[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.6

Continuing from Lowell Lecture 1.5 (CP 1.608, EP2:251): 609. There is also such a thing as a general logical intention. But it is not emphasized for the reason that the will does not enter so violently into reasoning as it does into moral conduct. I have already mentioned the logical norms,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.5

Stephen, scientific method, for Peirce at least, is conscientific method. http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/gds.htm#cnsc gary f. From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com] Sent: 3-Oct-17 09:41 This makes you wonder why Peirce is not understood to be a moral philosopher as much as a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.5

A few comments on Lowell 1.5: The grounding of logic in phenomenology (i.e. close attention to "the all-familiar phenomena of self-control") is again emphasized by Peirce's assertion that those who "deluded themselves" with the fallacy he is opposing did so because they "were so inattentive to

RE: RE: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4

Helmut, yes, “self-control” is almost an English translation of the Greek root of “autonomy.” And yes, I do see a tension between individual self-control and control of the individual by external agencies or subordination to the community. In fact this is one of the major themes of my book

RE: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4

Eric (and list), I don’t believe that Peirce is making an empirical claim here, i.e. he is not claiming that his generalization is true because it is based on observation of a large sample of individuals. He is making a cenoscopic claim, i.e. describing his own experience and assuming that

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.5

Continuing from 1.4 (EP2:248, CP 1.602): 603. Now let us compare the facts I have stated with the argument I am opposing. That argument rests on two main premisses; first, that it is unthinkable that a man should act from any other motive than pleasure, if his act be deliberate; and second,

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4

Edwina, are you really saying that individual humans are so “informationally closed” that they are incapable of reasoning? Or that the ‘reasoning’ of an individual human cannot involve genuine “Thirdness”? If so, your analysis based on “modal categories” would appear to be very much at odds

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4

List, I'm puzzled by Edwina's remarks about "relativism" and Helmut's about "machismo," as I don't see how those comments are related to Peirce's description of "the typical phenomena of controlled action." His emphasis in Lowell 1.3 was on the cycles of formulation, resolution, determination,

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.4

Continuing from 1.3 (EP2:247, CP 1.594): . All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by a feeling that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is felt as pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it as pleasurable comes a little later is

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.3

Following up on the comments by Gary R, Stephen, Jon, and (earlier) Tom Gollier, What strikes me first about Peirce's description of "the all-familiar phenomena of self-control" is that his generic "man" seems to behave more rationally than most people actually do. But we have to bear in mind

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.3

Continuing from Lowell 1.2: Taking up, first, the argument about morals, let us confront it with the facts of the case. The necessitarians tell us that when we act, we act under a necessity that we cannot control. I am inclined to think that this is substantially so. We certainly cannot

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

List, In case there are other subscribers besides Gene who would prefer to read this Lowell lecture in bigger chunks, and don’t have a copy of EP2 handy, I’ve put up a page on my website that gives the whole text from the beginning to the part most recently posted to the list. The link to

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.2

Continuing Peirce’s Lowell Lecture 1 (from EP2:243): … I had better mention that the argument I shall criticize is open to quite another objection than that which I notice,— and a more obvious one. You may wonder why I pass over it. It is simply because some forms in which the same confusion

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

Peirce begins his lecture series with a 'hook,' warning of an intellectual disease which is likely to spread through all of science if not nipped in the bud. The source of the disease is "a false notion about reasoning," and the practitioners of science are vulnerable to it because many of them

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell lecture 1.1

Here is the first of the projected series presenting Peirce's Lowell lectures of 1903 for close reading and discussion. Comments and questions are invited as replies to this post. Here is the source information given in EP2:242: [Partly published in CP 1.591- 610 (MS 448), 1.611- 15 and 8. 176

RE: [PEIRCE-L] SPINning Peirce's Lowell Lectures

I must apologize to the list for jumping the gun on this project. I had proposed it offlist to the moderator, Gary Richmond, and he liked the idea, but I didn't give him time to consult with others responsible for the management of this list before posting about it. If and when full approval is

[PEIRCE-L] SPINning Peirce's Lowell Lectures

List, Charles Peirce's classification of sciences certainly affirms the dependence of logic on phenomenology, as indicated in the diagram which John Sowa posted here recently. We can get some idea of what this means from Peirce's definitions the key terms. But to see this "dependence" in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Deduction, induction, abduction, categories

Helmut, you wrote “Deduction has one mode: True. Induction has two modes: true and false. Abduction has three modes: True, false, and nonsentic.” Actually all of these “modes” belong properly to deduction, or “necessary reasoning,” where a proposition is either true or false; as for absurdity,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's classifications of the sciences

Kirsti, John, Tommi, list, Kirsti, your objections to John’s diagram seem to be based entirely on terminological choices. But in the case of “phenomenology” you haven’t suggested an alternative you would prefer. I don’t think “phaneroscopy” would work very well in that slot, for people who

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

John, Clark, Kirsti, …, John, I agree with everything you say here. Peirce’s “high regard for his work on lexicography” is well deserved, too. But there is another side of the question revealed in Peirce’s 1909 letter to Welby (SS 118): “My studies must extend over the whole of general

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Clark, Kirsti has presented zero evidence that the sign classifications Peirce detailed in the 1908 Welby letters are summaries of earlier work rather than current work on his part. In fact, if you actually read the material in EP2:477-91 you’ll see why the editors described it as “among

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Helmut, What you project here is pretty much what I’ve done with Turning Signs. One part of the text, the obverse I call it, consists of 19 sequential chapters that were completed two years ago and have not changed (except that some links have been added.) Another part, the reverse, is

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications aside and proceeded towards other aims." I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he must have done it in 1909 or later.

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Helmut, It’s not that complicated. A triad is a set of three — three of anything. A trichotomy is a division of something into three — usually a division of a type into three classes, or subtypes. For example, signs can be subdivided into three classes, in various ways:

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

Clark, you wrote that for Peirce, “Intentionality is from object through signs rather than anything like an ego or directness.” I don’t see that this applies to Peirce’s use of the terms “intention” or “intentional,” and that makes it difficult for me to see what your sentence means. Can you

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [Sadhu Sanga] Re: Is relativity theory holding back progress in science?

I'd like to second John Sowa's suggestion that the cc or bcc of Sadhu Sanga posts to Peirce-L should stop — not because the study of physics is irrelevant to the study of semiotics, but because these posts have not been relevant to the study of semiotics or of Peirce. Gary f. -Original

[PEIRCE-L] Surdity - Turning Signs

This blog post might be of interest here as it directs attention to the involvement of genuine Secondness in genuine triadic relations, and links to other relevant parts of Turning Signs. Also, among other Peirce quotes, it includes as a JPG part of Peirce's Century Dictionary entry on the word

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's definitions in the Century Dictionary

John, I assume that each JPG you would want to download is an image of a single page of the CD. The site at http://www.micmap.org/dicfro/introduction/century-dictionary allows you to download an entire volume (of the 8 volumes) of the CD in PDF format; the files vary in size up to 2GB(!). Not

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

Kirsti, "Repurposing" is a common term in the North American vernacular these days, and it simply means using something old for a new purpose. Often applied to tools and other artifacts, not usually to words. If you're referring to my comment on the CP 2.407 footnote as "bold," I disagree;

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

Jeff, What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the application of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them. That does not mean that their depth, or "signification" as Peirce often called it, changed in any way; rather it signals an increase of information

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

John, list, I think we all agree that Peirce’s concept of information has significant advantages over Shannon’s, for semiotic purposes. But in reference to his current monologue, Jon appears to be claiming that Peirce’s early (1866-7) concept of “information” is better (less “nominalistic”)

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: { Information = Comprehension × Extension }

John, speaking of Frederik Stjernfelt’s Natural Propositions, you may not be aware that peirce-l (and the biosemiotics list) hosted an intensive discussion of it that lasted through most of 2015. Frederik participated very generously in it, especially in the early months. At Gary Richmond’s

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

Gene, Thanks for the links; I’m quite familiar with the mirror neuron research and the inferences various people have drawn from it, and it reinforces the point I was trying to make, that empathy is deeper than deliberate reasoning — as well as Peirce’s point that science is grounded in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

I see you got the point, Jerry.  Gary f. From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Sent: 22-Jun-17 19:20 gary f, list: "I have given the reader such a dose of mathematics, psychology, and all that is most abstruse, that I fear he may already have left me, and that what I am

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Jerry R, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ntx.htm gary f. From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] Sent: 22-Jun-17 18:26 Gary f, how do you tell the two apart? Best, jerry r On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 4:08 PM, > wrote: Jon, I'm

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Jon, I'm not sure what you're driving at on these roads, but when I suggested that terms should always be “taken in context” by a reader/listener, I was referring to the larger text or dialogue in which the term is embedded, not to the context of the reader’s personal history. Gary f.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

List, Gene's post in this thread had much to say about "empathy" - considered as something that can be measured and quantified for populations of students, so that comments about trends in "empathy" among them can be taken as meaningful and important. I wonder about that. My wondering

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

rs that I'd never heard of, much less read. Learning about this earlier work tends to encourage my hope that these ideas are sound; as Peirce said, "Any philosophical doctrine that should be completely new could hardly fail to prove completely false" (CP 5.11). Anyway, thanks for that articl

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

John, I think you're right that the term "positive science" is problematic because of its post-Peircean usage, but the term "empirical science" is also problematic: few workers in these fields today would consider semiotics, or logic, or philosophy, to be "empirical sciences" according to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Gary R, After I mentioned Peirce’s “narrow sense” of the term “logic,” you asked, “What narrow sense?” What I had in mind was mainly CP 1.444: [[ The term “logic” is unscientifically by me employed in two distinct senses. In its narrower sense, it is the science of the necessary conditions

RE: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

Gary, you wrote, “the rapid, varied, and numerous inductiosn of the Gobot, for example, do not yet lead to true abduction. The Gobot merely chooses out of the extraordinarily many possible moves (more than an individual player would be able to imagine towards the ends of the game) those which

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Jeff, Gary R (and list), I think John has dealt with your question here, Jeff, in a way that I can't improve on. But I also wonder if you are classifing speculative grammar (which is part of "logic" in Peirce's broad sense) as "normative" simply because you've subsumed all of semiotics under

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

Gary R, Sorry, instead of “DNA chauvinism” I should have used a term that Peirce would have used, like “protoplasm.” — But then he wouldn’t have used “chauvinism” either. My bad. Anyway, the point was to name a chemical substance which is a material component of life forms as we know them

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

Jon, what you say is true of logic in the narrow sense. But Peirce invested the greater part of his attention to semiotics in what he called speculative grammar, which is not a normative science but a descriptive one. The connection between logical “grammar” and linguistic “grammar” is by no

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

Gary, For me at least, the connection to Peirce is his anti-psychologism, which amounts to his generalization of semiotics beyond the human use of signs. As he says in EP2:309, “Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which signs must conform in order to function as

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

Footnote: In case anyone is wondering what AIs are actually doing these days, this just in: https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/ gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] Sent: 15-Jun-17 11:43 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu

[PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

Are you conning us, Jon? Actually the Sarah Connor Chronicles explored with some depth some of the ethical dilemmas involved with autonomous AIs. But I don't think it likely that they will ever be instantiated in a form that could pass for human, as they so often do in science fiction. That

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

Gary R, Well, if nothing else results from this conversation, it’s good to know that you and I read Peirce differently in this respect. I think it’s better to know that such differences exist than to assume otherwise. Two points of agreement: yes, the definition of life is the crux of

[PEIRCE-L] RE: AI

Gary R, Jon et al., Logic, according to Peirce, is “only another name for semiotic (σημειωτικη), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs … [ascertaining] what must be the characters of all signs used by a ‘scientific’ intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Rheme and Reason

Jon, I think you first have to learn what games are available to you, before you can choose among them (or choose the null game). The question is whether silicon-based life forms are evolving, i.e. whether AI systems are potential players in what Gregory Bateson called “life—a game whose

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

John, you've made several important points here, and thanks especially for taking Jerry C's question off my hands.  A note about AI … back in the 1970s I played go quite a bit and got reasonably good at it. At that time, chess-playing programs were just beginning to reach the higher

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason

John, you wrote “Logicians from Aristotle to Peirce to the present use the *semantic* criterion of preserving truth to justify their *syntactic* rules.” Yes, this is crucial! You can’t do formal logic without mathematics, but as Peirce always said, logic is a positive science while

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

: The following quote, posted by gnox (Thanks, Gary) appears to be a deep conundrum from several perspectives of 21 st Century logic. On Jun 9, 2017, at 8:44 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896): [[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one p

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason

Jon, What you say is a good reason for (a) not taking terms too “literally” and (2) always taking them in context. Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896): [[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo. A proposition,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Jay Zeman's existentialgraphs.com

John S, I've been slow responding to this (busy week behind me) ... my comments inserted. Gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa Sent: 30-May-17 18:17 On 5/29/2017 4:38 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > Roberts (p.92) describes the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Rhematics

Gary R, thanks for finding that quote from Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking (p. 234-5)! I recalled something like that but couldn’t find it. I too am called away today, so will have to get back to the thread later — also to John’s post in the other thread, which is

[PEIRCE-L] Rhematics

Jon, I trust you are eventually going to say something relevant to the content of my “Rhematics” post, but in the meantime, here’s the follow-up I promised, which specifically relates developments in Peirce’s logic to his categories and his Existential Graphs. Peirce was critical of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Jay Zeman's existentialgraphs.com

John and list, Peirce’s “Improvement on the Gamma Graphs” (CP 4.573-84) in indeed a fascinating read; Frederik Stjernfelt comments on it extensively in Chapter 8 of Natural Propositions. But according to Don Roberts (1973, p.89), it’s from the spring of 1906, and preceded the drafts of the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Jay Zeman's existentialgraphs.com

John, we owe you thanks for making Jay Zeman’s material on EGs accessible in such a complete form. At one time, Zeman’s transcription of Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” was the only version online. Since then I’ve put one on my own site,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Determination and Creation in Sign-Action (was Laws of Nature as Signs)

Thanks Jeff! I should really study Peirce's Logic of Mathematics paper more carefully. Maybe we can do that on the list, one of these days . Gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 1-May-17 11:00 Hi Gary F, List, You have commented on remark I

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Determination and Creation in Sign-Action (was Laws of Nature as Signs)

Jeff, Jon S, Sorry, I'm a bit late following up on this thread - but I only have a few comments to add anyway. JS: Peirce obviously endorsed analyzing the Sign-Object relation as dyadic by excluding the Interpretant. GF: Yes, in a way, but he did not exclude the Interpretant in his

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

List, I think John's remarks here are right on target as usual, but also came across a Peirce quote today which struck me as relevant to this and other recent threads having to do with “determination” and Thirdness. It’s from a 1909 letter to James: [[ The Sign creates something in the

RE: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary R, Jeff, Jon S et al., A bit of synchronicity just now … Tomorrow night, as it happens, I’ll be discussing Chapter 18 of my book Turning Signs with a small group of readers. When I “completed” the book a year and a half ago, I promised myself not to make changes to it unless I found

RE: Fw: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S, Jeff, Having just caught up with this exchange, I think I’m in substantial agreement with both of you. A couple of generalized observations about the classification of signs: Peirce says in the very first paragraph of NDTR that “Even after we seem to identify the varieties called

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary R, list, Actually, Gary, you compounded your mistake here, by typing “qualisign” where you meant “legisign.” (Well, I had a bad day yesterday too!) I do understand the basis of your nomenclature choice and acknowledge your right to make it. But I feel compelled to make a different

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S, Gary R, Jeff, Hold the phone . perhaps the scales have suddenly fallen from my eyes, but I now see the problem with CP 2.235-6 if it's applied to signs: the order of complexity as stated there is NOT consistent with the order of determination object > sign > interpretant. My point 3

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S, Hold the phone … perhaps the scales have suddenly fallen from my eyes, but I now see the problem with CP 2.235-6 if it’s applied to signs: the order of complexity as stated there is NOT consistent with the order of determination object > sign > interpretant. From: g...@gnusystems.ca

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S., OK, what I’ll do here is take CP 2.235-6 and apply it to signs on the assumption that the Sign is First Correlate and determines the Interpretant which is Third Correlate, and list ALL the possibilities, and see whether your “entailment” is among them. 1. Sign is a mere

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary R, I don’t have time today to respond to all of your points, so I’ll start with this one: Gr: “It is my understanding the 9 are NOT as GF wrote "classifications of Signs," rather, they are parametric in the sense that Ben Udell and I introduced in my first paper on the topic over a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C, By “represent it formally,” do you mean translate the verbal expression into an algebraic notation? Or perhaps an entirely nonverbal diagram? Since you say you have no idea how to represent it formally, and you’ve read some Peirce, are you also saying that Peirce never represented

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S, see insert below … Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 16-Apr-17 17:40 Gary R., List: GR: But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that Peirce always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant ...

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C, You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything specific about representamens which are not signs (though

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, I think i’m beginning to catch on to what you’re driving at, so I’ll insert my responses below. I hope this doesn’t make you any queasier, Gary R, as I have no desire to evoke that kind of feeling! Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 16-Apr-17

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the

[PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, Gary, list, I just noticed that a point got somehow dropped out between those numbered 9 and 10 below. That point was about the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy, which of course is Peirce’s third division of signs, “according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

First, Happy Easter to all our Christian friends! Jon S, Gary R, Evidently you are both making some inference that to me appears unwarranted and unmotivated. The issue may be terminological, or it may be grounded in a much deeper conceptual difference regarding the nature of signs.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jeff, Gary R, Jon S, List, Jeff, I've always assumed - and NDTR explicitly says, right at the beginning - that this principle is based on phenomenology. Of course, the hardest part of Peircean phenomenology is developing clear enough notions of what is denoted by the terms Firstness,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S, Gary R, Jon, I’m afraid this doesn’t help at all — doesn’t help me, anyway, because I don’t see in what sense any of the three trichotomies sketched in 2.238 could “come before” either of the other two. Are you assigning some temporal order to them? Or some logical order? On what

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Clark, yes, that’s why I was careful to qualify my comments by saying “In NDTR.” But when you say that “what happens actually affects what is possible,” what you mean is that what happens now affects what can possibly happen in the future. Possibility as Firstness is timeless, in Peirce’s

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, Sorry, I don’t know what you mean by “the order of the three correlate trichotomies.” In NDTR, Peirce defines a Sign as the First Correlate of a triadic relation in which the Object is Second Correlate and the Interpretant is Third Correlate. So when we apply CP2.235-6 to the sign

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S, you wrote: “in subsequently rereading CP 2.235-236, I noticed that it implied the order of determination of the three correlates to be Third, Second, First; i.e., Interpretant, Object, Sign.” But I don’t see how these two paragraphs imply anything at all about order of determination.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary R, A quick response to the point you asked for clarification on: what I had in mind was a part of NDTR that I didn’t bother to quote in my original post, where Peirce says that “The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S, Thanks for noticing and fixing my typo (NDDR for NDTR) (I can’t blame that on the youngster). The question you raise is an interesting one. When I wrote that “the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy cannot be defined in terms of dyadic relations,” I was reflecting on the fact that in

[PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S, Gary R, list, Much as I admire the efforts of Jon S. to reconcile the Taborskian framework with the Peircean, and Jon A's efforts to express it all algebraically, I would rather go straight to Peirce's own text on the question Jon raised about the tenfold classification of signs. Since

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Gary R, Edwina, Jon S, list, I probably shouldn’t intervene in this discussion, but I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms — especially what he means by a triadic relation — we need to read them in the context where Peirce uses them, not lift them out of

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut, Your idea of “self-defined bodies” is essentially the “autopoiesis” of Maturana and Varela, and the idea of final causation being intrinsic to animate bodymind is shared by Gregory Bateson and, I think, by Peirce. My book Turning Signs joins these concepts with Robert Rosen’s

RE: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, I think that what you call atheism, some people call “religious naturalism” — a more positive expression of the “wonder of creation.” https://religiousnaturalism.org/ gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 8-Apr-17 19:37 To: Peirce List

RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon Alan, The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and

[PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, Jon S., As John has already pointed out, the key idea in the Peirce quote I supplied is “that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous.” If all thought is in signs, all reasoning and all knowledge is in signs. If we ask what kind of sign the laws of nature

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign cannot be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption. For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem to use EP2, and this passage was

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Jon A.S., John S., I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below. Gary F. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52 John S., List: JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects

RE: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Jon A.S., John C., In the quotation cited by Jon, it is clear from the context that the word “subject” is being used as a more technical term for “thing” — i.e. in the sense of subject given in the Century Dictionary as follows: 7. In metaph.: (a) A real thing to which given characters

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Jon (and Jon), J.A.S., your post quoting “New Elements” makes much more sense that the other Jon’s claim that “icons and indices are species under the genus” of symbol, which I’m pretty sure Peirce would never say. The point that Peirce makes in his “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Jon Alan, you asked: [[ What I was really asking about is the notion that "every kind of sign begins with an image (icon), and every sign constructed from other signs is a diagram." Does this come from Peirce, or is it your own insight? ]] I wonder if it might come indirectly (with the

[PEIRCE-L] Intentionality and ethics

There's a newly revised section of my online book Turning Signs which pulls together several usages of the term "intention" from several philosophical and neuropsychological sources in the search for a common ground for the concept, and finds a closely related concept in Peircean semiotics. Some

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Cyclical Systems and Continuity

Jeff, your post seems to head in directions I'm unable to follow, so I'll just mention this: the final two selections in Moore's "Philosophy of Mathematics" collection are probably the best tools for "filling in the gap" in Peirce's thinking between arrival of the proofs of the article and the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Cyclical Systems and Continuity

Jeff, list, I was struck by that passage too, but I don’t think Peirce’s claim is “that the continuity of our experience of time can serve as a kind of standard for measure.” Rather I think the claim is that our experience of time is the prototype for all conceptions of a perfect continuum.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

Eric, this excerpt from my book (http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/cls.htm#3thought) may be helpful in adapting to Peirce’s usage of the word “thought”: Gary f. Peirce's concept of thought is both broader and deeper than the common usage of the word. Peirce wrote to William James in

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon, Yes, all conceptions are general. Conceptions are signs. But that doesn’t mean that their objects are all general. An object is general to the degree that it is itself a conception. The truth of a proposition “essentially depends upon that proposition's not professing to be exactly

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon, you’ve acknowledged the point that Gary R. made about your post (below) but I see another problem with it. You wrote, “If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we can have no knowledge of anything real.” But Peirce does not say that all objects of cognition

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