RE: Maudlin's argument
Peter Jones writes: > Under physicalism, one physical state corresponds to one total > conscious state. > > I suppose it is possible, even under constraints which exlude baroque > re-intrerpretations, for one physical state to implement more than > one computational state. A computational state is basically a subset of > a physical > state. A physical state could have two disjoint computational subsets. > > This > is just "parallel processing". I suppose the human > equivalent would be patients who have had "split brain" surgery for > epilepsy. Parallel processing is a case of many physical states -> one computational state, isn't it? I don't think this is at all problematic in computer science, and it is the basis of any functionalist theory of consciousness. However, the reverse relationship, one physical state -> many computational states is deeply problematic if computation is taken to be the basis of consciousness, because it destroys the supervenience thesis as commonly understood. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > Russell Standish writes: > > > > > > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, > > > > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to > > > > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information > > > > that can be extracted from observation. > > > > > > Functionalism explicitly allows that different physical states may > > > implement > > > the same observer moment. For example, OM1 could be implemented on a > > > computer running Mac OS going through physical state S1, or by an > > > equivalent > > > program running on the same computer emulating Windows XP on Mac OS > > > going through state S2. In this way, there is potentially a large number > > > of > > > distinct physical states S1, S2... Sn on the one machine all implementing > > > OM1. > > > > > > Is there any reason to suppose inclusion of a physical state in this set > > > S1... Sn > > > prevents it from implementing any OM other than OM1? > > > > If "this set" is the set of all phsyical states that possibly implement > > OM1, the any physical state either in the set, or doesn't belong there. > > But does that mean that a physical state which belongs in this set implements > OM1 > and only OM1, or is it possible that a physical state may implement more than > one > OM? Under physicalism, one physical state corresponds to one total conscious state. I suppose it is possible, even under constraints which exlude baroque re-intrerpretations, for one physical state to implement more than one computational state. A computational state is basically a subset of a physical state. A physical state could have two disjoint computational subsets. This is just "parallel processing". I suppose the human equivalent would be patients who have had "split brain" surgery for epilepsy. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Peter Jones writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Russell Standish writes: > > > > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, > > > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to > > > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information > > > that can be extracted from observation. > > > > Functionalism explicitly allows that different physical states may implement > > the same observer moment. For example, OM1 could be implemented on a > > computer running Mac OS going through physical state S1, or by an equivalent > > program running on the same computer emulating Windows XP on Mac OS > > going through state S2. In this way, there is potentially a large number of > > distinct physical states S1, S2... Sn on the one machine all implementing > > OM1. > > > > Is there any reason to suppose inclusion of a physical state in this set > > S1... Sn > > prevents it from implementing any OM other than OM1? > > If "this set" is the set of all phsyical states that possibly implement > OM1, the any physical state either in the set, or doesn't belong there. But does that mean that a physical state which belongs in this set implements OM1 and only OM1, or is it possible that a physical state may implement more than one OM? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 08:53:07PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Russell Standish writes: > > > OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is > > involved, but it is presumably finite. > > > > Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and 1 > > green. The information describing one of these apples is the > > "component" I was referring to. > > > > As for other OMs sharing that component, this comes down to the usual > > suspect arguments against solipsism. I don't feel like rehashing those > > at the moment :) > > That's a quite different notion of OM to what I have in mind when I see the > term > used. I think of an OM as just the smallest possible unit of subjective > experience. > If you see the same red apple as I see, I don't think of that as "sharing" a > component of an OM. I don't even think of it as sharing a component of an OM > if I experience the same red apple a second apart: they are distinct OMs > which > happen to belong to an ordered set constituting my stream of consciousness. There must be some way of telling two distinct OMs apart. That distinction is information. Unless there are only two OMs in total, and one bit of difference between them, it is possible to divide the information describing the difference between two OMs into parts. That is all I was talking about, I wasn't talking about dividing them up into sub-OMs. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Russell Standish writes: > > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, > > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to > > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information > > that can be extracted from observation. > > Functionalism explicitly allows that different physical states may implement > the same observer moment. For example, OM1 could be implemented on a > computer running Mac OS going through physical state S1, or by an equivalent > program running on the same computer emulating Windows XP on Mac OS > going through state S2. In this way, there is potentially a large number of > distinct physical states S1, S2... Sn on the one machine all implementing OM1. > > Is there any reason to suppose inclusion of a physical state in this set > S1... Sn > prevents it from implementing any OM other than OM1? If "this set" is the set of all phsyical states that possibly implement OM1, the any physical state either in the set, or doesn't belong there. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > > > > The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists > > > are partially right. > > > > The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point > > about a block universe is that there is no A-series, > > not that there is a B-series. This asymmetry makes the > > situation unlike W/P duality. > > My point was that the philosophers could be wrong ;) i.e a block > universe does *not* have to mean that there is no A-series. A block universe is *defined* as a B series without an A series. > I'm > pointing out the possibility that that there could be *both* a block > universe *and* an A-Block. ] There *can* be a B series and an A series. You get the B series for free with the A series. You don't get the a series for free with the B series. > I pointed out that this could be possible > if time had several different components or dimensions associated with > it. Heard of Dunne? > If both a block universe and an A-series is possible, then the > philosophy debate over whether time flows or not would be exactly like > the debate over whether light is particles or waves. No, because the situation is not symmetrical. > Every-one thought > it had to be one or the other, but it turned out to be both. > Analogously, every-one thinks time is *either* an A-series *or* a > B-series, but I'm saying it *can* be both. Everyone knows it can be both. A block universe is B only, a dynamic universe is A+B. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: > On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Also see my reply to Russell below: > > > > > > >Russell Standish > > > > > >The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described > > >by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum > > >state is an observer moment, and the set of consistent quantum > > >histories is the set of observer histories. As such all observer > > >moments are in the Multiverse. > > > > > >But I appreciate this is not a widely held interpretation... > > > > > > Indeed so. And there's a good reason why it isn't a widely held > > interpretation, as J.barbour explained in 'The End Of Time'. In order > > to define 'the Multiverse' in terms of QM one needs a *static* > > wave-function solution for the entire universe (one which doesn't > > change) , whereas conventional QM solutions to real world problems are > > *dynamic* wave-function solutions (wave functions which evolve with > > time). No one has yet succeeded in demonstrating a static > > wave-function solution for the entire universe. > > > > I haven't read Barbour's book, but if that is what he is saying, he > would be wrong. Consider a universe of a single electron living in a > potential well Where does the potential well come from? >V(x)=|x|^2, x\in R^3. There is a well defined solution > \psi(t,x) = \sum_j <\psu_0|j> condition \psi_0. > > The function \psi: R x R^3 -> C is a static (time independent) > mathematical object (I wrote it the mathematicians write to emphasize > this point). Why wouldn't you identify this with the Multiverse of > that electron? > > Now I am aware that several people (Hawking included I gather) have > proposed various "wave functions of the universe", which tend to be > solutions of the Wheeler de Witt equation, which is a time independent > equation. However, I'm not so interested in following that literature. That is roughly the approach Barbour takes. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > I was using "quantum state" as synonymous with "physical state", which I guess > is what you are referring to in the above paragraph. The observer sees a > classical > universe because in observing he collapses the wave function or selects one > branch > of the multiverse. Traditional computationalism ignores the other branches/ > other > elements of the superposition, Traditional computationalism doesn't say anything about physics other than the background assumption that it allows for computation. > but you have implied previously that these are > necessary for consciousness because they allow implementation of > counterfactuals. i.e. Consciousness must supervene on N>1 branches, if computationalism and quantum MW are both true. > Does that mean consciousness would be impossible in a classical universe? No, because classical counterfactuals are exactly that -- things that could have happened but didn't. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish writes: > OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is > involved, but it is presumably finite. > > Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and 1 > green. The information describing one of these apples is the > "component" I was referring to. > > As for other OMs sharing that component, this comes down to the usual > suspect arguments against solipsism. I don't feel like rehashing those > at the moment :) That's a quite different notion of OM to what I have in mind when I see the term used. I think of an OM as just the smallest possible unit of subjective experience. If you see the same red apple as I see, I don't think of that as "sharing" a component of an OM. I don't even think of it as sharing a component of an OM if I experience the same red apple a second apart: they are distinct OMs which happen to belong to an ordered set constituting my stream of consciousness. The main utility of the concept from my point of view is that it removes ambiguity when personal identity becomes problematic, such as in duplication experiments. If you and I participate in a teleportation experiment and the signals accidentally get mixed so that the person emerging at the receiving station has 67% of my memories and 73% of your memories there is no obvious answer to the question of who has survived, who should have access to whose bank account, and so on. However, there is no ambiguity if we simply describe the streams of OMs before and after the experiment; the "after" OM may be confused, but it is still a perfectly well defined OM. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 07:00:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Russell Standish writes: > > > I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever > > they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of > > information, a particular meaning to a particular observer. > > Computationalists do sometimes say things like "cognition is computation" and > leave > it at that. A more common formulation is that consciousness supervenes on the > physical activity underlying computation. It was Donald Davidson in 1970 who > introduced the term "supervenience" in philosophy of mind: > > "Mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on > physical > characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot > be > two events exactly alike in all physical respects but differing in some > mental respects, > or that an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in > some > physical respects. > > [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/#2.1] > > That seemed perfectly reasonable and obvious to me a few years ago, but the > more I > think about it the more problematic it becomes. The subject of the present > post is that > it seems two objects or processes may in fact be physically identical but > mentally different. > Indeed. > > I was using "quantum state" as synonymous with "physical state", which I > guess > is what you are referring to in the above paragraph. The observer sees a > classical > universe because in observing he collapses the wave function or selects one > branch > of the multiverse. Traditional computationalism ignores the other branches/ > other > elements of the superposition, but you have implied previously that these are > necessary for consciousness because they allow implementation of > counterfactuals. > Does that mean consciousness would be impossible in a classical universe? No - just computationalist consciousness supervening on a classical physical systems. I am open to machines + random oracles being conscious, and I am also open to computational Multiverses. What I'm not open to is abandoning supervenience, due to the problem of the Occam catastrophe. > > > In this case, this projected QM state describes not a full observer > > moment, but only a component of one. And of course there will be > > multiple observer moments sharing that component. > > I didn't think an OM could have components, being the smallest unit of > subjective > experience. Do you mean a component of the physical structures giving rise to > the > OM? And how can you be sure that other OMs share that component? > OMs are defined by some information. Very clearly more than 1 bit is involved, but it is presumably finite. Let us say that within this OM I am aware of two apples - 1 red and 1 green. The information describing one of these apples is the "component" I was referring to. As for other OMs sharing that component, this comes down to the usual suspect arguments against solipsism. I don't feel like rehashing those at the moment :) -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish writes:
> I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
> they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
> information, a particular meaning to a particular observer.
Computationalists do sometimes say things like "cognition is computation" and
leave
it at that. A more common formulation is that consciousness supervenes on the
physical activity underlying computation. It was Donald Davidson in 1970 who
introduced the term "supervenience" in philosophy of mind:
"Mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on
physical
characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be
two events exactly alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental
respects,
or that an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in some
physical respects.
[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/#2.1]
That seemed perfectly reasonable and obvious to me a few years ago, but the
more I
think about it the more problematic it becomes. The subject of the present post
is that
it seems two objects or processes may in fact be physically identical but
mentally different.
> Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is
> an eigenvalue of, the state contains precise information about those
> observables. For observables that the state is not an eigenvalue of,
> there is still information about relative proportions of different
> outcomes of measurement.
>
> If I understand your argument correctly, you say that 1 string of bits could
> be interpreted in multiple ways by multiply different observers. This
> is true regardless of whether we accept computationalism. But you
> can't associate quantum states with uninterpreted strings - each quantum
> state is an interpretation.
>
> Perhaps where some confusion lies is when we use a quantum state to
> refer to a subsystem of the universe, eg that experiemental apparatus
> over there on the lab bench. This is the typical situation in QM
> calculations. What this state is is the projection of the full QM
> state onto the subspace of interest (the apparatus) with all other
> dimensions summed over ("traced out" in mathematical parlance).
I was using "quantum state" as synonymous with "physical state", which I guess
is what you are referring to in the above paragraph. The observer sees a
classical
universe because in observing he collapses the wave function or selects one
branch
of the multiverse. Traditional computationalism ignores the other branches/
other
elements of the superposition, but you have implied previously that these are
necessary for consciousness because they allow implementation of
counterfactuals.
Does that mean consciousness would be impossible in a classical universe?
> In this case, this projected QM state describes not a full observer
> moment, but only a component of one. And of course there will be
> multiple observer moments sharing that component.
I didn't think an OM could have components, being the smallest unit of
subjective
experience. Do you mean a component of the physical structures giving rise to
the
OM? And how can you be sure that other OMs share that component?
> > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
> > > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
> > > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
> > > that can be extracted from observation.
> >
> > Functionalism explicitly allows that different physical states may
> > implement
> > the same observer moment. For example, OM1 could be implemented on a
> > computer running Mac OS going through physical state S1, or by an
> > equivalent
> > program running on the same computer emulating Windows XP on Mac OS
> > going through state S2. In this way, there is potentially a large number of
> > distinct physical states S1, S2... Sn on the one machine all implementing
> > OM1.
> >
> > Is there any reason to suppose inclusion of a physical state in this set
> > S1... Sn
> > prevents it from implementing any OM other than OM1? It seems that you
> > would
> > quickly run out of useful states on a finite state machine if this were so.
> > Perhaps
> > it would be possible in the case of any state Si to reverse engineer a
> > language
> > or operating system under which Si is implementing OM1 (I don't know if
> > this
> > can be shown rigorously), which would mean that any Si implementing another
> > observer moment OM2 would also be implementing OM1. The conclusion would
> > be that the relationship between QM states and OMs could be one->many.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 03:21:52AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > Russell Standish wrote: > > I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever > > they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of > > information, a particular meaning to a particular observer. > > > > Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is > > an eigenvalue of, the state contains precise information about those > > observables. For observables that the state is not an eigenvalue of, > > there is still information about relative proportions of different > > outcomes of measurement. > > A wavefunction itself does contain information about the 'relative > proportions of different outcomes of measurement' (as you put it) but > extracting this information requires 'extra assumptions' apart from QM. > We don't see half-dead, half-alive cats after all. Why not? Why do > we only 'observe' classical reality (i.e objects in definite states)? > This is what is not fully explained by QM. > > Perhaps I should revise what I said somewhat: I can agree with you that > the 'consistent histories' that you mentioned earlier are equiavlent to > observer histories. But it's the supposed derivation of these > 'consistent histories' from the QM multiverse picture that I'm > doubting. In other words I think that somewhere along the way some > 'extra non-QM assumptions' have slipped in ;) > > Perhaps you should read my paper "Why Occam's Razor" - available from my website, or an arXiv mirror near you (http://www.arXiv.org). The assumptions I run off are called TIME and PROJECTION, as well as the Kolmogorov probability axioms (and the set theoretic axioms underlying them). From this, I can derive the main QM postulates, aside from the "odd man out" Correspondence principle. The CP itself can be obtained from Stenger's POVI, but needs 3+1 Minkowski spacetime. Probably what you think of as the "extra non-QM assumptions" are the TIME and PROJECTION postulates, but these are relatively minimal models of consciousness. Things like thermostats probably also satisfy TIME and PROJECTION :). Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 15, 2006 at 02:37:10AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Barbour argues the same way you do. But he does concede that his > argument is not yet proven. The trouble is that in the case of, for > instance, the electron, in the example you give, there is still an > environment external to the electron, but for the entire universe there > could be nothing external to the wave function of the universe. And In the example I gave, there was only one electron in the universe. There is no external environment. Sure it is only a thought experiment, since the only universe we know about is not like this, but it was deliberately constructed to expose the flaw in your argument. > the wave function of the universe, if the block-universe picture is > right, would have to be a static equation as well, as I mentioned > above. Apparently, none of the proposals for time-independent > equations of the entire universe have yet been made to work. > I guess this is not something I care about much one way or the other... > > > > > > See what I said above. If the *same* QM state could be associated with > > > *different* observer moments, then observer moments would not be > > > reducible to QM states and the set of consistent quantum histories > > > could not be said to be fully identified with the set of observer > > > histories. > > > > > > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, > > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to > > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information > > that can be extracted from observation. > > > > Cheers > > > > > > See above. As was pointed out, functionalism allows for one-to-many > relationships between conscious experiences and the physical substrates > on which these experiences are instantiated. > Sure, but it also says these conscious experiences will be unable to to detect which hardware they are running on (otherwise they'd be different conscious experiences). If the two different physical implementations differed in their quantum state, then there would be a physical measurement that could distinguish them (disregarding the "nonphysical" arbitrary complex-valued scaling factor). So the quantum states describing these different physical systems must be the same (up to a scaling factor). > What I really mean by 'observer moment' in the fullest sense of the > phrase is 'conscious experience'. Conventional QM cannot yet explain > how the actual consciously observed reality is supposed to emerge from > the QM wave-function. As has been pointed out, the observed reality > can only be derived from QM+Additional Assumptions. There are implicit > theories of consciousness in any account of how the actual observed > reality is supposed to emerge from the QM wave-function and convincing > explanations for how or why these assumptions are supposed to work are > not yet forth-coming. > > How does the *observed* (classical) reality emerge from the QM > wave-function? Not explained! Coarse graining, decoherence, > consistent histories etc etc don't yet convincingly explain it. > > Until these questions are fully resolved, doubt must remain about the > static timeless 'block universe' picture put forward by hard-core > multiverse fans. > My guess is that it will arise from things like Stenger's "point of view invariance" (POVI) principle. But you are right that there is still much to be worked out, starting from why we experience living in a 3+1 spacetime. My point on the block universe picture is that it is a valid picture (but not the only one) iff physics is deterministic. Standard quantum mechanics without collapse is deterministic. Hence the block Multiverse. If you follow Copenhagen or Bohm, then there can't be a block Multiverse, nor a block universe for that matter. > > -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.goog
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: > I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever > they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of > information, a particular meaning to a particular observer. > > Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is > an eigenvalue of, the state contains precise information about those > observables. For observables that the state is not an eigenvalue of, > there is still information about relative proportions of different > outcomes of measurement. A wavefunction itself does contain information about the 'relative proportions of different outcomes of measurement' (as you put it) but extracting this information requires 'extra assumptions' apart from QM. We don't see half-dead, half-alive cats after all. Why not? Why do we only 'observe' classical reality (i.e objects in definite states)? This is what is not fully explained by QM. Perhaps I should revise what I said somewhat: I can agree with you that the 'consistent histories' that you mentioned earlier are equiavlent to observer histories. But it's the supposed derivation of these 'consistent histories' from the QM multiverse picture that I'm doubting. In other words I think that somewhere along the way some 'extra non-QM assumptions' have slipped in ;) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
I don't quite follow your argument. OMs are not computations. Whatever
they are under computationalism, they must be defined by a set of
information, a particular meaning to a particular observer.
Quantum states have this property. For observables that the state is
an eigenvalue of, the state contains precise information about those
observables. For observables that the state is not an eigenvalue of,
there is still information about relative proportions of different
outcomes of measurement.
If I understand your argument correctly, you say that 1 string of bits could
be interpreted in multiple ways by multiply different observers. This
is true regardless of whether we accept computationalism. But you
can't associate quantum states with uninterpreted strings - each quantum
state is an interpretation.
Perhaps where some confusion lies is when we use a quantum state to
refer to a subsystem of the universe, eg that experiemental apparatus
over there on the lab bench. This is the typical situation in QM
calculations. What this state is is the projection of the full QM
state onto the subspace of interest (the apparatus) with all other
dimensions summed over ("traced out" in mathematical parlance). In
this case, this projected QM state describes not a full observer
moment, but only a component of one. And of course there will be
multiple observer moments sharing that component.
Cheers
On Sat, Oct 14, 2006 at 04:39:17PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments,
> > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to
> > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information
> > that can be extracted from observation.
>
> Functionalism explicitly allows that different physical states may implement
> the same observer moment. For example, OM1 could be implemented on a
> computer running Mac OS going through physical state S1, or by an equivalent
> program running on the same computer emulating Windows XP on Mac OS
> going through state S2. In this way, there is potentially a large number of
> distinct physical states S1, S2... Sn on the one machine all implementing
> OM1.
>
> Is there any reason to suppose inclusion of a physical state in this set
> S1... Sn
> prevents it from implementing any OM other than OM1? It seems that you would
> quickly run out of useful states on a finite state machine if this were so.
> Perhaps
> it would be possible in the case of any state Si to reverse engineer a
> language
> or operating system under which Si is implementing OM1 (I don't know if this
> can be shown rigorously), which would mean that any Si implementing another
> observer moment OM2 would also be implementing OM1. The conclusion would
> be that the relationship between QM states and OMs could be one->many.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
> _
> Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
> http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d
>
--
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email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
may safely ignore this attachment.
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: > On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Also see my reply to Russell below: > > > > > > >Russell Standish > > > > > >The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described > > >by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum > > >state is an observer moment, and the set of consistent quantum > > >histories is the set of observer histories. As such all observer > > >moments are in the Multiverse. > > > > > >But I appreciate this is not a widely held interpretation... > > > > > > Indeed so. And there's a good reason why it isn't a widely held > > interpretation, as J.barbour explained in 'The End Of Time'. In order > > to define 'the Multiverse' in terms of QM one needs a *static* > > wave-function solution for the entire universe (one which doesn't > > change) , whereas conventional QM solutions to real world problems are > > *dynamic* wave-function solutions (wave functions which evolve with > > time). No one has yet succeeded in demonstrating a static > > wave-function solution for the entire universe. > > > > I haven't read Barbour's book, but if that is what he is saying, he > would be wrong. Consider a universe of a single electron living in a > potential well V(x)=|x|^2, x\in R^3. There is a well defined solution > \psi(t,x) = \sum_j <\psu_0|j> condition \psi_0. > > The function \psi: R x R^3 -> C is a static (time independent) > mathematical object (I wrote it the mathematicians write to emphasize > this point). Why wouldn't you identify this with the Multiverse of > that electron? > > Now I am aware that several people (Hawking included I gather) have > proposed various "wave functions of the universe", which tend to be > solutions of the Wheeler de Witt equation, which is a time independent > equation. However, I'm not so interested in following that literature. Barbour argues the same way you do. But he does concede that his argument is not yet proven. The trouble is that in the case of, for instance, the electron, in the example you give, there is still an environment external to the electron, but for the entire universe there could be nothing external to the wave function of the universe. And the wave function of the universe, if the block-universe picture is right, would have to be a static equation as well, as I mentioned above. Apparently, none of the proposals for time-independent equations of the entire universe have yet been made to work. > > > See what I said above. If the *same* QM state could be associated with > > *different* observer moments, then observer moments would not be > > reducible to QM states and the set of consistent quantum histories > > could not be said to be fully identified with the set of observer > > histories. > > > > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information > that can be extracted from observation. > > Cheers > > See above. As was pointed out, functionalism allows for one-to-many relationships between conscious experiences and the physical substrates on which these experiences are instantiated. What I really mean by 'observer moment' in the fullest sense of the phrase is 'conscious experience'. Conventional QM cannot yet explain how the actual consciously observed reality is supposed to emerge from the QM wave-function. As has been pointed out, the observed reality can only be derived from QM+Additional Assumptions. There are implicit theories of consciousness in any account of how the actual observed reality is supposed to emerge from the QM wave-function and convincing explanations for how or why these assumptions are supposed to work are not yet forth-coming. How does the *observed* (classical) reality emerge from the QM wave-function? Not explained! Coarse graining, decoherence, consistent histories etc etc don't yet convincingly explain it. Until these questions are fully resolved, doubt must remain about the static timeless 'block universe' picture put forward by hard-core multiverse fans. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish writes: > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, > you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to > consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information > that can be extracted from observation. Functionalism explicitly allows that different physical states may implement the same observer moment. For example, OM1 could be implemented on a computer running Mac OS going through physical state S1, or by an equivalent program running on the same computer emulating Windows XP on Mac OS going through state S2. In this way, there is potentially a large number of distinct physical states S1, S2... Sn on the one machine all implementing OM1. Is there any reason to suppose inclusion of a physical state in this set S1... Sn prevents it from implementing any OM other than OM1? It seems that you would quickly run out of useful states on a finite state machine if this were so. Perhaps it would be possible in the case of any state Si to reverse engineer a language or operating system under which Si is implementing OM1 (I don't know if this can be shown rigorously), which would mean that any Si implementing another observer moment OM2 would also be implementing OM1. The conclusion would be that the relationship between QM states and OMs could be one->many. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Also see my reply to Russell below: > > > >Russell Standish > > > >The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described > >by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum > >state is an observer moment, and the set of consistent quantum > >histories is the set of observer histories. As such all observer > >moments are in the Multiverse. > > > >But I appreciate this is not a widely held interpretation... > > > Indeed so. And there's a good reason why it isn't a widely held > interpretation, as J.barbour explained in 'The End Of Time'. In order > to define 'the Multiverse' in terms of QM one needs a *static* > wave-function solution for the entire universe (one which doesn't > change) , whereas conventional QM solutions to real world problems are > *dynamic* wave-function solutions (wave functions which evolve with > time). No one has yet succeeded in demonstrating a static > wave-function solution for the entire universe. > I haven't read Barbour's book, but if that is what he is saying, he would be wrong. Consider a universe of a single electron living in a potential well V(x)=|x|^2, x\in R^3. There is a well defined solution \psi(t,x) = \sum_j <\psu_0|j> C is a static (time independent) mathematical object (I wrote it the mathematicians write to emphasize this point). Why wouldn't you identify this with the Multiverse of that electron? Now I am aware that several people (Hawking included I gather) have proposed various "wave functions of the universe", which tend to be solutions of the Wheeler de Witt equation, which is a time independent equation. However, I'm not so interested in following that literature. > See what I said above. If the *same* QM state could be associated with > *different* observer moments, then observer moments would not be > reducible to QM states and the set of consistent quantum histories > could not be said to be fully identified with the set of observer > histories. > If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information that can be extracted from observation. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Do you believe there is a difference between the experience of a being > living in a model block universe, such as having the observer moments > of its life running simultaneously on different machines or as separate > processes run in parallel on the one machine, and the experience of a > being running in a linear simulation as per the traditional view of time? > > Stathis Papaioannou > This is a 'philosophical leading question' ;) If my theories are right you *can't* have a being experiencing things living in a model block universe. I suspect that if you tried to actually carry out the thought experiements you mention (observer moments being simulated simultaneously), you couldn't be certain of simulating a being with a fixed identity. So perhaps I should answer: 'Yes I believe there is a difference. The being whose observer moments one is trying to simulate simultaneouly cannot be garanteed to be the same being as the being simulated linearly'. The problem lies in the meaning ascribed to symbols. The same computation can mean any number of different things depending on the encoding system used. For example the following two bytyes: 45, 65 mean two different things depening on whether ASCII or EBCDIC was used to encode the meaning of the bytes. Could one be sure that the same computations run simultaneously *mean* (i.e encode) the same thing as computations run linearly? I maintain you cannot. Also see my reply to Russell below: >Russell Standish > >The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described >by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum >state is an observer moment, and the set of consistent quantum >histories is the set of observer histories. As such all observer >moments are in the Multiverse. > >But I appreciate this is not a widely held interpretation... Indeed so. And there's a good reason why it isn't a widely held interpretation, as J.barbour explained in 'The End Of Time'. In order to define 'the Multiverse' in terms of QM one needs a *static* wave-function solution for the entire universe (one which doesn't change) , whereas conventional QM solutions to real world problems are *dynamic* wave-function solutions (wave functions which evolve with time). No one has yet succeeded in demonstrating a static wave-function solution for the entire universe. See what I said above. If the *same* QM state could be associated with *different* observer moments, then observer moments would not be reducible to QM states and the set of consistent quantum histories could not be said to be fully identified with the set of observer histories. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 06:02:01AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > > > > Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible > > observer moments are already "there" in the ensemble. This is > > certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's > > Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to > > have some notion of time that his "Great Programmer" lives in. I'm > > not sure what the status of Tegmark's ensemble is, but I doubt there > > is any external temporality in that. > > > > I suspect in that case you would disagree with most of the ensemble > > theories discussed here then. > > Right. The Multiverse does exist but it's just a bunch of meaningless > Shannon information. It is actually quite trival to see that the > observer moments can't be fully inside that ensemble. An 'Observer > moment' is a *cognitve interpretation* or *meaning* which is ascribed > to the Shannon information in the ensemble and this meaning is not a > fixed pre-existing thing. > The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum state is an observer moment, and the set of consistent quantum histories is the set of observer histories. As such all observer moments are in the Multiverse. But I appreciate this is not a widely held interpretation... -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Marc Geddes writes: > The implicit assumption in anthropic reasoning is that the observer > moments are in some sense *already there* (i.e the future and past are > already layed down in the block universe). This is what I waas > disputing. If the observer moments do *not* in fact pre-exist in a > fully formed or consistent fashion, then you cannot apply standard > statistical reasoning about the chances of an 'observer moment' being > instantiated. > > Re-read what I said. I was disputing the block universe as reagrds > observer moments. If Observer moments don't actually exist until we > come to them via the river of time, then they cannot be reasoned about > using standard statistical methods to talk about pre-existing > frequencies. Do you believe there is a difference between the experience of a being living in a model block universe, such as having the observer moments of its life running simultaneously on different machines or as separate processes run in parallel on the one machine, and the experience of a being running in a linear simulation as per the traditional view of time? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: > > > > Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible > observer moments are already "there" in the ensemble. This is > certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's > Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to > have some notion of time that his "Great Programmer" lives in. I'm > not sure what the status of Tegmark's ensemble is, but I doubt there > is any external temporality in that. > > I suspect in that case you would disagree with most of the ensemble > theories discussed here then. Right. The Multiverse does exist but it's just a bunch of meaningless Shannon information. It is actually quite trival to see that the observer moments can't be fully inside that ensemble. An 'Observer moment' is a *cognitve interpretation* or *meaning* which is ascribed to the Shannon information in the ensemble and this meaning is not a fixed pre-existing thing. > > OTOH, if we're looking at it in terms of an emergent duality picture > like I suggested, the observer moments do exist in the block > multiverse, but when asking about appearances this is irrelevant, and > one can only ask the question "what is the probability distribution of > my next observer moment". This is the RSSA. > > Cheers Again, the phrase 'probability distribution of next observer moment' is in my view incoherent, since it presupposes that all observer moments are already laid down inside the ensemble. To reason about 'Observer Moment's' properly requires a new kind of quantatative measure defined in terms of *degree of reflection*, not *probability*. Probability theory just isn't up to the job. That's why neither Nick Bostrom nor any-one else can resolve puzzles of anthropic reasoning such as the Doomsday argument or the Simulation argument --- '...he (Geddes) grabbed the book (of nature/the universe) and turned to one of the spells... He concentrated on the symbols and recited the spell - reading the old (math) symbols easily now, as if it were a children's book.' --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 03:38:13AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > Russell Standish wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > > > All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on > > > the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating > > > observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest > > > above, you can't do this. > > > > > > > I'm not entirely sure what to make of what you say here, except that > > it seems to be a criticism of the ASSA (that each observer moment is > > selected independently of any other from an absolute measure distribution). > > > > > > > > The implicit assumption in anthropic reasoning is that the observer > moments are in some sense *already there* (i.e the future and past are > already layed down in the block universe). This is what I waas > disputing. If the observer moments do *not* in fact pre-exist in a > fully formed or consistent fashion, then you cannot apply standard > statistical reasoning about the chances of an 'observer moment' being > instantiated. > > Re-read what I said. I was disputing the block universe as reagrds > observer moments. If Observer moments don't actually exist until we > come to them via the river of time, then they cannot be reasoned about > using standard statistical methods to talk about pre-existing > frequencies. > Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible observer moments are already "there" in the ensemble. This is certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to have some notion of time that his "Great Programmer" lives in. I'm not sure what the status of Tegmark's ensemble is, but I doubt there is any external temporality in that. I suspect in that case you would disagree with most of the ensemble theories discussed here then. OTOH, if we're looking at it in terms of an emergent duality picture like I suggested, the observer moments do exist in the block multiverse, but when asking about appearances this is irrelevant, and one can only ask the question "what is the probability distribution of my next observer moment". This is the RSSA. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
1Z wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists > > are partially right. > > The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point > about a block universe is that there is no A-series, > not that there is a B-series. This asymmetry makes the > situation unlike W/P duality. My point was that the philosophers could be wrong ;) i.e a block universe does *not* have to mean that there is no A-series. I'm pointing out the possibility that that there could be *both* a block universe *and* an A-Block. I pointed out that this could be possible if time had several different components or dimensions associated with it. If both a block universe and an A-series is possible, then the philosophy debate over whether time flows or not would be exactly like the debate over whether light is particles or waves. Every-one thought it had to be one or the other, but it turned out to be both. Analogously, every-one thinks time is *either* an A-series *or* a B-series, but I'm saying it *can* be both. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: > On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on > > the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating > > observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest > > above, you can't do this. > > > > I'm not entirely sure what to make of what you say here, except that > it seems to be a criticism of the ASSA (that each observer moment is > selected independently of any other from an absolute measure distribution). > > > The implicit assumption in anthropic reasoning is that the observer moments are in some sense *already there* (i.e the future and past are already layed down in the block universe). This is what I waas disputing. If the observer moments do *not* in fact pre-exist in a fully formed or consistent fashion, then you cannot apply standard statistical reasoning about the chances of an 'observer moment' being instantiated. Re-read what I said. I was disputing the block universe as reagrds observer moments. If Observer moments don't actually exist until we come to them via the river of time, then they cannot be reasoned about using standard statistical methods to talk about pre-existing frequencies. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Russell Standish wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > > > My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a > > > second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) > > > and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially > > > right *if* we allow time to have more than one component or dimension. > > > The block universe is the mathematical 'scaffolding' of time. But > > > superimposed on top of this is *another* component to time > > > conscious (sentient) observer moments. The block scaffolding of time > > > doesn't flow. But the observer moments *do*. > > > > They can also be both right if they're held to be emergent concepts > > (in the precise form of the term I use). Extra dimensionality is not > > needed. > > The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists > are partially right. The B-series is easily compatible with the A-series. The point about a block universe is that there is no A-series, not that there is a B-series. This asymmetry makes the situation unlike W/P duality. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 08:40:40AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on > the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating > observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest > above, you can't do this. > I'm not entirely sure what to make of what you say here, except that it seems to be a criticism of the ASSA (that each observer moment is selected independently of any other from an absolute measure distribution). > > Bostrom's writings appear to grant validity to anthropic reasoning > (which I think is bunk) and also appear to identify consciousness > (sentient observer-moments) with pre-existing computations in the > block-universe. As I suggested above, consciousness is not reducible > to physical processes and this is what invalidates anthropic reasoning. Not all anthropic reasoning maps consciousness to specific physical processes... > > um now why does your sig say 'professor Russell Standish', > Mathematics with a academic address given? ;) > Its an adjunct position, which mainly means they don't pay me anything, or give me an office. The main advantages for me are access to a uni library (and more importantly the electronic journal subscriptions), and access to supercomputers for running simulations (I still have to apply, but it doesn't cost me anything). The main advantage to the school is some credit for my publications (which is worth real money)! Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: > On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a > > second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) > > and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially > > right *if* we allow time to have more than one component or dimension. > > The block universe is the mathematical 'scaffolding' of time. But > > superimposed on top of this is *another* component to time > > conscious (sentient) observer moments. The block scaffolding of time > > doesn't flow. But the observer moments *do*. > > They can also be both right if they're held to be emergent concepts > (in the precise form of the term I use). Extra dimensionality is not > needed. The key point I think is that both the A-theorists and the B-theorists are partially right. The debates over A-Theory of time and B-Theory of time strike me as similar to the debates over whether light was particles or waves. I think the trick is to seperate 'time' into several different components - there's a mathematical scaffolding which *doesn't* flow (the block universe of the B-Theorists) and there's something else which *does* flow (I think it's conscious -sentient - observer moments). All the anthropic reasoning stuff is bunk in my opinion. It's based on the faulty idea that one can reason about consciousness by equating observer moments with parts of the block universe. But as I suggest above, you can't do this. > > > > > Poor old Nick Bostrom and the other pompous academic fools are all so > > confused because they think consciousness is reducible to physical > > time. > > I find this suprising. I've never seen any of Bostrom's writings that > indicates this. Bostrom's writings appear to grant validity to anthropic reasoning (which I think is bunk) and also appear to identify consciousness (sentient observer-moments) with pre-existing computations in the block-universe. As I suggested above, consciousness is not reducible to physical processes and this is what invalidates anthropic reasoning. > > > This is the source of all the confusion about anthropic > > reasoning and observer moments. Consciousness is *not* reducible to > > physical time, but is *another* time dimension super-imposed over the > > top of (supervening on but not reducible to) physical time. As I said > > in my previous post: 'Consciousness is movement of mathematical > > continuants through mathematical configuration space' (i.e. a higher > > dimensional - abstract - time). > > > > If the academics didn't spend all their time jetting around the world > > on elaborate conferences and trying to impress us all with fancy > > 'papers' and 'lectures' filled with worthless verbiage they would have > > realized that time had more than one dimension and that consciousness > > should be directly equated with an extra dimension long ago. > > > > I take it then that you're spending all your time jetting around the world > to sit in on conferences where "pompous academics" present worthless > papers filled with verbiage. Half your luck! > > I'm not an academic myself, and rarely get an opportunity to attend > conferences. But in these lean times, not many of my academic > colleagues do either. I'm not an academic. In fact the more time I've spent around these folks (on various internet mailing lists) the more they irritate me. They just ain't any fun. um now why does your sig say 'professor Russell Standish', Mathematics with a academic address given? ;) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Thu, Oct 12, 2006 at 07:41:37AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a > second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) > and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially > right *if* we allow time to have more than one component or dimension. > The block universe is the mathematical 'scaffolding' of time. But > superimposed on top of this is *another* component to time > conscious (sentient) observer moments. The block scaffolding of time > doesn't flow. But the observer moments *do*. They can also be both right if they're held to be emergent concepts (in the precise form of the term I use). Extra dimensionality is not needed. > > Poor old Nick Bostrom and the other pompous academic fools are all so > confused because they think consciousness is reducible to physical > time. I find this suprising. I've never seen any of Bostrom's writings that indicates this. > This is the source of all the confusion about anthropic > reasoning and observer moments. Consciousness is *not* reducible to > physical time, but is *another* time dimension super-imposed over the > top of (supervening on but not reducible to) physical time. As I said > in my previous post: 'Consciousness is movement of mathematical > continuants through mathematical configuration space' (i.e. a higher > dimensional - abstract - time). > > If the academics didn't spend all their time jetting around the world > on elaborate conferences and trying to impress us all with fancy > 'papers' and 'lectures' filled with worthless verbiage they would have > realized that time had more than one dimension and that consciousness > should be directly equated with an extra dimension long ago. > I take it then that you're spending all your time jetting around the world to sit in on conferences where "pompous academics" present worthless papers filled with verbiage. Half your luck! I'm not an academic myself, and rarely get an opportunity to attend conferences. But in these lean times, not many of my academic colleagues do either. > > -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: > On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally > > agreed-upon description of "consciousness" - applied in the lit as all > > variations of an unidentified "thing" anyone needs to his theory. > > I 'feel' Ccness is a process. It not only 'knows', but also 'decides' and > > directs activity accordingly. I identified it as "acknowledgement of and > > response to information (1992) - info not in the information-theory term, > > but as a 'noted difference by anything/body'. It is not my recent position > > to hold on to that. On another list I read about the ID of Ccness: it is > > one's feeling of SELF (of "I") (which makes sense). > > We'll probably be old men (QTI-like ancient) by the time there is any > concensus on the subject. > > I operationally define consciousness in terms of Bostrom's > "reference class" - ie the property of there being something for it be > like (references of Nagel's What is to be like bat - if bats are > consciousm the question is answerable, if not then there is nothing > that it is like to be a bat). > > Note that this is _not_ equivalent to self-awareness, which is the > "feeling of self" you talk about. Mind you, self-awareness does seem > to be necessary for consciousness in order to prevent the Occam > catastrophe, which I mention in my book, and probably on this list. > > Process is covered by my "TIME" postulate, which I've been > deliberately somewhat vague on. It essentially says that experienced > observer moments can be placed into an ordered set (mathematical > notion of ordering - for every experienced observer moment, all other > experienced moments must exist in the past or the future of that one). > > This leaves open a wide variety of time structures (continuous, > discrete, rational and so on), and indeed all structures called > timescales is included. However, it dismisses things like 2D time, so > it could potentially be wrong. My dear fellow, as I explained in a previous post, consciousness IS a second time dimension. The 'Block-universe' view of time (B-Theory) and the 'Flowing River' view of time (A-Theory) can both be partially right *if* we allow time to have more than one component or dimension. The block universe is the mathematical 'scaffolding' of time. But superimposed on top of this is *another* component to time conscious (sentient) observer moments. The block scaffolding of time doesn't flow. But the observer moments *do*. Poor old Nick Bostrom and the other pompous academic fools are all so confused because they think consciousness is reducible to physical time. This is the source of all the confusion about anthropic reasoning and observer moments. Consciousness is *not* reducible to physical time, but is *another* time dimension super-imposed over the top of (supervening on but not reducible to) physical time. As I said in my previous post: 'Consciousness is movement of mathematical continuants through mathematical configuration space' (i.e. a higher dimensional - abstract - time). If the academics didn't spend all their time jetting around the world on elaborate conferences and trying to impress us all with fancy 'papers' and 'lectures' filled with worthless verbiage they would have realized that time had more than one dimension and that consciousness should be directly equated with an extra dimension long ago. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Not-Re: Maudlin's argument
And you also made a solemn promise to read the ones you've got? Wait a year or two, and I'll make my book available for a free download - if you have the time then, you'll be able to read it without breaking your promise :) In the meantime, I have to keep up the pretense of this book being a commercial enterprise so I can claim my publishing expenses as a tax deduction. I'm working on making a cheap PDF version available soon, since Booksurge don't offer that service any more. Cheers On Tue, Oct 10, 2006 at 04:18:54PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Russell, > thanks for the detailed reply with the agreement against Ccnss being sort-of > a self-awareness. Unfortunately I cannot get to your book for the time being > (we made a solemn oath with my wife at our 50th NOT to buy any more books, > rather get rid of most of them) and our excellent publ library does not > provide the fresh editions). > > On Nagel's bat (and later in JCS Hameroff-Penrose's 'worm') I wrote my > objection that WE want to understand with OUR level ideation the mental > functions of a bat or a worm - of course we cannot. So I seek a better (or > none?!) definition than a comparison to those. > > And a consensus on Ccness will never set in as long as diverse "researchers" > get grants (awards, tenure, etc.) and publish books with the diverse > identifications - theories (against all other ones). See the 15 year > success of the Tucson Conferences. > > John > > - Original Message - > From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 2:52 AM > Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > > > Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally > > > agreed-upon description of "consciousness" - applied in the lit as all > > > variations of an unidentified "thing" anyone needs to his theory. > > > I 'feel' Ccness is a process. It not only 'knows', but also 'decides' > and > > > directs activity accordingly. I identified it as "acknowledgement of and > > > response to information (1992) - info not in the information-theory > term, > > > but as a 'noted difference by anything/body'. It is not my recent > position > > > to hold on to that. On another list I read about the ID of Ccness: it is > > > one's feeling of SELF (of "I") (which makes sense). > > > > We'll probably be old men (QTI-like ancient) by the time there is any > > concensus on the subject. > > > > I operationally define consciousness in terms of Bostrom's > > "reference class" - ie the property of there being something for it be > > like (references of Nagel's What is to be like bat - if bats are > > consciousm the question is answerable, if not then there is nothing > > that it is like to be a bat). > > > > Note that this is _not_ equivalent to self-awareness, which is the > > "feeling of self" you talk about. Mind you, self-awareness does seem > > to be necessary for consciousness in order to prevent the Occam > > catastrophe, which I mention in my book, and probably on this list. > > > > Process is covered by my "TIME" postulate, which I've been > > deliberately somewhat vague on. It essentially says that experienced > > observer moments can be placed into an ordered set (mathematical > > notion of ordering - for every experienced observer moment, all other > > experienced moments must exist in the past or the future of that one). > > > > This leaves open a wide variety of time structures (continuous, > > discrete, rational and so on), and indeed all structures called > > timescales is included. However, it dismisses things like 2D time, so > > it could potentially be wrong. > > > > > > > > You wrote a less controversial variation in your post; > > > "... I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. ..." > > > which (being conscious) is part of the picture, I miss the activity in > it, > > > just as in the 'feeling of "I". > > > (Tied to: 'being conscious OF..., i.e. awareness, what many identify > with > > > the entire chapter.) > > > > > > Unfortunately the word is so deeply anchored in the multimillennial > usage > > > that we cannot get rid of this noumenon. We could talk about the > > > 'ingredients' by themselves and a
Not-Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell, thanks for the detailed reply with the agreement against Ccnss being sort-of a self-awareness. Unfortunately I cannot get to your book for the time being (we made a solemn oath with my wife at our 50th NOT to buy any more books, rather get rid of most of them) and our excellent publ library does not provide the fresh editions). On Nagel's bat (and later in JCS Hameroff-Penrose's 'worm') I wrote my objection that WE want to understand with OUR level ideation the mental functions of a bat or a worm - of course we cannot. So I seek a better (or none?!) definition than a comparison to those. And a consensus on Ccness will never set in as long as diverse "researchers" get grants (awards, tenure, etc.) and publish books with the diverse identifications - theories (against all other ones). See the 15 year success of the Tucson Conferences. John - Original Message - From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 2:52 AM Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument > > On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > > Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally > > agreed-upon description of "consciousness" - applied in the lit as all > > variations of an unidentified "thing" anyone needs to his theory. > > I 'feel' Ccness is a process. It not only 'knows', but also 'decides' and > > directs activity accordingly. I identified it as "acknowledgement of and > > response to information (1992) - info not in the information-theory term, > > but as a 'noted difference by anything/body'. It is not my recent position > > to hold on to that. On another list I read about the ID of Ccness: it is > > one's feeling of SELF (of "I") (which makes sense). > > We'll probably be old men (QTI-like ancient) by the time there is any > concensus on the subject. > > I operationally define consciousness in terms of Bostrom's > "reference class" - ie the property of there being something for it be > like (references of Nagel's What is to be like bat - if bats are > consciousm the question is answerable, if not then there is nothing > that it is like to be a bat). > > Note that this is _not_ equivalent to self-awareness, which is the > "feeling of self" you talk about. Mind you, self-awareness does seem > to be necessary for consciousness in order to prevent the Occam > catastrophe, which I mention in my book, and probably on this list. > > Process is covered by my "TIME" postulate, which I've been > deliberately somewhat vague on. It essentially says that experienced > observer moments can be placed into an ordered set (mathematical > notion of ordering - for every experienced observer moment, all other > experienced moments must exist in the past or the future of that one). > > This leaves open a wide variety of time structures (continuous, > discrete, rational and so on), and indeed all structures called > timescales is included. However, it dismisses things like 2D time, so > it could potentially be wrong. > > > > > You wrote a less controversial variation in your post; > > "... I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. ..." > > which (being conscious) is part of the picture, I miss the activity in it, > > just as in the 'feeling of "I". > > (Tied to: 'being conscious OF..., i.e. awareness, what many identify with > > the entire chapter.) > > > > Unfortunately the word is so deeply anchored in the multimillennial usage > > that we cannot get rid of this noumenon. We could talk about the > > 'ingredients' by themselves and agree, the ominous Ccness term is a good > > platform for eternal debates. Also for grants. > > > > I join you in disproving of assigning total meaning to simplified tools > > allegedly active in the mental concept, like a QM abstraction. > > > > John M > > > > > > > > - Original Message - > > From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: > > Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:25 PM > > Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the > > difference between > > > > consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently > > living through a virtual > > > > > > Sure, but I don't see how I am conscious in the first
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 11:44:38AM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally > agreed-upon description of "consciousness" - applied in the lit as all > variations of an unidentified "thing" anyone needs to his theory. > I 'feel' Ccness is a process. It not only 'knows', but also 'decides' and > directs activity accordingly. I identified it as "acknowledgement of and > response to information (1992) - info not in the information-theory term, > but as a 'noted difference by anything/body'. It is not my recent position > to hold on to that. On another list I read about the ID of Ccness: it is > one's feeling of SELF (of "I") (which makes sense). We'll probably be old men (QTI-like ancient) by the time there is any concensus on the subject. I operationally define consciousness in terms of Bostrom's "reference class" - ie the property of there being something for it be like (references of Nagel's What is to be like bat - if bats are consciousm the question is answerable, if not then there is nothing that it is like to be a bat). Note that this is _not_ equivalent to self-awareness, which is the "feeling of self" you talk about. Mind you, self-awareness does seem to be necessary for consciousness in order to prevent the Occam catastrophe, which I mention in my book, and probably on this list. Process is covered by my "TIME" postulate, which I've been deliberately somewhat vague on. It essentially says that experienced observer moments can be placed into an ordered set (mathematical notion of ordering - for every experienced observer moment, all other experienced moments must exist in the past or the future of that one). This leaves open a wide variety of time structures (continuous, discrete, rational and so on), and indeed all structures called timescales is included. However, it dismisses things like 2D time, so it could potentially be wrong. > > You wrote a less controversial variation in your post; > "... I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. ..." > which (being conscious) is part of the picture, I miss the activity in it, > just as in the 'feeling of "I". > (Tied to: 'being conscious OF..., i.e. awareness, what many identify with > the entire chapter.) > > Unfortunately the word is so deeply anchored in the multimillennial usage > that we cannot get rid of this noumenon. We could talk about the > 'ingredients' by themselves and agree, the ominous Ccness term is a good > platform for eternal debates. Also for grants. > > I join you in disproving of assigning total meaning to simplified tools > allegedly active in the mental concept, like a QM abstraction. > > John M > > > > - Original Message - > From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:25 PM > Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument > > > > > > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the > difference between > > > consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently > living through a virtual > > > > Sure, but I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. Yet the > > fact remains that I do. > > > > Until we have a better idea of the mechanisms behind consciousness, it > > is a little too early to rule out any specific conclusion. I think > > Penrose and Lockwood are dead wrong in their specific quantum > > mechanical connections with consciousness, but I retain a suspicion > > that quantum effects are important in some way. > > > > -- > > *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which > > is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a > > virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this > > email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you > > may safely ignore this attachment. > > > > -- > -- > > A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Mathematics > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Australia > http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks > > International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 > > -- > -- > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > No virus found i
Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell, I like your position - but am still at a loss of a generally agreed-upon description of "consciousness" - applied in the lit as all variations of an unidentified "thing" anyone needs to his theory. I 'feel' Ccness is a process. It not only 'knows', but also 'decides' and directs activity accordingly. I identified it as "acknowledgement of and response to information (1992) - info not in the information-theory term, but as a 'noted difference by anything/body'. It is not my recent position to hold on to that. On another list I read about the ID of Ccness: it is one's feeling of SELF (of "I") (which makes sense). You wrote a less controversial variation in your post; "... I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. ..." which (being conscious) is part of the picture, I miss the activity in it, just as in the 'feeling of "I". (Tied to: 'being conscious OF..., i.e. awareness, what many identify with the entire chapter.) Unfortunately the word is so deeply anchored in the multimillennial usage that we cannot get rid of this noumenon. We could talk about the 'ingredients' by themselves and agree, the ominous Ccness term is a good platform for eternal debates. Also for grants. I join you in disproving of assigning total meaning to simplified tools allegedly active in the mental concept, like a QM abstraction. John M - Original Message ----- From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 1:25 PM Subject: Re: Maudlin's argument > > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the difference between > > consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living through a virtual > > Sure, but I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. Yet the > fact remains that I do. > > Until we have a better idea of the mechanisms behind consciousness, it > is a little too early to rule out any specific conclusion. I think > Penrose and Lockwood are dead wrong in their specific quantum > mechanical connections with consciousness, but I retain a suspicion > that quantum effects are important in some way. > > -- > *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which > is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a > virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this > email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you > may safely ignore this attachment. > > -- -- > A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks > International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 > -- -- > > > > > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Free Edition. > Version: 7.1.407 / Virus Database: 268.13.1/466 - Release Date: 10/07/06 > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 01:41:52PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the > difference between > consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living > through a virtual Sure, but I don't see how I am conscious in the first place. Yet the fact remains that I do. Until we have a better idea of the mechanisms behind consciousness, it is a little too early to rule out any specific conclusion. I think Penrose and Lockwood are dead wrong in their specific quantum mechanical connections with consciousness, but I retain a suspicion that quantum effects are important in some way. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: > But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The > quantum > world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some > probability. Only under MWI. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:48, 1Z a écrit : > > > That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists, > > structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not > > Platonists. > > > After Godel, even formalists are platonist about numbers. Of course not. > If they say > that they are formalist it means they are not platonist about things > extending numbers like sets. Or it means they does not follows the > mathematical news. That is not how they describe themselves. > Formalism at the level of numbers has been shown senseless. This is > already clear in Dedekind, but provable in all details by using > theorems by Skolem or Godel. I think you are getting the Hilbertian programme, of mechanising mathematics, confuse with formalism, which is a claim about the meaning of mathematical propositions. Formalists believe that mathematical propositions in general take their meanings from systems of rules and defintions in general . The discovery that particular systems have particular limitations does not destroy that claim. > A strict formalist about natural numbers cannot even interpret the > modus ponens rule and explains what formalism is. > It is false to pretend (like we can heard sometimes) that Godel > incompleteness has kill the formalist doctrine in mathematics, but it > is correct to say that godel's incompleteness has kill the formalist > doctrine in arithmetics. > > But I agree with David's yesterday post, you should should less quibble > about terminology and try to understand the reasoning instead. No-one can understand anyhting withiut clear definitions. > That > would provide much more help for settling the possible interpretation > problems. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Le 07-oct.-06, à 16:48, 1Z a écrit : > That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists, > structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not > Platonists. After Godel, even formalists are platonist about numbers. If they say that they are formalist it means they are not platonist about things extending numbers like sets. Or it means they does not follows the mathematical news. Formalism at the level of numbers has been shown senseless. This is already clear in Dedekind, but provable in all details by using theorems by Skolem or Godel. A strict formalist about natural numbers cannot even interpret the modus ponens rule and explains what formalism is. It is false to pretend (like we can heard sometimes) that Godel incompleteness has kill the formalist doctrine in mathematics, but it is correct to say that godel's incompleteness has kill the formalist doctrine in arithmetics. But I agree with David's yesterday post, you should should less quibble about terminology and try to understand the reasoning instead. That would provide much more help for settling the possible interpretation problems. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish writes: > On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > For how would a1/a1b1 > > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of > > the multiverse? > > > > Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more > absurd than saying recordings can be conscious. Perhaps you are right, but the simplest position seems to me to be that if a machine is conscious with all its fellows in the multiverse implementing the counterfactuals, it should also be conscious if all the other machines did not exist. What you have argued is that a mechanism for handling counterfactuals which is apparently inert and irrelevant on a particular run is actually neither if the MWI is true, because the presence of the mechanism ensures that the counterfactuals are realised in other branches. This means that a machine with such a mechanism in place (i.e., a machine that is not a recording) has a varied and first person indeterminate future ahead of it. However, I don't see why having an interesting future should make the difference between consciousness and zombiehood. How do I know that I am not currently living through a virtual reality replay of something recorded yesterday? I could try to confound the simulation by performing an unpredictable act, but no matter how hard I tried I could not surprise an external observer in the know any more than I could surprise my reflection in the mirrror with a sudden unexpected movement. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>>Brent Meeker writes: >>> >>> >>> >>>>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on >>>>>no >>>>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is >>>>>also consistent >>>>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and >>>>>that >>>>>perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum >>>>>state >>>>>there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant >>>>>compared to >>>>>the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to >>>>>eliminate it >>>>>completely. >>> >>> >>>>But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. >>>>The quantum >>>>world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some >>>>probability. >>> >>> >>>I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the >>>counterfactuals are >>>always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the >>>counterfactuals >>>are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I >>>don't see that >>>it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI >>>case. A machine >>>is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular >>>time and b1 >>>comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a >>>counterfactual is >>>realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes some >>>physical >>>activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is not >>>realised) but not >>>conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it >>>seems no less >>>absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine >>>next to it, a2b2, >>>in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. For >>>how would a1/a1b1 >>>know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of >>>the multiverse? >> >>It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs. If it occured it >>wouldn't be counterfactual. The point is that in QM what occurs depends on >>what >>could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach arXiv.org for >>"interaction free measurment". > > > Doesn't this refer to quantum interference effects? Otherwise what would be > the distinction between > a quantum computer and a classical computer in what we know is a quantum > world? > > Stathis Papaioannou Yes, it does depend on quantum interference. But a "classical computer" in this quantum world can only be *approximately* classical. So I'm wondering how that affects Maudlin's argument and others that depend on counterfactuals making no difference. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sat, Oct 07, 2006 at 02:25:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > The quantum > > world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with > > some probability. > > > And I guess that is why Russell Standish believes that the Maudlin type > of argument could be just an argument in favor or the (physical) > multiverse (like UDA could be as well in that case). But this does not > follow because if the counterfactuals are needed to be simulated, it > would just mean, assuming comp, that the level of emulation has not > been correctly chosen. Just redo Maudlin's thought experiment with his > program PI being a quantum program simulated by a classical Olympia if > you want to be sure of this. > > Bruno > It doesn't really work, because the Multiverse is too simple an object. We would never say your universal dovetailer was conscious for example, so doing the Maudlin on it will not tell us anything interesting. We can conclude that consciousness must appear as an internal POV phenomenon (assuming a MV type structure, or equivalently COMP which implies the latter via the UDA). Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Sun, Oct 08, 2006 at 12:36:04AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > For how would a1/a1b1 > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the > multiverse? > Perhaps they do depend on other Multiverse branches. This is no more absurd than saying recordings can be conscious. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Brent Meeker writes: > > > > > >>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on > >>>no > >>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is > >>>also consistent > >>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and > >>>that > >>>perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum > >>>state > >>>there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant > >>>compared to > >>>the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to > >>>eliminate it > >>>completely. > > > > > >>But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. > >>The quantum > >>world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some > >>probability. > > > > > > I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the > > counterfactuals are > > always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the > > counterfactuals > > are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I > > don't see that > > it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI > > case. A machine > > is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular > > time and b1 > > comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a > > counterfactual is > > realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes > > some physical > > activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is > > not realised) but not > > conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it > > seems no less > > absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine > > next to it, a2b2, > > in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. > > For how would a1/a1b1 > > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of > > the multiverse? > > It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs. If it occured it > wouldn't be counterfactual. The point is that in QM what occurs depends on > what > could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach arXiv.org for > "interaction free measurment". Doesn't this refer to quantum interference effects? Otherwise what would be the distinction between a quantum computer and a classical computer in what we know is a quantum world? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no >>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also >>>consistent >>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and >>>that >>>perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum >>>state >>>there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant compared >>>to >>>the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to eliminate >>>it >>>completely. > > >>But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The >>quantum >>world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some >>probability. > > > I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the > counterfactuals are > always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the > counterfactuals > are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I > don't see that > it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI > case. A machine > is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular > time and b1 > comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a > counterfactual is > realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes some > physical > activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is not > realised) but not > conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it > seems no less > absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine > next to it, a2b2, > in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. For > how would a1/a1b1 > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the > multiverse? It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs. If it occured it wouldn't be counterfactual. The point is that in QM what occurs depends on what could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach arXiv.org for "interaction free measurment". Brent Meeker What is particularly curious about quantum theory is that there can be actual physical effects arising from what philosophers refer to as counterfactuals – that is, things that might have happened, although they did not happened. --- Roger Penrose --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be
> >> careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we
> >> are reifying numbers and mathematical objects.
> >
> > That is exactly what mathematical Platonism has always meant [*]
> >
> > But "reifying" doesn't mean treating as material. Platonic objects are
> > supposed
> > to immaterial, somehow. Well, you beleive the UD exists,
> > and you believe matter doesn't so you belive in
> > immaterial entitities, so you are a Platonist.
>
>
>
> So we agree on this since the beginning!!!
> I was just referring to a nuance you did introduce between believing
> that the number 5 exist (say), and believing in the independent truth
> of the proposition "It exist a number which is equal to 5".
The difference is reification, or Platonism, about numbers.
Which you claim not to
need.
> I hope you agree with the fact that in this sense everybody is
> *arithmetical* platonist,
That is obviously wrong. Formalists are not Platonists,
structuralists are not Platonists, Empiricists are not
Platonists.
>with the exception of the ultra-intuitionist
> (who does not believe in number which are too much big (yet finite). I
> am certainly an arithmetical realist (platonist), but I would not
> assert that I am a set-theoretical platonist. (Note that I would not
> necessarily deny it, I'm just currently agnostic on big sets).
>
> Note that by using godel's arithmetization device, it can be shown that
> the UD exists in exactly the same sense than saying that 5 exists.
Which of course is not any real existence at
all for the anti-Platonist, although he agees with
the truth of all the same mathematical propositions as the Platonist.
But you think the UD does things and behaves in certain
ways and generates certain appearances. So you think it
exists. So you are Platonising and reifying, although you claim
not to be.
> And I am not willing to defend the idea that "5 exists", just that
> comp ("yes doctor" + Church Thesis + "5 exists" (say)) entails that
> physics is a branch of number theory (including recursion theory like
> in Yuri Manin's book), and constructively so.
>
> My personal opinion if comp is true or false is ... personal. Ok I let
> you know that I have no doubt that "5 exists", few doubt that CT is
> true, some doubt that "yes doctor" is true.
And many doubt "5 exists" in a "real" sense of existence -- many
doubt Platonism.
>My point is that comp, made
> precise enough, is empirically refutable.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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RE: Maudlin's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no > > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also > > consistent > > to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and > > that > > perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum > > state > > there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant > > compared to > > the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to > > eliminate it > > completely. > But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The > quantum > world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some > probability. I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the counterfactuals are always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the counterfactuals are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I don't see that it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI case. A machine is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular time and b1 comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a counterfactual is realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes some physical activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is not realised) but not conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it seems no less absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine next to it, a2b2, in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. For how would a1/a1b1 know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of the multiverse? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
SV: Maudlin's argument
-Ursprungligt meddelande- Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Bruno Marchal Skickat: den 7 oktober 2006 14:50 Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com Ämne: Re: Maudlin's argument Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit : > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > "It exist a number which is equal to 5". I hope you agree with the fact that in this sense everybody is *arithmetical* platonist--~~~~--~~--~--~--- Not me... LN --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Le 07-oct.-06, à 11:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be
>> careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we
>> are reifying numbers and mathematical objects.
>
> That is exactly what mathematical Platonism has always meant [*]
>
> But "reifying" doesn't mean treating as material. Platonic objects are
> supposed
> to immaterial, somehow. Well, you beleive the UD exists,
> and you believe matter doesn't so you belive in
> immaterial entitities, so you are a Platonist.
So we agree on this since the beginning!!!
I was just referring to a nuance you did introduce between believing
that the number 5 exist (say), and believing in the independent truth
of the proposition "It exist a number which is equal to 5".
I hope you agree with the fact that in this sense everybody is
*arithmetical* platonist, with the exception of the ultra-intuitionist
(who does not believe in number which are too much big (yet finite). I
am certainly an arithmetical realist (platonist), but I would not
assert that I am a set-theoretical platonist. (Note that I would not
necessarily deny it, I'm just currently agnostic on big sets).
Note that by using godel's arithmetization device, it can be shown that
the UD exists in exactly the same sense than saying that 5 exists.
And I am not willing to defend the idea that "5 exists", just that
comp ("yes doctor" + Church Thesis + "5 exists" (say)) entails that
physics is a branch of number theory (including recursion theory like
in Yuri Manin's book), and constructively so.
My personal opinion if comp is true or false is ... personal. Ok I let
you know that I have no doubt that "5 exists", few doubt that CT is
true, some doubt that "yes doctor" is true. My point is that comp, made
precise enough, is empirically refutable.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Maudlin's argument
Le 06-oct.-06, à 19:51, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Bruno Marchal writes: >> >> >>> Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : >>> >>> >>>> Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could >>>> summarise, he states that one >>>> of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be >>>> the >>>> trivial case of a recording, a >>>> machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. >>>> He then proposes a second >>>> machine next to one which on its own is just a recording, such that >>>> the second machine comes into >>>> play and acts on the first machine should inputs be different. The >>>> system as a whole now handles >>>> counterfactuals. However, should the counterfactuals not actually >>>> arise, the second machine just >>>> sits there inertly next to the first machine. We would now have to >>>> say >>>> that when the first machine >>>> goes through physical sequence abc on its own, it is just >>>> implementing >>>> a recording and could not >>>> possibly be conscious, while if it goes through the same sequence >>>> abc >>>> with the second machine sitting >>>> inertly next to it it is or could be conscious. This would seem to >>>> contravene the supervenience thesis >>>> which most computationalists accept: that mental activity supervenes >>>> on physical activity, and further >>>> that the same physical activity will give rise to the same mental >>>> activity. For it seems in the example >>>> that physical activity is the same in both cases (since the second >>>> machine does nothing), yet in the >>>> first case the system cannot be conscious while in the second case >>>> it >>>> can. >>> >>> >>> This is a nice summary of Maudlin's paper. >>> >>> >>> >>>> There are several possible responses to the above argument. One is >>>> that computationalism is wrong. >>>> Another is that the supervenience thesis is wrong and the mental >>>> does >>>> not supervene on the physical >>>> (but Bruno would say it supervenes on computation as Platonic >>>> object). >>>> Yet another response is that >>>> the idea that a recording cannot be conscious is wrong, and the >>>> relationship between physical activity >>>> and mental activity can be one->many, allowing that any physical >>>> process may implement any >>>> computation including any conscious computation. >>> >>> Why? The whole point is that consciousness or even just computation >>> would supervene on *absence" of physical activity. >>> This is not "on *any* physical activity. I can imagine the quantum >>> vacuum is "full of computations", but saying consciousness supervene >>> on >>> no physical activity at all is equivalent, keeping the comp >>> assumption, >>> to associate consciousness on the immaterial/mathematical >>> computations. >>> This shows then why we have to explain the relative appearance of the >>> "physical stuff". >> >> >> It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes >> on no >> physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it >> is also consistent >> to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical >> activity, and that >> perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single >> quantum state >> there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant >> compared to >> the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to >> eliminate it >> completely. >> >> Stathis Papaioannou > > But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. I don't see this. Maudlin's assumes only that consciousness can be attributed to a "classical" computation. Its reasoning would work even in the case the brain would be a quantum computer. The reason for that is that quantum computations are classically turing emulable. Church thesis has not been violated by the rise of the quantum turing machine, as David Deutsch already explained in his seminal paper on quantum computation. > The quant
RE: Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal writes: > > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes > > on no > > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - > > > I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be > careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we > are reifying numbers and mathematical objects. This would be a mistake > only second to Aristotle reification of the notion of matter > > > > but it is also consistent > > to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, > > and that > > perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single > > quantum state > > there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant > > compared to > > the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to > > eliminate it > > completely. > > I think you are right, but it seems to me that at that point (still > more after the translation of the UDA in arithmetic) to really believe > that a recording can have all consciousness experiences would be like > to believe that, despite the thermodynamical explanation, cars are > still pull by (invisible) horses. In any *applied* math there is an > unavoidable use of Ockham razor. The movie graph or Maudlin's Olympia > makes it as minimal as possible. It seems there is a contest of absurdities: that consciousness can supervene on a recording, or any physical process, or no physical process. Maudlin apparently thinks all of these are absurd, you think the first two are absurd but not the last, I think all three are equally... a little bit absurd, but not absurd enough to knock off computationalism as the best theory of consciousness. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal wrote: > I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be > careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we > are reifying numbers and mathematical objects. That is exactly what mathematical Platonism has always meant [*] But "reifying" doesn't mean treating as material. Platonic objects are supposed to immaterial, somehow. Well, you beleive the UD exists, and you believe matter doesn't so you belive in immaterial entitities, so you are a Platonist. [*] http://www.maa.org/reviews/whatis.html There were three major points of view in the debate about the nature of mathematics. The formalists argued (roughly: the short summaries that follow are really caricatures) that mathematics was really simply the formal manipulation of symbols based on arbitrarily-chosen axioms. The Platonists saw mathematics as almost an experimental science, studying objects that really exist (in some sense), though they clearly don't exist in a physical or material sense. The intuitionists had the most radical point of view; essentially, they saw all mathematics as a human creation and therefore as essentially finite. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#1 Platonism is the view that there exist abstract objects, and again, an object is abstract just in case it is non-spatiotemporal, i.e., does not exist in space or time. [ ... ] Three examples of things that are often taken to be abstract are (a) mathematical objects (most notably, numbers), (b) properties, and (c) propositions. Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are about abstract objects (i.e., that their singular terms denote abstract objects and their existential quantifiers range over abstract objects). The philosophy of Plato, or an approach to philosophy resembling his. For example, someone who asserts that numbers exist independently of the things they number could be called a Platonist. http://www.fortunecity.com/emachines/e11/86/enm3.html# The view that mathematical concepts could exist in such a timeless,ethereal sense was put forward in ancient times (c.360 BC) by the great Greek philosopher Plato.Consequently,this view is frequently referred to as mathematical Platonism --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Bruno Marchal writes: > > >>Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : >> >> >>>Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could >>>summarise, he states that one >>>of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the >>>trivial case of a recording, a >>>machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. >>>He then proposes a second >>>machine next to one which on its own is just a recording, such that >>>the second machine comes into >>>play and acts on the first machine should inputs be different. The >>>system as a whole now handles >>>counterfactuals. However, should the counterfactuals not actually >>>arise, the second machine just >>>sits there inertly next to the first machine. We would now have to say >>>that when the first machine >>>goes through physical sequence abc on its own, it is just implementing >>>a recording and could not >>>possibly be conscious, while if it goes through the same sequence abc >>>with the second machine sitting >>>inertly next to it it is or could be conscious. This would seem to >>>contravene the supervenience thesis >>>which most computationalists accept: that mental activity supervenes >>>on physical activity, and further >>>that the same physical activity will give rise to the same mental >>>activity. For it seems in the example >>>that physical activity is the same in both cases (since the second >>>machine does nothing), yet in the >>>first case the system cannot be conscious while in the second case it >>>can. >> >> >>This is a nice summary of Maudlin's paper. >> >> >> >>>There are several possible responses to the above argument. One is >>>that computationalism is wrong. >>>Another is that the supervenience thesis is wrong and the mental does >>>not supervene on the physical >>>(but Bruno would say it supervenes on computation as Platonic object). >>>Yet another response is that >>>the idea that a recording cannot be conscious is wrong, and the >>>relationship between physical activity >>>and mental activity can be one->many, allowing that any physical >>>process may implement any >>>computation including any conscious computation. >> >>Why? The whole point is that consciousness or even just computation >>would supervene on *absence" of physical activity. >>This is not "on *any* physical activity. I can imagine the quantum >>vacuum is "full of computations", but saying consciousness supervene on >>no physical activity at all is equivalent, keeping the comp assumption, >>to associate consciousness on the immaterial/mathematical computations. >>This shows then why we have to explain the relative appearance of the >>"physical stuff". > > > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also > consistent > to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and > that > perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum > state > there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant compared > to > the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to eliminate > it > completely. > > Stathis Papaioannou But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The quantum world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some probability. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Le 06-oct.-06, à 13:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal writes: > >> Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : >> >>> >>> Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could >>> summarise, he states that one >>> of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the >>> trivial case of a recording, a >>> machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. >>> He then proposes a second >>> machine next to one which on its own is just a recording, such that >>> the second machine comes into >>> play and acts on the first machine should inputs be different. The >>> system as a whole now handles >>> counterfactuals. However, should the counterfactuals not actually >>> arise, the second machine just >>> sits there inertly next to the first machine. We would now have to >>> say >>> that when the first machine >>> goes through physical sequence abc on its own, it is just >>> implementing >>> a recording and could not >>> possibly be conscious, while if it goes through the same sequence abc >>> with the second machine sitting >>> inertly next to it it is or could be conscious. This would seem to >>> contravene the supervenience thesis >>> which most computationalists accept: that mental activity supervenes >>> on physical activity, and further >>> that the same physical activity will give rise to the same mental >>> activity. For it seems in the example >>> that physical activity is the same in both cases (since the second >>> machine does nothing), yet in the >>> first case the system cannot be conscious while in the second case it >>> can. >> >> >> This is a nice summary of Maudlin's paper. >> >> >>> >>> There are several possible responses to the above argument. One is >>> that computationalism is wrong. >>> Another is that the supervenience thesis is wrong and the mental does >>> not supervene on the physical >>> (but Bruno would say it supervenes on computation as Platonic >>> object). >>> Yet another response is that >>> the idea that a recording cannot be conscious is wrong, and the >>> relationship between physical activity >>> and mental activity can be one->many, allowing that any physical >>> process may implement any >>> computation including any conscious computation. >> >> Why? The whole point is that consciousness or even just computation >> would supervene on *absence" of physical activity. >> This is not "on *any* physical activity. I can imagine the quantum >> vacuum is "full of computations", but saying consciousness supervene >> on >> no physical activity at all is equivalent, keeping the comp >> assumption, >> to associate consciousness on the immaterial/mathematical >> computations. >> This shows then why we have to explain the relative appearance of the >> "physical stuff". > > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes > on no > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - I did not have problem with the expression "platonic object" but be careful because it makes some people believe (cf Peter Jones) that we are reifying numbers and mathematical objects. This would be a mistake only second to Aristotle reification of the notion of matter > but it is also consistent > to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, > and that > perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single > quantum state > there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant > compared to > the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to > eliminate it > completely. I think you are right, but it seems to me that at that point (still more after the translation of the UDA in arithmetic) to really believe that a recording can have all consciousness experiences would be like to believe that, despite the thermodynamical explanation, cars are still pull by (invisible) horses. In any *applied* math there is an unavoidable use of Ockham razor. The movie graph or Maudlin's Olympia makes it as minimal as possible. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal writes: > Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > > > Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could > > summarise, he states that one > > of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the > > trivial case of a recording, a > > machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. > > He then proposes a second > > machine next to one which on its own is just a recording, such that > > the second machine comes into > > play and acts on the first machine should inputs be different. The > > system as a whole now handles > > counterfactuals. However, should the counterfactuals not actually > > arise, the second machine just > > sits there inertly next to the first machine. We would now have to say > > that when the first machine > > goes through physical sequence abc on its own, it is just implementing > > a recording and could not > > possibly be conscious, while if it goes through the same sequence abc > > with the second machine sitting > > inertly next to it it is or could be conscious. This would seem to > > contravene the supervenience thesis > > which most computationalists accept: that mental activity supervenes > > on physical activity, and further > > that the same physical activity will give rise to the same mental > > activity. For it seems in the example > > that physical activity is the same in both cases (since the second > > machine does nothing), yet in the > > first case the system cannot be conscious while in the second case it > > can. > > > This is a nice summary of Maudlin's paper. > > > > > > There are several possible responses to the above argument. One is > > that computationalism is wrong. > > Another is that the supervenience thesis is wrong and the mental does > > not supervene on the physical > > (but Bruno would say it supervenes on computation as Platonic object). > > Yet another response is that > > the idea that a recording cannot be conscious is wrong, and the > > relationship between physical activity > > and mental activity can be one->many, allowing that any physical > > process may implement any > > computation including any conscious computation. > > Why? The whole point is that consciousness or even just computation > would supervene on *absence" of physical activity. > This is not "on *any* physical activity. I can imagine the quantum > vacuum is "full of computations", but saying consciousness supervene on > no physical activity at all is equivalent, keeping the comp assumption, > to associate consciousness on the immaterial/mathematical computations. > This shows then why we have to explain the relative appearance of the > "physical stuff". It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also consistent to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and that perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum state there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant compared to the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to eliminate it completely. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could > summarise, he states that one > of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the > trivial case of a recording, a > machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. > He then proposes a second > machine next to one which on its own is just a recording, such that > the second machine comes into > play and acts on the first machine should inputs be different. The > system as a whole now handles > counterfactuals. However, should the counterfactuals not actually > arise, the second machine just > sits there inertly next to the first machine. We would now have to say > that when the first machine > goes through physical sequence abc on its own, it is just implementing > a recording and could not > possibly be conscious, while if it goes through the same sequence abc > with the second machine sitting > inertly next to it it is or could be conscious. This would seem to > contravene the supervenience thesis > which most computationalists accept: that mental activity supervenes > on physical activity, and further > that the same physical activity will give rise to the same mental > activity. For it seems in the example > that physical activity is the same in both cases (since the second > machine does nothing), yet in the > first case the system cannot be conscious while in the second case it > can. This is a nice summary of Maudlin's paper. > > There are several possible responses to the above argument. One is > that computationalism is wrong. > Another is that the supervenience thesis is wrong and the mental does > not supervene on the physical > (but Bruno would say it supervenes on computation as Platonic object). > Yet another response is that > the idea that a recording cannot be conscious is wrong, and the > relationship between physical activity > and mental activity can be one->many, allowing that any physical > process may implement any > computation including any conscious computation. Why? The whole point is that consciousness or even just computation would supervene on *absence" of physical activity. This is not "on *any* physical activity. I can imagine the quantum vacuum is "full of computations", but saying consciousness supervene on no physical activity at all is equivalent, keeping the comp assumption, to associate consciousness on the immaterial/mathematical computations. This shows then why we have to explain the relative appearance of the "physical stuff". Bruno > Finally, it is possible that the second machine does > somehow imbue the system with consciousness even though it doesn't do > anything. The challenge is > to see what is left standing after deciding on which of these ideas > are the more absurd. > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > ------- >> Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2006 21:56:13 -0700 >> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com >> Subject: Maudlin's argument >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument: >> "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner >> experience, you >> can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical >> activity involved is >> arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no >> inputs and no outputs. >> Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running >> computation, the >> machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only >> for that precise computation, >> with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will >> make the machine running >> computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin ingenuously >> showed that >> counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active >> devices which will be >> triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the >> environment. >> I believe the argument is erroneous. Maudlin's argument reminds me of >> the fallacy in Maxwell's demon. >> To reduce the machine's complexity Maudlin must perform a modicum of >> analysis, simulation etc.. to predict how the machine performs in >> different situations. Using his newly acquired knowledge, he then >> maximally reduces the machine's complexity for one particular task, >> keeping the machine fully operational for all other tasks. In effect >> Maudlin has surreptitiously inserted himself i
RE: Maudlin's argument
Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could summarise, he states that one of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the trivial case of a recording, a machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. He then proposes a second machine next to one which on its own is just a recording, such that the second machine comes into play and acts on the first machine should inputs be different. The system as a whole now handles counterfactuals. However, should the counterfactuals not actually arise, the second machine just sits there inertly next to the first machine. We would now have to say that when the first machine goes through physical sequence abc on its own, it is just implementing a recording and could not possibly be conscious, while if it goes through the same sequence abc with the second machine sitting inertly next to it it is or could be conscious. This would seem to contravene the supervenience thesis which most computationalists accept: that mental activity supervenes on physical activity, and further that the same physical activity will give rise to the same mental activity. For it seems in the example that physical activity is the same in both cases (since the second machine does nothing), yet in the first case the system cannot be conscious while in the second case it can. There are several possible responses to the above argument. One is that computationalism is wrong. Another is that the supervenience thesis is wrong and the mental does not supervene on the physical (but Bruno would say it supervenes on computation as Platonic object). Yet another response is that the idea that a recording cannot be conscious is wrong, and the relationship between physical activity and mental activity can be one->many, allowing that any physical process may implement any computation including any conscious computation. Finally, it is possible that the second machine does somehow imbue the system with consciousness even though it doesn't do anything. The challenge is to see what is left standing after deciding on which of these ideas are the more absurd. Stathis Papaioannou --- > Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2006 21:56:13 -0700 > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: Maudlin's argument > > Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument: > "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner > experience, you > can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity > involved is > arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no inputs > and no outputs. > Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running > computation, the > machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for that > precise computation, > with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will make the > machine running > computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin ingenuously showed > that > counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active devices > which will be > triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the > environment. > I believe the argument is erroneous. Maudlin's argument reminds me of the > fallacy in Maxwell's demon. > To reduce the machine's complexity Maudlin must perform a modicum of > analysis, simulation etc.. to predict how the machine performs in different > situations. Using his newly acquired knowledge, he then maximally reduces > the machine's complexity for one particular task, keeping the machine fully > operational for all other tasks. In effect Maudlin has surreptitiously > inserted himself in the mechanism. so now, we don't have just the machine but > we have the machine plus Maudlin. The machine is not simpler or not existent. > The machine is now Maudlin! > In conclusion, the following conclusion reached by Maudlin and Bruno is > fallacious. > "Now this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary > low (even null) physical > activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that is absurd > with the > conjunction of both comp and materialism." > Maudlin's argument cannot be used to state that "any inner experience can be > associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity." Thus it is > not necessarily true that comp and materialism are incompatible. > I think the paradox can be resolved by tracing how information flows and > Maudlin is certainly in the circuit, using information, just like Maxwell's > demon is affecting entropy. > George >
Re: Maudlin's argument
Le 03-oct.-06, à 06:56, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument: "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no inputs and no outputs. Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running computation, the machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for that precise computation, with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will make the machine running computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin ingenuously showed that counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active devices which will be triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the environment. To reduce the machine's complexity Maudlin must perform a modicum of analysis, simulation etc.. to predict how the machine performs in different situations. Using his newly acquired knowledge, he then maximally reduces the machine's complexity for one particular task, keeping the machine fully operational for all other tasks. In effect Maudlin has surreptitiously inserted himself in the mechanism. so now, we don't have just the machine but we have the machine plus Maudlin. The machine is not simpler or not existent. The machine is now Maudlin! (We can come back on this real critics, but here is a short answer for those who have Mauldlin's paper, we can find a version on the net now). Olympia is "proto-olympia" + "the Klaras". Maudlin assumes comp and he needs only the description of the original machine to build the Klaras (for regaining counterfactual correctness) and add them to the proto-olympia (the machine with no physical activity which is only accidentally correct). Once added, the composed, Olympia = "proto-olympia + Klara", is independent of Maudlin, and is computationnaly equivalent with the original machine). So Olympia, once build, does not need Maudlin's at all. Of course with comp the building itself cannot influence the future possible supervenience, for the same reason that if a doctor give you an artificial brain, the story of each individual components has no relation with the later use of it (if not it means the comp level has not been chosen correctly). In conclusion, the following conclusion reached by Maudlin and Bruno is fallacious. "Now this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that is absurd with the conjunction of both comp and materialism." I think the paradox can be resolved by tracing how information flows and Maudlin is certainly in the circuit, using information, just like Maxwell's demon is affecting entropy. Once Olympia is build, Maudlin's is completely out of the circuit. I think you forget the purpose of the Klaras. At least, George, this is a real attempt to find an error, and in the 8th step ! I appreciate your try, but it seems to me you have just forgot that Maudlin's did *program* his intervention: through the Klaras, so that keeping comp at this stage makes Maudlin's special role irrelevant. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Maudlin's argument
Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument: "For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no inputs and no outputs. Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running computation, the machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for that precise computation, with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will make the machine running computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin ingenuously showed that counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active devices which will be triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the environment. I believe the argument is erroneous. Maudlin's argument reminds me of the fallacy in Maxwell's demon. To reduce the machine's complexity Maudlin must perform a modicum of analysis, simulation etc.. to predict how the machine performs in different situations. Using his newly acquired knowledge, he then maximally reduces the machine's complexity for one particular task, keeping the machine fully operational for all other tasks. In effect Maudlin has surreptitiously inserted himself in the mechanism. so now, we don't have just the machine but we have the machine plus Maudlin. The machine is not simpler or not existent. The machine is now Maudlin! In conclusion, the following conclusion reached by Maudlin and Bruno is fallacious. "Now this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that is absurd with the conjunction of both comp and materialism." Maudlin's argument cannot be used to state that "any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity." Thus it is not necessarily true that comp and materialism are incompatible. I think the paradox can be resolved by tracing how information flows and Maudlin is certainly in the circuit, using information, just like Maxwell's demon is affecting entropy. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
