Re: more firewalls
My opinion for what that is worth is that arithmetical dreams describe what happens in heaven where whatever we think becomes reality and if enough of us think the same thing it becomes a video game we can play together. My opinion is that inanimate physical things are more concrete even if consciousness is not. Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 11:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 12 Oct 2012, at 16:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Wiki: "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental > phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and > body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about > the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other > positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2]" > > Bruno, > It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism > (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance) > and now physicalism.. > What is left? > > > Arithmetical dreams. Some can cohere enough to generate, from the machines' > or numbers' point of view, persistant sharable video games. > > It is a form or mathematicalism, or arithmeticalism, with an unavoidable > zest of "theologicalism" separating truth from proof. > > I am not sure that is true, but I give argument that it is testable. Also, I > derive it from the assumption that there is a level where my body/brain is > Turing emulable. So I don't propose a new theory: it is a proposition > derived in a very old theory. > > If you are correct on the BEC, then comp will force to extract BEC from > computer science and/or arithmetic. They have to win some measure battle on > the set of all computations, to be short. > > Nothing disappears, but some things get a new epistemological status, as > belonging to numbers dreams. It makes eventually physics more solid, as it > become a necessary view of arithmetic as seen from inside. > > Bruno > > > > > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Hi Richard, > > > On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > Bruno, > > > Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes > > electrons, protons, neutrons, > > neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So > > if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I > > bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string > > theory models. > > > > Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp > > first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The > > UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can > > be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. > > > > > > It's like saying that god is everything, which is next > > to saying nothing. > > > > The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition > > and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it > > with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp > > refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature > > behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and > > why they have the current shape. > > > > (*) > > x + 0 = x > > x + s(y) = s(x + y) > > > x *0 = 0 > > x*s(y) = x*y + x > > > An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms > > > ((K, x), y) = x > > (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) > > > A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. > > > All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the > > whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with > > quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make > > confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the > > quanta/qualia distinction. > > > > Bruno > > > > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, > > > > Richard: Please explain why not. > > > > > It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain > > > (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* > > > emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete > > > infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. > > > > So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers > > > and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). > > > There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its > > > greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view > > > (except for "truth"). > > > > It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on > > > this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. > > > Or
Re: Re: more firewalls
Hi Bruno Marchal life= freedom= self-autonomy What do I know, but IMHO if comp has any constraints-- follows any rules or has language contraints-- it does not have free will to that extent. It is somewhat predictable. But it may be possible, as you have hinted, that things can happen (as they supposedly do) that are unpredictable. But whether this is truly free is the big question. Perhaps it may only depend on your definition of freedom. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 11:55:31 Subject: Re: more firewalls On 12 Oct 2012, at 16:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Wiki: "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind?ody problem.[1][2]" Bruno, It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance) and now physicalism.. What is left? Arithmetical dreams. Some can cohere enough to generate, from the machines' or numbers' point of view, persistant sharable video games. It is a form or mathematicalism, or arithmeticalism, with an unavoidable zest of "theologicalism" separating truth from proof. I am not sure that is true, but I give argument that it is testable. Also, I derive it from the assumption that there is a level where my body/brain is Turing emulable. So I don't propose a new theory: it is a proposition derived in a very old theory. If you are correct on the BEC, then comp will force to extract BEC from computer science and/or arithmetic. They have to win some measure battle on the set of all computations, to be short. Nothing disappears, but some things get a new epistemological status, as belonging to numbers dreams. It makes eventually physics more solid, as it become a necessary view of arithmetic as seen from inside. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Richard, On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and why they have the current shape. (*) x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the quanta/qualia distinction. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (l
Re: more firewalls
On 12 Oct 2012, at 16:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Wiki: "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2]" Bruno, It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance) and now physicalism.. What is left? Arithmetical dreams. Some can cohere enough to generate, from the machines' or numbers' point of view, persistant sharable video games. It is a form or mathematicalism, or arithmeticalism, with an unavoidable zest of "theologicalism" separating truth from proof. I am not sure that is true, but I give argument that it is testable. Also, I derive it from the assumption that there is a level where my body/brain is Turing emulable. So I don't propose a new theory: it is a proposition derived in a very old theory. If you are correct on the BEC, then comp will force to extract BEC from computer science and/or arithmetic. They have to win some measure battle on the set of all computations, to be short. Nothing disappears, but some things get a new epistemological status, as belonging to numbers dreams. It makes eventually physics more solid, as it become a necessary view of arithmetic as seen from inside. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Richard, On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and why they have the current shape. (*) x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the quanta/qualia distinction. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view (except for "truth"). It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. Or you can look at my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Or other paper that you can find on my URL. But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as I am in a super-busy period. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then
Re: more firewalls
Wiki: "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2]" Bruno, It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance) and now physicalism.. What is left? Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Richard, > > On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno, > > Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes > electrons, protons, neutrons, > neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So > if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I > bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string > theory models. > > > Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp > first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The > UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can > be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. > > > > > It's like saying that god is everything, which is next > to saying nothing. > > > The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition > and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it > with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp > refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature > behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and > why they have the current shape. > > > (*) > x + 0 = x > x + s(y) = s(x + y) > > x *0 = 0 > x*s(y) = x*y + x > > An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms > > ((K, x), y) = x > (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) > > A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. > > All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the > whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with > quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make > confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the > quanta/qualia distinction. > > > Bruno > > > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, > > > Richard: Please explain why not. > > > > It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain > > (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* > > emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete > > infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. > > > So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers > > and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). > > There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its > > greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view > > (except for "truth"). > > > It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on > > this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. > > Or you can look at my paper: > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > > Or other paper that you can find on my URL. > > > But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as > > I am in a super-busy period. > > > Bruno > > > > > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > Craig, > > > > I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the > > > substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if > > > consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then > > > the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. > > > So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. > > > > Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory > > > monads.. > > > > For example take the binding problem where: > > > "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different > > > objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single > > > neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each > > > one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) > > > However, at a density of 10^90/cc > > > (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), > > > the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for > > > "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial > > > location" > > > ever sensed. (I have a model that backs thi
Re: more firewalls
Hi Richard, On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and why they have the current shape. (*) x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the quanta/qualia distinction. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view (except for "truth"). It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. Or you can look at my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Or other paper that you can find on my URL. But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as I am in a super-busy period. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory monads.. For example take the binding problem where: "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) However, at a density of 10^90/cc (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial location" ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) So the monads and the neurons experience the same things because of the BEC entanglement connection. These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads perhaps to solve the binding problem and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. Richard BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look "very probable" in our neighborhood. Bruno On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: On Wednesday, Octob
Re: more firewalls
Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, > > Richard: Please explain why not. > > > It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain > (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* > emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete > infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. > > So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers > and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). > There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its > greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view > (except for "truth"). > > It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on > this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. > Or you can look at my paper: > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > Or other paper that you can find on my URL. > > But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as > I am in a super-busy period. > > Bruno > > > > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > Craig, > > > I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the > > substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if > > consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then > > the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. > > So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. > > > Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory > > monads.. > > > For example take the binding problem where: > > "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different > > objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single > > neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each > > one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) > > However, at a density of 10^90/cc > > (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), > > the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for > > "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial > > location" > > ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: > > > http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) > > > So the monads and the neurons experience the same things > > because of the BEC entanglement connection. > > These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory > > that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness > > and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads > > perhaps to solve the binding problem > > and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. > > Richard > > > > > BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making > > the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look > > "very probable" in our neighborhood. > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg > > wrote: > > > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > > > Roger, > > > To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. > > > More specifically, > > I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain > > and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. > > BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. > > > It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different > > substances > > can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads > > are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, > > crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is > > also a physical BEC in the brain. > > > So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad > > BEC is substantive, > > are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the > > connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based > > on logic is a category error. > > Richard > > > > What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism > > though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things > > and nothing else does? > > > Craig > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Go
Re: more firewalls
On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/ brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing- complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view (except for "truth"). It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. Or you can look at my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Or other paper that you can find on my URL. But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as I am in a super-busy period. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory monads.. For example take the binding problem where: "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) However, at a density of 10^90/cc (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial location" ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) So the monads and the neurons experience the same things because of the BEC entanglement connection. These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads perhaps to solve the binding problem and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. Richard BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look "very probable" in our neighborhood. Bruno On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger, To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. More specifically, I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different substances can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is also a physical BEC in the brain. So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad BEC is substantive, are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. Richard What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things and nothing else does? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/kEWP_Mi0G4IJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: more firewalls
Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: > >> Craig, >> >> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the >> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if >> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then >> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. >> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. >> >> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory >> monads.. >> >> For example take the binding problem where: >> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different >> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single >> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each >> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) >> However, at a density of 10^90/cc >> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), >> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for >> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial >> location" >> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: >> >> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) >> >> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things >> because of the BEC entanglement connection. >> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory >> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness >> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads >> perhaps to solve the binding problem >> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. >> Richard > > > > BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making > the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look > "very probable" in our neighborhood. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> >> >> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg >> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger, To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. More specifically, I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different substances can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is also a physical BEC in the brain. So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad BEC is substantive, are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. Richard >>> >>> What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism >>> though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things >>> and nothing else does? >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/kEWP_Mi0G4IJ. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/ev
Re: more firewalls
On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory monads.. For example take the binding problem where: "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) However, at a density of 10^90/cc (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial location" ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) So the monads and the neurons experience the same things because of the BEC entanglement connection. These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads perhaps to solve the binding problem and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. Richard BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look "very probable" in our neighborhood. Bruno On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger, To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. More specifically, I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different substances can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is also a physical BEC in the brain. So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad BEC is substantive, are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. Richard What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things and nothing else does? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/kEWP_Mi0G4IJ. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
Enough On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 10:54 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 9:37:33 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> The why is that your conception of space is unscientific. >> You sound like a New Ager. > > > Why do you think that my conception of space is unscientific? Saying I sound > like a New Ager makes you sound unscientific. > >> >> >> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 9:34 PM, Craig Weinberg >> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 7:46:17 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> >> >> I disagree with everything you suggest. >> > >> > >> > You are welcome to disagree, but without knowing why, I can only assume >> > that >> > you don't really have an argument against my view. The bottom line is >> > that >> > without some theory which gets us from matter to *us right here* it >> > really >> > is more of in interesting curiosity. It may turn out to be incredibly >> > useful/important/profitable from an engineering and technology >> > standpoint, >> > but it really doesn't answer the timeless questions of who we are and >> > what >> > awareness is. My model does that. >> > >> > Craig >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 4:33 PM, Craig Weinberg >> >> wrote: >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:52:30 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> Craig, >> >> >> Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws. >> >> >> >> >> >> You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes >> >> >> everything. >> >> >> >> >> >> String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess >> >> >> dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck >> >> >> diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact >> >> >> they're >> >> >> curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still >> >> >> expanding, monads are apparently still being made. >> >> >> >> >> >> The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural >> >> >> realm. >> >> >> They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That >> >> >> is >> >> >> why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string >> >> >> theory, >> >> >> they (the monads) exist. >> >> >> >> >> >> You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that >> >> >> extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to >> >> >> be >> >> >> correct, even if my modelling is incorrect. >> >> >> All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that >> >> >> probably can never be proven. >> >> >> Richard >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > All that I suggest is that string theory and especially string monads >> >> > only >> >> > really address the hard problem if they are understood as figurative >> >> > strings >> >> > rather than literal structures. The dimensions would have to be >> >> > qualitative >> >> > experiential dimensions (like emotion, meaning, etc.) rather than >> >> > literally >> >> > 'different kinds of space'. >> >> > >> >> > In my view the whole notion of space as a plenum is a non-starter. >> >> > You >> >> > can >> >> > look at it that way and perhaps it will work eventually, but it is >> >> > the >> >> > lng way around - like trying to guess what song is playing by >> >> > analyzing >> >> > a database of the expressions on the faces of people listening to >> >> > that >> >> > song. >> >> > >> >> > I say that space is a dimensionless void between phenomena which do >> >> > have >> >> > qualities that can be expressed as partly quantifiable with >> >> > dimension. >> >> > We >> >> > are in the big bang, as we always have been, only it is banging >> >> > within, >> >> > diffracting itself in many different ways, both figuratively and >> >> > literally >> >> > at the same time. >> >> > >> >> > Craig >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> > Groups >> >> > "Everything List" group. >> >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> >> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/JrTIYscXvbwJ. >> >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> >> > everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> >> > For more options, visit this group at >> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Q8vH2J5UkF0J. >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> > everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> > For more options, visit this group at >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/ms
Re: Re: more firewalls
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 9:37:33 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > The why is that your conception of space is unscientific. > You sound like a New Ager. > Also, not to pick a fight or to diminish the work that you are doing (which I respect), but your conception of space is: . "24 space-like dimensions of which all but 6 Space Dimensions have compactified into two effectively zero-volume matrices of wires of thickness near the Planck scale and Calabi-Yau fourfolds of 1000 Planck scales at their junctions." What do you think that people of Earth would say about that theory, say, any time before 1970? Compare that with my conception of space, which is that it is a text which is encoded and decoded through the coordinated experiences of matter itself, and that rather than telepathic memory in familiarized particles, quantum entanglement is evidence that space is in fact a 0 dimensional semiotic facade. Which sounds more New Agey to you? What is a "space-like dimension"? A semi-measurable, semi-nothing? What happens if you try thinking of it my way, just for an hour or so, and see what happens? I have already thought of it your way, and it just leads right back to a classical world connected mathematically to a quantum never never land, but not to the color red or the feeling of an itch. What universe are we talking about if we are not the ones living there? > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 9:34 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 7:46:17 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > >> > >> I disagree with everything you suggest. > > > > > > You are welcome to disagree, but without knowing why, I can only assume > that > > you don't really have an argument against my view. The bottom line is > that > > without some theory which gets us from matter to *us right here* it > really > > is more of in interesting curiosity. It may turn out to be incredibly > > useful/important/profitable from an engineering and technology > standpoint, > > but it really doesn't answer the timeless questions of who we are and > what > > awareness is. My model does that. > > > > Craig > > > >> > >> > >> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 4:33 PM, Craig Weinberg > >> wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:52:30 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > >> >> > >> >> Craig, > >> >> Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws. > >> >> > >> >> You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes > >> >> everything. > >> >> > >> >> String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess > >> >> dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck > >> >> diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact > they're > >> >> curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still > >> >> expanding, monads are apparently still being made. > >> >> > >> >> The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural > realm. > >> >> They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That > is > >> >> why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string > theory, > >> >> they (the monads) exist. > >> >> > >> >> You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that > >> >> extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to > be > >> >> correct, even if my modelling is incorrect. > >> >> All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that > >> >> probably can never be proven. > >> >> Richard > >> > > >> > > >> > All that I suggest is that string theory and especially string monads > >> > only > >> > really address the hard problem if they are understood as figurative > >> > strings > >> > rather than literal structures. The dimensions would have to be > >> > qualitative > >> > experiential dimensions (like emotion, meaning, etc.) rather than > >> > literally > >> > 'different kinds of space'. > >> > > >> > In my view the whole notion of space as a plenum is a non-starter. > You > >> > can > >> > look at it that way and perhaps it will work eventually, but it is > the > >> > lng way around - like trying to guess what song is playing by > >> > analyzing > >> > a database of the expressions on the faces of people listening to > that > >> > song. > >> > > >> > I say that space is a dimensionless void between phenomena which do > have > >> > qualities that can be expressed as partly quantifiable with > dimension. > >> > We > >> > are in the big bang, as we always have been, only it is banging > within, > >> > diffracting itself in many different ways, both figuratively and > >> > literally > >> > at the same time. > >> > > >> > Craig > >> > > >> > -- > >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> > Groups > >> > "Everything List
Re: Re: more firewalls
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 9:37:33 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > The why is that your conception of space is unscientific. > You sound like a New Ager. > Why do you think that my conception of space is unscientific? Saying I sound like a New Ager makes you sound unscientific. > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 9:34 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 7:46:17 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > >> > >> I disagree with everything you suggest. > > > > > > You are welcome to disagree, but without knowing why, I can only assume > that > > you don't really have an argument against my view. The bottom line is > that > > without some theory which gets us from matter to *us right here* it > really > > is more of in interesting curiosity. It may turn out to be incredibly > > useful/important/profitable from an engineering and technology > standpoint, > > but it really doesn't answer the timeless questions of who we are and > what > > awareness is. My model does that. > > > > Craig > > > >> > >> > >> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 4:33 PM, Craig Weinberg > >> wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:52:30 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > >> >> > >> >> Craig, > >> >> Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws. > >> >> > >> >> You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes > >> >> everything. > >> >> > >> >> String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess > >> >> dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck > >> >> diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact > they're > >> >> curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still > >> >> expanding, monads are apparently still being made. > >> >> > >> >> The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural > realm. > >> >> They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That > is > >> >> why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string > theory, > >> >> they (the monads) exist. > >> >> > >> >> You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that > >> >> extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to > be > >> >> correct, even if my modelling is incorrect. > >> >> All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that > >> >> probably can never be proven. > >> >> Richard > >> > > >> > > >> > All that I suggest is that string theory and especially string monads > >> > only > >> > really address the hard problem if they are understood as figurative > >> > strings > >> > rather than literal structures. The dimensions would have to be > >> > qualitative > >> > experiential dimensions (like emotion, meaning, etc.) rather than > >> > literally > >> > 'different kinds of space'. > >> > > >> > In my view the whole notion of space as a plenum is a non-starter. > You > >> > can > >> > look at it that way and perhaps it will work eventually, but it is > the > >> > lng way around - like trying to guess what song is playing by > >> > analyzing > >> > a database of the expressions on the faces of people listening to > that > >> > song. > >> > > >> > I say that space is a dimensionless void between phenomena which do > have > >> > qualities that can be expressed as partly quantifiable with > dimension. > >> > We > >> > are in the big bang, as we always have been, only it is banging > within, > >> > diffracting itself in many different ways, both figuratively and > >> > literally > >> > at the same time. > >> > > >> > Craig > >> > > >> > -- > >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> > Groups > >> > "Everything List" group. > >> > To view this discussion on the web visit > >> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/JrTIYscXvbwJ. > >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. > >> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > >> > everything-li...@googlegroups.com. > >> > For more options, visit this group at > >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Q8vH2J5UkF0J. > > To post to this group, send email to > > everyth...@googlegroups.com. > > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-li...@googlegroups.com . > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/pnqsF8NLu_8J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send e
Re: Re: more firewalls
The why is that your conception of space is unscientific. You sound like a New Ager. On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 9:34 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 7:46:17 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> I disagree with everything you suggest. > > > You are welcome to disagree, but without knowing why, I can only assume that > you don't really have an argument against my view. The bottom line is that > without some theory which gets us from matter to *us right here* it really > is more of in interesting curiosity. It may turn out to be incredibly > useful/important/profitable from an engineering and technology standpoint, > but it really doesn't answer the timeless questions of who we are and what > awareness is. My model does that. > > Craig > >> >> >> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 4:33 PM, Craig Weinberg >> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:52:30 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> >> >> Craig, >> >> Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws. >> >> >> >> You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes >> >> everything. >> >> >> >> String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess >> >> dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck >> >> diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact they're >> >> curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still >> >> expanding, monads are apparently still being made. >> >> >> >> The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural realm. >> >> They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That is >> >> why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string theory, >> >> they (the monads) exist. >> >> >> >> You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that >> >> extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to be >> >> correct, even if my modelling is incorrect. >> >> All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that >> >> probably can never be proven. >> >> Richard >> > >> > >> > All that I suggest is that string theory and especially string monads >> > only >> > really address the hard problem if they are understood as figurative >> > strings >> > rather than literal structures. The dimensions would have to be >> > qualitative >> > experiential dimensions (like emotion, meaning, etc.) rather than >> > literally >> > 'different kinds of space'. >> > >> > In my view the whole notion of space as a plenum is a non-starter. You >> > can >> > look at it that way and perhaps it will work eventually, but it is the >> > lng way around - like trying to guess what song is playing by >> > analyzing >> > a database of the expressions on the faces of people listening to that >> > song. >> > >> > I say that space is a dimensionless void between phenomena which do have >> > qualities that can be expressed as partly quantifiable with dimension. >> > We >> > are in the big bang, as we always have been, only it is banging within, >> > diffracting itself in many different ways, both figuratively and >> > literally >> > at the same time. >> > >> > Craig >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To view this discussion on the web visit >> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/JrTIYscXvbwJ. >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> > everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> > For more options, visit this group at >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Q8vH2J5UkF0J. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 7:46:17 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > I disagree with everything you suggest. > You are welcome to disagree, but without knowing why, I can only assume that you don't really have an argument against my view. The bottom line is that without some theory which gets us from matter to *us right here* it really is more of in interesting curiosity. It may turn out to be incredibly useful/important/profitable from an engineering and technology standpoint, but it really doesn't answer the timeless questions of who we are and what awareness is. My model does that. Craig > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 4:33 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:52:30 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > >> > >> Craig, > >> Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws. > >> > >> You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes > >> everything. > >> > >> String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess > >> dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck > >> diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact they're > >> curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still > >> expanding, monads are apparently still being made. > >> > >> The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural realm. > >> They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That is > >> why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string theory, > >> they (the monads) exist. > >> > >> You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that > >> extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to be > >> correct, even if my modelling is incorrect. > >> All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that > >> probably can never be proven. > >> Richard > > > > > > All that I suggest is that string theory and especially string monads > only > > really address the hard problem if they are understood as figurative > strings > > rather than literal structures. The dimensions would have to be > qualitative > > experiential dimensions (like emotion, meaning, etc.) rather than > literally > > 'different kinds of space'. > > > > In my view the whole notion of space as a plenum is a non-starter. You > can > > look at it that way and perhaps it will work eventually, but it is the > > lng way around - like trying to guess what song is playing by > analyzing > > a database of the expressions on the faces of people listening to that > song. > > > > I say that space is a dimensionless void between phenomena which do have > > qualities that can be expressed as partly quantifiable with dimension. > We > > are in the big bang, as we always have been, only it is banging within, > > diffracting itself in many different ways, both figuratively and > literally > > at the same time. > > > > Craig > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/JrTIYscXvbwJ. > > To post to this group, send email to > > everyth...@googlegroups.com. > > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-li...@googlegroups.com . > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Q8vH2J5UkF0J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
I disagree with everything you suggest. On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 4:33 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:52:30 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> Craig, >> Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws. >> >> You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes >> everything. >> >> String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess >> dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck >> diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact they're >> curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still >> expanding, monads are apparently still being made. >> >> The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural realm. >> They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That is >> why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string theory, >> they (the monads) exist. >> >> You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that >> extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to be >> correct, even if my modelling is incorrect. >> All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that >> probably can never be proven. >> Richard > > > All that I suggest is that string theory and especially string monads only > really address the hard problem if they are understood as figurative strings > rather than literal structures. The dimensions would have to be qualitative > experiential dimensions (like emotion, meaning, etc.) rather than literally > 'different kinds of space'. > > In my view the whole notion of space as a plenum is a non-starter. You can > look at it that way and perhaps it will work eventually, but it is the > lng way around - like trying to guess what song is playing by analyzing > a database of the expressions on the faces of people listening to that song. > > I say that space is a dimensionless void between phenomena which do have > qualities that can be expressed as partly quantifiable with dimension. We > are in the big bang, as we always have been, only it is banging within, > diffracting itself in many different ways, both figuratively and literally > at the same time. > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/JrTIYscXvbwJ. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 3:52:30 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > Craig, > Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws. > > You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes > everything. > > String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess > dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck > diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact they're > curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still > expanding, monads are apparently still being made. > > The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural realm. > They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That is > why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string theory, > they (the monads) exist. > > You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that > extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to be > correct, even if my modelling is incorrect. > All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that > probably can never be proven. > Richard > All that I suggest is that string theory and especially string monads only really address the hard problem if they are understood as figurative strings rather than literal structures. The dimensions would have to be qualitative experiential dimensions (like emotion, meaning, etc.) rather than literally 'different kinds of space'. In my view the whole notion of space as a plenum is a non-starter. You can look at it that way and perhaps it will work eventually, but it is the lng way around - like trying to guess what song is playing by analyzing a database of the expressions on the faces of people listening to that song. I say that space is a dimensionless void between phenomena which do have qualities that can be expressed as partly quantifiable with dimension. We are in the big bang, as we always have been, only it is banging within, diffracting itself in many different ways, both figuratively and literally at the same time. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/JrTIYscXvbwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
Craig, Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws. You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes everything. String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact they're curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still expanding, monads are apparently still being made. The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural realm. They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That is why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string theory, they (the monads) exist. You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to be correct, even if my modelling is incorrect. All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that probably can never be proven. Richard On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 2:47 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 2:32:40 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> Craig, >> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. >> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. >> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. >> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. >> Names are not important. >> Richard >> > > I agree that the names aren't important, but why are there two different > unrelated kinds of experiences? Do the monads make the neurons, and if so, > why? Or do the neurons make monads, and again, why? If you have either one, > why have the other? > > Craig > >> >> >> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg >> wrote: >> > >> > >> > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> >> >> Craig, >> >> >> >> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the >> >> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if >> >> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then >> >> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. >> >> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. >> > >> > >> > I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I >> > think >> > that what you are describing would be technically categorized as >> > interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed >> > to be >> > two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that >> > doesn't...bleed? >> > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) >> > >> >> >> >> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory >> >> monads.. >> >> >> >> For example take the binding problem where: >> >> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different >> >> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single >> >> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each >> >> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) >> >> However, at a density of 10^90/cc >> >> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), >> >> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for >> >> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial >> >> location" >> >> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: >> >> >> >> >> >> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) >> > >> > >> > I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only >> > tries >> > to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually >> > suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The >> > hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? >> > >> >> >> >> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things >> >> because of the BEC entanglement connection. >> >> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory >> >> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness >> >> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads >> >> perhaps to solve the binding problem >> >> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. >> > >> > >> > This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and >> > neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in >> > what >> > we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human >> > consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum >> > framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this >> > capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble >> > perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring >> > an >> > experiencer? >> > >> > Craig >> > >> >> >> >> Richard >> >> >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> >
Re: Re: more firewalls
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 2:32:40 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > Craig, > The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. > I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. > But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. > The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. > Names are not important. > Richard > > I agree that the names aren't important, but why are there two different unrelated kinds of experiences? Do the monads make the neurons, and if so, why? Or do the neurons make monads, and again, why? If you have either one, why have the other? Craig > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > >> > >> Craig, > >> > >> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the > >> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if > >> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then > >> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. > >> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. > > > > > > I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I > think > > that what you are describing would be technically categorized as > > interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed > to be > > two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that > > doesn't...bleed? > > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) > > > >> > >> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory > >> monads.. > >> > >> For example take the binding problem where: > >> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different > >> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single > >> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each > >> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) > >> However, at a density of 10^90/cc > >> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), > >> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for > >> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial > >> location" > >> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: > >> > >> > http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) > > > > > > > > I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only > tries > > to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually > > suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The > > hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? > > > >> > >> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things > >> because of the BEC entanglement connection. > >> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory > >> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness > >> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads > >> perhaps to solve the binding problem > >> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. > > > > > > This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and > > neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in > what > > we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human > > consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum > > framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this > > capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble > > perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring > an > > experiencer? > > > > Craig > > > >> > >> Richard > >> > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SK1WBWfunroJ. > > To post to this group, send email to > > everyth...@googlegroups.com. > > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-li...@googlegroups.com . > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/iPDr2MZS2MUJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
Craig, The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. Names are not important. Richard On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> Craig, >> >> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the >> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if >> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then >> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. >> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. > > > I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think > that what you are describing would be technically categorized as > interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to be > two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that > doesn't...bleed? > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) > >> >> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory >> monads.. >> >> For example take the binding problem where: >> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different >> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single >> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each >> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) >> However, at a density of 10^90/cc >> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), >> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for >> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial >> location" >> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: >> >> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) > > > I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries > to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually > suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The > hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? > >> >> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things >> because of the BEC entanglement connection. >> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory >> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness >> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads >> perhaps to solve the binding problem >> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. > > > This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and > neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in what > we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human > consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum > framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this > capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble > perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an > experiencer? > > Craig > >> >> Richard >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SK1WBWfunroJ. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > Craig, > > I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the > substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if > consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then > the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. > So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. > I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think that what you are describing would be technically categorized as interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to be two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that doesn't...bleed? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) > Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory > monads.. > > For example take the binding problem where: > "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different > objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single > neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each > one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) > However, at a density of 10^90/cc > (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), > the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for > "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial > location" > ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: > > http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) > > > I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? > So the monads and the neurons experience the same things > because of the BEC entanglement connection. > These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory > that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness > and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads > perhaps to solve the binding problem > and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. > This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in what we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an experiencer? Craig > Richard > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SK1WBWfunroJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory monads.. For example take the binding problem where: "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) However, at a density of 10^90/cc (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial location" ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) So the monads and the neurons experience the same things because of the BEC entanglement connection. These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads perhaps to solve the binding problem and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. Richard On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> Roger, >> >> To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. >> >> More specifically, >> I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain >> and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. >> BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. >> >> It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different >> substances >> can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads >> are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, >> crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is >> also a physical BEC in the brain. >> >> So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad >> BEC is substantive, >> are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the >> connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based >> on logic is a category error. >> Richard >> > > What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism > though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things > and nothing else does? > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/kEWP_Mi0G4IJ. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > Roger, > > To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. > > More specifically, > I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain > and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. > BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. > > It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different > substances > can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads > are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, > crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is > also a physical BEC in the brain. > > So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad > BEC is substantive, > are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the > connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based > on logic is a category error. > Richard > > What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things and nothing else does? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/kEWP_Mi0G4IJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: more firewalls
Roger, To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. More specifically, I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different substances can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is also a physical BEC in the brain. So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad BEC is substantive, are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. Richard On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/10/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-09, 08:25:10 > Subject: Re: more firewalls > > Hi Roger, > What makes you think that what you claim is true? > Richard > > On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 8:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> Hi Richard Ruquist >> >> Nature has put a firewall between subjective entities such as monads >> and objective entities such as BECs or the manifolds. >> When I said "attached" I should have said "associated to". >> There's no physical, only logical connections. >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 10/9/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> From: Richard Ruquist >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-10-08, 12:35:34 >> Subject: Re: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis >> ThoughtExperiment >> >> >> Roger, >> Monads are everywhere, inside computers >> as well as humans, rocks and free space. >> Whatever allows monads to connect to physical objects >> may be operative for inanimates as well as animates. >> >> So the first step is to identify the connecting mechanism. >> >> For physical consciousness I conjecture the connection >> is based on BECs (Bose-Einstein Condensates) >> in the monadic mind entangled with BECs in the brain. >> >> It has been demonstrated experimentally >> that BECs of disparate substances can still be entangled. >> So once a computer is designed with BECs as in the human brain >> then it may be capable of consciousness. >> Richard >> >> >> On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 9:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> Hi Richard Ruquist >>> >>> I may have given that impression, sorry, but >>> a monad can only make what's "inside" do what it can do. >>> >>> Human and animal monads can both feel, so they can be conscious. >>> But a rock is at best unconscious as it cannot feel or think.\ >>> >>> There's no way to tell what faculties a computer has. >>> >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 10/8/2012 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>> >>> >>> - Receiving the following content - >>> From: Richard Ruquist >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2012-10-07, 11:06:17 >>> Subject: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought >>> Experiment >>> >>> >>> Roger, >>> >>> If human consciousness comes from attached monads, as I think you have >>> claimed, >>> then why could not these monads attach to sufficiently complex computers >>> as well. >>> Richard >>> >>> On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>>> Hi John Clark >>>> >>>> Unless computers can deal with inextended objects such as >>>> mind and experience, they cannot be conscious. >>>> >>>> Consciousness is direct experience, computers can only deal in >>>> descriptions of experience. >>>> >>>> Everything that a computer does is, to my knowledge, at least >>>> in principle publicly available, since it uses publicly available >>>> symbols or code. >>>> >>>> Consciousness is direct experience, which cannot be put down in code >>>> an
Re: Re: more firewalls
Hi Richard Ruquist What makes you think it is false ? Please be specific. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/10/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-09, 08:25:10 Subject: Re: more firewalls Hi Roger, What makes you think that what you claim is true? Richard On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 8:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > Nature has put a firewall between subjective entities such as monads > and objective entities such as BECs or the manifolds. > When I said "attached" I should have said "associated to". > There's no physical, only logical connections. > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/9/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-08, 12:35:34 > Subject: Re: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis > ThoughtExperiment > > > Roger, > Monads are everywhere, inside computers > as well as humans, rocks and free space. > Whatever allows monads to connect to physical objects > may be operative for inanimates as well as animates. > > So the first step is to identify the connecting mechanism. > > For physical consciousness I conjecture the connection > is based on BECs (Bose-Einstein Condensates) > in the monadic mind entangled with BECs in the brain. > > It has been demonstrated experimentally > that BECs of disparate substances can still be entangled. > So once a computer is designed with BECs as in the human brain > then it may be capable of consciousness. > Richard > > > On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 9:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> Hi Richard Ruquist >> >> I may have given that impression, sorry, but >> a monad can only make what's "inside" do what it can do. >> >> Human and animal monads can both feel, so they can be conscious. >> But a rock is at best unconscious as it cannot feel or think.\ >> >> There's no way to tell what faculties a computer has. >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 10/8/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> From: Richard Ruquist >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-10-07, 11:06:17 >> Subject: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought >> Experiment >> >> >> Roger, >> >> If human consciousness comes from attached monads, as I think you have >> claimed, >> then why could not these monads attach to sufficiently complex computers >> as well. >> Richard >> >> On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> Hi John Clark >>> >>> Unless computers can deal with inextended objects such as >>> mind and experience, they cannot be conscious. >>> >>> Consciousness is direct experience, computers can only deal in descriptions >>> of experience. >>> >>> Everything that a computer does is, to my knowledge, at least >>> in principle publicly available, since it uses publicly available symbols >>> or code. >>> >>> Consciousness is direct experience, which cannot be put down in code >>> any more than life can be put down in code. It is personal and not publicly >>> available. >>> >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 10/7/2012 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>> >>> >>> - Receiving the following content - >>> From: John Clark >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2012-10-06, 13:56:30 >>> Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> ?>>I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that behaves >>> sensibly with just a few transistors.? ? >>> >>> >>>> Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology >>>> is fully supported from the start. >>> >>> >>> We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe >>> allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it b
Re: Re: more firewalls
Hi Richard Ruquist Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/10/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-09, 08:25:10 Subject: Re: more firewalls Hi Roger, What makes you think that what you claim is true? Richard On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 8:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > Nature has put a firewall between subjective entities such as monads > and objective entities such as BECs or the manifolds. > When I said "attached" I should have said "associated to". > There's no physical, only logical connections. > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/9/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-08, 12:35:34 > Subject: Re: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis > ThoughtExperiment > > > Roger, > Monads are everywhere, inside computers > as well as humans, rocks and free space. > Whatever allows monads to connect to physical objects > may be operative for inanimates as well as animates. > > So the first step is to identify the connecting mechanism. > > For physical consciousness I conjecture the connection > is based on BECs (Bose-Einstein Condensates) > in the monadic mind entangled with BECs in the brain. > > It has been demonstrated experimentally > that BECs of disparate substances can still be entangled. > So once a computer is designed with BECs as in the human brain > then it may be capable of consciousness. > Richard > > > On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 9:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> Hi Richard Ruquist >> >> I may have given that impression, sorry, but >> a monad can only make what's "inside" do what it can do. >> >> Human and animal monads can both feel, so they can be conscious. >> But a rock is at best unconscious as it cannot feel or think.\ >> >> There's no way to tell what faculties a computer has. >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 10/8/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> From: Richard Ruquist >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-10-07, 11:06:17 >> Subject: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment >> >> >> Roger, >> >> If human consciousness comes from attached monads, as I think you have >> claimed, >> then why could not these monads attach to sufficiently complex computers >> as well. >> Richard >> >> On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> Hi John Clark >>> >>> Unless computers can deal with inextended objects such as >>> mind and experience, they cannot be conscious. >>> >>> Consciousness is direct experience, computers can only deal in descriptions >>> of experience. >>> >>> Everything that a computer does is, to my knowledge, at least >>> in principle publicly available, since it uses publicly available symbols >>> or code. >>> >>> Consciousness is direct experience, which cannot be put down in code >>> any more than life can be put down in code. It is personal and not publicly >>> available. >>> >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 10/7/2012 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>> >>> >>> - Receiving the following content - >>> From: John Clark >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2012-10-06, 13:56:30 >>> Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> ?>>I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that behaves >>> sensibly with just a few transistors.? ? >>> >>> >>>> Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology >>>> is fully supported from the start. >>> >>> >>> We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe >>> allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but >>> we know for a fact that it can be done. So how on Earth does that indicate >>> that a conscious computer is not possible? Because it doesn't fart?? >
Re: more firewalls
Hi Roger, What makes you think that what you claim is true? Richard On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 8:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > Nature has put a firewall between subjective entities such as monads > and objective entities such as BECs or the manifolds. > When I said "attached" I should have said "associated to". > There's no physical, only logical connections. > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/9/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-08, 12:35:34 > Subject: Re: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis > ThoughtExperiment > > > Roger, > Monads are everywhere, inside computers > as well as humans, rocks and free space. > Whatever allows monads to connect to physical objects > may be operative for inanimates as well as animates. > > So the first step is to identify the connecting mechanism. > > For physical consciousness I conjecture the connection > is based on BECs (Bose-Einstein Condensates) > in the monadic mind entangled with BECs in the brain. > > It has been demonstrated experimentally > that BECs of disparate substances can still be entangled. > So once a computer is designed with BECs as in the human brain > then it may be capable of consciousness. > Richard > > > On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 9:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> Hi Richard Ruquist >> >> I may have given that impression, sorry, but >> a monad can only make what's "inside" do what it can do. >> >> Human and animal monads can both feel, so they can be conscious. >> But a rock is at best unconscious as it cannot feel or think.\ >> >> There's no way to tell what faculties a computer has. >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 10/8/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> From: Richard Ruquist >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-10-07, 11:06:17 >> Subject: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment >> >> >> Roger, >> >> If human consciousness comes from attached monads, as I think you have >> claimed, >> then why could not these monads attach to sufficiently complex computers >> as well. >> Richard >> >> On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> Hi John Clark >>> >>> Unless computers can deal with inextended objects such as >>> mind and experience, they cannot be conscious. >>> >>> Consciousness is direct experience, computers can only deal in descriptions >>> of experience. >>> >>> Everything that a computer does is, to my knowledge, at least >>> in principle publicly available, since it uses publicly available symbols >>> or code. >>> >>> Consciousness is direct experience, which cannot be put down in code >>> any more than life can be put down in code. It is personal and not publicly >>> available. >>> >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 10/7/2012 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>> >>> >>> - Receiving the following content - >>> From: John Clark >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2012-10-06, 13:56:30 >>> Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> ?>>I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that behaves >>> sensibly with just a few transistors.? ? >>> >>> Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology is fully supported from the start. >>> >>> >>> We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe >>> allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but >>> we know for a fact that it can be done. So how on Earth does that indicate >>> that a conscious computer is not possible? Because it doesn't fart?? >>> >>> ? you have erroneously assumed that intelligence is possible without sense experience. >>> >>> No, I am assuming the exact OPPOSITE! In fact I'm not even assuming, I know >>> for a fact that intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a >>> Evolutionary advantage, and I know for a fact that intelligent behavior >>> WITH consciousness confers no additional Evolutionary advantage (and if you >>> disagree with that point then you must believe that the Turing Test works >>> for consciousness too and not just intelligence). And in spite of all this >>> I know for a fact that Evolution DID produce consciousness at least once, >>> therefore the only conclusion is that consciousness is a byproduct of >>> intellagence. >>> >>> >>> Adenine and Thymine don't have purpose in seeking to bind with each other? >>> >>> >>> I don't even know what a question like that means, who's purpose do you >>> expect Adenine and Thymine to serve? >>> >>> >>> How do you know? >>> >>> >>> I know because I have intelligence and Adenine and Thymine do not know >>> because
more firewalls
Hi Richard Ruquist Nature has put a firewall between subjective entities such as monads and objective entities such as BECs or the manifolds. When I said "attached" I should have said "associated to". There's no physical, only logical connections. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/9/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-08, 12:35:34 Subject: Re: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis ThoughtExperiment Roger, Monads are everywhere, inside computers as well as humans, rocks and free space. Whatever allows monads to connect to physical objects may be operative for inanimates as well as animates. So the first step is to identify the connecting mechanism. For physical consciousness I conjecture the connection is based on BECs (Bose-Einstein Condensates) in the monadic mind entangled with BECs in the brain. It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs of disparate substances can still be entangled. So once a computer is designed with BECs as in the human brain then it may be capable of consciousness. Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 9:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > I may have given that impression, sorry, but > a monad can only make what's "inside" do what it can do. > > Human and animal monads can both feel, so they can be conscious. > But a rock is at best unconscious as it cannot feel or think.\ > > There's no way to tell what faculties a computer has. > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/8/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-07, 11:06:17 > Subject: Re: Can computers be conscious ? Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment > > > Roger, > > If human consciousness comes from attached monads, as I think you have > claimed, > then why could not these monads attach to sufficiently complex computers > as well. > Richard > > On Sun, Oct 7, 2012 at 8:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> Hi John Clark >> >> Unless computers can deal with inextended objects such as >> mind and experience, they cannot be conscious. >> >> Consciousness is direct experience, computers can only deal in descriptions >> of experience. >> >> Everything that a computer does is, to my knowledge, at least >> in principle publicly available, since it uses publicly available symbols or >> code. >> >> Consciousness is direct experience, which cannot be put down in code >> any more than life can be put down in code. It is personal and not publicly >> available. >> >> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 10/7/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> - Receiving the following content - >> From: John Clark >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-10-06, 13:56:30 >> Subject: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment >> >> >> On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> ?>>I'm openly saying that a high school kid can make a robot that behaves >> sensibly with just a few transistors.? ? >> >> >>> Only because he lives in a universe in which the possibility of teleology >>> is fully supported from the start. >> >> >> We know with absolute certainty that the laws of physics in this universe >> allow for the creation of consciousness, we may not know how they do it but >> we know for a fact that it can be done. So how on Earth does that indicate >> that a conscious computer is not possible? Because it doesn't fart?? >> >> ? >>> you have erroneously assumed that intelligence is possible without sense >>> experience. >> >> No, I am assuming the exact OPPOSITE! In fact I'm not even assuming, I know >> for a fact that intelligent behavior WITHOUT consciousness confers a >> Evolutionary advantage, and I know for a fact that intelligent behavior WITH >> consciousness confers no additional Evolutionary advantage (and if you >> disagree with that point then you must believe that the Turing Test works >> for consciousness too and not just intelligence). And in spite of all this I >> know for a fact that Evolution DID produce consciousness at least once, >> therefore the only conclusion is that consciousness is a byproduct of >> intellagence. >> >> >> >>> Adenine and Thymine don't have purpose in seeking to bind with each other? >> >> >> I don't even know what a question like that means, who's purpose do you >> expect Adenine and Thymine to serve? >> >> >> >>> How do you know? >> >> >> I know because I have intelligence and Adenine and Thymine do not know >> because they have none, they only have cause and effect. >> >> >> >>> How is it different from our purpose in staying in close proximity to >>> places to eat and sleep? >> >> >> And t
