to the creation of metaverses.
Hal
At 10:36 AM 7/2/2004, you wrote:
At 10:14 01/07/04 -0400, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Re the discussion on mathematical realism etc. I ask for comments on
whether or not definition that is the division of ALL in to two parts
is a mathematical process.
To me definition seems arbitrary
from the beginning arithmetic is complete so its
inconsistent.
Hal
Hi Bruno:
At 01:15 PM 7/2/2004, you wrote:
Hi Hal,
At 12:44 02/07/04 -0400, Hal Ruhl wrote:
By the way if some systems are complete and inconsistent will arithmetic
be one of them?
As I understand it there are no perfect fundamental theories. So if
arithmetic ever becomes complete
believe he is a knight. And if Bx implies x, then:
11. t
and I have reached a contradiction with 9.
So I don't think I am doing this right.
Hal Finney
multiverse. (Of course there are other ways to get a multiverse.)
Hal Finney
program which runs all programs
(including, by definition, itself). If the OP brings itself into
existence, so does the UD, which is much simpler. And the UD then makes
us exist along with all other universes, whether the OP turns out to be
cosmologically plausible or not.
Hal Finney
, it is just a pair of letters. B doesn't
have to mean believe. It could mean Belachen, which is German for
believe.
All I need to know, as a formal system, is what rules the letter B
follows.
Bruno wrote:
At 09:54 27/07/04 -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
If I ever write down x on
my numbered list, I
, it was never very plausible and is much less so now.
Hal Finney
exist which contain jinn than all universes exist.
That doesn't seem at all plausble to me. My heuristic is that any rule
of the form all universes exist except X is going to be more complicated
than one of the form all universes exist.
Hal Finney
I once saw a quote attributed to Niels Bohr to the effect that an expert is
a person who has made all the mistakes its possible to make in a narrow
field of endeavor.
Hal
At 07:11 AM 9/24/2004, you wrote:
The curious and amusing thing is that in FU, Smullyan
call that error the beginners error
will tell the truth, and if you are
pointing at a Jack it will work because both other cards are Aces.
Hal Finney
conditions.
It's pretty hard to think of yourself as a typical driver given the wide
range of personality, age and experience among drivers on the road.
Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
Hal Finney writes:
Not to detract from your main point, but I want to point out that
sometimes there is ambiguity about how to count worlds, for example in
the many worlds interpretation of QM. There are many examples of QM
based world-counting which seem to show
introduces random information into each component of a multiverse from a
source external to that component.
Hal
Sorry, I placed the definitions at the end of my post for easy group
reference and forgot to mention it.
Hal
subparts.
5) True noise: The random content of the evolution of the Somethings
introduces random information into each component of a multiverse from a
source external to that component.
Hal
At 07:56 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I would appreciate comments on the following.
I placed the definitions at the end for easy group reference.
Proposal: The Existence of our and other universes and their dynamics are
the result of unavoidable definition and logical incompleteness
Hi Georges:
At 08:16 AM 11/14/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
4) A Something: A division of the All into two subparts.
That too, sounds bad to me. It might well be that the only something that
deserve the title of Something would be the All itself. Everything else
might appear so only in our
, essential, it is renewed, refreshed,
reestablished, resurrected - however you want to look at it the Nothing can
not vanish from the system.
Hal
not wish to do.
Hal
it
become if it does? A different Nothing?
It becomes a Something i.e. an evolving multiverse as outlined in the
original post.
How can you
distinguish between the former and the latter?
It will no longer meet the definition of Nothing.
Hal
Hi Norman:
My model has both a Nothing, the All, and a set of Somethings simultaneously.
Hal
At 06:10 PM 11/15/2004, you wrote:
Hal,
I'm way out of my depth, but if I'm correctly interpreting what you are
saying, it looks to me that your multiverse model cannot be valid.
This is because it answers
Hi Benjamin:
Norman's comments as I indicated in a response completely miss the essence
of my model.
Hal
At 06:25 PM 11/15/2004, you wrote:
Norman's answer sounds pretty good to me. I also checked
http://www.nothing.com/ found maybe or maybe not nothing
there. Something's also at http
are not mutually exclusive. Perhaps the
exclusive idea is based on a hidden assumption of some sort of space that
can only be filled with or somehow contain one or the other but not both.
Hal
of Somethings in
that each new quantum of information incorporated into a Something makes
it a new system.
Arithmetic and any system that incorporates it can not prove its [their]
own consistency.
Hal
Hi Eric:
At 09:46 PM 11/15/2004, you wrote:
On Tue, 2004-11-16 at 10:13, Hal Ruhl wrote:
To respond to comments on consistency.
I see no reason why components of the system need to be internally
consistent. And I have indicated that the All is not internally
consistent. Generally speaking
At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident [once
you notice it].
The problem with evidence is that on one side
At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I recall
in some earlier related threads defined information as a potential to
erect a boundary. So the All is chuck full of this potential. Actual
boundaries are the Everything
At 08:48 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 05:39 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
[...]
The idea that defining a thing actually defines two things seems self
evident [once you notice it].
At least one case of unavoidable definition also seems self evident
[once you notice
Hi George:
At 09:13 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
At 05:58 PM 11/16/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Boundaries: I have as I said in one post of this thread and as I
recall in some earlier related threads defined information as a
potential to erect a boundary. So the All is chuck
of these Somethings except that they all
are subject to information injection from an external random oracle i.e.
the current but momentary remainder [relative to that individual
multiverse] of the All.
snip
Hal
All members of [is,is not] definitional pairs including the [All, Nothing]
pair have a conceptual foundation within the All. Why would the [All,
Nothing} pair be the only one denied a mutual and concurrent physical
expression?
Hal
both members
of the [All, Nothing] pair seem to have usefulness.
Hal
Hi John:
At 11:27 AM 11/18/2004, you wrote:
Hal:
makes sense to me - with one question:
I take: ALL stands for the totality (wholeness as I say) and your -- is
is confined to whatever we do, or are capable (theoretically) to know -
whether already discovered or not.
It is more than that. The All
I forgot to point out that the definitional information for the
[All,Nothing] pair cancels because the inverse definition i.e. the
[Nothing, All] pair is the same system.
Hal
I was asked about concepts.
I would define concept as any division of the All into two sub
components, each of the sub components is a concept.
Usefullness of a concept as judged by a SAS [if they exist] is not an issue.
Hal
Hi John:
I am trying to make the model independent of what might be the detail
structure of individual universes within it.
Hal
At 10:41 AM 11/21/2004, you wrote:
Hal:
how about this:
a 'concept' is THE part of ALL cut (limited?) by topical boundaries into a
(topical) model disregarding other
Hi Bruno:
At 09:38 AM 11/30/2004, you wrote:
At 13:40 26/11/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
What does logically possible mean?
In the above I meant in the context of the larger phrase of: logically
possible worlds.
In the following call an individual [Ai,Dj] pair logic system Ln where i,
j, and n can
- and where
did all that info come from and why allow any in a base level system for
worlds?
Yours
Hal
At 08:03 AM 12/3/2004, you wrote:
At 15:49 01/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
the All is internally inconsistent since it is complete.
I have a counter-example: take the following theory: All
true
Hi John:
At 02:29 PM 12/3/2004, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
here are some stupid remarks (I call them stupid, because - they really
are - I cannot follow the theoretical logic of your discussion with Bruno,
and base my remarks on feeling while reading your text - which is not the
most scientific way
its
components individually may have any amount of information the sum of all
the information in all the components is no information.
At 08:13 AM 12/6/2004, you wrote:
At 17:15 03/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Bruno:
I assume your theory is intended to give the range of descriptions of worlds
. That is the simplicity of it.
As to any confusion over the concept of model I can call just as well
call it a theory.
Hal
At 02:40 PM 12/6/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
To answer these questions it seems necessary to inject information into
your theory beyond what may already be there - the sentences
to incompleteness is to assume
consistency of the system in question.
The only way I see to falsify my theory at this location is to show that
all contents of the All are consistent.
Hal
At 11:46 PM 12/6/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Jesse:
My originating post appeals only to the result of Turing
Hi Bruno:
At 06:40 AM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
Hi Hal,
In my questions about truth etc I was not really looking for a response
but was rather trying to demonstrate the need for additional information
in your theory.
I don't have a theory. Just an argument showing that if we are machine
restriction. All the information is in
there all the time. The boundaries of the Somethings wash across the
inherent counterfactuals counterfactually.
Hal
Hi Jesse:
At 09:23 PM 12/7/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
To clarify - the All contains all information simultaneously [see the
definition in the original post] - including ALL Truing machines with
ALL possible output tapes - so it contains simultaneously both output
tapes re your comment
can
arbitrarily closely approach or even exactly match those that would be
output by a Turing machine for long runs of states [but not infinite runs
of states due to the random input factor - no selection allowed]. All
other sequences of all kinds of states also take place.
Hal
encompassed. [OK?]
Hal
in the
system so at this point drop most of the original All as sphere
picture. It was meant to illustrate just a few aspects of the system.
Now pick things up with the original post with the Nothing bring incomplete
re having to resolve the meaningful question of its own persistence.
Hal
. Are
these both not required for a global non selected activity? Random could
still be consistent which would be a selection.
Hal
At 09:10 PM 12/10/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
A kernel of information is the that information constituting a particular
potential to divide.
The All contains all
and may be able to put some handle on ideas such as self aware and free
will etc. at least for me.
As to the individual beliefs, understandings, or needs of others I can not
speak.
Hal
) a consistent set of beliefs A
2) the choice of a deduction system D (and then consistent
means does not derive 0=1).
Most mathematical proofs are too complex to be judged by other than the
belief of the majority of mathematicians.
Hal
At 03:44 PM 12/11/2004, you wrote:
Hal,
With reference
At 07:28 PM 12/11/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
You wrote:
Well, what I get from your answer is that you're justifying the idea
that the All is inconsistent in terms of your own concept of evolving
Somethings, not in terms of inconsistent axiomatic systems.
Just the reverse. The evolving
Hi Jesse:
At 04:46 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All is
inconsistent in terms of your own theoretical framework, not in terms of
inconsistent
Hi Jesse:
At 09:35 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl:
Hi Jesse:
At 04:46 PM 12/12/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
OK, since I don't really understand your system I should have said
something more general, like you're justifying the idea that the All
is inconsistent in terms of your own
but it seems to me that there
may be additional justification for my position in what Bruno says below.
But I do think, and perhaps that's related with Hal intuition (I'm not
sure), that any theory which try to capture too big things will be
inconsistent. Classical example is the naive idea of set
- inconsistencies.
Hal
information in the first
place--by the most commonly-accepted definition of information in
information theory, I don't think it would, simply because there is no room
for multiple possible answers to a given question.
Then does not all information include multiple possible answers?
Later
Hal
. The All is full of boundaries between kernels but has no potential to
erect more. In your dependent case one has to manage the dependency
rules - a necessary potential to erect boundaries.
Hal
computer generated but there seems to me to be a need [as payment for the
dynamic] to also allow input to the computer that is inconsistent with any
of its prior states. I think Bruno might call it a little third person
indeterminacy if I sufficiently remember and understand his material.
Hal
Hi Bruno and Jesse:
At 10:23 AM 12/18/2004, you wrote:
At 21:48 17/12/04 -0500, Hal Ruhl wrote:
Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent? From Bruno's last post
I think it is possible to impose this idea on the All.
I'm afraid I said the contrary (unless I misunderstand what you
Hi Jesse:
I do not think the conversation re:
I can't think of any historical examples of new
mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already
believe their premises in order to justify these premises,
has a valid place in this thread. Can you tell me why you do?
Hal
it is indeed
random. So the most recent motion must rather be inconsistent with
its past or future - no accumulating info.
Hal
At 10:04 PM 12/20/2004, you wrote:
Hal Ruhl wrote:
I do not think the conversation re:
I can't think of any
historical examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas
of counterfactuals was composed of just two kernels these kernels would be
what I called pair wise inconsistent kernels.
Hal
At 02:45 PM 12/26/2004, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
About this zero information feature, could it be due to a strict
communitivity between any given subset of the All/Nothing? I
Hi John:
At 06:12 PM 12/26/2004, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
is there some draft seeable on the web?
Not yet. If the idea still looks good at the end of this thread I intend
to post something on my web page with visual aids etc.
I thought I am comfortable with your
terminology (whether I understand
say that I see too much confusion and uncertainty to hold
to any position regarding the existence of multiple universes.
Hal Finney
select on the types of rules.
I have posted my proposal for such a base level embedding system in the An
All/Nothing multiverse model thread.
Hal
commensurate with
the features of the dynamic.
Hal
At 07:40 PM 1/9/2005, you wrote:
A compromise on these two views occurs through my assumption of Time
being a necessary property of observerhood. Sure atemporal worlds
exist, but there's nobody in them to observe them. Similarly, Hal
Ruhl's dynamic
kernels - a non
zero, discrete step evolution of the applicable world.
Hal
survival at all costs. I.e. go out and steal from people,
rob banks, commit murder without thought of the consequences, because
it's far more likely that the street will turn to molten metal than that
you'll be apprehended and sent to jail.
Hal Finney
on is a universal
altruism, where our goal is to maximize the total happiness of conscious
entities. Such a goal is largely immune to these paradoxes, although
it does have some problems of its own.
Hal Finney
in such a sequence the result would be the same.
So I find I must also reject ... Comp: I (you) am (are)
computable/Turing emulable.
Yours
Hal Ruhl
Hi Bruno:
At 09:51 AM 1/17/2005, you wrote:
Hello Hal,
snip mine
Now if one envisions the physical reality evolution of sub components of
the world kernels in such a sequence the result would be the same.
?
So I find I must also reject ... Comp: I (you) am (are)
computable/Turing emulable
incompleteness issue as the one in the All/Nothing
model. In this case to resolve this issue the Nothing spontaneously decays
into a Something which then sets off on a trip to completion. This model
seems to insist on the presence of choice.
Hal
models. In the model
free of an All once this happens it continues to complete itself by some
path. This is a creation of information scenario. Choice is the way to do
this.
Hal
question for the Nothing. The question - various
stabilities of a construct is first covered in freshman physics.
Hal
of that conscious
experience is so small as to be completely negligible.
Hal Finney
quantified time - that is a continuous
flow in a = and there must be steps in a =.
Hal Ruhl
On 28 Jan 2005 Hal Finney wrote:
I suggest that the answer is that accidental instantiations only
contribute an infinitesimal amount, compared to the contributions of
universes like ours.
Stathis Papaioannou replied:
I don't understand this conclusion. A lengthy piece of code (whether
I meant to define the symbol = as:
= is a path over kernels where each new step is inconsistent with prior
steps.
Hal Ruhl
At 06:29 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
What your defining seems to me to be a NOT map or else it is a mere
random map. There is no consistent definition of an inconsistent map
otherwise, IMHO. Please explain how I am wrong. ;-)
I wanted to have a sequence that does not accumulate net
Hi Stephen:
At 10:49 PM 1/29/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
What do you propose as a means to explain the memory and processing
required to be sure of inconsistency as opposed to consistency?
It is not a logical inconsistency. What I am trying to convey is that each
step in the sequence pays
Hi Stephen:
At 11:08 AM 1/30/2005, you wrote:
Dear Hal,
How do your kernels fundamentally differ from Julian Barbor's time
capsules?
I defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.
A kernel is the potential to establish a particular boundary.
When I said time in a previous post
fundamental for the sequence but this itself is an illusion. The
inconsistent dynamic is the fundamental and contains no fundamental rules
in its inconsistency let alone any that could be deduced from within the
sequence.
Hal Ruhl
to be
not appearances at all.
Hal
change the logic. (And actually changes it according to the lobian
machine).
I'm losing you here.
Hal Finney
the mechanism described above could account for self aware in
what is actually an overall timeless moment.
I will try to put this all in a post to the An All/Nothing multiverse
model thread.
Hal Ruhl
Hi John:
Sorry this took awhile - I have been very busy.
At 07:49 AM 1/31/2005, you wrote:
Hi, Hal,
I stepped out from this discussion a while ago, because it grew above my
head (or attentional endurance), but I keep reading. Now is a remark of
yours I want to ask about:
I defined information
no reason why reality must visit these states in some
ordered sequence or in some ordered grouping - only one branch of MWI may
be active for some number of transitions for example.
An illusion of free will may reside in this last.
Well anyway that is where my thinking stands at the moment.
Hal Ruhl
the
illusion that the judge has Free Will because our minds are too coarse
grained to store the quantum level events.
Hal Ruhl
grained. Thus the illusion of indeterminacy and thus free will.
Hal Ruhl
] which seems inherent in the idea of evolving world.
Is such a possible illusion, or its origin, the origin of the concept of
consciousness? Sort of an illusion or perhaps inductive inference [as
per Bruno] of self consistency due to the truncation of memory?
Hal
. This is the
paradox, and the essay on compatibilism might also shed light on how a
purely random nondeterminism can be compatible with free will as well.
Hal Finney
the illusion of free will and consciousness I propose may follow from
the above definition as a truncation of memory when a world reality moves
through a series of states as I have been arguing from looking at Turing's
work.
Hal
continue to
: believe that we are ultimately morally responsible.
Maybe we don't like this way of formulating the problem, but if we are
going to continue to debate it, we ought to at least state what the
problem is.
Hal Finney
and
interesting.
Welcome to the list!
Mark Fancey
Philosophical Engineer
Sounds like you have come to the right place...
Hal Finney
is quite
controversial on this list and we had a former member, Jacques Mallah,
who made many strong arguments against it.
Hal Finney
of consciousness where
you are drugged or barely alive? That's how death is for most people,
it's not like flicking off a light. Will Quantum Immortality protect you
from spending an eternity in a near-coma? Exactly how much consciousness
does it guarantee you?
Hal Finney
this feeling as a direct,
pre-rational self-perception, like the experience of redness or of pain?
I'm not sure I have any such feeling, but perhaps I have internalized
the philosophical arguments so much that they have contaminated this
pure self-perception that you describe.
Hal Finney
and
mathematical consistency are not properties of worlds, they are properties
of our descriptions.
Hal
501 - 600 of 644 matches
Mail list logo
