now tell me, is it a crime to torture a p-zombie? I know a three years kids who broke a doll purposefully. Should we send the kid in jail? In an asylum? Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, even if the brain might have arbitrary choices in some of the way to sum up big chunks of informations available for the person in act. Consciousness might better be seen as phenomenal, 1p. It depends on truth, self, and relative consistency. Bruno If you start looking for consciousness being an extra thing with (perhaps) its own separate causal efficacy, that's where problems arise. Dualism is a problem. Making consciousness epiphenomenal is not satisfying, and basically contradicted in the everyday life. It is because pain is unpleasant that we take anesthetic medicine. The brain is obliged to lie at some (uncknown, crypted) level, not for consciousness (that it filters), but for pain and joy. That's normal. If you run toward the lion mouth, you lower the probability of surviving. Epiphenomenalism does not eliminate consciousness, but it still eliminate conscience and persons. I don't think it diminishes the significance of consciousness, but maybe I just look at it differently. With comp I think we avoid it, even if the solution will appear to be very Platonist, as truth, beauty, and universal values (mostly unknown) will be more real than their local terrestrial approximations through primitively physical brains and other interacting molecules like galaxies foam. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
Found it! On Friday, January 31, 2014 11:45:24 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 31 January 2014 01:52, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: The we of individual human beings relies on physical consistency because that is a common sensory experience of the animalorganismsubstance context. The substance context however relies on the we of the Absolute context. The biological context relies on those wes, and the animal context relies on the biological wes. It's all nested but the bottom of each extrinsic level is being supported by the top of the previous intrinsic level. I'm not sure I fully grasp all of the above, but I would like to tackle you again on the POPJ, because I still can't see how your model can succeed in avoiding it. Let me start by telling you about a movie I streamed last night - Inception (I'm a bit behindhand on popular movies!). It was quite an enjoyable yarn, but it struck me as pretty flaky, even as science fiction, not least because the plot is built on the idea that dreams could be experienced (and even nested dream-within-dream) with near-waking physical consistency. This got me reflecting on what does indeed distinguish dreams from waking reality (acknowledging of course that both are virtual presentations from the personal perspective). I don't know about your dreams, but in mine things have the darnedest habit of disappearing or turning into something else when I look away and this, presumably, is because sleeping-dreams are different to waking-dreams in that their appearances are not in general stabilised by anything extrinsic to the brain and body. By extrinsic here I am not committing to the ultimate nature of the brain and its environment, merely that all our experiences - metaphorised as dreams, or in a more up-to-date image, a multi-player video-game - must depend on some generalised and consistent system of appearances for consistency and stabilisation. It turns out, indeed, that the system of appearances our internal video game depends on is detailed, consistent and stable to the most extraordinary degree; let us call this stable, exhaustive and reliably causally-complete set of appearances the game-physics. And the avatars that appear to us within the game - bodies and brains, our own and others' - turn out to follow the rules of the game-physics precisely in conformity with the set of appearances as a whole, to the furthermost extent we can explore. The logical consequence of the above is just this: Even if you consider that the sensory nature of that-which-exists extends, beyond our personal virtual presentations, to the whole of reality itself, one can still not avoid the encounter in waking-dreams with avatars (including one's own) that cheerfully lay claim to sensory phenomena that are supernumerary in explaining their behaviour in terms of its own rules-of-appearance (i.e. the game-physics), and which they could not logically have access to in terms of those very rules. Hence these sensory phenomena cannot be the cause of these claims. This, again is the POPJ. ISTM that it is unavoidable in any schema, whether primitive-sensory or primitive-physical, in which no further logical entailment is discoverable in the causally-complete machinations of the game-physics. The POPJ is not a problem at all for MSR. MSR is a solution to POPJ because judgments are just other kinds of sensations than public facing sensations. Judgments are cognitive qualia, and qualia is 1) beyond function, and 2) transparent and reflective (metaphorically) to other kinds of qualia. Instead of starting from the assumption of isolation in which sensations have to be added on top of our separateness, I start from the assumption of unity at the Absolute, which is diffracted locally through insensitivity. Thus in some sense we are all the same experience. In others we are experience of all organisms. In others we are experiences of animals, etc, all the way down to our unique narrative experience. With sense as primordial, all appearances of separation are derived from insensitivity. Thanks, Craig I've tried to set out the problem as clearly as I can and I would be grateful if you could respond directly with a reasoned consideration of how your theory might circumvent this formidable logical obstacle. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 2/1/2014 2:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 1 February 2014 16:48, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/31/2014 9:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: We are potentially immortal in the same way as a car can potentially survive indefinitely provided parts can be repaired or replaced indefinitely. At present, we can repair or replace some parts in the human body, but not enough to prolong life for more than a few years. Actually I think we can make people live indefinitely now. I have seriously considered starting a business to do this. I certainly think I can do it more legitimately than those cryogenic preservation services. What I would do it is gather as much information about the person as possible. If they were still alive this would include extensive video recordings and interviews. Then they would be 3d-modeled in CGI, with adjustment of age appearance as desired. This model would then be inserted as an avatar of the person in an artificial CGI world, similar to many computer games. The avatar would be provided with an AI based on all the writings, video, interviews etc so that it would respond like the person modeled in most conversation. It could access current events etc from the internet so it would be able to discuss things. Would the avatar be conscious? According to Bruno it would be if it's AI were Lobian - which isn't that hard. But really it's beside the point. AI, such as Watson, could easily appear as conscious and intelligent as your 90yr old aunt and tell the stories she tells and exhibit the quirks she has. Would the avatar be alive? conscious? Who would care? Not the loved ones that paid to preserve Grandma for future generations. Anybody want to invest? It'll take big bucks to do it right. If you really could do that, we could send these AI's into the world to work for us and represent us. That would be a much more ambitious project to implement the CGI avatars as robots so they could act in the world. I'm proposing something much less difficult, something half-way between the robot avatar and a collection of videos of Grandma. We are nowhere near doing that. Then there is the additional question of whether the AI is a continuation of the person's consciousness. Indeed. And supposing I created an avatar of Grandma with whom you could interact via your computer monitor, what would be the ethical implications of turning off Grandma1.0 or of erasing Grandma1.0? Would the answer turn on whether we could show Grandma1.0 was conscious? I think not. But it seems that most people on this list think that's the crucial point. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 2/1/2014 2:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Feb 2014, at 06:48, meekerdb wrote: On 1/31/2014 9:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: We are potentially immortal in the same way as a car can potentially survive indefinitely provided parts can be repaired or replaced indefinitely. At present, we can repair or replace some parts in the human body, but not enough to prolong life for more than a few years. Actually I think we can make people live indefinitely now. I have seriously considered starting a business to do this. I certainly think I can do it more legitimately than those cryogenic preservation services. What I would do it is gather as much information about the person as possible. If they were still alive this would include extensive video recordings and interviews. Then they would be 3d-modeled in CGI, with adjustment of age appearance as desired. This model would then be inserted as an avatar of the person in an artificial CGI world, similar to many computer games. The avatar would be provided with an AI based on all the writings, video, interviews etc so that it would respond like the person modeled in most conversation. It could access current events etc from the internet so it would be able to discuss things. Would the avatar be conscious? According to Bruno it would be if it's AI were Lobian - which isn't that hard. But really it's beside the point. AI, such as Watson, could easily appear as conscious and intelligent as your 90yr old aunt and tell the stories she tells and exhibit the quirks she has. Would the avatar be alive? conscious? Who would care? Not the loved ones that paid to preserve Grandma for future generations. Anybody want to invest? It'll take big bucks to do it right. Is that not the normal future of facebook or Linkedin, or personal family memory? That is like saying yes to the current doctor, meaning, that the level is *very* high. But it will go lower and lower. The children will not be glad. It is already annoying to listen to grandpa nth account of 14-18, every sunday, but now, you have to listen to grandpa and grandma, and to their grandgrand-pa, and their grandgrand-ma, and so one. But at least you can turn them off. Chinese have a name for that, it is the cult of ancestors. It is good, it is human. You can do money but you have to act quickly, because that emerges naturally from the net. Exactly. The only thing lagging is the AI. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 4:28 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Jesse, PS: If coordinate time is just saying that when the twins meet up again they are actually at the SAME point in spacetime, but we don't know (can't agree) what clock time that corresponds to then I agree completely. There is no objective fact to know or not know, it's just a matter of labeling, just like with x and y coordinates used to label points on a 2D plane. That is exactly what my theory says and what I've always said. I just call that same point in spacetime the present moment because it's standard nomenclature, and it's consistent with everyone's direct experiential observation. But don't you go beyond that and say that there is an objective truth about whether events that *don't* happen at the same point in spacetime--like an event happening to me here in Providence and an event happening to someone else in Paris--happen at the same time or not? Isn't the present moment supposed to say that a bunch of events spread throughout space are all happening now? If so, then as I said there is no logical justification for going from there is an objective truth about whether two events coincide at the same point in spacetime to there is an objective present, such that there is an objective truth about whether two events happened at the same time even if they didn't coincide in spacetime. Jesse On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:45:17 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Jesse, Not correct. My present moment does NOT say that there is an objective common present moment for events that are *not* at the same point in spaceTIME (my emphasis). My theory says that there is a common universal present moment shared by all points in SPACE, not spaceTIME. Because clocktimes can obviously have different t values within that present moment. That's just semantics, I was using the standard terminology of relativity, if you want to change the meaning of terms you're free to translate my statement into your own terminology, but I don't think I got the *meaning* of your theory wrong. When I said not at the same point in spacetime I meant events that someone using the labeling system of mainstream physics would say occur at different points in spacetime, which in terms of your own theory could cover both events at different p-times as well as events at the same p-time but different points in space. You believe that for any pair of events that a physicist says happen at different points in spacetime, there is an objective truth about whether they happened at the same time, different points in space or different times. The set of all events that are happening at the same p-time as what I am experiencing here and now would be the objective common present moment, and these are events a physicist would label as having different points in spacetime, regardless of how you would label them. So that's what I meant when I said that you believed there was an objective common present moment for events that are not at the same point in spacetime. Second, thanks for the long explication following, which I more or less agree with. But my question remains: If coordinate time is just an alternate coordinate system then for the twins to be at the SAME place in that coordinate system there must be some actual t-value describing that point that both twins agree upon. What is that t value, and how does it relate to the t values of the clock times of the twins' two different clocks? Actual t value in a specific coordinate system, or in some objective coordinate-independent sense? If the former then sure, within the context of any given inertial coordinate system there is a specific t-value where they reunite. You asked in another comment I hadn't responded to yet for an example, so I'll give you one here. Suppose we have an inertial coordinate system in which the Earth is at rest (ignoring the fact that it orbits and doesn't really move inertially for the sake of argument), and in this system it's located at position x=0 light-years, and there is another distant planet which I'll call Planet X which is 24 light years away from Earth, and at rest in Earth's frame so it's always located at x=24 light years in this frame (assume they both lie along the x-axis so the other spatial dimensions can be ignored). At t=0 years in this system, two twins, Alan and Bob, are born on Earth, and each one is given a clock to mark their age (proper time). Then Bob is immediately placed on a ship which accelerates in a negligible time to 0.8c in the Earth frame, after which it moves at constant velocity towards Planet X. Since Planet X is 24 light-years away it arrives there after 24/0.8 = 30 years, at time t=30 in the Earth frame. Then the ship accelerates in a negligible time so it is moving at 0.6c back towards Earth. Then the return leg
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 2 February 2014 08:41, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: There can be no zombies if consciousness is epiphenomenal. Just to be sure, I agree with that. I asked why? because I was thinking at the meta-level. The problem, is that if we can conceive that consciousness is epiphenomenal, we can conceive that consciousness does not exist. That is why I am afraid that epiphenomenalism makes a step toward the elimination of the person. With comp we can eliminate or own person or ego, but that's the kind of thing which needs our own personal consent. Another way to look at it is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal then it necessarily exists. Equivalently, if consciousness is epiphenomenal we could say it does not really exist and we are all zombies; but I think that's just semantics, and misleading. As I said, that's eliminativism. Now tell me, is it a crime to torture a p-zombie? I know a three years kids who broke a doll purposefully. Should we send the kid in jail? In an asylum? Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, even if the brain might have arbitrary choices in some of the way to sum up big chunks of informations available for the person in act. Consciousness might better be seen as phenomenal, 1p. It depends on truth, self, and relative consistency. If the dolls lack consciousness then it is not a crime to torture them. Whether the consciousness is epiphenomenal or not is irrelevant. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 5:48:04 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: On 2 February 2014 08:41, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript: wrote: There can be no zombies if consciousness is epiphenomenal. Just to be sure, I agree with that. I asked why? because I was thinking at the meta-level. The problem, is that if we can conceive that consciousness is epiphenomenal, we can conceive that consciousness does not exist. That is why I am afraid that epiphenomenalism makes a step toward the elimination of the person. With comp we can eliminate or own person or ego, but that's the kind of thing which needs our own personal consent. Another way to look at it is that if consciousness is epiphenomenal then it necessarily exists. Equivalently, if consciousness is epiphenomenal we could say it does not really exist and we are all zombies; but I think that's just semantics, and misleading. As I said, that's eliminativism. Now tell me, is it a crime to torture a p-zombie? I know a three years kids who broke a doll purposefully. Should we send the kid in jail? In an asylum? Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, even if the brain might have arbitrary choices in some of the way to sum up big chunks of informations available for the person in act. Consciousness might better be seen as phenomenal, 1p. It depends on truth, self, and relative consistency. If the dolls lack consciousness then it is not a crime to torture them. Whether the consciousness is epiphenomenal or not is irrelevant. There is potentially an argument that torturing anything, even fictionally, could have negative consequences over time. it could conceivably build a tolerance for sadism and cruelty, both neurologically and culturally. The suppression of fictional torture could have negative consequences too though. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On 1 February 2014 21:49, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Found it! On Friday, January 31, 2014 11:45:24 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 31 January 2014 01:52, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: The we of individual human beings relies on physical consistency because that is a common sensory experience of the animalorganismsubstance context. The substance context however relies on the we of the Absolute context. The biological context relies on those wes, and the animal context relies on the biological wes. It's all nested but the bottom of each extrinsic level is being supported by the top of the previous intrinsic level. I'm not sure I fully grasp all of the above, but I would like to tackle you again on the POPJ, because I still can't see how your model can succeed in avoiding it. Let me start by telling you about a movie I streamed last night - Inception (I'm a bit behindhand on popular movies!). It was quite an enjoyable yarn, but it struck me as pretty flaky, even as science fiction, not least because the plot is built on the idea that dreams could be experienced (and even nested dream-within-dream) with near-waking physical consistency. This got me reflecting on what does indeed distinguish dreams from waking reality (acknowledging of course that both are virtual presentations from the personal perspective). I don't know about your dreams, but in mine things have the darnedest habit of disappearing or turning into something else when I look away and this, presumably, is because sleeping-dreams are different to waking-dreams in that their appearances are not in general stabilised by anything extrinsic to the brain and body. By extrinsic here I am not committing to the ultimate nature of the brain and its environment, merely that all our experiences - metaphorised as dreams, or in a more up-to-date image, a multi-player video-game - must depend on some generalised and consistent system of appearances for consistency and stabilisation. It turns out, indeed, that the system of appearances our internal video game depends on is detailed, consistent and stable to the most extraordinary degree; let us call this stable, exhaustive and reliably causally-complete set of appearances the game-physics. And the avatars that appear to us within the game - bodies and brains, our own and others' - turn out to follow the rules of the game-physics precisely in conformity with the set of appearances as a whole, to the furthermost extent we can explore. The logical consequence of the above is just this: Even if you consider that the sensory nature of that-which-exists extends, beyond our personal virtual presentations, to the whole of reality itself, one can still not avoid the encounter in waking-dreams with avatars (including one's own) that cheerfully lay claim to sensory phenomena that are supernumerary in explaining their behaviour in terms of its own rules-of-appearance (i.e. the game-physics), and which they could not logically have access to in terms of those very rules. Hence these sensory phenomena cannot be the cause of these claims. This, again is the POPJ. ISTM that it is unavoidable in any schema, whether primitive-sensory or primitive-physical, in which no further logical entailment is discoverable in the causally-complete machinations of the game-physics. The POPJ is not a problem at all for MSR. Pleased to hear it. Why? MSR is a solution to POPJ because judgments are just other kinds of sensations than public facing sensations. Doesn't help. In your theory, everything is of course hypothesised to be just one sort of sensation or another - that's obviously the case for any kind of idealist or panpsychist schema. The point I'm laboriously trying to get you to acknowledge is that move doesn't get you off this particular hook. See below. Judgments are cognitive qualia, and qualia is 1) beyond function, and 2) transparent and reflective (metaphorically) to other kinds of qualia. That's as may be, but we're precisely talking about qualitatively-instantiated appearances and likewise the ubiquitous evidence of a rigorous and causally closed set of game-physics followed by those appearances. I take it that you don't deny that this is a defining aspect of your own experience? It certainly is of mine. The stabilisation of experience by stringently rule-following appearances is what I was alluding to in my contrasting of the dreaming and waking states. Instead of starting from the assumption of isolation in which sensations have to be added on top of our separateness, I start from the assumption of unity at the Absolute, which is diffracted locally through insensitivity. Thus in some sense we are all the same experience. In others we are experience of all organisms. In others we are experiences of animals, etc, all the way down to our unique narrative experience. With sense as primordial, all appearances of
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Jesse, You already told us that the twins ARE at the same point in spacetime when they meet up again. Is that not an OBJECTIVE fact? Do we not actually KNOW that? The twins most certainly DO KNOW it because they can shake hands and look at each other's clocks at the same time. How can you claim it if it is not a fact and knowable? Label or not, it is a knowable fact that both twins agree on. If we agree then that the twins ARE at the SAME point of spacetime when they meet again, then they must be at the same point in TIME as well as in space. I call that same point in time what everyone else does, the present moment. 1. This clearly demonstrates there is an ACTUAL same point of TIME independent of clock time. 2. This establishes an actual local same time independent of clock time but not a universal actual same time. 2. But the proof that that actual same point in time is common and universal is simple: a. The twins are at the same actual point in time both before and after the trip. b. The twins are always in their OWN local present moment continuously during the trip. c. Therefore during the trip there must always be a one to one correspondence between those actual present moments even though the clock times are not in synch. Because they both begin and end in that present moment and never leave it during the trip. d. This will be true for all observers, therefore there IS a common universal present moment. It's simple logic... Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 5:18:38 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 4:28 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Jesse, PS: If coordinate time is just saying that when the twins meet up again they are actually at the SAME point in spacetime, but we don't know (can't agree) what clock time that corresponds to then I agree completely. There is no objective fact to know or not know, it's just a matter of labeling, just like with x and y coordinates used to label points on a 2D plane. That is exactly what my theory says and what I've always said. I just call that same point in spacetime the present moment because it's standard nomenclature, and it's consistent with everyone's direct experiential observation. But don't you go beyond that and say that there is an objective truth about whether events that *don't* happen at the same point in spacetime--like an event happening to me here in Providence and an event happening to someone else in Paris--happen at the same time or not? Isn't the present moment supposed to say that a bunch of events spread throughout space are all happening now? If so, then as I said there is no logical justification for going from there is an objective truth about whether two events coincide at the same point in spacetime to there is an objective present, such that there is an objective truth about whether two events happened at the same time even if they didn't coincide in spacetime. Jesse On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:45:17 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Jesse, Not correct. My present moment does NOT say that there is an objective common present moment for events that are *not* at the same point in spaceTIME (my emphasis). My theory says that there is a common universal present moment shared by all points in SPACE, not spaceTIME. Because clocktimes can obviously have different t values within that present moment. That's just semantics, I was using the standard terminology of relativity, if you want to change the meaning of terms you're free to translate my statement into your own terminology, but I don't think I got the *meaning* of your theory wrong. When I said not at the same point in spacetime I meant events that someone using the labeling system of mainstream physics would say occur at different points in spacetime, which in terms of your own theory could cover both events at different p-times as well as events at the same p-time but different points in space. You believe that for any pair of events that a physicist says happen at different points in spacetime, there is an objective truth about whether they happened at the same time, different points in space or different times. The set of all events that are happening at the same p-time as what I am experiencing here and now would be the objective common present moment, and these are events a physicist would label as having different points in spacetime, regardless of how you would label them. So that's what I meant when I said that you believed there was an objective common present moment for events that are not at the same point in spacetime. Second, thanks for the long explication following, which I more or less agree with. But my question remains: If coordinate time is just an alternate coordinate system then for the twins to be at the SAME
Re: Unput and Onput
On 1 February 2014 20:33, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:53:30 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not because their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each other's presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical. I don't see that you make your point here. How does your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame get around anything? Because it is not that consciousness follows rules, it is that rules are the result of one conscious experience modeling others. What we can know about the universe outside of our body is limited by our body. The mind has different limitations, but it is much more directly sensitive to physics than our body, and its view of other bodies. Right, so the mind transcends the limits of the brain in its ability to make contact with physics? Is this supposed to mean that you are capable of thoughts that are not minutely correlated with some behaviour of your brain? If so, how do you explain how those thoughts acquire their sensitivity to physics or any purchase on the universe outside the body? ISTM rather that the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical because when placed under examination at any scale it can be observed to adhere to an unvarying and causally-closed set of rules (the ones we group under the heading of physical). That's because the variation is closed to our vantage point. If an alien astronomer looked at any individual or group of people, they would conclude a causally-closed set of rules as well, but that's only because they are looking at the behavior of our bodies. The behavior of bodies is not that interesting compared to the aesthetic content of experiences. You could have a life changing epiphany and the alien astronomer would see nothing very interesting. But that, my dear Craig, is my very point, don't you see? Because amongst those uninteresting behaviours is the ability to lay claim to the possession of those very aesthetic experiences and those selfsame epiphanies. In effect, it appears to be a mechanism at all scales. Appears. What about feels? Why would mechanisms have an experience that feels like something? And there you have it! My point exactly - why indeed? But you would have been more correct to say why would mechanisms *claim* to have an experience that feels like something. And, a fortiori, how? Don't look away - this is the POPJ. The inexorable progress of this analysis of physical appearances has so far trumped every historical attempt to interpolate novel top-down rules operating at other levels (spiritualism, vitalism, holism, dualism etc.). Because it is looking for the head (temporary experiences) at the tail end (bodies in space). They are aesthetically orthogonal views. If you measure something with an instrument, you can only measure the outside of the instrument interacting with the outside of another body. The result is an inside out view of the universe. True, but that inside-out view must be intelligibly correlated - and in astoundingly-precise detail at that - with the outside-in view. Else you are hard pressed to explain why they appear to co-vary in such exquisite detail. The emergence of the POPJ in both theories is a sign that neither a purely outside-in, nor a purely inside-out theory, can do the job of correlating consciousness with the appearance of mechanism. Comp, as I've said, at the least confronts the problem and offers the possible shape of a solution (but that alone, of course, doesn't guarantee its correctness). Yes, Comp is almost correct, but at the absolute level, when it comes to putting the horse of sense before the cart of information, it gets it exactly wrong. Only if you impose your particular prejudices on it by fiat. The value of any genuinely new insight (Relativity Theory, for example) is not in ignoring the previous theory (Newtonian mechanics in this case) but rather in providing a better explanation for the predictions of the old theory whilst simultaneously making new and surprising ones that turn out to match observation better. This is not about making predictions, although someone could take it in that directions. This is about understanding the nature of consciousness and physics. Which as I've said must correlate the two whilst eliminating neither. Consequently, if your theory is to prevail, it must be able to explain why appearance - and especially the appearance of conscious behaviour, not excluding
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Sat, Feb 01, 2014 at 03:46:37PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: c. Therefore during the trip there must always be a one to one correspondence between those actual present moments even though the clock times are not in synch. Because they both begin and end in that present moment and never leave it during the trip. It is here that your argument breaks down. Yes, there is a 1:1 correspondence (a bijection in fact) between the two clock times. But there are many possible such bijections, where you (implicitly) assume only a single one (perhaps the linear one). In SR there is a differnt bijection for each different inertial reference frame. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Jesse, You said it was just a label that seemed to imply otherwise, but I'm glad we agree it is an objective knowable fact that the twins meet in an ACTUAL same point in both time and space even with different clock times. That's what I've always exactly said the present moment was. By actual I mean that the twins AGREE, and will always agree, on being at the same point in time (in the same present moment) after they meet even though their clock times are different. That actual time obviously trumps their clock times on which they don't agree. Again if we accept the fact that the twins are in the same actual time before and after the trip let me tighten the duration argument up a little. Assume now that one twin stays at home but he now has billions of other twins. Now assume each of those traveling twins takes a relativistic trip from which they return sequentially one second apart for the next billion seconds. As agreed each twin will always arrive into the same ACTUAL point in time (my present moment) as the earth bound twin. Therefore we can conclude that there is a continuous common same actual point in time for all the twins over the next billion seconds from when they all leave till the last one returns, even though EVERY twin will have different clock times within that same actual time. Now assume there are an infinite number of twins and that they arrive continuously forever into the exact same actual point in time even though every one of their clock times is different. Thus the present moment must be universal and shared by all twins at all times. As for your 2D example, sure I agree that CLOCK time is just an equivalent dimension, but you are talking about CLOCK time, not the ACTUAL time that all twins arrive back into and AGREE UPON that is clearly NOT the same as clock time. There is only one valid conclusion here and that is that there is a common present moment (actual time) for all twins which is NOT equivalent to and is independent of clock time. That's because there can be NO single coordinate system that gives the same clock time for all the billions of traveling twins but there is a SAME actual time for all of them which is a knowable observable fact. Sure, you can choose a coordinate system arbitrarily, that is standard relativity theory. But there is NO single coordinate system that gives the same t value for all the billions of traveling twins, yet there is an agreed upon SINGLE actual time in which they meet and agree upon even though every one of those billions of twins has a different clock time. Therefore there must be a separate kind of actual time in which clock times vary that is not clock time, and is not any single coordinate time. Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 7:23:19 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 6:46 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Jesse, You already told us that the twins ARE at the same point in spacetime when they meet up again. Is that not an OBJECTIVE fact? Do we not actually KNOW that? The twins most certainly DO KNOW it because they can shake hands and look at each other's clocks at the same time. How can you claim it if it is not a fact and knowable? Label or not, it is a knowable fact that both twins agree on. Uh, I never said it wasn't an objective knowable fact that they meet and compare ages at a single point in spacetime, in fact I very clearly said there is an objective truth about whether two events coincide at the same point in spacetime. There is no objective fact about what specific time coordinate is associated with a given point in spacetime, because that depends entirely on arbitrary what event we choose to label as t=0 and how we define simultaneity. If we agree then that the twins ARE at the SAME point of spacetime when they meet again, then they must be at the same point in TIME as well as in space. With respect to any particular coordinate system for labeling time, sure, that's true. Similarly if two cars meet at the same point in space, they must be at the same y-coordinate as well as the same x-coordiante, regardless of how you choose to define your x and y axes. Are you going to address the 2D geometric analogy as I asked you to in my next-to-last post (the one before the one you are responding to here)? You do have a habit of not addressing questions and arguments that I put to you, even when I repeatedly ask you politely to address them. Whether you choose to address it or not, I will continue to compare all your statements to analogous statements one could make about 2D spatial geometry, in order to demonstrate to anyone reading along that the resulting conclusions would make no sense despite the fact that the argument appears to be precisely analogous. I call that same point in time what everyone else does, the present moment. 1. This clearly demonstrates there is an
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Russell, Sorry, but you miss my argument. The 1:1 correspondence is between actual or present moment time, not clock time. Please refer to my proximate responses to Jesse for the details of the argument. Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 8:21:48 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Feb 01, 2014 at 03:46:37PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: c. Therefore during the trip there must always be a one to one correspondence between those actual present moments even though the clock times are not in synch. Because they both begin and end in that present moment and never leave it during the trip. It is here that your argument breaks down. Yes, there is a 1:1 correspondence (a bijection in fact) between the two clock times. But there are many possible such bijections, where you (implicitly) assume only a single one (perhaps the linear one). In SR there is a differnt bijection for each different inertial reference frame. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
How to define finite
Maybe we can convert Bruno to Aristotelanism: https://web.math.princeton.edu/~nelson/papers/e.pdf Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 2/1/2014 9:46 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 7:57 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net mailto:edgaro...@att.net wrote: One might think it was the acceleration that slowed time on A's clock, BUT the point is that A's acceleration was only 1g throughout the entire trip which was exactly EQUAL to B's gravitational acceleration back on earth. So if the accelerations were exactly equal during the entire trip how could A's acceleration slow time but B's not slow time by the same amount? If A were going into space and accelerating upward off the surface of the Earth at one g (32 feet per second per second), then he would be experiencing 2g, one g from the Earth and one g from his continuing change in upward velocity. But A would experience acceleration quickly decreasing to 1g as he left the vicinity of the Earth. And the result wouldn't change if B entered a centrifuge and experienced an exactly equal acceleration while remaining on Earth. This is why I emphasize that it is NOT an effect of acceleration, it is a geometric effect of different path lengths. Brent both = 1g throughout the entire trip No, not during the entire trip. And if the space traveler ever wants to return to Earth to rejoin his friend so they can directly compare their clocks then he's going to have to change the direction of his acceleration by 180 degrees. So their clocks will not match because their travel experiences were not symmetrical. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Unput and Onput
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 7:56:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 20:33, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:53:30 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not because their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each other's presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical. I don't see that you make your point here. How does your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame get around anything? Because it is not that consciousness follows rules, it is that rules are the result of one conscious experience modeling others. What we can know about the universe outside of our body is limited by our body. The mind has different limitations, but it is much more directly sensitive to physics than our body, and its view of other bodies. Right, so the mind transcends the limits of the brain in its ability to make contact with physics? Is this supposed to mean that you are capable of thoughts that are not minutely correlated with some behaviour of your brain? If so, how do you explain how those thoughts acquire their sensitivity to physics or any purchase on the universe outside the body? You're framing it so that the brain appears as a viable thing on its own rather than as the knot of experience that I'm assuming it is. Physics, in my view, is nothing more or less than sense sensing itself. It's not that there is not minute correlation, it's that the brain activity correlates to nothing unless we import our own experience into the correlation. The brain is a character in the experience of those who can relate to having an animal's body. A neuron is a character in the experience of those who can relate to having a cell, or a group of cells for a body. To be clear, the body and brain (as we see them) are just as sensitive to physics as we are, but our view of that sensitivity is not direct. Our body filters, our brain filters, parts of ourselves are filtered, but part of us is unfiltered, and that is 'who' we are. Not a what, or a how, or a why, but irreducibly a personal experience of who. Who is the direct (if limited and privatized) experience of physics (sense). The what and how of public bodies is public physics (indirect sense). ISTM rather that the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical because when placed under examination at any scale it can be observed to adhere to an unvarying and causally-closed set of rules (the ones we group under the heading of physical). That's because the variation is closed to our vantage point. If an alien astronomer looked at any individual or group of people, they would conclude a causally-closed set of rules as well, but that's only because they are looking at the behavior of our bodies. The behavior of bodies is not that interesting compared to the aesthetic content of experiences. You could have a life changing epiphany and the alien astronomer would see nothing very interesting. But that, my dear Craig, is my very point, don't you see? Because amongst those uninteresting behaviours is the ability to lay claim to the possession of those very aesthetic experiences and those selfsame epiphanies. I'm saying that there are no uninteresting behaviors at all. It is not accessible from the outside. If it were not for the fact that we can correlate our own conscious experience with exotic magnetic resonance distribution patterns in the brain, something like a brain would seem no more worthy of inspection than the small intestine. It is like looking for the meaning of Shakespeare only in the grammar and punctuation of the play. It's the wrong place to look. The meaning is not visible there. In effect, it appears to be a mechanism at all scales. Appears. What about feels? Why would mechanisms have an experience that feels like something? And there you have it! My point exactly - why indeed? But you would have been more correct to say why would mechanisms *claim* to have an experience that feels like something. And, a fortiori, how? Don't look away - this is the POPJ. I'm not talking about the claim though. It doesn't make sense to claim something that cannot exist to begin with. I'm saying that experience cannot be invented in a mechanistic universe. It doesn't have a function. The inexorable progress of this analysis of physical appearances has so far trumped every historical attempt to interpolate novel top-down rules
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Jesse, Consider another case: Consider every observer in the entire universe. Every one of them is always currently in their own local actual time, their present moment. Now consider every last one of them all travel to meet up on earth. Every last one of them continually brings their own actual time with them through the whole trip with no discontinuities and when they meet up they discover that every last one of those local actual times turns out to be the exact SAME actual time, even if every one of their clock times is different. Therefore it is clear that the actual times every one of them was always in was the exact same actual time as all the others were always in, and that demonstrates that the actual times of every observer in the universe is the exact same actual time... Thus there must be a common universal present moment. Edgar On Saturday, February 1, 2014 7:23:19 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 6:46 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Jesse, You already told us that the twins ARE at the same point in spacetime when they meet up again. Is that not an OBJECTIVE fact? Do we not actually KNOW that? The twins most certainly DO KNOW it because they can shake hands and look at each other's clocks at the same time. How can you claim it if it is not a fact and knowable? Label or not, it is a knowable fact that both twins agree on. Uh, I never said it wasn't an objective knowable fact that they meet and compare ages at a single point in spacetime, in fact I very clearly said there is an objective truth about whether two events coincide at the same point in spacetime. There is no objective fact about what specific time coordinate is associated with a given point in spacetime, because that depends entirely on arbitrary what event we choose to label as t=0 and how we define simultaneity. If we agree then that the twins ARE at the SAME point of spacetime when they meet again, then they must be at the same point in TIME as well as in space. With respect to any particular coordinate system for labeling time, sure, that's true. Similarly if two cars meet at the same point in space, they must be at the same y-coordinate as well as the same x-coordiante, regardless of how you choose to define your x and y axes. Are you going to address the 2D geometric analogy as I asked you to in my next-to-last post (the one before the one you are responding to here)? You do have a habit of not addressing questions and arguments that I put to you, even when I repeatedly ask you politely to address them. Whether you choose to address it or not, I will continue to compare all your statements to analogous statements one could make about 2D spatial geometry, in order to demonstrate to anyone reading along that the resulting conclusions would make no sense despite the fact that the argument appears to be precisely analogous. I call that same point in time what everyone else does, the present moment. 1. This clearly demonstrates there is an ACTUAL same point of TIME independent of clock time. I don't know what you mean by actual. Time is a coordinate, the phrase same point in time has no more coordinate-independent meaning than same y-coordinate. Only statements about spacetime geometry can be meaningful without any notion of a coordinate system--separating them into space and time is an artificial coordinate-dependent notion, just like separating 2D space into the x-axis and the y-axis (though in spacetime it is objectively meaningful to distinguish particular *paths* through spacetime depending on whether they are timelike, spacelike or lightlike). 2. This establishes an actual local same time independent of clock time but not a universal actual same time. 2. But the proof that that actual same point in time is common and universal is simple: a. The twins are at the same actual point in time both before and after the trip. The two cars in my example, driving along different roads between two points A and B where the two roads cross (analogous to the twins who have different paths through spacetime that cross at the event of the departure and the event of the reunion), are likewise both at the same y-coordinate at A and at B (regardless of what specific coordinate system we choose). b. The twins are always in their OWN local present moment continuously during the trip. The cars are always positioned at their OWN local y-coordinate continuously during the trip (again regardless of what coordinate system we choose). c. Therefore during the trip there must always be a one to one correspondence between those actual present moments even though the clock times are not in synch. Because they both begin and end in that present moment and never leave it during the trip. Do you claim this correspondence would be independent of the choice
Re: Unput and Onput
Sorry Craig but I find you a simply impossible discussion partner. It doesn't seem to matter how directly and specifically one tries to put a point to you; you seem endlessly capable of deflecting, ignoring or just changing the subject. It's a real pity too that you seem convinced that all criticisms of your ideas stem from the most primitive misunderstandings - it stops you from really evaluating the arguments. In fact I'm not convinced you bring much that's novel to the party (which in itself is no cause for shame in such a traditionally intractable subject) but your reluctance to confront the real difficulties faced by your type of theory makes further discussion too frustrating to sustain, at least for me. Sorry if that seems harsh, but there it is. Over and out. David On 2 Feb 2014 02:20, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 7:56:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 20:33, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:53:30 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not because their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each other's presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical. I don't see that you make your point here. How does your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame get around anything? Because it is not that consciousness follows rules, it is that rules are the result of one conscious experience modeling others. What we can know about the universe outside of our body is limited by our body. The mind has different limitations, but it is much more directly sensitive to physics than our body, and its view of other bodies. Right, so the mind transcends the limits of the brain in its ability to make contact with physics? Is this supposed to mean that you are capable of thoughts that are not minutely correlated with some behaviour of your brain? If so, how do you explain how those thoughts acquire their sensitivity to physics or any purchase on the universe outside the body? You're framing it so that the brain appears as a viable thing on its own rather than as the knot of experience that I'm assuming it is. Physics, in my view, is nothing more or less than sense sensing itself. It's not that there is not minute correlation, it's that the brain activity correlates to nothing unless we import our own experience into the correlation. The brain is a character in the experience of those who can relate to having an animal's body. A neuron is a character in the experience of those who can relate to having a cell, or a group of cells for a body. To be clear, the body and brain (as we see them) are just as sensitive to physics as we are, but our view of that sensitivity is not direct. Our body filters, our brain filters, parts of ourselves are filtered, but part of us is unfiltered, and that is 'who' we are. Not a what, or a how, or a why, but irreducibly a personal experience of who. Who is the direct (if limited and privatized) experience of physics (sense). The what and how of public bodies is public physics (indirect sense). ISTM rather that the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical because when placed under examination at any scale it can be observed to adhere to an unvarying and causally-closed set of rules (the ones we group under the heading of physical). That's because the variation is closed to our vantage point. If an alien astronomer looked at any individual or group of people, they would conclude a causally-closed set of rules as well, but that's only because they are looking at the behavior of our bodies. The behavior of bodies is not that interesting compared to the aesthetic content of experiences. You could have a life changing epiphany and the alien astronomer would see nothing very interesting. But that, my dear Craig, is my very point, don't you see? Because amongst those uninteresting behaviours is the ability to lay claim to the possession of those very aesthetic experiences and those selfsame epiphanies. I'm saying that there are no uninteresting behaviors at all. It is not accessible from the outside. If it were not for the fact that we can correlate our own conscious experience with exotic magnetic resonance distribution patterns in the brain, something like a brain would seem no more worthy of inspection than the small intestine. It is like looking for the meaning of Shakespeare only in the grammar and punctuation of the play. It's the wrong place to look. The meaning is
Re: Tegmark's new book
I will answer that if / when I have read it. On 2 February 2014 01:23, Ronald Held ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote: Liz I should have typed which of the two diametrically opposed camps has the most members in it. For another try I have read the following: arXiv:0704.0646 [pdf, ps, other] Title: The Mathematical Universe Authors: Max Tegmark (MIT) arXiv:0707.2593 [pdf, ps, other] Title: Many lives in many worlds arXiv:0905.1283 [pdf, ps, other] Title: The Multiverse Hierarchy Authors: Max Tegmark (MIT) arXiv:0905.2182 [pdf, ps, other] Title: Many Worlds in Context including arXiv:1401.1219 [pdf, other] Title: Consciousness as a State of Matter Am I going to getting anything different or more clearly explained in his book? Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Block Universes
On 2 February 2014 04:44, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 1 February 2014 07:05, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Everything we observe takes place in a manner that can be placed within a space-time continuum such that a god's eye view (or the relevant equations) would see it as static. But of course *we* don't see it like that. This appears to be the source of the problem a few people have with this concept, however - they appear to confuse the god's eye view with ours. But of course we're embedded in space-time - along for the ride. So of course we see change all the time. Hi Liz I'd just like to be clear that I'm not one of those attacking block (in the sense of co-existent) models in physics or TOEs in general (comp, for example). In fact I'd come to this view already some years back after finally losing confidence in my previous adherence to presentism - despite (or rather because of) trying unsuccessfully to defend it against experts. That said, as you may have noticed, I'm rather interested in the heuristics people employ to make intuitive sense of the frog view from within the block, as Mad Max Tegmark calls it. So in that spirit could I ask you to enlarge a little on just what you are thinking about when you use the term we in your statements above? Who or what are the we who don't see it like that, are along for the ride and see change all the time? I'm thinking here specifically of the frog or first-person perspective. Should we think of an extended frog, for example, that is spread out over a co-existent series of moments, each of which encodes a slightly different spatial-temporal perspective? If so, how specifically can we account for the momentary frog that believes itself always to be restricted to only one moment of that series, but is convinced that it's not always the same one? After all, from the frog's perspective, the appearance of an irreversible progression through a series of changes in a singular spatial-temporal location is the most non-negotiable feature of its very life. If you feel that the best available answer is that it's all an illusion, actually I wouldn't dispute that. But I'm interested in investigating the detailed logic of that very illusion, in approximately the sense that we can investigate and account logically for other illusions like the apparent continuity of vision despite constant rapid ocular saccades. With respect to the latter, we could probably say quite a lot about how the brain contrives that particular illusion Funnily enough, physicists also tend to appeal loosely to the brain in response to the illusion of the passage of time (it's psychology - not my subject). But, presumably we can say a little more about what a brain might be doing in deleting the gaps between ocular fixations, whereas we might be a bit in the dark about how the brain (itself now conceived as a four-dimensional physical object spread out over time) might contrive to manage the illusion of change in its own apparent spatial-temporal location. Is a series of frogs spread out over time, each believing it occupies a different spatial-temporal location, equivalent to the apparent experience of one frog occupying a single moment that keeps changing? By what logic do we suppose this would this be distinguishable from the permanently separated experiences of a series of individual frogs? IOW, why wouldn't each of us have the permanent experience of being many different frogs stuck in time, rather than one frog moving through time? These are not intended to be rhetorical questions, by the way. IOW, saying that something is an illusion is only the beginning of an explanation, not the conclusion of one. Comp may fare better here because it sets out on the path of elucidating exactly how a we might be defined such that this we might entertain the specific illusion of successive changes in its spatial-temporal location. But for me, at least, this is more difficult to intuit with any precision in a non-comp block concept, precisely because of the under-definition of the referent for we. The frog perspective is assumed, rather than elucidated. Anyway, as ever, your own thoughts would be much appreciated. Thank you for those kind words :) The block universe view requires that our sense of time passing emerges from whatever the current state of our brain is, of course. However that requirement isn't limited to the BU view. Any view in which locality is preserved has the same requirement. In fact, presentism, come to think of it, has this requirement even more, because it literally says that the past doesn't exist! So actually the real problem is how presentism gives rise to the illusion of time passing, with no past there, why s the present constrained to act as though it is there? In a BU the past is there, embedded in space-time, and each state is constrained to follow the last one by the laws of physics. E.g.
Re: Better Than the Chinese Room
On Saturday, February 1, 2014 6:30:52 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 21:49, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: Found it! On Friday, January 31, 2014 11:45:24 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 31 January 2014 01:52, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: The we of individual human beings relies on physical consistency because that is a common sensory experience of the animalorganismsubstance context. The substance context however relies on the we of the Absolute context. The biological context relies on those wes, and the animal context relies on the biological wes. It's all nested but the bottom of each extrinsic level is being supported by the top of the previous intrinsic level. I'm not sure I fully grasp all of the above, but I would like to tackle you again on the POPJ, because I still can't see how your model can succeed in avoiding it. Let me start by telling you about a movie I streamed last night - Inception (I'm a bit behindhand on popular movies!). It was quite an enjoyable yarn, but it struck me as pretty flaky, even as science fiction, not least because the plot is built on the idea that dreams could be experienced (and even nested dream-within-dream) with near-waking physical consistency. This got me reflecting on what does indeed distinguish dreams from waking reality (acknowledging of course that both are virtual presentations from the personal perspective). I don't know about your dreams, but in mine things have the darnedest habit of disappearing or turning into something else when I look away and this, presumably, is because sleeping-dreams are different to waking-dreams in that their appearances are not in general stabilised by anything extrinsic to the brain and body. By extrinsic here I am not committing to the ultimate nature of the brain and its environment, merely that all our experiences - metaphorised as dreams, or in a more up-to-date image, a multi-player video-game - must depend on some generalised and consistent system of appearances for consistency and stabilisation. It turns out, indeed, that the system of appearances our internal video game depends on is detailed, consistent and stable to the most extraordinary degree; let us call this stable, exhaustive and reliably causally-complete set of appearances the game-physics. And the avatars that appear to us within the game - bodies and brains, our own and others' - turn out to follow the rules of the game-physics precisely in conformity with the set of appearances as a whole, to the furthermost extent we can explore. The logical consequence of the above is just this: Even if you consider that the sensory nature of that-which-exists extends, beyond our personal virtual presentations, to the whole of reality itself, one can still not avoid the encounter in waking-dreams with avatars (including one's own) that cheerfully lay claim to sensory phenomena that are supernumerary in explaining their behaviour in terms of its own rules-of-appearance (i.e. the game-physics), and which they could not logically have access to in terms of those very rules. Hence these sensory phenomena cannot be the cause of these claims. This, again is the POPJ. ISTM that it is unavoidable in any schema, whether primitive-sensory or primitive-physical, in which no further logical entailment is discoverable in the causally-complete machinations of the game-physics. The POPJ is not a problem at all for MSR. Pleased to hear it. Why? MSR is a solution to POPJ because judgments are just other kinds of sensations than public facing sensations. Doesn't help. In your theory, everything is of course hypothesised to be just one sort of sensation or another - that's obviously the case for any kind of idealist or panpsychist schema. I separate my view from idealism or panpsychism in that both of those imply a human-like first person experience, so that people might presume we are talking about rocks that can feel or rocks that disappear when nobody is looking at them. With pansensitivity, I am not talking about a public world which is 'maya', but privacy and publicity as opposite ends of a single continuum of fantastic and realistic qualities. Everything is not 'just one sort of sensation or another', but rather that thing itself is an expectation within sense. The point I'm laboriously trying to get you to acknowledge is that move doesn't get you off this particular hook. See below. Judgments are cognitive qualia, and qualia is 1) beyond function, and 2) transparent and reflective (metaphorically) to other kinds of qualia. That's as may be, but we're precisely talking about qualitatively-instantiated appearances There aren't any other kind of appearances. and likewise the ubiquitous evidence of a rigorous and causally closed set of game-physics followed by those
Re: Unput and Onput
It's because you don't listen, and then project that quality onto me. It's very common I've found. Not everyone is that way though. I have many productive conversations with people also. That would be hard to explain if it was my fault. On Saturday, February 1, 2014 10:28:38 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: Sorry Craig but I find you a simply impossible discussion partner. It doesn't seem to matter how directly and specifically one tries to put a point to you; you seem endlessly capable of deflecting, ignoring or just changing the subject. It's a real pity too that you seem convinced that all criticisms of your ideas stem from the most primitive misunderstandings - it stops you from really evaluating the arguments. In fact I'm not convinced you bring much that's novel to the party (which in itself is no cause for shame in such a traditionally intractable subject) but your reluctance to confront the real difficulties faced by your type of theory makes further discussion too frustrating to sustain, at least for me. Sorry if that seems harsh, but there it is. Over and out. David On 2 Feb 2014 02:20, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 7:56:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 20:33, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:53:30 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not because their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame. By modulating frequency and scale, perceptual histories diverge and alienate each other's presence. The more extreme the alienation, the more the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical. I don't see that you make your point here. How does your vantage point amplifies the insensitivity of your perceptual frame get around anything? Because it is not that consciousness follows rules, it is that rules are the result of one conscious experience modeling others. What we can know about the universe outside of our body is limited by our body. The mind has different limitations, but it is much more directly sensitive to physics than our body, and its view of other bodies. Right, so the mind transcends the limits of the brain in its ability to make contact with physics? Is this supposed to mean that you are capable of thoughts that are not minutely correlated with some behaviour of your brain? If so, how do you explain how those thoughts acquire their sensitivity to physics or any purchase on the universe outside the body? You're framing it so that the brain appears as a viable thing on its own rather than as the knot of experience that I'm assuming it is. Physics, in my view, is nothing more or less than sense sensing itself. It's not that there is not minute correlation, it's that the brain activity correlates to nothing unless we import our own experience into the correlation. The brain is a character in the experience of those who can relate to having an animal's body. A neuron is a character in the experience of those who can relate to having a cell, or a group of cells for a body. To be clear, the body and brain (as we see them) are just as sensitive to physics as we are, but our view of that sensitivity is not direct. Our body filters, our brain filters, parts of ourselves are filtered, but part of us is unfiltered, and that is 'who' we are. Not a what, or a how, or a why, but irreducibly a personal experience of who. Who is the direct (if limited and privatized) experience of physics (sense). The what and how of public bodies is public physics (indirect sense). ISTM rather that the quality of what is perceived appears mechanical because when placed under examination at any scale it can be observed to adhere to an unvarying and causally-closed set of rules (the ones we group under the heading of physical). That's because the variation is closed to our vantage point. If an alien astronomer looked at any individual or group of people, they would conclude a causally-closed set of rules as well, but that's only because they are looking at the behavior of our bodies. The behavior of bodies is not that interesting compared to the aesthetic content of experiences. You could have a life changing epiphany and the alien astronomer would see nothing very interesting. But that, my dear Craig, is my very point, don't you see? Because amongst those uninteresting behaviours is the ability to lay claim to the possession of those very aesthetic experiences and those selfsame epiphanies. I'm saying that there are no uninteresting behaviors at all. It is not accessible from the
Re: A theory of dark matter...
The saga continues... [image: Inline images 1] -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 10:21 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Jesse, Consider another case: Consider every observer in the entire universe. Every one of them is always currently in their own local actual time, their present moment. Are you just asserting your presentist views, or are you trying to make an *argument* for them? Hopefully you agree that if you want to make an argument, you can't just assume presentism in your argument from the start. So if you mean there is only one point on each observer's worldline that is his own actual local time, that's a cheat because it already assumes that eternalism is false and that all points on a given worldline don't have an equally real existence. On the other hand, if you just mean that at each point on an observer's worldline, the observer's mind at that point judges certain events to be in his local actual time, that's OK--for example at the point on my worldline where I turned 20 I judged the local date to be 1997, at the point on my worldline where I turned 30 I judged the local date to be 2007, etc. Now consider every last one of them all travel to meet up on earth. Every last one of them continually brings their own actual time with them through the whole trip with no discontinuities and when they meet up they discover that every last one of those local actual times turns out to be the exact SAME actual time, even if every one of their clock times is different. This argument only seems to make sense if you assume the presentist notion of a unique point on each observer's worldline that's their local actual time--and as I said, that is simply assuming what you are trying to prove, so if your argument proceeds from that assumption it's completely circular. Jesse On Saturday, February 1, 2014 7:23:19 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 6:46 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Jesse, You already told us that the twins ARE at the same point in spacetime when they meet up again. Is that not an OBJECTIVE fact? Do we not actually KNOW that? The twins most certainly DO KNOW it because they can shake hands and look at each other's clocks at the same time. How can you claim it if it is not a fact and knowable? Label or not, it is a knowable fact that both twins agree on. Uh, I never said it wasn't an objective knowable fact that they meet and compare ages at a single point in spacetime, in fact I very clearly said there is an objective truth about whether two events coincide at the same point in spacetime. There is no objective fact about what specific time coordinate is associated with a given point in spacetime, because that depends entirely on arbitrary what event we choose to label as t=0 and how we define simultaneity. If we agree then that the twins ARE at the SAME point of spacetime when they meet again, then they must be at the same point in TIME as well as in space. With respect to any particular coordinate system for labeling time, sure, that's true. Similarly if two cars meet at the same point in space, they must be at the same y-coordinate as well as the same x-coordiante, regardless of how you choose to define your x and y axes. Are you going to address the 2D geometric analogy as I asked you to in my next-to-last post (the one before the one you are responding to here)? You do have a habit of not addressing questions and arguments that I put to you, even when I repeatedly ask you politely to address them. Whether you choose to address it or not, I will continue to compare all your statements to analogous statements one could make about 2D spatial geometry, in order to demonstrate to anyone reading along that the resulting conclusions would make no sense despite the fact that the argument appears to be precisely analogous. I call that same point in time what everyone else does, the present moment. 1. This clearly demonstrates there is an ACTUAL same point of TIME independent of clock time. I don't know what you mean by actual. Time is a coordinate, the phrase same point in time has no more coordinate-independent meaning than same y-coordinate. Only statements about spacetime geometry can be meaningful without any notion of a coordinate system--separating them into space and time is an artificial coordinate-dependent notion, just like separating 2D space into the x-axis and the y-axis (though in spacetime it is objectively meaningful to distinguish particular *paths* through spacetime depending on whether they are timelike, spacelike or lightlike). 2. This establishes an actual local same time independent of clock time but not a universal actual same time. 2. But the proof that that actual same point in time is common and universal is simple: a. The twins are at the same actual point in time both before and after the trip. The two cars in my example, driving along different roads between two points A and B where the two roads cross
Re: Unput and Onput
On 2 February 2014 06:47, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you don't see how my 'theory' automatically trumps any logical objection then you don't understand my theory fully. That is truly hilarious Craig! I cannot help being reminded of Luther's admonition that To be a Christian, you must pluck out the eye of reason.. Are you looking for converts rather than debate? I have no idea how you expect me or anyone else to understand your theory if you continue sidestep all logical objections to your ideas. Phew. At least it isn't just me who has this reaction. Maybe Craig and Edgar can get together and form a church whose motto is I am right, and if you don't realise that it's because your little brain can't grasp my magnificent theory. They could call it C E ... which happens to be the initials of me and my other half (not to mention the Church of England). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
For a trip of interstellar distance, the time dilation caused by getting into low earth orbit will be insignificant. Alice and Bob can compare their watches when Alice is in orbit, and see that they are still synchronised to high accuracy, at least as far as humans are concerned - there might be a few nano or even microseconds difference, but that will be nothing compared to the difference that will occur after a trip to another star and back. In fact there are competing effects here, Alice is travelling at several km/s relative to Bob, but experiencing a slightly weaker gravitational field. Then Alice fires up the TC drive and heads off towards interstellar space at 1g... On 2 February 2014 14:51, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/1/2014 9:46 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Feb 1, 2014 at 7:57 AM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: One might think it was the acceleration that slowed time on A's clock, BUT the point is that A's acceleration was only 1g throughout the entire trip which was exactly EQUAL to B's gravitational acceleration back on earth. So if the accelerations were exactly equal during the entire trip how could A's acceleration slow time but B's not slow time by the same amount? If A were going into space and accelerating upward off the surface of the Earth at one g (32 feet per second per second), then he would be experiencing 2g, one g from the Earth and one g from his continuing change in upward velocity. But A would experience acceleration quickly decreasing to 1g as he left the vicinity of the Earth. And the result wouldn't change if B entered a centrifuge and experienced an exactly equal acceleration while remaining on Earth. This is why I emphasize that it is NOT an effect of acceleration, it is a geometric effect of different path lengths. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Sat, Feb 01, 2014 at 05:36:42PM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Russell, Sorry, but you miss my argument. The 1:1 correspondence is between actual or present moment time, not clock time. Please refer to my proximate responses to Jesse for the details of the argument. Edgar The only way for your argument to make sense is for the correspondence to be between proper times along each worldline. You are in the process of trying to define your present moment. You cannot use what you are trying to construct as a building block for that construction. But that correspondence is not unique, as I mentioned. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
