Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jul 1, 2016, at 11:40 AM, Martin Kettelhut wrote: > > I see Peirce’s observations about the copula as iconoclastic. That is, they > bring closure to all of the old-school empiricist and phenomenological > metaphysical and ontological debates, and—despite the fact that most of > twentiet

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 30, 2016, at 8:35 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > Do you find my previous writing to be religious or theological? > > For instance, if I were to ask "what would God be?", > would that question not fit neatly into the previous argumentation? When you start talking God or Trinity there’s a l

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 30, 2016, at 2:22 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > Copula is the Holy Spirit or, copula is the network that connects the subject > with the predicate in unity in the form of a symbol that gives > meaning/understanding. > I’ll leave the religious discussions for others. I assume you mean i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 30, 2016, at 10:19 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > [BU] On averageness as a background needed to make communication (and > informative difference) possible, you wrote, > > >[CG] At which point the term “average” has become rather distorted. > > [BU] I think that you're getting to the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> So "being" seems to be a quite boiled-down concept. "Truth" on the other hand > is a concept, that should not be boiled down like that in my opinion. I’m not sure I agree with that. It seems to me being for Peirce (and what I tend to think) being is tied to this relation of the dynamic object

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 29, 2016, at 10:37 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Immediate objects may have averageness but the averageness seems not > definitive of them, and Peirce never makes it so. It seems to me (perhaps incorrectly) that Peirce raises everydayness for similar reasons to his common sensism. It

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 28, 2016, at 4:56 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I think, your posts have made the problem of the term "average" clear. Am I > right with understanding it like: "Average" usually suggests a completed > statistical calculation, and statistics is mathematics, therefore exact > logic. Bu

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce, Epistemology and Immortality

The Being thread didn’t really go as far as I expected, although I know many people are out of town right now. (And I will be next week) I thought I’d raise a different topic. At various times people have been discussing Peirce and religion. I’ll confess I’ve not followed such exchanges closely

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 24, 2016, at 3:30 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I understand it like "mean", "average" and "normal" are necessary traits of > any predicate, and there is no predicate but within communication, and "mean" > is the common aspect of the communicated subject, "average" is the > agreed-ab

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 24, 2016, at 1:42 PM, John Collier wrote: > > OK, this seems better to me, especially in communication among people, but I > still resist the idea that the immediate object is generally an average in > any sense. My problem is trying to fit that idea into my understanding of > inform

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 23, 2016, at 12:14 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote: > > Peirce somewhere talks about taking a companion's experience as one's own, > say, if the companion has better eyesight. The companion reports discerning a > ship on the horizon, while one sees just a blurry p

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 23, 2016, at 5:18 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > Wouldn't it make things clearer if we, like Peirce, made a distinction > between the immediate object conceived of as a possibility, or as an > actuality, or as a necessity? On the basis of this modal division between the > th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 23, 2016, at 10:36 AM, Ozzie wrote: > > First, objects have multiple signs, which the Wikipedia definition above > fails to recognize by mentioning 'the' sign. Isn’t this caught up with the fact any sign is itself made up of other signs in various ways. So for instance my ability to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 23, 2016, at 2:16 AM, John Collier wrote: > > The “average” notion is distinctly misleading. Suggests an external averager > that does not exist. It is an abstraction at best, and typically ignores > aspects of the dynamics object (but I think could even get it entirely wrong > and s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 22, 2016, at 1:10 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > >i. Immediate object: the object as represented in the sign [DELETE], a > kind of statistical, "average" version of the given object [END DELETE. Gary > Richmond, as I recall, convinced me that my text there was mistaken]. Yes, I’m n

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

> On Jun 21, 2016, at 1:55 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > One interesting think in Parker’s book is the cosmological element in the > development of the categories. Whoops. One interesting thing… LOL. Sorry for all the typos. I wrote that quickly. Hopefully I don’t make an embarrassing mistake

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Copula

> On Jun 21, 2016, at 6:45 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > Thank you for your insights, they were helpful. > > As for the “copula" as “being”, in my view, this is remote from the roots of > the word and its usage as a verb. > "Man marries women.” Man and women copulate. > > It is also rem

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

(Hope you don’t mind — since this is primarily related to the copula I put it under the other thread) > On Jun 21, 2016, at 2:46 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > In your response, there's no mention of the object that is outside of us, and > in my opinion, no respect for what that object can teach us

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parker's propositions on the development of CSP's categories of Logic

> On Jun 21, 2016, at 12:47 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > You said, "If I understand Peirce, then the logic of indices works via icons." > > What, then, distinguishes indices from icons in a context for logic of > indices? > ___ > > Does, then, a logic of icons work via indices? The question

[PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

I hope you don’t mind if I open up a tangent from those last posts of mine. I’ve long thought the question of being to be a fundamental one in philosophy. It’s interesting to me seeing Peirce’s use of being (aka the copula) in various texts. I think Kelly Parker’s book actually does grapple with

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parker's propositions on the development of CSP's categories of Logic

> On Jun 13, 2016, at 11:27 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > The recent mention by Clark of Parker’s book, “Continuity…” > re-opens the question of how Parker categorized CSP’s writings. > > Of particular interest is Parker’s division of the three periods of meanings: > Fig. 6.2: 1865-1885

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parker's propositions on the development of CSP's categories of Logic

> On Jun 19, 2016, at 9:45 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > The reasoning is simple with respect to your post. It is the way CSP forms > some propositions and propositional functions around sentences with copula. > > The role of copula in modern logic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parker's propositions on the development of CSP's categories of Logic

> On Jun 16, 2016, at 8:12 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > My distant memories tell me that I took up Parker's book in the hope of > finding there something essential & important about the concept of continuity > in CSP's work. I was quite disappointed in finding out that the book was >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and objects

> On Jun 14, 2016, at 12:30 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > You wrote, > > A famous example of this that again got Derrida castigated was noting the > sexual connotations of imaginary numbers in mathematical symbology. > > I looked around and found that it was Lacan rather than Derrida who talk

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Percepts and objects

> On Jun 13, 2016, at 9:55 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I think that it's worth making the point that the signal/noise relation > involves an idea of what questions or interests the quasi-mind has in the > semiosis, i.e., one quasi-mind's signal is another quasi-mind's noise, and a > phenome

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parker's propositions on the development of CSP's categories of Logic

> On Jun 13, 2016, at 11:27 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > The recent mention by Clark of Parker’s book, “Continuity…” > re-opens the question of how Parker categorized CSP’s writings. > > Of particular interest is Parker’s division of the three periods of meanings: > Fig. 6.2: 1865-1885

Re: [PEIRCE-L] on the reality of objects

> On Jun 13, 2016, at 10:40 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > Some passing thoughts… > > Can you extend your categorization of “EXISTENCE” to the meanings of the > sciences? > > Is this paragraph applicable to the "real/existent distinctions" among such > logical terms as organic, organ, o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] on the reality of objects

> On Jun 12, 2016, at 3:22 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > However, in the following you only take up a dual distinction, between what > exists and what is real. Where is the virtual? Where is triadicity? Well I wasn’t addressing everything. Just that I notice for many trying to get a g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] on the reality of objects

> On Jun 10, 2016, at 5:57 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Clark, very nice collection of excerpts you posted there. I think my blog > post for today is roughly in the same ballpark: Wow, that’s a really interesting quote I don’t think I’d seen before. > In the end is the beginning. Along th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] on the reality of objects

> On Jun 9, 2016, at 1:21 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Clark, List, > > Interesting post. And also: The entire universe > is perfused with signs, if it is not > composed exclusively of signs . > > I too very much ad

Re: [PEIRCE-L] on the reality of objects

> On Jun 9, 2016, at 1:21 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > I too very much admire Kelly Parker's book, while I agree that it has some > problems. Or should I say, it has been superseded and/or corrected in certain > topics by scholarship since it was published (1998). Kelly (who btw, is a > terri

Re: [PEIRCE-L] on the reality of objects

> On Jun 9, 2016, at 12:26 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > How is reality a process of semiosis if it's independent of what is thought > concerning the object? Because of Peirce’s conception of ontology as semiosis. He’s somewhat Hegelian in this sense. You have pure chance which semiotically devel

Re: [PEIRCE-L] on the reality of objects

> On Jun 8, 2016, at 2:22 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > In semiosis (the process of meaning), > there is no sign without an interpretant, no interpretant without an object, > no object without a sign. But in this ‘cooperation of three subjects,’ the >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [Sadhu Sanga] New Experiences

> On Jun 4, 2016, at 11:31 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I think that Peirce and Heidegger has a lot in common: 1. A phenomenological > foundation in their philosophies, which Peirce calls phaneroscophy and 2. > They are both process philosophers, an aspect that separates them from the > young H

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [Sadhu Sanga] New Experiences

> On Jun 2, 2016, at 5:26 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > > To cut a long story short… it all revolves around knowing how to be. To those > familiar with Heidegger, Dasein is the closest analogy to what I have in > mind. For those familiar with CS Peirce, pragmatism relates. Yes, Heidegger’s phe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

> On May 20, 2016, at 2:56 PM, John Collier > wrote: > > There are versions of what science is supposed to do that don’t worry about > causation, but just try to find regularities. The more extreme forms of this > are instrumentalism (like Mach) or Pierre Duhem’s an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

> On May 18, 2016, at 4:46 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > That's yet another reason to start at the and not but or hence... Not quite sure what you mean by that. BTW - regarding one of the quotes you had. Circa 1897, Peirce wrote this: The development of my ideas…but of course it is not I who ha

Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

> On May 18, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > In the 1980s, the study of abduction found a new home in Artificial > Intelligence… It’s worth noting that a lot of literature on abduction is using the term as inference to best explanation. This is somewhat different from Peirce, although

Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

> On May 13, 2016, at 12:16 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Does "feeling," understood in this context as a manifestation of Firstness, > entail psychology? Of course, Peirce was very concerned about NOT grounding > any aspect of logic in psychology or any other special science. > Psycho

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Determination, etc.

> On May 9, 2016, at 1:45 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > I read Peirce primarily for his insights into logic, mathematics, > and science, which are considerable enough for several lifetimes, > and I read him the same way I read other thinkers in those areas. > Maybe some people read Peirce as Charles

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on the Definition of Determination

> On May 6, 2016, at 4:22 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > Do you see this issue as part of the “symbol grounding problem?” > When with the determination generate a correspondence between the semantics > of the determination and the measurements associated with the proposed > determinatio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on the Definition of Determination

> On May 7, 2016, at 5:56 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca > wrote: > > It’s true that this discourse has an ontological aspect, i.e. takes us into > metaphysics, as Peirce usually called that science. But for Peirce, this is > not really a distinct kind of analysis, but rath

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce on the Definition of Determination

> On May 6, 2016, at 8:16 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > There’s no question that scarlet is a determination of red and red a > determination of color. That’s just another way of saying that scarlet is a > specific shade of red and red is a specific class of color. But I don’t see > how thi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Systems Of Interpretation - in Chemistry and Biology FYI

> On Apr 29, 2016, at 7:29 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > It is a fact that the natural sciences use several notational systems to > express the consequences of inquiries. These notational systems use > different meanings of symbols in order to create a coherent (logical, > mathematical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Systems Of Interpretation - in Chemistry and Biology FYI

> On Apr 25, 2016, at 12:15 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > The idea of meta-languages presents the way of thinking in levels > (characteristic to modern age). Thinking in terms of levels involves jumps. > Triadic thinking doen not. It incorpotes the idea of growth. I’m not sure the two

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Systems Of Interpretation - in Chemistry and Biology FYI

> On Apr 22, 2016, at 9:37 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > What might you mean by the term “master” meta-language? I was thinking more in terms of Peirce’s concept of continuity. There’s a presumption there is a meta-language that can make things make sense now but I’m very skeptical of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Systems Of Interpretation - in Chemistry and Biology FYI

> On Apr 20, 2016, at 9:17 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > Of course, things are always more complex than they first appear. > I would argue for a completely connected world if my purpose were > metaphysical in nature. > But, language itself separates the world from its totality into mana

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Systems Of Interpretation - in Chemistry and Biology FYI

> On Apr 19, 2016, at 10:28 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > Pure mathematics avoids the concept of scaling, and its implication of > natural units. It makes no appeals to nature. For a pure mathematician to > appeal to nature would defy the Gods of the mathematical universe! I suppose thi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How does one justify something like a "completeness" in a logic of vagueness?

> On Apr 8, 2016, at 3:04 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > What exactly is "complete" about a logic of vagueness? Isn’t Peirce’s distinction between generals and vagues complete? It doesn’t deal with all philosophical questions with the term “vague” which often include what I’d call ambiguity or for

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Systems Of Interpretation - Contrasting the diagrams of ammonia and the handedness of carbon compounds.

> On Apr 5, 2016, at 9:13 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > Approximations from both quantum theory and molecular mechanics suggest a > ‘flattened” TETRAHEDRAL structure, not a plane. In gas phase, the spectra > data suggests that NH3 molecule flips back and forth, above and below the >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Announcement of the passing of Hilary Putnam

> On Mar 14, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > A life in reason was and is difficult. All of us, whether we are ignorant of > philosophy or professors of philosophy, find it easier to follow dogma than > to think. What Hilary Putnam's life offers our troubled nation is, I think, a >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

> On Mar 10, 2016, at 2:13 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > Are you not participating in unhelpful exposition about something about which > much can be said, of which you are only talking about a small part? > Technically, Peirce's method is not about meaningfulness as it is about > clarifying the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

> On Mar 10, 2016, at 9:53 AM, John Collier wrote: > > For example, Newtonian space and time are one way to explain the bucket > thought experiment. But even in Newton's own time it was observed (e.g. by > Leibniz) that the explanation couldn't be tested (it failed the pragmatic > maxim). M

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

> On Mar 10, 2016, at 12:14 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > To me, we are talking about whether Feyerabend or Peirce can offer a definite > suggestion on how to proceed if we are frozen with respect to advancing on a > problem. To say there’s no systematic way to proceed is antithetical to > Peirc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

> On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best > explanation”. > That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it > has > led to a whole literature of misconception. Abduction is more like “infe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry

> On Mar 1, 2016, at 11:46 AM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > I consider Inference to the Best Explanation as the concluding part of the > First Stage of Inquiry, not the beginning. Selecting the best explanation > has to operate in context of relieving a genuine doubt, preceded by problem > framing

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?

> On Feb 20, 2016, at 11:15 AM, John Collier wrote: > > Thanks Clark. I don’t think of Heidegger as a phenomenologist as much as an > existentialist (view from studying Heidegger from Bert Dreyfus). Merleau > Ponty fits the Husserlian model more closely, I think. <> I always enjoy Dreyfus’ stu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?

> On Feb 19, 2016, at 9:08 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote: > >> >> On Feb 19, 2016, at 4:03 PM, John Collier > <mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote: >> >> Husserl explicitly uses the idea of “bracketing” questions of existence in >> phenomenology. In ot

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?

> > On Feb 19, 2016, at 4:03 PM, John Collier wrote: > > Husserl explicitly uses the idea of “bracketing” questions of existence in > phenomenology. In other words, you ignore existence and truth issues.  <> Yes, in that they are similar. In other ways they are quite different. The list starte

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?

> On Feb 19, 2016, at 1:47 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > "[B]y the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or > in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds > to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatism - atoms, molecules, entanglement

> On Feb 2, 2016, at 12:37 AM, John Collier wrote: > > So the empirical support and even coherence of the postulates (in the case of > multiverses) is different in the three cases, but dark matter and dark energy > have both empirical support for their existence and their character (compared

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatism - atoms, molecules, entanglement

> On Feb 1, 2016, at 8:23 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > If you're interested in education and integrating cultures, you ought to know > Bruner's work. How can I convince you that it will be good for you? > one, two, three...pathos, ethos, logos... Oh my point wasn’t that he wasn’t valuable. Simp

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatism - atoms, molecules, entanglement

> On Feb 1, 2016, at 6:42 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > How about instead of “…because Peirce”, we try “…because Bruner”? There is > an intense resemblance between the two. > > Maybe it just says more about my background but I suspect Peirce is far better known than Bruner. In any case we shoul

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatism - atoms, molecules, entanglement

> On Feb 1, 2016, at 3:52 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > > Clark, the inspiration for my own thinking is Isaac Newton. What I would love > to see in the life sciences is an axiomatic framework that hangs together, > much as Newton delivered for the physical sciences... hence my interest in > Pe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatism - atoms, molecules, entanglement

> On Feb 1, 2016, at 12:21 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > > I stumbled upon a fascinating video clip on > the weekend. Might Peircean-biosemiotic concepts apply also to atoms and > molecules? Peirce’s “mind hidebound with habits” comes to mind. But back in > his d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Dec 18, 2015, at 1:26 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > "If you have the form but not the matter then it’s degenerate.". Thank you: > This way eventually, after a long time, I think I understand why it is > called degenerate. Yeah, it’s a terminology I kind of struggle with a lot too. I kep

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Dec 16, 2015, at 10:32 PM, John Collier wrote: > > In the passage from Peirce that you quote below, by way of Clark, I think the > distinction is that the degenerate seconds consider them in terms of their > form alone, which degenerates our understanding of them to firsts associated > w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Dec 16, 2015, at 1:48 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Degenerateness, I think, is a relation too. So, something may be (regarded > for) degenerate, if you look at it as a mode. Because degeneracy is a trait > of modes. But if you look at the same thing regarding it for a sign (a > triadic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Dec 14, 2015, at 3:08 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: > > On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: >> Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the >> things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the >> development of a language to the point wh

Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

> On Dec 14, 2015, at 12:57 AM, John Collier wrote: > > I agree with the connection to the Pragmatic Maxim, especially in its later > formulations, but I am pretty sure that there are even earlier formulations > have a subjunctive component. I just checked and you’re right. It appears the pre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

> On Dec 13, 2015, at 9:58 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote: > > By his mature era Peirce realized that the maxim only made since when > considered in terms of counterfactuals. …only made sense… I really should turn autocorrect off one of these days. I swear it makes things worse when i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

> On Dec 12, 2015, at 12:49 AM, John Collier wrote: > > I tend to see “in the long run” as more a regulatory concept rather than > something actual. For a long time I did worry about how the “in the long run” > worked and raised concerns similar to yours. The question of whether it > really f

[PEIRCE-L] Re: in case you were wondering

On Dec 12, 2015, at 4:32 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > For any finite community then (i.e. any practical community we worry about) > we’re always fallible from Peirce’s conception. What I sense you wanting > isn’t a point of relative stability in our beliefs through continued inquiry. > Rather I th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Dec 11, 2015, at 9:04 AM, wrote: > > I can only ask: Who is “we”, and which of us is in a position to judge the > “success” or non-success of “our” explanations? I think it often happens that > one person’s explanation is another’s obfuscation, and vice versa. I don’t > see that one sch

Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

> On Dec 10, 2015, at 6:15 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: > > Induction can't work when there are potentially infinite samples to be drawn, > and the long-run opens up the pool of potential samples to infinity. Maybe > Peirce's phenomenology limits the potential samples at any given time (I > still h

Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

> On Dec 10, 2015, at 1:54 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > > I’d assume that for human beings aesthetics will be a mix of universal > aesthetically values (if there are any) and those indexed to our particular > biology and the physics of the world in which we live. Beyond that knowi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

> On Dec 8, 2015, at 12:58 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: > >> Are you saying that we should judge music like we judge medicine—e.g., just >> because certain music works for me doesn't mean music that doesn't work for >> me is bad? Similarly, should we judge music like we judge mathematics >> relativ

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Dec 3, 2015, at 9:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types > defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a > possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly > this p

[PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

>> Is the quality of music determined by the final opinion of that music? > > My first response is that "in the long run" for Peirce is a normative idea in > science and does not apply necessarily--maybe only very little, or not at > all--to the fine arts. > > It is true that Bach and Mozart,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

> On Dec 2, 2015, at 9:56 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, > of part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and > as "scaling" in physics. > > A noun is what? a part of a sentence? an obje

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Dec 1, 2015, at 7:16 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > > (1) I agree with you on the definition of these categories of Peirce. > We seem to disagree on how to assign these categories to the three worlds of > Burgin and the three roses of Scotus. I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness

[PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Dec 1, 2015, at 8:38 AM, Helmut Raulien > wrote: > > Gary, Clark, Sung, list, > to make the subject more complicated: We are dealing with the two kinds of > Salthean Hierarchy (Paper "Salthe´12Axiomathes"). The division of object into > immediate and dynamical obj

Re: [biosemiotics:8987] [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:18 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > To you think this citation is consistent with the physics of the 21st > Century? How do you integrate physical-chemical reasoning into this citation? I think this is meant to refer to evolution prior to the emergence of space/ti

Re: [biosemiotics:8987] [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:02 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > I agree that Peirce does not start with firstness in that sense that "in the > beginning there was 1ns." And I agree that 1ns cannot be separated from the > other Pythagorean categories (although, admittedly, in some of his > cosmologic

Re: [biosemiotics:8987] [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 8:24 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Supplement: Now one of my weird ideas: Peirce starts with firstness, and > relation of firstness with itself leads from (1) to (1.1), and then to > (1.1.1), and so on, so in this case, the relation is not really something > more than th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 2:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > The idea that one sign may be dominant is nicely highlighted in Peirce's > discussion of focusing attention on one thing and letting others fade into > the background. This ability to focus one's attention is, on Peirce's > a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 2:18 PM, Claudio Guerri wrote: > > Jacques Lacan and Louis Althusser studied Peirce in a Seminar by Farnçois > Recanati in Paris, France, during the 50's...??? if somebody knows a good > reference, I would be glad to know more about... That’s very interesting. I confess

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 3:19 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I always have a problem at this point. Isnt it so, that natural laws and > natural constants havent change at all since the big bang? Depends upon what one means by law. In physics laws are often treated as descriptive rather than presc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 12:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I certainly didn't mean to imply that I, myself, thought that the > Representamen functioned as a kind of 'Sovereign Will 'agent. I was instead > suggesting that Gary F's insistence on considering ONLY the Representamen as > 'the Sig

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:40 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > I am uncertain with regard to the meaning of this sentence. > The term "middle voice" suggests utterances and hence a relation to grammar > and rhetoric and logic. Originally yes. However it related to how we ascribe being and th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 12:03 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > >> Are you suggesting this as an alternative world view relative to physical >> "laws", e.g., the absence of order? > > No, far from it. Rather the argument would be this is what enables laws to > d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 12:05 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > > It seems to me that your remark here would be true if all structures are mind > (or mentality)-dependent. But I believe that the astrophysical evidence we > have suggests that there were structures in the Universe that existed even > bef

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:11 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > Interestingly relative to Scotus the middle voice argument usually is made by > the proponents of analogy against Scotus. Heidegger sees this voice as key to > understanding the pre-socratics (since he’s caught up on

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 7:22 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Agreed. As I've said, I don't agree with confining the term 'sign' to refer > to and only to one single Relation in the whole triad; that of the > Representamen or ground. That transforms this one Relation, the > Representamen, from be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > > > f g > Real Rose > Rose ---> Mental Rose > (Firstness) (Secondness) > (Thirdness) >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 30, 2015, at 6:15 AM, wrote: > > Probably the most common distinction made by Peirce in this connection is > that between real relations and relations of reason Yes, that section of The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus I linked to yesterday goes through that a bit. > “Relations w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 29, 2015, at 9:03 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote: > > I assume this refers to the types of relations one finds in say Duns Scotus. > For those interested the SEP has an entry on medieval theories of relations > that is helpful. > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entri

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

> On Nov 26, 2015, at 7:44 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Again, Peirce uses the term of 'sign' to refer to both the Representamen and > the full triadic set of relations. You have to be careful of the context to > figure out which one he is referring to. This is definitely true and can thr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

> On Nov 28, 2015, at 10:34 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Jon, if you can point out where Peirce's text or mine in this thread is > conducive to the kind of confusion you are warning us about, I'll see what I > can do to clarify things. But I don't really have the time for a wild goose > c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 26, 2015, at 8:14 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I do not know if there is a connection from Timaeus to Aristotle who ‘s hyle > has inspired Peirce synechism. It is true that Hyle contains the > possibilities for making a limited amount of forms (inspired from Plato’s > ideas). Pierce –

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