Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

John, List: JFS: A willingness to accept intentions, laws, and nominalizations as quantifiable entities distinguishes realists from nominalists. This is a very interesting way to frame the debate. Could you please elaborate on it, or perhaps just point me to a good online resource (or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

- Original Message - From: "John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net> To: <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Sent: Friday, January 27, 2017 2:47 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual On 1/26/2017 6:13 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: the putati

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

On 1/26/2017 6:13 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: the putative distinction between the semeiotic triad seen /as a single triadic entity/ /versus/ the triad *as expressing three relations* seems to me to one worth entertaining in considering what is really a fundamental aspect of Peircean semeiotics.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Stephen, John, List, I know the frustration that one can occasionally feel in reading forum messages and segments of thread exchanges which, for example, seem to be rehearsing the same material, covering the same--or similar--territory, especially on a topic in which one has little or no

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Dear list: “*Now ‘prior’ and ‘better known’ are ambiguous terms, for there is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of being and what is prior and better known to man. I mean that objects nearer to sense are prior and better known to man; objects without qualification

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Interesting. Just time for a daily walk! But to me I would be interested in a discussion of binary versus triadic thinking and in some reflection on the points at which ethics and aesthetics fit into a triadic pattern of thinking. I am not sure what a modal realist is but I think the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 25, 2017, at 8:28 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > Peirce was more than a pingpong ball in a long and repetitive exegetical > battle involving I suppose the core group of this forum. But I have had > enough. I simply will not open mail from the correspondents

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

On 1/25/2017 10:42 PM, John F Sowa wrote: On 1/25/2017 10:28 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: Sorry for the rant and if I am alone in my reaction... You're not along in that reaction. Sorry for the typo. I meant 'alone'. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

On 1/25/2017 10:28 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: Sorry for the rant and if I am alone in my reaction... You're not along in that reaction. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Peirce was more than a pingpong ball in a long and repetitive exegetical battle involving I suppose the core group of this forum. But I have had enough. I simply will not open mail from the correspondents until something that is not a bnary ether-or argument that dwells on "what Peirce thinks"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List: CG: I think the big break between Peirce and the nominalists is because a general can’t be limited to any collection of actual entities. I strongly agree with this, and just came across an interesting passage that seems to confirm it--and also corroborates my comment to Edwina

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

leave it at that. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 25, 2017 5:39 PM > *

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Cc: Peirce-L Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2017 2:48 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual Edwina, List: "Reductionist," "mechanical," "individual," "nominalist," and "

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

in a mode of Secondness] . >> >> We'll have to end it there. Our views are totally different. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> - Original Message - >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

rules from that >>> Dynamic Object..which according to you, MUST also be in a mode of Thirdness? >>> >>> What would be the function of the Representamen in such a triad? >>> Useless, just a mechanical transfer rather than a dynamic transformation. >>> >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

--- Original Message - From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Peirce-L Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2017 9:38 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual Edwina, List: I agree that we should n

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

o debate. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 25, 2017 9:38 AM > *Subject:*

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Peirce-L Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2017 9:38 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual Edwina, List: I agree that we should not rehash our past debates; I am simply offering my own alternative views

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

ally affected* >> by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object" >> [2.259 my emphasis] That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself >> operating as a general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated* >> in such a manner that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

riginal Message - From: Clark Goble To: Peirce-L Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

gt; *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> > *To:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU> > *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and > Particular//Singular/Individual > > On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

ent Object [in a mode of Secondness]. Edwina - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: Peirce-L Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt &l

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Just to add, I think the big break between Peirce and the nominalists is because a general can’t be limited to any collection of actual entities. This is obvious in mathematics if we talk about a general like “even integers.” Clearly that’s an infinite collection. But if you say something like

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 3:40 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > I think our problem may be that we’re not using the term “general” in the > same way. I’m trying to observe what Peirce calls “the proper distinction > between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.: indefiniteness and generality, >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I > think you’re talking about. > > Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent an > object that is a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List: Correcting my earlier post ... CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I think you’re talking about. Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant. CG: ...

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary R., List: Thanks for clarifying your (accurate) criticism. The explanation that I provided was just that--not a justification, by any means. I agree completely with your much more nuanced assessment. Regards, Jon On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 5:11 PM, Gary Richmond

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary F., List: Yes, not getting a lot of work done today; just enough to stay out of trouble. I certainly do not intend to "deny the reality of 2ns" or to "deny that a relation of 2ns can subsist between a sign and its object," so I would like to understand why you see that as an implication of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

.Jon, list, Jon, I don't think that there's a need for you to apologize, especially as this may simply be a matter of semantics (or an unfortunate phraseology, or my lacking a subtle sense of humor, etc.) You wrote: "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any philosophical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List: CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I think you’re talking about. Right, but a legisign/type can only have a Dynamic Object that is collective; it cannot represent a Possible or Existent, only a Necessitant. CG: ... the object could be any sort

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 10:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is general > have an object that is not general? Just a guess but I suspect the issue here is how one identifies a sign. That is what

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

generality of the sign with the > *possible* generality of the object. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 24-Jan-17 11:09 > *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Su

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> ] Sent: 23-Jan-17 21:01 To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> > Cc: kirst...@saunalahti.fi <mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi> ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Univ

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

gt; Cc: kirst...@saunalahti.fi; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual Helmut, List: Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "n

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary R., List: My sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious exaggeration, and it was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor job of conveying that. I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone. I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized Descartes, Locke,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon wrote: "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*" (emphasis added). Please offer sufficient (considerable) support for this statement, in my view,, at very least a hugely overstated mere opinion. "Any

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Dear list: *Jerry*: I will take “Peirce at any stage of his life” for 100, Alex. *Alex*: The answer is, “label any philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic." *Jerry*: What is “Something Peirce would never say or do because fallibilism”? *Alex*: That’s right.

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon, Kirstima, List, I am not clear about (besides many others) the term "Nominalism", and why everybody does not like nominalism. Ockham thougt, that universals do not have an extra-mental substance. I think it is ok. to guess so, if I think, that the universe has a mind. So universals are not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon, You are right about my unhappy choice of word. It was an overstatement, to say the least. Long ago, when you had used "segments" in connection with continuity, It gave me the impression of some lines of thought akin to nominalistic ways. - But you responded with taking a critical stand

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Dear list: Disputation/eristic and not dialectic: *Gor.* And if the last is false, is the first false? *Soc.* It follows. *Gor.* If, then, black is white, does it follow, that black is not smooth? *Soc.* It does. *Gor.* Black-white is not smooth? *Soc.* What do you mean? *Gor.* Can any dead

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Kirsti, List: What you wrote on Tuesday: "Definitions I do abhorre." What I wrote on Thursday: "You say now that you are not denying the usefulness of definitions, but you said before that you abhor definitions." What you wrote today: "I definitely never said that I "abhorr definitions"."

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Sorry Jon. Again. - I definitely never said that I "abhorr definitions". If you do not regocnize an intrepretation here, compared to what I wrote, I'm afraid there is nothing to discuss. - We are not on anything like a same page. Kirsti Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 19.1.2017 16:25: Kirsti,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Kirsti, List: Just to clarify, Alan is my middle name; I go by Jon. What makes you think that I am missing that "crucial aspect"? I provided this quote very early in the thread. But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in the sense of that which has no generality and which

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Kirsti, List: What problems do you think I am trying to solve with definitions? What is intrinsically nominalistic about working with definitions? Peirce associated them with the second grade of clarity, and wrote many of them for the *Century Dictionary* and Baldwin's *Dictionary*. How would

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

OK, very interesting. - But not viable to any kind of an answer to the question of the nature of relationship between quality and generality. CSP is just throwing some loose characerizations to the field. What he happened to write (e.g in his notebooks), or even his published papers, were

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

John, List: > On Jan 17, 2017, at 8:38 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Yes, but mathematicians never assume that any terms have universally > accepted definitions. They never say "set theory" by itself. > Even the qualifications ZF or VNBG in front of "set theory" are > not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Solving problems with definitions and defining is the nominalistic way to proceed. I do not work in the way of presenting definitions. - I work with doing something, with a (more or less) systematic method. - Just like in a laboratory. I have done strict experimental work. And strict up to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Kirsti, the reply from Jon A.S. answers your question but I noticed that in your message my link to the source was partly broken, taking the viewer to the right website but not to the right webpage. A "[3]" got inserted and the embedded URL string included both the "[3]" and the following

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jerry and Clark, In mathematics, logic, computer science, physics, engineering..., precision in measurement, reasoning, and communication is essential. I am not denying that. But I also believe that Peirce's point that "symbols grow", Wittgenstein's language games, and Sue Atkins' remark that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Kirsti, Ben, List: There is nothing omitted within each quote; the long dashes are in the original text. Note that in CP 1.422, Peirce is addressing a reader who claims that in the dark, red bodies "become indeterminate in regard to the qualities they are not actually perceived to possess."

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Kirsti, List: KM: Just as well as a continuous line (in CSP's view) doesn not consist of points, it does not consist of segments, continuous or not so. A truly continuous line cannot be segmented without breaking the very continuity you are trying to capture. - It presents just the same

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, Your wrote: CG: Logically that then has a beginning and end to the symbol. Definitely not so acccording to the logic of CSP. - You are using some other kind of logic, according to which symbols do not grow - on the ground of communities, not just by individuals. You seem to be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

I agree! Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 16.1.2017 23:56: On 1/16/2017 3:32 PM, Clark Goble wrote: I think one can still manage how symbols grow. That is consider them bundles of process. The question ends up being what the limits of the symbol are. Of course that becomes a complex topic too. I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben, Are there omitted parts in your quotes? Marked by -? Best, Kirsti Benjamin Udell kirjoitti 15.1.2017 20:05: Jon A.S., Kirsti, list, Regarding Peirce about reflected-on qualities as generals, I was basing that on the same text as contains CP 1.427 quoted by Jon A.S. That is "§2.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon S. Not only is continuity the most difficult problem for philosophy to handle, it is also the most difficult problem for mathematics to handle. Taking into consideration the view of CSP that we always have to start with math, then proceed to phenomenology, and only after this try to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 16, 2017, at 2:56 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > I don't believe that it's possible or desirable to put any limits on > the way symbols grow. Any attempt would "block the way of inquiry." One should distinguish between epistemological limits - that is artificial bounds

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Hi John: Your points about the instability of words and logical terms are well taken, and, I believe, well-recognized by those inquirers who are culturally competent in the history of language development. And, yes, similar principles hold for mathematics, although the “wavelength" is a tad

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

On 1/16/2017 3:32 PM, Clark Goble wrote: I think one can still manage how symbols grow. That is consider them bundles of process. The question ends up being what the limits of the symbol are. Of course that becomes a complex topic too. I don't believe that it's possible or desirable to put any

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 15, 2017, at 11:50 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Gary F., when Peirce in Harvard Lecture 6 says that "the totality of all real > objects" is a "singular", he is pretty clearly discussing that which he > elsewhere calls an individual. Jon A.S. was discussing

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 15, 2017, at 8:02 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > Peircer's qualities of feelings are not 'generals'. When reflected upon they > appear vague, which does not have any direct relation with tte philosphical > concept of 'general'. I thought Peirce defined them as inversely

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben and Jon, That’s right — or as I would put it, “singular” as a predicate in the semiotic context refers to the reactivity (or existence or Secondness) of its object. The singular/individual distinction is not relevant here as it is in a mathematical context, where all the objects are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary F., Ben, List: I agree with Ben that Peirce used "singular" in a different sense in the 1903 Harvard Lecture that Gary F. referenced. More so even than "individual," he seems to have had in mind how he elsewhere defined "existence"--that which *reacts *with other like things in the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary F., Jon A.S., list, Gary F., when Peirce in Harvard Lecture 6 says that "the totality of all real objects" is a "singular", he is pretty clearly discussing that which he elsewhere calls an individual. Jon A.S. was discussing singulars in Peirce's other sense of "singular," that which can

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon, While it’s true that a real continuum would contain no singularities, I don’t think you can say that a singular is “only an ideal” for Peirce. Indeed he says that “the totality of all real objects” is a singular. Harvard Lecture 6 (EP2:208-9): [[ That which is not general is singular;

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon A.S., Kirsti, list, Regarding Peirce about reflected-on qualities as generals, I was basing that on the same text as contains CP 1.427 quoted by Jon A.S. That is "§2. Quality" http://www.textlog.de/4282.html in "The Logic of Mathematics; An Attempt to Develop My Categories From Within,"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Kirsti, List: Not surprisingly, I have found that Peirce was exactly right when he stated, "Of all conceptions Continuity is by far the most difficult for Philosophy to handle" (RLT:242). I think that the light bulb finally came on for me when I stopped focusing on a line as consisting of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben, Peircer's qualities of feelings are not 'generals'. When reflected upon they appear vague, which does not have any direct relation with tte philosphical concept of 'general'. Kirsti Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 10.1.2017 06:07: Ben, List: BU: This rule-style of formulation reflects a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon A.S. First: see my recent response to Jon Awbrey. Second: In developing his theory of true continuity, CSP used the basic geometrical notions of a line and a point. (According to his architecture of sciences, which presents not just an architecture of sciences, but more so a method for

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List: I would be interested in getting your take on Forster's book whenever you finish it. Nathan Houser wrote a review ( http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/29410-peirce-and-the-threat-of-nominalism/) that included a few criticisms at the end, but Thomas Short was quite scathing in his *Transactions

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 10, 2017, at 12:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > In a few cases, I have decided to go ahead and buy the book after reading it > for free--most recently, Forster's Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism. > Coincidentally I’m halfway through that right now.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List: Other than the *Transactions*, whose online archives are available at no additional cost to subscribers, I have obtained most of my Peirce-related reading material via interlibrary loan. In a few cases, I have decided to go ahead and buy the book after reading it for free--most

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben, List: I agree; that is why I acknowledged the distinction between unembodied qualities as medads (feelings) and embodied qualities as monadic predicates (concepts). Regards, Jon On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 10:49 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Jon S., list, > > I don't have a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List: Moore has edited two volumes that may be of interest--*Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Writings* with Peirce's own stuff, and *New Essays on Peirce's Mathematical Philosophy* with contributions from various people including Hookway and Moore. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt -

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 8:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I agree that this definitely tends to make nominalism self-refuting > which I see as a problem rather than a strength. > > A problem for nominalism or for realism? Is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon S., list, I don't have a quote handy, but Peirce said specifically that the pragmatic maxim is for clarifying not qualities of feeling, but conceptions. I suppose that that could include conceptions of qualities of feeling, but not the qualities of feeling themselves. A mechanical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jacob, List: Unless I am misunderstanding you, I disagree--I think that according to Peirce, a general as a continuum is infinite; in fact, it contains *potential *individuals exceeding *all *multitude. I have been advocating the existence/reality distinction on the List for a while now, much to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben, List: BU: This rule-style of formulation reflects a major difference between Peirce's generals and Peirce's qualities of feeling which are generals when reflected on but are not rules and are not formulated as rules. I am not convinced that there is a significant difference here, at least

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List: CG: I agree that this definitely tends to make nominalism self-refuting which I see as a problem rather than a strength. A problem for nominalism or for realism? Is it legitimate for a nominalist to deny that holding everything real to be singular is self-contradictory, on the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Dear list: Why not consider instead: “What do you make to be the meaning of "George Washington"?” Or “a statue of a soldier on some village monument, in his overcoat and with his musket…” For if the names are of “a *type*, or *form*, to which objects, both those that are externally

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 4:44 PM, jacob longshore wrote: > > Yes, I think you're right about that. Peirce's definitions of "generals" are > framed in terms of parts of a whole (and thereforefinite), whereas > "universal" would apply to an infinite number of possible

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon S., list, _/Universum/_ in the sense of the whole world goes back at least to Cicero in the 1st Century B.C. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Duniversus You wrote, Note also Peirce's stance that universal propositions do not assert

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain > general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and these > are called individuals. They are generals that is, not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 2:25 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > Here metaphysics seems important if only to show what hidden premises > undergird our thinking. It’s also possible that he might mean approaching > metaphysics in a somewhat transcendental approach akin to Kant’s various >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 1:58 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I always liked his use of "general" since the word "universal" unqualified in > English seems to mean true of absolutely everything, and that's certainly not > what Aristotle meant by the Greek word traditionally

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben: Of course, "universal" as employed by the scholastics came from Latin, probably by combining "unum" (one) and "versus" (turned), thus meaning something like "turned into one." Presumably the current connotation, "true of absolutely everything," was a later linguistic development within

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon S., list, You may well be right. "General" was one of the words of which Peirce was in charge in the Century Dictionary - http://web.archive.org/web/20120324152427/http://www.pep.uqam.ca/listsofwords.pep?l=G but the definition that appears in the Century Dictionary -

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Ben, List: Yes, I have obviously made some progress since I first posed the question to Gary. The more I read about all of this, the more I am inclined to think that Peirce's preference for "general" over "universal" does indeed simply reflect his position that no law or habit is absolutely

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Sorry, I forgot to adjust the email message subject line. Repaired here. - Best, Ben Jon S., Gary R., Jon A., list, As promised in my previous message, here is the first off-list response that I made to Jon S.'s messages in this thread to peirce-l: Jon S., You've out-researched me! I'm not