Vinicius, Gary R., Kees, list,
I agree with Gary about the role of purpose in interpretation. Vinicius
does, however, seem to allow of it in connection with the final
interpretant, and to wish merely that Kees had somehow put it into those
terms. On the other hand, I think Vinicius underplays
lies external to the identity of the organism.
Cheers
jerry
Best, Ben
On Mar 30, 2014, at 9:11 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary F., Tori, list,
I figure that the imperative might be generalizable to vegetable
cases if one considers evolution as quasi-mind.
I'll give it a try:
A flower has
overrated his abilities so magicians
aren't necessarily smarter than their audience apart from what they
have read or learned from others of tricks.
Harold L. Orbach
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 11, 2014, at 1:45 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
Dear John
to pay too little
attention to other kinds of philosophical questions about morality, art, and
the like?
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Sunday, April 13, 2014
says,
relates to making thought conform to being, the other, to making
being conform to thought. There seems to be much justice in this
restriction. []
Best, Ben
On 4/14/2014 9:21 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
Ben, List
On Apr 14, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
He
and from
several perspectives. Very important to me.
On Apr 14, 2014, at 9:10 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Or did Schleiermacher start out in theology?
Yes, the three theology students studied at Tubingen together in the
early years the 19th Century. My understanding is that they were
or the special
sciences) is not too inconsistent with that.
Best, Ben
On 4/14/2014 9:06 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jeffrey D., list,
For my part I don't have an opinion on whether Peirce should have paid
more attention to hermeneutics and genealogical thinking and should
have had a higher opinion
that!
Best, Ben
On 4/15/2014 12:36 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
CORRECTIONS! I bothered to scroll down further on the page to which I
linked, and found the following topics AFTER The Course of Research:
On Systems of Doctrine. On Classifications. On Definition and the
Clearness of Ideas
and his
legacy. It's edited by Cathy Legg and Gary Richmond, with lots of help
from Benjamin Udell, and you'll see familiar names among the authors
as well.
Best wishes,
Kees
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
List,
We've posted two dissertations to Arisbe:
Charles Peirce: The Idea of Representation by Joseph Ransdell, 1966.
Thanks to Lucy Ransdell for permission, and to Jonathan Devore who had a
copy and optimized the PDF.
The dissertation is spread into a few PDFs linked at:
Gary, list,
I think you're off to a solid start!
You wrote,
My first question is, What can we think of this very broad claim
as to the foundational character of the [pragmatic maxim] for all of
science, philosophy, and thought generally? Does Kees perhaps go too
far here?
*
On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 10:00 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
Gary, list,
I think you're off to a solid start!
You wrote,
My first question is, What can we think of this very broad
claim as to the foundational character of the [pragmatic maxim
, for the purposes of
clarifying, conceptions involved in/associate with their work.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York *
On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 3:14 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote
of the City University of New York*
On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 9:57 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., list,
This seems to be error-confession month. I've a few new ones of my
own now to mention.
As regards _/logica utens/_ and _/logica docens/_, I confused things
a bit, for example by asking
Jeffrey D., list,
I've wanted to take Peirce literally about the FIRST rule of logic or
reasoning, but the CP editors seem to treat it as methodeutical (i.e.,
belonging in logic's third department). In Volume 5 Pragmatism and
Pragmaticism, Book 3 Unpublished Papers, one finds
Chapter 6:
Phyllis, list,
Thanks for your thoughtful and clear post. I'm a fellow unreal
philosopher, but differ from you in that I've no professional occasion
of connection with Peirce's thought at all.
I remember years ago finding a discussion of the ways in which people
mean things that they say,
helpful. Meanwhile, I'll continue reflect on what you just
wrote.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 1:02 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., list,
I'd put the three non
Ulysses, Matt, Mara, list,
I think that Peirce would agree with Matt's posted criticism by Swigart
of Mill https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2014-05/msg00066.html
so far as it goes. Mill is trying to re-cast induction as deduction from
some postulated or inductively inferred
Gary R., all,
I saw your post only after I sent my previous post. Yes, I had plenty to
say, way too much, including draft material that didn't make it into the
article that Gary mentions, where I attempted to summarize Peirce's
arguments in Ground of Validity of the Laws of Logic. Many of
Gary F., Stephen, all,
The full text of Peirce's letter of April 24, 1892 to the Reverend John
W. Brown is at
http://www.unav.es/gep/LetterJBrown.html
at the website of the Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos. G.E.P. also has
images of the letter, beginning at:
http://www.unav.es/gep/1Brown.html
Gary, Jeff, Søren, Charles, list,
Actually my view seems to diverge from Jeff's, at least as he has
expressed it in the past.
In my peirce-l response sent March 26, 2014,
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/12301/focus=12327
Jeff had asked:
[JBD QUOTE] [...] I'd
he makes the point more clearly.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
*From:* Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
*Sent:* Sunday, June 01, 2014 12:42 PM
*To:* peirce-l
: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2014 5:06 PM
To: De Waal, Cornelis; Peirce-L
Cc: Benjamin Udell; Catherine Legg; Houser, Nathan R.
Subject: de Waal: Conclusion of the seminar
Dear Kees, seminar emcees, list,
Now that the seminar on Peirce: A Guide
Matt, as I amateurishly understand it, a gravitational field is an
accelerational field, so a distant observer outside of it and at rest
with respect to it will see the clocks there ticking more slowly (time
dilation) than the observer's own. On the other hand, if you were
orbiting a planet
List,
At Gary Richmond's suggestion, I've created an Arisbe page with links to
the threads of peirce-l's Peirce Centennial Seminar, January to June,
2014 (and still going!) on Peirce: A Guide to the Perplexed by Cornelis
de Waal.
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/seminar-waal.htm
Some may
at 5:57 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
List,
At Gary Richmond's suggestion, I've created an Arisbe page with
links to the threads of peirce-l's Peirce Centennial Seminar,
January to June, 2014 (and still going!) on Peirce: A Guide
.
Imagine if Peirce had had a modern computer
Best, Ben
On 6/17/2014 8:10 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Ben,
Congratulations❢
You have just been chosen Data-Hound Pin-Up for the Month of June
and are definitely in the running for Data-Hound-Dog of the Year❢
Cheers,
Jon
Benjamin Udell wrote
not convinced that
the currently sanctified forms of philosophical publication are
working as well as they might to encourage the development of
genuinely radical new ideas.
Cheers, Cathy
*From:* Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com ]
*Sent:* Wednesday, 18 June 2014
and looks like a tremendous lot of
work. Thanks! This will be very helpful, as I do want to go back to
some discussions.
With the best wishes,
Kees
*From: * Gary Richmond
*Date: * Tuesday, June 17, 2014 6:17 PM
*To: * Benjamin Udell
*Cc: * peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Matt, list,
Peirce briefly outlined his objection to James's 'will to believe',
'right to believe,' etc., in A Neglected Argument for the Reality of
God where he characterizes it as willing not to exert the will.
http://www.gnusystems.ca/CSPgod.htm#na0
As far as I can tell, exactly two
Helmut, list
Peirce's argument is that induction and hypothetical inference depend
for their general rationale or justification on their correctability in
the course of research, and the idea of that correctability depends on
the idea of a community indefinite in size, with the prospect of
Sung, list, I think you're getting into a thicket. Mathematicians have
varied on these questions.
Kronecker (according to Weber 1893) said that God made integers, all
else is the work of people (/Menschenwerk/).
The Nicolas Bourbaki group placed most classical geometry under the
umbrella of
icons,
indices and symbols, along with the corresponding truths derived from
observations.
Cheers
Jerry
On Jul 2, 2014, at 3:57 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Sung, list, I think you're getting into a thicket. Mathematicians
have varied on these questions.
Kronecker (according to Weber 1893
Sung, list,
You're mixing apples and oranges, using the word 'sign' equivocally.
Saussure's 'sign' is not Peirce's 'sign' or even Peirce's 'symbol';
Saussure's 'sign' is Peirce's 'linguistic symbol'.
Peirce defines a symbol as a sign that refers to its object by a norm or
rule of
Sung, list,
Your syllogism fails not only because of its equivocation with the word
'sign' but also its equivocation on the regard in which arbitrariness is
involved. The arbitrariness of which among various synonyms one uses to
denote an object - the arbitrariness of the Saussurian sign and
List,
I'll be sending along information on at least six new Peirce-related
books published during 2014.
You can see five of them at the New Books page at Arisbe (when you get
there, clear your cache by reloading the page, my old tricks to force
automatic reload have stopped working, at
...@hum.au.dk .
- Best, Ben
On 7/6/2014 10:27 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
List,
I'll be sending along information on at least six new Peirce-related
books published during 2014.
You can see five of them at the New Books page at Arisbe (when you get
there, clear your cache by reloading the page, my old
List,
Reported by Mats Bergman today at _Commens_:
Free copies of back issues of the _Transactions of the Charles S.
Peirce Society_
http://www.commens.org/news/item/free-copies-back-issues-transactions-charles-s-peirce-society
While there, take a look around the new Commens
List,
I've proofread and put Google Books' text copies into improved HTML and
posted
The Architecture of Theories
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/arch/arch.htm and
Introductory Lecture on the Study of Logic
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/introlog.htm
and posted them at
List,
I've posted an html version of On the Logic of Number at Arisbe.
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/lognum.htm
It has a number of fomulas, if anybody finds I've made an error, do
please let me know.
Paul Shields said of this paper:
It is not generally known that Peirce's
://twitter.com/stephencrose*
On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 3:26 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
List,
New links added to Arisbe.
* New papers Biosemiotics, Evolution, and Peircean
Generalization The Role of Semiosis in Evolution — from
List, here's a new page at Arisbe:
Books till 2005
http://www.cspeirce.com/pastbooks.htm
It's a start.
Best, Ben
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
Sung, list,
If you want to take the word written so literally, then consider the
writing of an authorized signature on a contract or on legislation. Now,
you may say that the system of the individual writing-event is a
dissipative system, as opposed to the signature standing written.
But
!
Cheers, Cathy
-Original Message-
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Saturday, 26 July 2014 12:35 p.m.
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] New page at Arisbe: Books till 2005
List, here's a new page at Arisbe:
Books till 2005
http://www.cspeirce.com/pastbooks.htm
Sung, you wrote to Stephen,
[QUOTE]
Your written word just conveyed energy to my (6231-1)
fingers to say NO.
I did not write any words on a piece of paper (which would have been
an example of equilibrium structure, since no energy would have been
required for them to exist on
List,
The Books till 2005 http://www.cspeirce.com/pastbooks.htm list now has
60 books, and the New Recent Books (2006-2014)
http://www.cspeirce.com/newbooks.htm list now has 91. I'm not done yet.
I don't know how many people care about the following, but I've made
both pages more
Clark, you sent the message below to the OLD peirce-l server at Texas
Tech (lyris.ttu.edu)
You need to send it again, this time to the CURRENT peirce-l server
PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU
Otherwise, many current subscribers won't receive it. Those long-timers
who do reply to it may end up replying
Clark, you sent the message below, like your previous one, to the OLD
peirce-l server at Texas Tech (lyris.ttu.edu)
You need to send this one again to, this time to the CURRENT peirce-l
server PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU
Otherwise, many current subscribers won't receive it. Those long-timers
who do
List,
Below is a list of books that I've added the New Books page
http://www.cspeirce.com/newbooks.htm since I last sent a list of them.
You can find them all linked in the Recently Added table. The first
three are the newest books, and I include publishers' descriptions in
this message. The
wary of suggestions that logical validity depends on a
feeling, but trying to sharply separate general validity of inference
from power, ability, or capacity to infer, is not the road that Peirce
finally took, so I'm going to back off on that one!
Best, Ben
On 8/25/2014 2:04 PM, Benjamin Udell
Edwina, list,
I don't understand why you speak of _/confinement/_. To say that a sign
is priman, or is a first, in some sense, is not to say that it is
confined to firstness in all respects.
[Lectures on Pragmatism, CP 5.43, Quote]
The particular categories form a series, or set of
these two analytic frameworks.
Edwina
- Original Message -
*From:* Benjamin Udell mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 6:07 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6515] Re: Abduction
analytic frameworks.
Edwina
- Original Message -
*From:* Benjamin Udell mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Sent:* Monday, August 25, 2014 6:07 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6515
Edwina, list,
Responses interleaved.
On 8/26/2014 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
[Edwina] Ben, you wrote:
[Ben] You have not explained what is so confining about seeing the
sign as a first, object as second, interpretant as third, in a general
way. You have not explained how that creates a
Jerry, list,
You wrote,
[JLRC] 1. What served as the principle affinities of objects when
the classification was made? [End quote]
I did a Wikipedia article that, near the start, covers Peirce's
discussions of the taxa, complete with a table. In the footnotes are
links to the sources
correlations
don't seem so clear with Peirce's three main classes of discovery
science (1. (pure) maths, 2. cenoscopic philosophy, 3. the special
sciences). Gary Richmond's vectors are an effort aimed ultimately at
dealing with that among other things.
Best, Ben
On 8/27/2014 1:34 PM, Benjamin
List,
Long-time peirce-listers will remember Bernard Morand, who continues in
retirement to peruse peirce-l. Some years ago he wrote a book _Logique
de la Conception_, which he mentioned at peirce-l. I had, or retained,
no clear idea back then that the book was about DESIGN and semiotic. The
Jon,
Why not be a bit more specific? You know that Peirce starting in 1903
Syllabus Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations says that some
dicisigns (a.k.a. dicent signs) are symbols and some dicisigns instead
are indices. Is your argument that every dicisign incorporates a symbol
(I
Jeff, list,
Jeff, you wrote,
[Quote]
First, what are the other key developments in Peirce's normative
science of semiotics that—in addition to a deeper appreciation of
the role of diagrams in deductive reasoning--are driving this
rearticulation of the cognitive field?
Second,
Frederik, John,
As far as I can tell (and I've been looking around), Peirce never
distinguishes between _/mind/_ and _/psyche/_. But he does distinguish
between a logical conception of mind and a psychological conception of
mind. (See for example Memoir 11 On the Logical Conception of Mind
Frederick, John C, John D, list,
On 9/8/2014 3:44 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
[BU] As far as I can tell (and I've been looking around), Peirce
never distinguishes between _/mind/ _ and _/psyche/ _.
[FS] I did not claim P made such a distinction. I claimed his notion
of mind was not
Sungchul,
You do this very often - sending a message without an intended
attachment, then re-sending it with the attachment. Please stop doing
that and instead check each time that you have included the attachment
that you intended for the message.
Ben Udell as co-manager of peirce-l
On
. 22.21 skrev Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com
:
Dear Frederik, lists,
I don't see that we disagree on any fundamental points as to, for
examples, the difference between philosophical logic and idioscopic
psychology, or the pertinence of the theorematic-corollarial
Jeff D., Gary F., lists,
I seem to be recalling the neo-Scholastic de Wulf a lot lately, I don't
know why, I didn't read him that much. Anyway, at some point he wrote of
biology as passing over individual differences in order to understand
species and so on. And I thought, that's not it at
Stan, Gary F., list,
When mathematicians start basing their findings on those of neurology,
I'll start to think that maybe there's something to the idea that
mathematics is a neural phenomenon. Instead, mathematics is applied in
neurology, not vice versa, and there seem good reasons in
link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender,
provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected”
(EP1:29). It also reminds me of Susan Haack’s crossword puzzle
analogy: mutual reinforcement of solutions can be read as evidence for
their correctness.
*From: * Benjamin
-)learning sense. We need more prefixes, this is turning into mush.
Best, Ben
On 9/16/2014 12:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Clark, list
I thought that Cornelis de Waal had found another passage where Peirce
identifies philosophy as logical analysis and logical analysis as
phaneroscopic analysis
or the other vices of psychologism. If one
doesn't attend carefully to the details of Peirce's self-assessments,
he can seem inconsistent or confused about his position with respect
to psychologism.
Best,
Jeff
From: Benjamin Udell
Sent: Monday, September 15
form if there's nothing lower
physically, it could only be a higher form.
Best, Ben
On 9/16/2014 9:00 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
On Sep 16, 2014, at 12:09 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
In regard to the Peirce quote from 1907 that you provided, it's also
Howard, Frederik, lists,
Howard, is your objection is to using the decidedly adjectival real to
describe something other than a concrete individual object, this man,
this horse? Would you allow an adverb? Then you could say that Earth and
Mars are really two planets, and their twoness has
To all,
The Arisbe website has been transferred to a different server at
Indianapolis University.
1) Some folks may need to clear their browser caches to force their
browser to download the new site. You'll know that you've reached the
new site when you click here on
Howard, lists,
Epistemologies are not claims about special concrete phenomena in the
sense that they and their deductively implied conclusions would be
directly testable for falsity by special concrete experiments or
experiences. That's also true of principles of statistics and of
' is NOT now, how can we know which
version from different cultures is 'real'? This is the basic reason
one must be a nominalist.
STAN
On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 10:31 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Howard, lists,
Epistemologies are not claims about special concrete phenomena in the
sense
On Sat, Sep 20, 2014 at 2:31 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
Stan, list,
The main idea is not that of a long run. Instead the idea is that
of sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently long' or
'sufficiently far-reaching
Stefan, Gary F., list,
I was indeed addressing the snakebite example, just not mentioning it by
name. If two traditions, two people, two of anything, arrive at
incompatible conclusions about snakebites, then at most one of their
conclusions is true. That's what incompatible conclusions means.
.
John
*From:* Benjamin Udell
*Sent:* September 23, 2014 6:25 PM
*To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:* [biosemiotics:6967] Re: Natural Propositions,
Stan, lists,
You prefer to use 'truth' in quotes and to call 'truth' any opinion
that anybody calls a truth. You're
naming of ‘culturalism’ and
empirical critique of its effect on scientific research also.
Cheers, Cathy
From: Benjamin Udell
Sent: Monday, 22 September 2014 4:28 a.m.
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6908] Re: Natural Propositions,
Stan
John C.,
Thanks, done. But you say your paper deals just in things that aren't
directly Peirce related? (Signs without minds
http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Signs%20without%20minds.pdf ) It has
plenty of review of Peirce's ideas, and draws conclusions that
definitely are not simply about
/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote:
The laws seem for all the world like mathematical rules nontrivially
operative as laws of physical quantities such as force, mass,
velocity, etc. That's why the laws can be formulated as mathematical
rules, in conventional mathematical symbols and formulas.
Ben, I
Howard, lists,
You snipped a bit too much of what I said. I was talking about
mathematics not just in the sense of doing the math, but of the
mathematical objects themselves. You switch between the objects that one
considers, and one's considering of the objects, and end up comparing
apples
Clark, list,
I've also noticed a difficulty of finding usefulness for the formal
cause in physics, though I came at it from other directions, simpler
ones for me since I'm not a physicist, but also I'd like to add a
clarification of the idea of formal causation. A thing's form is its
formal
Clark, list,
Responses interleaved.
On 9/27/2014 7:41 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
On Sep 26, 2014, at 12:41 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:/p
Clark, list,
I've also noticed a difficulty of finding usefulness for the formal
cause in physics, though I came at it from other directions, simpler
ones
of space and time in the sense in
which that unification is understood in physics - such as to modify the
idea of the signal speed limit as a common yardstick of space and time?
Best, Ben
On 9/29/2014 2:36 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
On Sep 29, 2014, at 10:38 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
By the way
, at 9:21 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
If one is a realist _/only/_ about things that one doesn't know, then
one implies that the real is not cognizable. I suppose that one could
say in a loose sense that one is partly an instrumentalist about
simplified models, but one may regard such models as still
Clark, list, sorry, a few corrections/additions in *bold red*. - Best, Ben
On 9/30/2014 1:58 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Clark, list,
You wrote,
[CG] It’s a subtle issue that’s hard to get terminology for.
(Probably one should do a literature search and see how others have
solved
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
Thanks for the reminder, Gary R. about renaming tangential threads. I
should have done that a while ago with some threads that I've been on.
Regarding conservation of energy: My understanding is that, in general
relativity it's considered not to be conserved in an
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*
On Tue, Sep 30, 2014 at 4:05 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L
, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
Regarding conservation of energy: My understanding is that, in
general relativity it's considered not to be conserved in an
expanding or contracting universe, although it's still regardable as
conserved in normal situations
, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
[CG] Whether the “nearly real” is good enough is a reasonable
question. Like you, I see it as good enough, but I think there
are important caveats one has to make which is why I mentioned
that on practical grounds
be symbols. And then I found the
passage on Singular Symbols, and put two and two together, so to speak.
Best, Ben
On 10/1/2014 2:00 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the Syllabus (circa 1902
, Ben
On 10/1/2014 2:00 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
I'm not sure that Peirce stuck with his idea of a Singular Symbol. CP
2.293-4 is from the Syllabus (circa 1902, according to the CP
editors). In a Syllabus passage - the one on subindices a.k.a.
hyposemes, dated 1903, he
Jeff D., Jon,
I'd just like to note that the questions of triads versus trichotomies
is something that we've discussed a number of times at peirce-l over the
years. For my part, I like using those words in the way that Jon and
others have recommended - 'triad' for the triadically related
into the idea of the index via the idea of the indexical legisign?
Well, I don't know.
Best, Ben
On 10/1/2014 6:48 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., Gary F., lists,
Yes, I think that the subindex is the singular symbol. Well, I can't
say, for example, that Peirce didn't have in mind more
.
Best, Ben
On 9/30/2014 5:49 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
(Changed the thread title since weâEUR^(TM)ve drifted far from natural
propositions)
On Sep 30, 2014, at 11:58 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
[CG] Whether the âEURoenearly realâEUR? is good enough
Sungchul, list
I know next to nothing about category theory.
Most generally a triad is a trio. A predicate is called triadic if it
is predicated of three objects like so: /Pxyz/. In Peirce's system a
genuine triad is one involving irreducibly triadic action, called
semiosis, among three
of
mathematics more felicitous than the discarded logicism of Frege,
Dedekind, and the Russell of the _Principles of Mathematics_ and the
_Principia_.
Irving H. Anellis
[End quote]
On 10/3/2014 2:57 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:20 PM, Benjamin Udell bud
Gary F., Tom, list,
Gary, are you sure you're not confusing denotation with designation or
indication? The denotation of 'red' is all red things, or the population
of red things; the comprehension (or significance) of 'red' is the
quality _/red/ _ and all that that implies. That's why
This is crucial for understanding the syntax of the dicisign, which is
the subject of NP 3.7.
gary f.
From: Benjamin Udell
*Sent:* 4-Oct-14 7:35 PM
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:*
Re: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?
Gary F., Tom, list,
Gary, are you sure
distinctions
impacting the argument being made by Frederik in NP?
Best,
Gary
*
*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 8:31 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
.
Best, Ben
On 10/6/2014 9:36 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Gary R., lists,
I'm arguing against the idea that the subject alone denotes and the
predicate alone comprehends. It's difficult to maintain Peirce's
'breadth times depth equals information' unless each rheme (subject or
predicate) both
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